Understanding Confluences and
Contestations, Continuities and Changes:
Towards Transforming Society and Empowering People

The Work of the 2009/2010 API Fellows

The Nippon Foundation Fellowships
for Asian Public Intellectuals

UNDERSTANDING CONFLUENCES AND CONTESTATIONS, CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES: TOWARDS TRANSFORMING SOCIETY AND EMPOWERING PEOPLE

The Work of 2009/2010 API Fellows

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The Work of 2009/2010 API Fellows

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ABOUT THE BOOK

UNDERSTANDING CONFLUENCES AND CONTESTATIONS, CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES: TOWARDS TRANSFORMING SOCIETY AND EMPOWERING PEOPLE, is a collection of papers by the 2009/2010 Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Fellows. The twenty-three papers that comprise this volume cover key areas such as development and marginalization of the poor, indigenous peoples, forced migrants and Muslim minorities; globalization and its impacts; sustainable development and human relationship with nature; and the flow of cultural ideas, texts, and practices. API publications can be downloaded at http://www.api-fellowships.org.

The API Fellowships Program

As Asia enters the 21st century, it faces political, economic, and social challenges that transcend national boundaries. To meet these challenges, the region needs a pool of intellectuals willing to be active in the public sphere who can articulate common concerns and propose creative solutions. Recognizing that opportunities for intellectual exchange are currently limited by institutional, linguistic, and cultural parameters, The Nippon Foundation (TNF) launched the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Fellowships Program in July 2000. The Program's primary aim is to promote mutual learning among Asian public intellectuals and contribute to the growth of wider public spaces in which effective responses to regional needs can be generated.

The API Fellowships Program is open to academics, researchers, media professionals, artists, creative writers, non-governmental organization (NGO) activists, social workers, public servants and others with moral authority who are committed to working for the betterment of society by applying their professional knowledge, wisdom and experience. The Program is designed to stimulate the creation of a pool of such intellectuals in the region.

The API Fellowships Program set three main themes as follows:

- Changing identities and their social, historical , and cultural contexts;
- Reflections on the human condition and the quest for social justice; and
- The current structure of globalization and possible alternatives.

Within these themes, the Fellows are required to:

- Propose and carry out research and/or professional activities in a participating country or countries other than their native country or country of residence;
- Conduct research and/or professional activities in compliance with a schedule accepted by the Selection Committee;
- Attend the API Workshop to exchange results of their research and/or professional activities with other fellows;
- Disseminate their findings and results to a wider audience; and
- Pursue a deeper knowledge of each other, and hence of the region.

Post-Fellowship Program/Activities

Having entered its second phase of the Program, the API Fellowships Program has intensified its focus on community building efforts. A number of post-fellowship activities have been launched allowing Fellows to continue to be engaged and further collaborate among themselves and beyond. Through furthering collaboration among Fellows and beyond, the Program hopes to build and promote the API Community and its undertakings, in order to achieve greater social impact. The following initiatives are now being carried out through the post-fellowship programs:

1) Regional Committee and Regional Project

The API Community has selected ten Fellows as representatives to the Regional Committee (RC) to promote activities which are critical for the region, cross-disciplinary in nature, trans-border in scope, and multi-level in approach, recognizing the inter-linkages of locality, nation, and region. The RC aims to foster a greater regional consciousness by promoting relationships among cultures, societies, traditions and so forth by initiating or endorsing collaborative activities, and by confronting public issues with discernment, integrity and commitment. The RC initially focused on the launch of the Regional Project.

The Regional Project, entitled "Community-Based Initiatives toward Human-Ecological Balance," was launched in November 2008 as a joint effort that mobilized the entire API Community. The project lasts three years, involving five sites in the region: Biwako (Japan), Batanes (Philippines), Khiriwong (Thailand), Tasik Chini (Malaysia) and Kalicode (Indonesia). In conducting the Regional Project, the API Community is guided by the values of social relevance, public-policy advocacy, network building, creativity, transparency and accountability. (For further information, please visit http://www.api-rp.com/)

2) API-Salzburg Global Seminar Collaboration

The Salzburg Global Seminar was founded in 1947 by three graduate students at Harvard University as a means to bringing together young Europeans and Americans from countries recently at war to engage in intellectual dialogue.

Over some 60 years since its establishment, the Salzburg Global Seminar has evolved and expanded both the breadth of countries from which its participants come as well as the issues that serve as the focus of its programs. To date, more than 25,000 individuals from more than 150 countries have attended Seminar sessions.

In an effort to flow with the tide of globalization, the Salzburg Global Seminar decided to reach out beyond Europe and the US, to Asia, the Middle East and Africa. In so doing, the Seminar found the API Fellowships Program to be a good quality pool of intellectuals in Asia and began planning a new partnership. As a result, a new scheme whereby selected API Fellows attend the Seminar was created. This collaborative scheme provides opportunities for API Fellows to expand their intellectual capacity by exposing themselves to world intellectual leaders and to convey to a wider audience the messages and voices of Asia.

The Nippon Foundation

The Nippon Foundation (TNF) is an independent, non-profit, grant making organization that was founded in 1962. It supports projects both in Japan and overseas. It funds activities in three areas: domestic social welfare and volunteer support; maritime research and development; and overseas cooperative assistance. It works with other non-profit organizations, governments, non-governmental organizations and international organizations in Japan and overseas.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

THE CONTRIBUTORS

(in alphabetical order according to names as they are spelt)

A snapshot of the contributors in their own words is provided here (information as of August 2011).

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Alan Feinstein is currently an independent consultant based in Bangkok, Thailand, specializing in philanthropy, culture, and development in Southeast Asia. In 2011, he carried out a consultancy on "culture and development" for UNESCO; and in 2010, as a World Bank consultant, he oversaw a pilot project on "creative communities" in Indonesia. From 2009 to 2010, under API Senior Fellowship he carried out research on international foundations in Indonesia and the Philippines. Previous to that, he worked for a total of 23 years for four major grant-making foundations in Asia: Rockefeller Foundation, Bangkok; Toyota Foundation, Tokyo; Japan Foundation, Tokyo; and Ford Foundation, Jakarta. He has also lectured on music, social science, and Indonesian studies at a number of universities in the US, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand.

Amin Shah B. Iskandar, also known as Amin Iskandar, is Secretary General for the National Institute for Electoral Integrity (NIEI) in Malaysia. NIEI advocates for electoral stakeholders and educates Malaysians on free and fair elections. He is also a freelance writer for several online news portals including *Malaysiakini* and *The Malaysian Insider*. Prior to joining the NIEI on a full time basis, Amin served as a consultant for think tanks and individuals locally, regionally and internationally. He is best known for his civil society involvement, particularly in the area of elections, democracy and international networking. He has worked extensively in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Thailand under the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) to promote democratization efforts.

Arsenio Nicolas has conducted extensive research on the music of Asia since 1972 with his first assignment as a research aide at the Department of Asian Music, University of the Philippines, joining a research team for a survey of music in the Philippines. The API Senior Fellowship enabled him to revisit sites in Java, Bali, West Malaysia, Thailand and Japan. He is a Senior Lecturer at the College of Music, Archaeological Studies Center, Department of Anthropology, and Center for International Studies, University of the Philippines. Currently, he is a Visiting Professor at the College of Music, Mahasarakham University, Thailand. His music studies have since then expanded to include a larger geographical field of Asia, focusing on recent developments in archaeology, linguistics, music cognition, genetics and biomusicology.

Avyanthi Azis is an independent researcher/writer from Jakarta. She was trained in international relations and graduated from the University of Indonesia. She completed her MS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University as a Fulbright scholar. She was previously a guest lecturer for the course on Global Migration at the Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia. Her research interests include narratives of displacement, statelessness, citizenship studies and multi-ethnic governance, particularly in the Southeast Asian context.

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Erni Budiwanti is an anthropologist who holds a Ph.D. from the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, Australia and is currently (2010) working at the Centre for Regional Resources - Indonesian Institute of Sciences. Her major interests are the study of ethno-religious groups, ethnic minorities, and inter-religious relationships. Apart from the API Fellowship, she has conducted research fellowships with the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), and the Asia Research Institute - National University of Singapore, (ARI-NUS)).

Kidlat Tahimik (a.k.a. Eric de Guia) was born in Baguio in 1942. He is a critically acclaimed artist, widely recognized as one of the pioneers of independent filmmaking in the Philippines. He evolved concepts of "sariling duwende" (akin to an inner voice or inspiration) and "indiogenius" (innate or indigenous genius) which emphasize tapping into one's own culture and consciousness in the production of creative expressions. Among his groundbreaking works is *Mababangong Bangungot* (Perfumed Nightmare) from 1977. As a senior API Fellow, he documented rice terrace cultures in the Asian region and their struggles with the global rice shortage from 2009-2010. He has since continued to actively participate in various international film festivals such as Taiwan's International Documentary Festival and Jeonju International Film Festival.

Kohei Watanabe has been looking into the issue of waste management since his undergraduate years at the Engineering Department in Kyoto University (Japan). He conducted his Ph.D. research at the Department of Geography, University of Cambridge (U.K.) The main focus of his research is on the verification and analysis of data on municipal waste and material flows in the society. He currently acts as an associate professor at Teikyo University (Japan), while also supervising graduate students at the National University of Malaysia, and being a research associate at the Malaysian Commonwealth Studies Centre, University of Cambridge (UK).

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Maria Regina M. Hechanova is an associate professor at the Department of Psychology and the Executive Director of the Ateneo Center for Organization Research and Development, Ateneo de Manila University. Her major fields of interest are organization development, human resource management, technology, innovation, and leadership. She was named one of the Outstanding Young Scientists in 2005 by the National Academy of Science and Technology and in 2010, was named one of the Ten Outstanding Women in Nation's Service for her work as an organizational psychologist.

Prabda Yoon is a Thai writer, translator, graphic designer, artist and publisher who lives and works in Bangkok, Thailand. He graduated with a BFA in Fine Arts from the Cooper Union in NYC in 1998. His story collection, *Kwam Na Ja Pen* (Probability) won the S.E.A. Write award in 2002. His small publishing house, Typhoon Books, was founded in 2004.

Saya Kiba is a researcher. She studied at the Graduate School of International Cooperation Studies, Kobe University (Ph.D. in Political Science 2010) and the Third World Studies Center, University of the Philippines (2003-2004, 2010). Her major fields of interest are social movements and electoral politics, especially in urban poor communities in the Philippines. She is currently a secretary of Seiji Maehara, former Foreign Minister and member of the House of Representatives, Japan.

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Soliman M. Santos, Jr. is a Judge of the 9th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabua-Bato, Camarines Sur in his home Bicol region of the Philippines. He has been a human rights and international humanitarian lawyer and peace advocate since the 1980s until his judicial appointment in 2010. Most of his written and published work, including several authored and co-authored books, are related to the Mindanao peace process. He was a pioneer of global civil society efforts to develop the work of constructive engagement of non-state armed groups, starting with the landmine ban. He holds degrees in history and law.

Thitipol Kanteewong is with the Department of Thai Art, Faculty of Fine Arts, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Currently an Assistant Professor, He obtained his Master of Music (Musicology) from Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand in 2002. In 2007, Thitipol was selected by the Komai Fellowship from the Hitachi Scholarship Foundation to do a short research on Japan. Thitipol is interested in Southeast Asian music, East Asian music, and ethnomusicology fieldwork. He plays a several Northern Thailand musical instruments. He recently performed a piece called "Lanna Renaissance" with his musical troupe "Changsaton".

Thanyathip Sripana is a political scientist. She received a scholarship from the French government and earned her doctorate degree from Faculte de Droit et de Science Politique, Universite d'Aix-Marseille III, in France. Currently, she is a senior researcher at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, and is a guest lecturer in various institutions. Vietnamese Studies has taken up much of her time since 1988, when she did research in France, Canada, Japan, and countries in the Mekong Sub-region. She has especially conducted in-depth research on Vietnam. Her research interests are as follows: Vietnamese politics, economics and culture; Vietnamese foreign policy; Thai-Vietnamese relationship; Vietnamese migration into Thailand; the Asean connectivity; tourism in the Mekong Sub-region; and foreign investment in Vietnam. Her research on "The Viet Kieu in Thailand in Thai-Vietnamese Relationship" received the "The Best Research of the Year 2005" award from Chulalongkorn University.

Wiwat Tamee is Executive Director of the Highland People's Task Force, Chiang Mai, Thailand. He holds a M.A. in Education from Chiang Mai University and has written and edited a wide variety of reports and publications on indigenous peoples.

Zawaih Yahya was professor of Critical Theory and Postcolonial Literature in the School of Language Studies and Linguistics, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia before her retirement, and was later appointed Guest Scholar. Her main area of interest remains the development of local critical theories and strategies for domesticating English Literature in post-colonial contexts. Her commitment to this field for the past thirty years has resulted in her engagement with curricular changes at the institutional and national levels, as well as in the publication of numerous academic papers and books. Her books include *Resisting Colonialist Discourse* (2nd ed 2003), *Malay Characters in Malaysian Novels in English* (2nd print 2003), and *Reading Approaches in Malay Literature: Critical Theory in the Making* (2010).

WELCOME SPEECH

Yohei Sasakawa
Chairman of The Nippon Foundation

Honorable Dr. Sharom bin Ahmat, Dr. Francis Loh, Dr. Tham Siew Yean, Prof. Surichai Wun'Gaeo, the API staff from around Asia, API Fellows. It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity to speak to you today.

I would like to congratulate the 23 members of the ninth group of API Fellows attending this workshop, for completing your fellowships.

As you all know, the changes taking place in Asia are remarkable. The world is watching Asia now, more than ever before. Our region's position in the world is rising.

On the other hand, we are facing both unresolved issues and new challenges. Poverty, discrimination, economic disparity, environmental problems and frictions are arising from cultural differences. Through such bodies as ASEAN, nations throughout the region are joining hands to deal with these issues. Yet, they are difficult to resolve at the governmental level alone. Solutions must also be sought by individuals from a wide variety of disciplines, by people who can contribute different perspectives. The API Fellowships Program offers precisely that chance. It offers you, public intellectuals who are willing to shoulder this task, the opportunity to research and enact your ideas.

You, my dear fellows are scholars, artists, journalists, filmmakers or some other kind of professional from one of five countries. You are active in many fields, including economic affairs, religion, the environment and music. Though each of you has an expertise that may lie (or that lies) in an area different from the rest, your goals are one and the same: the betterment of society. I believe this will become apparent at this workshop—the first opportunity for all of you in the ninth group to meet and present your activities.

I hope this workshop will convince each one of you to take advantage of the unique opportunity to learn from your colleagues' endeavors. It is also a chance to have your work reviewed by people from other disciplines.

As you learn about subjects previously unknown or of little concern to you, you will find yourself struck by many new ideas. I hope you will make the most of them in your own work.

I hope too that you will ask yourselves these questions: Can I contribute to the research being described? Can I make use of it in my own research? What can I achieve by collaborating with the other Fellows?

Let me tell you about a real-life example of collaboration between API Fellows. An API Fellow, a journalist, had done a survey on the human organ trade. Another Fellow, a filmmaker, learned of the survey and wondered if the journalist's message might not reach a wider audience through film. The two then combined their expertise and worked together on a documentary about the human organ trade. This was something that neither of them had considered before they happened to find themselves seated together during the API workshop.

Such encounters can be the starting point of deeply meaningful collaborations. On the API homepage (www.api-fellowships.org), you will find descriptions of the activities of past API Fellows, as well as their profiles and contact information. Please use this as a resource, and seek out potential research partners. As I said before, while you all go about your research in your own way, you all share a common desire to contribute to society. By combining your efforts, you can overcome problems that at first appear insurmountable.

Of course, I hope you will enlist the help of many others besides the API Fellows in your effort to build a better society. By recruiting many like-minded individuals, your activities are bound to grow and prosper.

Yet I expect even more of you as public intellectuals.

Please remember how important it is for you, as public intellectuals, to send a powerful message to those who are oblivious to society's problems, as well as to those who are aware of them, but are not actively seeking solutions. You must try to encourage as many people as possible to make a positive contribution.

I know you use various tools to reach a wider public. However, you and I also know that we always need to consider whether our messages are reaching the right people or not. Secondly, we must be concerned about whether our messages are understood. I believe it is crucial to consider whom we are trying to reach, and what exactly we are trying to say.

Furthermore, if we are to work efficiently, we must be judicious in our selection of the media we use. This kind of strategic approach will surely have a major impact on our efforts to better society.

Therefore, I urge you to collaborate with each other to attain even better results, and to tell others about what you have achieved so that you can recruit more people to our cause. Only then will you have achieved the status of the true public intellectual.

Please use this workshop to get to know the other fellows. Do all you can to explore new possibilities for collaboration. More than anything, I hope you will use the mindset of the public intellectual, as I have described it, in your work for the betterment of society. With the completion of this workshop, you will become full-fledged, valued members of the API Community. With your participation, this community will be able to address Asia's challenges in several unique ways. It will become a force that guides Asia into the future.

I look forward to welcoming all 23 of you into the community.

Thank you very much.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Dato' Dr. Sharom Ahmat
Chairman of Socio-Economic & Environmental Research Institute (SERI)

Thank you for inviting me to deliver this year's keynote address.

I am truly honored, but also very nervous. Had I seen the list of the previous eight keynote speakers, comprising such eminent and well known scholars, statesmen and even royalty, I would not have accepted your invitation, no matter how tempting. But, having been lured unwittingly into accepting, I had to find a suitable topic to share with you, which hopefully will be of some interest. I do not have the scholarly depth of the late Yoneo Ishii or of Ayako Sono; the political understanding of Surin Pitsuwarn, Emil Salim or the late Corazon Aquino; nor the insights of royal intellectuals like Sultan Hamengkubuwono or Raja Nazrin Shah. So I thought I had better find some other niche.

In my search, I found inspiration in what The Nippon Foundation was established to achieve: *"the realization of a peaceful and prosperous global society, in which none need struggle to secure their basic human rights."* I was equally touched by the Foundation's sensitivity toward *"different value systems"* and cultures, and its goal to *"...transcend the political, religious, racial and national boundaries that divide the world."* And I could not agree more with your zeal *"....to grasp the essence of problems faced by humankind."*

Then I read Francis Loh's concept paper for this year's workshop where he talked of the *"likelihood that the API community can contribute toward new knowledge about globalization, changing identities, and the human condition and social justice ..."*

And I was delighted to see that the theme of your Workshop is **"Towards Transforming Society and Empowering People"**, with panel discussions on the poor, the marginalized, sustainable development, relationship with nature and cultural ideas.

Per my understanding of the above, I sense their focus to be "humanity", "society", "human rights", "values", "humankind". In short, we are talking about the humanities. Are not the concern of The Nippon Foundation and the purpose of the API Fellowships Program, to seek an understanding of the meaning, purpose, goals and appreciation of historical or social phenomenon? Are we not talking of an interpretative method of finding "truth" rather than explaining the causality of events or uncovering the truth of the natural world? Have we forgotten that "narrative imagination" apart from its societal application, is an important tool in understanding history, culture and, indeed, humanity?

Yet what we see today is the decline of the humanities, and the technologization of everyday life. We are undergoing transformation in the hands of technological imperatives, such as rationalization, universalism, monism. We live increasingly in a world of technology, not a world of nature. Technological values have eroded human values instead of "humanizing" them.

The humanities are, to a considerable measure, about identifying, analyzing, critiquing and interpreting values. Through their dispassionate commentary and through great, passionate works of literature and the arts, the humanities present models and anti-models of behavior. They challenge us about where we stand on issues pertaining to the value of human life, the appropriateness of particular behaviors, the appreciation of beauty, the value of money! From the viewpoint of responsible citizenship, they pose the challenge not just of knowing one's rights, but of doing what is right–a particularly important attribute in an age when doing what is right, and doing what is technically lawful are entirely different matters.

The humanities are about the diagnosis of our human conditions and the consequential pathways, hopefully, toward the betterment of that condition. Is not this the objective of The Nippon Foundation, and the API Fellowships Program? If so, what can the humanities offer? The answer, which is also the problem and the threat to the humanities, is their offering what money cannot buy.

In 1980, the Rockefeller Commission on the Humanities stated:

"Through the humanities we reflect on the fundamental question:

What does it mean to be human?

The humanities offer clues but never a complete answer. They reveal how people have tried to make moral, spiritual and intellectual sense of a world in which irrationality, despair, loneliness and death are as conspicuous as birth, friendship, hope and reason."

Thirty years hence, I do not detect much change.

The then Australian Minister for Innovation, Industry, Science and Research, Senator Kim Carr, was quoted as saying on 3 September 2008, *"Whatever they may be worth in the market place, it is the intrinsic value of the humanities, arts and social sciences, we should treasure them for. We should support these disciplines because they give us pleasure, knowledge, meaning and inspiration."*

But in this materialistic, technological age, the humanities cannot take refuge in intrinsic values alone. Politicians, ministers and governments change; government funding does not equate with political rhetoric; and intrinsic value itself has its changing fortunes with public recognition. The humanities cannot afford to deny or shun commercial value, although (not) without compromising its own values. The humanities need as many friends and links as possible. What needs to be made clear is that humanities matter because individual people matter. Further, it is these people who, in their different ways, will contribute to the successful propagation of the humanities and humanistic values.

It is not impossible that the humanities representing intrinsic value, and innovation which is an economic value, become synergistic through the identification and interpretation of user needs, through the nurturing of creative people, through being part of industry, through their generation of smart new directions of the knowledge economy, as opposed to agricultural and manufacturing economies. After all, the commercial world is ultimately a reflection of the values of a culture. And the humanities are about studying "what it is good to desire and what our real needs are." Business should focus on these same questions, for modern society should be a society in which a strong commercial instinct serves a mature conception of the "good life".

