S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

RSIS Working Paper

No. 251

Securing the State:
National Security in Contemporary times

Sir David Omand GCB

S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Singapore

6 November 2012

About RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies when it was established in July 1996, RSIS' mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis,
- Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy,
- Foster a global network of like-minded professional schools.

GRADUATE EDUCATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Thus far, students from more than 50 countries have successfully completed one of these programmes. In 2010, a Double Masters Programme with Warwick University was also launched, with students required to spend the first year at Warwick and the second year at RSIS.

A small but select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students who are supervised by faculty members with matching interests.

RESEARCH

Research takes place within RSIS' six components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (Centre for NTS Studies, 2008); the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN, 2008); and the recently established Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS, 2011). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region.

The school has four professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to conduct research at the school. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations and the Bakrie Professorship in Southeast Asia Policy.

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

ABSTRACT

This lecture draws lessons from the experience of the first decade of the 21st century about how best to think about national security in modern times. Two related themes are identified. The first theme explores the connections between how we define the risks – both threats and hazards - to national security in human terms, how we use approach of risk management to maintain adequate public security, and as a result how we need to invest in modern intelligence to help in that task of risk management. The second related theme is about what can be learned specifically about maintaining security against terrorism and political violence since 9/11, and the connections that need to be made between public security, civil liberties, and human rights and the limits of counter-terrorism policy in a democracy.

****

Professor Sir David Omand GCB is a visiting professor in the War Studies Department at King's College London. He was appointed in 2002 the first UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator, and Permanent Secretary in the Cabinet Office responsible to the Prime Minister for the professional health of the intelligence community, national counter-terrorism strategy, homeland security and domestic crisis management. He served for seven years on the Joint Intelligence Committee. He was Permanent Secretary of the Home Office from 1997 to 2000, and before that, Director of the UK signals intelligence agency, GCHQ. Previously, in the Ministry of Defence he served as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy, as Principal Private Secretary to the Defence Secretary (during the Falklands conflict), and served for three years with HM Diplomatic Service in NATO Brussels as the UK Defence Counsellor. He is the Senior Independent Director of Babcock International PLC and a non-executive Director of Finmecannica UK Ltd and a Trustee of the Natural History Museum London. A Scot, he was educated at the Glasgow Academy and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge where he is an honorary fellow. His book, *Securing the State*, was published by C. Hurst (Publishers) Ltd and Columbia University Press in 2010.

Securing the State: National Security in Contemporary times

I spent my career in the service of the British State working on defence, security and intelligence issues – a common factor is perhaps that they all involved secrecy. When I left Cambridge University and joined GCHQ even the purpose of the organization was secret then, even more so than rest of the British intelligence community. That I could on retirement, with strong encouragement from within the intelligence community, have written my book[1], *Securing the State*, dealing with security and intelligence matters is just one sign of the way that intelligence work has become a routine government activity affecting directly the security of the public - sometimes very visibly.

One of the reasons for writing the book was to help identify some of the security lessons we should have absorbed since the events of 9/11. Those lessons include those that we have learnt the hard way about what I would describe as the 'thermodynamics' of counter-terrorism:

- how government can best exercise its primary duty to protect the public in the face of a severe terrorist threat –
- and yet maintain civic harmony, and uphold democratic values and the rule of law at home and internationally.

For there is an important relationship between the vigour of security measures taken, at home and overseas, to protect the public and to obtain intelligence to prevent attacks, and the level of confidence among all sections of the community in the government's commitment to protect the liberties and rights of the citizen, including both the right to life in the face of murderous terrorism and the right to privacy of personal and family life.

As with the thermodynamic relationship between the volume, pressure and temperature of a gas, too sudden an application of force to compress it and the temperature may rise dangerously to explosive levels; too little pressure applied and the gas is uncontained and will expand out of control. The best approach may well be to cool things down as you gradually build up the pressure, and certainly not to do things unnecessarily that heat it up – the impact of the occupation of Iraq on domestic radicalization comes to mind; the impact of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities were one to occur would be another.

[1] David Omand, *Securing the State*, London: Hurst, 2010 and Columbia University Press, 2010

I will not push such an inexact analogy to thermodynamics further - the point I want to register is the inter-relationship between our security efforts, their direct effect on the risks we face and the indirect effects on the rule of law, civil liberties, human rights and thus civic harmony or *'Civitas'* – the public value of harmony in the community based on a shared sense of place, of belonging, regardless of ethnic roots or religious difference. The choice of security strategy is of course crucial to getting that thermodynamic judgment right.

This is not a new issue. I decided to illustrate my book with details from a remarkable attempt almost 700 years ago to describe the balance needed for good government. Ambroglio Lorenzetti's great 14th century fresco cycle in Siena in Italy, entitled Good and Bad Government, illustrates that some of the most pressing dilemmas we face over public security are ancient ones, such as the balance between security and the rule of law, albeit today disguised by the effects of modern technology.

Good government today as in the 14th century vision brings peace, stability and security, prosperity, and culture. The painting shows cheerful townspeople and country folk working in harmony and going freely about their affairs transporting their goods on well-kept roads or sowing in the weed-free fields. Builders are hard at work developing the city-state. The watchtowers are well kept and manned.

Hovering overhead in the fresco is a winged figure, labelled Securitas, or security. The winged figure also holds up a scroll on which is written the promise that under her protection all can live in safety, and without fear: the words eerily presage the aim of CONTEST, the UK government's 21st century counter-terrorist strategy, 'so that people can go about their normal business, freely and with confidence'.

On the other hand, in the fresco representing bad government, the figure of Tyranny dominates. The prevalent emotion is insecurity and fear. Not only are the city walls crumbling, leaving the city vulnerable to its enemies, but the very internal fabric of the town is decaying. The message directed at 14th century Siena's rising merchant class (and now to our own global markets) is that insecurity makes investment and thus innovation hazardous.

My argument, in a nutshell, is that good government will always place the task of 'securing the state' at the top of its priorities. With security comes confidence, economic and social progress and investment in the future. But good government also recognises, as the 14th

century frescoes show, that security needs the active support of the public and thus the right relationship between justice, civic harmony, wise administration, fortitude, prudence and the other virtues to which the wise ruler and government should aspire.

