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The End of the Peasantry and the Politics of Peri-urbanization in an Indonesian Metropolis

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THE END OF THE PEASANTRY AND THE POLITICS OF PERI-URBANIZATION IN AN INDONESIAN METROPOLIS[1]

The nature of Southeast Asian urbanization has been the object of theoretical attention for almost two decades. A central theme in the discussion revolves around the dissolution of the city and countryside divide; and it seems the focus is largely on questioning whether the city is winning (through urbanization) or if the countryside is losing in the development game.[2] Such issues however are much more complex in Asia. For Terry McGee, (who is among the first to consider the specificity of the region), urbanization and the process of urban spread means "the emergence of regions of highly-mixed rural and non-rural activity surrounding the large urban cores of many Asian countries" that are "significant foci of industrialization and rapid economic growth."[3] McGee calls this region *desakota* from the Indonesian words *desa* for village and *kota* for town. The term signifies an attempt to revise the conventional or Eurocentric view of urbanization as a process, which assumes a distinction between rural and urban. It broadly signifies an extended-urban region, which includes the peri-urban (*pinggiran kota*) zones and an extensive area of mixed rural-urban land use along two large urban cores linked by transportation routes.[4] The peri-urban areas thus, in Phillip Kelly's words, are not only "new and enduring urban form… which is neither rural nor urban but incorporates distinctive elements of both,"[5] but they are also the spaces undergoing rapid urbanization. In this "transitional landscapes or a dramatic new species of urbanism,"[6] Jonathan Rigg proceeds to argue that "people cannot easily be squeezed into single categories like 'rural/agricultural' when their work not only crosses the agriculture/industry divide but they have also led

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[1] Earlier version of this paper was first presented as part of the workshop, **"The End of the Peasant? Global Capitalism and the Future of Agrarian Society"** organized by Arif Dirlik and Alexander Woodside for the Peter Wall Summer Institute for Research, University of British Columbia, 2009. This version was presented at the Asian Research Institute Seminar Series, National University of Singapore, June 1, 2010. Thanks to participants of the seminar and an anonomous reader for ARI's Working Paper Series for their helpful comments.

[2] This kind of debate in some ways is influenced by the urban bias thesis. For this theory see, among others, Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development*, London: Temple Smith, 1977.

[3] Terry McGee, "Presidential Address: Eurocentrism in Geography – The Case of Asian Urbanization," *The Canadian Geographer*, 35, 4, 1991: 341. McGee indicates that "what I mean by urbanization is the process of the growth of urban places within the administrative boundaries defined by nations as urban as well as at the margins of cities. The advancement of this process of urban spread into the densely crowded rural hinterlands created a *desakota* region. Desakota thus is one spatial and conceptual part of the urban phenomenon" (Personal communication, May 15, 2009). Efforts to explore the characteristic of Asian urban geography have been made earlier by Dutch and other European scholars in the Pre-WWII, such as Jan Broek. For a recent attempt, see Paul Kratoska, Remco Raben and N.H. Schulte (eds), Locating Southeast Asia: Geographies of Knowledge and Politics of Space. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2005.

[4] Terry McGee, "The Emergence of *Desakota* Regions in Asia," in *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia*, edited by Norton Ginsburg, Bruce Koppel and Terry McGee. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1991: 7.

[5] Phillip Kelly, "Everyday Urbanization: the Social dynamics of development on Manila's extended metropolitan Region," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 23, 1999: 283-303.

[6] Mike Davis, "Planet of Slums: Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat," *New Left Review*, Mar-Apr 2004: 8.

'split' lives in terms of where they live."[7] Similarly Gregory Guldin argues that the migration of people from rural to the urban in China came in tandem with urbanization of and by the rural in situ via, among others, rural industrialization.[8] This in situ urbanization of the rural raises the questions of not only "what's a peasant to do," but also who is the peasant today, and where has the peasant been staying and moving around?

These studies have importantly identified and captured some central features of urbanization with "Asian characteristics" that perpetuates, rather than challenges, the capitalist world system. Yet, With studies mostly centered on the *processes* of urbanization, very little attention has been given to the *political* formation of *desakota* or periurban.[9] There has also been very little attempt made to place these extended spaces in their historical context in order to understand the political processes that have made their formation possible.[10] This essay is intended to fulfill, however imperfectly, these purposes. I argue that periurbanization stemmed from the postcolonial state's attempt to eliminate the political identity of the peasant (along with its memories of mass political mobilization) and to form a new subjectivity via multiple occupations and labor mobility (instead of isolation) even as these practices have been well established during the colonial and even pre-colonial period.[11] Central to this governing strategy is the formation of the extended urban region beyond the administrative boundaries defined by the capital city, such as peri-urban (*pinggiran kota*) of Jakarta. The rapid urbanization in this area could be seen as stemming from the non-agricultural job opportunities opened up by the state policy of industrialization and economic growth of capitalist countries in the region, but, as I will argue, the peri-urban is also a political space for the transformation of the peasants' identity. This paper thus aims to open up inquiries on the largely unnoticed relations between the politics of *urban* planning and the transformation of the peasant world in the Southeast Asian region. I organize the essay into three parts with each consists of different sections representing the rural, the urban and the periurban.

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7 Jonathan Rigg, "Rural-urban Interactions, Agriculture and Wealth: A Southeast Asian Perspective, *Progress in Human Geography*, 22, 4, 1998: 515.

8 Gregory Eliyu Guldin, *What's a Peasant to Do? Village Becoming Town in Southern China*. Westview Press, 2001.

9 For an examination of the cultural ideological and economic forces driving the development of the periurban areas of Jakarta, see: Tommy Firman, "The Emergence of Extended Metropolitan Regions in Indonesia: jabotabek and Bandung Metropolitan Area," *Review of Urban and Regional Developmental Studies*, 7, 1995: 167-188; Tommy Firman, "The Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area: A 'Global City' in Asia," *Cities*, 15, 4, 1998: 229-243; Michael Leaf, "The Suburbanization of Jakarta: A Concurrence of Economic and Ideology," *Third World Planning Review*, 16, 4, 1994: 341-56; Michael Leaf, "Building the Road for the BMW: Culture, Vision, and the Extended Metropolitan Region of Jakarta," Environment and Planning A, 28, 1996: 1617-35.

10 To understand the political history of an urban formation is to respond to the call for "geography of engagement." See: McGee, "Presidential Address: Eurocentrism in Geography," 241.

11 The labor demand of the wet-rice agricultural system is not only large, but also fluctuated by the on and off seasons. The off season has prompted farmers to take up various non-agricultural occupations. Historically, farmers in Indonesia thus have multiple occupations.

A few caveats to note at the outset. First, it is not the intention of this paper to problematize existing studies which have finely shown that the rationale for rural-to-urban migration is rural poverty and the perceived economic opportunities in cities. The aim of this paper is to offer a different way of seeing centered on the interplay between politics and space that would help to unravel the formation of the periurban as a space of governmentality peculiar to Indonesian history. Second, I shall confine my attention to Indonesia and its capital city, Jakarta, and hope readers with knowledge of a wider geographical stage of Southeast Asia would offer inputs for the interest of comparative studies and a more global approach to the issue. Third, on terminology and classification: I use the words *desakota* and periurban interchangeably assuming that they both refer to a similar characteristic even though each designates different geographical propinquity to the city. Both terms in any case designate what Guldin called "a partially urbanized countryside." I use the term "peasants" and the "floating mass" to designate an "imagined community" either constructed by the state or by the peasants themselves in their engagement with politics of identity and identification.[12] In reality, the notion of "peasants," like "the village," is problematic since the social group is neither monolithic nor unchanging. Instead it has been characterized by internal class, gender, ethnic differentiation, tension and conflict. The category of "floating mass" is harder to explain and identify. It is constructed in the shadow of popular radicalism of the 1960s. The term refers to people, largely underclass rural-to-urban migrants, who could be turned into productive subjects as long as they refrained themselves from any engagement with politics or political parties. As will become clear, "floating mass" is a both a "real" and "imagined" category created by the state to govern bodies and imaginations. As such, members of the floating mass could not be shown statistically, but their presence could be *felt* through the voice of the state. Finally, the use of "space" here is not metaphorical, instead it is practical for only then it can function as a spatial technology of governance. As will become clear, it is through space that the movement of the floating mass to the peri-urban area – designated as economic space - is managed and control (almost) without the use of force.

EPILOGUE - EARLIER VISION AFTER DECOLONIZATION

In 1962, Kenneth Watts, formerly a Town Planning Advisor under the UN Assistance program, published his proposal for the Greater Jakarta region to the Ministry of Public Works and Power for which he worked from 1956 to 1959. Watts started by saying:

> The problems attending rapid growth in tropical cities cannot be resolved within the boundaries of the cities themselves… For, by enhancing the attractiveness of the city to the would-be migrant, they will only accelerate the rate of inward migration… An alternative policy has often been urged – that of preparing complementary programmes for the surrounding region. They would have as their objective the improvement of conditions both in the rural area as a

[12] In addition to these there are categories that one could find in the politics of urban Indonesia such as "massa" (mass) and "rakyat" (people). See: James Siegel, *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.

