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Mapping the Religious and Secular Parties in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi, Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to map out the presence and activities of the mainstream as well as minor political parties across South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Its focus shall be on a number of key questions:

1. Which are the dominant political parties in Sulawesi today?
2. Why and how have these parties maintained their respective dominant positions?
3. What is the fate of the smaller political parties in Sulawesi?
4. Do the parties in Sulawesi strive for popularity and support by appealing to national political aspirations and agenda, or do they cater to local communitarian and sectarian demands instead?

The paper begins with an overview of the history of political Islam in Sulawesi and proceeds to look at how Islam (and religion in general) has or has not been a factor in the province's internal politics. It ends with some cursory observations about the present state of politics in Sulawesi, with a special emphasis on the state of party politics in South Sulawesi, and how the local government has been addressing the issue of sectarian religious and ethnic politics in that part of the province.

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Depannya di Asia Tenggara, SAMHA, Jogjakarta, 2005; and *New Voices of Islam*, ISIM, Leiden, Netherlands, 2002.

Mapping the Religious and Secular Parties in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, Sulawesi, Indonesia¹

I. South Sulawesi at a glance: Local religio-politics reflecting national concerns and aspirations

Research that went into this paper was conducted mainly in South Sulawesi as well as the Christian-majority territory of Tanah Toraja in the northern half of South Sulawesi bordering Central Sulawesi in August 2010.²

For the aims of this paper our focus has been on Sulawesi in particular, cognizant of the fact that the outer island province has played a significant role in the formation and development of post-colonial Indonesia, and also of the fact that Sulawesi's relationship with the unitary republican state and government of Indonesia has been a

¹ Field research for this paper was initiated in Jogjakarta, Central Java and carried out in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja (Torajaland) in the northern part of South Sulawesi between 3 to 22 August 2010. In Sulawesi we would like to thank Professor Azhar Arsyad, Rector of Alauddin State Islamic University (UIN Alauddin Makassar) for his kind support as well as fellow faculty members of UIN Makassar including Professor Musaffor Pababbari, dean of the faculty of Usuluddin, Professor Muhsin Mahfudz, Dr. Hamdan Juhannis and Dr. Wahyuddin Halim of the faculty of political theory, Muhammad Ali, Iqbal and Pipin for their assistance in our research and for accommodating our interviews despite their heavy schedules. In Rantepao we would like to thank Heri Andino, Julius and Imanuel Yakob of the Toraja Christian Federation of Students for their assistance and offering us accommodation during our stay there. In Jakarta we would like to thank Professor Azrumardy Azra, Rector of UIN Sharif Hidayatullah for his help in securing contacts and assistants in Sulawesi, and Shafie Anwar of the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP); while in Jogjakarta we would like to thank Dr. Moch Nur Ichwan of CISFORM at the UIN Sunan Kalijaga for his help in our research as well.

² Preliminary work began in Jogjakarta on 3–6 August and 6–9 August were spent in Makassar and the southern regions of South Sulawesi. Between 10 and 15 August we were in the northern half of South Sulawesi, centred in Makale and Rantepao, in Tanah Toraja. Our stay in Makassar was facilitated by the staff of UIN Alauddin Makassar, where we stayed in University accommodation. In Rantepao we spent the first three nights as guests at the hostel of the Toraja Christian Students' Federation in Rantepao. On 16 August we attempted to take the land route from South Sulawesi to Central Sulawesi, heading to Poso. However, this leg of the journey was cut short by the time we reached Palopo on the way to Masamba as we were warned by other drivers and oncoming traffic that the hill roads were unsafe due to the presence of local gangs (*premans*) who were stopping cars and extorting money from drivers and passengers. On 16 August we, therefore, returned to Makassar and spent the remaining days until 18 August completing our research there. A planned trip to Manado by air was cancelled due to shortage of funds. Follow-up research was further conducted in Jogjakarta on 19–21 August and terminated by 22 August. For all inter-city travel in South Sulawesi and up to Tanah Toraja we travelled by local transport and hired cars. In Tanah Toraja we covered two-thirds of the area on foot. On the last night in Jogjakarta the city was hit by a minor earthquake (point 5) that struck at Bantul, but no injuries were sustained by the author.

complex and at times problematic one.³ In recognition of this complex relationship between Sulawesi and the rest of the country (as well as the wider region of maritime Southeast Asia), the paper will also take into account the various overlapping networks and patterns of direct and indirect influence upon, and emanating from, Sulawesi and its society, as we shall see below.

³ The question of decentralization of power from the political centre to the peripheral island provinces has been a problem of a political nature since the beginning, as noted by Gerald S. Maryanov (1958). He argues that since the emergence of Indonesia, the state has been faced with both centrifugal and centripetal demands, and the claims of the leaders of the non-Javanese island provinces have always been couched more in terms of autonomy rather than self-determination or decentralized power (pp. 14–15). Moves towards decentralization in Indonesia date back to 1956 when Aceh was declared a special province (*Provinsi Istimewa*) like Jogjakarta and the division of Kalimantan into three provincial commands. (Yet he also notes that even as early as the Dutch colonial era there were already attempts to decentralize command, if not power, by the Dutch as well, in the administrative reforms of 1922 and the constitution of the Dutch East Indies of 1925.) Post-colonial Indonesia inherited a state that was institutionally and structurally the product of colonization and colonial governance (pp. 19–21), and as such many of the power-structures and their attendant power-relations remained largely intact even after 1945. But while the Dutch had created a colonial federal state, the post-colonial Indonesian leaders opted for a centralized Republic with power invested and concentrated in Jakarta. The short-lived experiment with federalism lasted less than a year and by 1948 most of the Indonesian federal states had opted to join the Indonesian republic (then based in Jogjakarta). In 1950 the Negara Indonesia Timur NIT (based in Makassar, Sulawesi) also opted to join the Indonesian republic. Maryanov, however, notes that one variable factor that has always complicated the process of governance in Indonesia is the lingering effect of culture and political culture in particular (pp. 29–31). From the outset, the democratic principles of the Indonesian republic and its republican constitution had to be adapted to local realities where for centuries (and even during Dutch colonial rule) democratization was never really implemented, and in fact resisted by the colonizers and local feudal elites alike. As such, the popular understanding of democracy in Indonesia then, for Maryanov, veers between collective aspirations for self-determination on a national scale as well as more short-term demands for self-determination on the local level. Translated to centre-periphery politics, this meant that Jakarta became the focal point of competing local demands for central state funding, development, political patronage as well as protection. He also argues that this is why democratization is particularly problematic for Indonesians, for as a nation they have never been truly united save for the common struggle against Dutch colonialism and neo-colonialism (p. 40). Having won their independence, the democratic structures that were installed within a centralized republican system meant that the political centre became the new site for local and regional competition for capital and power. Maryanov also notes that the resistance to federalism was partly due to the fact that federalism was associated with the Dutch and their modes of divisive politics. The net outcome of this historical-political impasse, however, was the problem of provincialism that was seen as a threat by the centralized republican state but a natural consequence of democratization by local leaders on the provincial level (pp. 51–76). From the 1950s onwards, the Indonesian republican state was forced to go on the defensive to defend the idea of a unitary Indonesian nation-state against all competing loyalties and attempts at local ethnic/cultural/religious mobilization. The revolts in Sumatra, West Java, Kalimantan and Sulawesi were put down by force and justified on the basis of necessity and the need for the new republic to survive, for fear of Balkanization. But this also meant that the suppression of local/provincial demands would lead to civil war, the flaming of local provincial loyalties and demands (often couched in separatist or ethno-cultural essentialist terms), and the empowerment of the army (TNI) as one of the key actors in nation-building and the defence of the post-colonial state. Thus the Indonesian armed forces came to play the same role as the Burmese army, to protect the new post-colonial state from what it regarded as the meddling of populist politicians and the internal threat of separatism and calls for autonomy. [Re: Gerald S. Maryanov, *Decentralisation in Indonesia as a Political Problem*, Cornell University Press, 1958; reprinted Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, 2009.]

Background

Historically, Sulawesi has played a visible and important role in the development of the Indonesian archipelago long before the rise of Indonesian nationalism or even the creation of the independent Indonesian republic in 1945. As in the case of Sumatra, religious differences in Sulawesi have coincided with ethnic-linguistic cleavages as well. The Islamization of Sulawesi dates back to the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries when Islam came to Sulawesi via trade routes that linked South and Southeast Sulawesi to Java, Kalimantan and Sumatra. Typically, the conversion to Islam took place along the coastal regions of South and Southeast Sulawesi and this accounts for how and why until today the most pious Muslims of the province are the Bugis and Makassarese⁴ who inhabit South Sulawesi, centred around Makassar and Bone.

Christianity arrived much later with the consolidation of Dutch rule but was extended only to the other parts of Sulawesi that were not already Islamic. The Sultanates of Makassar, Gowa and Bone were then the centres of Islamic learning and politics, leaving northern Sulawesi (around Manado) open to Dutch and other Christian missionaries as well as the Torajans of Tanah Toraja. However, attempts to convert the Torajans to Christianity were largely superficial, as many Torajans retained many of their animist beliefs and traditional practices, making them Christians in name rather than conviction, akin to the Bataks whose conversion to Christianity was a negotiated process all along.⁵

⁴ Though ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious similarities between the Bugis and Makassarese are evident till today, it has to be noted that among members of both communities the distinction remains an important one. For the purpose of this paper, we shall maintain the distinction between the two groups. For practical purposes, “Makassarese” denotes the people of Makassar and the territories that surrounded the older kingdom of Makassar and its dominions, extending southwards to Bira, Bulukumba and the other principal towns and settlements along the southern coast of South Sulawesi. “Bugis” on the other hand denotes the communities that live north of Makassar, extending from Maros to Pare Pare and stopping at the foothills of Mamasa and the Toraja highlands. [We would like to thank Professor Musaffor Pababbari, dean of the faculty of Usuluddin, for making this distinction clear to us, 5 August 2010.]

⁵ The arrival of Christianity in Sulawesi was accompanied by the consolidation of Dutch colonial rule and as a result the identification of religious differences with ethnic ones meant that fissures had been introduced to divide the communities from the start. The Torajans’ adherence to Christianity—no matter how nominal it might have been—served the same end as the Bataks’ conversion to Christianity, which was to establish an ethnic-religious difference between them and the majority of Bugis/Acehnese society in their respective societies.

Sulawesi Islam also experienced the same tribulations as did the Islamization process in Java and Sumatra. Even as late as the sixteenth century, pious Muslims such as La Ma'deremmeng, the Sultan of Bone, had attempted to implement the *shariah* in Bone between 1631 and 1644. This led to a revolt in the court of Bone itself with the Sultan's mother and other nobles leaving to join the court of Gowa, and leading to the war between Gowa and Bone where the latter was defeated. In 1645, the Prince Sheikh Yusuf of Gowa also attempted to introduce *shariah* to Gowa after his return from Mecca.⁶ Such attempts at the reform and/or "purification" of Islam in South Sulawesi continued up to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bugis traditionalists like Haji Asad reacted to the arrival of groups like the Shirat al-Mustaqim and Muhamadiyah by forming their own traditionalist movements like the *Darud Dawah wal Irsyad* (DDI) and *Assadiyyah* (named after Haji Asad). By the 1950s, the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama was also opening up branches all over South and Southeast Sulawesi.

These movements—both reformist-puritan and traditionalist—were briefly united during the Japanese occupation when the Japanese formed the all-encompassing *Jama'ah Islam* in Sulawesi. But throughout this period, there remained internal class conflicts between the traditional aristocratic elite and the modernist-reformists who were part of the new economic mercantile class. With the end of World War Two and the commencement of the war for independence, the Dutch attempted to maintain their control by declaring the Eastern Indonesian State (NIT), and relying on the support of the traditionalist aristocratic elite. However, by 1949, the Dutch were forced to give up control and Sulawesi became part of Indonesia with many reformist-modernist Islamist movements supporting the *Masjumi* and calling on the Indonesian government to declare Sulawesi a special province (like Aceh) where Islamic *shariah* law could be implemented.