New strategic imperatives

Of course there are some *new* security lessons we are learning from recent years, such as the impact we must now expect from the internet and social media, the potential of modern security and surveillance technology and the openness of our society to global influences. But there are also classic lessons that we need to relearn. For example:

- The importance of strategy: the strategic narrative governments choose to tell about what is going on in the world, based not just on their assessment of the threat but also the likely effects of their response, direct and indirect.
- The need to understand that we have to learn to prosper in a world of risk, and thus to explain - and to apply correctly - the principles of risk management.
- The recognition of the added value in managing risk of having an effective intelligence community – spanning domestic and foreign intelligence services, mastering the relevant technologies - that can generate pre-emptive intelligence, and forestall trouble by working harmoniously with law enforcement.
- The recognition that some risks will, despite our efforts, crystallise and thus recognize the value of pursuing a long term national policy of working with the private sector to build up resilience against a range of threats and hazards.
- And of course, as I have mentioned the importance of having an informed and supportive public that has confidence in the authorities and their methods

For me, the over-riding lesson of general applicability is the first of these, the importance of the choice of strategy. The strategic assessment made by government has to consider not just the characteristics of specific emerging threats and the need to counter them. It also has to incorporate, to use the term being popularized by Professor Sir Lawrence Freeman of King's College, *the strategic narrative* government chooses to believe about what is going on in the world, including about the character of the enemies of the state.[2]

As an illustration consider the way that the surprise attack on 9/11 created new narratives.

[2] Lawrence Freedman, *The Transformation of Strategic Affairs* (London: IISS Adelphi Paper 379, 2006).

On the one hand, 9/11 reinforced a growing view in both the US and the UK that not only should States be prepared to use force to defend themselves against external attack by other States, but in the face of this kind of terrorism governments have a responsibility to their citizens to anticipate trouble brewing of all kinds and to act *before* it is too late. And the international responsibility to protect, as the United Nations terms it, extends in some circumstances to citizens of those unfortunate countries whose governments are not able to provide them with security.

On the other hand, however, the strategic narratives told by the US and the UK about *terrorism* after 9/11 were different.

For the US, America had been the subject, as at Pearl Harbour, of a surprise attack from overseas. As President Bush's national security strategy subsequently stated: America is at war, thus accepting the war metaphor, legitimizing abnormal wartime measures, embodied in the Bush 'war on terror' aimed at destroying the external enemy, Al Qaeda.

For the UK, the threat, although inspired and directed from outside, had established support in parts of some domestic communities inside the UK. A domestic law enforcement model imposed itself with the aim of bringing terrorist suspects before the Courts. Unlike a war metaphor seeking defeat of the enemy, the UK CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy that was adopted had the formal aim of reducing the risk with the objective of maintaining domestic normality - so that people could go about their everyday business, freely and with confidence. These strategic differences across the Atlantic have had to be managed within the very closeness of our deep relationship with the US as seen in our intelligence cooperation and our joint operations overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan, but have inevitably led to difficulties when the actions and methods justified by these different narratives sometimes collided.

Strategic logic of UK CONTEST

In the UK we are, however, confident in the strategic logic of the approach taken in CONTEST for our circumstances. The aim – which *is* being achieved - is to reduce the risk from terrorism so that people could go about their normal life freely (that is, without having to interfere with individual liberties) and with confidence (for example, with people still travelling by air and on the underground, visitors coming to the UK, markets stable and so on). Implementation of CONTEST has involved acting on each factor in the risk

management equation that provides the measure of total risk: likelihood x vulnerability x initial impact x duration of disruption.

Thus making attacks less likely by expanding the intelligence and law enforcement effort to improve the ability to frustrate attacks and bring terrorists to justice in the Courts (the Pursue campaign); reducing violent radicalisation in the community and overseas (the Prevent Campaign); reducing the vulnerability of aviation and transport and safeguarding infrastructure essential for normal life (the Protect Campaign); and equipping and exercising the emergency services to reduce the impact should terrorists succeed in mounting an attack (the Prepare Campaign). The strategy remains in force now some 8 years after its initiation and is on its third major iteration under its third Prime Minister.[3] The value of such continuity in basic strategy in terms of maintaining effective counter-terrorist effort, not least during the recent Olympics, should not be underestimated. I judge it a success in its own terms: as the 2012 Olympics showed the UK is a nation living in peace, despite the continuing real threats.

Two years ago the British coalition government published its overall National Security Strategy, spelling out those major modern threats and hazards that have to be managed, from terrorism to cyber piracy, and from instability in key regions overseas to natural disasters, as well as the continuing task of preserving the territorial independence of the United Kingdom, not least through our membership of NATO.

The National Security Strategy identifies four 'top tier' risks:[4]

- International terrorism affecting the UK and its interests overseas
- Hostile attacks upon UK cyber-space
- A major accident or natural hazard
- An international military crisis drawing in the UK

Since these priorities were identified two years ago, examples of all four risks have occurred.

[3] http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat/ (accessed October 9 2012).

[4] http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/national-security-strategy/ (accessed October 9, 2012).

AQAP in Yemen for example almost brought down airliners with bombs hidden in printer cartridges discovered at Luton airport in the UK. Severe persistent advanced cyber-attacks from China are a daily occurrence. The Libyan crisis saw British Armed Forces in action in a new theatre. And although the major environmental disaster happened in Fukushima, Japan, the repercussions in the global industrial supply chain were quickly felt.

A characteristic of many such risks is of course that they are as the economists say, exogenous: they cannot be wished away or negotiated away by any one country such as the UK – their implications just have to be managed. And what the hard and dedicated work of the security and intelligence authorities can do is shift the odds in our favour, not guarantee a result.

A modern approach to security

Based on these observations, let me describe what I think is the logic behind such a modern approach to national security. I would summarise the argument in terms of three steps.

The first step in the argument is to recognise the implications of regarding national security as a collective psychological state as well as an objective reality such as freedom from foreign invasion. People need to *feel* sufficiently safe to justify investment, to be prepared to travel, indeed to leave the house in the morning to get on with ordinary life and to live it to the full - even in the face of threats such as terrorism and hazards such as pandemics. Our adversaries – and the international markets – must know we have the confidence to help each other protect and defend ourselves.

In terms of threats, increasingly in modern society, it will be too late to wait until the adversary is at the gate or inside the city before taking action to prevent, to protect and to prepare to deal with the consequences of threats by building up resilience. In a comparable way, we could tomorrow face the consequences of major natural hazards, such as the effects of 'space weather' resulting from coronal ejections from the sun, or animal diseases jumping the species barrier, or those that are likely to flow from resource stress as the global climate changes. Such hazards also demand that governments anticipate and act now – preferably in international concert - to mitigate future consequences.

A national UK risk matrix to help plan such anticipatory work was developed when I was the UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator, and is now published. Although I admit that we did not as I recall have the foresight to include either greedy bankers precipitating the

economic crash or volcanic ash clouds disrupting aviation. So, as my book discusses, some humility is needed about our ability to forecast. But I do believe we can all do better to give government and the private sector what I term '*strategic notice'* of possible futures that were they to arise would cause us problems.