> whole, which might encourage the prospective migrants to remain where they are, and in the smaller towns of the region, which might have the effect of deflecting migrational flow from its main objective. How valid are these arguments?"[13]

Watts was then facing an unprecedented rapid population growth in the city where he worked. The flow of migrants to the city was due to many factors, but amongst the most pivotal reasons was the political insecurity of the countryside in the aftermath of the Indonesian revolution. The social and political unrest that plagued the surrounding regions of Jakarta, the economic difficulties in the villages, and, not least, the "modernity" of Jakarta, led many "migrants" to abandon the memories of ruin in order to occupy the city of the future. Thus, as Pramoedya Ananta Toer wrote in 1955, "Before I came to Jakarta I thought as you do. I dreamed that I would do great things, that I would be equal in mind and body to the opportunities I would find. Perhaps you will be luckier than I was. The wind blows through the provinces whispering that once cannot be fully Indonesian until one has seen Jakarta."[14] J.M. van der Kroef (1954) similarly pointed out "Life in a 'kota Parijs' like Djakarta has cast a magic spell even on those who live far from the city's crowded, bustling roar. A modern city, with modern ways and urban conveniences is a concretization of revolutionary aspirations, affording education, material comforts and an escape from ennui, or so it is hoped."[15]

Confronted by "the magnitude of the rural-urban movement (which) is now so great… that attempts to halt it – far less reverse it – are quite futile," Watts suggested the development of "small towns" at the outskirts of Jakarta in order to "create counter-magnets to the pull of the big city,"[16] and "if effort were made to stimulate industrial growth in the smaller town, the chances of attracting more migrants to them might be much better than is usually supposed."[17] Watts believed that his 1959 outline plan for a small "tropical" town in the Greater Jakarta region was a "short term" solution for the city. This temporary solution ended up haunting Jakarta's future twenty years later as the New Order of Suharto (1966-1998) consolidated its power by producing (with assistance from the World Bank in the 1970s and 80s) a new, yet similar, urban development plans.

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[13] Kenneth Watts, "Tanggerang: A Case Study in Planning Policy for a Small Town within a Tropical Metroplitan Region," *Planning Outlook*, 1962, 5, 4, p. 5.

[14] Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "Letter to a Friend from the Country," in H. Aveling (ed. And trans.), *From Surabaya to Armageddon*, Singapore: Heinemann Books, 1955.

[15] J.M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World*, vol. I. Bandung: Masa Baru, 1954: 157.

[16] Watts, "Tanggerang," op.cit., 5.

[17] Watts, "Tanggerang," ibid., 19.

These plans were politically designed and used as a mechanism to create order and peace after the 1965 massacre of individuals (mostly peasants) who were accused of having communist ties.[18] The terror aimed (though not exclusively) at the annihilation of the left and the long "processes of national revolution." It ended the political (as well as the physical and mental) body of what the communist leader called "the majority in the villages in our country… the poor peasants together with the agricultural laborers (who made up) the largest force pushing the revolution forward."[19] In this aftermath of killing and detention, the New Order of Suharto found resolution in the peri-urban areas of the Greater Jakarta region as a way to manage the "mass subject" in both the city and the village. The idea of creating counter-magnets of small towns around Jakarta thus goes back to the era of early decolonization,[20] but the aftermath of 1965 and its pervasive concern over security could be seen as the turning point for the implementation of such spatial politics of urbanization.

THE RURAL

The Political Economy of Governing the Peasants

The coup of October 1, 1965 and the charges against the Communist Party as the generator of the event, served to change the social life and institutional direction of rural Java, and by extension, Indonesia. The Communist Party, with remarkable success in mobilizing peasant interests was decimated, many of its members killed and imprisoned in a series of frightful terrors. The slaughter of over 500,000 people many of whom were peasants, workers and activists supportive of the Indonesian left mostly in rural areas of Java and Sumatra had radically changed the village and prompted waves of migration to the city. Ali Sadikin, the governor of Jakarta who served in the first decade of Suharto regime noted in his memoir that the influx of migrants (permanent or temporary) to the capital city was overwhelming especially

[18] Most analysis estimates the number of people slaughtered to be between 500,000 and 2 millions. In addition, over 10,000 were detained for more than ten years. The killings and arrests mostly took place in the rural areas. See: Robert Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali*, Melbourne: Monarch University, 1990. For a recent account about the event, John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'etat in Indonesia*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006.

[19] D.N. Aidit. (1957), "Indonesia's Class Structure," in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970: 254. The communist party leader, D.N. Aidit, who must had picked up the sophisticated view of the peasantry from Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse Tung, had a nuanced definition of the peasants which in some ways helped determine the target of violence. "What we mean when we use the term 'peasants' is mainly the poor and middle peasants that make up the majority of the inhabitants of the villages. In leading the people's struggle in the countryside, the Party must always strive to be able to draw in and mobilize 90 per cent of the village inhabitants and must firmly base itself on the poor peasants and the peasant laborers as well as to make an alliance with the middle peasants." D.N. Aidit., "Indonesia's Class Structure," ibid., 254-255.

[20] In 1950, soon after the transfer of sovereignty, Indonesian and Dutch experts were appointed by the Ministry of Public Works and Energy and the team produced a proposal under the name of Jakarta Raya (the Greater Jakarta), which according to Giebels, "had much in common with the later JABOTABEK." See: Lambert J. Giebels, "JABOTABEK: An Indonesian-Dutch Concept on Metropolitan Planning of the Jakarta-Region" in *The Indonesian City*, edited by Peter J. Nas, Dirdrecht: Foris Publication, 1986: 102.

when many of them had become vagrants (*gelandangan*) and sex workers (*wanita P*).[21] This may not be true for many of them were gradually absorbed into informal sector, but the violence of category suited Sadikin's need to demonize the poor migrants from villages for the "cleaning up" of the capital city. As I will argue in the next sections, during the mid-1970s the formation of the peri-urban became a space for the containment of migrant labor from the countryside; and this move was due in large measure to the aftermath of the 1965 terrors, in which the governing rural bodies became heavily monitored by rapid spatial and political disciplinary actions. I will return to this issue, but for now it is sufficient to say that Sadikin was appointed by Sukarno (1950-1966), but he worked in the force field of Suharto who assumed power in 1966. The urbanization that the Governor witnessed was different from that of Kenneth Watts, for the influx of migrants of his time stemmed from the "cleaning" up of the village from "communist infiltration" and the "restoration of order" under military control.[22]

The agrarian land reform program, initiated under the Sukarno regime, was soon regarded as "communist inspired."[23] In place of agrarian reform, the "green revolution" was introduced in which peasants were transformed into farmers' groups and cooperatives in order to carry out state-controlled "intensification" of food production, a strategy, which had resulted in national self-sufficiency in the 1980s. While this was acknowledged as successful (receiving international acclaim), it was also an expression of the "top-down" approach in which farmers of the government group could obtain "fertilizer, insecticides and pesticides at the 'official' prices, credits to pay their input, loans… and better prices for their produce."[24] Those who remained independent producers of their own land were never quite left alone, for they too held no power in the system that sought to undermine their agencies. In general the violence following the 1965 coup, as Gary Hansen reported, "had served to cast a heavy pall over rural Java and most peasants and rural leaders were much

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[21] His mission was to ensure that Jakarta would eventually become a metropolitan region; which would ultimately get rid of the negative image of Jakarta, the big village. See: Ali Sadikin, "The Big Village Harus Jadi Metropolitan," (The Big Village must become a Metropolis) in Ramadhan K.H, *Bang Ali: Demi Jakarta, 1966-1977*, (Bang Ali: For Jakarta, 1966-1977), Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995: 436-445.

[22] See: Ernst Utrecht, "Political Mobilizations of Peasants in Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 6, 3, 1976: 284.

[23] Salim Rashid and M.G. Quibria, "Is land reform passes? With special reference to Asian agriculture," in *Critical Issues in Asian Development: Theories, Experiences and Policies*. Edited by M.G. Quibria, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, p. 145. For a review of the agricultural debate during the eras of Sukarno and after including a critical assessment of Clifford Geertz's work on Agricultural Involution, see: Ben White, "Java and Social Theory: Agrarian Debates, Past and Present," in Hans Antlov and Jorgen Hellman (eds)., *The Java that Never Was: Academic Theories and Political Practices*. Lit Verlag Munster, 2005: 157-185; For an assessment of the agrarian issues on the eve of the New Order, see: Ina Slamet, *Views and Strategies of the Indonesian Peasant Movement on the Eve of its Annihilation in 1965-1966*. The Hague: Institute of Social Studies. See also: Soekarno (1957), "Marhaen and Proletariat," in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970: 154-160; Aidit, D.N. *Kaum Tani Mengganjang Setan-Setan Desa: Laporan Singkat Tentang Hasil Riset Mengenai Keadaan Kaum Tani dan Gerakan Tani Djawa Barat*. (Peasants fighting against rural demons: A short report from research on the conditions of peasants and their movements in West Java). Jakarta: Yayasan Pembaruan, 1964: 35.

[24] Ernst Utrecht, "Political Mobilisations of Peasants in Indonesia," op.cit., 284.

less inclined to risk involvement in any form of organized political activity, let alone opposition to government programs."[25]

This traumatic experience of the 1965 coup along with "green revolution" fundamentally reorganized the political economy of rural life to a degree that there were "no 'peasants' lobbies at either local, regional, or national level."[26] In great part this situation was accomplished through a systematic alteration of political and institutional life within the village. Directly after the coup," Gary Hansen points out, "nearly every district head (*Bupati*) on Java was replaced by an officer from the army, usually of colonel rank. Likewise, many village heads (*lurah*) were replaced by veterans or recently deactivated members of the army. To further buttress government hegemony in the countryside, the army created its own hierarchical structure parallel to the territorial units of local and regional government. Thus, all levels of civilian government from the province down to the village area are now complemented by a counterpart army command with functioning authority over the respective territorial jurisdiction."[27]

The "green revolution" thus was part of the attempt to depoliticize the village by ways of intensification and commercialization of the rural economy under the disciplinary control of rural elites, and behind them the military. The program was part of the national "stabilization and rehabilitation" program in the aftermath of 1965. In 1968, two years after the regime change, President Suharto laid out his new development plan on agriculture:

> For the next five years, industrial development will be concentrated on those industries supporting agricultural development, such as manufacture of fertilizer, insecticide and farm implements… Increased use of fertilizer and insecticides will require outlays by farmers. Since their resources are very limited, finance may be a major obstacle. To meet this problem, plans have been made to establish village banks and village warehouses…. Government rural credit facilities will also be strengthened and extended. Additional finance may be provided by private domestic and foreign capital. Such companies could assist farmers by supplying fertilizers, insecticides, and farm implements on credits, and by providing training in the use of these implements, repayment to be made by delivery part of the additional production made possible by this assistance. A start has been made in this co-operation between farmers and private entrepreneurs.[28]

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[25] Gary Hansen, *Rural Local Government and Agricultural Development in Java, Indonesia*. The Rural Development Committee Report, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1974.

