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**Enabling Security for the 21st Century:
Intelligence & Strategic Foresight and Warning**

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ABSTRACT

This article addresses a very specific challenge the world and security institutions, notably those having as mission to provide intelligence, must currently face: their adaptation to a present and future conceptualized differently from the old Cold War worldview or from the following “Davos paradigm” and incorporating real life threats and dangers perceived as new.

It will show that such notions as energy, food, health, mineral resources, or ecosystem and environmental changes need to be reincorporated within the primary mission of intelligence, besides more traditional issues, not just because one needs to change but because those dangers and threats do belong to the very idea of security, and that to be able to do that in a timely fashion strategic foresight and warning must be fully integrated within intelligence.

The first section of the article will set the general stage, going back to the basics of what security is, starting with its most straightforward definition and then showing consequences in terms of political organization. The second section will emphasize the unbreakable relationship between security and intelligence, and revisit from this perspective existing definitions and characteristics of intelligence. Finally, building upon the two previous sections, the last part will focus on the integration of strategic foresight and warning within an intelligence function seen as the understanding capability of political authorities that needs to be implemented or reinforced to face the challenges of the present and future.

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Enabling Security for the 21st Century: Intelligence & Strategic Foresight and Warning

INTRODUCTION

Emerging technologies and new armaments, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, damage to the biosphere, energy issues, mineral resources stress, epidemics and pandemics, economic and financial crises, terrorism, instability, international tension, conflicts and civil wars are some of the intertwined dangers and threats that nations increasingly recognize as having to face in the framework of their national security. Yet, at the same time, many of those dangers and threats are considered by some within the security and intelligence communities as not belonging to their primary mission and treated accordingly, be it in terms of allocated resource, status or overall organization. We are therefore presently confronted with, on the one hand, a broad encompassing official strategic discourse striving to consider all threats and dangers,¹ and, on the other, a retreat on so-called “traditional”, most often militaristic threats and corresponding practice. This dichotomy was summed up by Dennis Blair, then Director of National Intelligence of the United States in his 2009 *Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community*, who underlined that climate change, global health, etc. “while not traditionally viewed as ‘threats’ to U.S. national security, (they) will affect Americans in major ways. The Intelligence Community has increased its focus on these three critical issues as a result of unprecedented developments in the last year.”²

At present, the world and security institutions, notably those having as mission to provide intelligence, must therefore face a very specific trial: to adapt themselves to an emerging awareness of a present and future conceptualized differently from the old

¹ See, for example: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, *The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America*, August 2009; République française, *Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité nationale*, (Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation Française, 2008); among others, S. Jayakumar, “Opening Address By Prof. S. Jayakumar, Senior Minister and Coordinating Minister For National Security At The Opening Of The 3rd International Risk Assessment and Horizon Scanning Symposium (IRAHSS)”, 15 March 2010, <http://app.hsc.gov.sg/public/www/content.aspx?sid=2025>, Teo Chee Hean, “Speech by Mr. Teo Chee Hean, Minister for Defence, at Committee of Supply Debate on Defence Budget 2007,” March 2007, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resources/speeches/2007/05mar07_speech.html.

² Dennis C. Blair, United States Director of National Intelligence, *Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 12 February 2009, p. 41.

Cold War worldview or from the following “Davos paradigm” and incorporating real life threats and dangers perceived as new, while struggling against denial and dealing with self-perception quarrels.³

This article seeks to address this challenge by reinserting security and intelligence within the larger political process. It will suggest that such notions as energy, food, health, mineral resources, or ecosystem and environmental changes need to be reincorporated within the primary mission of intelligence, not just because one needs to change but because those dangers and threats do belong to the very idea of security, and that to be able to do that in a timely fashion strategic foresight and warning must be fully integrated within intelligence. This article thus addresses the normative framework of thoughts that underlies the way we collectively act. Grounding itself in a humanist understanding of society, the first section will set the general stage, going back to the basics of what security is, starting with its most straightforward definition and then showing consequences in terms of political organization. The second section will emphasize the unbreakable relationship between security and intelligence, and revisit from this perspective existing definitions and characteristics of intelligence. Finally, building upon the two previous sections, the last part will focus on the integration of strategic foresight and warning within an intelligence function seen as the understanding capability of political authorities that needs to be implemented or reinforced to face the challenges of the present and future.

Security: the mission of authority

The “debate on security” in the academic world, on the necessity to enlarge the concept beyond a strictly militaristic or criminal (for the domestic dimension) vision, was renewed in its most recent phase in the 1980s, beginning notably with Buzan’s book *People, State and Fear* and Ullman’s article “Redefining Security” and fully took off with the end of the Cold War.⁴ Buzan, for example, placing the state as

³ In a similar way, Ian Bremmer underlines the end of the “Davos generation”, in “Top risks: Emerging long term political trends,” speech at the *IRAHSS 2010*, March 2010, Singapore.