The second step in modern national security strategy builds on that recognition of the citizen-centric view of threats and hazards. We have to recognize that security rests on the sensible *management of risk* not on attempts to eliminate risks altogether. Efforts to avoid all risk can do more harm than good. The law of unintended consequences often applies. Unreal expectations in that respect breed cynicism and an accusatory blame culture. In particular, governments can, in their pursuit of security, risk compromising freedom of movement and of speech, and the rule of law, thus disturbing the civic harmony that lies at the heart of successful societies. Indeed, an important ingredient in public security in a democracy is confidence in the government's ability to manage risk in ways that respect human rights and the values of society.

The third step in the argument then follows. It is to see that the key to good risk management, maintaining that delicate balance, is to have better informed decision-making by government.

Now, the overall purpose of an intelligence community is to improve the quality of decision making by reducing ignorance. Today there is more information available than ever before to help us do that. So-called secret intelligence is simply the achievement of that purpose in respect of information that other people, such as terrorists or rogue states, do not want us to have. Obviously we need decisions to be based on adequate knowledge of the situation – situational awareness – plus a deep understanding of what is going on. With situational awareness plus good explanation of why the situation is as it is there is some hope that what is liable to happen next can be predicted and risks anticipated, and successfully managed, within the limits of the knowable.

Thus we can use intelligence – broadly defined – to improve the odds of achieving our goals beyond what we would have managed had we simply tossed a coin to decide between courses of action, acted on hunch, or allowed events in the absence of decision to decide the outcome. But it is always a matter of odds, not certainties. Since the London bombings of 2005 there have been around a dozen terrorist plots affecting the UK. A few, such as the Haymarket

bombing plot that ended violently at Glasgow Airport, failed only because of slip-ups by the terrorists. But most failed because the intelligence services and the police got on to their trail first. We had a trouble-free Olympics this year in London, in large part because of a great deal of pre-emptive work by the security authorities.

Anticipation places a great responsibility on the intelligence analysts who are to provide strategic and tactical intelligence. Anticipation also places a huge responsibility on the shoulders those who have to decide whether and how to act upon intelligence, or not. As Machiavelli said "a Prince who is himself not wise cannot be well advised".

The tracking down of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011 was a remarkable example of bold political decision-taking based on good judgments about intelligence and on a partnership between the US intelligence community and US Special Forces – an extreme example of what I would describe as the emphasis now on *intelligence for action* - and a pointer to the increasing importance in warfare of special forces using tactical intelligence to achieve a strategic impact.

An effective intelligence community

From this line of argument flows my belief in the increased importance for modern national security of an effective modern national intelligence community working with their counterparts in like-minded nations. By the term effective, I mean an intelligence community that flexibly spans domestic and overseas interests in order to generate actionable intelligence, that works harmoniously with law enforcement and partners overseas to help disrupt threats and bring suspects to justice and that has a well developed analytic capability and the capacity to manage the mass of information that modern digital technology makes available.

There is a danger of public misunderstanding of this line of argument as a call for 'whatever it takes to keep us safe' in the secret world of intelligence. Clearly better media and public understanding is needed of some of what is <u>really</u> involved behind the scenes in providing the intelligence needed for ‘Securing the State’, as I titled my book – and what is simply cinematic or television fantasy such as is depicted in TV series such as 24 and Spooks, and films such as Mission Impossible or the Bourne trilogy. There is much the public needs to understand about how intelligence communities actually work and how they are regulated and overseen in a democracy. The public also needs to understand why it is in the interest of

public security that despite modern openness, there has to be secrecy surrounding the details of intelligence sources and methods.

As a general rule, the public gets to know much more about intelligence failures more than intelligence successes. That is inevitable. It is of course easier too, to point to past failures than to prescribe remedies that will genuinely improve matters for the future. Let me explore one example from the area of intelligence analysis and ask how the analyst should approach a typical question that the policymaker or military commander might pose. For instance, would the Chinese ever threaten military force as well as using diplomatic and economic levers to reverse a Japanese intention to nationalise what Japan calls the Senkaku islands in the East China Sea?

To answer such questions the analysts can assemble a great deal of information, There may be some sensitive sources but a good situational awareness of the position today can be obtained from open and diplomatic sources. But to make sense of the developing situation, the analyst must apply – often unconsciously – some explanatory mental model.
Traditionally, many defence intelligence analysts would first try to establish the military *capability*, and economic and other levers, at the disposal of the parties. Then the bolder analysts might try to judge the *intentions* of the parties towards the dispute. This distinction, between capabilities and intentions, is often coloured by the recognition that capabilities can take a long time to build up, but intentions can change in the twinkling of an eye or with the arrival of new leadership.

For some purposes, governments need to assess what might be the worst case they could face – even without detailed intelligence as to intentions - so as to be able to consider how best to protect their national interest in specific ways. This is common in domestic security planning. Thus, stockpiling smallpox vaccine effectively removes the risk of terrorists trying to obtain and spread that disease; having heavily armed guards at nuclear sites similarly makes what could be a catastrophic attack there very unlikely. The worst case is, however, not usually what intelligence analysts would forecast as the most likely outcome on which diplomats should act. This poses an obvious problem for public communication, as experienced over the last decade in relation to international terrorism.

Distinction between secrets and mysteries

Another model used by analysts might be the distinction (introduced during the Second World War by Professor R V Jones, the founder of scientific intelligence) between *secrets* and *mysteries*. Secrets are in principle knowable, since the events and decisions have happened, although no intelligence agency will succeed in uncovering all of them.

But no intelligence source will be able to provide the answer to mysteries, since these concern events that have not yet happened and may not happen – the leader has not decided on his next step, or may not have confided his decision to anyone. Customers for intelligence need to take care to distinguish when they are being told the intelligence analyst's best estimate of a secret – e.g. how much uranium have the Iranians processed - and when they are being given the best divination of a mystery – will the Iranians proceed to make and test a bomb once they have sufficient highly enriched material?

And that example illustrates the problem with that model of analysis since our best guess at the mystery of whether in certain circumstances the Chinese and Japanese would escalate the dispute depends upon our judgment of how their leaderships regard the likely consequences of such decisions and that in turn depends upon their reading of the US, EU and world reaction and how those reactions might affect Chinese and Japanese national interests respectively. So intelligence judgment is not just about the potential adversaries facing each other in a conflict or dispute, it is about how they view each other and the rest of the world, and thus about the likely effectiveness of our own policies towards the potential conflict. Such interaction of strategic narratives introduces complexity to the old distinction between secrets and mysteries.

In teaching intelligence analysis in London, I offer another mental model for intelligence assessment of such problems.

We should aspire to assessments based on three 'phenotypes' of intelligence judgment that, together with the concept of strategic notice, form my model of modern intelligence analysis.