[26] Ben White, "Organization of peasants and rural poor in Indonesia, past and present," in *Ontwikkeling van Onderop: Zelforganisatie in de Derde Wereld*, edited by J.P. de Groot. Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, 1993: 98.

[27] Gary Hansen, *Rural Local Government and Agricultural Development in Java, Indonesia*. Op.cit., 35.

[28] Suharto: "Plans for Development," *Bulletin for Indonesian Economic Studies*, 11, 1968: 101-102.

What underlies this state patronage mechanism of agro-commodity relations is not only the attempt to alleviate rural poverty and to promote rural employment, but it is also to control the peasants by integrating them into a network of 'patron-client' dependent agricultural labor. With technology of productions and lands in the hands of corporations, managers and entrepreneurs, middle-lower end poor peasants have lost the capacity to control their own agricultural base.[29] In this mechanism, the rural elites ran the show while serving the state by becoming not only the beneficiary, but also the "police" of the countryside. And with social hierarchy in place the countryside "police" were able to monitor and control the type of labor that many were engaged in within the local space. Often many peasants on the lower end of the rural hierarchy were thereby displaced if the police suspected them to have communist loyalties. The political capacity of the state and its rural elite was based on the mobilization of the militaristic and ideological discourses of stability and security. Through the discourse of "cleaning up" the rural from the communist threat, political activities of villagers thus were eliminated.

This technique of governance which seeks to clean the social environment of the rural from the "communist threat" by working under the network of the "green revolution" has fragmented the peasantry as a relatively autonomous unit of socio-political force and ended what Ben White called the "self organization and resistance" of peasants and rural poor.[30] Even though the program came to be quite unpopular in the eyes of the peasants, as Hansen points out, "at no time was either the policy or its heavy handed administration the subject of organized criticism or opposition within the rural sector."[31] In *Agrarian Transformations*, Hart, Turton and White indicate just how the mechanism of creating agro-commodity relationship is linked to the control of the peasantry.[32] The Green Revolution has taken away the peasants' control of their means of production (both land and tool) even though they have gained productivity and larger income.[33] In this sense, the "green revolution," while increasing productivity, has its goal of dismantling the political base of the peasants and hence protecting the regime from the possibility of rural unrest.

The integration of "peasants" into government-monitored "farmers groups" and the fear of revolt from displaced peasants and rural poor marked the era of "stabilization and rehabilitation." With local civilian government and its military counterpart stood out as the sole representative of organized power and with many peasants losing control of institution and land, and could not afford the inputs on the green revolution, the peasants became what Foucault would call the "docile bodies" available for

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29 For an analysis of agrarian change as an issue of class formation and the exercise of class power during the era of Green Revolution, see: Jonathan Pincus, *Class Power and Agrarian Change: Land and Labour in Rural West Java*. London: Macmillan Press, 1996.

30 Ben White, "Organization of peasants and rural poor in Indonesia," op.cit, 92.

31 Gary Hansen, *Rural Local Government and Agricultural Development in Java, Indonesia*. Op.cit. 37.

32 Gillian Hart, Andrew Turton, and Ben White, *Agrarian Transformations: Local Processes and the State in Southeast Asia*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

33 Gary Hansen reported that "In summary, while the Green Revolution has demonstrated its capacity to increase productivity, there is less convincing evidence concerning the flow of rural benefits to the producers." Gary Hansen, *Rural Local Government and Agricultural Development in Java, Indonesia*. Op.cit. 57.

elimination and transformation. Thus, programs to eliminate peasantry and to reduce the number of peasants could spontaneously initiate with ease by the state. For instance, as recorded by Ben White:

> In August 1984 Minister of Agriculture Affandi announced, seemingly out of the blue, that small farms of less than half a hectare (and in a later phase, those of less than one hectare) would be abolished: there were too many farmers in Indonesia, and the numbers were ideally to be brought down from 60-70 percent to 8 percent of the population. They would be encouraged to sell their farms or amalgamate with other farmers, to join one of the government's Transmigration or Nucleus-Estate programs outside Java, or to shift to non-agricultural occupations (Kompas, 20 August 1984).[34]

The Ministry of Agriculture basically expressed the general strategy of the nation's security measure. He recalled the concern of Major-General Ali Moertopo (1924-1984), a key member of the President's advisory board, who had long been preoccupied by the political arrangement of Indonesian population as a prerequisite for accelerated economic growth. In 1972, Moertopo (then head of OPSUS, a special operations unit linked to the army under the Suharto regime), helped formulated a state ideology, which was to be applied "to every aspect of life, to every government institution and state organization, as well as to all levels of urban and rural society."[35] One of his most important concepts was the "floating mass" (*massa mengambang*) which became the central pillar of Suharto's political system: "a demobilized and depoliticized population."[36] The "floating mass" is essentially a policy of population control pursued in the aftermath of the terror, murder and massive arrests of people accused to have had association with communism or leftist idea and its affiliated mass organizations. In Lane's word, it is "a policy of political restructuring aimed at making permanent the end of any form of open mobilization politics."[37] To ensure the death of "popular radicalism," the military established bureaus, which screened citizens to make sure that they were clean of communism. Citizens who passed the screening of the "clean environment" (*bersih lingkungan*) program could obtain a certificate of good behavior needed for their job and membership application. However, regardless of whether they passed or failed the screening, they remained members of "floating masses." In Slamet's words:

> The deprived rural masses are floating politically because the government wants them to stay unorganized. They are floating because they are more and more cut off from the land and even from work opportunities as labourers, as a result of changes in technology favourable to the richer peasants, to landed members of the bureaucracy and to agro-business…[38]

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[34] Ben White, "Java and Social Theory: Agrarian Debates, Past and Present," op.cit.,: 176-177.

[35] As cited in Ian Chalmers and Vedi Hadiz (eds), *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia: Contending Perspectives*. London and NY: Routledge, 1997: 73.

[36] Max Lane, *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto*, London: Verso, 2008: 2.

[37] Max Lane, *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto,* ibid., 45.

[38] Ina E. Slamet, *Cultural Strategies for Survival: The Plight of the Javanese*. Rotterdam: The Comparative Asian Studies Programme, 1982: 38.

The Floating Mass and its Spatial Governance

The "floating mass" essentially referred to people in the villages who, after the event of 1965, were seen as a potential threat to the stability of the New Order. Under the category of "floating mass," the people in and from the villages were condemned to have no affiliation with any political party. Eliminated of political adversaries and identities, the "floating mass" could be moved around as "productive labor" to support national development.

Ali Moertopo's 1972 Doctrine reads as follows:

> It is worth remembering that in the past the people in general, particularly those in the villages with their own, often national, ways of thinking, were played upon and involved in the political and ideological conflicts of the parties… The mass of people, especially those in the villages, always fell prey to the political and ideological interests of those parties. Their involvement in the conflicts of political interests had as its result the fact that they ignored the necessities of daily life, the need for development and improvement of their own lives, materially as well as spiritually. Such a situation should not repeat itself… Therefore it is only right to attract the attention of the mainly village people away from political problems and ideological exclusiveness to efforts of national development through the development of their own rural societies… Here lies the meaning and the goal of the *depolitisasi* (the process of freeing the people from political manipulation) and the *deparpolisasi* (the process of freeing the people from political party allegiances) in the villages… In this way people in the villages will not spend their valuable time and energy in the political struggles of parties and groups, but will be occupied wholly with development efforts. Through this process there emerges the so-called "floating mass" i.e.: people who are not permanently tied to membership of any political parties. This concept of 'floating mass' should lead to increased development efforts…[39]

In the mind of the state, the idea of dislodging villagers of the right to participate in any party politics – except voting only at national election time – was to force individuals to be preoccupied "wholly with development efforts." Nothing could translate better the idea that everyone should be "wholly occupied" in their life for developmental efforts than flexibly diversifying occupations for survival. Uprooted from their base, members of the floating mass were made to earn their living from various occupations ideally moving around different places, in Moertopo's words, "to improve their own lives, materially as well as spiritually." In a crucial way Ali Moertopo's vision was in line with the diversification and multiplication of job opportunities and the dream for a better life away from the village. The extended era of "stabilization and rehabilitation" (1966-1975) could be seen as the period that set the foundation for the transformation of the political subjectivity of peasants in the

[39] Ali Moertopo (1972), "The Acceleration and Modernisation of the 25 Years Development," reprinted under "Ali Moertopo: The Floating Mass," in David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz (eds), *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*. London and NY: Routledge, 2003: 47-48.

village into politically passive, but productive floating masses drifting in and out of the city and the countryside in search of jobs. Meanwhile, while villagers were moving in and out of the rural areas, military command post was stationed permanently at all villages to ensure the non-existence of political activity in the rural areas. Intended for villagers, the concept of the floating mass was to create a condition that would "let them live in calm, to work and construct" even if they had to move around as opportunity arises[40]

The floating mass concept in some ways sets villagers "free" from their rural base, but it also brings the peasants back into the fold of the state. It creates a condition for diversification of job opportunities in the village and encourages both circular and permanent migration to the city, which needs their labor power. The de-politicization of the village and the engineering of the "floating mass" came in tandem with the opening up of the village for the labor market. The "floating mass" concept thus not only encouraged peasants to leave the countryside and seek non-farm related occupations, but it has also changed the social relations of the peasant world and has led to the rapid decline of the peasantry as a political force.