But the humanities themselves are often their own worst enemy. Sometimes, humanistic values are not transmitted well, just at the time when they are needed the most. The traditional values of the humanities—defending freedom and cultivating dispassionate scholarship, for example—have sometimes become excuses for not communicating the crucial strengths of a crucial disciplinary area. The result has been the marginal place of the humanities in today's society. Governments, industry and business turn to economic and political think tanks for answers to current questions about global directions; rarely, if at all, do they turn to the humanists who often have deeper answers to questions involving our increasingly distressed human condition. Economics rule over ethics; moral goods remain depreciated. While riots grow rife in the streets, little is done to address the needed change in the moral climate. And a great deal of the alignments we see—corporations and shareholders; policymakers and civil servants—have been found to be flawed because they are alignments of greed.

"The interdependence of Science and the Humanities and Social Sciences has never been clearer in the fast-paced, technologically advanced world we live in. It is vital that we make sure these disciplines are sustained in order to protect our long-term interests as a nation," so says Professor Sir Adam Roberts, President of the British Academy in June of 2010A. It is in this context that we cannot slow climate change if we do not support work on how people change their behavior. And how can we make medical and scientific advances without analyzing their human and ethical implications? Fortunately, things are changing. In Birbeck College, University of London, for instance, There is now a Master Degree in Medical Humanities. This program is for clinicians and other healthcare professionals, focusing on improving patient care through a deeper understanding of the humanities which include literary studies, history, law, philosophy, art, film and visual studies. Through this program is offered the unique opportunity to encounter the rich insights of the humanities about culture and what it means to be human, as they have direct relevance upon clinical practice. And now there is the Association for the Medical Humanities based in the University of Glasgow.

Likewise, at Kings College, London there is the Centre for Computing in the Humanities. The primary objective of this academic department in the School of

Arts and Humanities is to study the possibilities of Computing for the Arts and Humanities. There are also postgraduate programmes in Digital Humanities and Digital Culture which explore the use of advanced technologies for research in the arts and humanities.

The humanities need to be proactive, not apologetic; they should embed themselves in society. Instead of residing in isolation, the humanities need to hook on to all sectors: government, business, industry, citizen groups, students, scholarly societies and even philanthropists. The humanities are challenged to demonstrate their worth, highlight their educational and research achievements, know themselves and know others, show their intrinsic and extrinsic value, and recognize their importance as part of the public and private sectors.

Above all, the humanities must also transcend the limits of the human condition by going beyond the technical issues to discover the soul. In this technological age of accountability and effectiveness, the humanities are needed to remind us that there is more, much more to human life than the everyday and the mundane.

Penang, November 20, 2010.

OVERVIEW

Francis Loh Kok Wah
Workshop Director, 9th Workshop of the API Fellowships Program

INTRODUCTION

The 9th Asian Public Intellectuals Regional Workshop brought together 22 Fellows from Japan, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia in a five-day meeting in November 2010 in George Town, Penang. The Fellows had completed their year-long fellowships which had taken them to at least one other Asian country where they had conducted fieldwork. After that they had spent time reflecting on their research findings and writing up their reports. The gathering in Penang was therefore an occasion to share those reflections and findings and to develop comparative perspectives together. It was also an opportunity to network with one another as a community of API Fellows for future collaborative work.

At the Inauguration of the API Fellowships Program in 2001, Tatsuya Tanami, Director for International Relations and Special Projects of the Nippon Foundation clarified that the Fellows—comprising academics, researchers, media people, artists, NGO activists, even priests and monks—are people 'who articulate issues, ask questions, and stimulate thinking and knowledge-sharing on broad contemporary problems in the social sciences, humanities, arts and culture' and are 'committed to the betterment of society'. Among other things, Fellows are 'to contribute to the growth of public spaces in which effective responses to regional needs could be generated'. Presumably, the year-long Fellowships have enabled the Fellows to learn from other Asian experiences and perhaps nurtured an even greater sense of commitment to that original set of values to transform Asian societies and to empower Asian peoples.

As can be seen from the titles of the individual papers, the Fellows' interests are wide-ranging. To facilitate dialogue and learning across disciplines, nationalities and the Fellows' chosen topics of interests, the author who was appointed as Director of the 9th Regional Workshop was tasked to prepare an overall concept paper, in a sense *ex post facto*. The Fellows were then assigned to particular panels which were broad enough to accommodate the Fellows' particular interests, yet

link these disparate research interests to one another via addressing a set of related questions posed by the Director to each panel, with the hope that these questions would draw out common points of references among panelists.

The theme of the 9th Workshop was **Understanding Confluences and Contestations, Continuities and Changes: Towards Transforming Society and Empowering People**. It was guided by the fact that the Workshop was being held in George Town, Penang, which (with Malacca) was listed in 2008 as a UNESCO World Heritage site. This UNESCO listing was in recognition of Penang's heritage as a harbor-city which was an important confluence where peoples, institutions, socio-political movements, religious and political ideas, cultural practices, etc have regularly converged. The flows of these assorted arrivals at different points in time have continuously linked Penang to wider regional and global socio-cultural networks and political-economic structures[1].

No doubt, many changes have occurred in Penang over the past 200 to 300 years—transformation from a sleepy fishing village to a port-city municipality under British colonial rule; then war and collapse of the economy during the Japanese occupation, 1941-45; emergence as a state within independent Malaysia, for a long time governed by the ruling party, but now in the hands of the Opposition. Its political economy evolved from that of a colonial trading post in a mercantilist-capitalist global economy in to an entrepot serving northwest Malaya, northern Sumatra, southern Thailand and southern Burma, and now as 'Silicon Island' and a regional hub integrated into the global IT and communications industries. Meanwhile its population grew rapidly. Apart from small populations of original Malays, the British and other Europeans, then Chinese, Indian and other immigrants from the former Dutch East Indies settled on the island.

Conflict or contestation often occurred as a result of these confluences. And changes occurred. Yet, through all these changes and contestations, the characteristic of Penang as a confluence persisted and the legacy of that can be seen in its heritage of ethnic enclaves and

streets, as well as mixed quarters; in the different and contesting voices that characterized its past and now its present; and in its distinct multi-ethnic inner-city material and living heritage, not least those varied and tasty hawker foods for which Penang is so famous. In other words, continuities also persisted amidst the confluences, contestations and changes.

Continuity and change: Fellows were required to locate the problem that they had investigated in the context of the history of the place, in order to highlight the nature and evolution of the community, its cultural practices, the scope of changing social relations, etc. What had changed over time? What kinds of continuities have persisted? How and what accounts for these changes and continuities? Put simply, Fellows were asked to dig into history and to address historical continuities and changes in their reflection and reporting of the contemporary problem or issue they were focusing on.

Confluences: Fellows were further required to reflect on how other arrivals intersected with the particular communities, sites and locales they were studying. In this regard, Fellows were reminded that the process of globalization is not a new and recent phenomenon for many parts of Asia. Regional trade, migration, cultural exchanges, and acculturation and/or assimilation processes had occurred over many centuries. While one might contend that there is, today, a 'new globalization' driven by neo-liberal capitalism and the revolution in information technology, an earlier version of globalization had occurred under the auspices of old-fashioned imperialism and colonialism. At any rate, the early globalization had also penetrated deep into the sinews of Asian society. Indeed, the current phase of forced migration throughout the region, too, had precedents during the period of colonialism.

Contestations: In many cases, the flows of new arrivals led to conflicts and contestations. There were popular uprisings against the colonizers, and wars of independence too. There were also ugly urban racial conflicts and sometimes 'ethnic cleansing' in the rural settings. 'Divide and rule' characterized the colonial regimes. In some cases, this 'divide and rule' has persisted into the postcolonial era.

Even when a semblance of peace prevailed, contestations actually occurred and persisted beneath the apparent calm of political dominance. Not least, official histories and national narratives tend to be biased in favor of the ruling elites, the dominant ethno-religious groups, the men-folk, generally, the victors in past conflicts. These official accounts are then contested in 'counter-narratives' sometimes in the form of 'hidden transcripts' in an oral tradition, the emergence of a 'deviant' religious sect, the persistence of a 'traditional' way of life considered anachronistic, etc. Or, as more often the case today, contestation has taken the form of rallying around alternative sets of leaders, organizations, rejection of government decrees and policies and their replacement by self-help local initiatives, etc. It is also expressed in terms of protest paintings, music and the performing arts, films and comics, and other creative works that sometimes extol the virtues of heritage and conservation, protecting and preserving the natural environment. Protests and contestations are not limited to the formal electoral process.

The point is that contestation is a constant. The marginalized and subalterns have always had a sense of agency, in spite of their dire straits. Peaceful initiatives to reach a just solution via accommodation are also manifestations of this agency. The dominated groups do contest and can 'negotiate' around attempts by the dominant groups to overwhelm and control the former. Hence the Fellows were reminded to look out for and report on these voices and maneuverings by the marginalized, the subalterns and the dominated lower class in their papers.

The Panels

With the above as an overarching conceptual theme, Fellows were then assigned to one of five particular panels. Below are listed the sub-themes of the panels, the panelists and the titles of their papers.

Panel 1: Development and Marginalization: the Poor, Indigenous Peoples and Forced Migrants

- Saya Kiba 'Diverse Political Behavior among the Urban Poor and their Identities'.
- Michiko Sugawara 'Food Security in Rural Sumatra, Indonesia: Study on Roles and Capacities of Rural Leaders and NGOs'.
- Thanyathip Sripana 'The Socio-Economic Plight of Vietnamese Labor in Malaysia'.

- Avyanthi Azis 'Finding Room for the Stateless: Locating the Rohingya in a Difficult World of Nations'.
- Toh Kin Woon (discussant)

Panel 2: Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia: From Conflict to Peace Building and Democratization

- Erni Budiwanti 'Malaysian Indian Muslim Community: Maintaining Socio-Cultural Adaptability and Strengthening the Notion of Truly Asia'.
- Siti Sarah Muwahidah 'Muslim-Christian Dialogue: A Case Study of Inter-Faith Programs in Mindanao, the Philippines'.
- Erna Anjarwati 'Engaging the Role of NGOs in a Conflict-Prone Area: Conflict Transformation and Peace Building and Alternative Processes in Southern Thailand'.
- Soliman M Santos, Jr. 'Constructively Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Asia'.
- Ahmad Su'adi 'Managing Identity: Muslim Minorities in Asia'.
- Ahmad Fauzi (discussant)

Panel 3: Globalization and its Impact on Socio-political Processes and Institutions: The Search for Regional Alternatives?

- Amin Shah bin Iskandar 'Monitoring Elections— Resistance against Authoritarian Regimes'.
- Ma. Regina M Hechanova Alampay 'Winds of Change: Globalization and Transformation in Southeast Asian Organizations'.
- Alan Harris Feinstein 'International Philanthropy in Southeast Asia: Case Studies from Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines'.
- Kohei Watanabe 'Identifying the 3R Potential of Municipal Waste in Malaysia'.
- Lim Mah Hui (discussant)

Panel 4: People in the Margins, Sustainable Development, and Our Relationship with Nature

- Bampen Chaiyarak 'A Study of Community State on Mining Industry Context'.
- Wiwat Tamee 'Entitlement and Accessibility of Right to Resource Management of Indigenous Peoples: Comparative Study of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines and Indonesia'.

- Dwi Any Marsiyanti 'Socioeconomic Security for Poor People Living around Forest Areas'.
- Prabda Yoon 'New Nature: New Evidence of Naturalistic Pantheism in Contemporary Art and Culture of Japan and the Philippines'.
- Kidlat Tahimik 'Local Rice-Terrace Cultures as Tested Immune Systems vs. Global Rice Shortages: Can Kultur-Fests Rejuvenate such Ancient Survival Kits?'
- Lye Tuck Po (discussant)

Panel 5: The Flow of Cultural Ideas, Texts, Practices: Contestations, Continuities, Changes

- Ramon Guillermo 'Southeast Asian Robinsonades: A Comparative Historical Study and Analysis of the Translation of Joachim Heinrich Campe's Robinson der Jungere (1779/ 1780) into Tagalog (Bagong Robinson [1879]) and Bahasa Melayu (Hikayat Robinson Crusoe [1875]).
- Zawiah binti Yahya 'Western Texts in Uncolonized Contexts: English Studies in Japan and Thailand'.
- Mohd Shaiful Ramze bin Endut 'Ali Shariati and Morteza Mutahhari's Ideological Influences on Intellectual Discourse and Activism in Indonesia'.
- Thitipol Kanteewong 'Changing Identity of Japanese Traditional Music in the 21st Century'.
- Arsenio Nicolas 'Early Musical Exchange in Southeast Asia'.
- Shakila Manan and Tan Sooi Beng (discussants)

The Regional Workshop

Panel 1: Development and Marginalization: the Poor, Indigenous Peoples and Forced Migrants

As development proceeds, egged on by neo-liberal economic policies that have become the orthodoxy in economic development strategizing since the late 1980s, there is a tendency by those tasked to promote growth in our region to focus on liberalization and deregulation of the national economy, as well as privatization of hitherto government-run services and utilities. To maintain the competitive edge, governments have invested in R&D, education and human resources.

In fact, development under neo-liberal conditions has resulted in marginalization of large groups of the population too. Thanks to this cohort of API Fellows, the plights of these marginalized peoples are given some due attention. By documenting the voices of protest and frustration of these groups, as well as their collective struggles for a better future, we are reminded of the underside of neo-liberal development strategizing, which has also led to the withdrawal of governments from pro-people interventions into the economy. The challenge is not only to understand the plight and agency of marginalized groups but to come to some understanding of the wider neo-liberal global forces at work. In this regard, the Fellows were asked to address the particular, as well as the more general questions. Apart from documenting the negative consequences of globalization upon the local communities and how these communities have responded to these challenges, Fellows were also egged on to ask macro-level questions like: what ought to be the role of the state? How should corporations be made more socially responsible? How viable is pushing for a 'third leg' of the development process that is organized on a co-operative basis, one that is neither profit-seeking nor state-operated, as sometimes promoted by religious groups and local self-help efforts, more akin to the idea of the 'commons'?

Saya Kiba's paper focuses on the political behavior and identity of the urban-poor in Metro-Bangkok and Metro-Manila. Her study revolves around two questions: why do the poor join social movements and how do the poor choose their political leaders. By definition, the poor have limited access to economic, health and educational resources, and little direct connections to the rich and powerful. However, some of them find ways to take advantage of situations and initiatives launched by outsiders to turn themselves into a force to be reckoned with, and in so doing benefit from such situations and initiatives. Saya makes the pertinent point that the urban poor are not homogeneous and united. Rather they are fragmented and there exists political diversity among the poor. Hence, although some of the urban poor are pushed around by outsiders, others make use of those ties with the outside organizers and make political choices, whether during elections or in their everyday politics, that benefit them.

Saya further distinguishes between two types of activities sponsored by the outsiders: community development (CD) and community organizing (CO). The former is issue specific and can result in tangible development projects; the latter is cause-specific, often involves more than a single issue, and more focused on mobilization. Depending on whether they are involved in a CD or CO-type activity, the poor have resorted to use of formal channels for dialoguing with the government agencies, or approaching the top politicians directly, to get what they want. Hence, although the urban poor are dominated by outsiders, Saya argues that the poor can also pressure the latter to attend to their needs and interests. Put another way, the urban poor are sometimes agents of their own destiny. On the basis of her research, Saya offers important insights into the current differences between the Red Shirts and Yellow Shirts in Bangkok. She argues that these differences date back to the 1980s when a broad coalition called the Voluntary Movement for People's Organizations in Thailand (VOMPOT) broke up into the People's Organization for Progress (POP, more CD-inclined) and the Community Organizations for People's Action (COPA, more CO-inclined).

The paper by Michiko Sugawara looks into the question of food security by taking a closer look at how it impacts upon the everyday lives of ordinary small farmers in Northern Sumatra. As a result of the penetration of capitalism, the production and consumption patterns of the farmers have been transformed. It has made them dependent on industrial products on the one hand, increasingly threatened by food insecurity on the other. One of the dilemmas is the turn by the farmers to cash cropping and off-farm jobs to earn money to pay for education and various other new needs, including the pursuit of more materialistic lives. It is within such a setting that Michiko investigates how the local NGOs and the leaders of farmers' groups try to empower the small-scale farmers to combat these patterns and threats of food insecurity.

Michiko highlights how an NGO educated the farmers of the dangers of agricultural chemicals and persuaded them to pursue integrated organic farming instead. However, the change has been difficult, not least because the benefits of organic faming are not readily accessible, materially speaking. Hence they continue to use industrial products (introduced by the Green Revolution) in their farms.

Another interesting aspect of Michiko's study is her discussion of the activities of yet another NGO, which has been certified to export coffee outside Indonesia under 'international fair trade' arrangements.

Supposedly, this would result in greater equity for the farmers. However, the farmers' organizations do not yet have the capacity to sustain and coordinate the different groups involved. Moreover, the rules and regulations of fair trade have become a' heavy burden' for the farmers and the NGO. To resolve the predicament, Michiko proposed that the NGOs should network with each other and with the government too, to develop an alternative marketing system, among others. More than that, Michiko discovered that there exist problems between the NGOs and local communities. Often, to accommodate the requirements of donors, the NGOs have had to compromise on the security needs of the local communities. And tellingly, the provision of goods and services to the villagers has led to dependence on the NGOs. To that extent, this account of the rural farmers in northern Sumatera, contrasts with Saya Kiba's study of the agency of the urban poor in Manila and Bangkok.

Thanyathip Sripana's paper focuses on the plight of Vietnamese labor in Malaysia. It is based on primary data collected from the Malaysian and Vietnamese authorities and is supplemented by participant-observation fieldwork among the Vietnamese in the Kuala Lumpur region. The author's command of Vietnamese facilitated her reaching out to the Vietnamese workers in Malaysia. Thanyathip argues that it is poverty and the lack of employment opportunities in Vietnam that has pushed the Vietnamese to become migrant workers in Malaysia. The majority are employed in construction sites while some are found in light industry. However, most women are employed in the service sector as house maids.

Although the Vietnamese have a reputation of being fast-learners and hard working, the number of Vietnamese workers in Malaysia is small, as compared to other nationalities. The problem, Thanyathip correctly points out, is because of their lack of familiarity with either English (which the Filipinos, Indians, Bangladeshi and Nepalese migrants tend to know) or Malay (which the Indonesians can speak). Her study of how the Vietnamese are recruited and of the terms and conditions of their work in Malaysia—long hours, lack of off-days—indicates that their experiences do not differ much from that of the other migrant workers. The harassment that they face from the authorities also does not differ. However, whereas almost all Vietnamese workers are registered, large percentages of Indonesians and south Asians forced

migrants in Malaysia are actually illegal! In this regard, one wishes that Thanyathip had also investigated the plight of the Vietnamese women who end up in Malaysia due to marriage migration and trafficking, which gets reported in the Malaysian media from time-to-time.

Thanyathip's report would have been enriched if she had allowed the Vietnamese workers to speak. Perhaps, they might have shared with us some of deeper frustrations and emotional sufferings. Perhaps, also, we might have learnt how their plight (as non-English and non-Malay speakers) differs from those of the other migrant-groups. Giving a voice to the migrants and/or reporting on specific cases would have given us a better sense of how the Vietnamese workers cope with their situation. For there is a need to capture how they negotiate to maintain some sense of dignity amidst the difficult situation they are caught in.

The last paper by Avyanthi Azis contrasts sharply from Thanyathip's. It is written reflexively narrating the author's journey among the *Rohingya* in Malaysia as she tries to understand their plight and ponder about what can be done to alleviate their problems. Significantly, Avyanthi weaves into her discussion the voices of the *Rohingya* themselves.

The crux of the problem, Avyanthi clarifies, is not that the *Rohingya* have been displaced by war or natural disaster. Nor is it because they are a minority discriminated by the majority Burmans who run an ethnocratic state. Rather, they are a stateless people in a world of nations wherein the state's primary obligations are towards its own citizens. Consequently the stateless *Rohingya* end up completely disenfranchised 'from the national order of things'.

As the author states: the stateless *Rohingya* 'come from nowhere, and have no place to go to'. Yet this 'condition of statelessness', as it were, can be passed down to one's children! It is in this regard that Avyanthi talks of the 'deterministic nature of statelessness'. One can choose to be a refugee fleeing from one place to another. But one does not choose to be stateless.

The *Rohingya*'s problem in Malaysia is compounded by the fact that they are divided. They even quarrel over whether some groups which regard themselves as *Rohingya* are in fact 'authentic *Rohingya*'. In the event, the *Rohingya* consider themselves like balls 'being kicked around'. Some also feel 'not human' and liken

themselves to animals, often to cows. For like the cows they have no rights and live in constant fear of all types of dangers—arrest, detention, deportation, extortion by the state apparatus, even 'taxation by their leaders'. There are no rights of man, only rights of citizens. Or at best, the *Rohingya*, Avyanthi reports, consider themselves as orphans of the world and the UNHCR as their guardian. However, given their statelessness, the UNHCR cannot offer the usual protection because there is no territory over which the UNHCR governs. They can only provide relief.

The plight of the *Rohingya* was highlighted in the open discussion. It was agreed that NGOs had little capacity to redress their situation. For the solution, plain and simple, is conferment of citizenship which can only be accorded by nation-states. In response to a query, Avyanthi clarified that although the *Rohingya* would like to be citizens of a Muslim country, they don't mind becoming citizens of non-Muslim countries if they can maintain their Muslim identity. At any rate no country, Muslim or non-Muslim has been forthcoming. Perhaps pressure could be applied on Myanmar? Or the neighboring countries could assume some joint-responsibility: perhaps Malaysia should grant citizenship to the *Rohingya* children born in Malaysia, while Indonesia should grant citizenship to children of the *Rohingya* who have married Indonesian spouses? Might this be an issue that Asian civil society groups, perhaps led by API Fellows, could pursue collectively?