The three phenotypes are:

- the use of the best validated *evidence* that can be accessed to provide situational awareness,

- the best *explanation* of the causes of events (and the motivations of those involved) that can be devised having examined which hypotheses are most consistent with the evidence and our historical understanding, leading in turn to
- the third phenotype, careful *predictions* of how circumstances might develop and how all those involved might respond to the measures we and our allies might take.

But prediction beyond a short time ahead is usually unreliable, and should be complemented by

- the technique of *strategic notice*: the identification of possible future developments of interest on which research and intelligence gathering can be commissioned, and policies developed, without necessarily assuming that we can know whether and when such developments will occur. We cannot eliminate surprise, but we can learn to live better with it.

My brief example of the East China Sea is in many ways an old fashioned one: a longstanding territorial dispute between two powerful States that have a history of antagonism. The subjects of intelligence analysis over the last decade have, however, increasingly been so-called non-State actors: terrorists, proliferators, narco-traffickers, organised criminals, and cyber hacktivists. Let me briefly say a word about that side of intelligence work.

Now there is a price for obtaining intelligence on people, and that is invasion of their privacy. And in modern circumstances that means some surrender – under safeguards – of personal privacy. PROTINT is my term (by analogy with HUMINT and SIGINT) for the data-protected personal information about us to be found in digital data-bases either in public or private sector hands and both here and overseas. Our communications, our movements and air travel, our financial transactions, our immigration status, national insurance record and so on and on. What some in the CIA call the 'electronic exhaust' we all leave behind as we live our normal lives in a high tech society. It is in the nature of such data bases that they will contain mostly information on the ordinary citizen, thus information on the innocent as well as the guilty. Very recently, the explosive growth in the use of social media - Twitter, Facebook, etc. – provides another channel of access to individuals and their preferences and

associations. I have spoken separately about my recent research into the role of social media intelligence for public security, what I call SOCMINT[5].

These intrusive methods are powerful and they get results. So public trust that this machine is only to be used when necessary for public protection against major dangers and will be used proportionately will continue to be essential.

To conclude, drawing on the British experience of the last decade, I would suggest we need to frame according to the circumstances in each country a series of propositions representing a balance of the competing principles and interests involved.

All concerned, Government, its agencies, and the public, have to accept that maintaining security today remains the primary duty of government and will have the necessary call on resources. The public should be invited to accept however that there is no absolute security and chasing after it does more harm than good. Providing security today is an exercise in risk management.

The public should be reassured that terrorists will be treated as criminals and dealt with under the law, a necessary condition for a democratic nation when building counter-terrorism strategy.

The ability to catch and mount a successful prosecution of the criminal is important but will not by itself sufficiently protect the public, especially when the terrorist is prepared to be a suicide bomber. Pre-emptive secret intelligence is thus an essential key to reducing the risk, including by building up resilience, so that normal life can continue. There will always be intelligence gaps and ambiguities, but overall the public must understand that the work of the intelligence and security services shift the odds in the public's favour, sometimes very significantly.

If the secrets of terrorists and serious criminals are to be uncovered and their plots disrupted there will be inevitable intrusions into privacy. These intrusive methods are powerful and they get results. So the public trust that the security and intelligence apparatus is under

5 See Omand D., Bartlett J., and Miller C., *#Intelligence* (2012) London: Demos and the same authors' *Introduction to Social Media Intelligence,* Intelligence and National Security, iFirst 28 Sept 2012.

control and acting lawfully, and will only be used for public protection against major dangers, and will continue to be essential.

The law enforcement, security and intelligence community have to accept in turn that ethics do matter: there are 'red lines' that must not be crossed. So some opportunities will have to be passed over and the principles of proportionality, necessity and due authority will have to be followed. In my book I set down six such principles. Alan Rusbridger, the Editor of the *Guardian* newspaper in his blog has also suggested that these principles could also be applied to govern the use of intrusive investigative methods by newspapers and other media in the wake of the current allegations of phone hacking by News Corporation papers.[6]

Finally, the public must accept that there is no general 'right to know' about intelligence sources and methods, but the public has a right to oversight of the work of intelligence by a group of their democratically elected representatives, and to judicial oversight of intrusive investigative powers, with the right of redress in cases of abuse of these powers.

In my book I use the ancient Greek term *phronesis*, the application of practical wisdom to the anticipation of risks. Phronesis was defined by the historian Edgar Wind as the application of good judgment to human conduct - consisting in a sound practical instinct for the course of events, and an almost indefinable hunch that anticipates the future by remembering the past and thus judges the present correctly. The key words here are, 'instinct', 'hunch', 'judgment' and above all 'practical'.

[6] http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/07/phone-hacking-alan-rusbridger

RSIS Working Paper Series

1. Vietnam-China Relations Since The End of The Cold War (1998)
Ang Cheng Guan

2. Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Prospects and Possibilities (1999)
Desmond Ball

3. Reordering Asia: "Cooperative Security" or Concert of Powers? (1999)
Amitav Acharya

4. The South China Sea Dispute re-visited (1999)
Ang Cheng Guan

5. Continuity and Change In Malaysian Politics: Assessing the Buildup to the 1999-2000 General Elections (1999)
Joseph Liow Chin Yong

6. 'Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo' as Justified, Executed and Mediated by NATO: Strategic Lessons for Singapore (2000)
Kumar Ramakrishna

7. Taiwan's Future: Mongolia or Tibet? (2001)
Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung

8. Asia-Pacific Diplomac*ies:* Reading Discontinuity in Late-Modern Diplomatic Practice (2001)
Tan See Seng

9. Framing "South Asia": Whose Imagined Region? (2001)
Sinderpal Singh

10. Explaining Indonesia's Relations with Singapore During the New Order Period: The Case of Regime Maintenance and Foreign Policy (2001)
Terence Lee Chek Liang

11. Human Security: Discourse, Statecraft, Emancipation (2001)
Tan See Seng

12. Globalization and its Implications for Southeast Asian Security: A Vietnamese Perspective (2001)
Nguyen Phuong Binh

13. Framework for Autonomy in Southeast Asia's Plural Societies (2001)
Miriam Coronel Ferrer

14. Burma: Protracted Conflict, Governance and Non-Traditional Security Issues (2001)
Ananda Rajah

15. Natural Resources Management and Environmental Security in Southeast Asia: Case Study of Clean Water Supplies in Singapore (2001)
Kog Yue Choong

16. Crisis and Transformation: ASEAN in the New Era (2001)
Etel Solingen

17. Human Security: East Versus West? (2001)
Amitav Acharya

18. Asian Developing Countries and the Next Round of WTO Negotiations (2001)
Barry Desker

19. Multilateralism, Neo-liberalism and Security in Asia: The Role of the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (2001)
Ian Taylor