By the 1970s, it was no longer easy to identify the peasants in terms of their place, occupation and status for they were marked not only by diversity, but also by mobility. Attached to the peasants, are often other categories such as workers, traders, and "migrants" in the city even as they stay there only temporarily. Indonesian anthropologist, Koentjaraningrat, indicated, for instance, the difficulty of categorizing the peasants and migrants as two separate categories given the high frequency of migration in the rural ring around Jakarta.

> It was apparent that not all of (villagers) were landless peasants. Some were landowners who sharecropped their land or who only harvested the kinds of fruit which required the least care, thus freeing them for work in construction or road-building projects in the city or elsewhere, allowing them to earn a substantial amount of cash in a short period of time. Some even left their land uncultivated and speculated on rising land prices while working in the city. Naturally, many landless peasants would not leave the village if they could earn money by setting up foodstands, cigarette stands or the like, right in the village.[41]

Koentjaraningrat did not discuss the political displacement of the peasants and the formation of the "floating mass" in the Suharto era, but he pointed to a new subjectivity emerging out of the changing condition of the village life in Java. This new floating subjectivity [-which peasants only recognized through words such as "*pindah*" (moving) or "*rantau*" (commute) but never "migrate"] could be seen as the peasants' own modality of survival, but such strategy is connected to the state's

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[40] See: *Kompas* editorial comment on the concept of the floating mass published on 25 December 1971. Reprinted in David Bourchier and Vedi Hadiz (eds), *Indonesian Politics and Society: A Reader*, ibid., p.70. Kompas at least was critical to the concept and asked: "If, for instance, the interests of the majority of the people in the villages are damaged by some individual in authority, to whom shall they turn for political protection?" Ibid, p. 70.

[41] Koentjaraningrat, "Population mobility in villages around Jakarta," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, 11, 2, 1979: 112-113.

technique of population control via occupational mobility. "Peasants on the move," to use Li Tana's phrase,[42] keeps flexibility and variety in people's livelihood and as a result, as Hill points out, "rural people are in many areas less than committed to agriculture having added significant off-farm and non-farm employment to their domestic economies."[43] In the city, as I will discuss in the following section, they are often demonized as vagrants (*gelandangan*) for the practices of their "circulatory migration" (and in order to keep costs low) demand no commitment to establishing a "home" in the city. This peasants' tactic of survival has therefore constituted a floating world, but one that is inseparable from the state's modality of governance.

The diversity and mobility of the peasant world is certainly not new for one could trace patterns of such movement within the history of Southeast Asia.[44] The "new wave" of such diverse mobility in present times however lies in its "new non-farm activities, sustained or created by the contemporary process of development, which are underpinning diversification."[45] This new type of diversification has only taken place largely since the 1970s[46] and for the case of Indonesia is inseparable from the state's politics of modernization and discourses of stability and security. Ali Moertopo understood that dislocation of peasants from their places to become a floating mass via rural diversification and mobility would allow them to be part of the experience of modernity and modernization; and this was central to aid in the de-politicization of the peasants in the rural areas and the organization of their production and wage levels. He claimed that, "this process of modernization will naturally involve conflicts, as new norms come into conflict with traditional norms. Consequently, modernization requires planned social and cultural change… As 'planned change', modernization must clearly determine the direction which will be taken."[47]

Central to this "planned social and cultural change" was the creation of peri-urban areas as the industrial zones for the containment of the otherwise scattered floating mass. The creation of the peri-urban areas as exceptional spaces designated for national development in which peasants could find accommodation as off-farm "productive laborers" was not only a plan for socio-cultural change in the village. Instead, it was connected to the politics of the city. The state and the city authorities

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42 Li Tana, *Peasants on the Move: Rural-Urban Migration in the Hanoi Region*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996. Graeme Hugo recognized peasants' mobility as "circular migration" in his PhD dissertation. G.J. Hugo, "Population Mobility in West Java, Indonesia." Department of Demography, Australian National University, 1975.

43 R.D. Hill, "Stasis and Change in Forty Years of Southeast Asian Agriculture," *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography*, 19, 1, 1998: 1-25.

44 The existence of non-agricultural secondary economic activities in rural areas is an ancient phenomenon that seems to be widespread in Southeast Asia. See: Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

45 Jonathan Rigg, "Evolving Rural-Urban Relations and Livelihoods," in *Southeast Asia Transformed: A Geography of Change*, edited by Chia Lin Sien, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003: 235.

46 Jonathan Rigg points out that "what village studies since the 1980s almost invariably show is a dramatic diversification in people's livelihoods away from agriculture abd into assorted non-farm activities." Jonatahn Rigg, "Evolving Rural-Urban Relations and Livelihoods," ibid., 234.

47 As cited in Ian Chalmers and Vedi Hadiz (eds), *The Politics of Economic Development in Indonesia*, opcit., p. 77.

were just too willing to let rural-urban migrants locate themselves in per-urban regions. They wanted to alter the socio-political ground of the peasantry by detaching the peasants from their village, but they did not want them to end up in the city.

To understand the political significance of the peri-urban, we need to first turn to the city, for the urban, like its rural counterpart, also plays a role in the governing of the "peasants." In the city too the "floating mass" of the urban population has been left either unorganized or they have become members of the tightly control state-sponsored social (but never political) organizations. They too are ideally to be absorbed into the peri-urban areas away from the center which fears the return of populist politics and, in any case, as a foreign consultant hired by the government points out, "the leadership simply doesn't want rustic looking people pushing bikes around in their capital city."[48]

THE URBAN

Peasants in the City

The "floating mass" strategy of cutting the rural population adrift from organized political activity and the politics of "clean environment" (*bersih lingkungan*) have immediate consequences for the city.[49] In her study of the labor market in the urban construction sector, Kartini Sjahrir points out that the "stabilization and rehabilitation" program has pushed many villagers to leave the countryside for the city where they are able to find new jobs and hope to disappear into the general urban population without being interrogated and harassed.[50] For villagers, escape to the city was thus considered favorable.

The cleaning up of the village in the era of "stabilization and rehabilitation" had a spatial implication as it generated significant flow of migration to the urban center, especially the capital city which by then had become the focus of national development. Ali Sadikin, the new Governor of Jakarta at the time recalled in his memoir that the waves of migration from the village had already entered the city even though urban development had not yet "taken off."[51] During the era of "stabilization

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48 As cited in Michael Specter, "Letter from Jakarta," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 8, 1984.

49 The "bersih lingkungan" was a program to the nation of communism. It was institutionalized in 1980 but had started since 1966.

50 Kartini Sjahrir, *Pasar Tenaga Kerja Indonesia: Kasus Sektor Konstruksi*. (The Labor Market in Indonesia: The Case of Construction Sector) Jakarta: Grafiti Press in association with Center for Policy and Implementation Studies, 1995: 49.

51 See: Ali Sadikin, *Bang Ali: Demi Jakarta 1966-1977,* (written by Ramadhan K.H.) Jakarta: Sinar Harapan 1995: 271. It is a common practice for Indonesian dignitaries to "write" memoirs at the end of his or her tenure in the government to be remembered as patriots who have served the nation. The publisher made a special comment about the Memoir of Ali Sadikin. At the half-page preface, the publisher pointed out that "Ali Sadikin who worked as the Governor of Jakarta from 1966 to 1977 has tried to build Jakarta which at the beginning of his term did not look like a modern capital city. The still unstable political environment *(gejolak politik)* (after the failed attempt of the 30th September Communist movement) has contributed to the problems in the city." *Bang Ali: Demi Jakarta 1966-1977,* ibid..7.

and rehabilitation," Sadikin also witnessed many vagrants (*gelandangan*) in the city.[52] In the Governor's words, "so visible were vagrants in many parts of the city. The numbers increased almost on the daily basis. And this posed a problem for me…. In short, vagrants in the capital city have become a serious problem. Their numbers are high."[53] Most of the vagrants, the governor believed, were not home grown, but were from different parts of rural Java. Vagrancy in Indonesian political tradition, for both the left and the right, connotes instability and indecisiveness, qualities that could lead to destruction.[54] For the Governor, with the mandate from the state to help prevent social unrest and political disturbance, vagrants were not only nuisance for the view of the city, but were also potentially threatening to the public order.