⁴ Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear* – 2nd edition: An agenda for international security studies in the post-Cold War era, (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1st edition 1983, 2nd edition 1991); Richard Ullman, “Redefining Security”, *International Security*, Vol. 8, no 1, 1983, pp. 129–153. Among others, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, “Redefining Security,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, Spring 1989, pp. 162–177; H. Haftendorn, “The Security Puzzle: Theory Building and Discipline Building in International

central actor yet considering also the individual and systemic levels, defines five sectors that affect the security of human collectivities, military, political, economic, societal and environmental, “all woven together in a strong web of linkages”.⁵ Ullman underlines the danger of conceiving security exclusively in military terms, as increasing insecurity rather than preventing it, and stresses the necessity to redefine the meaning of threat so as to include within policies of National Security natural disasters and other catastrophes, indirect threats and those stemming from supply and demand or assessment of vulnerabilities.⁶ Many authors start by attempting to define security and underlining how amorphous this concept is. For example, Buzan, although giving us a list of various definitions according to authors, suggests to refrain defining the notion, while the American school of constructivism led by Katzenstein proposes to look at the prevalent definition of security as a construct, which allows for addressing the question “whose security?”.⁷ As aptly explained by Rotschild, this debate, including the more recent one attempting to oppose a human security to a state security, is grounded in an effort started in the 17th century, to comprehend and define security in the framework of the conceptualization of the modern state and its relation to the individual, to which Buzan, for example, adds the systemic level.⁸ Considering our purpose, to identify a security adapted as well to the present as to a yet undetermined future, we need to grasp the essence of the problem, Kant’s *noumen*, rather than run the risk of remaining at the phenomenological level, which is time-dependent. If we succeed in identifying this essence and to do so in a dynamic perspective, then we should be able to deduce all the various security-related phenomena according to time. This does not invalidate other comprehensions or definitions of security but should allow inserting them within a larger framework for understanding. We shall thus start from a very general, basic and universal definition of security for a human being and use political sociologist Barrington Moore’s understanding of the processes underlying and explaining the political organization of human beings to reach our goal.

Security”, *International Security Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1991, pp. 3–17; Peter Katzenstein (Ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); etc.

⁵ Buzan, *People*, p. 20.

⁶ Ullman, “Redefining Security”.

⁷ Buzan, *People*, pp. 14–20; Katzenstein (Ed.), *The Culture*.

⁸ Emma Rotschild, “What Is Security?” *Daedalus*, Vol. 124, No. 3, Summer 1995, pp. 53–98; Buzan, *People*.

According to the *Oxford Concise Dictionary*, security is defined as “a secure condition or feeling”, secure meaning “untroubled by danger or fear” and danger “liability or exposure to harm”. We thus have as basic and also fundamental definition of security “a condition or feeling untroubled by exposure to harm or fear”.⁹ This definition considers not only the objective character of security but also its relative (a feeling of) and emotional (fear) components.

If we follow both humanist psychologist Maslow and Moore, harm, in turn, comes from a failure to satisfy adequately physiological and psychological natural needs (i.e. intrinsic to human nature).¹⁰

According to Moore, in natural conditions an individual is biologically too weak to see his needs met successfully.¹¹ It thus needs a group to maximize its chances, which means society. Living in society creates new difficulties and demands, summarized as the problem of overall social coordination, which is broken down through three components: “the problems of authority, the division of labour and the distribution of goods and services.”¹² To solve those problems is a social need and even social imperative. To achieve this aim, people living in a society create “an implicit and sometimes explicit social contract”, most of the time involving a certain amount of inequality, where, notably, a balance between individual needs and social imperatives are negotiated and where the content of essential organizing rules or principles are defined.

In the case of authority, which is used by human beings “to coordinate the activity of a large number of persons”, and which concerns us most here, the first principle is that authorities must be chosen and organized according to specific rules, as defined

⁹ Note that this definition is quite similar to Mroz, “Security is the relative freedom from harmful threats” or Wolfers, “Security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked”, cited by Buzan, *People*, p. 17; John E. Mroz, “Beyond Security: Private Perceptions among Arabs and Israelis” (New York: International Peace Academy; 1980), p. 105 & Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 152.

¹⁰ Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1st edition: 1954, 3rd edition: 1987); Barrington Moore, *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*, (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 5–8.

¹¹ The following three paragraphs summarize succinctly Moore’s masterful demonstration, *Injustice*, pp. 9–22. Note that, originally, Moore is not preoccupied with security but with explaining why people obey or revolt. He finds as main explanatory variable outrage and feeling of injustice that may arise from failure to respect the moral rules, crucial component of a society.

