

UPDATES ON TERRORISM
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INTRODUCTION

This update is based primarily on open and confidential sources who are familiar with the trend and directions of terrorism in the Philippines.

Specifically, essential information were provided by confidential informants who have access with terrorist support and family networks.

INTERNATIONAL TREND OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM

- SUICIDE ATTACKS in the form of human car and truck bombs are becoming ordinary incidents in Iraq and Afghanistan
- AL QAIDA cells remain active in United Kingdom specifically in London.
- AL QAIDA is also active in India and Pakistan
- Terrorist financing activities are not fully curtailed.
- JI is aggressively rebuilding its support networks in Indonesia and Malaysia
- Resource generation of AL QAIDA is aggressively pursued through the internet

THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT OF TERRORISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

ON THE ASG

1. The reported assumption of YASSER IGASAN as the new AMEER of ASG is expected to swing the ASG to a new genuine height by Islamic Militantcy.
2. YASSER IGASAN Y SARAHAN was born on April 22, 1972 in Talipao, Sulu. He is a versatile religious and combat leader. He is a financial manager and has great experience on Islamic NGO administration.
3. The Comparative Analysis of ASG below show that IGASAN outsmarts the brother tandem of Abduljarak and Khadaffy Janjalani in terms of:
 - Leadership qualities
 - Training and skills
 - Combat exposure and experience
 - Overseas networks
 - Jihad propaganda/Radical Dawah Propagation

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ON ASG LEADERS

PARAMETERS	ABDUJARAK JANJALANI	KHADAFFY JANJALANI	YASSER IGASAN
LEADERSHIP QUALITIES	Excellent leadership with charisma; excellent planner; creative and innovative leader; deeply religious leader	Aggressive leadership quality; courageous in combat situation; lacks administrative leadership qualities.	Comprehensive leader both in administrative and military leadership; creative and innovative leadership qualities.
TRAINING AND SKILLS	Islamic scholar; graduated from Libya Advance Islamic Preacher and	Have no overseas training; a small unit commander;	Graduate of Dar'ul Imam Shafee, 1994-1995; financial management

	Propagator	graduate of Dar'ul Imam Shafee Marawi City, 1994-1995; graduate of demolition/ Explosives courses.	skills; administrator of IIRO-SULU; graduate of Islamic Propagation Course KSA, 2001-2005 (Shariah,etc)
COMBAT EXPOSURE and EXPERIENCE	Have defensive and offensive military/combat experience; defender of Camp Madina; supervised several defensive Ops in Sulu and Basilan.	Acknowledged to be a Jihad fighter; planned and managed several criminal ops; led his men in several skirmishes against AFP.	With combat experience in Camp Madina and Ipil raid; wounded in an armed engagement in Sulu; participated in several K4R Ops.
OVERSEAS NETWORKS	Excellent overseas contacts; have access to AL QAIDA's Overseas support networks.	Limited overseas networks; have several contacts in the Middle East; have great experience on JI and non-JI activities.	Have excellent overseas support networks in Middle East; have the capacity to administer radical Islamic NGOs.
JIHAD PROPAGATION/RADICAL DAWAH PROPAGATION	Islamic preacher and propagator ; charismatic Islamic leader ; can issue Fatwah.	Cant issue Fatwah; he is not a Dawah preacher.	Islamic preacher and propagator; he has the authority to issue Fatwah.

4. The recent internet showcase of the ASG with the JIHADIST ORGANIZATIONS for fund-raising initiatives is attributed to IGASAN's skills as fund raiser and NGO manager. He was once the Administrator of IIRO- Sulo in early 1990s.