Ali Sadikin was witnessing the impact of labor migration from the countryside in the aftermath of 1965. Many villagers escaped to the city with the hope of getting new jobs without harassment from the state's mission of "clean environment." However, as a "floating mass" in the city, they became subjected to the play of power and knowledge from the municipality. Instead of recognizing the *gelandangan* as "circular migrants," Ali Sadikin considered them "illiterate and unskilled cheap labors from the countryside, trishaw drivers, construction workers, vendors, the homeless, beggars, and prostitutes."[55] Thus, he viewed them as deviant "others" in need of a space, which would take them away from the visibility of 'clean' Jakarta (the heart of the nations' modernity). The circular migrants, as pointed out earlier, just could not afford settling a family permanently in the city.[56] They would prefer moving alone and along by sleeping under bridges or in their trishaw (*becak)* or putting up temporary accommodation in squatters or staying in *pondok* (a hut like lodging place, especially

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[52] Ali Sadikin did not define *gelandangan* for us, but Soetjipto Wirosardjono, Deputy Chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistics in the 1980s and 1990s at least tried to identify gelandangan as

> "new comers who have recently moved from rural areas to the city for employment and have not succeeded. Because they are poorly educated and have few contacts they start by becoming a scavenger. If the leader of scavengers has a house they will live there; if they cannot stay with him for some reason they will find themselves in the homeless status. They are socially ashamed to go back to the rural areas so they adapt to the situation (in the city). They normally don't have any relatives in the city, or other people to fall back on. Although they are eligible to stay in the rehabilitation centers organized by the Ministry of Social Affairs, they often choose to stay outside. There are a lot of regulations in the rehabilitation centers. For example, as a homeless you can still find some income as a scavenger or as a begger, which you can spend as you wish. So at least, outside the rehabilitation centers, they still possess a certain amount of freedom, which is very important for them." Soetjipto Wirosardjono, "The Informal sector," 67.

[53] Ali Sadikin, *Bang Ali*, ibid., 148-149.

[54] Vagrants didn't even find a place in Sukarno's most inclusive category of "Marhaen" which referred to all kinds of the destitute people (of Indonesia). See also: D.N. Aidit's position towards vagrants in "Indonesia's Class Structure," (1957) in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles (eds), *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*. Op.cit., pp. 256-257.

[55] Ali Sadikin, *Gita Jaya: Catatan H. Ali Sadikin, Gubernur Kepala Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta, 1966-1977* (Gita Jaya: Notes from Ali Sadikin, the Governor of Jakarta, 1966-1977) Jakarta: Pemda Khusus Ibu Kota Jakarta, 1977: 160.

[56] Graeme Hugo points out that "circular migration allows highly valued social benefits of village residence to be essentially maintained." Graeme Hugo, "Circular Migration" *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies,* 13, 3, November 1977: 62.

one made of cheap and impermanent materials) all of which the Governor considered as unacceptable for a city that was trying hard to become a modern metropolis.[57]

At the beginning of his tenure, Sadikin called on the central government for help and two measures were carried out in the early 1970s. The first was the effort of making Jakarta a closed city, and second, through the enforcement of the state, the deportation of migrants to outer islands under a national program known as *transmigrasi*. Several scholars and activists have written about the deportation and relocation of less desirable people from the city and the politics of *transmigrasi* to the outer islands.[58] It is sufficient to emphasize here that these programs of sending villagers away are related to the violent discourses of "clean environment" and the "floating mass." Furthermore, these measures point to the problematic relations between the city and the countryside and perhaps more importantly, the importance of finding a spatial solution for a productive governing of the "floating mass," especially in the context of the realization on the part of the policy makers that "*Urbanisasi* (meaning rural migration to the city) never stops as it cannot be stopped."[59] And, perhaps, following the logic of the floating mass it should never be stopped for the (circular) migrants are seen as valuable resources to be exploited for national development.

It eventually became clear to Sadikin that the method of closed city and *transmigrasi* are insufficient, impractical and counterproductive. The question is more on how to control and in some ways make use of the labor power embedded in the floating mass for the advantage of the city and the nation. For instance, many migrants from villages were young men, and it was soon discovered that they would be a great labor pool for the construction industry necessary for capital city-building.[60] Consistent with the concept of "floating mass," the government left these migrant laborers unregulated in order to prevent unionization and put them in the hands of "patron-client" informal networks of construction workers in the city, which continued to fuel and supply labor to and from rural areas.[61] They were allowed to occupy unused land close to where they worked and many continued to stay there more permanently but there was no base for them to organize.

The millions of village (*kampung*) folks in the city thus found themselves living in shantytowns with no organized political life. They remained without any protection from the state and had to enact practices of self-help and mutual helping out which constituted the informal sector. Their presence was and is tolerated for the city needs

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[57] For a discussion of *pondok*, see: Lea Jellinek, "The Pondok of Jakarta," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies,* 13, 3, November 1977: 67-71. I discussed the political attempt of Jakarta to become a metropolis in *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia*. London: Routledge, 2000: Chapter 4.

[58] For transmigrasi see J.M. Hardjono, *Transmigration in Indonesia*, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977; and M. Otten, *Transmigrasi: Indonesian Resettlement Policy, 1965-1985*, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, Document 57, Copenhagen: IWGIA Publication, 1986.

[59] Bang Ali: Demi Jakarta, p. 177. Governor Ali Sadikin used the *urbanisasi* to refer to population growth.

[60] Construction industries were prosperous in the 1970s due to the oil boom. See: Kartini Sjahrir, *Pasar Tenaga Kerja Indonesia: Kasus Sektor Konstruksi.* Op.cit.

[61] See Kartini Sjahrir, *Pasar Tenaga Kerja Indonesia*, ibid.

their labor, but their settlements however are considered illegal and subjected to eviction at any time, especially when investments have become available for "national development." In some ways one could understand the formation of informality, the term used for and by the urban poor, as actually a form of governance in which survival intersects with the de-organization of the urban "floating mass." As peasants have become important non-farm labor forces in the city, a new kind of space was called upon to resolve the problem of *urbanisasi*.

THE PERI-URBAN

Guarding the City on the Fringe: The Rise of the Peri-Urban

In 1967, a year after Suharto came to power, Abdurrahman Surjomihardjo, the historian of urban Indonesia, the government issued a master plan of Jakarta (1965-1985). The plan indicates that the city will expand outwards in concentric manner 15 kilometers from the National Monument, the "center" of the city. The Governor of Jakarta Ali Sadikin was given the authority to interpret the plan and he was quick to realize that the plan was part of the stabilization and rehabilitation program. The Governor was also delighted that the concentric development plan of Jakarta was essentially a means to manage population growth for it included for the first time the areas of BOTABEK (acronym for Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi, each representing the extended area of Jakarta to the South, West and East respectively). The governor recalled that "in its development, the area of JABOTABEK consists of "urban area," "rural area" and the "transitional area" each with its specificity."[62]

For Sadikin the notion of "transisi" is more than just referring to a transitory space in the process of becoming a city. Instead the transitional area is designated to be more of an exceptional space, which would serve as a "counter-magnet" for migrants to Jakarta. The Governor was interested in the concept of the extended space in so far as it could resolve the population problems he had been facing in Jakarta. In his mind, the creation of periurban zones would protect Jakarta from the influx of less desirable migrants and "to push population from Jakarta outwards to the development zone ('*wilayah pengembangan*')."[63] Furthermore, the extended space would give clarity to the issue of territory, boundary and authority. His memoir recorded his obsession with boundaries and the difficulty of arriving at an agreement with the governor of West Java. He emphasized the importance of dealing with the private sector without diminishing the authority of the city hall. The concept of JABOTABEK thus offered the opportunity for the Governor to fulfill his wish to retain the authority of Jakarta to the city hall while allowing the private sectors to advance their own entrepreneur spirit away from the controlled center.[64] Once developed by private developers, the peri-urban would alleviate population and security problems in the city. The city authorities did not have to suffer from headache of planning. It did not have to deal with issues of service provision and not even transport for this should be arranged

[62] Sadikin, *Bang Ali*., op.cit., 366.

[63] See: Ali Sadikin, *Gita Jaya*, op.cit., and also Edi Sedyawati, et. als, *Sejarah Kota Jakarta, 1850-1980*. (History of Jakarta, 1850-1980) Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1986/87: 85.

[64] Sadikin, *Bang Ali*., op.cit., 386.

privately by the capital to move the labor to work. We thus heard about the "success" story often told in the 1990s of "Mitsubishi colt" pickup which was associated with the efficiency of transportation provided by the multinational (including Japanese) corporations at the periurban for their workers and staffs.[65]

The experiment with the concept of extended space for development (*wilayah pengembangan*) first took place in the coastal areas of North Jakarta (better known as the backyard of the city) rather than the BOTABEK areas. In 1973, the first Export Processing Zones (EPZs) in Indonesia were formed in North Jakarta in an area of 10.5 hectares adjacent to the Tanjung Priok harbor facilities. Defined as an area of land "lying outside the normal customs of jurisdiction," the area offered "substantial incentives (in order) to attract foreign firms into the zones."[66] In detail, the zone included the following special treatment:

> combination of duty-free import of manufactured intermediate goods and raw materials, company income tax holidays, subsidized provision of factory space and/or utilities, streamlined bureaucratic and administrative procedures to avoid costly 'red tape,' exemptions from industrial regulations applying outside the zones, guarantees on the absence of strikes and guaranteed repatriation of profits.[67]

Under the control of (but not necessarily owned by) a state company, PT Bonded Warehouses Indonesia (BWI), the EPZ in North Jakarta was a "pilot project" for many more new zones to come. This export processing zone, an invention of the postwar geopolitical economic space for the operation of multinational corporations, opens up the subsequent peri-urban areas of Jakarta as an economic space of exception.[68] These World Bank prompted free trade export-processing zones have since then become the prime location for the operation of international industrial capitalism; not surprisingly, the exploitation of the low-wage "floating mass" population becomes an added bonus for these capitalists. Thereby showing the many forms of indirect stress and everyday exploitation of the "freedom" to work and stay in and around Jakarta.