¹² *Ibid.* p. 9.

by the social contract. Those rules define part of legitimacy.¹³ At the same time, those in authority must make sure they fulfil their obligations regarding the social coordination needs: as no society can be ruled by fear and coercion alone and as a certain amount of inequality exists, to obtain obedience from those who are ruled and allow for the division of labour and distribution of goods and services, authorities must in exchange provide the ruled with security. Moore defines the mission of security of authorities as comprising three elements: protection from foreign enemies, foreign being defined by what does not belong to the sphere of the “we”, maintenance of peace and order, and contribution to “material security”, or “security against supernatural, natural and human threats to the food supply and other material supports of customary daily life”.¹⁴ Being efficient in fulfilling this security mission represents the other part of the legitimacy of authority.¹⁵ Indeed, failure to provide security would break the social contract with consequences in terms of revolts, thus further failure to ensure security, increased illegitimacy, which would again enhance insecurity, in a vicious circle, until more efficient authorities take over. Events such as the 2008 food crisis or the 2010 street protests generated by the Greek financial turmoil can be seen as examples of the very early stages of this process.

As society changes with time and becomes increasingly complex, the social imperative will have to evolve accordingly, as well as the rules presiding over authority, the division of labour and the distribution of goods and services. However, whatever the complexity, the fundamental organizing principles remain, even if their contents change.

Thus, ensuring security is indeed the primary mission of political authorities, because of the inherent requirement to see the needs of individual human beings fulfilled when they are naturally weak. Meanwhile, individuals cannot reject political authorities, notably in their mission to ensure security, because they need it for the fulfilment of

¹³ Those are more exactly the rules embodied as regime, Helene Lavoix, “Identifier l’Etat fragile avant l’heure : le rôle des indicateurs de prévision”, (“Identifying early fragile states : the role of indicators”) in Chataignier and Magro (Ed.), *Etats et Sociétés fragiles (States and Fragile Societies)* (Paris: Karthala, 2007), pp. 55–71.

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 22.

¹⁵ ARD/United States Agency for International Development (USAID), *Measuring Fragility: Indicators and Methods for Rating State Performance*, document prepared by ARD Consortium for the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance/Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (DCHA/CMM), June 2005.

their needs. Hence, this understanding of security unites rather than opposes both the individual and state levels, while allowing for the consideration of the systemic and global level. Indeed, the modern state, the birth of which is traditionally attributed to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, is nothing but a specific embodiment of authority. Hence, the modern nation-state, as we know it, can be reinserted in its larger historical context, which should allow us envisioning its transformation, including at systemic level through international norms, as historical evolution takes place, most often in the direction of an increasing complexity.¹⁶ We note that this approach is also congruent with Weber's definition of the modern State, with its legitimate monopoly of the means of violence, when, in the context of modernity, its missions are best provided through a centralized administration, an extraction of resources and "other means of management".¹⁷ A human, i.e. individual, security cannot be separated from the security provided by the most adequate form of authorities according to the complexity of the society. Again in the case of the modern state, this has been emphasized by Hobbes, Locke, or Kant among others.

We find here an understanding of security much broader than the traditional military security approach, yet incorporating it as an essential element that ought not to be neglected, and including potentially all components which may be thought of nowadays—from cyber-security to environmental security to preservation of ways of life—without forgetting a critical self-reflection about the nature of the contemporary evolution, of the social contract and of the corresponding way to organize the overall social cooperation. The latter should allow for state and political system reorganization if need be, as well as for the necessity to consider the feelings of one's population and its potential fear (for example the spread of emotion and fear after 9/11 as a consequence of globalized media).¹⁸ Being dynamic and grounded in

¹⁶ Hélène Lavoix, *'Nationalism' and 'Genocide': the construction of nation-ness, authority and opposition – The case of Cambodia (1861–1979)*, (PhD Thesis, Political Sciences, University of London, SOAS, 2005).

¹⁷ Max Weber, *Le savant et le politique*, (Paris: 10/18, 1963) originally in German "Wissenschaft als Beruf" & "Politik als Beruf" 1919; Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, Vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 54–56. See also Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 16 quoting John Brewer's work: the collection of commercial revenues is more difficult than the collection of land revenues and thus leads to the development of bureaucracy.

¹⁸ Gerd Gigerenzer, "Out of the Frying Pan into the Fire: Behavioral Reactions to Terrorist Attacks", *Risk Analysis*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2006.

process and understanding, this comprehension of security should equally permit anticipating future elements of security. Furthermore, it transcends the boundary between what is domestic and what is foreign and allows for the full consideration of feedback, both being crucial for the evaluation of potential impacts of dangers and threats, as well as for the determination of opportunities to improve security.¹⁹

From Security to Intelligence, Foresight and Warning

Now, where is intelligence? If authorities want to ensure security in all its dimensions, then they need to bring about “a condition or feeling untroubled by exposure to harm or fear”, and for this, first of all, they need to understand what this condition or feeling is and to get warning when this condition or feeling may be troubled or enhanced. If we use an organic analogy, this is the function of an intelligence oriented towards this problem, as intelligence is both understanding and the capability to reach this understanding, accompanied by warning. Warning is an intrinsic part of life, existing within all living beings and without which survival would be impossible.