5. Information indicates that IGASAN has a hand on the abduction of Italian priest Father BOSSI. The abductors of Father BOSSI who are tagged as renegade members of the MILF, SOG, 4th Division operating in Zamboanga, Sibugay appeared to be contacts of IGASAN. One of the abductors of BOSSI is an Alumnus of Batch 3 of the Dar'ul Iman Shaffee of Class '94. IGASAN and Khadaffy Janjalani were batchmates, of one of the BOSSI abductors.
6. Similarly, an ASG Sub-Commander in Basilan is an alumnus of Dar'ul Iman Shaffee.
7. Dar'ul Imam Shaffee which was disbanded in early 1996 served basically as the Islamic Militant School that operated in Marawi City from 1992-1995. It was established by late Mohammad Jamal KHALIFA. It has graduated 3 batches from 1992-1995 and its alumni are mostly in ASG and MILF as either Jihad warriors or Dawah Preachers.
8. With IGASAN at the helm of ASG, the strategic aspirations of Abdujarak Janjalani to continue organizing and consolidating ISLAMIC MOVEMENT (Al Harakatu'l Al Islamiyah) could be revived and rejuvenated.
9. To attain the initial phase of realizing the creation of ISLAMIC MOVEMENT, IGASAN will rely mainly on the assistance of the alumni of Dar'ul Imam Shaffee and most importantly from his overseas support networks linked with AL QAIDA.
10. The present tempo of military offensives in Sulu and Basilan will undoubtedly cause major disruptions of ASG force. However, potential ASG recruits from MILF SOGs from the 4th DIV of the BIAF and other field units sympathetic to IGASAN may be realized.
11. There is no guarantee that the AFP can attain a quick military victory against the ASG in Basilan and Sulu. Granting that the decimation and delibitation of ASG could be achieved, a new ASG will emerge in a different form and character.
12. It can be surmised that the new ASG under YASSER IGASAN whose recruits would be mainly drawn from disgruntled MILF force in Zamboanga Sibugay and several places in Central Mindanao.

ON THE JI

1. JI presence in Mindanao could be traced specifically in Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Davao provinces, Sulo and Tawi-Tawi.
2. There are credible reports indicating that OMAR PATEK and DULMATIN are non-JI leaders. They are not organizationally attached with the JI.
3. Specifically, PATEK and DULMATIN are possibly members of DAR'UL ISLAM, also an Islamic militant organization actively operating in Indonesia.
4. In Mt Cararao Complex, Lanao del Sur, more or less 15 JI members under USMAN, an Indonesian citizen are maintaining a camp. They are being harbored and protected by an MILF force under Cmdr BRAVO.
5. OMAR PATEK and a certain FAHAR are reportedly out of Sulu and Basilan corridor. Allegedly, they are somewhere in Leguasma Marsh Complex enjoying the support of PENTAGON GANG.
6. JI leader MARWAN is similarly located somewhere in Central Mindanao while Malaysian JI leader MAUWIYA is probably in Sarangani or Davao Oriental.
7. In the first quarter of 2007, about 6 non-JI members who are suspectedly aligned with PATEK and DULMATIN entered Sulo.
8. The ASG under the late Khadaffy Janjalani who were evicted by the MILF in the third quarter of 2006 are apparently aligned with the non-JI team of PATEK and DULMATIN, while the JI under USMAN is aligned with the MILF force of Cmdr BRAVO.
9. In 2004-2005, it was detected that JI leaders in Indonesia were seriously concerned about the operations being waged independently by non-JI members in Indonesia and in the Philippines.
10. Several non-JI operations were allegedly attributed to the JI through information primarily based on an intercepted document in 2005.

ON THE MILF

- Continuity of Peace Talks between the GRP and MILF is expected
- There are pressure groups calling for the peace talks resumption both coming from international and domestic institutions.
- Varying tendencies of several MILF Central Committee members in several major issues i.e. creation of hostilities, JI, criminal acts of alleged MILF renegade groups.
- The MILF/BIAF-CPP/NPA/NDF alliance is reinvigorated. This was exemplified on joint training for weapons and explosives from June-December 2006 held in the boundary of Lanao del Sur and Bukidnon. The training was participated in by more than fifty (50) trainee from the different NPA Regional Operations Command (ROCs) and the National Operations Command (NOCs) Ordinance/Explosives Unit.
- Recent terrorist incidents in Central Mindanao which are blamed to the group of BASIT USMAN generally affect the MILF/BIAF. BASIT USMAN is being accused as BIAF operative.
- MILF overseas liaison work in Pakistan and other parts of the Middle East is very much active.