This strategy of containing the "floating mass" by ways of zoning was officially carried out in 1976 under the Presidential Instruction No. 13.[69] Clusters of industrial zones in the surrounding inland areas of Jakarta were created to absorb both the capital and the floating "labor" mass. Consistent with the idea of protecting the capital city by deflecting migration to the peri-urban areas, over a thousand industries in the

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65 I would like to thank Terry McGee for the story of the "Mitsubishi Colt."

66 See: Peter G. Warr, "The Jakarta Export Processing Zone: Benefits and Costs," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, vol. XIX, No. 3, December 1983: 28.

67 Warr, "The Jakarta Export Processing Zone," 28-29.

68 Peter Warr indicates that "the nominal ownership of firms operating in the zone differs radically from that seen in EPZs elsewhere in Asia. Of the 18 firms occupying the zone by 1982, three were nominally Indonesian-owned, three were joint ventures between Indonesians and foreign Chinese or Indians, one was Indian and the remaining eleven were owned by Hong Kong, Singapore or Taiwan interests." (Warr, "The Jakarta Export Processing Zone," 30) Warr notes that these firms are also indirectly owned by North American and European firms.

69 See: Lambert J. Giebels, "JABOTABEK," op cit.; also Sadikin, *Gita Jaya*, op.cit.,: 223.

city were relocated in 1975 to the outskirts of Jakarta. They were expected to become part of the newly established Jakarta Industrial Estate of Pulo Gadung which by 1977 had already absorbed some 13,000 workers and expected to be soon absorbing 150,000 workers.[70] By the mid-1980s (pushed by the liberalized economy of Repelita V), investment by the private sector in industries increased sharply which drove up the growth rate of the surrounding areas of Jakarta such as Tangerang and Bekasi.[71] The deregulation immediately resulted in the absorption of about 18 % of the country's labor force while contributing some 25% to the overall GDP.[72] The workers were part of the mobilization that Dianne Wolf described as "ten large-scale 'modern factories, driven by Western machinery and technology (commanding) in the middle of the agricultural land of two villages (in Java) that still have neither running water nor electricity."[73] In these factories, the floating mass were turned into a productive force and, as Diane Wolf has shown in her *Factory Daughters*, this included young, unmarried village women who left the rural areas, some against the wishes of their parents, to find non-farm related occupations. "Because of these industries," Hasan Poerbo, then a researcher of Institute of Technology Bandung, indicates, "you have tens, hundreds of thousands of people actually moving around. And many of the people employed by these industries are young, unmarried women."[74] Women thus are absorbed into the "formal" sector because "their labor is cheaper and women are more industrious when it comes to working with small parts needed for the manufacturing of electronics, garments and shoes," while "men are employed in the informal sector."[75] Yet, as Soetjipto Wirosardjono points out, "only because of the informal sector, workers can be paid such a low salary."[76]

By the 1980s, the metropolitan press reported that the extended space has become the destination of migrants from rural areas and outer regions.[77] A series of Presidential Instructions has made possible the development of the peri-urban areas and further the *desakota* region of Java, all of which have immediate impact on the flow of population.[78] Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni and Tommy Firman indicate that, "besides receiving migrants from Jakarta city, BOTABEK has been increasingly targeted as the destination of migrants from all over Indonesia, mainly from Java. Migrants have

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70 See: Edi Sedyawati et als, *Sejarah Kota Jakarta 1950-1980*, Jakarta: Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1986/1987: 34.

71 Soetjipto Wirosardjono, Deputy Chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistics pointed out in 1991 that the agglomeration of urban centres in the surrounding area of Jakarta was purely the power of the market economy. Soetjipto Wirosardjono, "The Informal Sector: Victims of a Double Standard," *Prisma*, 51, 1991: 61.

72 Soetjipto Wirosardjono, ibid., 61.

73 Diane Wolff. *Factory Daughters: Gender, Household Dynamics, and Rural Industrialization in Java*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989: 109.

74 Hasan Poerbo, "A Glimpse of Tragedy anda Question of Morality," *Prisma*, 51, 1991: 76.

75 Hasan Poerbo, ibid.: 77.

76 Soetjipto Wirosardjono, "The Informal Sector," 62.

77 See: Her Suganda, "Fenomena Kota Baru Sekitar Botabek," *Kompas*, 10 September 1995: 9.

78 For instance Presidential Instruction no 53, 1989 has made possible some 36.800 hectares for the development of a *desakota* industrial zone along the corridor of Purwakarta-Serang with possibility for further expansion. See: Her Suganda, "Fenomena Kota Baru Sekitar Botabek," *Kompas*, 10 September 1995: 9.

chosen BOTABEK instead of Jakarta because of its lower living costs, employment opportunities resulting from the spillover of industrial growth from Jakarta, and its high accessibility to Jakarta via a well-developed transportation system."[79] A series of decrees and permits were issued to domestic and foreign private enterprises to develop the peri-urban areas as the space for the floating mass to "live in calm, to work and construct."[80] Hundreds of licenses were issued in the early 1990s to both domestic and foreign trade company representatives, especially those from the industrialized countries of Asia such as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea; these countries have turned the peri-urban areas of Jakarta into "the largest concentration of both foreign and domestic investment in Indonesia."[81] This contour of investment represents just the instance of regional restructuring of economic space in which Indonesia provides cheap labor power for the low end subcontracting network of industrial production in Asia. With the peri-urban designated as a zone for the restructuring of economic and social life, domestic developers, often with ties to the ruling elites, mobilized their capitals to build series of mega new towns for the growing members of middle class.

The consequence is clear, as Dharmapatni and Firman indicate that "in Bekasi alone, for example, if we assume a person-land ratio of four persons per hectare, the 3,000 ha of industrial estate development will have to displace 12,000 farmers. If this assumption is valid for the whole of BOTABEK, then the 6,500 ha planned for industrial development will have to displace about 26,000 farmers."[82] We may never know exactly the responses of the peasants to this draconian displacement, but under the doctrine of the floating mass, they would have most likely disappeared into the general work force of the factories in support of the national "development effort." Such displacement also indicates to us, that although the peri-urban areas of BOTABEK have their own histories, under Suharto's politics of space, they were in "no-man's land" in which the juridical and the political intersected for the governance of the floating mass. As far as the city of Jakarta is concerned, the result was unambiguous, for as Dharmapatni and Firman point out "permanent movement from West Java (including Botabek) and other parts of Indonesia into Jakarta city declined during 1975-90 and was accompanied by a reverse movement of permanent migrants from Jakarta city to Botabek area."[83] We do not know how the establishment of the peri-urban might have contributed to the decrease in the number of *gepeng* (*gelandangan and pengemis* – vagrants and beggers) in the city of Jakarta, but Soetjipto Wirosardjono reported that "in the census of October 1990 only 24,000

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79 See: Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni and Tommy Firman, "Problems and Challenges of Mega-Urban Regions in Indonesia: The Case of Jabotabek and the Bandung Metroplitan Area," in *The Mega-Urban Regions of Southeast Asia*, edited by T.G. McGee and Ira M. Robinson, Vancouver: UBC Press, 308.

80 In 1989, through the Presidential Decree No 53, the state reorganized Bekasi (the periurban to the East of Jakarta) into clusters of industrial zones along the toll road to Purwakarta (on the way to Bandung).

81 See: Tommy Firman, "The Restructuring of Jakarta Metroplitan Area," *Cities*, 15, 4, 1998: 237.

82 Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni and Tommy Firman, "Problems and Challenges of Mega-Urban Regions in Indonesia," op.cit., 308.

83 Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni and Tommy Firman, "Problems and Challenges of Mega-Urban Regions in Indonesia," op.cit, 307.

people were counted as *gelandangan* while they used to number more than 100,000."[84]

The political economy of space and the control of population are therefore interconnected and they are central to the "stabilization and rehabilitation" of Indonesia under the New Order of Suharto. The exodus of villagers from the rural areas has finally prompted the government to create a space for containing them. The peri-urban areas of JABOTABEK offer just such a space "to exploit incarceral modes of labor control."[85] Not surprisingly this extended space was never left alone. Instead, the administration of the peri-urban areas around Jakarta was initially staffed by personnel working for the Department of Internal Affairs, a major apparatus of political control responsible for the "development of village society."[86]

The Periurban as the Space of Exception

Anne-Marie Willis, after surveying a number of uses of the term peri-urban by various scholars, summarizes the association underpinning the notion of peri-urban:

> Over-reading, then, the periurban seems to be characterized by flux: rapid changes in land-use. Built forms, economic activities; mismatches between administrative structures and territory; influxes of new populations; conflicts between new and existing landholders; and visually, somewhere that seems disjunctive, that jars with longstanding preconceptions of the distinctiveness of places, as either fundamentally rural or urban. Linked to this is that the periurban is always nearly always associated with the naming of problems, whether these be issues of urban governance, exploitation of labor, lack of planning and infrastructure, degradation of natural resources and biodiversity or threats to urban food security through loss of agricultural land. This would suggest that change in these territories is undirected, random, opportunistic. The periurban could be considered as a naming of ever-changing spaces of opportunism."[87]

What we learn from this characterization of the peri-urban is that it is a space filled with both potentials and problems where lack of planning and governance could mean excessive control and vice versa. In this sense, the lack of governance is a form of governance. Peri-urban may be better understood as a "space of exception" which, to appropriate Giorgio Agamben, is set "in an ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political."[88] As with the case of the peri-urban of

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84 Soetjipto Wirosardjono, "The Informal Sector," 67.

85 Ong Aihwa, *Neoliberalism as Exception*, 21

86 For a description of the role of the Department of Internal Affairs in the governance of urban politics and economy, see Sadikin, *Bang Ali*, op.cit., 83-87; See also: Ben White "Organization of Peasants, op. cit p. 100.