Panel 2: Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia: From Conflict to Peace Building and Democratization

In contrast to the East Asian countries, the Southeast (and South) Asian countries are more plural societies. Indeed, ethnic or communal conflicts haunted the region during the first decades of independence. As development proceeded during the 1970s and 1980s, it appeared as though ethnic tensions were being ameliorated. Meanwhile, attention was directed towards the growth of the middle-class, on the establishment of new forms of political participation via NGOs and new social movements, on redressing gender relations, and on questions of democratization generally, including facilitating inter-religious dialogues.

In the Muslim-majority countries like Malaysia and Indonesia, researchers and policy-makers have noted the rise of the Islamic resurgence movement. Initially, in the 1970s and 1980s, attention was drawn to the *dakwah* movement as a protest movement in search of an alternative modernity. Less attention was given to that faction of the movement that intended to reconstitute the nation-states along Islamic principles. This orientation has changed, especially during the past decade, as captured in the academic and popular discourses of so-called 'political Islam'. In turn, these discourses were related to events like the Iranian revolution and its aftermath, the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the growth of the Wahhabi movement, and more recently, the 9/11 Tragedy and the US invasion of Iraq and its aftermath. Accordingly, the old ethnic fault lines have assumed new *ethno-religious* significance with all the attendant implications for politics in the region, whether Muslims constitute the majority or the minority communities in particular countries. Panel 2 is located within this wider historical context.

It focuses attention on Muslim-non-Muslim relations in Southeast Asia which is currently characterized by violent conflict in southern Thailand and southern Philippines. That said, there have always been efforts by Muslim groups working with non-Muslim counterparts to arrest the violence. In this panel Fellows elaborate on the difficult roles of local elites, civil society and the NGOs in fostering inter-faith dialogue; in constructively engaging the 'non-state armed groups'; and in working towards peace via democratization. While sharing with us their research findings of particular case-studies, Fellows were reminded to keep in mind the bigger picture. For instance, what kinds of new roles must the state authorities assume, and civil society promote re: development? democratization? respect for diversity? And what might be the scope for regional initiatives, if any? The efforts of local leaders, NGOs, and isolated pro-democracy advocates, though heroic, might have very limited overall impact in stemming the violence and promoting democratization. By putting their specific reports in the context of the larger Islamic world, the panelists hoped to develop useful links and comparisons. We also hoped that other Fellows not well versed on Islamic-related communities and affairs would therefore develop greater appreciation of this panel's concerns.

Erni Budiwanti explored the dilemma of the Indian-Muslim minority in Malaysia wherein Islam has the status of 'official religion' and is the religion of the majority. While some Indian Muslims have assimilated into the Malay community, a significant number of them prefer to maintain their identity as Indians: they

speak Tamil as their first language and practice Indian culture in dress, dietary habits, marriage, peer socialization, etc. In so maintaining their ancestral identity, these Indians distinguish themselves from Malay-Muslims and effectively deny themselves access to *bumiputera* status and privileges. In fact, they are critical of the special rights accorded to the *bumiputera*. However, because of the Malay-Muslim nexus in everyday Malaysian politics, such criticism of the privileges is tantamount to an attack on not only Malays, but on Muslims too. For Ahmad Fauzi, the discussant, Budiwanti's paper highlights the ironies behind the Indian Muslims' position in Malaysia'; it further 'exposes the fragile rudiments of a state built on a notion of racial supremacy…race being an inflexible social unit'. For Fauzi, 'a race-based polity is not only sociologically jaundiced but also politically unsustainable in the long term'.

To some extent, the presentations by Siti Sarah Muwahidah and Erna Anjarwati which discuss grassroots activities of inter-faith dialogue proponents and local NGOs in Mindanao, Philippines and the southern provinces of Thailand respectively, reverses the scenario. While inter-faith dialogue can be a medium for reconciling the Christian and Muslim populations of Mindanao, Siti Sarah shows that obstacles can, and do arise when participants from the different groups feel they are not placed on a level playing field. She highlights the need to address: 'imbalances of power between the organizer, facilitators, and participants', including at the inter-personal level. That said, Siti Sarah concludes that proactive forces, acting independently from the state, can succeed in eliminating prejudice and nurturing seeds of inter-faith solidarity. This does not result in resolution of the conflict. However, it offers 'a platform for people of warring faiths to meet peacefully and civilly to find solutions'.

NGOs have also played important roles in facilitating dialogue and reconciliation in southern Thailand. Erna Anjarwati highlights their involvement in the trauma-healing process among affected Muslim and Buddhist grassroots populations. The use of dance therapy is innovative and builds long-lasting bonds between the young of both communities on different sides of the conflict. Like Siti Sarah, Erna Anjarwati also asserts that 'NGOs can really play positive and critical roles which the state will never be able or willing to play.' Indeed, in both southern Philippines and southern Thailand, the state carries too much historical baggage and is too much associated with

allegations of violence and discrimination, to be able to reach out to the Muslim minorities effectively. Erna's elaboration on the Thai government's assimilationist policy vis-à-vis the Malay-Muslim minority, in response to a query, was particularly useful for Fellows less knowledgeable about Thai affairs. However, Erna was equally concerned that solutions to the conflict had to be developed from the bottom up, as opposed to being imposed from the outside, in a one-size-fits-all package, a point she directs especially towards the international NGOs. In his commentary, Ahamd Fauzi reminded that we should not limit our definition of 'minority' simply to the 'ethno-cultural' sense. For there can also be minorities, sometimes castigated as 'deviants' by state-sanctioned religious leaders, who then also suffer the repression and discrimination of the majority.

In contrast to the afore-mentioned, Ahmad Sua'di's and Soliman M. Santos' papers discuss more broadly their subject matters. Santos advocates engaging with 'non-state armed groups' (NSAGs), which often have legitimate reasons for resorting to violence, not least in self-defense against repressive states. Engagement would involve the Muslim NSAGs in southern Philippines and southern Thailand, but also many non-Muslim groups elsewhere. For Ahmad Fauzi, such engagement amounts to 'legitimating what are seemingly illegal and violent organizations….which carries the risk of being misinterpreted as condoning the illicit activities of NSAGs'. However, Ahmad Fauzi regards API-sponsored events as a proper launching pad for such a controversial proposition'. In the discussion that followed, Soliman clarified that the normal response to a conflict was 'to fight fire with fire'. Invariably, such a response has led to an escalation of the conflict. Hence, it is 'in the interest of human security to engage with the NSAGs'. High level peace talks or cease-fire agreements might be far down the road. But low-level daily interaction with NSAGs in humanitarian and development pursuits, in the defense of human rights, and in advocacy of the peace process could be initiated.

Like Santos' study, Ahmad Sua'di's discussion is broad in scope. The most important aspect of his study is its highlighting of Muslim groups that are involved in peaceful struggles for democratization and transformation. It is an important reminder to those who have stereotypical notions of Islamic radicals whom they associate with violence and terrorism. Alas, being so broad in scope, the many cases he investigates sometimes miss out on important nuances. That said,

Ahmad Fauzi regarded his troubling discussion on how Muslim-non-Malay relations in Malaysia was compounded by the *Ketuanan Melayu* (Malay Supremacy) policy as spot-on, leading to considerable discussion with all the Fellows present.

As conclusion, it is worth recalling Ahmad Fauzi's congratulatory remarks to the API Fellowships Program for supporting research that 'debunk myths, venture into unexplored territories and engage with grassroots populations...highlighting the roles of the subalterns...and... offering 'counter-narratives' of the world around us. As well, he hoped that the new knowledge produced would result in positive change, either via government policies or interventions of NGOs and other non-state actors.

Panel 3: Globalization and its Impact on Socio-political Processes and Institutions: The Search for Regional Alternatives?

From a political point of view, the notion of globalization is related to the end of the Cold War. It is further related to how liberal democracy characterized by competitive elections, multi-party systems and constitutional government, and nowadays 'good governance' too, began to take root not only in the former communist countries but in the developing countries too, including in our region. Perhaps this spread of liberal democracy and good governance can be considered one of the more positive aspects of the new globalization.

However, globalization is more than this. It is also about the penetration of the market economy into all corners of the globe including those countries which previously fell under command economies, as well as the developing countries less penetrated by the market previously. The end result has been the increasing economic integration of the world through trade of goods and services, and flows of capital, technology (knowledge) and labor. However, integration has not meant equalization. Rather, it has resulted in a more hierarchical economy dominated by MNCs and foreign investors, with developing countries at the bottom of the global production supply chain. The upper and middle classes have become homogenized by consumerism, and human progress is measured in terms of material goods.

Panel 3 brings together investigations into the flows of formal institutions and on the socio-cultural and (to a lesser extent) political consequences of this aspect of globalization. Are neo-liberal values creeping into and restructuring the way we conduct philanthropy? Are neo-liberal values also shaping managerial practices in Asian companies nowadays? Or are the new managerial practices being adopted a consequence of the introduction of the new technology? Recalling that the promotion of liberal democratic government, indeed governance, can be considered the flip-side of globalization, aren't there formal organizations and organizational principles that enhance good governance (in the mature liberal democracies) that are worth copying, and/or adapting to suit our Asian setting? Where are our models to enhance good governance—competency, accountability and transparency, popular participation, protection of our environment and the rule of law—in our Asian societies?

Amin Shah discusses NAMFREL in Philippines and KIPP in Indonesia, two organizations that played seminal roles in monitoring and ensuring fair elections in the two countries. NAMFREL's role in the run-up to the 1986 presidential election was critical, and People Power mobilization aside, contributed towards the ultimate downfall of Marcos. Though the scope of its role was less comprehensive, KIPP also played an important role in the lead-up to the 1997 presidential election in Indonesia. This is no mean feat because the US government had backed the two authoritarian regimes and had largely closed an eye to the human rights abuses, sham elections and cronyism which characterized these two regimes for some two to three decades. It should be stressed that a by-product of the globalized world is also the sharing of knowledge and strategies among those who organize against the establishment. Indeed, NAMFREL was able to share its experience with Indonesia and other Asian countries. Due to the harassment of KIPP by the Suharto authorities, the training of its personnel was conducted in Bangkok instead. That said, it should be clarified that neo-liberal economic globalization does not lead automatically to political liberalism and electoral democracy. It was the agency of electoral monitoring bodies like NAMFREL and KIPP, as well as interventions by other civil society groups that contributed towards regime change. In the discussion that followed, it was stressed that there should also be more efforts by civil society groups to reform the elections commissions and the formal electoral processes too; not just conduct exposes on their shortcomings.

Regina Hechanova Alampay's paper touched on the impact of globalization on business organizations in Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia and how they responded to these challenges. Globalization opened up markets for domestic businesses, enabled them to access foreign partners and new technology, and egged them on to become more competitive. Although some businesses continued with employment policies that were 'more family-oriented' and 'in line with their traditional culture', some of the businesses restructured and adopted 'new' employment strategies viz. cutting down on the numbers employed via utilizing labor-saving machines and adopting new managerial practices. The latter included outsourcing, as practiced by the foreign corporations. During the discussion, Regina clarified, that it was the bigger companies who depended on export that had collapsed during the 2007-2008 economic downturn. That said, she maintained that it was still important to develop small and medium-scale enterprises into bigger concerns so that they had a larger say vis-à-vis governments and their policies.

Alan Feinstein's paper discusses the impact of globalization on the vision and structures of philanthropic organizations, an area of investigation that is seldom ever explored. He is particularly concerned that the new vision and methods employed are too business-oriented and are undermining many of the social and cultural programs that traditional foundations promote and support. He highlights that the new breed of 'capitalist-philanthropists' like Gates and Buffet are fixated on achieving technical and measureable results like reduction of the incidence of HIV or malaria, increasing crop yields to fight poverty, etc, Apparently, they are not interested in more complex and less easily measurable issues like cultural integrity and pluralism, social and participatory democracy, and social justice. Consequently, corporate values and principles have been imported into the conduct of philanthropic activities. Perhaps it is not ironic that such transformation has occurred in this age of globalization wherein although tremendous wealth has been generated, inequality has worsened in most countries throughout the world. For it is the same set of corporate leaders responsible for creating this scenario of extreme inequalities who have assumed the new roles of philanthropists too.

Significantly, Tatsuya Tanami, Executive Director of the Nippon Foundation, agreed with the general thrust of Feinstein's argument. Although the Nippon Foundation (NF) still believes in, and continues to sponsor the API Fellowships Program, geared towards social transformation of Asian society and the empowerment of people, there have developed new pressures to ensure that NF grants are spent fruitfully, and that grantees are more accountable, he elaborated. Hence, although philanthro-capitalism does not yet characterize the API and other programs administered by the NF, nonetheless, Feinstein is not wrong to observe an important shift in focus in philanthropy, especially among American foundations. Feinstein agreed that some of the slack could be redressed by governmental pressures on local corporations to assume greater corporate social responsibilities (CSR). However, in view of the relative under-development of CSR in Southeast Asia, it was necessary for public intellectuals and civil society organizations to impress upon the funders the folly of their new vision and shift in focus. He was especially concerned that CSOs, already critical of how the donors were imposing what they considered 'unnecessary conditions' upon their activities, were not yet adequately addressing this critical shift which threatens to usher in dire consequences.

The final paper by Kohei Watanabe dealt with the environmental impact of globalization. He looked into the potential of reducing, re-using and recycling (3-Rs) waste in the university town of Bangi in Malaysia, in relation to his earlier investigations of the 3-Rs in Kyoto, Japan and in Cambridge, U.K. Though of course the latter two had more comprehensive waste management arrangements in place, he found that there was potential for the 3-Rs in Bangi, wherein the recycling of paper is already quite effective, though less so for plastics. That said, Kohei opined that the local community itself cannot successfully promote the 3-Rs. Governments, too, must assume more pro-active roles. Ultimately, as emerged from the discussion, the producers who are responsible for producing the bulk of waste must be involved as well. For like in the issue of philanthropy, there is a conflict between the imperatives of a free market system and the 3-Rs, particularly the call to reduce and reuse products. For the basic drive of business is production for profit. Accordingly, they are keen to get people to consume more; not to reduce and to reuse! In response to another query, Kohei clarified that 'scavenging' in Bangi was not so widespread as in some other parts of urban Southeast Asia, perhaps due to Malaysia's relative economic development. Hence, unlike say in the Philippines, dumpsites were not supporting the urban poor communities to the same extent.

Taken as a whole, the findings of the Fellows in this Panel confirm the vagaries of the neo-liberal global economy in which we find ourselves today. The Fellows also note that the people and groups that they have investigated are aware of these negative trends and have even acted to prevent a worsening scenario. Perhaps, the authors could have reflected more on the issue of alternatives. In the field of politics, beyond monitoring electoral democracy, what might be the kind of institutions needed especially at the local level to deepen democracy and to enhance participatory democracy? In the field of alternative development, how might civil society organizations promote a non-profit private sector that engages with the free-market global order yet ensure that social welfare, equality, the environment and cultural differences are not sacrificed in the pursuit of economic well-being. For instance, is there a model, perhaps inspired by traditional concerns for safeguarding the community's interests, to re-organize our economy so that growth benefits equitably all the stake holders involved—not just the employers and financiers but also the employees, consumers, suppliers etc., while maximizing the 3-Rs?

Panel 4: People in the Margins, Sustainable Development, and our Relationship with Nature

One of the most notable of dichotomies that has impacted upon the construction of institutions and practices is that between 'modernity' and 'tradition'. In colonial times, this opposition was used to justify the imposition of Western rule over colonized areas, including in our region. Progress, or modernity, was associated with the West, with science and technology, and with economic rationality. In the postcolonial period, this dichotomy has also been used to justify centralized control by national elites over the rural population and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) in the hinterlands. Images of modernity, development, resource use and protection, national elites and nationalism are associated with progress too. Images of tradition are seen as representing underdevelopment, backwardness, sometimes caught in the colonial past. In fact, there are similarities and continuities that connect colonialism to post-colonialism. Both control access to resources through legal institutions that privilege private property and corporations over customary rights and practices of the marginal groups.

Then and now, political discourses justify centralized rule and economic planning and ignore the symbiotic relationship that IPs in the margins have with nature and natural resources, and their accumulated

'traditional' wisdom about all these. Under the guise of protection and rational use of resources, elite interests precede are over local subsistence and naturally sustainable uses. Yet, instead of preventing the powerful profit-seeking outsiders from encroaching into and destroying the interiors .the IPs and other rural poor people are blamed for the destruction of the natural resources. These observations are *apropos* for countries that have not been colonized too.

Panel 4 grapples with how the IPs and others in the margins have been represented; how their livelihoods and cultures are threatened by encroachments of mining and other industrial concerns and state authorities into their backyards; how they cope with the new legal regimes and the commercial arrangements in the form of industrial forest management agreements which will ostensibly bring modernity to the margins, promote sustainable development and benefit them. Are there ways to escape the encroachment of this form of modernity? Is there a need to rethink the relationship between (wo)man and nature? What is the traditional wisdom on this score?

The paper by Bampen Chaiyarak compared mining histories and problems in the Philippines and Japan, with a view to gaining insight for practical purposes in Thailand. Her account of how a group of Japanese people living in the margins had persistently protested against, and were ultimately successful in terminating mining activities in the vicinity of their villages, after their plight was finally taken up by concerned politicians, is most uplifting indeed. However, this encouraging part of her report was complemented by the disturbing recounting of how mining activities have started, and will most probably expand, elsewhere, in this case in the Philippines. Although the minerals extracted from the Philippines are not necessarily intended for Japan's industrial consumption, nonetheless, insofar as Japan continues to depend on mineral imports, and developing countries like the Philippines resort to mining to provide jobs and export earnings, the two cases are related. That aside, Bampen's discussion of the two cases reminds one of the environmental destructiveness of all mining activities and of the, almost always tragic, transformation of the everyday lives of those people living in the margins, in this case in the vicinity of the mines. For all of us can think of examples from our own countries. In her case, Bampen expressed fears that the livelihoods of the IPs of Thailand might soon be devastated with the opening

of mines in their backyards. Perhaps the only way to prevent the devastation is by preventing the opening of the mines, she opined. To this end, she intends to conduct an educational campaign on the potential dangers of mining among the upland communities in Thailand.

Wiwat Tamee's paper shows a concern for the rights of the IPs—about the plight, conditions, and agency of the people from whom resources are extracted, often without due compensation. Wiwat's paper was detailed and well thought out. However, it would have benefited from some historical discussion. Perhaps, then, it would have become evident that the indigenous struggle in the Philippines was related to a broader nation-wide anti-Marcos movement. Hence, it is not surprising that the IPs have been more successful in the Philippines compared to their counterparts in Indonesia. Without this historical and comparative insight, Wiwat leaves the unfortunate impression that it is perhaps the Dayak's lack of facility in English, and hence inability to reach out to the outside world effectively, that explains the difference. This point is taken up by Lye Tuck Po, the discussant, who commented that lack of facility in English should not be, in itself, a problem. More than that, Lye adds: 'indigenous peoples are not a problem in themselves. No matter how sophisticated indigenous organizations become, it's no use unless the broader society changes as well. The problems, which are familiar... include the outright theft and appropriation of land and resources, corruption, the bailouts of and granting of resource rights to political cronies, etc. Until these very public issues are resolved, indigenous struggles will always have limited successes'.

The living conditions of the IPs are well described in the paper by Dwi Any Marsiyanti, who examines the alliances between governments and corporations and their effects on forest dwellers in the Philippines and Thailand: how the resource bases of several IP communities have been appropriated by the state and local peoples are made, basically, *persona non grata*— strangers in their own lands. This process, of course, dates back to the colonial era, with the early establishment of timber reserves, and is now repeated in the establishment of national parks, etc. Consequently, the IPs end up without access and use rights to the lands and forests of their ancestors. The situations described by Dwi Any are extremely familiar. Her study would be enhanced if she had reflected more rigorously on the notion of 'security',

especially distinguishing between 'national security' from what is nowadays referred to as 'human security' or livelihood security. Admittedly, in situations involving the Karen in northern Thailand bordering on Burma, questions of human security do become entwined with national security issues.

Prabda Yoon's paper interrogates the word 'nature' in philosophical manner, which is then elaborated on in his discussion of pantheism in Japanese and Filipino modern art. Perhaps, Prabda attempts too much in this short paper, especially when he asserts on the essentialisms of pantheism, and the linkages between modern art in Japan to that in the Philippines. It would have been preferable to investigate the individual careers and biographies of a handful of artists, Japanese and Filipinos, whom he considers motivated by pantheism. In this regard several Fellows were concerned whether this orientation towards pantheism stemmed from the artists themselves, or from Prabda's own reading into their works. Although the artists' inspiration from nature is easily discernible, it appears that the claim that that they were oriented towards pantheism was Prabda's own. That said, there were other Fellows who wished that Prabda had also examined to the extent to which the artists and their works had influenced the 'public' in their respective countries. Although pantheism as a philosophy or a description of nature is fascinating in its own right, it may be too ambitious to try and use it to explain the work of the diverse group of artists he identified in his paper. If Prabda had done so, it would have been easier to extend his discussion to consider the role of the artists in the wider society too; indeed, to investigate their empowerment and transformation of their societies!

Kidlat Tahimik, a film maker, did not prepare a paper for the panel. However, he showed snippets of his film-in-progress. His project investigates the everyday culture, livelihood and struggles of various upland peoples of Asia involved in terrace rice-farming. Due to their relative distance and isolation from the urban centers which are more exposed to the vagaries of global capitalism, Kidlat posited that such rice-terrace communities had a stronger resilience. More than that, they had not experienced the recent food insecurity to the same extent. During the discussion he shared that the people he met had conveyed 'a special sense of connectedness' to the local environment and society which he termed 'indio- genous'. This special sense had facilitated their critical attitude towards encroaching

capitalism today, indeed towards colonialism in times past, too. Lye agreed with Kidlat. Such local knowledge, she said, promoted creativity and adaptability of the indigenous peoples to changing circumstances which they faced, contrary to the assumptions of the general public that IPs are uneducated and backward. The challenge is how to tap into this deep understanding of the local to engage the unfamiliar from the outside, egged on nowadays by globalization. Put another way, how does one engage these encroachments efficiently from a socio-economic standpoint, yet with dignity and without loss of identity?