20. Humanitarian Intervention and Peacekeeping as Issues for Asia-Pacific Security (2001)
Derek McDougall

21. Comprehensive Security: The South Asian Case (2002)
S.D. Muni

22. The Evolution of China's Maritime Combat Doctrines and Models: 1949-2001 (2002)
You Ji

23. The Concept of Security Before and After September 11 (2002)
a. The Contested Concept of Security
Steve Smith
b. Security and Security Studies After September 11: Some Preliminary Reflections
Amitav Acharya

24. Democratisation In South Korea And Taiwan: The Effect Of Social Division On Inter-Korean and Cross-Strait Relations (2002)
Chien-peng (C.P.) Chung

25. Understanding Financial Globalisation (2002)
Andrew Walter

26. 911, American Praetorian Unilateralism and the Impact on State-Society Relations in Southeast Asia (2002)
Kumar Ramakrishna

27. Great Power Politics in Contemporary East Asia: Negotiating Multipolarity or Hegemony? (2002)
Tan See Seng

28. What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of "America" (2002)
Tan See Seng

29. International Responses to Terrorism: The Limits and Possibilities of Legal Control of Terrorism by Regional Arrangement with Particular Reference to ASEAN (2002)
Ong Yen Nee

30. Reconceptualizing the PLA Navy in Post – Mao China: Functions, Warfare, Arms, and Organization (2002)
Nan Li

31. Attempting Developmental Regionalism Through AFTA: The Domestics Politics – Domestic Capital Nexus (2002)
Helen E S Nesadurai

32. 11 September and China: Opportunities, Challenges, and Warfighting (2002)
Nan Li

33. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia after September 11 (2002)
Barry Desker

34. Hegemonic Constraints: The Implications of September 11 For American Power (2002)
Evelyn Goh

35. Not Yet All Aboard…But Already All At Sea Over Container Security Initiative (2002)
Irvin Lim

36. Financial Liberalization and Prudential Regulation in East Asia: Still Perverse? (2002)
Andrew Walter

37. Indonesia and The Washington Consensus (2002)
Premjith Sadasivan

38. The Political Economy of FDI Location: Why Don't Political Checks and Balances and Treaty Constraints Matter? (2002)
Andrew Walter

39. The Securitization of Transnational Crime in ASEAN (2002)
Ralf Emmers

40. Liquidity Support and The Financial Crisis: The Indonesian Experience (2002)
J Soedradjad Djiwandono

41. A UK Perspective on Defence Equipment Acquisition (2003)
David Kirkpatrick

42. Regionalisation of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership (2003)
Mely C. Anthony

43. The WTO In 2003: Structural Shifts, State-Of-Play And Prospects For The Doha Round (2003)
Razeen Sally

44. Seeking Security In The Dragon's Shadow: China and Southeast Asia In The Emerging Asian Order (2003)
Amitav Acharya

45. Deconstructing Political Islam In Malaysia: UMNO'S Response To PAS' Religio-Political Dialectic (2003)
Joseph Liow

46. The War On Terror And The Future of Indonesian Democracy (2003)
Tatik S. Hafidz

47. Examining The Role of Foreign Assistance in Security Sector Reforms: The Indonesian Case (2003)
Eduardo Lachica

48. Sovereignty and The Politics of Identity in International Relations (2003)
Adrian Kuah

49. Deconstructing Jihad; Southeast Asia Contexts (2003)
Patricia Martinez

50. The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion (2003)
Alastair Iain Johnston

51. In Search of Suitable Positions' in the Asia Pacific: Negotiating the US-China Relationship and Regional Security (2003)
Evelyn Goh

52. American Unilaterism, Foreign Economic Policy and the 'Securitisation' of Globalisation (2003)
Richard Higgott

53. Fireball on the Water: Naval Force Protection-Projection, Coast Guarding, Customs Border Security & Multilateral Cooperation in Rolling Back the Global Waves of Terror from the Sea (2003)
Irvin Lim

54. Revisiting Responses To Power Preponderance: Going Beyond The Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy (2003)
Chong Ja Ian

55. Pre-emption and Prevention: An Ethical and Legal Critique of the Bush Doctrine and Anticipatory Use of Force In Defence of the State (2003)
Malcolm Brailey

56. The Indo-Chinese Enlargement of ASEAN: Implications for Regional Economic Integration (2003)
Helen E S Nesadurai

57. The Advent of a New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects Based Operation (2003)
Joshua Ho

58. Critical Mass: Weighing in on Force Transformation & Speed Kills Post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004)
Irvin Lim

59. Force Modernisation Trends in Southeast Asia (2004)
Andrew Tan

60. Testing Alternative Responses to Power Preponderance: Buffering, Binding, Bonding and Beleaguering in the Real World (2004)
Chong Ja Ian

61. Outlook on the Indonesian Parliamentary Election 2004 (2004)
Irman G. Lanti

62. Globalization and Non-Traditional Security Issues: A Study of Human and Drug Trafficking in East Asia (2004)
Ralf Emmers

63. Outlook for Malaysia's 11th General Election (2004)
Joseph Liow

64. Not *Many* Jobs Take a Whole Army: Special Operations Forces and The Revolution in Military Affairs. (2004)
Malcolm Brailey

65. Technological Globalisation and Regional Security in East Asia (2004)
J.D. Kenneth Boutin

66. UAVs/UCAVS – Missions, Challenges, and Strategic Implications for Small and Medium Powers (2004)
Manjeet Singh Pardesi

67. Singapore's Reaction to Rising China: Deep Engagement and Strategic Adjustment (2004)
Evelyn Goh

68. The Shifting Of Maritime Power And The Implications For Maritime Security In East Asia (2004)
Joshua Ho

69. China In The Mekong River Basin: The Regional Security Implications of Resource Development On The Lancang Jiang (2004)
Evelyn Goh

70. Examining the Defence Industrialization-Economic Growth Relationship: The Case of Singapore (2004)
Adrian Kuah and Bernard Loo

71. "Constructing" The Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist: A Preliminary Inquiry (2004)
Kumar Ramakrishna

72. Malaysia and The United States: Rejecting Dominance, Embracing Engagement (2004)
Helen E S Nesadurai

73. The Indonesian Military as a Professional Organization: Criteria and Ramifications for Reform (2005)
John Bradford

74. Martime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: A Risk Assessment (2005)
Catherine Zara Raymond

75. Southeast Asian Maritime Security In The Age Of Terror: Threats, Opportunity, And Charting The Course Forward (2005)
John Bradford

76. Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives (2005)
Manjeet Singh Pardesi