Bugis resistance to Dutch rule was led by non-aristocratic leaders who opposed the traditional Sulawesi elite whom they regarded as being too close to the Dutch. During

⁶ Attempts to purify Bugis/Sulawesi Islam of "non-Islamic" elements accelerated after the return of more and more hajis from Mecca by the first two decades of the twentieth century. In 1917, another Wahabi-inspired reformist movement was started by Abdullah Abdurrahman who had studied in Mecca for 10 years, and in 1923 he formed the Shirat al-Mustaqim, which later merged with the reformist Muhamadiyah movement as it spread to Sulawesi.

the revolutionary war (1945–1949), many of the Sulawesi royals and nobles worked with the Dutch and accepted Dutch support when they declared that Sulawesi would be the base for the Eastern Indonesian state (NIT). But with the fall of the Dutch and the end of the revolutionary war, almost all of the traditional Bugis elite were discredited and the way was left open for the non-traditional elite, most of whom were Islamist leaders like Abdul Kahar Muzakkar⁷ who were linked to Muhamadiyah.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the Muslims in Sulawesi were largely united against a common enemy that was the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). Muslim parties like *Masjumi* were very popular in Sulawesi, gaining most of the votes at the elections of 1955 despite the fact that some Islamist organizations had told their followers not to vote at all. In 1960, when Sukarno banned *Masjumi*, Sulawesi's Muslim population reacted with anger and accused Sukarno of giving in too much to the Communists of the PKI. As a result of this, Muslim activism grew even stronger in South Sulawesi leading to increased demands for more Muslim institutions that would reflect the Muslim character of South Sulawesi.⁸

- **Sulawesi during the New Order: From resistance to patronage-politics**

Following the fall of Sukarno after the failed coup of 1965, the Muslim leaders and movements of Sulawesi initially supported the New Order regime of Suharto and the

⁷ Abdul Kahar Muzakkar was one of the leaders of the Bugis rebellion against the Dutch and later the Indonesian state. He had studied at the Muhamadiyah schools of Sulawesi and then in Surakarta, Central Java. He returned to Sulawesi to take part in the revolutionary war against the Dutch, and later was assigned to the revolutionary army headquarters in 1945 where he worked on Bugis prisoners, persuading them to support his struggle. Following the revolutionary war he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel of the revolutionary army, but was not given the opportunity to assume the role of provincial commander for Sulawesi. During the first decade of Sukarno's rule he agitated for Sulawesi to be given the right to implement Islamic *shariah* law, but when this did not materialize he opted to support the Darul Islam revolt that was declared by Kartusuwiryo in West Java. Kahar was then promoted to the rank of commander of the Fourth Division of the Islamic Army of Indonesia (*Tentara Islam Indonesia*, TII). In Sulawesi, Kahar declared the province to be a *shariah*-compliant zone and unilaterally imposed *shariah* law and *hudud* punishments across the province. He recruited the help of many Bugis Ulama but was also accused of forcibly converting Christians to Islam during the Darul Islam revolt. In February 1965, Kahar was killed by Indonesian armed forces as the Darul Islam revolt was defeated across Sulawesi.

⁸ As a result of these growing demands from Muslim activists, the Indonesian Muslim University (UMI) was set up in Sulawesi in 1958 followed by the Muhamadiyah University in Soppeng, and a *shariah* faculty linked to the IAIN Sunan Kalijaga was set up in Makassar in 1962. Later in the 1960s, the *Ikatan Masjid dan Mushollah Mutahidah* (IMMIM) was set up, bringing together both modernist-reformists and traditionalists under one umbrella to further the Islamist agenda in Sulawesi, while also campaigning against the PKI.

Indonesian military (TNI). But in the end Sulawesi's Muslim groups were also disappointed with Suharto's New Order regime as it proved to be even more hostile to Muslim politics. After the fall of Sukarno, Suharto did not revive the *Masjumi* but made it even more difficult for Islamists to mobilize. Islamist students of *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI)—led by Bugis Muslim student activists like Jusuf Kalla—and the Indonesian Students Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia* KAMI) mobilized support for Islamist parties in South Sulawesi until the inter-religious conflict of 1967.⁹

By the 1970s and 1980s however, Suharto's control over Sulawesi was almost complete as a result of the Indonesian army's strong presence there. This compelled many of the former Muslim student activists of HMI and KAMI to transfer their loyalties to the Golkar party, among them being B. J. Habibie (who was born in Pare Pare, South Sulawesi, and whose other family ties go back to Garontolo, North Sulawesi) who became one of the most prominent Bugis technocrats and politicians of the Suharto era. During this period, Sulawesi was almost totally domesticated by the New Order, and Sulawesi was transformed into one of the most important (and loyal) vote banks for Golkar. Golkar won more votes in Sulawesi than the Islamist parties under the PPP umbrella, and the Suharto government continued to pump in vital aid and development funds into Sulawesi.

Sulawesi's politics from the New Order era to the present has, therefore, demonstrated the typical features of centre-periphery power relations, with the latter voting and offering political support and loyalty on a largely pragmatic, client-oriented basis. Support for Golkar was strong when Habibie was in a position of power to negotiate greater allocations of investment and development funds to Sulawesi, a pattern that

⁹ On 1 October 1967, Muslim-Christian violence was sparked off as a result of some controversial statements made by Christian leaders about the Prophet Muhammad. Though the conflict began in Jakarta, it spread instantaneously to Sulawesi and was made worse thanks to tension between Christians and Muslims there. For more than a decade, Muslim activists accused the Christians of surreptitiously converting Muslims to Christianity with foreign (Western) financial support. As a result of the conflict, a several churches were burnt in Makassar and other cities, and the Indonesian Catholic Students Association pulled out of KAMI. Other instances of violence followed, including the mass demonstrations in Makassar in 1969 following the controversy to allow gambling (Lotto) in the city. In many of these incidents it was clear that most of the protagonists were student activists who were militating against what they felt were class-based injustices, but often targeting Christians and ethnic minorities in the process.

was repeated later when another Sulawesi-born politician, Yusuf Kalla, rose to power as well.

- **Christians in Sulawesi and Muslim-Christian relations**

The presence of a sizeable and visible Christian community in Sulawesi was made obvious as a result of the inter-religious conflicts that have blighted the province since the 1960s and which peaked between 2000–2003. Sulawesi's Christian minority is concentrated in the north, around Manado among the Minahasa people, and in south and central Sulawesi among the Torajas of the Toraja highlands. Today, the Christians remain a minority, though they were protected by the state and the Indonesian army during the New Order era of Suharto, having close connections to the state and the business community.¹⁰

Today, Sulawesi's Christians are mainly of the Protestant and Catholic denominations, and there is relatively little evangelical influence among them. In Makassar there are still a number of Catholic and Protestant churches and the Atmajaya Catholic University that is a private university. The Theology Academy of Eastern Indonesia (STT) is based in Makassar as well and is an ecumenical college, while the Jaffray theology academy is evangelical in orientation. Both are locally funded. Makassar is also the home of the Sulawesi branch of the Indonesian Federation of Churches (PGI) and the PGI's Makassar office and hostel happen to be two doors down from the main office of the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan* (PDI-P) of Megawati Sukarnoputri. Thanks to the presence of significant pockets of Christians in North, Central and South Sulawesi, Indonesia's Christian parties such as

¹⁰ In Sulawesi, many of the Christians happen to belong to local ethnic minorities (Minahasa, Toraja) and are not necessarily of Chinese origin, unlike in Java. However, during the colonial period they worked closely with the Dutch and were regarded as the closest supporters of Dutch colonial rule in Sulawesi. Partly as a result of this proximity to colonial power, they enjoyed some degree of patronage and protection which lasted up to the post-colonial era and was further enhanced during the New Order period. The Christian minority in Sulawesi were caught up on the *Darul Islam* revolt that overtook the province shortly after Indonesia became fully independent. Many of the Christian politicians of Sulawesi were wary of the *Darul Islam* movement for its emphasis on *shariah* law and its demands for autonomy, in order to be able to enact *hudud* punishments in the province. This has been a matter of concern for the Christians who have been worried that with greater Islamization there will be less space for the religious freedom and praxis of other minority groups. Among the Toraja people Islamization was resisted as it reactivated memories of conflict between the Muslim Bugis and Makassarese and the pagan and Christian Torajans that date back to the Sultanates of Gowa, Bone and Makassar.

the *Partai Damai Sejahtera*¹¹ have also tried hard to win their support and establish a vote base there, though with little success as we shall see below.

The Christians of Sulawesi have been strong supporters of Golkar since the New Order era, preferring to work with the state and the military that protected them, ever fearful of the possibility of Muslim-Christian tension.¹² This partly explains why Golkar has been so strong in Sulawesi, particularly in the largely Christian areas around Tanah Toraja and in northern Sulawesi. From the 1970s to the late 1990s, Golkar has received the support of Muslim traditionalists, feudal Bugis communities and the Christian communities as well. In 1997, Golkar's share of the vote in Sulawesi rose to 91.6 per cent. Even after the fall of Suharto, Golkar was still in pole

¹¹ The roots of the *Partai Damai Sejahtera* (PDS, Peace and Prosperity Party), go back to the predominantly Christian Parkindo (*Partai Kristen Indonesia*) that was established earlier in the 1950s and which has contested at the elections from 1955 to 1971. Parkindo's appeal then was to defend and promote the interest of all the Christians of Indonesia, who are recognized as two separate faith communities as in Indonesia Catholics and Protestants have been regarded as different religious communities since the colonial era. Parkindo began to lose its relevance by the late 1970s and failed to secure any lasting support from the country's Christian minority for a range of reasons. During the Suharto period the state's policy of ethnic assimilation meant that other minority communities, notably the Chinese, were forced to adapt to Indonesian manners of dress, speech and even names, thereby diluting their presence as a visible minority community. Through such modes of forced assimilation many of the Chinese-Christian community leaders were better able to gain access to power by forming instrumental ties with the government, military and business community, adapting themselves to the realities of Indonesian society and politics, and in time rendering themselves relatively invisible. Parties like Golkar actively sought out the support of all minority groups, notably the Chinese as well as Christian minorities, and as such rendered parties like Parkindo increasingly irrelevant. The PDS was formed during the last stages of the Suharto era and by the time of Suharto's fall in 1998 had re-emerged as a party in the country. It was officially registered on 1 October 2001 by Christian Indonesian leaders and though it claimed to be a Christian party it did not present itself in exclusive communitarian terms. In places like Surakarta and Jogjakarta (Central Java), the PDS fielded Muslim Parliamentary candidates in Muslim-majority areas. For the elections of 2004, the PDS won 2.1 per cent of the popular vote and managed to gain 12 Parliamentary seats (out of 550). At the elections of 2009, 21 of the PDS's candidates across the country were non-Christians. But in 2009 the PDS gained only 1.5 per cent of the popular vote, thereby failing to pass the 2.5 per cent threshold that had been set in order to gain seats in the People's Assembly (DPR). As a result, the PDS failed to gain a single seat in Parliament at the 2009 elections. Though the PDS does not present itself as an exclusive communitarian party, it has repeatedly expressed its concern about the state of Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia and its worries about the signs of overt Islamization across the country. Under the present leadership of Harry Wattimury and Markus Hurasoit, the PDS gains its support from the Christian-majority regions of the country, notably in West Papua, North Maluku and North Sulawesi (among the largely Christian *Minahasa* peoples). Interestingly, in some areas such as *Tanah Toraja* (South-Central Sulawesi), the PDS has been relatively unsuccessful in winning the support of some of the Christians, such as the Torajas. It has also been relatively unsuccessful among the Christian Bataks of North Sumatra.

¹² The roots of present-day Muslim-Christian tension date back to 1967 when a dispute over Christian missionary activities and a controversy surrounding the statements of Christian politicians led to inter-religious conflict in Makassar. Though the root cause of the problem lay in the internal politics in Jakarta, it soon spread to Sulawesi and the issue was raised by Muslim student activists in HMI. As a result of the campaign led by HMI and KAMI, the Catholic student movement of Sulawesi withdrew from KAMI in 1967.

position, gaining 66.5 per cent of the votes at the 1999 elections in Sulawesi. The Islamists of PAN, PKS, PPP and PBB scored much less (PPP winning 8.4 per cent and PBB only 2.9 per cent of the votes in 1999). During the first and second terms of SBY, the Islamists parties have likewise failed to make an impact in Sulawesi, and the same can be said of Christian parties like PDS. (Though in 2004 Golkar's share of votes dropped to 43.3 per cent, it remained the single biggest party in the provincial assembly.)

Following the fall of Suharto, however, the way was left open for the Islamists to organize and mobilize even more support in the public domain. In 2000, the first Congress of the Muslim Community (*Kongres Ummat Islam Indonesia*) was held, opening the way for the launch of the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of *shariah* in Indonesia¹³ (KPPSI) in 2000 as well.