In their various ways, all the papers challenge dominant positions on modern society's relationship with the environment, and remind us that, as much as Asian societies have achieved, we have also lost much. No doubt, some sacrifices are inevitable. More generally, it appears that despite numerous lessons from one major environmental tragedy after another, throughout the Asian region, and from colonial to postcolonial times, the lessons have not sunk in. Invariably, it is the IPs, and other people living in the margins, as Wiwat's paper so clearly shows us, who end up paying an unacceptably high cost for so-called 'progress' and 'development'. There have been minor concessions here and there, but as highlighted in the papers by Bampen, Wiwat, and Dwi, it is still industrialization that has priority for all of the governments in this region. As forest cover diminishes even more, and pressure increases via the demand for minerals, forest products, and land itself, these struggles will become more intense and the outcomes more critical. Hopefully, in this global era, not least because IPs themselves are making their voices heard, we should become more aware of their victimization and be inspired to work with them to rethink our assumptions about the environment and the control of nature. In this regard, this Panel succeeded in highlighting this acute state of affairs in our margin areas. The follow-up challenge is to ensure that research findings are now made meaningful to the broader public.

Panel 5: The Flow of Cultural ideas, Texts, Practices: Contestations, Continuities and Changes

Consider, at one level, Benedict Anderson's discussion of the origins of the nation as 'an imagined political community...inherently limited and sovereign', and of its spread in different modular forms. Or consider at another level, the earlier discussion of Penang as a confluence where peoples, institutions, movements, ideas, cultural practices, etc. have converged.

Panel 5 focuses attention on the flows of cultural ideas, texts and practices in particular. As in the case of Penang, it should be expected that the convergences of these cultural ideas, texts and practices would also lead to contestations, effecting changes, amidst continuities. For instance, to what extent have radical Shi'ite Islamic ideas caught on among Indonesian Muslim intellectuals traditionally schooled in the Sunni tradition? What is the scope of this contestation, if any? Has open conflict occurred? Or how are critical studies in English read in Thailand and Japan, which have no colonial (read 'western') cultural baggage, as opposed to a reading of the same in places like postcolonial Malaysia? And with regards to so-called neo-traditional Japanese music, who identifies with this music emblemizing continuities with the past on the one hand, engaging with the global on the other? And looking back even further into the pre-colonial era, what was the scope of musical exchanges in the region? And why does musical exchange in that era matter for the API Fellow committed to the betterment of modern-day society? Have people been empowered? Are societies transformed for the better as a result of these flows?

Ramon Guillermo's paper presents a comparative translation analysis of Joachim Heinrich Campe's *Robinson der Jungere* (RDJ, 1779/1780), a German text, into Malay, *Hikayat Robinson Crusoe* (1875) and into Tagalog, *Ang Bagong Robinson (ABR, 1879)*. It compares the conceptual systems and discursive elements informing the three texts, specifically with respect to the translation of German political-economic concepts. Guillermo had digitised the texts and conducted a collocational analysis of key terms and concepts related to political economy - use value, exchange value, division of labour, needs, etc. In the study, he focuses on the concept of 'needs', which in the RDJ, he argues, is related to the notion of development and the invention of tools and machines that would facilitate the satisfaction of these needs. Essentially, it alludes to the mastery over nature by humans. However, this mastery over nature through human technology does not arise in the HRC. Instead, the text emphasises how, when confronted with difficulty, the problem can be overcome by turning to God for help.

In RDJ, Robinson prays for strength to withstand hardship and suffering. In HRC Robinson pleads for

God's help to withstand the extreme difficulties he faces with calm/patience. ABR uses two words to describe the attitude towards suffering, namely 'to bear' and 'to endure'. ABR seems to dwell much more on the notion of suffering or enduring. In ABR the subject vacillates between strong will and weak will. Only a strong will can allow the subject to bear and endure suffering. Apparently, all three versions vary in their emphasis

Language is never neutral. It is always ideological. As such, when translators translate texts they are always influenced by their own ideology, worldview, conceptual and cultural belief system. Given this, what were the reasons and functions for translating Defoe's *Robinson Crusoe* into local languages? And keeping in mind the API project, how does the comparative-translation method employed in this paper, and Guillermo's findings from his investigation, empower and transform society?

In her paper, Zawiah binti Yahya investigates the English proficiency levels amongst students in selected universities in the capital cities of two non-colonised countries, Japan and Thailand, and also explored how English/American Literature was taught in universities in these two countries. In essence, her study is an investigation of the flow of Western culture—the English language, Eurocentric perspectives and methodologies on studying English—and the interventions by the non-West, especially the non-colonized recipients.

Her findings reveal that both Japan and Thailand have been affected by the hegemonic influence of the English language, although English is used and taught as a foreign language. This helps to explain Japan's national obsession with English proficiency and the hiring of thousands of native speakers to teach English, and Thailand's greater emphasis on English for international communication in the curriculum. Zawiah also found that there was an inclination on the part of the English Studies departments in Japan to get students to read and analyse highly revered Western canonical texts (e.g. Shakespeare's texts) although they may find the texts and their contexts totally foreign to them. It was only in a few literature seminar classes for English majors that attempts were made to incorporate perspectives of gender and race in discussions to widen an otherwise restrictive approach to text analysis.

In contrast, Thai university students were much more proficient than their Japanese counterparts. Literature programmes were run by a tested system and in terms of a preferred methodology, the traditional New Criticism approach of close reading was employed. Although students were exposed to critical reading protocols in the final year of their undergraduate program these were not consciously applied to their reading of texts in the graduate program. However, the Comparative Literature graduate program which was conducted in the Thai language adopted an interdisciplinary approach to literature. In her conclusion, Zawiah claimed that no attempts were made to indigenise reading protocols and to devise alternative methods that draw from local value systems or ancient texts. Instead, Western methods that tend to prioritise western cultures and marginalise local perspectives and values were adopted. Useful as these findings are, the paper would have benefited from some discussion of who—among the Thais and Japanese - frame the curriculum, select texts, materials and teaching methodologies in these countries? Is it a top-down process? Have there been any contestations or negotiations by certain locals? The inclusion of race and gender in discussions in the literature classes for majors in Japan seem to suggest some form of negotiation that has taken place.

Mohd Shaiful Ramze Endut's paper discusses the flow of Shi'a ideology from Iran to Indonesia. Specifically, he discusses the impact of Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari upon intellectual discourse and social activism in Indonesia. The paper first traces the history of the Shi'a movement in Sunni-majority Indonesia. It was only after the Iranian revolution that there occurred a fillip to the movement. This was facilitated through the translation of the two authors' books from Arabic, English and Persian into Indonesian. The author presents useful listings of many books, essays and articles that were written by Shariati and Motahhari, as well as about them and their thoughts. In this regard, publishing houses such as Mizan Publishing and the Motahhari Foundation were also set up.

For Shi'a to gain ground in Sunni-majority Indonesia, the author correctly argues that there needs to be an 'epistemic shift'. Not only must the Shi'a in Indonesia differentiate themselves from their counterparts in Iran; they must also avoid emotional debate on the Sunni-Shi'a issue within Indonesia. Significantly, the Shi'a community itself is divided into two groups which makes it difficult for the Shi'a to develop a greater solidarity with the Sunni-Indonesians. As well, it appears that the promotion of Shariati and

Motahhari's Shi'a ideas was also being hampered by a process of 'Iran-isation', Mohd Shaiful noted. Perhaps more attention should have been given in the paper to the Shi'a movement itself - its philosophy, its socialist-Marxist leanings, and how it differentiates itself from the Sunni sect, at least in the Indonesian context. Elaboration of the scope of these Shi'a arrivals would have helped in understanding the contestation that occurred, and the extent of changes and continuities that have occurred in Indonesian society.

The fourth paper by Thitipol Kanteewong also takes up the theme of continuities and changes. He argues that traditional Japanese music has been recreated and that three main styles exist today: new ensembles that combine western and non-western instruments and techniques; popular and world music advocates who use Japanese traditional instruments and music in their performances and compositions; and experimental Japanese avant-garde music that use western compositional techniques. Subsequently, through the process of 'co-creation' (presumably this implies collaboration), four forms of Japanese neo-traditional music has emerged. These are: a) new arrangements of Japanese traditional repertoire; b) new forms associated with Western classical repertoire; c) new free-improvised repertoire; and d) new Japanese neo-traditional musical composition.

As someone who is unfamiliar with Japanese traditional, and its recreation as neo-traditional music, I cannot comment on these assertions. However, the discussant and ethnomusicologist Tan Sooi Beng finds that the author has over-generalized. The claims of these styles and new forms should have 'made references to places, names of groups, backgrounds of musicians, methods of composition etc. which the author observed and studied.... More information of this kind [in addition to mention made of famous composers like Toru Takemitsu, Yuji Takahashi and Jo Kondo] will give us an insight into the forms, styles and relationship with what is happening elsewhere in the world'. As well, since Thitipol 'finds the collaborative method (co-creation) most engaging, he should elaborate with examples of methods, best practices and results of collaboration in greater depth'. Tan adds that the arguments in the paper would have been sharpened if Thitipol had highlighted on particular groups that he encountered; explained their methods of collaboration and what forms of new Japanese music they are creating. In fact, it is important to clarify what is meant by 'co-creation': whose term is this? Why is this the way forward? Tan

agrees that 'collaboration can be an empowering method which gives collaborators opportunities to experiment (although sometimes not equally). Is this the case with the Japanese music groups [that Thitipol] encountered?'

And finally, to link the paper to the larger theme of the Workshop, Tan asks: 'how does the author relate the changes in style and content of new Japanese music to the changes in the world e.g. globalization and hybridity? How has the use of 'cut and paste methods', 'the loss of reference to place and time, and use of new technology affect the new music?' 'What is the impact of hybridity on Japanese identity?.... Is hybridity a means of negotiating with the Anglo-American dominant cultures? How does the co-creation method contribute to this negotiation?'

The last paper by Arsenio Nicolas outlines the shared musical instruments and culture in Maritime Asia for the past 7000 years! He asserts that in the early history of the region, instruments made from bamboo, wood and natural materials, and bronze drums, gongs and bells could be found in many parts of Asia. He says that the 'flow of musical ideas from one place to another became more restricted as a result of European colonialism'. For instance, in the Philippines, the use of gongs diminished as new music using western instruments and harmony emerged after colonialism. He emphasizes that 'the invention of digital technology and the marketing of music as a commodity', has 'threatened the existence of the diversity of musical cultures in the world' today.

Besides outlining the flows of musical instruments and culture in the Asian region, it is not clear what other point the author is trying to convey? The paper would have been more focused if he had elaborated on the 'networks, centers, peripheries' which he mentions in the subtitle. However, trying to generalize on this theme over some 7,000 years would be simply too ambitious for any individual, and especially so in such a short paper.

Tan's suggestions are that the author focuses on a more specific period of time, perhaps the recent period, and traces the flows that occur in detail. In so doing, interesting new questions might in fact arise. She comments: 'For instance, was new music which combined western and local elements composed during the colonial period a mere imitation of the colonial west? Or was hybridity a way to negotiate around colonial hegemony?' In this regard, she

continues, 'is commercial popular music today 'global noise' from the centre (Anglo-America) which drowns out local music? Or is it a form of vibrant global music from the periphery shouting back? Did the instruments and musical ideas during the pre-colonial period flow freely? What was the role of the centre then?' Accordingly, Nicolas must also reconsider not only counter-flows but the 'the changes in the networks, centers and peripheries through the centuries in Asia?

In this regard, Tan questions Nicolas's assumption 'that cultural diversity has been threatened or eroded because of digital technology and commercial popular music'. Rather, Tan suggests that 'it might be more fruitful to look to the global music scene as an arena where differences and similarities are produced, and local traditions are represented in new ways. Thitipol's paper shows that this is happening in Japanese new music'. Herein, therefore, might be a link between these two papers on the musical culture of the region; but only if both speakers consider the question of hybridity seriously, which in turn allows them to ask how 'transformation' and 'empowerment' of musicians and society might have occurred, a theme of the API project.

NOTE

1 Tan Liok Ee 'Conjunctures, Confluences, Contestations: A Perspective on Penang History' in Yeoh Seng Guan, Loh Wei Ling, Khoo Salma Nasution and Neil Khor (eds) *Penang and Its Region: The Story of an Asian Entrepot*, Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, pp. 7-29. Apart from the book above, two other recent volumes about Penang's history and evolution are the special issue of *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, Vol. 82 Pt II, No 297, Dec 2009 and Ooi Kee Beng and Goh Ban Lee (eds) *Pilot Studies for a New Penang*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Penang: Socio-economic and Environmental Research Institute, 2010.

Identity and the Diversity of Political Behavior among the Urban Poor

Saya Kiba

1. Introduction and Objectives

This study focuses on the questions: 1) What inspires urban poor groups to join different kinds of political and social movements? 2) How do the poor choose their political leaders? and 3) How do the poor survive in a globalizing world by way of their participation in grassroots politics?

When people with very limited resources would like to participate in politics, they organize. In both the Philippines and Thailand countless 'outsiders,' such as political parties, politicians, political blocs, the left, NGOs, and religious groups, seem to consistently invest substantial resources, time and energy into trying to help organize the urban poor. What motivates them? No individual or group would actively attempt to engage poor communities without an agenda. Some may proclaim themselves philanthropist. Some NGOs may insist they are non-partisan and explicitly non-political. However, it is impossible to deny that NGOs and community organizers are susceptible to aligning themselves with visions or interests that may very well rest outside of the communities they claim to serve. As issues surrounding the poor are inherently political, the role of outsiders who 'enter' poor communities cannot but be anything but political.

I would like to focus on political diversity among the poor. It is important to accurately recognize the potential political power of the poor, not only in the context of elections but also in that of their daily lives. Poor communities are characterized by their limited or nonexistent access to resources, services such as those for education and health, and influential political and economic connections. They are also, for the most part, a highly heterogeneous and fragmented segment of the population both politically and socially, owing in great part to the variety of cultural, religious, linguistic, and other identities that come into play in their lives. However, many urban poor communities have come to see the somewhat inevitable involvement of outside groups in their affairs as a potential resource in itself, and have thus become conscious of the advantages of managing interactions with 'outsiders' for greater community benefit.

It is an undisputed fact that political elites try to win the favor of the poor with money and promises of land. Likewise, the poor utilize extra-institutional measures as a means of survival, and are less hesitant when it comes to taking part in extra-constitutional action for political change. However, contrary to popular belief, the poor are not simply passive actors. Most slum residents have experience in collective actions organized by People's Organizations (POs). Some POs have made dramatic progress in achieving their goals. In the Philippines, for example, the poor have demonstrated an astute awareness of how to best develop and maintain dialogs with government agencies and make their demands known; including by choosing to ignore certain formal channels and going directly to the Office of the President, or by contacting their congresspersons, mayors, and/or councilors. The poor know how to keep up with social and political movements as well as utilize formal dialogs with the relevant authorities.

This study tries to argue that poor communities recognize outsiders as 'agents' with an ability to speak for them. They, as well as their POs, are open to delegating negotiation processes to NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs), and/or lower-ranking government officials with connections to higher-ranking bureaucrats who, in turn, are in a position to make or influence decisions. The poor make knowledgeable and independent decisions when choosing POs, and the same is true when choosing 'agents'; they actively collect information on outsiders in order to assess their potential utility.

Although the urban poor are in many ways dominated by outsiders, at the same time, they also exercise control over them. An underlying awareness of 'how to be used wisely' or 'how to utilize outsiders effectively' permeates the choices they make. What follows is the author's qualitative exploration into this hypothesis, further study and the author will consider how 'identity' issues can be evaluated using quantitative measurements.

2. Methodology

This research focuses on the urban poor, who have collectively undergone the experience of 'being organized' and 'being mobilized' by numerous outsiders for decades. Since slum residents are usually members of at least one community group—such as a neighborhood association, homeowners' group, water association, or motherhood group—that acts as a base for broader networks, the unit of analysis in this paper shall be 'groups', namely, the POs with which poor individuals participate in collective action.

However, the author also conducted random interviews with ordinary people at political rallies and street demonstrations who are not necessarily constituents of any squatter community's PO.

The author conducted her research under an API fellowship for study in the Philippines and Thailand. Six months, from August to September 2009 and April to July 2010, were spent in Metro Manila observing events surrounding the presidential election of May 2010, which coincided with national and local elections. The period also happened to include the funeral of former President Corazon 'Cory' Aquino, which mobilized thousands of people to the streets and catapulted Benigno 'Noynoy' Aquino, an emerging presidential candidate for the 2010 election, even further into the spotlight. The author conducted interviews with several 'outsiders'—NGOs, political parties and political blocs, in particular—and undertook field research in poor communities.

The author selected roughly ten urban poor communities from each of three politically competitive Metro Manila cities, namely, Pasig City, Quezon City, and the City of Manila. Criteria for choosing communities were based on the author's experience with field research conducted prior to the API fellowship from 2003 to 2009 in 18 slum communities across four Metro Manila cities. These criteria were: 1) the presence of at least one PO actively working for land acquisition since the Estrada administration (1999-2001) through the Arroyo administration (2001-2010) and to the present; 2) the community had been approached by and interacted with at least three outsider groups with different political backgrounds (e.g. a pro-Estrada group, a pro-Arroyo group, progressive leftists, etc.); and 3) at least one of the outsider groups had been vocal in 'civil society' or had a high profile as an organization that represented 'civil society.' House-to-house interviews,

focus group discussions, and participatory observations were all used. All research was conducted in English and Tagalog, which are both widely spoken in Metro Manila.

Research in Bangkok was also conducted for a six-month period, from October 2009 to July 2010. During that time, both pro-Thaksin groups (red shirts) and anti-Thaksin groups (yellow shirts) were holding rallies throughout the city. The author conducted interviews with "outsiders" with a particular focus on NGOs and political blocs participating in the red and yellow rallies. Field research was conducted in three communities in Klong Toey, On Nut, and Makkasan Railway, each of which is contested territory for both the red and yellow groups. Criteria for choosing Bangkok communities were consistent with those applied in Manila. House-to-house interviews, focus group discussions, and participatory observations were used both for groups and individuals. Interviews were conducted in English with help of an English-Thai interpreter. It must also be noted that the author stayed with family members of deceased activist Suwit Watnoo, an API Fellow from Year 4 who had been active in community organizing work within urban poor communities as well as within national politics.

3. Urban Poor Movements in the Philippines

i) Community Development in the Philippines

In the Philippines, Community Development (CD) got its start as a CIA-funded state project in the 1950s (Nakano 2007). While its historical roots lie in the 19th and 20th century settlement house movement for poor immigrants in the United States (US), the Magsaysay Administration (1953-57) brought CD to the Philippines through the work of Gabriel Kaplan, an American affiliated with the CIA. As Kaplan headed the operation and its field offices nationwide, high-ranking experts based within state institutions led the expansion of locally-based 'participatory' rural development programs.

ii) Social Movements and Community Organizing as a Tool

Community Organizing (CO) also has origins in the US, but was developed as a counter-movement to CD. Urban poor movements in both Metro Manila and

Metro Bangkok stem from CO, a method of creating effective social movements developed by the Chicago-based civil rights activist Saul Alinsky (Alinsky 1971). In 1968, one of Alinsky's colleagues, Herbert White, went to Korea for the purpose of expanding CO to Asian countries, where urban dwellers faced problems similar to those being addressed by their counterparts in the US. In the following year, he visited the Philippines to train young Filipinos in Tondo, Metro Manila's largest slum. Over the next several years dedicated organizers, many of whom later founded the Asian Committee for People's Organization (ACPO) and the Philippine Ecumenical Council for Community Organization (PECCO), trained local Manila residents in the art of community organizing. Before long, by 1971 in fact, the Philippines' first PO network took shape. Known as the Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO), this network was aimed at fighting demolitions along Manila Bay in Northern Tondo.

Pioneers of CO from its early days included: Edicio de la Torre and Isagani Serrano, both core members of the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (PRRM); Karina Constantino-David, who later became a professor at the University of the Philippines and Chair of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC); Leonardo Montemayor, who recently served as President of the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF), Congressman in the House of Representatives, and Secretary of Agriculture; and Corazon 'Dinky' Soliman, who currently (2010) serves as Secretary of Social Welfare and Development. CO in the Philippines has become a hybrid of the Alinsky method, the philosophy of Paulo Freire, and liberation theology (Reed 1971: 54-55). Liberation theology formed the core of both Marxist movements and broader social movements through the influence of the Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs) of Catholicism during Marcos' authoritarian regime. In this way, community organizing was increasingly utilized as a tool for political organizing, particularly by the left (Jurgette 1984). Although the broad application of CO stirred up problems of its own, such as when PECCO suffered an internal split in the late 1970s due to discord among organizers (Jurgette 1984), as a whole community organizing became a prominent part of the social fabric of the Philippines.

iii) Estrada vs Arroyo

After the EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) Revolution of 1986 (also known as the People Power Revolution), organizers who had been captured or rendered inactive in CO came back to the mainstream of civil society (Silliman and Noble 1998, Ferrer 1997). At the same time, organizers and NGO activists made an effort to influence poor communities' political decisions through voter education campaigns, election monitoring, and other regular activities (Hedman 2006).