ON THE RAJAH SULAIMAN MOVEMENT (RSM)

- The RSM is organizationally decimated and delibetated. The major disruption of its fund raising NGO- the Islamic Information Council (IIC) in early 2005 and the series neutralization of its key leaders starting in 2005-2006 significantly contributed to its inactive status.
- “Radical Balik Islam” although dormant has the capacity to be active if overseas fund will be vigorously infused.

- The Al Marief Islamic Educational Foundation (AMIEF) in Baguio City which was one of the channels of support of the RSM is still operational catering for the Uztads Development Program.
- There are also radical fundamentalist Balik Islam leaders who created the International School for Islamic Philippines (ISIP) in July 2006. However, this initiative fizzled out due to funding problem.
- Sheik OMAR LAVILLA, one of the pioneer leaders of RSM remains unaccounted. He is now reportedly in KSA. LAVILLA is also an alumnus of Dar'ul Imam Shaffee.

ON THE NPA

- In accordance with its 3 years program which was one of the main agenda of the 11th CC Plenum in 2003, the CPP/NPA/NDF claims that it has aggressively developed its entry into the MIDDLE PHASE of the STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE STAGE OF ITS PEOPLES WAR.
- Four (4) years thereafter, the CPP/NPA has maintained the tempo, intensity and frequency of its tactical military offensives nationwide.
- To achieve the strategic objective of entering into a new heights and phase of its armed struggle, the CPP/NPA through its Military Commission issued ten (10) point guidelines in 2004 to wit:
 1. Develop the Operational Commands of the NPA at the levels of the province fronts, and regions.
 2. Maintain the fighting initiatives against the enemy.
 3. Fight only battles that the NPA can win.
 4. When the enemy force advance with a superior force raring for a fight, NPA force must not meet it headway that it can easily see pin down and crush.
 5. Continue the nationwide tactical offensive.
 6. Increase the tactical offensives for seizing weapons.

7. Give first place to tactics of annihilation because it yields us the most arms.
8. Make the enemy side pay heavily through attractive actions.
9. Disintegrate the enemy personnel through various tactics.
10. Give no quarters to the worst and notorious among the reactionaries; those most culpable for directing and carrying out repression, human rights violations, plunder, destruction of the environment and the drug trade.

- The abovesited 10 points guidelines is basically anchored on the strategic task of CPP/NPA as prescribed in the 11th CC Plenum:

“The NPA must carry out extensive and intensive guerilla warfare on the basis of an ever widening and deepening mass base”.

- Information indicates that the CPP is a “highly militarized” communist partly due to the following factors:
 1. The National Military Commission which is tasked to provide general political supervision for the NPA armed struggle is now a full time regular party collective.
 2. This organizational re-structuring is believed to be an important decision on the party’s organizational framework during the 11th CC Plenum in 2003.
 3. In previous CC Plenums, the National Military Commission was created as a confederal body which sets forth the direction for the 3 main NPA tasks for operation, work and build-up. In this framework, the National Military Commission is primarily composed of the secretaries of territorial commissions, the NPA National Commander of the General Command, Vice Commanding Officer-General Command, the Political Director and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the party.
 4. Since 2001, the CPP/NPA National Military Staff (NMS) has pioneered the holding of Inter-Regional Command

Conferences (IRCC). With the creation of ROCs nationwide, the NPA has started holding IRCCs this year.

5. The National Military Commission has started the organizational transition of creating its National Operational Command (NOC). However, this was massively disrupted due to the enforced disappearances of LEO VELASCO, PRUDENCIO CALUBID, LEOPOLDO ANCHETA, ROGELIO CALUBAD, MARIA POSA DOMENADO and PHILIP LIMJOCO.
6. At the time of the enforced disappearances, VELASCO is the Chairman of MILCOM. Calubid is the NPA Chief of Staff. Calubad is the Secretary of BICOL RPC. Domenado is the Deputy Secretary of PANAY RPC and LIMJOCO was a senior member of the Intelligence Section of NMS.