The formation of the *Forum Ummat Islam* (FUI) in 1999—a move initiated by Abdul Aziz Kahar, son of the Islamist leader Abdul Kahar Muzakkar¹⁴, among others—and

¹³ The KPPSI is not and has never been a political party per se, but is thoroughly political in its outlook and praxis. It presents itself as an umbrella organization and lends its support explicitly to any/all parties and politicians who care to support its call for regional autonomy to be given to Sulawesi. In Sulawesi, the KPPSI was guided by its own selective reading of Sulawesi history, arguing that Sulawesi was destined to become an Islamic state in its own right, owing to the legacy of the Muslim Sultans of Tallo and Gowa who had introduced *shariah* law there even before the coming of the Dutch colonialists. They also regarded the spread of Christianity in Sulawesi as a historical anomaly that was the result of Western colonial intervention and the divide-and-rule strategies employed by the Dutch colonizers. This was the basis for the KPPSI's call for Sulawesi to be given the status of Special Province (Provinsi Istimewa) like Aceh. The formation of the KPPSI alarmed the Christian and other non-Muslim minorities in Sulawesi due to its connections to more radical elements such as the DI, WI and MMI. In 1999/2000, the KPPSI was involved in the formation of the *Laskar Jundullah*—a militant para-military outfit originally set up in Solo, home of the MMI and JI—that was led by Muhammad Agung Abdullah Hamid, a businessman from South Sulawesi. The *Laskar Jundullah* was not active in Sulawesi then, but its militant character worried the non-Muslim community in Sulawesi, as well as moderate Muslims. In 2002, leadership of the *Laskar Jundullah* was passed to Agus Dwikarna. During the period of Muslim-Christian conflict in Ambon, Maluku, the *Laskar Jundullah* was involved alongside other Java-based groups like the *Laskar Jihad*. The fact that the *Laskar Jundullah* was sending Sulawesi youths to fight in Ambon was a cause of anxiety as these radicalized violent youth would then return to Sulawesi with some experience of violent conflict.

¹⁴ Abdul Aziz Kahar was the son of Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, who had played an active part in the Darul Islam revolt of the 1950s and 60s. From 1965 onwards, the New Order of Suharto effectively eliminated all forms of religiously-inspired resistance against the government, and at the same time sought to maintain its power by patronizing moderate and liberal Muslim movements. Most of the Islamist activists of the *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI) were forced underground while HMI-NU affiliated intellectuals like Nurcholish Madjid opted for *Islam Kultural*—a non-political approach to inculcating Islamic values and ideas on a societal level instead. Some of the more radical Islamists chose to continue their struggle in other ways—Sanusi Daris, who was one of the leaders behind Kahar continued in his clandestine activities, forging links with underground movements including the nucleus group that would later come to be known as the *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (JI). Nonetheless, in

the KPPSI in 2000 united Muslims of the moderate, traditionalist and modernist camps, bringing together former student activists of HMI as well as established movements like Muhamadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. However, in Sulawesi, it also attracted the support of the Muslim activists who were once associated with Kahar Muzakkar's Darul Islam revolt in Sulawesi and who had been forced to go underground following the state's repression of all forms of radical political Islam in the 1980s. At the 2000 FUI congress in Makassar, radical Islamist leaders like Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Irfan Suryadi Awas were invited to speak. Many of those who were working behind the scenes were activists of the Wadah Islamiyah (WI), who were mostly graduates of Medina University in Saudi Arabia. The now-president of the Malaysian Islamic Party, Abdul Hadi Awang, was also invited to the 2000 FUI meeting to speak about the success of the Islamization programme in Malaysia and the implementation of *shariah* law and *hudud* punishments there. (See Appendix A, below.) It was in the wake of this 2000 FUI meeting that the KPPSI was formerly set up, with some of its leaders looking to Malaysia as a model Islamic state to be imitated. The Muhamadiyah and NU were also involved in the setting up of the KPPSI, but were not in a position to determine its evolution and trajectory as its leadership was dominated by the more conservative elements of the WI, ex-HMI activists and former supporters of the DI movement.

Apart from the Christian community, the other vocal opponents to the KPPSI are the Islamic scholars of the IAIN (now UIN) Alauddin of Makassar. The IAIN Alauddin was set up in 1994 and upgraded to status of UIN in 2006, with many of its scholars being themselves the graduates of UIN Sharif Hidayatullah in Jakarta and UIN Sunan

Sulawesi, the memory of the Darul Islam revolt was kept alive by former members of the TII and DI movement. Kahar's son, Abdul Aziz Kahar, became one of the leaders of the HMI and soon came to be known as one of the leaders of its more radical wing in Sulawesi. By 1987–88, the HMI experienced a split as a result of the difference of approaches between the more political and less political leaders. Abdul Aziz Kahar came to lead the more radical splinter of HMI in Sulawesi. He worked at the Pesantren Hidayatullah in Balikpapan, Kalimantan and later established a branch of the Pesantren Hidayatullah in Makassar. After the fall of Suharto and the start of the *Reformasi* era in 1998, Abdul Aziz Kahar could be active once again. He took part in the *Forum Ummat Islam* and the launch of the Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of *Shariah* in Indonesia (KPPSI) in 2000. Abdul Aziz Kahar's Islamist ideology is a carbon copy of his father's Darul Islam project, with the stated aim of working towards regional autonomy so that *shariah* law and *hudud* punishments can be implemented in Sulawesi. Particularly in South Sulawesi and in overwhelmingly-Muslim areas such as Bulukumba (99 per cent Muslim), he enjoyed wide support for his unilateral calls for Islamization and his support for Islamic law and punishments being applied for alcohol consumption, gambling and adultery.

Kalijaga of Jogjakarta. Trained in critical theory and philosophy, the scholars of UIN Makassar, Jogja and Jakarta have opposed the KPPSI on the grounds that their literalist approach and selective reading of history is a straightforward political manipulation of Islam for political ends, and they have noted the aggressive nature of the KPPSI's political campaign and its links to groups like the MMI, DI, WI and the *Laskar Jundullah* and *Laskar Jihad*¹⁵ (see Appendix A).

II. Political and social developments in Indonesia and Sulawesi in particular in the months of July and August 2010

On the national level, several important matters of national interest were discussed in the mainstream media between the months of July and August 2010.

The Indonesian government under the leadership of President Yudhoyono floated the idea of a re-evaluation of the Indonesian Rupiah, on the grounds that the current rate of inflation was spiralling out of control making the cost of basic necessities such as rice, meat and oil too high for the ordinary masses.¹⁶ This, however, was met with scepticism by his opponents, and criticized by Megawati Sukarnoputri of the PDI-P in particular as being an alarmist move. Indonesian economists, however, noted that there were growing concerns that Indonesia might be heading towards hyper-inflation with the approach of the fasting month of Ramadan, when the costs of basic necessities including oil, gas and foodstuffs were bound to rise.

¹⁵ The modernist and critical scholars of UIN Alauddin are, however, a small minority in Sulawesi. Their close links to the state (All UINs are state-funded universities) and the support they gain from Christian community leaders and foreign funding agencies and NGOs means that they are easily discredited as being agents of the state who are secretly promoting the liberalization and secularization of Sulawesi's Muslim community. Furthermore, the fact that they have worked closely with liberal groups such as the *Jaringan Islam Liberal* (JIL) based in Jakarta also means that they are doubly disadvantaged by the liberal image projected upon them.

¹⁶ During our stay in Makassar, South Sulawesi, we noted from local informants that the price of rice, sugar and kerosene were already climbing higher than normal, sparking off demonstrations in front of the regional governor's residence and the provincial assembly on 5 and 6 August. Furthermore, we witnessed another demonstration on Jalan Yani that was part of a nation-wide series of demonstrations protesting against the hike in costs of electricity. Makassar town experienced 4 power failures during the first 3 days of our stay, causing some degree of unrest among the populace who were already complaining of the rise in electricity costs that was not matched by any significant improvement in terms of services and delivery.

Another matter that was discussed on the national level was the Indonesia 2033 project, aimed at improving the rate of infrastructural development and to transform Indonesia into a fully industrialized nation by 2033. Part of the project involved the proposal to transfer the capital of Indonesia from Jakarta to Palangkaraya in South-Central Kalimantan. It was noted by local scholars that Palangkaraya was deemed to be an appropriate location for the country's capital for a number of reasons. During the time of Sukarno, it was already considered as a possible location for the capital on the grounds that it would be located literally at the centre of Indonesia. It would dispel the notion of Javanese cultural and political hegemony in Indonesia. Furthermore, Palangkaraya is located at an area that is free of earthquakes and thus has no significant risk of environmental disasters. It is in a flat area where the capital could be expanded at will.¹⁷

The issue of Islam and political Islam in particular was also widely discussed in the mainstream national media in the lead-up to the fasting month of Ramadan. The government of SBY proposed a series of measures in Parliament to curb the activities of religious groups, and in particular Islamist NGOs, that it claimed were becoming too aggressively political. Though not mentioned specifically, respondents we interviewed in Jogjakarta and Sulawesi agreed that the groups that were being targeted were primarily pseudo-political right-wing fundamentalist groups, such as the *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI), that had courted controversy through their often violent unilateral actions against minority groups including Ahmadis, Shias and Christians.¹⁸

¹⁷ Reaction to the proposal was diverse, with some local critics in Sulawesi posing the question of why Palangkaraya ought to be made the new capital and not Makassar or any other city in Sulawesi. Furthermore, critics of the decentralization process warned that should the project come to fruition it might open the way for even more corruption at the local provincial level, and would not solve the problem of congestion and overcrowding in Jakarta but rather simply move the problem to another location. It was noted by some experts that at present the public transport system in Jakarta is all but dysfunctional, despite the imposition of heavier fines on bad drivers and for offences like cutting lanes and double parking. The Jakarta public transport system consisting of public buses, as well as the inter-city train system, currently only takes around two per cent of the city's population and is unable to cope with the population explosion as a result of massive rural migration to the capital.

¹⁸ Reacting to the news, Kyai Ma'aruf Amin, head of the *Majlis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI) publicly stated (ANTV, 5 August 2010) that the MUI would seek to moderate its members and to maintain a moderate (though anti-liberal) stand among its affiliated groups. Kyai Ma'aruf registered his own concern about groups like the FPI whom he regarded as being more political than missionary in their work, but opposed any attempt to impose any outright ban on them. Complicating matters further was the apparent reluctance and inability of local and regional leaders to curb the excesses of the FPI. On 9 August 2010, on the eve of the first day of Ramadan, the Governor of Greater Jakarta held a public forum with the leaders and members of the FPI about their activities during fasting month. Cognizant of the fact that the FPI would unilaterally patrol the urban quarters of Jakarta on their self-proclaimed

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Sulawesi's internal politics reflected the wider concerns on the national level as well.

As was the case elsewhere across Indonesia, there were widespread concerns of hyper-inflation around the corner. During our stay in Makassar we witnessed several small demonstrations in the city over the rising cost of kerosene. In Makassar, Mamasa and Bulukumba, there were demonstrations by local consumers who complained that local stocks of kerosene were rapidly being exhausted. A limit was imposed by the authorities in Makassar, to sell a maximum of five litres of kerosene to each family, for the period of the fasting month of Ramadan. This led to even more complaints in the local media, as well as speculation that this was part of a wider plot to wean the public off kerosene and force them to convert to liquid petroleum gas (LPG).¹⁹

Local unrest in Sulawesi was sporadic and mostly related to issues of economic distribution. In Mambi-Mamasa (West Sulawesi), violence erupted between rival villages over the issue of disputed farmland for rice cultivation (4–5 August). In Barru (South Sulawesi), factory workers at the Temoso Cement plant rioted and barricaded the cement production plant over complaints that they had not been paid, and were worried that the company was about to go bankrupt and that the workers would not be given their salaries before the start of the fasting month of Ramadan. In most cases,

“moral policing” campaigns, he reminded the FPI that it had to work within the parameters of the law and not break the law themselves. In other words, despite the FPI's notorious record of violent activities against religious minorities, the governor of Greater Jakarta was not prepared to ban them from conducting the moral policing campaign, including unilateral attacks on bars, clubs and massage parlours during the month of Ramadan. For Indonesian scholars and activists who have been opposed to the activities of the FPI and their links with radical violent Islamist groups, this was not a good sign at all as it signalled the lack of political will to stem the spread of such groups in the capital. Worse still was the fact that the governor not only failed to support the move to limit the activities of the FPI, but instead urged them to co-operate with the authorities (including Jakarta police) in their moral policing instead. (Phone interview with Shafie Anwar, Director, International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), Jakarta, 10 August 2010.)

