

## DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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The Department for International Development (DFID) is the British government department responsible for promoting development and the reduction of poverty. The government elected in May 1997 increased its commitment to development by strengthening the department and increasing its budget.

The policy of the government was set out in the White Paper on International Development, published in November 1997. The central focus of the policy is a commitment to the internationally agreed target to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015, together with the associated targets including basic health care provision and universal access to primary education by the same date.

DFID seeks to work in partnership with governments which are committed to the international targets, and seeks to work with business, civil society and the research community to encourage progress which will help reduce poverty. We also work with multilateral institutions including the World Bank, United Nations agencies and the European Commission. The bulk of our assistance is concentrated on the poorest countries in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.

We are also contributing to poverty elimination and sustainable development in middle income countries, and helping the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe to try to ensure that the widest number of people benefit from the process of change.

As well as its headquarters in London and East Kilbride, DFID has offices in New Delhi, Bangkok, Dhaka, Kathmandu, Nairobi, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, Harare, Pretoria, Suva and Bridgetown. In other parts of the world, DFID works through staff based in British embassies and high commissions.

## COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS

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*Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) are prepared for all countries where we provide development assistance programmes, and are normally produced every three years. CSPs set out how we aim to contribute to achieving the international development targets in the country in question. Progress will be assessed against the strategic objectives set out in Section E of the paper. In preparing CSPs, we consult closely with governments, business, civil society, and others within both the partner country and the UK.*

**Department for International Development**  
**July 2000**

## **BURMA: COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER 2000**

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*"People in economic need also need a political voice... no substantial famine has ever occurred in any country with a democratic form of government."*

**Amartya Sen**

**A1.** Burma is one of the largest, poorest and most ethnically diverse countries in South East Asia. Along with Cambodia and Laos it is one of only three countries in South East Asia categorised as having 'low human development'.

*"Civil, economic, political and social rights must all be honoured in order to create stable and sustainable economic development."*

**Clare Short, UK Secretary of State for International Development, speech on 'All Human Rights for All', Law Society, 3 December 1998**

**A2.** There are large disparities within the country. The country's seven Divisions have in the past received greater attention and development support than the seven border States where ethnic minorities are a majority. There are also disparities in wealth and opportunity in the same locations: a small number of well-connected people have reaped the lion's share of what slender opportunities there are in Burma.

**A3.** The country has been ruled by a succession of military regimes since the early 1960s. The first democratic election for decades was held in 1990. The National League for Democracy (NLD) won. But the military junta refused to recognise the results. The response of most nations has been to regard Burma as a pariah state. Most have suspended aid and normal bilateral relations until Burma fulfils its pledges to introduce genuine political reforms.

**A4.** Burma has one of the worst human rights records in Asia. There are no forums to discuss poverty and human development. Comment on or criticism of government policy is not tolerated. None of the criteria necessary for DFID to consider partnership with the Government are satisfied. The repression also reduces the ability of

opposition groups to engage effectively in policy debate and dialogue, even if the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) were willing to consider it.

**A5.** The international development community, with the exception of the United Nations and Japan, has largely shunned Burma. And even the UN programme is small for a country as large and as poor as Burma. A few international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operate there.

**A6.** Periodic diplomatic and political efforts are made to break the deadlock between the military government and opposition groups to normalise relations between Burma and the rest of the world. Some of these initiatives link increased development assistance to improvements in human rights with progress towards democracy.

**A7.** The challenge for the international development community is to help poor people in Burma without helping the government that is largely responsible for keeping them poor, and to work in a way that encourages a move away from despotism towards more democratic, inclusive and participatory government. We do not underestimate the difficulties involved. In the current political climate it is neither possible nor would it be effective for DFID to pursue a bilateral relationship with the Burmese Government, and there are real limits to what the international community can achieve. This strategy is therefore unlike other Country Strategy Papers in that it does not set out a clear programme of action. Rather it seeks to clarify our objectives and to offer a framework within which we believe the international community should work. Within this context our objectives are to work with the international development community to:

- improve the livelihoods of poor and socially excluded people inside and who have fled from Burma;
- provide support to and build the capacity of civil society;
- reduce human rights abuses;
- contribute to tackling serious public health threats to poor people inside and adjacent to Burma.