87 Anne-Marie Willis, "From Peri-urban to Unknown Territory," *Changing City Structures*, 14, 2005: 3 http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/81209/city-structures-14-willis.pdf

88 Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception* (translated by Kevin Attel), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005:1 (citing Alessandro Fontana).

Jakarta, the region was made possible and thus governable and productive by the construction of the category of "floating mass." The peri-urban, with all its problems, informality and opportunities outlined by Willis, is in fact a space with *political* calculation, and mode of governing population through violence of category. In this sense, the peri-urban can be defined as the establishment, by means of the space of exception, to appropriate Agamben again, "of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system."[89]

As a space of exception, the peri-urban has its own form of governance one that is often considered exceptional. It is exceptional for the borderline fringe keeps alive the open possibility for new enterprises and for the state to exploit its resources in the project of constructing new subjects. For instance, in cooperation with the Ministry of Home Affairs, the extended space of Jakarta (especially in the extended areas to the South and the West) was made available for private investors to invest and to develop into series of organized, and thus secured, new towns for residences.[90] Based on the principle of "large public-private partnership in urban land development and management,"[91] this new space at the fringe is expected to absorb some of the burden of population growth in Jakarta. For instance, the first major consortium, Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD) which consists of 10 real estate companies represented just this attempt "to establish a self-contained New Town" for a new life.[92] The new town is managed by private developers and not by the city hall of Jakarta. However it would be misleading to say that the residential and industrial zones have developed outside the state policies. Instead, while government has receded from getting involved in the management of new town, it exerts benefit from the politics of space, which is to turn the fringe into a territory supportive of "national development."[93]
On the edge of Jakarta, occupying an exceptional space, the peri-urban allows the private sector and the local government to benefit from overriding land use planning, permit and regulation. For instance, in the course of the 1990s, when large-scale constructions of profitable new towns were booming, the government regulation on land in the areas had changed several times for the convenience of developers and for attracting further investments. The effect was a series of land conversion, as Dharmapatni and Firman point out that "pressures on prime agricultural land in other

89 Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, ibid., 2.

90 The periurban gave rise to Real Estate Indonesia (REI), an association of corporate housing developers which was approved by Governor Sadikin in 1975.

91 See: Jo Santoso, "The Bumi Serpong Damai New Town – A Large Public-Private Partnership in Urban Land Development and Management" *Trialog* 32.

92 Jo Santoso, one of the senior planners for the New Town described the rationale behind the construction of BSD: "One of the most important results of modernization process is the increasing number of the urban population specially the genesis of the middle and low-income classes. These groups of people are basically looking for a new living environment, which conforms more to their new life styles. From the cultural aspects the birth of BSD, the new city project can be seen as an attempt by this new 'middle class' of realizing their 'dream' to create a new living environment that is able to accommodate their prerequisites for a higher standard of life." See: Jo Santoso, "The Bumi Serpong Damai New Town – A Large Public-Private Partnership in Urban Land Development and Management" *Trialog* 32: 36.

93 For a discussion of the relations between the construction of the new town and the formation of "middle class" in the context of the New Order's politics of nation building in Jakarta. See: *Behind the Postcolonial.*

places such as Teluk Naga, Tangerang, have continued, as a consortium of seven private developers is presently applying for 4,500 ha to be developed as a 'modern tourism city.'"[94] Situated at the uncertain intersection between the legal and the political, there are ample opportunities for different informal enterprises to grow. One among others is the proliferation of informal fees and brokers (*calo*) including thugs (*preman*) in the system of land acquisition and building construction for development.[95] The extended space is characterized by lack of ambiguity and looseness a condition, which allows possibilities for informal enterprises to grow. It seems advantageous for the space of the peri-urban to maintain such degree of ambiguity and thus endless possibility for the informal exploitation of the resources of the area. In the end the ultimate agent is not the state, but the assemblage of loosely affiliated social political forces and actors capable of preparing "development programs" for themselves.

Finally, as a space of exception for the exercise of displacement, one might also raise the question of resistance and what the space has meant for the displaced, as did Maruli Tobing and Emmanuel Subangun in 1980. These two well-known journalists asked precisely this question in a metropolitan press:

> When all the efforts of the poor, year after year, decade after decade, have brought no prospect of real change into their experience, we may ask: why do these hungry, debt-ridden people not protest? Isn't protest against injustice a continual, central element in the *wayang* (traditional shadow-puppet) stories and in all other kinds of popular myths?... Then why, in the concrete reality that has surrounded millions of poor peasants for decades, as the village has been incorporated into the open economy and extreme poverty is now juxtaposed with excessive life-styles – why do the peasants not protest?[96]

Depending on how we interpret differentiation within the seemingly monolithic notion of "the peasant," it seems that Tobing and Subangun were nonetheless disturbed by the absence of resistance. One could look for "resistances of everyday life" and the subtle expression of the "weapons of the weak,"[97] but the peri-urban has been sustained (for over three decades) not merely by force and isolation but also by opportunity and mobility in which the exploited too are contributing to the operation

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[94] Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni and Tommy Firman, "Problems and Challenges of Mega-Urban Regions in Indonesia," op.cit., 305.

[95] See: Tommy Firman, "New Town Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region: A Perspective of Spatial Segregation," *Habitat International*, 28, 3, 2004: 349-368; Michael Leaf, "Building the Road for the BMW, op.cit.

[96] As translated by and cited in Ben White, "Organization of peasants and rural poor in Indonesia," op.cit, 97. At the time of the 1997-1998 political and financial crises, groups of unemployed workers in the peri-urban area of Jakarta occupied "golf courses." Some inscribed "this is people's land" with their hoes and others began to grow vegetables. See: "Ratusan petani tanami lapangan golf Cimacan," (Hundreds of pesants plant golf course at Cimacan) *Kompas online*, June 15, 1998.

[97] James Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance." In James Scott and Ben Kerkvliet (eds), *Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance in Southeast Asia*, London: Frank Cass: 5-35; James Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985; and Ong Aihwa, *Spirits of Resistance and Capitalists Discipline: Factory Women in Malaysia*. Albany,NY: State University of New York Press, 1987.

of power. The decline of the peasantry in the peri-urban and indeed beyond is due in large measure to the regime intolerance of any political organization in the village, the military coercion and self-policing of the victims,[98] but it is also due to the mobile opportunities opened up by the spatial ambiguity of the peri-urban.

For instance, on the side of the "soft power," the new town (with its conception of an American suburb house) could never be as exclusive and self-contained as it has been promoted. For the operation of their daily lives, the residents of the new town continue to rely on housemaids, vendors, security guards, drivers, and workers from outside the "gated community." The New Towns provide opportunities for rural family members to work as off-farm workers. It promotes the integration of rural and peri-urban labor markets and helps to alleviate poverty in the village, but at the same time it contributes to the decline of labor in the agricultural sector. Meanwhile, the imposition of the new town raises land prices and even with the draconian method of land acquisition, agricultural landowners are inclined to benefit from selling their property to developers. Dharmapatni and Firman point out that "uncontrolled conversion of prime agricultural land has been exacerbated by the reluctance of farmers to retain their land as land prices increase,"[99] for they too are eager participants of the wheel of fortune opened up by the space of exception. The massive conversion from agricultural land to development sites was marked by power relations in which agricultural households basically gave up their lands with unfair compensation. However such "submission" was encouraged in part by the decline of agriculture where for farmers in the areas selling their land became much more profitable than cultivating the fields for paddy.

Many farmers' lands are continuously being sold often in an unjust market place, but many of these displaced individuals have found options of relatively higher wages in the low-wage regime of the industrial and housing construction sectors developed in their region. In some ways the systematic decline of the wages in the farming sectors are due to the state policy of integrating rural and urban labor markets. Studying the relation between economic development and poverty reduction in Indonesia, Rick Barichello indicates that over the past two decades (starting from the mid-1980s), "there have not been large budget allocations to the agricultural sector" and "little has been done to enhance productivity of the agricultural crops and commodities."[100] And yet, why do the peasants not protest in the midst of the declining rural livelihoods? The reason may well be that, as Barichello and others have pointed out, the income growth and poverty reduction in rural areas is being taken care of by non-farm income and the integration of rural-urban labor markets. In accomplishing this task, the peri-urban has played a historical role.

The world of the peasantry has been transformed via the formation of the peri-urban areas. Such spatial formation, I argue, needs to be understood as a paradigm of

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98 Ben White, "Organization of peasants and rural poor in Indonesia," op.cit., 97.

99 Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni and Tommy Firman, "Problems and Challenges of Mega-Urban Regions in Indonesia," op.cit.: 305.

100 Rick Barichello, "Economic Development and Poverty Reductions in East Asia: The Impact of OECD Agricultural Policies," paper for Seminar on "The Impact and Coherence of OECD Country Policies on Asian Developing Economies," Paris, 10-11 June, 2004. (In possession of the author)

governance with a mission to temporarily and permanently solve problems that are at once demographic, economic and political.

EPILOGUE

The Last Circularity? Back to the City and Return to the Village

Max Lane, in his *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto*, indicates that mass action politics (banned since 1965) such as street protest mobilizations, factory strikes and land occupations have been revived since the late 1980s.[101] However it is still fair to say that since the establishment of the JABOTABEK in the mid-1970s (after the Malari protest event) and up to the collapse of Suharto regime, no serious political unrest took place in the capital city and its periurban areas even though social, economical, and environmental crises have become clearly visible in the city. It may sound "spatial deterministic" to claim that the relative peace and order in both the city and the countryside under the authoritarian state was due to the production of the peri-urban. Nevertheless, we could say that the rural-urban linkages and the exceptional space of the peri-urban have served to turn the floating mass into a self-policing and self-benefiting "productive" population throughout much of the Suharto era.