77. Towards Better Peace Processes: A Comparative Study of Attempts to Broker Peace with MNLF and GAM (2005)
S P Harish

78. Multilateralism, Sovereignty and Normative Change in World Politics (2005)
Amitav Acharya

79. The State and Religious Institutions in Muslim Societies (2005)
Riaz Hassan

80. On Being Religious: Patterns of Religious Commitment in Muslim Societies (2005)
Riaz Hassan

81. The Security of Regional Sea Lanes (2005)
Joshua Ho

82. Civil-Military Relationship and Reform in the Defence Industry (2005)
Arthur S Ding

83. How Bargaining Alters Outcomes: Bilateral Trade Negotiations and Bargaining Strategies (2005)
Deborah Elms

84. Great Powers and Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies: Omni-enmeshment, Balancing and Hierarchical Order (2005)
Evelyn Goh

85. Global Jihad, Sectarianism and The Madrassahs in Pakistan (2005)
Ali Riaz

86. Autobiography, Politics and Ideology in Sayyid Qutb's Reading of the Qur'an (2005)
Umej Bhatia

87. Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and Diplomatic Status Quo (2005)
Ralf Emmers

88. China's Political Commissars and Commanders: Trends & Dynamics (2005)
Srikanth Kondapalli

89. Piracy in Southeast Asia New Trends, Issues and Responses (2005)
Catherine Zara Raymond

90. Geopolitics, Grand Strategy and the Bush Doctrine (2005)
Simon Dalby

91. Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia: The Case of the Riau Archipelago (2005)
Nankyung Choi

92. The Impact of RMA on Conventional Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis (2005)
Manjeet Singh Pardesi

93. Africa and the Challenge of Globalisation (2005)
Jeffrey Herbst

94. The East Asian Experience: The Poverty of 'Picking Winners (2005)
Barry Desker and Deborah Elms

95. Bandung And The Political Economy Of North-South Relations: Sowing The Seeds For Revisioning International Society (2005)
Helen E S Nesadurai

96. Re-conceptualising the Military-Industrial Complex: A General Systems Theory Approach (2005)
Adrian Kuah

97. Food Security and the Threat From Within: Rice Policy Reforms in the Philippines (2006)
Bruce Tolentino

98. Non-Traditional Security Issues: Securitisation of Transnational Crime in Asia (2006)
James Laki

99. Securitizing/Desecuritizing the Filipinos' 'Outward Migration Issue'in the Philippines' Relations with Other Asian Governments (2006)
José N. Franco, Jr.

100. Securitization Of Illegal Migration of Bangladeshis To India (2006)
Josy Joseph

101. Environmental Management and Conflict in Southeast Asia – Land Reclamation and its Political Impact (2006)
Kog Yue-Choong

102. Securitizing border-crossing: The case of marginalized stateless minorities in the Thai-Burma Borderlands (2006)
Mika Toyota

103. The Incidence of Corruption in India: Is the Neglect of Governance Endangering Human Security in South Asia? (2006)
Shabnam Mallick and Rajarshi Sen

104. The LTTE's Online Network and its Implications for Regional Security (2006)
Shyam Tekwani

105. The Korean War June-October 1950: Inchon and Stalin In The "Trigger Vs Justification" Debate (2006)
Tan Kwoh Jack

106. International Regime Building in Southeast Asia: ASEAN Cooperation against the Illicit Trafficking and Abuse of Drugs (2006)
Ralf Emmers

107. Changing Conflict Identities: The case of the Southern Thailand Discord (2006)
S P Harish

108. Myanmar and the Argument for Engagement: *A Clash of Contending Moralities?* (2006)
Christopher B Roberts

109. TEMPORAL DOMINANCE (2006)
Military Transformation and the Time Dimension of Strategy
Edwin Seah

110. Globalization and Military-Industrial Transformation in South Asia: An Historical Perspective (2006)
Emrys Chew

111. UNCLOS and its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime (2006)
Sam Bateman

112. Freedom and Control Networks in Military Environments (2006)
Paul T Mitchell

113. Rewriting Indonesian History The Future in Indonesia's Past (2006)
Kwa Chong Guan

114. Twelver Shi'ite Islam: Conceptual and Practical Aspects (2006)
Christoph Marcinkowski

115. Islam, State and Modernity : Muslim Political Discourse in Late 19th and Early 20th century India (2006)
Iqbal Singh Sevea

116. '*Voice of the Malayan Revolution*': The Communist Party of Malaya's Struggle for Hearts and Minds in the 'Second Malayan Emergency' (1969-1975) (2006)
Ong Wei Chong

117. "From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI" (2006)
Elena Pavlova

118. The Terrorist Threat to Singapore's Land Transportation Infrastructure: A Preliminary Enquiry (2006)
Adam Dolnik

119. The Many Faces of Political Islam (2006)
Mohammed Ayoob

120. Facets of Shi'ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (I): Thailand and Indonesia (2006)
Christoph Marcinkowski

121. Facets of Shi'ite Islam in Contemporary Southeast Asia (II): Malaysia and Singapore (2006)
Christoph Marcinkowski

122. Towards a History of Malaysian Ulama (2007)
Mohamed Nawab

123. Islam and Violence in Malaysia (2007)
Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid

124. Between Greater Iran and Shi'ite Crescent: Some Thoughts on the Nature of Iran's Ambitions in the Middle East (2007)
Christoph Marcinkowski

125. Thinking Ahead: Shi'ite Islam in Iraq and its Seminaries (hawzah 'ilmiyyah) (2007)
Christoph Marcinkowski

126. The China Syndrome: Chinese Military Modernization and the Rearming of Southeast Asia (2007)
Richard A. Bitzinger

127. Contested Capitalism: Financial Politics and Implications for China (2007)
Richard Carney

128. Sentinels of Afghan Democracy: The Afghan National Army (2007)
Samuel Chan

129. The De-escalation of the Spratly Dispute in Sino-Southeast Asian Relations (2007)
Ralf Emmers

130. War, Peace or Neutrality:An Overview of Islamic Polity's Basis of Inter-State Relations (2007)
Muhammad Haniff Hassan

131. Mission Not So Impossible: The AMM and the Transition from Conflict to Peace in Aceh, 2005–2006 (2007)
Kirsten E. Schulze

132. Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia: ASEAN's Approach to Terrorism and Sea Piracy (2007)
Ralf Emmers

133. The Ulama in Pakistani Politics (2007)
Mohamed Nawab

134. China's Proactive Engagement in Asia: Economics, Politics and Interactions (2007)
Li Mingjiang

135. The PLA's Role in China's Regional Security Strategy (2007)
Qi Dapeng

136. War As They Knew It: Revolutionary War and Counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia (2007)
Ong Wei Chong