**A8.** In a country as controversial and as difficult to work in as Burma *how* we do this is as important as *what* we do. We shall pursue these objectives principally by:

- supporting civil society organisations that share the objectives set out above;
- requiring our partners to set out their operational guidelines on working in Burma;
- in our relationships with the UN and the European Union advocating that similar approaches be used;
- encouraging consistency between political, diplomatic and development objectives.

**A9.** Threats to public health, particularly HIV/AIDS and malaria, will be better tackled through other approaches. We should seek to include Burma in broader multilateral or international efforts to tackle public health threats where we judge the threat is critical.

**A10.** We do not expect to increase significantly the amount of money DFID spends directly in Burma. Any change to this strategy and the volume of our assistance will depend upon significant political change in Burma.

**A11.** Our response will be proportionate to the impact that is likely to be achieved. In the absence of political change, DFID will concentrate on increasing the coherence and consistency of efforts to achieve change in Burma, and taking advantage of opportunities to encourage others to do the same.

## POVERTY IN BURMA

**B1.** Burma has never made the developmental gains that its abundance of natural resources and human talent promised. Under the current military Government, Burma will continue to be an underdeveloped, socially inequitable country characterised by very poor indicators of human development. Data are poor, but where they exist they indicate great deprivation and suffering. The Human Development Index rank is comparable with many sub-Saharan countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia in Africa, and India and Laos in the South and South East Asia Region. Rural areas are particularly deprived. Less than 2% of households have access to piped water and fewer than 10% have access to electricity. And in urban areas the situation is little better.<sup>1</sup>

**B2.** Further disparities exist between ethnic minorities in Burma and the Burmans. Burma is divided into seven Divisions and seven States which lie along the borders. The 1983 census showed 74% of the population living in the Divisions and 26% in the States, in which ethnic minorities comprise most of the population. Altogether there are over 135 ethnic groups speaking more than 100 different languages and dialects. The Government discriminates against these groups, often by denying or restricting their citizenship. Many of the groups have been in conflict, often violent, with the central government for many years. Cease-fire agreements have reduced the level of violence in some areas. But villagers have to provide the new Burmese army camps with forced labour and land. In other areas fighting, mass forced relocation and appalling human rights abuses continue.

**B3.** Human development has been uneven across the country. The border States, with the exception of Mon State, lag significantly behind the Divisions on several indicators of human development including infant mortality, educational attainment, access to safe water and health care. Even within the States there are striking differentials in the quality of life.

**B4.** HIV/AIDS is a significant and increasing problem in Burma. It is spreading beyond the major risk-behaviour groups and it is not clear at this stage how far it will spread into the general population. Urgent preventative action is needed. Burmese cases are part of the Golden Triangle epidemics that spread from India to Vietnam. Burma is a big heroin producer and HIV prevalence rates amongst injecting drug users are some of the highest in the world. There is a lack of government commitment to acknowledge or develop effective strategies. The total spend on HIV/AIDS annually is only US\$2m, over 50% of which is provided by international donors.

### ESTIMATED IMPACT ON IDTS<sup>2</sup> OF HIV/AIDS FOR BURMA: 2010

	With AIDS	Without AIDS
Growth rate	1.4%	1.6%
Life expectancy	58.8	62.8
Infant mortality	55.7	52.4
Child mortality	80.3	70.1

*As with HIV/AIDS, Burmese cases of malaria, TB and to some degree, childhood diseases are linked to transmission dynamics that cross national boundaries.*

## THE FAILURE OF SUCCESSIVE REGIMES TO TACKLE POVERTY

**B5.** The political history of Burma largely explains the failure successive governments have made of developing the country. Since 1962 the country has been under continuous military rule. At first, a policy of isolation from the world was pursued. This produced little growth and no development.

**B6.** In 1988 economic and political frustrations exploded into mass civil unrest and calls for a democratically elected government and economic liberalisation. A new military junta seized power. They brought in some economic reforms, stimulating some economic growth and attracting foreign investment, particularly in oil and gas and tourism

<sup>1</sup> From *Human Development in Myanmar*, United Nations Working Group, Yangon, July 1998, based on government data.