However, a split between organizers and 'the organized' became apparent in 2001 when a mass uprising popularly known as EDSA II (EDSA Dos) swept the capital city in January and led to the ousting of President Joseph Estrada, the winner of the 1998 election plagued by allegations of corruption. The rally was supported predominantly by students, businesspersons and other members of Metro Manila's middle class. NGOs and leftist political blocs, together with religious organizations linked to the Catholic Church and the media as a whole, played an important role in mobilizing the masses.

Estrada was arrested at the end of April that year. Before long, his supporters had taken to the streets in a protest rally that mobilized an even greater number of people than EDSA II. A majority of the participants of the new uprising, fittingly referred to as EDSA III, were poor residents of Metro Manila.

However, the rally was not covered by the mainstream press. Moreover, its participants were described by scholars in the academic community as dirty masses lacking morals[1] and dumb[2]. Leftists swiftly organized counter-rallies in order to stifle the pro-Estrada uprising. After being named Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare by the newly inaugurated President Arroyo, Corazon 'Dinky' Soliman—one of community organizing pioneers—managed to organize urban poor POs through an NGO she once chaired and instructed them not to join pro-Estrada rallies on April 30th. The pro-Estrada uprising ended on May 1st, after President Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion in response to an attempted march on the Presidential Palace.

The advent of EDSA II and EDSA III exposed the yawning gap separating the middle class and urban poor, whom the leftists and NGOs aimed to serve (Bello 2001, Esguerra 2001). Some interviewees recall the events of 2001 as follows.

"(The reason why we didn't join the pro-Estrada rally was because) we were told by an NGO that we'd benefit from the Arroyo Administration through Secretary Soliman. We did not want Estrada to resign but we joined Soliman's 'April 30 Working Group.' We loved Estrada and don't like Soliman, but at least we know her better. She is closer to us." (PO leader of the Riverside Community, Barangay Sta Cruz, Quezon City)

"What was the difference between those who joined the pro-Estrada rally and those who didn't? For us, we did not think of joining, it was automatic. All the members of our PO participated. However, other POs didn't join because the left told them not to. That also had to be automatic for them. We all love Estrada, but we belong to different POs." (PO Member of Kasigurahan Village, Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal)

iv) In A Divided Country—How to Choose?

The greater urban poor community was splintering under pressure from not only the Arroyo administration, but also pro-Arroyo NGOs. During the 2004 presidential election, Soliman asked POs affiliated with the NGO she belonged to prior to joining the government to throw their support behind Arroyo. Soon, it became clear that POs who cooperated were rewarded with promises from the president while those who did not, were not.

After her ascension in 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo stayed in power for nine years until the end of her second term in May 2010. During her rule, NGOs and the left—both of which had actively supported Arroyo in 2001—changed their position. Most took to strongly criticizing the president in 2005, when allegations that she may have illegally influenced the 2004 presidential elections came to light. Soliman together with other cabinet members resigned in protest, calling for Arroyo's resignation, in July 2005.

"We supported Arroyo since her start in 2001 because NGO organizers had told us that the

urban poor would benefit from her administration through the work of Soliman. However, Soliman and her group suddenly began telling people not to support Arroyo. Organizers were trying to mobilize us to take part in anti-Arroyo rallies and even public rallies in support of an attempted coup d'état in February 2006. We don't regard these groups as NGOs. They are political organizations. We never follow them." (PO member of Sta Ana, City of Manila)

"What we needed wasn't NGOs. We've been longing for someone or something that can connect us to the administration. Those who follow the NGOs are just being politically used. We have nothing to gain." (PO leader of Sta Ana, City of Manila)

The POs that interacted most with NGOs flatly recognized that organizers were 'using' them for political causes. This realization triggered heightened distrust towards NGOs and their organizers and, ultimately, several POs made the decision to sever relations with the 'outsiders.'

During the 2010 presidential elections, Soliman and an extensively interlinked NGO community aligned themselves with Benigno Aquino. Organizers at the NGO once headed by Soliman essentially served in dual roles as both community organizers and political organizers while tapping into the power of networks such as People Power Volunteer for Reform and the Change Politics Movement. The Aquino camp set its sights on winning the election by accusing Arroyo of corruption while portraying Aquino as eminently clean. However, the strategic use of the concept of 'cleanliness' ultimately alienated the urban poor, even insulting their dignity.

"I'll vote for Aquino, and my PO will too. But I hate some of the pro-Aquino NGOs and parties. One day, an organizer from a leftist group came and told us that only volunteers from the Aquino camp are not being paid. Now, I refuse to follow his group. Doesn't he see? Other camps also have a lot of volunteers who sacrifice themselves." (PO member of Isla Putting Bato, Tondo, City of Manila)

"I get irritated when I see Aquino's yellow poster saying WE ARE NOT BOUGHT. Yes, well, we are not bought either, even though we aren't yellow! I'll join Aquino's campaign today because

an NGO prepared the vehicle for us. We can't refuse. But I'll never vote for Aquino." (PO member of San Nicolas, Binondo, City of Manila)

"An NGO prepared 30 vehicles for the campaign tonight. We have no choice but to join. The NGOs get to make a choice when they decide to work for an election, but we wish they would not force us to." (PO member of Baseco, Tondo, City of Manila)

"You receive food if you join [Aquino's] Liberal Party as a volunteer. But if you are mobilized by the NGOs, they give you nothing. NGOs will tell you that you are serving as uncompensated volunteers. But if that is so, then the Liberal Party should follow the same rule. NGOs are far more demanding than the party. I wish I was mobilized by the party." (PO member, Valesquez, City of Manila)

Aquino claimed an overwhelming victory in the presidential election and was sworn in as president on June 30, 2010. He brought back Soliman as Secretary of Social Welfare and Development and appointed Joel Rocamora, an activist from the left, as Chair of the National Anti-Poverty Commission. The Aquino administration is said to be pro-poor and pro-civil society. However, the urban poor see things in a more critical light based on their own experience.

"One week after the election, a leftist organization sent an organizer here to tell our PO leaders not to join in rallies anymore. They had been mobilizing us for years, and now they want to prohibit us from going into the streets! Do you see how they bind us? They also told us to join Aquino's inauguration ceremony to demonstrate our support. We would never go, of course. When we join rallies, we don't do it just because we're told. We can decide on our own if we need to join or not. We can judge by ourselves." (PO member of North Triangle, Quezon City)

v) Synthesis

Community Development and Community Organizing have manifested themselves quite differently in the Philippines. While both target communities in urban slums, the former is implemented much like a state project, whereas the latter has taken the form of a social movement.

Moreover, the fact that the CO approach is so deeply rooted in civil society organizations, such as NGOs and the left, is particularly unique to the Philippines. Ever since the Marcos regime, NGOs and social movements have undergone a split and this, in turn, has served to divide the poor they aim to organize and mobilize. In the Philippines, outside agents have been exercising political influence over urban poor communities for decades. Experience engaging with these 'outsiders' has instilled many people with the wisdom of knowing what to choose, particularly when it comes to avoiding being 'used' by their agents. Today, PO members are more than willing to openly criticize organizers who try to manipulate or control the political behavior of their communities. This logically follows the fact that their higher interests lie in working with groups prepared to help improve— not exploit—their social position.

4. Urban Poor Movements in Thailand

i) Social Movements and Community Organizing as a Tool

In 1972, a Filipino organizer trained by Herbert White visited Thailand to initiate trainings. In the following year, duly trained Thai organizers set up a training organization of their own called the Voluntary Movement for POs in Thailand (VOMPOT) geared towards bringing student activists against the military regime into slum communities in Bangkok. After a massacre on October 13, many students fled into the forests where they formed underground movements.

The CO movement in Bangkok was revived in the 1980s, after activists left the forests and came back to the city. As they regrouped, they began organizing communities in Bangkok's slums and, in 1982, they moved to found Thailand's first advocacy group aimed at fighting evictions: the Human Settlement Foundation (HSF).

However, it was not long before a split between CO leaders emerged. In 1985, VOMPOT organizers decided to reform the organization, then renamed the People's Organization for Participation (POP), so as to promote participatory development within urban and rural communities through collaborative work with the government. Organizers opposed to this shifting set of principles left POP and formed the

Community Organization for People's Action (COPA) in 1986. COPA worked closely with HSF, which was engaged in organizing a vast network of POs, including the United Slums Development Association (USDA), under the leadership of its chair, Suwit Watnoo. Watnoo, a former student leader, was an experienced organizer who had spent years working for the Duang Prateep Foundation in Bangkok's Klong Toey slum.

The formation of a diverse range of coalitions in the 1990s helped link issues relating to life in the slums with other broader subjects. In 1992, urban and rural poor communities addressing the critical issue of land rights established a coalition known as the Land Reform Network. During Thailand's ascendant pro-democracy movement the same year, urban poor communities participated in street demonstrations and ultimately helped form the Slum Organization for Democracy. Outside of the slums, NGOs such as the Campaign for Popular Democracy began to turn their eyes to the issues and concerns of the poor and develop an agenda conscious of urban poverty. In 1995, one of Thailand's more well-known networks, the Assembly of the Poor, was created. In 1998, HSF and COPA worked together to create the most extensive network yet, the Four Regions Slum Network (FRSN), which today links over 7,000 households across 110 communities. FRSN's primary aim has been to fight for poor communities' rights to housing and it has met this aim by using its position as a social movement organization to work together with allies such as the Assembly of the Poor, peasant movements, anti-dam movements, labor movements, human rights advocacy groups, and others.

In the 2000s, FRSN went on to form links with anti-globalization movements like Focus on the Global South and FTA Watch, while also actively taking part in the World Social Forum and the ASEAN Peoples Forum. In addition to its fight for housing rights, FRSN has also taken a strong public stance against the privatization of water and electricity. Moreover, in 2006, the organization threw its weight behind the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), a political group organized in opposition to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

ii) Government-Backed Community Development

At the same time, a number of young architects and organizers with origins in the student movements of

the 1970s began to push for a more institutional approach to slum organizing. Somsuk Boonyabancha, formerly an architect for the National Housing Authority (NHA), stood at the head of this "new politics of slum upgrading." After serving as chair at the Human Settlement Foundation, she and her colleagues established the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO) inside of the NHA in 1992. It aimed to provide direct and low-interest loans to small saving groups of poor people in order to stimulate livelihood generation, community business and structural and environmental upgrading in the slums. In 2000, UCDO merged with the Rural Development Fund to form the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI), a wholly independent government agency. Its emphasis rested on the importance of 'networking' among savings groups.

In 2003, the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra initiated the Baan Mankong Program which was implemented under the direction of CODI. The Baan Mankong Program provides slum communities with access to public resources and various forms of support, enabling them to not only improve on standards of environmental health by upgrading their communities, but also resolve land issues which have historically permeated the core of problems facing slum residents.

iii) Perspectives on Thaksin

FRSN voiced sharp criticism of the Thaksin administration since 2003. Pete Rahon explains,

> During the Thaksin era, the government used the concept of the 'state-led civil society sector' as a mechanism to propel forward the solving of problems of the poor. New state organizations emerged that pulled the people's sector, academics, and NGOs into participating in their work. People's organizations, both in urban and rural areas, were set up by the state, as were funds to support the work of NGOs that joined together with the state. These persons and organizations that joined with the state played down within the people's sector the movement's issues pertaining to the structural level of problems, such as the distribution of land holdings, participation in the preservation of resources, and opposition to neo-liberalism. What remained was only development within the framework set by the state, which

included supplementing livelihoods, forming savings groups, and establishing groups for the provision of welfare in communities.[3]

In other words, the Thaksin-led livelihood programs, CODI savings programs, and rural development projects that had become so prominent in Thailand were the face of top-down community development and, as such, they threatened to weaken the 'real' people's movement.

To strengthen its movement, FRSN began to look for a way to reconnect with CO networks stretching throughout Asia. ACPO, one of the organizations that helped bring community organizing to Asia, met its end in the early 1990s but its mission and work were carried on by LOCOA, the Leaders and Organizers of Community Organizations in Asia. Pioneers of the movement originally trained by Alinsky's associates had spent decades working as leaders in LOCOA countries, particularly India and the Philippines. FRSN had met with these leaders several times in the early 2000s through international conferences such as the World Social Forum. In 2007, FRSN members formally joined an annual LOCOA workshop in the Philippines where participants discussed housing and land issues under globalization. Later, FRSN also visited India, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh to meet with organizers hailing from urban slum communities in each country. In October 2009, FRSN hosted a LOCOA Workshop on World Habitat Day. Some PO leaders from within FRSN explained,

> "The architectural designs offered by CODI never showed respect for people's actual interest. That is why we demanded that CODI let us choose our own designs. And CODI agreed." (PO leader of Putamonton Three)

> "CODI has more to give than FRSN since it is a government service. But we do not care. What is important is our freedom to choose." (PO leader of On Nut)

> "We can lie to politicians and bureaucrats that give us money, even though we don't really support them. But we are not bought. At least we can vote freely." (PO leader of On Nut)

One COPA organizer gave the following insight.

> "Somsuk Boonyabancha, the former head of CODI, openly says that she is from an NGO. But

in reality she is from the National Housing Authority and has only a certain level of experience from within an NGO. CODI has good commercial skill; it paints itself as representing participatory development in Thailand, while advertising success stories in English. ...Most funds received from foreign donors go to CODI-led projects or communities. Very little comes into our movement. The gap between the urban poor supported by CODI and those who are not is growing wider."

On the other hand, one leader from the Duang Prateep Foundation, an organization which collaborates with CODI, says that groups who work with CODI are similarly critical of FRSN. Community leaders living along the railway have said that their CODI-supported projects are specifically tailored to resolve immediate issues faced within each small community and, therefore, they have no need for a broader network like FRSN.

> "We highly value CODI, and particularly the Baan Mankong Program. It has helped lead to a drastic reduction in the number of conflicts between land owners and informal settlers in Klong Toey. We're not in any way controlled by CODI. In my opinion, FRSN is a movement for movement's sake." (PO leader in Rai 70, Klong Toey)

For a year after the coup d'état of September 2006, informal settlers in Bangkok were split into two groups: those who stood or sympathized with the anti-Thaksin group (PAD, or the yellow shirts) and those who were allied with the pro-Thaksin group (UDD, or the red shirts). For the most part, allegiances were based on the political leanings of a group's 'agents,' or initial contact points. If a community group was close to CODI or NGOs working with CODI, its members tended to be sympathetic to Thaksin. On the other hand, if a group was close to FRSN or social movement organizations, its members tended to ally themselves with the anti-Thaksin camp.

iv) In A Divided Country—How to Choose?

A few years after the coup d'état, many poor people have changed their minds and, ultimately, changed sides too. A leader at the Duang Prateep Foundation pointed out that POs with connections to both the Duang Prateep Foundation and FRSN are now internally divided into two sets: the yellow shirts and the red shirts. COPA also made an example of some

groups originally organized by CODI that had left the public agency in order to work with them (COPA). When members had a change of heart that led them to support the yellow shirts, they would step away from CODI and head to join FRSN.

> "We do not care whether our organizers are red or yellow. We just don't like organizers who force us to follow their political positions." (PO leader of railway community, Makkasan)

> "I support PAD because the leader of our savings group supports PAD. We do not like Thaksin because he is a neo-liberalist. However, I don't think that what PAD did—staging a coup in 2006 and later blockading the airport—was democratic. When I was invited to go to the airport for a rally, I lost some of my trust for my PO leader. I still support PAD, but many people now have complicated feelings regarding this leader." (PO member of On Nut relocation site)

> "I am yellow. But I don't want to join these demonstrations every time. I want to choose whether I go or not. I also find the CODI program effective. What I do not like is that some NGO activists are always pushing us to join the rallies and totally condemn CODI. I don't like that at all. That's why some of my neighbors have changed from yellow to red as they think that it's more effective for our movement to work with CODI than PAD." (PO leader of Klong Toey)

> "I am for the red shirts. I love Thaksin. But I want to decide by myself whether I go to the rally or not. I hate being ordered to join by NGOs." (PO member of Klong Toey)

v) Synthesis

During the Thaksin administration and through late 2007, the urban poor qualified their decisions as to whether they supported Thaksin or not based on their agents, or initial contact points. Persons close to CD-type organizers or CODI, tended to support Thaksin, while those who were close to CO-style movements tended to support the anti-Thaksin movement or PAD.

However, as the urban poor communities witnessed social uprisings, growing political tension, and several outright attempts at extra-constitutional regime change over the years, the ways by which they made their choices changed. The interviews above have shown that, more often than not, people simply wish to be 'free' from pressure applied by political organizers and NGOs. They are not interested in being 'mobilized' or 'controlled' by outside groups, even when they share the same affiliations or political views.

5. Conclusion

Both Thailand and the Philippines have suffered serious political splits over the past decade. Organizers navigating the territory around these splits have treated the urban poor as subjects for mobilization or education. Faced with this fact, the poor have become more critical of those who try to organize them. The interviews have shown how PO members are averse to having outside groups 'force' them into action while overlooking their capacity for making their own political decisions. What they believe to be most important is who they will choose to lead the nation. But how do they choose? It appears that a substantial portion of their decision rests on their ability to find freedom from outsiders.

This study presents a new perspective for observing poor peoples' political behavior, which has often been popularly deemed as 'irrational.' The fact is, conflicts within movements and community fragmentation both have roots in the "wise choices" of the poor. In the past, English media and the middle class have been prone to directing attention to supposed passive and acquiescent behaviors of the urban poor during election season. However, this is likely a misconception, seeing as how all evidence suggests that the poor are paying close attention to their surroundings.

Dividing lines exist among the urban poor. This becomes obvious when recognizing the multiplicity of POs organized in any given slum community. These groups are, in many ways, used to seeing themselves as 'different from others.'

> "I'm poor, and I'm dedicating myself to Estrada because I know that he is the best. I'm different from those who are influenced by the middle class that supports Arroyo."

> "I'm poor, but I vote for Arroyo, unlike ignorant Estrada supporters."

"I'm poor, and I belong to PO-A, which was organized by NGO-A. I pretend to follow NGO-A, but I would never. I'm different from the others who can't make decisions on their own."

"I'm a member of PO-A, but I don't necessarily follow any leader of PO-A. I can change my associations anytime, unlike the blind masses."

Each PO member above personally identifies her or himself as 'an independent actor and decision-maker' who can be differentiated from the 'passive and silent masses.' A social and political history of 'being used' and 'being looked down on' has instilled many poor communities with a deep sense of opposition to the notion that 'the poor are ignorant.' Their wish to escape this stereotype underlies their desire to assert that they are different from 'the other poor' and affirm that, 'I am wise enough.' By extension, their political work and actions are not only a statement with regard to politics itself, but a statement characterizing their relationship with outside—and often inherently—political actors.

Considering the ways in which communities analyze and interpret their surroundings can shed light on matters relating to the lives of the urban poor and their struggle for social justice. Agencies of the poor like POs must be reconsidered within the context of current neo-liberal economics and globalization. POs are not just directionless peer groups or a space where the urban poor turn for mutual aid. Rather, it is the space where community politics are born, and where communities engage with different outsiders in a contest of wits. Poor communities may indeed be 'organized' by outsiders, but 'the organized' still very much possess an independent outlook and autonomous decision-making capabilities.

NOTES

[1] Neal H. Cruz "Did gov't pressure TV not to cover People Power 3?" *Philippine Daily Inquirer 2001.5.7.*

[2] Conrado de Quiros, "Again, the 'dumb' masa" *Philippine Daily Inquirer 2001.4.30*

[3] LOCOA Website: http://www.locoa.net/home/?doc=bbs/gnuboard.php&bo_table=p_co_training&page=1&wr_id=22

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The role of NGOs and Farmer Leadership in Ensuring Food Security in Rural Sumatra

Michiko Sugawara

Introduction

Food Security for Rural Society

The global food crisis of 2008 was considered to have been caused initially by high oil prices and droughts in grain-producing nations in late 2006. It was also widely held that the crisis was largely a result of a speculative bubble in global grain markets (Rural 21, 2010, 7). The crisis highlighted new complexities concerning food production and food security. Food, especially grain, had become an object of international speculation. Grains and other agricultural products were increasingly being used as biofuel. Global climate change as well as biodiversity loss was seen as undermining production itself (Furusawa 2008, 5).[1]

'Food security' has long been an objective of the international community. In 1996 the World Food Summit stated that food security "exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life." In this case food security was clearly discussed in terms of individuals. However, in recent discourse this is more rarely seen and food security is more often discussed at the national and global levels, at the policy level, and in terms of global trade liberalization issues. Food is seen as a commodity, produced with heavy industrial inputs, transported away and consumed in distant places. Yet, if we look at those who are the most vulnerable in food crises, it is often the rural poor and small-scale farmers in developing nations. This paper investigates the situation, vulnerability and resilience of small-scale subsistence farmers in North Sumatra and of NGOs working with them.

Local NGOs in North Sumatra and Farmers' leadership

The Batak tribes residing in the highlands of North Sumatra live in village communities with strong family and clan relationships. They have retained traditional, autonomous and self-help systems over countless generations. Besides cultivating small rice paddies, the farmers have long grown vegetables and raised livestock traditionally, and have planted coffee ever since it was introduced by the Dutch in the colonial era (Yamamoto, 2007, 15). Traditional autonomous systems of the Batak tribes have however been radically transformed by Dutch colonization (Clauss, 1984, 52-57). The expansion of market economy capitalism has led to the further destruction of the "natural economy" or "reproductive forms of subsistence production" (Clauss, 1984, 52).

The colonial-era forerunners of modern-day community development in North Sumatra were religious organizations such as Christian churches and Muslim groups. The charity services of Christian churches in particular have been widely recognized as an early version of local non-government organizations (NGOs) in providing basic needs for rural societies. The first generation of modern local NGOs was established in the 1980s, and included charity, development and advocacy programs. These initiatives are often described as having been driven by people's common spirit of resistance to the Soeharto regime. After the fall of Soeharto in 1998, regulations around the establishment of organizations were freed up. In North Sumatra, many local NGOs were established and they continue to play an important role in providing basic assistance to rural societies.