137. Indonesia's Direct Local Elections: Background and Institutional Framework (2007)
Nankyung Choi

138. Contextualizing Political Islam for Minority Muslims (2007)
Muhammad Haniff bin Hassan

139. Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki, Surakarta (2007)
Farish A. Noor

140. Globalization: Implications of and for the Modern / Post-modern Navies of the Asia Pacific (2007)
Geoffrey Till

141. Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? (2007)
Irvin Lim Fang Jau

142. Sulawesi: Aspirations of Local Muslims (2007)
Rohaiza Ahmad Asi

143. Islamic Militancy, Sharia, and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Suharto Indonesia (2007)
Noorhaidi Hasan

144. Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and The Maritime Balance of Power in Historical Perspective (2007)
Emrys Chew

145. New Security Dimensions in the Asia Pacific (2007)
Barry Desker

146. Japan's Economic Diplomacy towards East Asia: Fragmented Realism and Naïve Liberalism (2007)
Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

147. U.S. Primacy, Eurasia's New Strategic Landscape,and the Emerging Asian Order (2007)
Alexander L. Vuving

148. The Asian Financial Crisis and ASEAN's Concept of Security (2008)
Yongwook RYU

149. Security in the South China Sea: China's Balancing Act and New Regional Dynamics (2008)
Li Mingjiang

150. The Defence Industry in the Post-Transformational World: Implications for the United States and Singapore (2008)
Richard A Bitzinger

151. The Islamic Opposition in Malaysia:New Trajectories and Directions (2008)
Mohamed Fauz Abdul Hamid

152. Thinking the Unthinkable: The Modernization and Reform of Islamic Higher Education in Indonesia (2008)
Farish A Noor

153. Outlook for Malaysia's 12th General Elections (2008)
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman, Shahirah Mahmood and Joseph Chinyong Liow

154. The use of SOLAS Ship Security Alert Systems (2008)
Thomas Timlen

155. Thai-Chinese Relations:Security and Strategic Partnership (2008)
Chulacheeb Chinwanno

156. Sovereignty In ASEAN and The Problem of Maritime Cooperation in the South China Sea (2008)
JN Mak

157. Sino-U.S. Competition in Strategic Arms (2008)
Arthur S. Ding

158. Roots of Radical Sunni Traditionalism (2008)
Karim Douglas Crow

159. Interpreting Islam On Plural Society (2008)
Muhammad Haniff Hassan

160. Towards a Middle Way Islam in Southeast Asia: Contributions of the Gülen Movement (2008)
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

161. Spoilers, Partners and Pawns: Military Organizational Behaviour and Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia (2008)
Evan A. Laksmana

162. The Securitization of Human Trafficking in Indonesia (2008)
Rizal Sukma

163. The Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF) of Malaysia: Communitarianism Across Borders? (2008)
Farish A. Noor

164. A Merlion at the Edge of an Afrasian Sea: Singapore's Strategic Involvement in the Indian Ocean (2008)
Emrys Chew

165. Soft Power in Chinese Discourse: Popularity and Prospect (2008)
Li Mingjiang

166. Singapore's Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Political Risk of Overseas Investments (2008)
Friedrich Wu

167. The Internet in Indonesia: Development and Impact of Radical Websites (2008)
Jennifer Yang Hui

168. Beibu Gulf: Emerging Sub-regional Integration between China and ASEAN (2009)
Gu Xiaosong and Li Mingjiang

169. Islamic Law In Contemporary Malaysia: Prospects and Problems (2009)
Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid

170. "Indonesia's Salafist Sufis" (2009)
Julia Day Howell

171. Reviving the Caliphate in the Nusantara: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia's Mobilization Strategy and Its Impact in Indonesia (2009)
Mohamed Nawab Mohamed Osman

172. Islamizing Formal Education: Integrated Islamic School and a New Trend in Formal Education Institution in Indonesia (2009)
Noorhaidi Hasan

173. The Implementation of Vietnam-China Land Border Treaty: Bilateral and Regional Implications (2009)
Do Thi Thuy

174. The Tablighi Jama'at Movement in the Southern Provinces of Thailand Today: Networks and Modalities (2009)
Farish A. Noor

175. The Spread of the Tablighi Jama'at Across Western, Central and Eastern Java and the role of the Indian Muslim Diaspora (2009)
Farish A. Noor

176. Significance of Abu Dujana and Zarkasih's Verdict (2009)
Nurfarahislinda Binte Mohamed Ismail, V. Arianti and Jennifer Yang Hui

177. The Perils of Consensus: How ASEAN's Meta-Regime Undermines Economic and Environmental Cooperation (2009)
Vinod K. Aggarwal and Jonathan T. Chow

178. The Capacities of Coast Guards to deal with Maritime Challenges in Southeast Asia (2009)
Prabhakaran Paleri

179. China and Asian Regionalism: Pragmatism Hinders Leadership (2009)
Li Mingjiang

180. Livelihood Strategies Amongst Indigenous Peoples in the Central Cardamom Protected Forest, Cambodia (2009)
Long Sarou

181. Human Trafficking in Cambodia: Reintegration of the Cambodian illegal migrants from Vietnam and Thailand (2009)
Neth Naro

182. The Philippines as an Archipelagic and Maritime Nation: Interests, Challenges, and Perspectives (2009)
Mary Ann Palma

183. The Changing Power Distribution in the South China Sea: Implications for Conflict Management and Avoidance (2009)
Ralf Emmers

184. Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da'wa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia (2009)
Noorhaidi Hasan

185. U.S. Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia: From Manifest Destiny to Shared Destiny (2009)
Emrys Chew

186. Different Lenses on the Future: U.S. and Singaporean Approaches to Strategic Planning (2009)
Justin Zorn

187. Converging Peril : Climate Change and Conflict in the Southern Philippines (2009)
J. Jackson Ewing

188. Informal Caucuses within the WTO: Singapore in the "Invisibles Group" (2009)
Barry Desker

189. The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: A Failure in Practice (2009)
Ralf Emmers and See Seng Tan

190. How Geography Makes Democracy Work (2009)
Richard W. Carney

191. The Arrival and Spread of the Tablighi Jama'at In West Papua (Irian Jaya), Indonesia (2010)
Farish A. Noor

192. The Korean Peninsula in China's Grand Strategy: China's Role in dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Quandary (2010)
Chung Chong Wook

193. Asian Regionalism and US Policy: The Case for Creative Adaptation (2010)
Donald K. Emmerson

194. Jemaah Islamiyah:Of Kin and Kind (2010)
Sulastri Osman

195. The Role of the Five Power Defence Arrangements in the Southeast Asian Security Architecture (2010)
Ralf Emmers

196. The Domestic Political Origins of Global Financial Standards: Agrarian Influence and the Creation of U.S. Securities Regulations (2010)
Richard W. Carney