¹⁹ The conversion to LPG was a policy introduced by the government of SBY but was not a popular move. It compelled consumers to purchase LPG in the form of LPG tanks that were provided by the national petroleum company Pertamina, and this was criticized on the grounds that it created a monopoly over LPG distribution. Adding to the problem was the poor quality of LPG tanks produced by Pertamina, and throughout our stay in Sulawesi there were daily reports of LPG tanks exploding and injuring users, an issue that was further exploited by SBY's opponents like Megawati Sukarnoputri and the PDI-P in particular.

the anticipation of the fasting month of Ramadan and the festivities of *Eid'ul Fitri* escalated pre-existing tensions between workers and employers.

Apart from protests that were inspired by economic demands, there were also protests by some hardline Islamist groups such as the *Fron Pembela Islam* (FPI) and the *Jama'ah Ansor* over issues related to Muslim concerns, the primary one being their opposition to the arrest of the radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. It is interesting to note that the FPI's demonstration coincided with a larger one organized by the FPI in Jakarta, signalling the close rapport between the Jakarta-based FPI and their counterparts in Makassar/South Sulawesi.²⁰

Another series of violent demonstrations were organized by the right-wing, though secular, *Laskar Merah-Putih*, a loosely organized mob of right-wing nationalist vigilantes whose members were recruited from the local gangster (*preman*) fraternity,

²⁰ During the period of our field research, security concerns across Indonesia and with regards to the personal safety of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono were heightened, particularly during and after the period of the arrest of the cleric, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. The president's office issued several warnings that the threat posed against the president of Indonesia had increased, particularly after the arrest of suspected terrorists in West Java. The president noted that Indonesian security personnel had discovered video evidence of training camps in West Java and Northern Sumatra which featured footage of alleged militants engaged in shooting exercises with his photo as a target. Bomb-making material was also found during the raid that led to the arrest of suspected militants in West Java. The president's spokesman, Julian Adrian Pasha, noted that the president was forced to make the announcements in the lead-up to the Independence Day celebrations on 17 August 2010 as security would have to be enhanced at all state events where the president would be present. Interestingly, it was also announced that there would be regular rotations of the members of the president's personal bodyguard, and during a visit to a military academy in West Java the president's office had directed that all the graduates present would be disarmed during the event. The presidential spokesman also noted that there have been several bomb threat warnings against the presidential palace on 17 August, as well as the flag-raising ceremony on the same day. This led to increased security measures being taken, including screening of guests and a wider security parameter being established around the presidential palace, the parade ground and the Parliament (DPR). Aggravating the situation was the arrest of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who was said to be directly involved in the funding and support of radical militant groups in Aceh. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's arrest involved the use of special security forces that ambushed the vehicle he was travelling in. Ba'asyir was in a crowded vehicle with nine others, including two women said to be family members. After his vehicle was stopped, Ba'asyir refused to leave the car and as a result the members of the security team had to break the windows of the vehicle and force the occupants out, taking Ba'asyir to an undisclosed location for further questioning. The circumstances of Ba'asyir's arrest—that was videoed by both security personnel and Ba'asyir's followers—were then telecast on TV and led to a heated debate about the use of force and violence in his arrest. Ba'asyir's followers and groups like the *Fron Pembela Islam* protested in Jakarta and demanded his immediate release, accusing the government of SBY to pandering to Western security concerns. In a copycat move the FPI wing of Makassar, South Sulawesi, also held a noisy demonstration in front of the state assembly offices in Makassar, confronting local police and burning the flags of America and Israel on 14 August 2010. Though the demonstration by the FPI was confined to Makassar and involved only members of the FPI in the greater Makassar area, it is interesting to note that the FPI wing of Makassar had coordinated its demonstration against the government and police closely with their counterparts in Jakarta.

over the issue of the detention of three members of the Indonesian fisheries authorities by Malaysian coast guard officers in the contested waters between Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. On 16 and 17 August, the *Laskar Merah Putih* held several noisy demonstrations in Makassar and on one occasion (16 August) threatened to enter the precinct of Makassar's port to attack any Malaysian commercial vessels docked there. The Malaysian flag was burnt, and anti-Malaysian rhetoric was fed to the media when the vigilantes accused Malaysia of trampling on Indonesia's rights and dignity.²¹

²¹ The circumstances that led to the *Laskar Merah-Putih's* demonstration were rather complex. On Friday, 13 August 2010, five Malaysian fishing boats that were fishing off the waters of Batam were stopped by Indonesian coastal fisheries authorities on the grounds that their boats had drifted into Indonesian waters and were illegally fishing in Indonesian territory. The Indonesian authorities requested that all the Malaysian fishermen direct their boats to Batam where they would be questioned instead. While negotiations were being conducted, a Malaysian coast guard vessel approached the scene and demanded that the seven Malaysian fishermen be released immediately, on the grounds that their boats were in Malaysian waters and that the Indonesian authorities had no right to detain the fishermen or their boats. Further negotiations were then carried out, but in the middle of the process—though the facts remained unclear—it appeared that the Malaysian coast guard vessel let off two warning shots in the direction of the Indonesian vessel. Somehow three Indonesian officers were then taken aboard the Malaysian vessel and brought back to Malaysia, while the seven Malaysian fishermen were taken to Batam in what might have been an exchange. News of the interception of the Indonesian vessel soon made it to the Indonesian press, and by the next day the Indonesian media reported that three of its officials had been detained illegally by the Malaysian police. The news, however, did not get the same coverage in Malaysia and was hardly reported in the Malaysian media. By 14–15 August, tempers began to rise on the Indonesian side as several Indonesian newspapers and TV channels (notably MetroTV, ANTV and TV One) continued to feature the news item and presented it as an act of deliberate and insolent aggression by Malaysia against Indonesia, on the eve of Indonesia's national day celebrations (17 August). Indonesian TV channels further aggravated the issue by highlighting the comments of Indonesian right-wing nationalist NGOs and militias—notably the *Laskar Merah Putih*—and held TV polls to solicit public opinion on what ought to be done. On Metro TV, ANTV, TV One and several other channels, right-wing Indonesian politicians were interviewed and opined that Indonesia should take stern action against Malaysia on account of this act of aggression. Meanwhile, Indonesian politicians like Fadel Mohammad called upon Malaysia to release the three detained Indonesian officials immediately, calling their detention unlawful and reminding Malaysia of the sensitivities of Indonesians who were about to celebrate their independence day. (Fadel Mohammad did, however, note that the waters where the Malaysian fishermen were fishing remained disputed and it was unclear as to whether it was part of Indonesian or Malaysian territory.) Other Indonesian leaders like Slamet Subyanto, former head of Indonesia's naval forces, went further by stating on television that Indonesia ought to consider taking military action or at least demonstrate a military response to the situation, arguing that Indonesia's naval forces were vastly superior to that of Malaysia's. Representatives of the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) argued that Indonesia ought to at least recall its ambassador from Kuala Lumpur or demand that the Malaysian ambassador to Jakarta be returned. Both Golkar and the PKS demanded that the government of Bambang Yudhoyono take clear action against Malaysia, manipulating the event further to gain leverage against the PD government under SBY. The situation escalated rapidly in Indonesia between 14–17 August, thanks to the manipulation of the Indonesian media in particular, that chose to give ample coverage to right-wing Indonesian politicians, nationalist public intellectuals and extreme right-wing para-military militias such as the *Laskar Merah Putih*. On 14 and 15 August, right-wing activists demonstrated in front of the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta, leading to another demonstration where members of the *Laskar Merah Putih* attempted to storm the gates of the Malaysian embassy, defaced the plaque of the Malaysian embassy and draped a large Indonesian flag in front of the Malaysian embassy. On the eve of Indonesia's national day (16 August) the *Laskar Merah Putih* held a rowdy and noisy demonstration in Makassar, where they converged on the port of Makassar to burn and trample upon the Malaysian flag, and to demand that

Throughout the period of our field research there, we know instances of inter-religious violence or conflict between Muslims and Christians in South and Central Sulawesi. (Makassar, Bulukumba, Bone, Torajaland, Poso.) However several controversies erupted on the eve of the fasting month over the issue of the determination of the date of the first day of Ramadan. On 8 August 2010, Luqman, leader and spokesman for the an-Nassir community that was based in Gowa, declared that the members of the an-Nassir group would begin their fasting two days earlier (on 10 August) than the rest of Indonesia, on the grounds that the group's leaders had already calculated the precise date of the month of Ramadan based on their Islamic calendar.

This announcement was met with some protest from mainstream Muslim groups in Makassar who regard the an-Nassir movement as a deviant fundamentalist community

the port authorities deny docking rights to all commercial vessels flying the Malaysian flag. This was covered by TV channels like Metro TV and ANTV in particular. The demonstrators vowed that they were prepared to risk the consequences and die in any conflict against Malaysia, which they condemned for having hegemonic ambitions on Indonesia. (This was the second violent demonstration in Makassar in two days, as on 14 August the FPI and *Jama'ah Ansor* held another violent demonstration in Makassar demanding the release of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir when they condemned the arrest of their leader by Indonesian police and also burnt the flags of America and Israel.) By 16 August the situation had stabilized somewhat with the news that both sides would be releasing the nationals who were detained. On 16 August Malaysian authorities stated that the 3 Indonesian officers would be released from their detention at the Police headquarters in Johor as soon as their release papers had been processed. By the morning of 17 August 2010 the Indonesians had released all seven of the Malaysian fishermen and the Malaysians had released all three of the Indonesian officers. It had to be noted that throughout the event, almost all of the Indonesian popular TV channels had presented only the Indonesian side of the story, while in Malaysia there was almost no coverage at all of the developments in Malaysia. While Indonesia's press and television media were allowed to inflame the situation even further, the Malaysian media was directed to do the opposite. A news blackout was imposed and as a result most Malaysians did not know what was happening in neighbouring Indonesia. (There was no coverage of the demonstrations in Makassar, which we witnessed personally close up.) Perhaps more worrying still was how this issue became such a heated controversy in so short a space of time, as there were no circuit-breakers active that could prevent it from escalating further. To the credit of some Indonesian TV channels (ANTV), not all of the news was lop-sided as it was later revealed that the Malaysian fishermen maintained that the GPS system on their boats indicated that they were fishing in Malaysian waters, and the fishermen later claimed that once their boats were boarded by the Indonesian officers, the GPS systems of their boats were shut down and re-calibrated to show different co-ordinates, thereby raising doubt about the Indonesian claim that the Malaysian boats were indeed in Indonesian waters. Another worrying aspect of the controversy was how it was set against the backdrop of an Indonesia that seemed to be growing more anarchic and out of control. While the Indonesia-Malaysia spat occupied a significant portion of the news, on the same day that negotiations for release were begun in earnest (16 August), the news was also dominated by sporadic reports of violence all over the country. In East Flores, villagers fought one another with spears and knives. In Sampang, Madura, another demonstration ended up with injuries for three of those who took part and in Bengkulu, another demonstration against the candidacy for the local Bupati elections led to conflict between demonstrators and police. Set against such a backdrop of normalized and routine violence, the *Laskar Merah Putih* attack on the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta and its violent demonstration in Makassar on the same day (16 August) were but two incidents of mass organized violence amongst many.

that is literalistic in its orientation and separatist in its behaviour. (See Appendix A, below.) The an-Nassir community is regarded as a hardline “*garis keras*” community by some, owing to the fact that most of its members were formerly affiliated to radical para-military outfits that were directly and indirectly involved in the sectarian inter-religious conflict in Ambon. It appears as an isolated, exclusive movement based around Gowa. Its members adhere to a literalistic interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah, preferring to live in isolated communes that are cut off from the rest of the community, which it regards as corrupt. Somewhat similar in appearance with other literalist-fundamentalist movements like Malaysia’s *Darul Arqam*, the male members of the movement don Arabic/Islamic dress while the women are noticeable for their use of the uniform all-black *hijab* and *niqab* which also covers their faces, leaving only the eyes exposed. The community is primarily based in the region of Gowa and has remained largely apolitical, avowing all forms of politics as un-Islamic, though still suspected of harbouring potentially militant leanings.

For an overview of other smaller Muslim communities and sects in Makassar and the rest of South Sulawesi such as the *Ahmadiyah* and the *Tablighi Jama’at*, see Appendix C, below.

III. Religious and secular political parties in and around Makassar and South Sulawesi

South Sulawesi encompasses Makassar, Gowa, Bone and extends to Pare-Pare and Enrekang to the north all the way to the Bira/Bulukumba coastal regions to the south, and is predominantly Bugis-Makassarese and Muslim.

However, a closer look at the present state of politics in South Sulawesi today suggests that none of the Islamist parties of the region have made a significant impact, and that by and large the dominant mainstream political parties—notably Golkar and *Partai Demokrat* (PD) have retained poll position in the region. A look at the 50-member Provincial Assembly (DPRD) gives a breakdown as follows.