Intelligence would thus be both the understanding, upon which the authorities will rely, of what is, for their citizens, “a condition or feeling untroubled by exposure to harm or fear” and the capability to reach this understanding and to warn about it. Citizens are understood as both individuals and members of a society; they are bound by the implicit and explicit social contract, which, for the time being, also implies the Nation as a collective body and consciousness.²⁰

Indeed, Dennis Blair stressed in his *Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, “Nothing is more important to national security and the making and conduct of good policy than timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence ... The

¹⁹ The most delicate task of estimating and determining trade-offs between different components of security and different dangers is not underestimated, but does not directly belong to the scope of this article. It is part of the difficult mission of authorities and notably intelligence, but will also result from the evolving and perpetually renegotiated social contract between different groups of society. It will probably strongly contribute to determine the success or failure to adapt to increasingly complex situations.

²⁰ Among others for Nation, see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, 1991); Anthony D., Smith, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986 [1999]) & *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Cambridge U.K.: Polity Press, 2000).

Intelligence Community is charged with the task of assessing threats and providing timely warning.”²¹

We find numerous other definitions of intelligence, for example, as compiled and commented by Warner, who references 18 of them, including his own.²² Why choose one over the other? In his endeavour, Warner attempts to find a definition that most accurately describes the intelligence craft and at the same time distinguishes it from other activities. However valid and accurate, if the reader fails to insert such a definition into its general dynamic context, s/he takes the risk of freezing intelligence, which then may become tightly linked to a specific historical period and corresponding purpose. The best definition thus becomes a photograph, which fixes something as it exists at a specific time. As evolution is the rule in terms of human beings, society, and thus security, relying upon a static and fixed comprehension of the crucial function responsible for understanding and warning is problematic at best, harmful at worst. This is not to say that the characteristics of current intelligence activities must be abandoned or despised; far from it; but it must be explicit that those characteristics must follow from the necessities of the authorities’ mission in ensuring security and neither precede it nor forget essence for form.

Among existing mission-focused approaches to intelligence, which might suit our requirements, we find a cluster that emphasizes knowledge. For example, the CIA states, “Reduced to its simplest terms, intelligence is knowledge and foreknowledge of the world around us—the prelude to decision and action by U.S. policymakers.”²³ Similarly, the French 2008 White Paper on defence emphasizes the importance to “know and anticipate”. Betts stresses, “Government should know as much as possible about threats and opportunities and, in time, to do something about them.”²⁴

However crucial knowledge is, including scholarly learning, it is a necessary but insufficient condition. Indeed, knowledge may or may not involve understanding, which introduces an uncertainty in the comprehension of what intelligence is. One

²¹ *Statement of Dennis C. Blair before The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, 22 January 2009.

²² Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Definition of “Intelligence”, *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol46no3/article02.html>.

²³ Central Intelligence Agency (Office of Public Affairs), *A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence*, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), p. vii.

²⁴ Richard K. Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 2.

may instinctively know that things are wrong, but nothing more. One may very well know something, a phenomenon, without understanding it. One may collect and accumulate facts relative to this phenomenon and devote so much resources and energy to this gathering that the underlying patterns will always elude us. Such knowledge would then be unhelpful for the authorities' security mission. For example, if one knows that there is ongoing violence somewhere, can document all the facts, but does not understand the dynamics underlying this violence, then the gathered knowledge is useless as it can help neither strategy nor action. Similarly, one may know that this chemical or this or that part is being produced, ordered and then shipped, if one does not understand the process of the making of a weapon, the intentions of actors, the network of people involved, then one may never recognize what is happening. Furthermore, an exclusive focus on such an undefined knowledge forbids "foreknowledge" as, without understanding, we can only hypothesize as many alternative futures as can be imagined, without any means to distinguish between them or evaluate their likelihood. Moreover, imagination is most often lacking, as the 9/11 Commission Report reminds us when it shows that the absence of imagination was one of the four kinds of failures leading to the 9/11 attacks.²⁵ We could thus be reduced to rehearse old beliefs under new guises. Indeed, a cursory look benefiting from hindsight at past foresight products shows how much those tend to reproduce the conventional wisdom of the times.²⁶ We could thus be fooling ourselves because we understand neither ourselves—our own cognitive biases and specificities, such as absence of imagination—nor the world in which we live, with its complex dynamics and interactions, and forbid any improvement by stating that the future is, anyway, unknowable, because collecting knowledge or facts on the future is indeed impossible.²⁷ Thus, focusing solely upon knowledge is insufficient to make sure that

²⁵ *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (2004), pp. 339–348, <http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm>.

²⁶ It is high time that foresight reports, those coming from state institutions as those coming from the business world, be submitted to the same scrutiny as intelligence failures. If such critical analysis could be implemented and the findings made known without fear of defamation and legal problems, the lessons learned would be highly valuable and foresight would progress.