After the economic crisis of 1997, the Government of Indonesia and local government programs began to enforce the formation of farmer cooperatives in rural societies (Indonesia Handbook 2006). However, the cooperatives have not functioned well in North Sumatra. Many collapsed, and farmers still harbor negative feelings about the word *koperasi* (cooperatives) since the membership fees they paid were often not returned.[2]

Meanwhile, various other kinds of farmers' groups also arose. Some were established under government fertilizer subsidy programs. Others were mainly micro-credit organizations initiated by local NGOs. Some concerned farmers formed similar groups after they had encountered other groups of farmers through local NGO networks and seen the benefit of organization.

This research tries to shed light on the work of local NGOs in empowering small-scale farmers through the formation of different kinds of groups. It also discusses the importance of nurturing leadership by small-scale farmers.

Objectives and Significance of the Research Project

A major objective of this participatory research was to understand the current food security situation of small-scale farmers by looking at their production and consumption patterns. The research also focused on efforts by local NGOs to ensure food security and to build resilient and independent rural communities. It examined how farmers' initiative can be nurtured, and leadership transferred from NGOs to farmers. The research was in two parts. The first part involved conducting basic research through interviews and field studies. The second part involved conducting a learning and exchange workshop with NGOs. The significance of the project was that it investigated food security not from global and national perspectives but by taking a close look at the individual level in rural settings. It also facilitated an opportunity for NGO workers to reflect on the major challenges in their work, in the process providing insights potentially useful for local and national governments, international organizations and local NGOs.

Research Methods

Interviews

The initial research consisted of interviews with local NGO staff, social activists, leaders of farmers' groups, and staff of international organizations. The interviews focused on their main activities, histories of their work, ideologies, motivations, missions and visions for the future.

Field Research

Three local NGOs working to benefit small-scale highland farmers were chosen for field research. *Yayasan Soripada* (Dignity of Women) was chosen as a typical NGO which supports basic needs in rural societies by facilitating group formation. Rural Development Action (RDA) was a leading agricultural training center introducing sustainable farming methods. *Asosiasi Petani Kopi Lintong Organik* (APKLO; Lintong Organic Coffee Farmers'

Association) was selected as a unique farmer's association. It consisted of six small farmers' groups that dealt directly with international markets directly through Fair Trade, a social movement and an international market approach which aims to create better trading conditions for farmers in developing countries.

Yayasan Soripada facilitated participatory research with three farmers' groups it assists. The research focused on food intake, food self-sufficiency and seasonal work calendars before and after the groups began working with the NGO. In-depth interviews attempted to establish the nature of the farmers' villages and the history of village farming and economic life. With RDA and APKLO, focused group discussions and in-depth interviews were conducted.

A questionnaire was used to investigate current situations and challenges faced by one farmers' group assisted by *Yayasan Soripada*. The questionnaire contained general questions such as family background, size of agricultural fields, kinds of crops and vegetables grown, and changes in production and consumption patterns over the years. It asked about approximate income and expenditure, largest household expenditures and current challenges.

Research Findings

Secured source of income and food self-sufficiency

Yayasan Soripada has been assisting small scale farmers in the remote *Tapanuli Utara* district for fifteen years. Their major work is to form micro-credit schemes to replace the use of money-lenders and to provide farmers with trainings to manage their farms better. In the recent decade, the staff of *Yayasan Soripada* has observed a common change in many farms in the region. It seems that farmers no longer care to produce a variety of food for their own consumption but rather put their efforts only on rice production for cash income. More and more men are going out to work as day laborers to make ends meet and the workload of women who have left behind has become larger. Alarmed by this situation, and fearing that farmers would become more vulnerable to possible food shortages or higher food prices, *Yayasan Soripada* has been advising farmers to grow different kinds of crops and vegetables so that they may be able to utilize their farmland to increase income as well as to secure their food.

A farmers' group named *Nunut* (continuous effort), formed by *Yayasan Soripada* in Situmeang Hasundutan village in 2002, was identified as a case study. A participatory study was conducted together with ten of the nineteen members of the *Nunut* group to make seasonal working calendars and food intake figures, comparing the periods before and after the group had assistance from the NGO. Figures 1 and 2 are the compiled outcomes of the participatory study of seasonal working patterns.

month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
man	work in the forest/ *manda* (day labor)					harvest rice	work in the forest/ *manda* (day labor)			hoe rice fields		hoe fields
woman	transplant rice seedlings		weed in rice fields		plant cassava		harvest rice			prepare rice seedlings		

Figure 1. Compiled Seasonal Working Calendar of the **Nunut** Group, for 2002

month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
man	plant rice seedlings / plant chilli	plant chilli / plant coffee / weed in rice fields	weed in rice fields / weed in coffee fields	make compost / collect firewoods	harvest rice / plant chilli and other vegetables	harvest rice	prepare chilli seedlings / prepare soil with compost	prepare chilli fields / plant chilli	harvest coffee / weed in chilli fields / plant corn and other vegetables	prepare rice seedlings / plant chilli	harvest chilli / hoe rice fields / harvest coffee	plant rice seedlings / harvest coffee
woman	plant rice seedlings / plant chilli	plant chilli / weed in rice fields	weed in rice fields	weed in coffee fields / plant cassava	plant corn and vegetables / weed coffee fields	harvest rice / prepare compost	prepare chilli seedlings / harvest coffee	plant chilli	weed in chilli fields	weed in chilli fields / plant cassava	hoe rice fields / weed in chilli fields	plant rice seedlings / harvest chilli

Figure 2. Compiled Seasonal Working Calendar of the **Nunut** Group, for 2009

As shown in Figure 1, men in the group in 2002 went out regularly for *manda* (day labor) or to the surrounding forest to get incense from tree bark. Men sometimes spent eight months a year outside the village for day labor or in the forest. Figure 2 shows men and women in 2009 working together to grow various crops and vegetables. Men no longer went for *manda*. Some men went to the forest occasionally but most of the time they worked in the farm.

The next section of the research focused on food intake. Figure 3 is an example of one family's intake. It describes the approximate percentage of different food items eaten during one day in 2002 and one day in 2009. This figure could indicate proof of changes, though the percentages given are not completely certain as the 2002 figures are dependent on memory. In 2009 staple food (cassava and rice) intake has been reduced and replaced by more consumption of meat and additional foods such as instant noodles and fruit. Salted fish seems to remain as one important source of protein in the diet. More meat was purchased from the market in 2009 as compared to

2002 when meat was not purchased and was only occasionally eaten at traditional parties such as weddings and funerals.

Food intake in 2002

| 70 % | 5% | 15% | 10% |

Cassava (from farm)   rice (from farm)   meat (at party)   salted fish (purchased)   vegetables (purchased)

Food intake in 2009

| 5% | 45 % | 10% | 15% | 25% |

cassava (from farm)   rice (from farm)   meat (purchased/ at party)   salted fish (purchased)   vegetables (from farm) instant noodles (purchased) fruits (from farm/ purchased) others (purchased)

*Figure 3. Food intake in 2002 and 2009, an example of one family of the **Nunut** group*

The information provided by the *Nunut* group members through questionnaires produced some noteworthy findings. Nine out of ten farmers stated that their income was greater in 2009; on average income was 1.7 times greater than that of 2002. This could to be attributed to the more intensified utilization of their agricultural fields with the planting of cash crops such as coffee and chilli (Figures 1, 2). Meanwhile, the results showed that food expenditure had also increased from 2002 to 2009 at almost the same rate as that of income increase. The biggest expenditure in 2002, food, remained the same as in 2009 in each household. In 2009 chemical fertilizer had also become one of the largest expenditures.

The research showed that farmers were able to increase their income by diversifying crop and vegetable production. Men no longer needed to go for day labor and forest work and farms generated more income. The farmers' food seemed to be more diversified and richer than before. Vegetables were freshly harvested from the farms. Yet at the time of the research, all the farmers' answer to the question 'What is the biggest challenge in your everyday life' was still 'economic conditions.' Income rose, but expenditure rose as well and food remained the biggest expenditure. Various other new needs were pressing on the farmers' cash economy, including paying for higher education for children. Farmers did not perceive their situations to be any more secure than before. Indeed, they were now more dependent on industrial products (fertilizers, pesticides) to produce food, and on cash income in order to buy alternative food from the market.

Processed food such as instant noodles and packaged snacks were already well received by farmers living in remote villages. Such easy to cook, ready-to-eat cheap products and other commercial products are penetrate more into rural societies as these become increasing receivers of media and commercials promoting global consumerism. The issue of the penetration of capitalism into many aspects of farmers' lives, both in production and consumption, is complex and challenging. It can be said that *Yayasan Soripada* has introduced noteworthy changes to farmers' security by increasing income and enriching food self sufficiency. However, the increased dependency on agricultural chemicals, such as chemical fertilizers, has yet to be addressed. The next discussion focuses on attempts by a leading agricultural training center, the Rural Development Action (RDA), to bring about farmers' independence from agricultural chemicals by integrated organic farming.

Independence from agricultural chemicals by integrated organic farming

Rural Development Action (RDA), a training center for farmers, was established in 2001 in the village of Mbinanga in the Dairi highland district. Since then it has trained hundreds of small-scale farmers in short and long-term trainings. Part of the training aims at fostering farmers' independence from agricultural chemicals and in the best use of local resources. Techniques focus on the use of compost, *bokashi* (natural fertilizer), and natural pesticide-making. The training includes the philosophy of organic farming, as well as teaching on how to lead an independent, caring

and dignified life as a farmer. A number of graduates noted that they learned a spirit of entrepreneurship in the trainings and were keen to pursue organic farming in their villages.

Interviews with Mbinanga villagers indicate that knowledge of the dangers of agricultural chemicals, as well as messages about the benefits of utilizing local resources and integration of livestock into farming, have been disseminated in the community. However, creating actual change in agricultural practices seems to be very difficult. Farmers are likely to use chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides despite their high costs, because of their quick and visible effects in boosting production. Consumer demands for 'cleaner' and 'bigger' crops and vegetables also facilitate farmers' choices to use agricultural chemicals.

A number of NGOs in North Sumatra promote organic farming, supported by international donors as an ecologically favorable practice. Research revealed that many farmers were interested in organic farming and some had already incorporated some organic farming methods into their practices. However, it seemed that the majority of farmers lacked the freedom to choose and/or develop their agricultural practices as they were increasingly integrated into the capital-centered production system.

Farmers' search for solutions to the challenges they face are exacerbated by lack of public interest, lack of investment in agricultural research and extension work, and close relationships between political and business interests that affect markets. By networking together and building on relationships of trust built up in communities, local NGOs may be in a position to continue appealing to the government to address the root causes of insecurity and food poverty of rural societies. Some NGOs are already taking this approach. The director of the RDA, for example, has become a village chief, a position that is a key to connecting villagers and local government. Several major NGOs have started a joint program to establish better marketing systems for small-scale farmers, especially relating to organic products. In these programs, different kinds of organic products from small-scale farmers are collected and sold directly to consumers in Medan city. Their major challenge is to ensure constant supply with decent quality. Currently the market for organic products is limited to a small number of wealthy consumers. To create a larger market and more consumer awareness will be necessary. Civil society and local NGOs have a role to play in this work.

Farmers' leadership and role of NGOs

Coffee is one of the major cash crops grown in the highlands of North Sumatra. The production and marketing of the crop is in the hands the middle-men and large private entities. Asosiasi Petani Kopi Lintong Organik (APKLO) was one of a few organizations in Indonesia with an international certificate that allows it to export coffee under the "Fair Trade" Label. Fair Trade is a social movement and an international market approach which aims to create better trading conditions for marginalized producers in the developing countries. It tries to bring about better prices, decent working conditions, local sustainability and fair terms of trade for farmers and workers. (The Fair Trade Foundation, 2011).

Fair Trade involvement had brought both positive and negative results for APKLO. Interviews with APKLO members indicated that Fair Trade had built self-confidence and motivation among farmers, who were trading internationally. However, some members were uneasy with the strict and complicated regulations, which sometimes did not fit well with the rural life of farmers. To address this, Fair Trade tries to facilitate strengthening farmers' organizations by providing opportunities to learn how to operate within the system and how to be accountable to buyers and consumers. However, some farmers' groups had not yet gained the capacity to change the difficulties into learning opportunities. The rules and regulations of Fair Trade had become burdens on the shoulders of APKLO and farmer group leaders. Managing direct communications with international buyers and digesting new information was difficult for many, especially those with limited education.

APKLO, like many farmers' groups, was initially organized by an international NGO from Japan. After the NGO left, APKLO as an association of farmers' groups had faced challenges. Leadership and a sense of ownership had not yet been built within the membership. This indicated the importance of focusing on long-term sustainability when international NGOs work with small-scale farmers. Activities in the arena of food security are often the province of social activists, local and international NGO workers, teachers, researchers and intellectuals, who have access to information, opportunities and social capital. The issue is how to pass on leadership and initiative to the people who own the problems, the farmers. To address this question a workshop was organized to reflect on the work of local NGOs and to look at the potential for networking among them.

NGO Workshop Design

As seen above, the research indicated that some local NGOs had facilitated positive changes for small-scale farmers. Villagers had improved access to small capital and social services, and increased farming skills and knowledge. However, the research also revealed gaps between farmers and NGOs that have made it difficult for NGOs to pass on leadership to the farmers themselves. A pattern has remained that NGOs provide goods and services, and rural communities continue to wait for help.

The theme of the workshop was 'Re-Positioning NGOs; Moving Rural Societies from Dependency to Sovereignty.' Three practical questions were addressed;

(1) To facilitate sustainable improvement in a remote village, is it more effective for NGO to work as an outsider/service provider, or to play a role as an insider to own the problems?

(2) What is hindering small-scale farmers from initiating activities, and from accessing information and social capital?

(3) Is the current position of NGOs—in relation to other parties such as domestic and international donors, government and business sectors— effective?

The workshop did not focus on 'food security' or other issues directly related to the NGOs' areas of work. This was because the key challenge for local NGOs appeared to be centered around their position viz-à-viz the communities where they worked, their absolute dependency on funds from overseas, and the small amount of recognition they received from the government. The second and third questions encompassed wider issues of global neo-liberalism, and allowed NGO staff to contemplate how or whether their efforts could make a difference to the lives of small-scale farmers within a context of global forces.

Workshop Outcome

A total of 22 participants from 16 NGOs attended the three-day workshop conducted at the premises of *Bina Keterampilan Pedesaan Indonesia* (BITRA), (Action for Rural Progress), a leading local NGO in North Sumatra. The NGOs were working in different ways for the betterment of rural societies, through creation of local credit union groups, providing trainings to small-scale farmers, advocating for the rights of farmers, or other activities. Through study groups, it was found that the NGOs had similar visions. These included transforming communities so their achieved relative independence, well-being, and justice for all people of all races, genders and religions.

A panel discussion including members such as a vice-mayor, social activists and senior NGO workers, revealed many external factors that were felt to be influencing the gap between elite NGO workers and farmers who had lost resilience and self-governance. Panel members raised issues such as a lack of good governance by national and local government, bureaucracy in government, corruption, failures of development programs, capitalism and globalization, and loss of activist spirit. The challenge for local NGO staff was how to take action to facilitate collaboration between farmers, NGOs, government, international organizations and private corporations. NGO staff were concerned that their activities had become limited by donors' interests, which were seen as not always corresponding with the real needs of the rural societies. It was maintained that NGO dependency on international funding could have indirectly caused the gap between them and farmers. Through sharing, it was argued that the main challenge for NGOs was to build up leadership among farmers and initiatives generated by farmers.

The workshop was a place of self-reflection rather than an exercise in finding shortcomings and problems. Participants felt that more collaboration among NGOs, as well as between NGOs and the government, was important. Participants made plans for a future workshop to continue discussing how best to achieve common aims through collaboration. Thus while the workshop did not bring a change in the work of NGOs, it helped in the process of networking and exchange of ideas. It is hoped that it was a first step to build further collaboration between NGOs, government, international organizations and private interests.

Concluding Discussion

The research indicated that local NGOs had facilitated some positive changes in remote villages in North Sumatra. A number of small scale farmers had been able to increase income from farms with the continuous efforts of local NGOs such as *Yayasan Soripada*. Other NGOs such as Rural Development Action (RDA) had provided various trainings for

farmers including alternative farming practices such as organic farming. Some farmers had taken a couple of the alternative methods into their agricultural practices.

On the other hand, the research also indicated that farmers did not perceive their situations to be any more secure than before. They were increasingly dependent on industrial inputs such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides. Their diets seemed to have been diversified and shifted from more starchy staple food such as cassava and rice to more meat and alternative processed foods from commercial markets, resulting in food remaining their greatest expense.

Farmers' lives were more integrated into the capital-centered market, and the challenges they faced seemed to be too overwhelming and complex to be tackled by any small farmer's group or local NGO alone. Lack of public interest, lack of investment in agricultural research and extension work, and close relationships between political and business interests seemed to have hindered farmers from initiating efforts to find solutions to their challenges. Learning from the situation that APKLO faced through their work with Fair Trade, building farmer's capacity and nurturing their leadership could be an important first step forward, in order for farmers themselves to be able to take initiative and sustain their activities in the long run.

In North Sumatra local NGOs continue to work with farmers to create micro-credit schemes, encourage more efficient utilization of land to increase farm income, and build up food self sufficiency, in order to enhance rural resilience. Yet addressing farmers' increasing dependency on industrial inputs in production remains an urgent challenge. Multiple approaches are required. Creating networks of local NGOs, fostering better government recognition of the work of local NGOs, and ensuring better partnership-building with international donors are all important. NGOs have a vital role to play in bringing awareness not only to farmers but to a wider community of consumers.

NOTES

[1]. Biodiversity loss is seen as undermining food production, as monoculture (the agricultural practice of growing a single crop over a wide area) prevails and crop variety reduces, creating increased vulnerability to pest outbreaks with resultant reduction in food production.

[2]. Interviews with farmers in field research with *Yayasan Soripada*, RDA and APKLO.

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The Socio-Economic Plight of Vietnamese Labor in Malaysia

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Introduction

Vietnam has been in the process of realizing its enormous economic potential since 1986. At present, it has a rapidly growing economy, and is intent on expanding its new export, labor. However, it has paid little attention to the plight of Vietnamese labor in Malaysia.

Labor migration is an important transnational issue in Vietnam that relates elements within the Mekong Sub-region to the world outside. Research on cross-border issues like "The Socio-Economic Plight of Vietnamese Labor in Malaysia" has mostly been about humanitarian and social justice issues. It is hoped that the study on these issues could help raise awareness among the Asian public and workers, in particular, and generate solutions for problems related to Vietnamese labor in Malaysia.

Vietnamese migration to Malaysia consists of several aspects, among them labor migration, marriage migration, etc. This can turn to trafficking when legal labor becomes illegal, workers are deceived, or marriage is used as a means to find a job or is not voluntary, but forced. However, this paper focuses only on the labor issue and intends to examine Vietnam's labor export to Malaysia, in particular. It does this by exploring the size of the labor market in Malaysia and the sectors where the Vietnamese are. Furthermore, it determines the recruitment practices, the push and pull factors, the employers' perceptions, the working and living conditions of Vietnamese labor in Malaysia, and the problems that they encounter therein. Finally, it tries to identify the causes of their problems.

Methodology

This research was conducted in Malaysia between August 2009 and July 2010. The researcher was based in Bangi town, where a number of small and medium light industry factories are located.

The information and analysis are largely based on interviews and discussions with the following informants: (i) Vietnamese workers in Malaysia, both individually and in groups; (ii) returnees from Malaysia; (iii) employers of Vietnamese workers in Malaysia; (iv) local NGOs such as Tenaganita in Kuala Lumpur (KL) and Penang; (v) CAMSA (Coalition To Abolish Modern-day Slavery in Asia), an international civil society network; (vi) the officials of the Vietnamese Labor Section at the Vietnamese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur; (vii) high-ranking Vietnamese authorities at the Department of Overseas Labor (DOLAB)–the Ministry of Labor, War Invalid and Social Affairs (MOLISA) in Hanoi; (viii) the officers of the Labor Section at the Thai Embassy in Kuala Lumpur; (ix) the Malaysian lawyers working for the Vietnamese workers; (x) police officers and officers in the Immigration Department; (xi) scholars; etc.

The research focuses as well on documentation, including official statistics on Vietnamese workers. Official statistics are available from both Vietnamese and Malaysian government agencies, such as DOLAB-MOLISA; the Labor Section at the Vietnamese Embassy in Kuala Lumpur; the Malaysian Immigration Department, etc. However, the researcher chose to use statistics provided by DOLAB-MOLISA as it is considered to have the most accurate data, given that all Vietnamese workers must register with it prior to leaving Vietnam.

Also used as research methods were observation and participation in some activities of the Vietnamese workers in Malaysia.

Overall, no fewer than 50 people made up the total number of informants for this research. The first interview of Vietnamese took place in Pasar Malam, the night market in Bandar Baru Bangi, where contacts and networking with the Vietnamese workers in Malaysia therefore started off.

Labor export from Vietnam

Under the eras of globalization and Vietnam's economic reform, the export of labor has become national policy and part of Vietnam's socio-economic development strategy. Labor exporting has been considered a means to reduce unemployment rates and alleviate poverty, especially of the people living in the rural and mountainous areas of the country. It has

been considered, as well, a means to enhance economic development, employment creation, and the socio-economic situation of workers and their families. However, as a matter of fact, labor exporting does not usually profit the workers.

Compared to other Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam entered the international and Asian labor markets quite late; however, more Vietnamese workers are leaving home in search of better incomes overseas. In accordance with the Vietnamese Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan (2006-2010) (Ministry of Planning and Development, Hanoi), Vietnam set the target of labor exports overseas at 70,000 to 80,000 workers per year, for a total of 500,000 workers abroad by 2010.