The power of space remains an issue to be speculated on and research is still needed to examine the ways in which the peri-urban was in fact received and used daily by the multitude. What we do know is that the "Asian crisis" which has substantially scaled down factories and housing construction in the BOTABEK area has unleashed a mass amount of unemployed workers back to the streets of the capital city. Many of the "floating mass," having lost their jobs in the peri-urban factories and construction sectors decided to take up occupations associated with the informal sector in the city.[102] In such time of crisis, many ignored the government offer of 70 percent discounts on economic fare train tickets for travelling across Java back to their villages, (perhaps back into agricultural work).[103] The reality bites thus are vividly expressed in the *post*-Suharto *reformasi* era as portrayed in a metropolitan press in the year 2000:

> The presence of vendors (*kaki lima*) in the capital city is not surprising. However, today their presences have been extremely ignited (*marak*). They do not just display their merchandises on pushcarts or under plastic or canvas tents. Instead they set up their places with permanent stalls, which they also use as their dwellings.[104]

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[101] For a history of Indonesian mass politics, see: Max Lane, *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia Before and After Suharto*. London: Verso, 2008.

[102] For a discussion of the social environment of Jakarta in the immediate post-Suharto era, see: Abidin Kusno, "Whither Nationalist Urbanism? Public Life in Governor Sutiyoso's Jakarta." *Urban Studies*, 41, 12, 2004: 2377-2394.

[103] M. Cohen, "Easing Labour's Pain," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29 January 1998: 17.

[104] *Kompas*, "Jakarta mirip kota kaki lima," (Jakarta is like a city of vendors) 12 June 2000, p. 29.

The vendors have registered their presence in the city as part of the post-Suharto urban "social movements" claiming for the rights to survive in the city. Unlike the past, today they do not seem to be afraid of the authority, as a vendor points out, "for today's condition is different from that before the *reformasi*. Today's traders are more daring compared with the past. If they (the security personnel) dismiss us, we will react against them.[105] These forces contributed to what Sutiyoso, the post-Suharto Governor of Jakarta described as "the multidimensional crisis, the change in people's behavior, and the fewer job opportunities have all caused difficulties in upholding security and order."[106] The Governor, (appointed during Suharto's regime of order), found it unbelievable that "during my first term as governor between 1997 and 2002, 4,538 demonstrations were staged by Jakartans against me… from small-scale rallies to ones that led to anarchy.[107] The responses that eventually came however were equally harsh. An activist indicates that massive evictions took place in the course of five years in the post-Suharto Jakarta leaving 78,000 urban poor homeless and at least 65,000 street vendors lost their jobs.[108]

By way of conclusion, it may be useful to acknowledge that these "social movements" claiming "rights to the city" after the fall of Suharto are largely taking place in the center of the city and not so much in the outskirts of the peri-urban areas. One could only reflect or speculate on the historical roles of the city as the arena of conflicts, but for sure the peri-urban is equipped with neither memory nor institutional capacity to organize in part because of the effect of the "floating mass."[109] This is a phenomenon that indicates to us the profound connection between space and politics. It also points to the connection between the floating mass, the capital city and the peri-urban "space of exception" that the political regime has created.

Finally, are the politics of space and the creation of the peri-urban as the space of exception described above correct not only for Jakarta or other megacities in Indonesia, but also for other mega-urban regions of Southeast Asia, which have often been understood as undergoing processes of peri-urbanization? This is a question that I haven't yet had the capacity to answer but I think some basic geo-political conditions shared by different cities in this post WW II region, may provide some reflections for future research. One might, for instance, suggest the following ideas.

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[105] *Suara Pembaharuan*, "Belum efektif, penanganan pedagang kaki lima," (Not yet efficient, the management of vendors) 12 August 1999, p. 16.

[106] *Jakarta Post*, "Sutiyoso blames public for his failure," 19 July 2002, p. 2.

[107] *Jakarta Post*, "Sutiyoso: most maligned governor?" 11 November 2002, p. 8.

[108] Sri Maryanti, "Upaya Warga Meraih Kota," (Attempts by citizens to have their rights to the city) *Mendengarkan Kota*, (listening to the city) Jakarta: Institute for Ecosoc Rights, 2007: 175.

[109] One of the political memories of the area that the state has incorporated into its narrative of "sacrifice for the nation" is the fight in the 1945-1949 in Jakarta, Karawang and Bekasi for the nation's Independence against the returning Dutch. The event has inspired poet Chairil Anwar to write: "Antara Karawang – Bekasi," (Between Karawang and Bekasi) and Promoedya Ananta Toer (1951) to produce a novel: *Di Tepi Kali Bekasi* (At the riverside of Bekasi).

The first was the Washington's Cold War largesse in the region, which initiated massive intervention from the Americans and its allies to prevent communist insurrection.[110] In this effort, the largely agricultural societies of Southeast Asia would need to be managed through capitalistically authoritarian anti-communist regimes by ways of controlling the political life of the countryside and the governing of its peasants through the concept of "floating mass." Perhaps one needs to look at the security-based development "aid" and its urban-rural planning apparatus made available by Washington in the postwar era to see how it was connected to the spatial organization of the peri-urban region.

The second condition, related to the first was the peculiar "sub-contracting" discourse led by Japan in its attempt to create an economic zone which by the 1970s has dominated Southeast Asia. The huge inflows of Japanese capital (which generated the first massive demonstration, called the Malari event, in Jakarta in 1974) and later of South Korea and Taiwan have made possible the growth of industrial zones at the peri-urban areas of major capitalist countries in Southeast Asia. The cooperation between Japan and the U.S. has created not only a particular economic regime for Southeast Asia, but also a particular space in which the organization of labor and population was at stake.

These geopolitical forces have produced the peri-urbanization of capitalist countries in Southeast Asia. But the concretization of this possibility, even after the Cold War has disappeared owed much to, in Terry McGee's words, "the particular role of the state as a central institutional element in the process of social change."[111] This essay has shown just how important the particular role of the state in leading the process of (peri-)urbanization to "the end of the peasantry."

Where are the peasants to be located in the post-Cold War era, and more specially, after the collapse of the authoritarian regime of Suharto?[112] The new era that followed has its own markers: in another power, in the legacies of imperialism and post-colonialism, in the institutions of neo-liberalism. Here too there are witnesses and voices that continue to weight heavily and importantly to ask what obligations the present bears for the past, which seems to carry over to the future. For instance, Achmad Ya'kub, a member of the post-Suharto Indonesian Federation of Peasant Unions (*Federasi Serikat Petani Indonesia* - FSPI) reports that (although the peasants he described did not come from just peri-urban areas):

> On May 17, 2006, the streets of Jakarta filled with thousands of peasants. More than ten thousand men, women and children from the remote villages of Java flocked to the city centre with their banners, songs and the sound of the drums to one of the largest protests for

[110] For an assessment of the rise and the fall of Southeast Asian developmentist regime in relation to the Cold War, see: Benedict Anderson, "From Miracle to Crash," *London Review of Books*, 16 April 1998: 3-7.

[111] Terry McGee, "Presidential Address: Eurocentrism in Geography – the Case of Asian Urbanization," *The Canadian Geographer*, 35, 4, 1991: 341.

[112] For a detail study of Indonesian peasants in the post-Suharto era, see: Anton Lucas and Carol Warren, "The State, the People, and their Mediators: The Struggle over Agrarian Law Reform in Post-New Order Indonesia," *Indonesia*, 76, October 2003: 87-126.

agrarian reform since the end of the New Order in 1998. They were joined by workers, students, youth groups, urban poor, and other civil society representatives.

The Indonesian Federation of Peasant Unions (FSPI) and La Campesina initiated this mass mobilisation to protest against two major events in Jakarta critical to the direction of agrarian policy nationally and regionally. Firstly, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) which in its 28th Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific in Jakarta declared faith in trade liberalisation to alleviate poverty "in line with the spirit of the WTO Doha Development Agenda."… Secondly, farmers in Indonesia are alarmed by the current move by the National Land Body (an institution directly under the presidency of the republic) to implement the World Bank's concept of "market led land reform" which focuses on the liberalisation of the land market (through land titling) and not on land distribution…

Protestors left from the Istiqlal mosque early morning and walked to the Presidential Palace. There, the president sent an official delegation (the minister of Agriculture, the chief of the National Land Body, the cabinet secretary and its spokesperson) to meet the farmers leaders. The official delegation told the protestors that they had "the same heart and mind" as the farmers, but that "even if power was in their hands, they could not use it alone". The peasants replied that if no concrete step was taken towards genuine agrarian reform, they would organize more mass actions and land occupations in the future.

The protesters then marched to a central circle (Bundaran Hotel Indonesia) to spread out information about agrarian reform among the public passing by… The march then went to the Parliament building where representatives from various parties addressed the farmers. From the top of a truck, they promised them to implement land reform, but farmers had heard it before. They shouted at the parliamentarians: "Don't promise it, do it!" They also shouted: "Come to our village, and see for yourself how we live!"

After an exhausting day of protest under the sun, some 7500 peasants which had come to Jakarta in 120 buses spent the night in the city and left at dawn to return to their villages. That same day, some protestors from Ciamis (West Java) occupied 300 hectares of land belonging to a teak plantation. A sign that agrarian reform in Indonesia can not wait anymore.[113]

[113] Ahmad Ya'kub, "Peasants march for agrarian reform in Jakarta: "Don't promise it, do it!" June 29, 2006 <http://www.landaction.org/display.php?article=428>