²⁷ For a masterful explanation of cognitive biases, notably in intelligence analysis, see Richards J. Jr Heuer, *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999. For an example among many of this approach to the future, Dator, Jim "What Futures Studies is, and is Not", http://www.tourism.wu-wien.ac.at/Summit/Material/What_is_Future_Studies.pdf, see also the third type – critical, corresponding approximately to post-modern critical theory – of approaches to the future in the

security is provided. Nonetheless, authorities must and ought to fulfil their mission and there is no possible alternative.

Is the reverse true? Is understanding an inadequate approach to achieve security? Understanding demands that the inner working, with dynamics and processes, of phenomena, including social ones, be comprehended as well as possible. To be achieved, this necessitates scholarly learning and induction, hence a certain amount of knowledge of gathered facts or empirical data, as well as deduction and also imagination, be it only for the ability to make new connections and see new or different patterns in sets of data.²⁸ Although perfect understanding can never be achieved, considering creativity, freedom, our own human cognitive limitations as masterfully explained by Heuer, and more broadly the nature of life as Taleb reminds us, recalling notably Popper on the induction fallacy, we can and must nevertheless strive towards a good enough understanding.²⁹ Having no other choice to survive than trying to achieve understanding in an evolving world, human beings need to permanently compare new gathered facts to the cognitive models that underlies their understanding, so as to improve them.³⁰ Understanding thus demands also self-understanding, of one's society and of one's institutions. Obtaining self-understanding will be particularly necessary in the mission of ensuring security, because, as we saw, the latter involves feelings and emotions, as exemplified in the case of 9/11 by Gigerenzer.³¹

Hence, understanding, which includes knowledge, appears as a concept that is well adapted to security and intelligence.

typology developed by Sohail Inayatullah, "From Who am I to When am I? Framing the Time and Shape of the Future", *Futures* 1993, 25 (3): pp. 235–253.

²⁸ For the importance of imagination to conceive new explanations or possible outcomes, or "to construct a coherent story out of a set of data", for example, Heuer, *Psychology*, p. 40 & pp. 128–129.

²⁹ Heuer, *Psychology*; Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, (New York: the Random House, 2007), Karl Popper, "The Problem of Induction", from *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Basic Books, 1959), pp. 27–34, reproduced in Martin Curd and J. A. Cover, *Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), pp. 426–432. Adapted from Helen Fein's idea of a "Good Enough Model" 'Tools and Alarms: Uses of Models for Explanation and Anticipation', *Journal of Ethno-Development*, 4 (1), pp. 31–35, (1994), Appendix 2.

³⁰ Heuer, *Psychology*.

³¹ Gigerenzer, "Out of the Frying Pan". For the importance of emotions see also Jon Elster, *Alchemies of the Mind*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Michel Tuan Pham, "Emotion and Rationality: A Critical Review and Interpretation of Empirical Evidence", *Review of General Psychology*, 2007, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 155–178.

Furthermore, many “intelligence failures” as one source of “strategic surprises” or “surprise military attacks” could also be explained through an excessive focus on knowledge to the detriment of understanding. The study of “intelligence failures” in case of surprise attacks by students and practitioners of intelligence, from Wohlstetter’s work on Pearl Harbour to investigation commissions, represents now an expanding body of knowledge—and understanding—both historically and theoretically.³² A review of some of these works as well as discussions with intelligence officers show that the reasons for failure may be located at each stage of the intelligence cycle or process (i.e. planning and direction, collection, processing, analysis and production, dissemination). Each author will tend to favour one or the other focus for his analysis and for his review of the works of others. Nevertheless, findings tend to converge to emphasize the problems of perceptions and misperceptions found within the intelligence as well as within the policy-making milieu.³³ The latter have consequences in terms of organization, management and finally analysis authorized to filter through the layers of management within the intelligence services, which vary according to the closeness of the relationship between policy-makers and intelligence as shown by Bar Joseph and Levy, thus creating institutional and organizational misperceptions.³⁴ As Nolan and Mac Eachin underline in a recent report, “The impulse to protect consensus revealed a systemic tendency to silence or even penalize professionals who tried to present new facts or judgments. Violating the implicit boundaries of accepted discourse proved damaging

³² To cite only a few, see Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962); Richard Betts, “Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable” *World Politics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1978; Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*, pp. 104–123; Abraham Ben-Zvi “The Study of Surprise Attacks” *British Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 5, July 1979, pp. 129–149 & Abraham Ben-Zvi, “Perception, Misperception and Surprise in the Yom Kippur War: A Look at the New Evidence”, *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. XV, No. 2, Fall 1995; Douglas MacEachin, *Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community's Record* <https://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/afghanistan/index.html> (CIA, CSI Publications, 2002); Bar-Joseph, Uri and Kruglanski, Arie W. “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise” *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 21, No. 1, February 2006, pp. 1–25; *The 9/11 Commission Report*; Gustavo Díaz, “Methodological Approaches To The Concept Of Intelligence Failure”, *UNISCI Discussion Papers*, January 2005; Uri Bar-Joseph & Jack S. Levy, “Conscious Action and the Study of Intelligence Failure”, APSA 2006 Annual Meeting, Philadelphia, 31 August – 3 September 2006, Janne E. Nolan and Douglas MacEachin, with Kristine Tockman, *Discourse, Dissent and Strategic Surprise Formulating U.S. Security Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2007); Chester A. Crocker, “Thirteen Reflections on Strategic Surprise”, http://isd.georgetown.edu/Crocker_Reflections_on_Strategic_Surprise.pdf; etc.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Bar-Joseph & Levy, “Conscious Action”.