SIGNIFICANT NPA ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

- Former CPP/NPA senior cadres from Mindanao Commission are now occupying vital positions at the National NPA Command Structure.
- NPA National Support and Liaison networks were effectively laid down since last year in several regions.
- NPA International Solidarity Work had started to blossom. Since 2005 to date, there are several exposurists from Chile, Nepal and Peru who were accommodated in Central Luzon guerilla fronts.
- NPA “center of gravity forces” in fully developed guerilla fronts have initiated daring and bolder terrorist attacks in a nationally coordinated and supervised tactical offensives starting September 2005.
- NPA extortion is widespread and terrorist attacks in Globe Telecom infrastructure continues with impunity.
- The NPA aside from the extortion revenues has also honed its financial management capacities over businesses ranging from medium to large scale entrepreneurships.

- The NPA has a Special Finance Group (SFG) engaged in business operations and management.
- The NPA has created a Special Commando Unit (SCU) which is internally known as ELITE FORCE. This is separate from the Special Operations Group (SOGs).
- The Self Defense Units (SDUs) of Legal Mass Organizations (LMOs) were provided with Basic Intelligence Course by the Intelligence Staff of the NPA National Command Structure in mid 2006 to early 2007.
- The NPA has a capable ordinance structure under its Special Logistics Group (SLG) which has the capacity for demolition/explosives operations and training. It is manned by season NPA operatives formerly assigned in Mindanao.

THE AL KHOBAR GROUP

- AL KHOBAR GROUP (AKG) gained notoriety following series of extortion demands and bus bombing incidents in Region XI and XII respectively.
- In recent months, AKG has repeatedly claimed responsibility on the bombing of several buses and stations of prominent bus companies.
- PRO 12 authorities claimed that AKG is not a terrorist organization but a criminal gang engaged in extortion.
- Very recently, it was revealed that AKG has probably established links with the JI and MILF renegade groups. The basis of this statement is the alleged similarity of the “bomb signatures” of AKG with that of earlier seized bomb components and paraphernalia.
- Forensic investigations established the similarity of the “bomb signatures”.
- Information obtained recently, however, indicated that the NPA is involved in the series of terrorist attacks on transport infrastructures.

- Specifically, the terrorist attacks were staged by NPA members belonging to the Moro Resistance Liberation Organization (MRLO)-Moro Resistance Liberation Army (MRLA).
- MRLO is the organizational precursor of the Moro Revolutionary Organization (MRO), a National Democratic Underground Mass Organization (NDUGMO) in the Moro Sector.
- In the Mindanao Commission organizational structure, there is a Moro Army Committee (MAC) directly under the Executive Committee which oversee the operations of the MRLA in Muslim dominated areas in Central Mindanao.
- MILF-BIAF-CPP/NPA/NDF alliance is truly established.
- A joint demolition and explosives training participated in by the MILF and NPA was conducted from June-December 2006 in a guerilla front directly handled by the MAC somewhere in the boundary of Bukidnon and Lanao del Sur.
- NPA has publicly admitted its extortion operations against business corporations, politicians, and agricultural land owners.

ASSESSMENT

- A new ASG will mostly emerge which will draw its membership from the old network of colleagues of YASSER IGASAN from the Dar'ul Imam Shaffee and alleged renegade MILF/BIAF members.
- The present ASG in Basilan and Sulu whose memberships are basically from disgruntled MNLF members would be disrupted and decimated by the current tempo of military operations.
- The MILF will decisively pursue its peace talks with the GRP.
- The JI is engaged in regrouping and fund raising in Indonesia and Malaysia. In Mindanao, JI will continue its agenda for training and liaisons with the ASG and MILF renegade members.
- The NPA is in the process of consolidating its National Command Structure and line staffs which was disrupted with the enforced disappearances of its senior commanders.

- The NPA's current dynamism in financial operation and management should be a high priority for counter-terrorism investigation.
- The AKG as a special NPA unit basically composed of Moro combatants needs further validation.