Since the mid-1990s, Vietnam has found labor markets in many countries and territories in East Asia and Southeast Asia, among them South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, *Malaysia*, etc. Vietnam's markets also include some Middle East and Gulf countries, such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The main stumbling block of Vietnam has been the insufficient number of qualified workers it can provide to meet the needs of the labor market.

Among the institutions responsible for Vietnamese workers overseas is DOLAB-MOLISA. DOLAB is in charge of labor exports abroad. The Management Boards of Overseas Labor, also under DOLAB, are situated in the foreign countries where the Vietnamese workers are. In Vietnam, decrees and laws related to labor exports since 1991 are Decree 370 promulgated in 1991; Decree 152 in 1999; Decree 81 in 2003, and the Law on Vietnamese Guest Workers passed on 29 December 2006 by the Ninth National Assembly (*Official Gazette* May 2007).

Labor imports into Malaysia

Generally, the Malaysian economy heavily relies on exports but suffers from labor shortage problems. To alleviate the labor shortage in major economic sectors such as agriculture, construction, manufacturing, plantation, and services, Malaysia employs foreign workers even as it is the policy of the Malaysian government to give priority to Malaysian workers in all sectors.

Considered a popular labor market of Vietnam, Malaysia receives mainly low-skilled or semi-skilled

foreign labor from Vietnam, unlike Japan and the Republic of Korea which are considered high-skilled labor markets, attracting and accepting only high-skilled workers and job trainees.

In 2006, Malaysia hosted more than 100,000 Vietnamese workers. But when the global economic crisis struck in 2008 and when the "Foreign Workers First Out" (FWFO)—the Malaysian policy to reduce foreign workers—was adopted, the number of Vietnamese workers slid to 80,000, according to officers of Dolab-MOLISA interviewed by the author in Hanoi on March 2010. Malaysia has between 3.0 million and 3.6 million legal and illegal migrant workers, the largest group coming from Indonesia, followed by Bangladesh, Nepal, India, etc.

The push and pull factors for the Vietnamese in Malaysia

Poverty and unemployment in Vietnam, a sense of gratitude to parents and grandparents, the hope to have a better life and earn more, have pushed the Vietnamese to find jobs abroad, in Malaysia included. The Vietnamese government also encourages its people to find work overseas.

The Vietnamese who do find employment abroad come from different parts of the country: from the north to the south, from the urban to the rural, remote, and mountainous areas. As most of these Vietnamese workers are low-skilled, their salaries in Malaysia are correspondingly low, compared to those of other nationalities.

In Malaysia, the availability of low-skilled and unskilled work opportunities is a pull factor for Vietnamese workers—the main reason they go, in fact. The Vietnamese can fill up sectors in which the Malays refuse to work. Moreover, the pre-departure fee from Vietnam to Malaysia costs less than in other countries, and the same holds for work contracts. Another pull factor for Vietnamese in search of jobs is Malaysia's relative proximity to Vietnam.

Presently, however, many Vietnamese are becoming more reluctant to go to Malaysia for various reasons, the main one being the low wages. In Malaysia, the average income of a worker per month ranges from US$120 to US$200 only, due to the lack of rights protection for migrant workers. Given a choice, some Vietnamese in Bandar Baru Bangi would prefer to go

to other countries like Japan and South Korea; but, in reality, they cannot meet the high standards for workers in these countries.

Number of Vietnamese workers overseas

Compared to other sending countries in Asia, Vietnam sends a relatively small number of workers abroad. From 10,000 Vietnamese workers in 15 countries and territories in 1995, the number increased to more than 400,000 in 2006 and to more than 500,000 in 40 countries and territories as of June 2008. Vietnam sent 78,855 workers abroad in 2006, while in 2007, it sent 85,020, and in 2008, exactly 86,990 workers (Tong hop so lao dong, nganh nghe va thu nhap o mot so thi thuong chinh (tu 1992 den 2009), Cuc Quan ly lao dong ngoi nuoc, Bo Lao dong-Thuong binh va Xa hoi, Ha noi, thang 3, 2009). Between 2003 and 2009, it sent an average of 77,000 people abroad yearly. Vietnam was expected to have sent 85,000 workers abroad in 2010.

Vietnam set the target of sending more than one million workers abroad by 2010, including 100,000 workers to Malaysia. Of Vietnam's total population of 86.2 million, the workforce accounted for 44.92%, with at least one million Vietnamese entering the labor market every year (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2009). In the Asian labor markets, Malaysia ranked first among the destination countries from 2005 to 2007. But in 2008, Malaysia ranked second to Taiwan with Malaysia sending 7,810 and Taiwan, 31,631.

Vietnamese workers overseas mainly work in light industries (e.g., electronics, textiles and garments, aquatic processing, etc.), construction, shipping (as workers or sailors), fishery, agriculture, services (in hotels and as house maids), and health care (as nurse assistants). Labor export companies recognized by DOLAB-MOLISA recruit Vietnamese workers. Consequently, they are considered legal.

Number of Vietnamese who went abroad to work each year

	Year	Total	Female	Receiving Countries				
				Taiwan	Japan	S Korea	Malaysia	Others
1	1992	810	100	0	0	210	0	
2	1993	6480	664	0	164	3318	0	
3	1994	10150	1563	0	382	4781	0	
4	1995	7187	348	0	286	5270	0	
5	1996	15046	1262	0	1046	7826	0	
6	1997	18470	4295	191	2227	4880	0	
7	1998	10740	1931	197	1896	1500	7	
8	1999	21810	2287	558	1856	4518	1	
9	2000	31500	9065	8099	1497	7316	239	
10	2001	36168	7704	7782	3249	3910	23	
11	2002	46122	10556	13191	2202	1190	19965	
12	2003	75000	18118	29069	2256	4336	38227	
13	2004	67447	37741	37144	2752	4779	14567	
14	2005	70594	24605	22784	2955	12102	24605	
15	2006	78855	27023	14127	5360	10577	37941	
16	2007	85020	28278	23640	5517	12187	26704	
17	2008	86990	28598	31631	6142	18141	7810	
18	2009 (Jan-Feb)	12591	2521	1561	889	1876	428	
	Total	680980	206659	189974	40676	108717	170517	----

Tong hop so lao dong, nganh nghe va thu nhap o mot so thi thuong chinh (tu 1992 den 2009), Cuc Quan ly lao dong ngoi nuoc, Bo Lao dong-Thuong binh va Xa hoi, Ha noi, thang 3, 2009.
(Statistics on employment, professions and income in some main markets (from 1992 to 2009), MoLISA, Ha Noi, 03/2009)

Vietnamese workers in Malaysia

At present, there are approximately 80,000 Vietnamese workers in Malaysia, majority of whom are Kinh. There are ethnic people as well, e.g., Nung and Muong. The officers of the Vietnamese Labor Section in Kuala Lumpur estimate that ethnic people account for between 20 percent and 30 percent of the Vietnamese workers in Malaysia.

The Vietnamese workers are widely dispersed in Malaysia; but the top three states where they are highest in number are Johor, Penang, and Selangor. In Johor, they can be found in Muar, Batu Pahat, and Johor Bahru (Skudai, Senai); while in Penang, they are currently in Sungai Penang, Prai, especially Bayan Lepas, the main industrial hub where factories of many multinational companies are located. The Vietnamese also work in Klang Valley in Selangor, particularly in Kuala Lumpur, Klang, Shah Alam, Bandar Baru Bangi, Serendah, and Batang Kali, where a number of factories are similarly located.

Many Vietnamese work in small and medium-sized factories devoted to electronics, furniture, jewelry, plastics, garments, bread, etc. They also work in Ipoh in the State of Perak, Nilai in the State of Negeri Sembilan, and in the State of Malacca. Most Vietnamese in Malaysia work in the industrial zones.

According to the Vietnamese Labor Section in KL, the Malaysian NGOs, the Malaysian Police Department, and the Immigration Department, official figures on the population of Vietnamese in each state in Malaysia are not available. However, the estimated number of Vietnamese in Johor ranges from 25,000 to 30,000 workers.

In Malaysia, Vietnamese workers are mostly in light industries, like textiles garments, plastics, electrical and electronics factories, bread factories, agriculture, and services. At present, very few of them are in construction. Those in the service sector are concentrated in restaurants.

Unlike in Taiwan, there are no Vietnamese nursing assistants in Malaysia. As for domestic helpers, around the end of 2007, the Vietnamese and the Malaysian governments negotiated their export from Vietnam. In 2008, the number of Vietnamese domestics increased as a result.

The Pre-departure Process

Networks and Recruitment

In Vietnam, friends, returnees, or friends coming back from abroad; labor export companies, private recruiters, brokers in the same commune or a different commune, and members of the People's Committee introduced the idea of leaving for work abroad. Since the 1990s, private companies have been undertaking labor export activities after being granted licenses by and under the supervision of DOLAB-MOLISA. They have thus been acting as labor recruitment units. At present, there are at least 164 labor export companies nationwide. They are responsible for monitoring overseas markets, securing service contracts, recruiting, training, and sending the workers. But in practice, most of them mainly focus on recruiting and sending workers to the receiving countries.

Pre-departure Cost

The pre-departure cost is defined as the sum of money the workers have to pay in advance, inclusive of air fare, passport and visa fees, and a deposit to guarantee their fulfillment of the obligations stipulated in the labor contract. The sum paid also covers the medical certificate, training fees, and intermediary fees. The first charge that the workers have to pay is usually intended for the intermediaries, who introduced them to the labor export companies. The next charge is a lump sum collected without the benefit of detailed information on what the fees are for. Therefore, the workers tend to pay higher than they should.

The pre-departure cost varies depending on the year and the number of departures. At the turn of the century, the cost increased significantly because of the big demand from overseas markets, including the Malaysian labor market. But the pre-departure charge was lowered when the number of Vietnamese going to Malaysia dropped because of their reluctance to go, given that the wages were very low relative to the pre-departure charge they had to pay. The pre-departure cost to Malaysia is approximately VND15 million to VND 20 million (or US$1,275 to US$1,300). This rate is the lowest vis-à-vis the cost to other countries, especially Japan and South Korea.

Pre-departure training is mandatory, according to the Vietnamese export labor law. The training should focus on the language, culture, and society of the destination country; on legal information and

technical training pertaining to the job applied for. Pre-departure training is supposed to allow the workers to learn and be better prepared for working and living overseas. But according to Hien, a 23-year old from An Giang, she did not learn much; while her friends said there was but a short training session, if at all.

Duration of employment

The employment duration is oftentimes initially three years, but may be extended to five years if the workers can prove their being skilled up to a certain level. Any extension beyond five years is on the condition that the employee must obtain a skills certification from the Malaysian Skills Development Council or the Construction Industry Development Board. In reality, the extension is usually good for only a year. However, at present, the employers prefer extended durations of employment to hiring new workers, as the policy on migrant workers in Malaysia has become stricter.

Employers' perceptions of the Vietnamese workers

In Malaysia, local employers usually appreciate Vietnamese workers for their intelligence, their being hard-working, fast, and tough. The Vietnamese are also appreciated by their employers because of their willingness to learn new techniques, to work overtime, and to focus on their work. They rarely ask for leaves.

However, the Vietnamese workers in Malaysia have one weakness: their lack of knowledge in English, which sometimes impedes their employment because all instructions in factories in Malaysia are in English and Bahasa Melayu. So, for example, big companies like Sony in Bandar Baru Bangi prefer hiring workers able to understand English, like the Nepali and Burmese. According to the vice president of Sony whom the author interviewed in September 2009, Indonesians can understand Bahasa Melayu, so they are likewise hired because it is easy for them to communicate with the Malay employers.

Employers often complain about the undisciplined nature of male Vietnamese workers. Many companies are reluctant to hire them, as a result. The Vietnamese usually produce wine, which is illegal, especially in Muslim society. They often drink alcohol, gamble, and fight among themselves sometimes.

The life, work, and difficulties of the Vietnamese factory workers in Malaysia

Most of the informants for this section are factory workers.

Life and work

Like other migrant workers, the Vietnamese workers feel anxious about their debts and the hardships that await them at work. However, they do not feel isolated from their homeland, as Malaysia and Vietnam are not too far from each other. Some Vietnamese are, in fact, happy.

According to Thao, a 25-year old from Tuyen Quang province in Vietnam, "Work is hard. But life is okay for me. I am not in debt because I have already paid all of it. I am single, so I am not under pressure. I also have Indonesian and Malay friends. I can speak Melayu. I've been here for four years. I help my boss communicate with the other Vietnamese." Unlike Thao, those who cannot speak Melayu or English—and they are a majority—can end up very much frustrated when they cannot communicate with their employer or follow instructions at work. Moreover, they risk being insulted or physically abused.

Thao and her friends live in an apartment that they consider to be in good condition, but which is quite cramped. There are between nine and ten of them sharing the three-room apartment that has two shower rooms and one kitchen. The apartment is located in the Sungai Chua area, Bandar Baru Bangi, State of Selangor. Still they are lucky compared to others who also live in a very small place that is not clean, thereby affecting their health.

Another important issue for Vietnamese workers has to do with safety and security in the residential areas. There are areas where it is safe to go out alone, but there are also areas where it is safer to go out in groups, or to be escorted by guards.

Most of the Vietnamese workers use mobile phones to communicate with their families in Vietnam. This is the most convenient way for them to do so.

As for their work, there are Vietnamese who do intense labor for more than eight hours a day. In some cases, their working conditions are not ideal, being lacking in occupational safety equipment, a condition that could lead to accidents or poor health.

Earnings and savings

Some Vietnamese could not immediately get a job upon arrival in Malaysia. According to Phuong, a 26-year old from Ha Tinh province in Vietnam,

> "I had to wait a month after arriving in Malaysia. And when I got a job in a garment factory in Johor Bahru, I had to work for more than nine hours a day for Rm200 a month. So some friends and I left the factory. When we moved to another factory in Bandar Baru Bangi, we got a better job with higher wages—Rm480 a month, excluding overtime pay."

Workers in factories in Malaysia usually work eight hours a day, their wages at Rm18 (US$5.54) per day or Rm558 (US$171) per month. They have 30-minute lunch breaks, their lunch costing between Rm3.5 and Rm4.0 daily. Those who work overtime receive between get Rm700 and Rm800 (US$215-US$246) a month in wages. According to Thi, a 26-year old from An Giang province, "I want to work overtime as much as possible. I need money."

Some Vietnamese are indeed able to save some money, but only small sums. According to Thao, she saved only VND20 million (US$ 1= VND18,000) after four years, while Phuong and Lan saved even less. Phuong and Lan are in more debt than Thao due to their high pre-departure costs, which they have to pay back.

Among the Vietnamese, the female workers were usually able to save more money than the males, who sometimes spent money on alcohol, clothes, outings with friends, and gambling. Unfortunately, the current exchange rate between the US dollar and the Vietnamese dong is not advantageous to the Vietnamese because the dong is very weak compared to the US dollar. In 10 October 2010 the exchange rate was US$1=VND19,480; it was US$1=VND16,000 in 2008. This is very discouraging for workers everywhere.

The violation of rights by employers in Malaysia

The exploitation or violation of the rights of workers by employers takes on various forms: retention of the workers' passports, very long work hours, lack of health insurance, unfair dismissal, verbal and physical abuse. However, not all Vietnamese workers are exploited or improperly treated.

Still, regarding the retention of passports, the employers always justify doing this by saying it is for safekeeping purposes. But it is very common practice for employers to retain their employees' passports, for fear that the workers would run away after arriving in Malaysia, in search of jobs with higher pay. In some cases, when the employment contract has expired, the employers try to force their workers to continue working for them by still keeping the workers' passports.

As for their workload, some workers are forced to work continuously for 12 hours or more each day, even if per the employment contract, they are required to work only eight hours each day for a minimum wage of Rm18 per day, and for at least 26 days a month. There have also been cases where workers are forced to do piece-rate work, an arrangement that obliges them to work longer hours, thereby increasing production, without having to be paid more. Furthermore, employers find many reasons to deduct from the wages of employees.

As mentioned earlier, working conditions in Malaysia may be poor, being characterized by pollution in the factory, for instance. This is confirmed by Xuyen, a 25-year old Nung ethnic from Cao Bang province in Vietnam. She said, "In my garment factory, we have to stand all day and breathe in chemical products. They smell so strong, our lungs must be in danger. But we do not have a choice. We have to work. We need our jobs."

Some employers do not get work permits for their workers. Still others do not pay their workers wages but force them to work. If the workers complain, the employers may terminate their work contract and cancel their visas so that they cannot work for other employers. Moreover, the employers may request RELA (Ikatan Relawan Rakyat Malaysia or Volunteers of Malaysian People) to arrest these workers. The workers then risk being deported, if arrested.

Before deportation, the workers may be put in a detention center where conditions are not always good. They may stay in the center for a few weeks, months, or years. RELA is a paramilitary civil volunteer corps formed by the Malaysian government. Its main duty is to check the travel documents and immigration permits of foreigners in Malaysian cities, including tourists, visitors, and migrants, in order to reduce the growing number of illegal immigrants in Malaysia.

Incorrect payment, exploitation, verbal and physical abuse may lead workers to desert their employers and find a new job. Sometimes this entails having to work illegally, without the benefit of work permits or

contracts, or even a visa which their former employers may have retained or have had canceled. When the police or RELA arrests these workers because of their illegal status, the investigation will usually not look into the root cause of their desertion: abusive treatment by the employers.

According to Tan, a 26-year old from Nghe An province in Vietnam:

> "I had to run away from my employer because he did not pay me the correct amount. After that, I did not have a passport because the employer kept it. So I worked illegally for another employer who is my friend's employer. He paid me correctly. But it is too risky to work without a passport. I am always worried about being arrested. I don't want to be deported. I still have a debt to pay in Vietnam. My father sold some land to get money for me to be able to pay for my pre-departure expense. So I cannot go back home to Vietnam with empty pockets. Some are so lucky to find a job with better wages, and to escape from the police."

Some employers hire illegal employees so they do not have to pay all kinds of fees to the local labor agents. Workers who want to get a new passport declare their old one as lost before the Visa Section of the Vietnamese Embassy and then apply for a new one.

How the Vietnamese labor export companies cheated the workers in Vietnam
According to Lien, a 27-year old from Ha Tinh province in Vietnam:

> "I got a different job and lower pay than promised. When we arrived at the airport in Malaysia, nobody picked us up. I think the Vietnamese labor export company cheated us. They asked us to sign the contract just before we boarded the plane. And the contract I signed with the employers in Malaysia was not in Vietnamese. I could not understand it."

Being threatened by RELA and the risks of detention
RELA is considered a threat to migrant workers, in particular, and to foreigners, in general. Workers detained by RELA are sent to a detention center which is usually overcrowded and dirty. There they receive inadequate medical care and insufficient food. The center is also lacking in ventilation (United Press International 2010).

Further, while at the center, the detainees have little or no contact with their families, friends, or lawyers—this according to the officers of Tenaganita in Kuala Lumpur, and a Thai worker who was arrested and sent to the center.

According to the lawyers, workers in the detention centers could be detained for a few weeks or for as long as six to twelve months, possibly longer. But as soon as the detained workers receive enough money from their family or friends to pay for an airline ticket, then they are deported. A service is available for the families of detained Vietnamese to be contacted and apprised of their situation. Those who avail of the service need to pay a fee, however.

Workers, local labor agents and/or the Vietnamese Labor Section in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Normally, workers who have complaints about their employers first report these to the local labor agents who provided them the job. If these agents do not react, the workers contact the Vietnamese Labor Section in Kuala Lumpur, which is then supposed to contact the local labor agents or the labor agents in Vietnam. In case these agents do not react, and if the Vietnamese Labor Section does not impose stringent measures, the workers become victims. Sometimes, the Vietnamese Labor Section has good relations with the local agents.

Health care
According to Thi Lan, a 28-year old from the southern province of An Giang in Vietnam, each worker in her factory receives Rm200 a year for medical treatment. Medical expenses beyond this amount are paid for by the workers themselves. She added:

> "The worst case involves a number of friends of ours who work in other factories but are not covered by heath insurance. Only a small portion of their medical expenses is undertaken by the company, if at all. When they are sick, often due to overwork, they have to use their own money for their medication. Some of them who were injured during working hours had to advance the payment and wait for reimbursement. There have been cases where the employers did not pay the employees for their medical treatment at all."

Usually, foreign workers are denied equal access to benefits and protection vis-à-vis their Malaysian counterparts. Among these are maternity benefits, limits to working hours, and holidays.

Lack of awareness of local laws and culture

Most Vietnamese are not aware of the *laws and culture* of Muslim countries, including Malaysia. They are thus vulnerable to breaking social rules or regulations, and are thus arrested and deported. According to Thao, "Some friends of mine who boiled rice wine were arrested. They have since learned to respect Muslim laws."

However, there are still Vietnamese, especially those in big groups, who catch stray dogs and cook them. Dog meat is food for the Vietnamese, especially those from the north of Vietnam, who resort to eating dog meat when they do not have enough money to buy other kinds of food. This was confirmed by Thao and her friends.

Debts

Usually, migrant workers fall into debt because of their recruitment and departure expenses, including commission fees for their recruiters, as well as other costs associated with their departure. According to Truong, a 27-year old male from Quang Binh in Vietnam,

> "Some friends of mine borrowed money from the bank at a high interest rate. I also borrowed money from the bank, apart from getting money from my father who sold buffalos and a piece of land to help finance my pre-departure expenses. It took me 20 months after I started working in Malaysia to pay my debt to the bank. I worked overtime to be able to do this."

Normally, Vietnamese workers take between 18 and 36 months to pay the debts they incur to be able to work in Malaysia.