to professional credibility, in some cases causing lasting adverse consequences for individuals' careers. Professionals who were simply doing their jobs as analysts ran the risk of being cast as dissenters who had ceased to be "team players".³⁵ This problem is unfortunately not one found exclusively within the intelligence but pervades the whole of society. General organizational challenges, for example bitter administrative struggles for parochial or even egoistic interests, as already denounced by Wholestetter, favour and intensify all other problems, while entrenching institutionalized organizational misperceptions.³⁶

Now, those misperceptions are problems of understanding and self-understanding, including comprehension of the real mission of authorities, not problems of knowledge. Indeed, the 9/11 report specifically underlines the crucial and foremost importance of "understanding the danger".³⁷ Despite existing knowledge, despite collected information, prior to the 9/11 attacks, understanding was lacking and thus existing knowledge could not be comprehended.³⁸ To cite another example, Ben Zvi shows that, in the case of the Yom Kippur attack, if the enemies' intentions were well estimated by the Israeli side, capabilities were wrongly assessed: knowledge of changes had been gathered but evolution was so slow it was not sufficient to raise awareness.³⁹ Misperception was also favoured by an absence of self-understanding about "their [the Israeli leadership] preconceived theories and image".⁴⁰ In the case of the American intelligence failure regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, knowledge was there since "information on Soviet force preparations and the deteriorating internal situation in Afghanistan was fully reported in daily intelligence publications", but sufficient understanding was lacking: indeed, if the prevalent U.S. intelligence assessment at the time was similar to the one held by some high level Soviet officials, it nevertheless obviously misunderstood the overall unfolding process that could lead to a Soviet invasion.⁴¹ Only a real understanding with its underlying

³⁵ Nolan and Douglas MacEachin, *Discourse*, p. 104, See also on this theme A. J. Rossmiller, *Still Broken: A Recruit's Insider Account of Intelligence Failures, from Baghdad to the Pentagon*, (New York: Ballantine books, 2008).

³⁶ Bar-Joseph & Levy, "Conscious Action"; Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor*.

³⁷ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, pp. 340–344.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Ben-Zvi, "Perception" pp. 8–9.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ MacEachin, *Predicting the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*.

dynamics, processes and interactions, which should include full self-understanding, as emphasized by studies on intelligence failure, would allow for the difficult detection of slow pattern of changes of the kind described in the case of the Yom Kippur attack, for the full consideration of the Soviet and Afghan systems and for hoping to “connect the dots” in the 9/11 case, while helping to struggle against one’s own organizational distortions.

Intelligence is therefore both the understanding upon which the authorities rely to act, of what is, for their citizens, “a condition or feeling untroubled by exposure to harm or fear” in the three areas of protection from foreign enemies, maintenance of peace and order, and protection against “supernatural, natural and human threats to the food supply and other material supports of customary daily life” and the capability to reach this understanding and warn about any potential coming trouble or, on the contrary, about ways to enhance this security.

Integrating Strategic Foresight and Warning within Intelligence

Now, if we start from this characterization of intelligence, we should be able to come up with a few general guiding principles.

First, as we know that security will be constantly evolving because of the growing complexity arising from the aggregation of our past actions and because of reactions to present and future actions generated by intelligence, trying to understand the evolving multidimensional security must lead the whole intelligence process, while the capabilities and organization of intelligence must be designed with this aim in mind.

This means that a fully developed and integrated capacity for foresight, long-range analysis or anticipation, and warning should be completely part and parcel of intelligence.

We should thus not only have the classical process of decision-makers asking specific questions and receiving intelligence in return, but also a process according to which, first, hypothetical futures for security and its themes and issues are anticipated

through adequate foresight methodologies, for example horizon scanning followed by structural analysis and scenarios.⁴² Those methodologies will have to be carefully selected to be adapted to the specificities of the themes and issues considered. Notably, the scientific understanding reached must be integrated, the underlying dynamics and complexity must be considered, as it is no longer possible to apply, for example, linear methods of simple statistical projections to non-linear systems, to disregard what science has understood, or to ignore feedbacks and second-and-third-order effects, if one wants to achieve truly useful foresight products. Out of this foresight, themes and issues are identified for monitoring, which leads according to cases to identification of problems and their surveillance and then to delivery of products. Hence, intelligence would also initiate the transmission of the rightly conceived and explained understanding and make sure it is received by the right part of the authorities. This is nothing but a slightly enhanced traditional warning process, to which strategic foresight would be added. Indeed, the usual intelligence cycle is seen as starting with requirements—the step called “planning and direction”—that then initiate the whole intelligence cycle, which includes as following steps collection, processing, analysis and production, and, finally, dissemination, which leads again to planning and requirement.⁴³ In a slightly different way, in the warning process, the warning officer, according to objectives and strategies, starts with