Partai Golkar	12 members, DPRD
Partai Demokrat PD	9 members, DPRD
Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan PDK	6 members, DPRD
Partai Amanat Nasional PAN	5 members, DPRD
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera PKS	4 members, DPRD
Partai Gerindra	3 members, DPRD
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan PPP	3 members, DPRD
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan PDI-P	2 members, DPRD
Partai Hanura	2 members, DPRD
Partai Bintang Refomasi PBR	1 member, DPRD
Partai Damai Sejahtera PDS	1 member, DPRD
Partai Bulan Bintang PBB	1 member, DPRD
Partai Keadilan Persatuan	1 member, DPRD

Though no single party has an absolute majority in the DPRD, leadership of the Provincial Assembly is divided between the two dominant parties, Golkar and PD, with Drs. Adnan Mahmud of Golkar as the head of the DPRD and Haidar Majid of PD as the Deputy head of the Assembly.

Both parties have managed to secure seats for the respective representatives in the three Assembly committees (*Komisi A, B, C*) of the DPRD, ensuring that all matters of local governance come under their purview. Though Golkar's fortunes have waned somewhat since 1999 (and it had peaked, quite naturally, during the time when B. J. Habibie was president and Yusuf Kalla was vice-president), Golkar remains the most organized party in the Makassar and greater Makassar region. Locals we met and interviewed noted to us that the periods of Habibie's and Kalla's terms in office were profitable to South Sulawesi and led to visible signs of rapid development, including the new and impressive international Sultan Hassanuddin Airport (now transferred from Maros to Makassar) and the north-south highway that connects Pare-Pare all the way south to Bulukumba. (This project, however, has been stalled indefinitely since the fall from power of Yusuf Kalla, as we witnessed ourselves on our trip to Tanah

Toraja where the highway remains incomplete in many parts, leaving long stretches of road un-tarred and bridges incomplete.)

The other party of note is the *Partai Demokrat* of current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, which commands nine DPRD seats and is likewise represented in all three DPRD committees. Owing to the fact that the PD enjoys a unique advantage with its leader as the current head of state, the PD's potential for patronage and networking in both South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja has been enhanced accordingly. All across Makassar, Gowa and other towns lining the western coast of South Sulawesi we came across branch offices, signboards, election notices and propaganda material put out by the two dominant parties.

Significantly, the parties in third and fourth rankings are the *Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan* (PDK) and *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN), respectively.

The *Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan's* origins can be traced back to 2002 when it was first registered as the *Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan* (PPDK, National Unity and Democracy Party, est. 23 July 2002). The PPDK (later PDK) was one of the smaller regional parties that were formed in the wake of the fall of Suharto and the first democratic election in Indonesia of 1999. Following the elections of 1999, Indonesia witnessed a sudden proliferation of new parties, some of which aspired to regional, as opposed to national leadership.

The PDK is one of the regional parties that have always focused its attention on Sulawesi. Led by Ryaas Rasyid and Andi Mallarangeng, the PDK's Secretary-General is Rapiuddin Hamarung. With prominent leaders like Andi Mallarangeng among its founders, the PDK found a natural vote base in South, Western and Southeastern Sulawesi, particularly among those of Bugis and Makassarese ethnic background. Though the party in Sulawesi remains dominated by Makassarese and Bugis members and leaders, its ideology remains vaguely nationalist, with the PDK describing itself as a *Pancasila*-based party and it has publicly supported the principles of *Pancasila* with reference to pluralism and religio-ethnic diversity. The PDK is not an Islamist party and has never supported any form of radical Islamist or religiously sectarian

politics, preferring to present itself as a small regional party that hopes to further the cause and demands of Sulawesi viz. the central government in Jakarta.

At the elections of 2004, the PDK openly supported the presidential campaign of former military strongman General Wiranto, though this was publicly questioned by one of the party's founder-leaders, Andi Mallarangeng himself. On 28 October 2007, the PPDK changed its name to the PDK and contested the elections of 2009. At the elections of 2009, the PDK failed to make a considerable impact on the national level, but managed to secure six out of the 50 seats of the Provincial Assembly of South Sulawesi, making it the third highest party in the Assembly, after Golkar and *Partai Demokrat*.

Despite its unique appeal to the electorate of South Sulawesi, the PDK has not presented itself as a Bugis "ethnic" party and does not appeal to ethnic primordial sentiments in its propaganda. It remains a "*Pancasila*-based" party committed to broadly-defined Indonesian nationalist-republican principles and also committed to the pluralist ideals of the *Pancasila* ideology.

At the vanguard of the Islamist parties that have been relatively successful in South Sulawesi is the *Partai Amanat Nasional*²² (PAN), which, with 5 members of the

²² The *Partai Amanat Nasional* is one of the more moderate Islamist parties of Indonesia that is most closely associated with the leader of the *Muhamadiyah* movement, Amein Rais. The origins of PAN go back to the last years of Suharto when the Suharto regime was tottering on the verge of collapse following the East Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998. The Indonesian economy, like that of Thailand and Malaysia, had floundered badly and as a result of the flight of capital from the region, the value of the Indonesian Rupiah had depreciated by 80 per cent, leading to panic across the country at the prospect of hyper-inflation and political unrest. The failure of the Suharto government to control the effects of the crisis eventually led to student protests across Indonesia and the calls for democracy, sparking off the "*Refomasi*" movement that was led by men like Amein Rais and other social activists and student movements. On 14 May 1998, Amein Rais called for the creation of the *Majlis Amanat Rakyat* (MARA), a public consultative body, in response to the failure of the Suharto government to heed the calls of the public. PAN was officially registered on 23 August 1998. The rise of PAN, PBB alongside other established Islamic/Islamist parties like PPP and PKS meant that Islamist activists were entering the political domain once again, something that had stopped since Sukarno had forcibly shut down the *Masjumi* party in 1960. PAN's clarion call in 1998 was *refomasi* and the need for institutional reform, democratization, transparency and accountability, to deal with the problem of "cronyism, nepotism and corruption" associated with Suharto's government. With backing from the *Muhamadiyah*, and with notable *Muhamadiyah* leaders in PAN, the party was seen as the political offshoot of the *Muhamadiyah* reformist Islamist movement. In 1999, PAN managed to win 7.4 per cent of the popular vote and gained 34 seats in Parliament. This gave PAN and Amein Rais the strategic leverage to play the role of kingmakers, and PAN was instrumental in the formation of the "*central axis*" that prevented Megawati Sukarnoputri from coming to power, and opened up the way for the rise of Abdurrahman Wahid instead. At the elections of 2004, Amein Rais offered conciliatory moves to the

DPRD, comes before the PKS (4), PPP (3) and PBB (1) in terms of representation at the Provincial Assembly. It is important to note that despite the long history of Islamist political activism in South Sulawesi and the legacy of past Islamist movements from *Darul Islam* to the rise of Islamist sectarian politics in the early 2000s, the total number of seats won by all the overtly Islamist parties combined is only 13, which is roughly one-quarter of the total number of DPRD seats (50). The Christian PDS party has also been relatively unsuccessful in gaining support in South Sulawesi, with only one member of the DPRD (Nelson Marnanse Kamisi).

This would suggest that overall it can be argued that politics in South Sulawesi remains largely untouched by ethnic or religious primordial sentiments and loyalties, and that the religiously-inspired parties of South Sulawesi have not been able to mobilize support on the basis of ethnic and/or religious loyalties.

Despite the manifold reports of inter-ethnic/religious violence further north in Central Sulawesi (in and around the Poso region), our own cursory observations of the party-political offices we visited (the Golkar, PD and PDI-P offices) suggest that mainstream politics remains open and undifferentiated on the basis of ethnic-religious loyalties, with none of the mainstream parties openly or knowingly exploiting ethno-religious differences for the sake of short-term party-political gains. And while some religious minority groups (such as the *Ahmadiyah*, see Appendix C) have been the victims of persecution and harassment by right-wing Islamist conservative groups like the *Fron Pembela Islam*, etc. none of the major mainstream parties have supported or condoned such instances of selective persecution of religious minorities either. The dominance of Golkar, PD and to some extent PDK and PDI-P, has contributed to the largely secular, though nationalist, tenor of South Sulawesi politics up until now.

Indonesian military, claiming that he was prepared to run for the office of president with a former military leader as his running mate. PAN won 6.4 per cent of the popular vote and 52 seats (out of 550) in the People's Assembly. For the presidential elections, Amein Rais and Siswono Yudo Husodo won only 15 per cent of the vote. At the elections of 2009, PAN won 6 per cent of the popular votes, earning it 43 seats in Parliament. Under the leadership of its present leader, Hatta Rajasa and Secretary-General Taufik Kurniawan, PAN's main bases of support remain West Sumatra, Jambi, Jogjakarta and South, West and Central Sulawesi.

IV. Religious and Secular Political parties in Tanah Toraja²³ and the northern half of South-Central Sulawesi: Presence and Networks

The Toraja highlands are home to the Toraja people who were and remain predominantly Christian.²⁴ Inter-religious relations have been generally good throughout Tanah Toraja, and even when inter-religious conflict between Muslims and Christians ignited and peaked in Poso and the outlying areas in Central Sulawesi in 2000–2002, there were no reported incidents of Muslim-Christian violence in Torajaland. During our stay at the Christian student centre in Rantepao we were told that one of the reasons why inter-religious conflict has seldom occurred in the Toraja highlands was the fact that the Torajan extended family (*keluarga besar*) system has been able to link almost all of the local clans and factions together, thus providing the means for early conflict-detection and conflict-prevention. Rantepao is also the base of many Torajan-Christian Youth groups, including the Torajan wing of the *Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia* (Indonesian Christian Student Movement, GMKI), which is based at No. 60 Jalan Samratulangi, Rantepao, which is also the headquarters of the *Persatuan Pemuda Gereja Toraja* (PPGT). During our meetings with youth activists of the GMKI and PPGT, we were told that most of the Christian groups have worked closely with the leadership of the mainstream national parties, and that Torajan Christian leaders have encouraged their respective constituencies to stay alert and vigilant against all forms of potentially-violent sectarian or communitarian politics.

²³ Seven days were spent researching around the northern half of South-Central Sulawesi, and five days in Tanah Toraja. Our research around Tanah Toraja was conducted on foot primarily, covering the main Toraja basin area between Makale (Toraja Selatan) and Rantepao (Toraja Utara). For the past two years now, Torajaland has been divided into two larger electoral constituencies, Toraja and Toraja Utara.

²⁴ The Toraja people are a distinct ethnic group with a culture and language of their own (derivative of Bugis, but with their own script) and historically have been animists until their conversion to Christianity by Dutch missionaries from the late nineteenth century. Though all the major Christian denominations are present in Torajaland (dominated by Protestants and Catholics but also increasingly by evangelists), the belief system of the Toraja people remain eclectic and residual cultural practices that pre-date the arrival of Christianity remain dominant. Torajaland is no longer the site of aggressive conversion campaigns by Western missionaries, but it is also evident that Muslim missionary groups have had almost zero influence among the Torajans. During our visits to Rantepao, Makale, Sangalla and other towns in the region we found no evidence at all of *Tablighi Jama'at*, *Ahle Sunnah* or other Muslim activists among Muslims or non-Muslims. The local economy was previously dominated by the cultivation of cloves until international market prices for cloves collapsed. Today, the Toraja economy remains primarily agrarian with rice and corn cultivation as the primary earners. Corn is grown as a cash crop for export (there are corn mills in and around Makale and Rantepao) and not consumed locally. Another major revenue earner is tourism, with Makale and Rantepao serving as the main bases for tourist groups to the region.

Politically, the Torajans have always supported the dominant political parties dating back to the New Order era, with Golkar remaining in the lead. The two other main parties that have contended for the Torajan vote base are the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan* (PDI-P) and *Partai Demokrat* (PD).²⁵

During our research we attempted to locate and contact members and leaders of the smaller political parties in the Torajan area, and in both Rantepao and Makale it is evident that none of the smaller parties have managed to make a lasting impression on the local population. The level of support for the smaller, local and non-mainstream parties is negligible, and none of the smaller parties have managed to establish local grassroots support networks. Significantly, as our research was conducted in the wake of the recent Bupati elections in Makale and Rantepao, we noted that all of the smaller parties were by then passive and no longer actively campaigning to expand their support bases. This was made all the more evident by their lack of party-political institutional infrastructure and the absence of permanent party-political bases.

In Rantepao, the base of our research, we noted that almost all of the offices of the smaller parties had closed and that none of the smaller offices had a permanent staff.