<sup>2</sup> The International Development Targets (IDTs) on human development include: 'A reduction by two-thirds in the mortality rates for infants and children under age five and a reduction by three-quarters in maternal mortality, by 2015'. The UK Government's White Paper on International Development, *Eliminating World Poverty: A Challenge for the 21st Century* (November 1997), reaffirms its commitment to this target and the associated IDTs.

projects. They held elections in 1990, in which the National League for Democracy won an overwhelming victory. But the ruling junta ignored the results. Progress in writing a new constitution, which the regime say is a necessary precursor to democratic reform, has moved at a snail's pace. Meanwhile, economic growth has slowed, with inflation over 50% per annum.

**B7.** Due to the political situation Burma receives almost no bilateral or multilateral development aid and anti-trade measures and consumer boycotts have been successful at discouraging private investment. But the underlying reasons for the failure to stimulate economic growth and development lie within the system of government, which is unaccountable, incompetent and dictatorial.

**B8.** Government revenue is minimal due to the informal, and illegal, nature of most economic activity (Burma is a major producer of opium and heroin). And the Government does not spend sensibly the money it has. Burma spends proportionately more on the military than almost any other country in the world. Projected government expenditure in the social sectors is among the lowest in Asia: 0.5% of GDP on health; 1.1% on education. In 1999 education expenditure is estimated to have fallen to 30 cents per child.

**B9.** Important posts are filled by military appointees who use a dictatorial and secretive management style. Policy is invented on the hoof and then abruptly changed to suit the whim or interests of senior members of the regime. This will not change unless the Government changes and becomes more accountable and open.

**B10.** The Government refuses to consider or discuss any changes to the way the country is governed. The principal objective of the Government is to safeguard Burma's security, political integrity and national identity. Development of the country and its people, and eradicating poverty are not priorities. There are still few opportunities for people's participation. Freedom of speech and movement is restricted. The press and media are heavily controlled.

**B11.** The ruling junta is largely insulated from any impact from the poor state of the economy. They have weakened and marginalised the NLD, the principal voice of internal democratic opposition. The isolation of the junta from the international community, especially the west, has not yet brought any signs of weakening their resolve to maintain their authority.

**B12.** In short, it is hard to predict how and when political change will come in Burma. But political reform and development are vital to Burma's development. Until this takes place, sustainable economic, social and human development will remain difficult, limited and fragile.

## REFUGEES

**B13.** Because of the long-running conflict between the regime and the many different ethnic minority rebel groups, large numbers of people have been internally displaced, or have crossed the border into neighbouring countries. There are 105,000 refugees in Thailand and 24,500 in Bangladesh.

## WHAT THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY HAS DONE

### EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

**B14.** The European Union, in common with most other major donors, has made clear it will not provide development assistance to Burma until the Government improves its human rights record. The EU common position on Burma includes a full-scale arms embargo, visa restrictions, and the suspension of defence links and all non-humanitarian or development aid. Exceptions may be made for projects and programmes in support of human rights and democracy as well as those concentrating on poverty reduction and, in particular, the provision of basic needs for the poorest section of the population.

## UNITED NATIONS

**B15.** Burma is a member of the UN. And based on the principle of universality, the UN continues to operate there with the approval of the SPDC. This presents the UN with some challenges. But also with some opportunities. As the largest international presence in Burma with a complex and legitimate relationship with the SPDC it has opportunities for dialogue and action to promote development and change.

**B16.** The UN Secretary General manages the Department of Political Affairs, which is responsible for many of the political and diplomatic efforts to promote dialogue between the SPDC and the opposition groups.

**B17.** The work of the funds and programmes is the responsibility of the heads of those agencies, who are appointed by the UN Secretary General and report to member states and donors through their Executive Boards. The specialised agencies are constitutionally separate from the UN General Assembly. Their heads are elected and are accountable to their own Executive Boards.