197. Indian Naval Effectiveness for National Growth (2010)
Ashok Sawhney

198. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) regime in East Asian waters: Military and intelligence-gathering activities, Marine Scientific Research (MSR) and hydrographic surveys in an EEZ (2010)
Yang Fang

199. Do Stated Goals Matter? Regional Institutions in East Asia and the Dynamic of Unstated Goals (2010)
Deepak Nair

200. China's Soft Power in South Asia (2010)
Parama Sinha Palit

201. Reform of the International Financial Architecture: How can Asia have a greater impact in the G20? (2010)
Pradumna B. Rana

202. "Muscular" versus "Liberal" Secularism and the Religious Fundamentalist Challenge in Singapore (2010)
Kumar Ramakrishna

203. Future of U.S. Power: Is China Going to Eclipse the United States? Two Possible Scenarios to 2040 (2010)
Tuomo Kuosa

204. Swords to Ploughshares: China's Defence-Conversion Policy (2010)
Lee Dongmin

205. Asia Rising and the Maritime Decline of the West: A Review of the Issues (2010)
Geoffrey Till

206. From Empire to the War on Terror: The 1915 Indian Sepoy Mutiny in Singapore as a case study of the impact of profiling of religious and ethnic minorities. (2010)
Farish A. Noor

207. Enabling Security for the 21st Century: Intelligence & Strategic Foresight and Warning (2010)
Helene Lavoix

208. The Asian and Global Financial Crises: Consequences for East Asian Regionalism (2010)
Ralf Emmers and John Ravenhill

209. Japan's New Security Imperative: The Function of Globalization (2010)
Bhubhindar Singh and Philip Shetler-Jones

210. India's Emerging Land Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities (2010)
Colonel Harinder Singh

211. A Response to Fourth Generation Warfare (2010)
Amos Khan

212. Japan-Korea Relations and the Tokdo/Takeshima Dispute: The Interplay of Nationalism and Natural Resources (2010)
Ralf Emmers

213. Mapping the Religious and Secular Parties in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi, Indonesia (2010)
Farish A. Noor

214. The Aceh-based Militant Network: A Trigger for a View into the Insightful Complex of Conceptual and Historical Links (2010)
Giora Eliraz

215. Evolving Global Economic Architecture: Will We have a New Bretton Woods? (2010)
Pradumna B. Rana

216. Transforming the Military: The Energy Imperative (2010)
Kelvin Wong

217. ASEAN Institutionalisation: The Function of Political Values and State Capacity (2010)
Christopher Roberts

218. China's Military Build-up in the Early Twenty-first Century: From Arms Procurement to War-fighting Capability (2010)
Yoram Evron

219. Darul Uloom Deoband: Stemming the Tide of Radical Islam in India (2010)
Taberez Ahmed Neyazi

220. Recent Developments in the South China Sea: Grounds for Cautious Optimism? (2010)
Carlyle A. Thayer

221. Emerging Powers and Cooperative Security in Asia (2010)
Joshy M. Paul

222. What happened to the smiling face of Indonesian Islam? (2011)
Muslim intellectualism and the conservative turn in post-Suharto Indonesia
Martin Van Bruinessen

223. Structures for Strategy: Institutional Preconditions for Long-Range Planning in Cross-Country Perspective (2011)
Justin Zorn

224. Winds of Change in Sarawak Politics? (2011)
Faisal S Hazis

225. Rising from Within: China's Search for a Multilateral World and Its Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations (2011)
Li Mingjiang

226. Rising Power… To Do What? (2011)
Evaluating China's Power in Southeast Asia
Evelyn Goh

227. Assessing 12-year Military Reform in Indonesia: Major Strategic Gaps for the Next Stage of Reform (2011)
Leonard C. Sebastian and Iisgindarsah

228. Monetary Integration in ASEAN+3: A Perception Survey of Opinion Leaders (2011)
Pradumna Bickram Rana, Wai-Mun Chia & Yothin Jinjarak

229. Dealing with the "North Korea Dilemma": China's Strategic Choices (2011)
You Ji

230. Street, Shrine, Square and Soccer Pitch: Comparative Protest Spaces in Asia and the Middle East (2011)
Teresita Cruz-del Rosario and James M. Dorsey

231. The Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the landscape of Indonesian Islamist Politics: Cadre-Training as Mode of Preventive Radicalisation? (2011)
Farish A Noor

232. The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) Negotiations: Overview and Prospects (2012)
Deborah Elms and C.L. Lim

233. How Indonesia Sees ASEAN and the World: A Cursory Survey of the Social Studies and History textbooks of Indonesia, from Primary to Secondary Level. (2012)
Farish A. Noor

234. The Process of ASEAN's Institutional Consolidation in 1968-1976: Theoretical Implications for Changes of Third-World Security Oriented Institution (2012)
Kei Koga

235. Getting from Here to There: Stitching Together Goods Agreements in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement (2012)
Deborah Elms

236. Indonesia's Democratic Politics and Foreign Policy-Making: A Case Study of Iranian Nuclear Issue, 2007-2008 (2012)
Iisgindarsah

237. Reflections on Defence Security in East Asia (2012)
Desmond Ball

238. The Evolving Multi-layered Global Financial Safety Net: Role of Asia (2012)
Pradumna B. Rana

239. Chinese Debates of South China Sea Policy: Implications for Future Developments (2012)
Li Mingjiang

240. China's Economic Restructuring : Role of Agriculture (2012)
Zhang Hongzhou

241. The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign Policy: The case of Philippines-China relations since 2004 (2012)
Aileen S.P. Baviera

242. The Forum Betawi Rempug (FBR) of Jakarta: An Ethnic-Cultural Solidarity Movement in a Globalising Indonesia (2012)
Farish A. Noor

243. Role of Intelligence in International Crisis Management (2012)
Kwa Chong Guan

244. Malaysia's China Policy in the Post-Mahathir Era: A Neoclassical Realist Explanation (2012)
KUIK Cheng-Chwee

245. Dividing the Korean Peninsula: The Rhetoric of the George W. Bush Administration (2012)
Sarah Teo

246. China's Evolving Fishing Industry: Implications for Regional and Global Maritime Security (2012)
Zhang Hongzhou

247. By Invitation, Mostly: the International Politics of the US Security Presence, China, and the South China Sea (2012)
Christopher Freise

248. Governing for the Future: What Governments can do (2012)
Peter Ho

249. ASEAN's centrality in a rising Asia (2012)
Benjamin Ho

250. Malaysia's U.S. Policy under Najib: Ambivalence No More? (2012)
KUIK Cheng-Chwee

251. Securing the State: National Security in Contemporary times (2012)
Sir David Omand GCB