Significantly, the Christian *Partai Damai Sejahtera* (PDS), which is one of the few Christian parties in Indonesia, has failed to make a strong impact among the nominally Christian Torajans. Its secretariat office (*Dewan Pimpinan Desa Sekretariat PDS*) for Lembang Tallulolo, Kecamatan Kesu, is located on the Rantepao-Makale road (3 km) and appears to be located in a motorcycle workshop. During our visit to the secretariat office (twice) we were told that the staff were on “standby” but not in the office. The secretariat itself has no permanent staff, no office facilities but only a signboard with a telephone number at the front. A second PDS

²⁵ During the recently-held Bupati elections for South Toraja (Makale), the main contenders were from Golkar and PD respectively. Controversy surrounded the election for the post of Bupati as the former Bupati from the Golkar party had already served two terms in office (and as such could not run for a third term). Instead, the Golkar candidate happened to be the wife of the former Bupati. The main contender was K. Solihin of *Partai Demokrat*, who lost the contest and who, after losing the contest, was declared financially ruined. Solihin further added controversy to the contest by claiming that the voting was rigged, accusing Golkar party functionaries of smuggling in five ballot boxes that had been filled with faked voting slips in favour of the Golkar candidate. It was clear, however, that during the Makale/South Toraja Bupati elections, only the major parties were really in the running, and that none of the smaller parties had managed to make a significant impact.

branch office (*kantor cabang ranting PDS*) is found on Jalan Diponegoro, leading from Rantepao to Bolu, in the general direction of northeast Toraja (1 km). This branch office was likewise located in what appeared to be a car wash centre, and like the Rantepao secretariat office, was minimal in its function. It only had the PDS party flag and sign above the car wash centre, but there was no office *per se*, and no party members or office staff. When we spoke to those working at the workshop/car wash we were informed that the office was only opened on special occasions and that it was only active during elections.

Interestingly, when speaking to student activists of the *Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia* and the *Persatuan Pemuda Gereja Toraja*, we were told that the Toraja Christian student groups were less inclined to work for and with the PDS rather than Golkar or the PDI-P. The reason for this, we were told, had less to do with religious loyalties or affiliation, but the more mundane reason that the mainstream parties—if elected to office at regional and national level—would be able to bring more economic and infra-structural development to Toraja. By contrast, the PDS was regarded as being somewhat lightweight, and a “small party” (*“partai genit, kecil”*) by the activists we spoke to, with no national claims or aspirations.

The PDS, as one of the three Christian parties that contested the national elections in Indonesia, had failed to make the 2.5 per cent national electoral threshold and had not been able to build an effective national network across Indonesia. Yet it is interesting to note that in Christian-majority Torajaland it has also failed to gain any significant support from the majority-Christian Toraja community, and has not been successful at any of the local elections. During the recent elections for the post of Bupati in Makale, the PDS did not field any candidates. No statistics were available on the size of the PDS constituency in Toraja Pusat and Toraja Utara.

The two Islamic parties of note that we encountered in Rantepao were the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB, Crescent and Moon Party) and the *Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan* (PPP).

The PBB’s office was located at No. 13 Jalan Emi Saelan, Kecamatan Rantepao. The Islamist parties have been less enthusiastic in their campaign in Tanah Toraja for

understandable reasons, as the majority of Torajans are Christians and have shown little support for Islamist parties such as the PKS, PPP and PBB. The office of the PBB was located above a hand phone and call centre (*wartel*) and down the road from the main mosque of Rantepao (*Masjid Besar Rantepao*), but as was the case of the offices of PDS and Gerindra, did not have a permanent office staff to entertain questions. We visited the office four times during our research in the area and found that it was never open. Even during and after Friday prayers at the mosque down the road, the PBB's office remained shut and there were no PBB propaganda material to be found anywhere in Rantepao or the adjacent villages. During the recent Bupati elections the PBB did not field a candidate either.

Around the corner from the Masjid Besar Rantepao at No. 59 Jalan Andi Mapanyuki was the office of the PPP party, located above a sundry shop. Like the PBB, the PPP office was likewise empty most of the time, though we were told that it did have a secretary and staff that were mobilized during political campaigns.

That neither the PPP nor the PBB have managed to make an impact at Rantepao and the adjacent villages of North Toraja constituency can be accounted for by two factors namely the predominantly Christian Toraja population and the overwhelming presence of the more dominant mainstream parties—Golkar, PD and PDI-P. It is important to note that our research was conducted in Toraja Utara and Toraja Selatan just as the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan was beginning. Neither of the two Islamic parties PPP or PBB had put up any banners, posters or other propaganda material to wish the Muslims of their constituency a blessed or happy Ramadan, unlike the ostensibly secular PD, Golkar and PDI-P, who had lined the main thoroughfares of Rantepao and Makale with posters and banners proclaiming the celebration of Ramadan and Eid. Again, the explanation for this was a prosaic one—Golkar, PD and PDI-P being the bigger parties with more funding and expenses, while PPP and PBB being smaller parties that simply had no funds to put up banners and posters, indicative of their negligible presence.

But while the religious parties (PDS, PPP and PBB) have largely failed to gain popular support in Rantepao-Makale, the same observation can be made of the smaller non-religious parties of Indonesia.

The *Partai Gerakan Indonesian Raya* (Gerindra, Movement for a Greater Indonesia Party) that was particularly active in its campaigning for the 2009 elections was also present in Tanah Toraja, but like the PDS on a very small scale. Its office for the Kecamatan Rantepao, Kabupaten Tanah Toraja is located at No. 52 Jalan Ratulangi in Rantepao and shares the building with a sundry shop. As was the case of the PDS offices we visited, there was no permanent staff at the Gerindra office in Rantepao, and the staff of the sundry shop were not able to help us with our queries. We were informed that Gerindra was active during the Bupati elections and general elections of 2008–2009, but that the office lacks a permanent staff. Like the PDS, Gerindra has also not canvassed the areas of Rantepao and Makale and there were no party-political propaganda materials (banners, flags, brochures) to be found anywhere in the towns we researched.

The *Dewan Pimpinan Kecamatan Rantepao* of the *Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia* (PKP, Justice and Unity Party of Indonesia) has its main office at No. 19 Jalan Ratulangi, in an area that is full of cheap hotel and tour agencies. The office appears to be located in the home of one of the party representatives, but as in the case of Gerindra the party is not active in North Toraja most of the time. The PKP did attempt to field candidates at the recent Bupati elections, but failed to make an impact.

The worst-off non-mainstream party in Rantepao/North Toraja seems to be the *Partai Peduli Rakyat Nasional* (PPRN), whose branch office (*kantor rantai cabang*) appears to have been vacated and dismantled, and which now shares a space with what appears to be a nightly satay stall, on Jalan Emi Saelan, just in front of the *Masjid Besar* of Rantepao. It was clear that in Rantepao at least the PPRN was practically disbanded and had no real political presence anymore.

Overall, it would appear that only the mainstream national parties (Golkar, PD, PDI-P) have managed to gain and maintain a domineering presence in Torajaland for practical reasons related to finance and resources. There is no evidence that the Christians of Toraja are inclined in any way to support the smaller sectarian Christian parties such as the PDS, and the Muslim parties (PKS, PPP, PBB, etc.) have likewise failed to gain a foothold among the Muslims of Toraja. This suggests that in the Toraja highlands at least (as compared to Central Sulawesi) religious primordial

sentiments have not been a significant factor in voting patterns, political loyalties and choice of party-political support.

V. Observations: State of religious and secular parties in Sulawesi, local and international linkages and networks, future trends

- **South Sulawesi's Political Landscape: No room for the smaller parties**

The concerns that have been raised by Maryanov (1958) over the decentralization of power in Indonesia and the worry that it might lead to the rise of smaller, more exclusive and sectarian local parties championing exclusive racial-ethnic and religious demands needs to be tempered by the present state of politics in South Sulawesi. Our observations would indicate that despite the slow process of decentralization that has taken place over the past decade, there are no visible indicators of strong primordial political demands being articulated by the local parties.

Indeed, the relative success of the *Partai Demokrat* and *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan*, and the continued dominant presence of Golkar as the party leading all others would suggest that 10 years after the fall of Suharto and *Reformasi*, local politics in South and Central Sulawesi has not significantly shifted to a more sectarian, communitarian and exclusive register.

The relatively small representation of members of the Islamist parties (PAN, PKS, PBB, etc.) and the significant failure of the Christian PDS (in Tanah Toraja, in particular) would suggest that the overall tone and tenor of local political discourse in South and Central Sulawesi remains nationalist rather than religiously sectarian. Though Central Sulawesi became the centre of media attention from 2000 to 2003 as a result of Muslim-Christian violence in and around the vicinity of the town of Poso, this has not resulted in a further enhancement or empowerment of the religious-based parties in the province.

- **Security concerns in South Sulawesi**

There were no incidents of inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflict during our fieldwork in Sulawesi, and there have been no major disturbances in the province since the end of the inter-religious violence around Poso by 2003. The heavy and visible presence of Indonesian armed forces in and around Poso (Brimob brigade and local police) means that inter-religious conflict has been contained and will be likely to remain so for some time to come.

Despite low-level violence and the perpetual threat of *preman* street gangs (which accounted for our not being able to get to Poso by road, due to *preman* gangs active around Palopo-Masamba), local incidents of violence are not serious and are more a threat to local commerce and transport. Nor do these gangs represent any form of significant ethnic-religious threat as our local contacts informed us that none of this gangsterism has a particularly sectarian aspect to it.

The remnants of the former *Laskar Jihad/Laskar Jundullah* units that were once active in the Moluccas have largely disarmed and are now settled in communes such as the *An-Nasir* group, that is based along the southern coast of South Sulawesi (see Appendix A) and are by and large politically inactive, preferring to make a living from local agriculture and remaining isolationist. The *An-Nasir* members, for instance, shun all contact with outsiders (whom they regard as *kafirs* or unorthodox Muslims), but their relative isolation also means that they have no significant impact on the rest of society.

Makassar, however, seems to have become the new base for more vocal and visible groups like the *Fron Pembela Islam* and *Jama'ah Ansor*, off-shoots of their national chapters that are more prominent in Jakarta. The relative ease with which such groups can be formed (without the need for registration or permits) means that chapters of the FPI and JA can be formed in Makassar and other towns with ease. As noted above, the FPI and JA were active in Makassar during our stay there, protesting against the arrest of their symbolic leader-figure, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. This would suggest that the FPI and JA enjoy some degree of local support and this, in turn, poses other

questions of funding, support networks and membership that are not the main focus of this paper.

Apart from radical Islamist groups like the *Fron Pembela Islam* and *Jama'ah Ansor*, Makassar also seems to host a visible presence of the right-wing ultra-nationalist *Laskar Merah Putih*, who organized two loud and rowdy demonstrations against Malaysia during the recent Malaysia-Indonesia spat. As noted above, we drove into one of the demonstrations by the LMP at the port of Makassar where the members of the *Laskar Merah Putih* set the Malaysian flag alight, and then threatened to enter the port to do damage to any Malaysian commercial ships docked there. Apart from the LMP demonstrations in Jakarta that were widely reported, the LMP's demonstrations in Makassar also received considerable publicity in the Indonesian press. It also has to be noted that apart from Jakarta, the only demonstrations of the LMP that were covered in the national media were those in Makassar. No other major violent demonstrations by the LMP or equivalent right-wing organizations were reported in the other major cities of Java, Kalimantan or Sumatra.

Makassar may now be in a position to play the role of host to both radical Islamist and right-wing secular nationalist movements and NGOs like the *Laskar Merah Putih*, *Fron Pembela Islam* and *Jama'ah Ansor*. Just how and why Makassar has come to play this role may be the subject of further research by other scholars.

- **International Linkages and Networks**

For reasons attributed mainly to history, Makassar and the rest of South Sulawesi share strong and close links to Malaysia, in the same way that North Sulawesi shares close cultural and historical links with the peoples and communities in the Philippines.²⁶

²⁶ This remains true to this day, for the Minahasa people of North Sulawesi are different from the Bugis, Makassarese and Torajans of the South in terms of culture, ethnicity, language and religion. The Minahasans are of the same ethnic stock as Filipinos and for centuries there have been constant seafaring activities between the regions of North Sulawesi with the various island groups of Southern Philippines.