**B18.** Many UN development organisations have remained active in Burma throughout successive military regimes. Most maintain an operational relationship with the Government. The approach of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) has changed under pressure from its executive board and they have withdrawn as far as they can from collaboration with the Government and work directly with communities. Others have closer relationships with the Government. UNICEF works selectively with a number of government ministries. They believe this is the best way to ensure that vital public health interventions such as universal child immunisation are delivered.

**B19.** The UN family in Burma is not silent on the question of political change. In 1998 the United Nations Working Group in Burma prepared a report on Human Development in Burma which included the latest UN

General Assembly resolution on Human Rights in Burma. It also stressed the need for democratic and open governance and improvements in human rights for development to take place. The UN is preparing a Common Country Assessment, which will form the basis of all UN programmes in Burma.

**B20.** The UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and the UN General Assembly have passed resolutions, co-sponsored by the UK, condemning Burma for its human rights abuses each year. In recent years, the UN Human Rights Special Rapporteur has not been allowed to visit, but has produced damning reports for the Commission on the basis of reports from refugees on the border.

**B21.** In the UNCHR's April 1999 resolution, drafted by the EU, the Commission called on the Secretary General to bring the text of the resolution to the attention of all relevant parts of the UN system. This was reconfirmed in the April 2000 resolution. This is a significant departure from the previous focus on governments as having the primary responsibility for human rights. Burma is now prevented from attending regional or technical meetings or benefiting from technical assistance programmes run by the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

## MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

**B22.** The World Bank and Asian Development Bank (AsDB) have suspended lending to Burma. Burma is in arrears to the World Bank and the AsDB. Burma does co-operate with the AsDB in the Greater Mekong Sub-region initiative, but does not benefit from any concrete activities in country.

**B23.** The World Bank explored in 1999 the possibility of reopening a programme with Burma. Starting the programme would be linked to improvements in governance, transparency and accountability. The timing of the exploratory mission was linked to progress with a UN démarche to encourage dialogue between the Government and the opposition. The SPDC regime showed little desire for change.



**B24.** Constitutionally the World Bank and AsDB are prevented from attaching political conditions to their lending. However, Burma's poor governance, and lack of transparency and accountability present serious economic obstacles to their becoming involved in Burma.

### INTERNATIONAL NGOS

**B25.** A small, but slowly increasing number of international NGOs are active in Burma. The operating environment for them is highly constrained, but the situation is gradually improving. Their freedom of movement outside the towns remains at the whim of local military commanders. But the past three years have seen them expand their geographical spread. They are also developing activities in relatively sensitive sectors such as children in especially difficult circumstances. Progress has been slow, but real. Most are trying to achieve what they can in difficult circumstances, but acknowledge that progress is slow and will always be limited.

### EXTERNAL LOBBY AND INTEREST GROUPS

**B26.** A large number of NGOs and other coalitions and alliances of civil society organisations operate outside Burma. The Burma Border Consortium (BBC) provides relief to 105,000 refugees living inside the Thai border. Other NGOs concentrate on helping exiles continue their studies and support debate dialogue and communication on Burma. Some promote and manage consumer boycott campaigns intended to punish international companies with investments in Burma.

*"We should never strengthen governments that violate human rights. But nor should we abandon repressed people living under unjust governments. Always the test should be what works – what brings real improvements in the observance of human rights."*

Clare Short, UK Secretary of State for International Development, speech on 'All Human Rights for All', Law Society, 3 December 1998

### WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY DO?

**B27.** Burma presents a development dilemma: how to assist poor people ruled by an oppressive Government at the same time as avoiding supporting or otherwise lending legitimacy to the Government? Providing services can relieve government of the responsibility to do so. By restricting where and with whom development and relief organisations operate, government can make these organisations unwilling partners in pacification campaigns. Taken individually organisations may be doing good. But the net effect may be less positive.

**B28.** In a situation such as that of Burma, the international development community needs more than ever to have a unified and consistent approach to providing assistance. DFID should contribute to the formation of this more consistent approach, and support activities that fit within.