⁴² It will be impossible in this framework to detail foresight methodologies, the latest peer-reviewed compendium of such methodologies counting 39 chapters and approximately 1300 pages: Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, Ed., *The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology*, Version 3.0, <http://www.millennium-project.org/millennium/FRM-V3.html>. For horizon scanning, see, for example, Theodore J. Gordon and Glenn, Jerome C., “Environmental Scanning”, *The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology*, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. Gordon, 2009, Chapter 2 and also Beat Habbegger, *Horizon Scanning in Government: Concept, Country Experiences, and Models for Switzerland*, Center for Security Studies (CSS), ETH Zurich, 2009 http://www.crn.ethz.ch/publications/crn_team/detail.cfm?id=96084. For structural analysis, Jacques Arcade, Michel, Godet, Francis Meunier, and Fabrice Roubelat, “Structural Analysis with the MICMAC Method & Actors' Strategy with MACTOR Method”, *The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology*, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. 2009, Chapter 11, for scenarios, Jerome C. Glenn, and The Futures Group International, “Scenarios”, in *The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology*, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. 2009, Chapter 19; Tom Ritchey, “Morphological Analysis”, in *The Millennium Project: Futures Research Methodology*, Version 3.0, Ed. Jerome C. Glenn and Theodore J. 2009, Chapter 17; Andrew Curry, & Wendy Schultz, “Roads Less Travelled: Different Methods, Different Futures”, *Journal of Futures Studies*, May 2009, 13(4): 35–60, <http://www.jfs.tku.edu.tw/13-4/AE03.pdf>.

⁴³ For example, among others: CIA, “The Intelligence Cycle”, <https://www.cia.gov/kids-page/6-12th-grade/who-we-are-what-we-do/the-intelligence-cycle.html>.


monitoring issues (for example instability, war, economic crises, state fragility, etc.).⁴⁴ Thanks to this monitoring, he and his team will be able to identify more specific warning problems for each issue (for example, if the issue is war, specific countries, where the level of escalation is such that war becomes more likely, are seen as problems). Those problems will then be under surveillance. At the “right” moment the warning officer will deliver the warning to his policy maker; the right moment being a critical time when the warning officer is certain enough about its warning, yet when sufficient lead time still remains to allow the policy makers to decide and then to see actions implemented.⁴⁵

Ideally, considering the happenstance of new themes and issues that could affect security, strategy and objectives, foresight should be fully integrated into the cycle. An ideal-type sketch of the strategic foresight and warning cycle could be drawn as in the figure below (note that responses do not belong to the warning process and are only mentioned for ease of comprehension):⁴⁶

⁴⁴ For the rest of the paragraph on warning, Kenneth Knight, “Focused on foresight: An interview with the U.S.’s national intelligence officer for warning”, September 2009, McKinsey Quarterly, http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Public_Sector/Management/Focused_on_foresight_An_interview_with_the_US_national_intelligence_officer_for_warning_2415; Cynthia M. Grabo, *Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning*, edited by Jan Goldman, (Lanham MD: University Press of America, May 2004); Jack Davis, “Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning”, *The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers* Vol. 1, No. 1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/pdf/OPNo1.pdf> & “Strategic Warning: If Surprise is Inevitable, What Role for Analysis?” *Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Occasional Papers*, Vol. 2, No. 1 <https://www.cia.gov/library/kent-center-occasional-papers/vol2no1.htm>, Helene Lavoix (Ed.), “Constructing an Early Warning System”, *From Early Warning to Early Action?*, (European Commission, External Relations: 2008; published first in French Notes de l’IFRI, Summer 2006), pp. 365–382 & *Confidential Study on Strategic Early Warning* (Paris: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Bureau de la prévention des conflits et de la reconstruction, DGCID, 2007).

⁴⁵ Notably, Kenneth Knight, “Focused on foresight”.

⁴⁶ Helene Lavoix, “Early Warning and 21st Century Challenge”, Presentation at the *5th meeting of the Club of Budapest*, European Commission, Bucharest, February 2009.



The adequate reporting or delivery of products would need to be done at all levels, from the definition of objectives when vision must meet foresight to the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Furthermore, we would need to implement the feeding back of the indications collected and analysis done into the initial foresight hypotheses. This would in turn allow for their revision, leading to new cycles. We thus would have a revised intelligence cycle which would be a perpetual iterative process.