For centuries, particularly after the fall of Makassar and Gowa at the hands of the Dutch and the decline of the two powers, the Bugis and Makassarese peoples who have traditionally been seafarers and seaborne merchants and mercenaries, have expanded their networks all the way across Sumbawa to the south and further to the west to Kalimantan, Sumatra, Riau-Lingga and the Malayan Peninsula. Importantly, it has to be noted that the Sultanates of Johor-Riau, Pahang, Selangor and Perak have all been deeply influenced by Bugis and Makassarese culture, and that Bugis nobles and their mercenary forces were instrumental in the creation of the kingdoms of Johor, Pahang and Selangor in particular. As such, it is not surprising if Sulawesi-Malaysian relations remain close and intimate.²⁷

Recent developments would point to the fact that these links remain strong up till today. The fact that the *Forum Ummat Islam* FUI had invited PAS's leader Hadi Awang to address the congress and to present Malaysia's Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party PAS as a model Islamic party to be emulated by Sulawesi's Islamist parties and movements is no accident. Though Hadi Awang hails from Trengganu (a Malay state with comparatively little Bugis influence), he was nonetheless accepted as a model Muslim whose words of counsel were taken seriously.

Since the FUI forum and congresses of 2000–2002, PAS has dropped off the radar screens of the Sulawesi Islamist parties and movements in a manner of speaking, but PAS remains a party whose Islamist policies and progress are followed closely by its Sulawesi counterparts. (See Appendix A)

Apart from Malaysia's Islamic party PAS, leaders of Malaysia's ruling UMNO party have also been visiting Sulawesi with some regularity. Former prime minister Tun Mahathir Mohamad visited Makassar in 2009 and was a guest at several Makassarese universities where he spoke of the need for closer political and economic co-operation.

Perhaps most significantly was the recent visit by Malaysia's current prime minister, Najib Razak, to Makassar, which was pregnant with political symbolism and

²⁷ See Farish A Noor, *Pahang: A Deconstructive History*, Silverfish Books, Kuala Lumpur, 2010 (forthcoming).

meaning. Prime Minister Najib had visited Makassar as a guest of the governor and also included in his itinerary a visit to Gowa Tua (the former seat of the Sultanate of Gowa), where he visited the tomb of Sheikh Yusuf as well as Balla Lompoa, the old palace of the Sultans of Gowa, and crucially, the graves of the kings of Gowa at Tamalate cemetery.

Prior to the Malaysian prime minister's visit to the Tamalate cemetery, we were informed by the curators of the museum and guardians of the cemetery that the Malaysian government had paid for the creation and erection of a statue-bust of Sultan Hassanuddin, I Mallombassi Daeng Mattawang, the sixteenth king of Gowa and one of Indonesia's acclaimed national heroes. The bust now stands in the pavilion in front of the royal graves. Furthermore, Prime Minister Najib took the opportunity to remind his Indonesian hosts that he was a direct descendant of Sultan Abdul Jalil (Daeng Mattimung Karaeng Sanrobone), the fourteenth king of Gowa, who had for a period of several years, spent part of his life in Pahang (where Najib Razak and his father Tun Razak hail from) and thus helped to set up the Pahang royal family.²⁸

Prime Minister Najib's visit to Makassar and Gowa was, therefore, hugely important in the development of Malaysian-Indonesian bilateral relations, though it is significant to note that a special visit was paid to Sulawesi (and not to other Indonesian outer island provinces such as Sumatra or Kalimantan) due to the long historical links between South Sulawesi and the Malay Sultanates of Malaysia. This may have also added to the image of Makassar and South Sulawesi in general as well, for in the context of present-day Indonesian politics the people of South Sulawesi can lay claim to having not only produced two important Indonesian leaders (B. J. Habibie and Yusuf Kalla) but also strong and intimate family bonds to many of the ruling royal families of Malaysia as well as two of Malaysia's six prime ministers (Tun Razak and Najib Razak).

Despite Malaysian attempts at forging closer ties with South Sulawesi however, it has also to be noted that Makassar is also the base of several strongly nationalist para-

²⁸ Interview with the guardian of the Tamalate cemetery and monument, Gowa, 18 August 2010. Prime Minister Najib's signature remains in the guestbook, which the curator proudly showed us. Also in the guestbook were the signatures of other UMNO members including Rosli Idrus, Mat Yusuf Abdul Latif and Mansur Abidin, who were recorded down as being from "UMNO Puchong".

military units and mass movements such as the far-right *Laskar Merah Putih*, who, during the occasion of the recent spat between Malaysia and Indonesia over the detention of three Indonesian fisheries officers by Malaysian coast guard officials, were at the forefront of anti-Malaysian protests in Makassar town itself (on 16 and 17 August 2010), and who did not hesitate to burn the Malaysian flag in public and threatened to attack all Malaysian commercial vessels docked at Makassar port.

As such, despite the long and unique historical links between Malaysia and Sulawesi, it cannot be said that these long historical bonds have in any way significantly enhanced Malaysia's reputation or presence in the province.

Appendix A

Discussion with Professor Musafir Pababbari, Dean of the School of Usuluddin, Politics and Political Thought, UIN Alauddin Makassar; Dr. Hamdan Juhannis, Faculty of Tarbiyyah; Professor Muhsin Mahfudz, Faculty of Usuluddin; and Wayyuddin Latif, UIN Makassar on 16 August 2010

Q. How would you describe the current state of political contestation in Makassar and its vicinity in South Sulawesi?

A: In general, things have not really changed all that much since 1998, and the dominant parties in the Makassar and South Sulawesi regions remain Golkar, PDI-P and now PD with Bambang Yudhoyono as president. For some time, Golkar was particularly powerful, especially when Yusuf Kalla was deputy president, as the nature of Indonesian politics meant that the disbursement of funds to Sulawesi for development purposes peaked then. It was during this time that Golkar did particularly well and the results can be seen in the development that took place in South Sulawesi when Kalla was in office: the new airport in Makassar, the new highway and flyovers on the main coastal road north to Pare Pare and into Central Sulawesi. All these started during that period and the local community developers were content as a result. It was a typical case of development funding aided through

local political patronage, and as a result, the vote for Golkar was a vote for sustained development.

Historically, South and Central Sulawesi have also been rather pro-establishment during the New Order period, though there is still some support undercurrent for some of the more conservative and sometimes radical alternative political movements, dating back to the period when Sulawesi was also the base for anti-government opposition movements. Much of this was kept in check with the banning of *Masjumi* in 1960, which drove many Muslims to the official parties and some others to the more radical ones.

Q. During my research here in South Sulawesi and in the north in Tanah Toraja I noted that there was very little visible support for the smaller parties, including the PKS among Muslims in South Sulawesi and the PDS among Christians in Torajaland. Why is this so?

A. The answer is a mundane one, and has less to do with ideology and more to do with pragmatism and pragmatic voting patterns. The parties that failed to make the 2.5 per cent threshold in the general elections have generally not been able to develop stronger grassroots networks, and without that, their political base is weak, as is their funding base and funding sources.

The PKS, for instance, has not been able to make headway in Makassar and South Sulawesi for that reason. Though Bugis and Makassarese Muslims are also conservative. They will not vote for a party like the *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* unless the PKS demonstrates the ability to win a bigger proportion of parliamentary seats at the national level. This is because, without parliamentary representation, the voters feel that the PKS cannot deliver in terms of development and investment at the local level.

The same is true for the PDS in Tanah Toraja, which has not managed to pass the 2.5 per cent parliamentary threshold and, as such, is not seen as a national party with a national presence.

For that reason, the predominantly Christian Torajans will not give their support to a Christian party like the PDS because it cannot deliver in terms of developmental aid to Torajaland. This is why Golkar, PDI-P and PD have all done better than the PDS in Tanah Toraja, even though none of these parties are ostensibly Christian parties.

Q. So the political contests remain confined to the dominant parties?

A. Yes. Look at the situation in Makassar and the rest of South Sulawesi. For the Bupati elections in Makassar and the assembly elections in Makassar and South Sulawesi, it was almost a straight fight between Golkar and *Partai Demokrat*. PDI-P was also present but there was almost no contest from the other smaller parties.

Q. But how does this account for the continued presence of the smaller Islamist parties like the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) and *Partai Bulan Bintang*?

A. Perhaps these are the parties that receive residual support from those who used to support Masjumi right through the *Darul Islam* controversy and the DI movement in Sulawesi in the 1950s and 1960s. Following the ban of *Masjumi* in 1960 and the amalgamation of the Islamist parties into the PPP during the New Order, many of the Islamist groups and their supporters have gone underground or mainstream.

The PBB, in particular, is seen in South Sulawesi as the inheritor of the struggle of *Masjumi*, and there might be some degree of symbolic loyalty being expressed in the support for the PBB. But during the elections the votes do not go to the PPP, PBB or even the PKS, for the pragmatic reasons we discussed earlier.

Q. Are you suggesting that some residual sentiment of support for the *Darul Islam* movement is still here in Sulawesi?

A. No. The *Darul Islam* movement has not been a major factor in the popular memory or imagination here, and has not been an issue even after the end of the New Order and the *Reformasi* era.

In particular, you will note that there is also a significant Christian (Toraja, Chinese) and ethnic Chinese community in South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja. They certainly have no attachment to the *Darul Islam* movement for fear of how it may impact on their lives and businesses.

Among Muslim groups, the rise of radicalism has more to do with the new wave of radical militant politics that emerged after the fall of Suharto and the end of the New Order than with the old *Darul Islam* movement of the 1950s. When the conflict in Poso began in 1999–2000 and continued to 2002–2004, those who were involved

were the more radical jihadi types who had been radicalized during the time of Suharto. As you know, other non-Sulawesi groups were also involved, such as the *Laskar Jihad* and *Laskar Jundullah* that came from Java, etc.

Q. Is that why the *Fron Pembela Islam* is active here in Makassar?

A. Maybe. They do not really have a centre here but you will note that there seems to be a strong bond between the FPI in Makassar and their counterparts in Jakarta or Jogja/Solo in Java, more so than anywhere else. That is why if there is a demonstration in Jakarta by the FPI there will be one here as well in Makassar, but not in other provinces like Sumatra, Kalimantan or Papua.

Q. Do these groups get support and inspiration only from their counterparts in Java or are there other transnational links as well?

A. Malaysia is one of the transnational links that is important to them. As you know, when the *Forum Ummat Islam* (FUI) had their congress here they invited Abdul Hadi Awang from Malaysia's Islamic party PAS to come here to speak. Hadi Awang was a model for them, and he spoke of the success of Islamization in Malaysia by PAS and how it could be a model for Islamization in South Sulawesi as well.

At the first and second congresses of the FUI in Makassar, Malaysia's PAS was often cited as an example to follow. This was also the case during the third FUI congress held in Bulukumba. But all of this took place during the first half of the decade, between 2000 and 2003.

Q. That might not be very accurate for during that time (as now), PAS does not govern all of Malaysia and PAS has also been very selective in the way it has attempted to Islamize the states under its control. Yet you say that PAS is a model for the Islamists here?

A. Yes, because PAS had come to power constitutionally and it had shown that there was a way to power via elections.

You have to remember that the Islamists in Sulawesi were also divided between the legalists-constitutionalists and the more radical ones. PAS was seen as the right sort of

model (“*PAS cocok buat Sulawesi*”) because it offered proof to the legalist-constitutionalist Islamists that party-political mobilization was a genuine alternative. And Hadi Awang, when he was here, talked about how *shariah* and *hudud* could be implemented legally if Islamists came to power.

Q. So is Hadi Awang advocating constitutional Islamism?

A. Yes, not violent Islamist politics, and that is why PAS is seen as a model by the more politically-inclined Islamists in South and Central Sulawesi, those who do not want to opt for the path of violent confrontational militancy.

This is the result of the split when the FUI’s Committee for the Preparation of the Implementation of the *Shariah* (KPPSI) broke into two factions, with one faction opting to support the legal political parties and trying to bring about *shariah* law and enforcement of *hudud* through legal-constitutional means. Hadi Awang is admired by those who belong to this group of legalist-Islamists.

But the less political minded among the FUI and KPPSI has chosen to listen to people like Abu Bakar Ba’asyir instead, who argue that any form of politics or democratic political participation is *haram* in Islam, and that to take the legal-constitutional road is un-Islamic. These people broke from the KPPSI/FUI and formed their own groups, leading to the more radical movements like the *Jundullah*, and many of them happen to be supporters of groups like the *Fron Pembela Islam* today. They also include the members of the *An-Nasir* community, who are the remnants of some of the radical militias that were fighting in Ambon and other parts of Indonesia, some of them former jihadi types and they tend to be totally non-political, rejecting not only politics but even contact with society. That is why you will find these *An-Nasir* communes around the southern coastal areas like Bulukumba, where the men wear *Shalwar Khameezes* and the women are in black *burqas*. They are quite distinct, and they don’t mix with the rest of society.

Q. Are the more radical groups still active today?

A. Not really, in the sense that they are no longer violent and they have not made any violent *razias* (raids) on hotels, clubs, etc. They tend to be isolationist now, and they also know they are under observation by the police and security forces most of the

time. But they are often involved in the polemics and campaign to ban the Ahmadis in Sulawesi.