*"Where poor countries are ruled by governments with no commitment to helping the poor realise their human rights, we will help – where we can do so – through alternative channels. These will include the institutions of civil society, voluntary agencies and local government. In such cases our assistance will be tightly focused on the victims of neglect and oppression."*

**UK Government White Paper on International Development, November 1997**

## **PARTNERSHIPS WITH NGOS AND UN AGENCIES**

**C2.** Our current partnerships with NGOs have developed in response to needs identified by the NGOs themselves and within the framework set out by the EU Common Position. DFID has also been supporting the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the Rohingya refugees in Rakhine state.

## **PARTNERSHIP WITH GOVERNMENT**

**C1.** In the current political and diplomatic environment, partnership with the Government is not possible. The normal criteria of openness, transparency, willingness to discuss policy and flexibility are not satisfied. The regime would use development assistance that is channelled through them corruptly, inefficiently and unethically.

**Di.** DFID currently supports a small number of international NGOs in Burma. Activities supported include community health, social marketing of condoms, and street children. DFID also supports Burmese refugees inside Thailand. The British Embassy in Rangoon supports small projects working directly with communities through local civil society organisations.

**D2.** We take part in UNDP and UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) Executive Board meetings, stressing the need for UNDP and UNICEF to avoid operating in a way that undermines the climate for change, lends undue legitimacy to the SPDC or fails to recognise the legitimacy of the opposition and take into account the widespread human rights abuses in Burma.

## UK GOVERNMENT POLICY

**E1.** The UK Government's White Paper on International Development focuses on eliminating poverty and sets out the framework within which DFID works. Included in this framework is the importance of human rights and the responsibility of states to respect and recognise all human rights. The White Paper also sets out the conditions under which DFID will enter into partnership with governments and other donors and the approach that will be taken when partnership is not possible. Furthermore, the White Paper stresses the need for DFID not to work alone but to work with other members of the international development community.

**E2.** Where significant numbers of people from a war-torn or otherwise crisis-affected country take refuge in neighbouring states, the international community has an obligation under international refugee law to provide necessary protection and assistance. DFID's policy on humanitarian assistance recognises that treating just the symptoms of crisis can risk prolonging the cause. We encourage the participation of those affected by crises to help them find lasting solutions which respect their rights. These principles will help to guide our humanitarian assistance.

## DFID STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN BURMA

**E3.** Given the policies and behaviour of the present Government in Burma, the challenges facing the international community are extreme. We recognise that it will be difficult to achieve any significant impact, even when working with others (as we must). Our objectives are to work with the international development community, in ways that do not strengthen the hand of government, to:

- improve the livelihoods of poor and socially excluded people inside and who have fled from Burma;
- provide support to and build the capacity of civil society;
- reduce human rights abuses;
- contribute to tackling serious threats to public health to poor people inside and adjacent to Burma.

*"We recognise that humanitarian intervention in conflict situations often poses genuine moral dilemmas. We will base our decisions on explicit analyses of the choices open to us and the ethical considerations involved, and communicate our conclusions openly to our partners."*

## Policy Statement on Conflict Reduction and Humanitarian Assistance, DFID

## HOW WILL WE ACHIEVE THIS?

**E4.** We shall use four principal ways to achieve these objectives:

- our contributions to multilateral institutions and the scope this gives us to engage in discussions with them on their policy on Burma;
- the Civil Society Challenge Fund, which supports poor people by improving their access to information and enabling them to articulate their demands on those in power for reform and change;
- funds available for humanitarian relief, refugees and rapid-onset emergencies; and contributions to multilateral organisations with these responsibilities;
- contributions to regional and international efforts to tackle HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and eradicable diseases such as polio, guineaworm and filariasis.

## EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

**E5.** We shall encourage the European Commission and member states to take a similar approach to promoting a more coherent and consistent international effort in Burma. We shall achieve this through periodic discussions on the renewal of the EU common position and through discussion with EU officials responsible for EU policy towards Burma.

## UNITED NATIONS

**E6.** We shall encourage a more coherent approach by the UN agencies in Burma. We will discourage UN agencies from increasing their activities in Burma when there are serious doubts about the scope for effective interventions.