This demands a flexibility embedded within the organization itself, while human needs and capabilities are respected. People with different kinds of cognitive endowment and skills as well as expertise will need to be mixed and Red Team analysis included. At all levels, the current “working understandings” obtained through the perpetually revised foresight will need to be communicated and integrated.

Second, the previous two sections imply that it is dangerous to build an unbridgeable boundary between what is domestic and what is foreign. If those novel intelligence capabilities integrating strategic foresight and warning ought to best fulfil their mission, then they need to be able to understand also what is happening at home and within their own organization to include “self-understanding” within their mission. If we take the example of the 2007–2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, it is

obviously a matter of security, as it leads ultimately to questioning the very legitimacy of authorities. Not to have first included the possibility of crisis into foresight products, then understood and warned about the crisis and its impacts, probability, and timeline is a severe intelligence failure.⁴⁷ Yet, was it domestic? What is foreign? For whom and when? Who should have provided intelligence and warned about it?

How could intelligence and strategic foresight and warning on the crisis have taken place if the largest part of the intelligence efforts and resources are focused elsewhere because of hard boundaries?

Solving those problems would most likely demand a major reorganization, made all the more difficult by the need to still preserve what works, the craft and experience acquired and to integrate them into the new system without loss, since the more traditional security missions do not disappear.⁴⁸ This reorganization should be eased and made possible by a full change of mindset and by the integration of strategic foresight and warning. Meanwhile, counter-intelligence and its missions would also need to be retained and adapted where necessary, within the new flexible arrangement. Finally, it would also imply, in many countries, an in-depth legislative revision, as freedom must also be respected and accountability upheld.

This suggests that the study of intelligence failures as well as the ongoing practice of lessons learned should not be limited to cases of surprise military attacks but, building upon what has already been found, enlarged to fit the definition of security and thus the mission of intelligence, as has recently been started by the Georgetown University working group on intelligence failure, with the case of the 1997 Asian crisis.⁴⁹ It should also include the foresight or long-range analysis products that were—or should have been—guiding strategy, policy-making and strategic planning. The fact that new threats or dangers were ignored, or failed to be incorporated within the mission of intelligence may be considered as a fundamental intelligence failure. As a direct consequence, this pleads for even more outreach, but one freed from the “impulse to

⁴⁷ Crocker, “Thirteen Reflections”. James A. Dewar, “The Importance of ‘Wild Card’ Scenarios”, Discussion Paper, RAND, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/nic2020/dewar_nov6.pdf.

⁴⁸ Betts, *Enemies of Intelligence*.

⁴⁹ Nolan, MacEachin, and Tockman, *Discourse*.

protect consensus” as denounced by Nolan and MacEachin.⁵⁰ Meanwhile, such practical lessons learned should favour awareness of cognitive biases and models held by individuals, teams, society and country and help develop cognitive flexibility, which in turn would ease the understanding and integration of the current “working understanding” and thus improve the iterative intelligence process.

Third, this has also consequences for secrecy. Secrecy has become the object of sometimes heated and polarizing debates. Yet, rather than fighting for or against it, it would be better to recognize that the need for secrecy according to object (source, data, analysis, agents, warning, etc.) may evolve according to dangers and their underlying dynamics, and thus to devise a system of classification accordingly. This again demands understanding. It is not secrecy that determines if something is intelligence or not, and this underlines a fundamental difference between intelligence and secret services, but the needs of intelligence and security which determines if secrecy is necessary or not and when, how, and for what. What may be open at a specific time when relations between two social groups (including nations) are peaceful may need to become secret if escalation happens and tension heightens. Indeed, in cases of war, getting accurate information on an enemy and withdrawing information from it is crucial.⁵¹ This becomes more complex to handle when one has to deal with dangers which do not originate from an enemy or from a competing nation-state, for example those resulting from the loss of biodiversity, and thus would logically not entail secrecy, yet take place within the overall security environment where different kinds of enemies exist and could take advantage of weaknesses in case of high tension, where competition exists, where feelings and emotions of citizens must imperatively be considered while at the same time collective action, thus sharing, is probably more than required. Thus, this new intelligence may need to devise a system of classification that would be flexible in time yet easy to apply, again led by an understanding of the situation.

Those few but major changes not only may guide intelligence but also assert its specificity compared to other sources of understanding, because only intelligence as part of authorities has the legitimacy and the resources as well as the duty to reach the

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Lavoix, *Nationalism*, pp. 102–113.

best potential understanding and deliver adequate warnings. Yet, a major question remains unanswered: if the mission of intelligence must be so revised, does it imply also a need for more resources? As many states face growing budgetary deficits and as the impact of non-anticipated hazards and threats might grow, how will countries finance those budgetary needs? Should we revise public accountancy to adapt it similarly to the future?⁵² Should we also imagine a new international architecture for intelligence? This in itself is a major question to which the strategic foresight and warning component of an intelligence adapted to the future might find worthwhile to endeavour to answer.

⁵² The work of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress led by Stiglitz and Sen could be a first step in this direction. <http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/en/index.htm>.

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