Appendix B

Governorial and State Assembly posts for South Sulawesi

Governor and Deputy Governor (*Gubernur dan Wakil Gubernur*), Sulawesi Selatan

Governor: Dr. H. Syahrul Yasin Limpo, SH.MSi

Deputy Governor: H. Agus Arifin Nu'man,

Provincial Assembly members (Anggota2 DPRD) for Kota Makassar, South Sulawesi (Sulsel)

1. Drs. H.I. ADNAN MAHMUD

Partai Golkar

Head of State Assembly (Ketua DPRD)

2. HAIDAR MAJID, S.Sos

Partai Demokrat (PD)

Deputy Head of State Assembly (Wakil Ketua DPRD)

3. H.M. BUSRAH ABDULLAH

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)

4. Drs. SAMSU NIANG, M.Pd

Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)

5. YUSUF GUNCO, SH, MH

Partai Golkar

Head of Commission A, DPRD

6. IMRAN MANGKONA, SH

Partai Demokrat

Deputy Head of Commission A, DPRD

7. KARTINI E GALUNG, SS

Partai Gerindra

Secretary to Commission A

8. RAHMAN PINA, S.IP

Partai Golkar

9. Drs. H.A. HASIR, HS

Partai Golkar

10. Drs. ABD. RAUF RACHMAN, SH

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)

11. MUSTAGFIR SABRY, S.Ag, M.Si

Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)

12. MUDZAKKIR ALI DJAMIL, ST

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)

13. H. ARIS MUHAMMADIAH

Partai Bintang Refomasi (PBR)

14. IR.STEFANUS SWARDY HIONG

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P)

15. SHINTA MASHITA MOLINA, A.Md

Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (HANURA)

16. NURMIATI, SE

Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (HANURA)

17. Hj. SRI RAHMI
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
18. Drs. LUKMAN BASRA, M.Pd
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
19. H. HASANUDDIN LEO, SE, M.Si. Ak
Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)
20. Ir. FAROUK M. BETTA, MM
Partai Golkar
21. ABDUL WAHAB TAHIR
Partai Golkar
22. Ir. HAERUDDIN HAFID
Partai Demokrat (PD)
23. A. ENDRE M. CECEP LANTARA, SE.Ak
Partai Demokrat (PD)
24. ASRIADY SAMAD, A.Md
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
25. ERIK HORAS, SE
Partai Gerindra.
26. Hj. ST. MUHYINA MUIN, SP, MM
Partai Keadilan Persatuan (PKP)
27. HAMZAH DORAHING, SE. Ak., M.Si
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

28. ADI RASYID ALI, SE

Partai Demokrat (PD)

29. BUSRANUDDIN BT, SE

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

30. Drs. AMAR BUSTHANUL

Partai Gerindra.

31. Ir. H. MUH. IRIANTO AHMAD, MM

Partai Golkar

32. IMRAN TENRI TATA, SE

Partai Golkar

33. IR. H.BAKHRIF ARIFUDDIN

Partai Demokrat (PD)

34. A.FADLY F.DHARWIS, SE

Partai Demokrat (PD)

35. H. ZAENAL DG.BETA, S.Sos

Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)

36. MUJIBURRAHMAN B., S.Sos.I

Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)

37. IRWAN, ST P K S

Partai Golkar

38. NELSON MARNANSE KAMISI, ST

Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS)

39. Drs. H. M. YUNUS HJ
Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)
40. H. NASRAN MONE, S.Ag., MM
Partai Golkar
41. Dra. HJ. ERNA AMIN
Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PDK)
42. HAMZAH HAMID, S.Sos
Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)
43. RAFIUDDIN KASUDE
Partai Golkar
44. A. RAHMATIKA DEWI Y, S.Kg
Partai Golkar
45. NURYANTO G. LIWANG, S. Sos
Partai Demokrat (PD)
46. Ir. SOEWARNO SUDIRMAN
Partai Demokrat (PD)
47. MUH. IQBAL ABDUL DJALIL, LC
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)
48. H. BAHAR MACHMUD
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P)
- 49 Drs. RAHMAN, SE, M.Si
Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)

50. Muhammad. AMIN

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP)

Breakdown of membership of Provincial Assembly (DPRD) on party-to-party basis

Partai Golkar	12 members DPRD
Partai Demokrat PD	9 members DPRD
Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan PDK	6 members DPRD
Partai Amanat Nasional PAN	5 members DPRD
Partai Keadilan Sejahtera PKS	4 members DPRD
Partai Gerindra	3 members DPRD
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan PPP	3 members DPRD
Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan PDI-P	2 members DPRD
Partai Hanura	2 members DPRD
Partai Bintang Refomasi PBR	1 member DPRD
Partai Damai Sejahtera PDS	1 member DPRD
Partai Bulan Bintang PBB	1 member DPRD
Partai Keadilan Persatuan	1 member DPRD

(From: <http://makassarkota.go.id>)

Names of Regional and District Governors (*Bupatis and Wakil Bupatis*) for all of South Sulawesi

Bupati/wakil Bupati Kab. Maros : Hatta Rahman dan Harmil Mattotorang

Bupati/wk. Bupati Pagkep : Syamsuddin Hamid Batara dan Rahman Assagaf

Bupati/wakil Bupati Barru : Andi Idris Syukur dan Anwar Aksa

Wali (Mayor) dan wk. Wali Kotai Pare-Pare : H Mohammad Zain Katoe dan H. Syamsu Alam

Bupati/wakil Bupati Pinrang : H. Andi Aslam Patonangi, SH, M.Si dan Drs. H. Andi Kaharuddin Machmud

Bupati/ek. Bupati Enrekang : La Tinro La Tunrung da Drs. Nurhasan

Bupati/wk. Bupati Soppeng : HA Soetomo dan Aris Muhammadia
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Wajo : Andi Burhanuddin Unru dan Amran Mahmud
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Tator : Theofilus Allorerung dan Adelheid Sosang
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Luwu Timur : Hatta Marakarma dan Thoriq Husler
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Luwu Utara :
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Gowa : Ihsan Yasin Limpo dan Abd. Razak Bajidu
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Takalar : Dr. H. Ibrahim Rewa dan Drs. H. Andi Makmur
 Sadda, MM
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Jeneponto : Raja Milo dan Drs. H. Burhanuddin BT
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Bantaeng : DR. Nurdin Abdullah dan Drs. H. A. Asli Mustadjab,
 M.Si
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Bulukumba : Zainuddin-Syamsuddin
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Selayar : Syahrir Wahab dan Saiful Arief
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Sinjai : Andi Arianto Assapa dan A. Massalinri Lathief
 Bupati/wk. Bupati Bone : Idris Galigo dan Said Pabokori
 Wali Kota Palopo : HPA Tenriadjeng dan H Saruman
 Wali/wk. wali kota Makassar : Ilham Arif Sirajuddin dan Supomo Guntur

Appendix C

Minority and non-mainstream Muslim/Islamist communities in South Sulawesi

- ***The Tabligh Jama'at***

In the course of field research across South Sulawesi and Tanah Toraja, we encountered the visible presence of the *Tablighi Jama'at* in Makassar, which was the main base of the *Tabligh* for all of Sulawesi.

The *Tabligh Jama'at* in South Sulawesi, unlike in Surakarta, Surabaya, Jakarta and other centres of the *Tabligh* in Java, seems to be almost entirely local in the composition of its members and leaders—almost all of whom are of Bugis or Makassarese ethnic background. This makes the *Tabligh* presence in Sulawesi an entirely local one, though, like all *Tabligh* chapters across Indonesia, the *Tabligh's*

markaz in Sulawesi receives and sends delegations on regular *khuruj* (excursion missionary tours) across the country and beyond.

The first base for the *Tabligh* was the *Masjid Mamajangraya*, located at No. 72 Jalan Veteran I in downtown Makassar. This became their first base of operations when they first settled in Makassar in the 1970s, though it should be noted that the *Masjid Mamajangraya* is a public mosque that is free to all and not claimed by any of the mainstream Islamist organizations or political parties. Owing to the fact that it was—and remains—an open public mosque, it was difficult for the members of the *Tabligh* to turn it into one of their own bases of operation. It was also difficult for them to use it as a base to host their fellow *Tablighi* members who were touring Sulawesi on *khuruj*. Later, by the late 1990s, efforts were made by the local *Tabligh* to acquire their own plot of land and transfer their activities to their own purpose-built mosque.

The second (and now permanent) base of the *Tabligh* in Makassar is the *Markaz Besar Tabligh*, at No. 61 Jalan Kerung-Kerung in central Makassar town. During our visit there we noted that the *Markaz Besar* was still under construction and had been under construction since 2006. It was a very large mosque/*markaz* complex, built in concrete in modern Arabic style, though the dome had not been completed. Our survey of the building site showed that the low walls that currently surrounded the *markaz* complex would eventually be raised, creating an enclosed environment for the *Tabligh* members and delegations from abroad.

The mosque/*markaz* complex was located on grounds that were entirely owned by the *Tabligh*, the funds for which were collected from local donations and with no additional funding of note from other *Tabligh* branches anywhere else in Indonesia. Though half-complete, it was fully functional and served as the first and last stop-post for all delegation to and from Sulawesi sent by the *Tabligh*. The grounds encompassed a small car park that could accommodate about 40 vehicles, and an internal courtyard. All *Tabligh* activities took place in the *markaz*, and members slept on the floor on the first and second levels. Cooking and cleaning of clothes was also done entirely within the *markaz*.

The *Tabligh* members whom we interviewed noted that this was a *markaz* entirely dedicated to, as well as owned and run, by the *Tabligh*. Additional interviews that we conducted with the faculty members of UIN Allauddin Makassar supported the view that the *Tabligh* *markaz* at Jalan Kerong-Kerong was a cut-off community and had minimal contact with other Muslims in Makassar. It should be noted that the *markaz*-mosque is not used by other non-*Tabligh* Muslims for Friday prayers (*Solat Jumaat*) either. It was not possible to conduct extensive interviews with the leaders of the *Tabligh* at the *Markaz Besar* and we were not allowed to photograph the premises or the occupants therein.

- **The Ahmadiyah community**

The Ahmadiyah community has been in Indonesia since 1953, having first settled in Manislor in 1954, and has been recognized by the Indonesian government since 1953. However, following the first of many *fatwas* issued against the movement by the *Majlis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI) in 1980, their activities across the country have been severely curtailed, with attacks on the Ahmadis growing in frequency over the past decade.

The law SKB3 MENTERI has since protected the Ahmadi right to exist as a community, though it has also made it illegal for them to preach to any other Muslims in Indonesia. Citing SKB3 as a precedent, more radical Islamist groups in Sulawesi (notably groups like the *Fron Pembela Islam* FPI, *Jama'ah Ansor* and others) have intensified their attacks on the Ahmadi community in and around the Makassar area, vowing to have them banned and removed from all of South Sulawesi. Attacks against Ahmadi mosques and *madrasahs/pesantrens* have grown in violence and frequency, leaving the Ahmadis a small and almost invisible minority community that has been forced to seek protection from the state security authorities.

Almost all of the Ahmadi mosques and educational centres in Makassar are now defunct or destroyed, and the small Ahmadi community is clustered around the last official Ahmadi mosque and communal centre, located in the *Masjid al-Nushrat* at No. 112, Jalan Anuang, Makassar. The *Masjid al-Nushrat* is the only remaining

Ahmadi mosque and office that is functional in Makassar, though there have been repeated attempts by groups like the FPI and *Jama'ah Ansor* to have it closed. The centre also happens to be the base for the *Pimpinan Wilayah Propinsi SulSel* (Provincial Command for the Province of South Sulawesi) and the *Pimpinan Daerah Kota Makassar* (Area Command for Makassar Region) of the Ahmadis in South Sulawesi.

Despite explaining the nature of our research work and interests, it was not possible to secure an interview with the leaders of the Ahmadis there. No literature was available to the public and those we spoke to informed us that this was because the Ahmadis had been warned not to have any contact with non-Ahmadis and they wanted to protect the interest and safety of their community members. The size of the Ahmadi community is very small, numbering only about 400 in total throughout all of South Sulawesi, though this is the only functioning mosque for the community. During the time of our research work, the Ahmadi community across Indonesia was against inviting dialogue with mainstream Islamist movements in Indonesia, apprehensive after another spate of Ahmadi-mosque attacks and burnings in West Java. Despite the apprehension we encountered (all requests for interviews received no response), there was no overt security presence around the *Masjid al-Nushrat*. Nor was there any visible presence of Indonesian police guarding the premises.

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