We shall:

- promote an approach that minimises collaboration with the Burmese Government, when Burma country programmes come up for discussion at the Executive Boards of individual UN agencies unless a strong case can be made, for example, in important health interventions with cross-border implications, and where there are good opportunities for engaging on human rights/protection issues;
- encourage UN agencies to examine the scope for a more consistent approach in the context of the Common Country Assessment process – through contact by the UK Mission and DFID's United Nations and Commonwealth Department (UNCD) with UNDP in New York, and through contact with UNDP in Rangoon.

**E7.** We shall use other opportunities to discuss Burma with other key UN organisations when they arise.

#### INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

**E8.** We shall work through our Executive Directors' offices in the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to ensure that discussions about the re-opening of assistance to Burma include full consideration of the need for improvements in governance, transparency and accountability before assistance is provided.

#### CIVIL SOCIETY

**E9.** The Civil Society Challenge Fund will consider applications for support to civil society inside Burma. Applications will be considered in line with the guidelines for the Civil Society Challenge Fund. Applicants should also set out their rationale for operating in Burma. They should also include their operating guidelines and mechanisms and principles governing co-ordination and collaboration with other NGOs and members of the international development community.

**E10.** Further details of the Civil Society Challenge Fund can be found at:

- the Public Enquiry Point (*see back cover for details*).

#### CIVIL SOCIETY CHALLENGE FUND

*"The Fund is about supporting work which empowers poor people, enabling them to speak for themselves, to do things for themselves and to make their own demands of those in power.. It is about improving links between people to strengthen the demand for progress and to ensure that economic and social advances are equitably distributed globally."*

**Clare Short, UK Secretary of State for International Development, Introduction to the Civil Society Challenge Fund, Guidelines for Applicants, DFID 1999.**

#### HUMANITARIAN AND REFUGEE WORK

**E11.** We will provide support to UNHCR and NGOs to help ensure the basic needs of refugees and internally displaced people are met. Where possible we will encourage self-sufficiency and seek durable solutions. This may, when conditions are right, include support for refugee repatriation and reintegration within Burma. We will, in addition, be ready to respond appropriately to any rapid onset disasters which may strike Burma.

**E12.** Given the particularly difficult situation inside Burma at present, we will give sympathetic consideration to proposals for direct service delivery activities of a humanitarian nature, which would normally fall outside the scope of the Challenge Fund.

#### THREATS TO PUBLIC HEALTH

**E13.** We will seek opportunities to collaborate with regional and global efforts to tackle major public health issues which have implications beyond Burma's border such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and polio and other eradicable diseases. DFID is also developing its own regional strategies to tackle HIV/AIDS. Burma will be included in this strategy.

**Fi.** We will continue with the existing management arrangements for providing assistance to Burma. Overall policy co-ordination is now being undertaken by the Eastern Asia and Pacific Department. The Civil Society Department will consider applications for support from the Civil Society Challenge Fund. Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs

Department will respond to applications for funding for work with refugees and for humanitarian appeals. Our United Nations and Commonwealth Department and International Financial Institutions Department will lead on relations with the UN and the international financial institutions.

## G. PROGRAMME RESOURCES

**Gi.** DFID does not have funds earmarked for Burma. We currently spend about £700,000 a year on direct support to civil society, refugees, and people affected by rapid-onset emergencies. This includes an annual contribution through the Small Grants Scheme, managed by the British Embassy

in Rangoon. We also provide indirect support through our contributions to the UN funds and programmes. Increased funding could be made available if the political situation improved but currently we do not expect this sum to increase.

## SUMMARY OF CONSULATION PROCESS

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Consultation began early in the formulation of this strategy. Two visits were made to Burma. Meetings were held with the representatives and staff of UN organisations, the representatives of international NGOs, and representatives of civil society. Outside Burma, discussions were held with representatives of international NGOs, both in London and in Bangkok. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office were closely involved in the consultations.

We did not meet with the Government of Burma.

The key issues that emerged from the consultation were:

- The need for the international community in Burma to work together in a more coherent and consistent way.
- The key role of the UN in co-ordination, and the particular legitimacy it can lend to international efforts to encouraged change in Burma.

Consultation will not end with the publication of this Country Strategy Paper. We shall continue to maintain and develop our relationship with the international community that wants to encourage change in Burma.