Vietnamese labor export companies usually charge a flat fee of US$1,000 to US$2,000 per person (US$ 1= VND16,000 as of 2008) and an additional $150 for a health certificate and a visa to Malaysia (Vietnamnet 2008).

Remittances to Vietnam

The Vietnamese workers usually send money through a wire transfer service like Western Union, which offers fast and convenient service. The senders and the beneficiaries do not need to open a bank account, and the beneficiaries also do not have to pay any fees as these are paid for by the senders.

According to a Malaysian lawyer and some Vietnamese workers, the staff of the bank that receives money through a transfer does not pay the beneficiaries the correct amount. Many of the workers' families are poor and uneducated, so they are not aware of the money deducted by the staff of the bank. If they suspect this at all, they do not know to whom they should complain.

There are still no statistics on the remittance figures from Malaysia to Vietnam, but it has been said that money sent back to the workers' families in Vietnam from Malaysia was not a big sum compared to remittances sent back from other countries to Vietnam. This is probably due to the low wages paid in Malaysia. However, we do not know either how the bank in Vietnam registers the amount of remittances per transaction. If it is true that the bank's staff deducts a certain amount from money intended for the beneficiaries, then this may partly explain the small amount of remittances.

The case of Vietnamese domestic workers

Apart from the plight of Vietnamese working in factories, there is the case of Vietnamese domestic workers who also experience hardship and risks. They work in isolation and not in groups like the factory workers.

There was once a case involving Vietnamese domestics recruited by SONA, a Vietnamese labor export company in Vietnam that sent them to Winbond Company, a Malaysian broker firm. On 8 November 2008, the Tenaganita–CAMSA Office, which provides assistance to Vietnamese workers in Penang, received a call for help from a Vietnamese domestic worker. Four Vietnamese and some Indonesians had apparently been held captive in a house by Winbond Company. Two Vietnamese managed to escape.

According to them, when they arrived in Malaysia, Winbond confiscated their passports, cell phones, and cash, among others. They were not paid the Rm750 stated in the contract; they were not paid at all for months.

According to Quynh, "I had to work in a local home from 5:00 a.m. till 11:00 p.m. Work was really hard. I had to clean house, sweep, clean the kitchen, wash and iron clothes for many people, etc."

As well, according to Hoa,

> "I had to work in local homes from 5:00 a.m. till 11:00 p.m. I had time only to wash my face and

brush my teeth. I had to work hard. I had to carry a very heavy basket and experienced very serious back pain. When my back hurt, I had to lie down. I suffered very much. When I could not work, I was deprived of food. I had to ask for food from the neighbor next door. I was not paid after six months of work. I had borrowed VND10 million for this trip. So I was bound by the loan."

Afterward, her employers returned her to Winbond Company, which held her captive in a house.

According to Dang Ha, "Some Vietnamese women suffered a lot. Some were beaten".

According to Nguyen Ha, "I had to take care of an old mother, three children, and a husband". She was allowed to call home after five to six months, and received no pay after six months of work.

Most of the Vietnamese domestic workers had borrowed between VND10 million and VND20 million for their trip to Malaysia. So they felt bound by the loan. The broker in Vietnam had tricked them into the deal.

These Vietnamese eventually tried to enlist the help of SONA, the company supplying labor. But according to Ha, "SONA did not intercede and did not offer repatriation help".

The Tenaganita–CAMSA Office is now helping the workers in their quest for compensation and repatriation, and in filing a complaint against SONA. CAMSA had worked with Tenaganita to establish this office in Penang in early 2008.

Given all the problems and hardships mentioned, it seemed a wonder why Vietnamese workers still wanted to work in Malaysia. When asked, they gave answers that ran along the following themes: "The poverty in our village is so serious." "We don't have anything to eat." "We need jobs and money." "My children need to go to school." "Our parents are sick." "I don't want to lose face."

But when asked whether they wanted to live in Malaysia forever, all informants interviewed gave negative replies. They said they wanted to go back to their homeland after finishing their contract, to be with their parents and their families. Their attachment to their family and homeland was very strong, due to their long history and their Confucian culture.

Besides, working in Malaysia was too hard. Certainly, there might be some Vietnamese who might wish to live in Malaysia for the rest of their lives, especially if they had a good job, or had gotten married to a Malaysian man with a good job, and therefore lived happily in the country.

How the Vietnamese workers coped

When confronted with extremely difficult situations, some Vietnamese called or sent petitions to labor export companies in Vietnam or to the Vietnamese Labor section in Kuala Lumpur, which exercise could turn out fruitful or futile. Some who complained to their employers risked retaliation, such as the case of the Vietnamese who worked for Esquel Malaysia in Penang in 2007 (Tin Que Hong 2008). Fortunately, they received assistance from some lawyers pro bono, from Tenaganita and CAMSA. Moreover, a Protestant church also gave them moral support. The workers were sometimes visited by a Vietnamese priest, besides.

Some Vietnamese also sought the help of their family if they were to be deported, for example, as then they would need money for an airplane ticket. The family had to borrow money from relatives, friends, or a bank.

Certainly, there were many who could not do anything but suffer. As most of the Vietnamese workers in Malaysia were low-skilled, they did not have the option to work in other labor markets requiring high-skilled workers. Therefore, they still kept working in Malaysia.

Nonetheless, it is believed that if the Vietnamese could develop their skills in the near future, they would choose to work in other countries because of very low incomes in Malaysia and the feeling that their rights were not protected. The Vietnamese were always exploited by their employers.

Solving the problems of Vietnamese workers

1. The recruitment process in Vietnam should be seriously reconsidered. For one, MOLISA should install an efficient recruitment monitoring system in the labor export companies. It is also necessary to streamline the operations of these companies and to keep them under close and direct control. MOLISA should apply punitive measures on the labor export companies which do not act responsibly toward the workers. It should strictly oblige the representative of the labor export companies and the Labor Section of DOLAB to

oversee and pay more attention to the workers who encounter problems, or are exploited by employers.

In order to oversee the workers closely, MOLISA should not only ask but should oblige the labor export companies to open representative offices in the markets where they export over 100 workers. Exporters sending fewer than 100 workers can cooperate with others to open joint representative offices that would look after Vietnamese workers abroad.

MOLISA should strengthen the ongoing technical and language training program, and the workers' awareness of local laws and culture, especially in Muslim society. It should inform the workers of their rights, which are protected by law. Professional training will make it possible for the workers to work correctly so that they will not have to be scolded by their employers. Training will also give them the opportunity to find better jobs.

MOLISA should also pay more attention to the medical check-ups arranged by labor export companies. Disseminating information in Vietnamese newspapers on the risk the Vietnamese workers may face while working abroad, Malaysia included, is a must.

The Vietnamese government should also ask itself whether its labor export policy has really benefited the people. Only recently, the Vietnamese government offered bank loans to workers for their pre-departure expenses. In some provinces, government has also been providing training to workers who belong to ethnic groups. However, the government should try to control the pre-departure cost as well, and not allow the labor export companies to charge too much. Debts can push the workers to submit to exploitation and to become victims of human trafficking just so they can pay for their debts.

2. As for the workers, they should be informed of the possible risks awaiting them in Malaysia: exploitation, unlawful dismissal, improper treatment. They should be told whom to contact should they have any complaints.

3. Malaysia is considered one of the worst receiving countries for migrant workers because most Malaysians consider migrant workers inferior to them, and treat them accordingly. Interviews with some Vietnamese workers, as well as with

Tenaganita's staffs and lawyers, revealed that most maltreatment cases, especially those that entailed verbal and physical abuse, involved Chinese employers. Moreover, when the workers were arrested, only the workers were investigated and not their employers. This is unfair.

The Malaysian government and Malaysians should respect the rights of migrant workers. While easier said than done, the Malaysian government should issue a comprehensive policy protecting the migrant workers' rights.

The Malaysian government should also reconsider the existence of the RELA and the credentials of its staff. Is it appropriate to use RELA as a tool to control migrant workers? Is this volunteer corps violating human rights?

4. Corruption in Vietnam and Malaysia, the hardest issue to be tackled, impedes the justice system from proceeding correctly.

As long as poverty, one of the root causes of labor migration, cannot be eliminated or alleviated, people will keep leaving their countries. Furthermore, as long as the governments of the sending countries, including Vietnam, encourage labor exports without a correct and efficient recruitment monitoring system, without adequate control of labor export companies, etc., their people will run the risk of being exploited, and will become vulnerable to the possibility of trafficking.

International pressure may need to be put on both the sending and the receiving countries, which do not protect the rights of migrant workers. Local and international NGOs and international network organizations should stay involved and take serious action.

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Finding Room for the Stateless:
Locating the Rohingya in a Difficult World of Nations

Avyanthi Azis

Introduction

This research features an ethnic Muslim minority from northwestern Myanmar widely known as the *Rohingya*. Their native land is the troubled Rakhine state of Myanmar—formerly Arakan—which is situated 'where South and Southeast Asia meet.' This fateful geographical feature and the great weight of history attached to it have served as a background for denial of a Myanmar national identity to the *Rohingya*.

In late 2008 and the early months of 2009, news outlets throughout Southeast Asia were filled with headlines of a *Rohingya* crisis as boats carrying hundreds of destitute refugees reached the coast of Aceh, having allegedly been earlier towed to sea from Thailand by the Thai military. The flight of the *Rohingya*, hitherto mainly to Malaysia and Thailand, had become what the then Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva described as "a regional problem."

This regional problem has persisted for decades with dim prospects for solution.[1] It is difficult to solve because the underlying cause is very profound. This paper focuses on statelessness, illustrating how the contemporary neoliberal situation has led to the pervasiveness of a form of citizenship that is tied to nationalism. In the context of Asia (particularly Southeast Asia), the end of colonial empires and the birth of nation-states has given way to the construction of a "neoliberal subject"—*citizens* of the modern Southeast Asian states. The nation-state has become a global norm. The Southeast Asian neoliberal subject is produced through neoliberal governmentality that is subscribed to by *both democratic and authoritarian states* (in this case, Myanmar) alike. Under the prevailing neoliberal order, the basic premise of traditional political liberalism which holds that a state's primary obligations are toward its own citizens continues to be sustained by modern nation-states.

Suffering greatly from this construction of the neoliberal citizen are the stateless, who are ultimately "the citizen's Other" (Kerber 2007). Other marginalized people whose plights are addressed by my API cohorts fare better, I think, since they are still recognized as citizens of a country and thus are not entirely bereft of protection. Matters are worse for the stateless *Rohingya*, who are unwelcome everywhere.

Attempting an answer to the question raised by Steinberg (2006), "What arrangements/provisions could accommodate the *Rohingya*, who feel excluded from citizenship …?" This research begins by investigating people's own subjective narratives. It is virtually impossible to conduct research in Rakhine state, therefore exiled *Rohingya* populations in Malaysia are accessed as a kind of proxy. As of July 2009, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 16,662 *Rohingya* individuals registered with its office in Malaysia (the actual number of refugees is probably much higher). The majority live in the poorer parts of Klang Valley.[2] The model for the research is Liisa Malkki's ethnography of displacement on Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania in the mid-1980s (Malkki 1995).

In the realm of migration studies, when criticizing neoliberal projects, scholars often point to the relatively unfree movement of people compared to goods and services. For the purposes of this paper I wish to draw attention instead to how in the prevailing neoliberal environment the state may retreat from pro-people interventions into the economy, but remains central in particular areas—in this case, citizenship. As the *Rohingya* case illustrates, in the era of neoliberal development, *the nation's understanding of the people* remains unchallenged and therefore, the support of the state is continually sought although the role of the market is marked.

The Divide

One of the most striking initial findings I made in relation to the exiled *Rohingya* in Malaysia was the divided nature of the community. Most conspicuously,

this was reflected in the existence of numerous groups. When I began my research, there were at least seven refugee organizations/political committees claiming to represent *Rohingya* interests in Kuala Lumpur alone.[3] The number of *Rohingya* 'committees' proliferated after a defining event in 2006, when the Malaysian government opened up registration for the IMM13 (temporary work) document. Around 5,000 persons at that point were gathered, each subject to a RM90 levy, but due to alleged corruption on the part of the *Rohingya* elite during the process (allegedly, a number of Bangladeshis were registered as *Rohingya* by the leaders), the Malaysian government put a halt to the registration. The registration fee was never returned, and on this basis, many came to the conclusion that the leaders were self-interested and "selling" their own people, dehumanizing them and rendering them a mere commodity.

Closer observation shows that division in the community is more than a matter of political schisms. Originally, the purpose of the research was to observe the displaced *Rohingya* population's changing identities after a long period of exile in Malaysia. To my mind, this exercise could help direct attempts to reach a durable and workable solution to their plight. Plainly put, the main question was: How Malay have they become after a long period of exile from their reluctant homeland of Myanmar? The framing of this original research question was naïve and quickly ran into serious problems since it completely ignored ethnic complexities which existed before the flight from Myanmar. It falsely assumed identity as an: (a) static mode of 'being,' instead of 'becoming' and (b) a concept that is self-explanatory.

Among Myanmar's ethnic minorities, the question of *Rohingya* identity is one of the most intricate, as even the *Rohingya* people themselves do not agree on the matter. At the more easily observed level, different (sub-) dialects are spoken by the supposedly unitary people—those originally from the more interior areas such as Kyauktaw display more Rakhine/Burmese influence, while it appears that the people originally from areas closer to the border with Bangladesh speak dialects closer to Chittagongian.[4] More serious than this linguistic variety, the narratives collected from respondents often reveal disownment of supposedly fellow *Rohingya*. One common form of renouncing others of *Rohingya* identity is observed in the

narratives of those originally from the township of Kyauktaw, who regards themselves as the true *Rohingya*. One man commented:

> "Back in Arakan, the people from Maungdaw and Buthidaung called us 'people of Rwang Cóor'. They never called themselves *Rohingya*. We called them "*anikka*." I think they are actually Bangladeshis."[5]

According to these narratives, it is only in exile that those from Maungdaw and Buthidaung insist on being called *Rohingya*, taking advantage of the advocacy mounted by civil society for the "ethnic *Rohingya*." Literally meaning 'people from the West,' or 'people adjacent/next to,' the term *anikka* connotes a Bangladeshi admixture and therefore, tends to be pejorative, since it evokes the very foreigner identity with which ironically the Myanmar government and the Buddhist majority have stigmatized the *Rohingya*.[6]

What can be discerned from the *anikka*/'true *Rohingya*' distinction? Given my lack of linguistic and anthropological training as well as the limited duration of the year-long research period, it is unwise to comment in depth or draw any definite conclusion on the subject of ethnicity—obviously more research is needed in understanding the ethnic dynamics. The point is clearly important for those who insist on their authentic *Rohingya* identity—but does it matter in the practical realm, when the public intellectual puts on the advocacy hat? Should one group be favored, when all are effectively stateless? Furthermore, it should be noted that the *anikka*/true *Rohingya* distinction is not the only mechanism of disavowal. Claiming others as *kafiyyah* (mixed) or as Myanmar Muslims is also common. Additionally, in Malaysia, a considerable number of *Rohingya* men are married to Indonesian women—creating a sub-group (playfully dubbed the '*Rohingdon*') that adds to the nuances surrounding ethnicity. If there ever was a pure form of *Rohingya*-ness, is it approaching a vanishing point?

Picture 1.

Aisha, the 'Rohingdon' daughter of a Kyauktaw man and an Indonesian woman from Medan

Against this backdrop, my take on the contested claims of 'true *Rohingya*' identity is to recognize in it an undercurrent which runs through every *Rohingya*'s veins—a stubborn insistence on being called native and a protestation against the 'foreigner' label. To be a *Rohingya* is to constantly try to prove that one belongs, that one is not an *anikka*, not a *kala* (a pejorative term used in Myanmar for foreigner), or the most hurtful label since they are Muslims, *pendatang haram* (illegal comers) as they have been dubbed in Malaysia.[7]

The question of who the *Rohingya* are may have different answers—there is no neat edge to ethnicity. For the purpose of this research, I refocus the lens on the interpretation of "what is at stake for particular participants in particular situations" (Kleinman 1995). What is indisputable about the *Rohingya* is their stateless predicament, which has become indexical to their identity. Despite contestations over ethnic purity, the narratives tell the same story. Identity is experiential, formulated through the actors' lived experience. The *Rohingya* identity has become strangely sustained by their lack of citizenship.

Recurring narratives

The Football

> "I am like a football. When men play sports, you know how they kick the ball around? That's what happens to us. Why? It's because we have no value. Every nation. Every human being has a country of their own. A country that can protect them. Everyone but us. Myanmar doesn't accept

us, Thailand doesn't, Bangladesh doesn't. And so that's what we've become in this world, a ball. That's what we are, a ball. Wherever we go, we get kicked out."[8]

This is a typical account, which, although it appears simple, is actually very perceptive of how the prevailing international system works. An acute apprehension of the multiple exclusions enacted by the Family of Nations,[9] it is reminiscent of the stateless Jews' predicament in Europe during the time of Nazi Germany: "Those whom the persecutor had singled out as the scum of the earth… actually were received as scum of the earth everywhere… if the world was not yet convinced that the Jews were the scum of the earth, it soon would be when unidentifiable beggars, without nationality, without money, and without passports crossed their frontiers…" (Arendt 1951, p. 269).

This recurring narrative is important for our better understanding of statelessness as it suggests a key feature. Statelessness is often defined as 'lack of citizenship.' Less delineated than this is the second, consequent feature, *exclusion from citizenship*. The oft-multiple exclusion endured by the stateless suggests complete and utter disenfranchisement from the national order of things. Once a person is stripped of nationality, s/he will be denied that everywhere.

Myanmar

"Democracy is a Burman problem—ours is not a problem of democracy." Respondents repeatedly emphasize this point. International attention on Myanmar is often fixated on the oppression by the military-backed government and the struggle for democracy. One is prompted to ask whether this is the ultimate issue faced by Myanmar. I am inclined to believe that, "the most important and enduring issue that Burma/Myanmar has to face, would not be… the stark choice between authoritarian military rule or "democracy"… Rather, it would be the multi-ethnic aspects of governance" (Steinberg 2006, xxix).

Myanmar has been depicted as an "ethnocratic state," illustrating the "capture of the state" by the dominant ethnic Burmans in the wake of Burma's independence from the British in 1947 (Brown 1994). Since independence, the state has acted as the agency of dominant ethnic Burmans in terms of ideologies, policies and resource distribution. The Burmans, undoubtedly, have played a pivotal role in constructing

Myanmar's neoliberal citizen. According to Brown, their approach to the minorities has been to 'centralize' and 'assimilate.' While this explanation works well in delineating relations with the two minorities cast as case studies, the Shans and the Karens, it does not appear fitting in the case of the *Rohingya*.

Presently, the official argument for the denial of citizenship and refusal to recognize the *Rohingya* as one of the 135 'national races' by the government is as follows:

> "The Government renders full and equal treatment to these people, as with other races, in matters relating to birth and death registration, education, health and social affairs. In the official records, (the *Rohingya*) are listed as a Bengali racial group of the Bengali race and are recognized as permanent residents within Myanmar."[10]

> "In actual fact, although there are (135) national races living in Myanmar today, the so-called *Rohingya* people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a '*Rohingya*' race in Myanmar. The very name *Rohingya* is a creation of a group of insurgents in the Rakhine State. Since the First Anglo-Myanmar War in 1824, people of Muslim Faith from the adjacent country illegally entered Myanmar Ngain-Ngan, particularly Rakhine State. Being illegal immigrants, they do not hold immigration papers like other nationals of the country."

In this statement we observe how Myanmar's neoliberal history rests heavily on the history of Empire. Clearly, the British colonization and the year 1824 have become ingrained in Myanmar with regard to the historic rights of Muslims to residency in Arakan. Burma was occupied by the British in three campaigns: 1824-1826, 1852 and 1885. Arakan fell in the first and was annexed as part of the British India. A large-scale immigration of Indians soon began— entering not as immigrants to a foreign country, but as citizens moving to another province. The flows continued until 1948. It is these particular migration flows that became viewed as illegal and were used as reference to deny the *Rohingya* as an ethnic group; the claim being that the Muslims in northern Rakhine were in fact Bengalis whose arrival was fairly recent.[11]

With the exception of the brief administration under U Nu, during which all minorities were accommodated—a few older informants recalled the '*Rohingya* radio,' referring to how their language was included in national radio programs broadcasting in native languages of all ethnic minorities—it seems that a strategy of effacement toward the *Rohingya* has taken place since the turbulent, immediate years leading up to independence. Some respondents, usually those who arrived in Malaysia as teenagers in the 1990s, recall elders' stories about the massacre of Muslims in Arakan in the early 1940s. The mass murders were said to have been perpetrated by the Rakhines, allegedly at Aung San's orders, or at the very least, consent.

It is also curious how the Muslims of Arakan were not included in the Panglong Conference of February 12, 1947—did this indicate how the *Rohingya* were not part of the elite's political imagination of the nation? Another point of importance regarding the *Rohingya* identity that is still unclear is whether the autonym '*Rohingya*' has persisted for centuries—or was the birth of the nation-state and the warfare surrounding it instrumental in the creation of the ethnic identity that emerged? Callahan (2004) argues that state-making in Myanmar has centered on the making of enemies and distrust of minorities. I have not sufficient historical evidence to support any definite claim, but it appears that the emergence of the *Rohingya* as an ethnic group was a reaction to the state-making that deliberately designated them as 'enemies disqualified from citizenship.' The name *Rohingya* suddenly became necessary as it functioned to denote nativeness, which was not required before. Ironically for the *Rohingya*, independence made them worse off. Statelessness did not occur under the liberal colonial Empire. It became an issue subsequently, under the neoliberal order.

Also of note is the politics of naming and renaming in Myanmar—including the designated 'Rakhine' to replace the old name of Arakan. This practice is important in Myanmar for it implies the state as the absolute guardian of a linear, modern history. To change the name Arakan to Rakhine is to negate the *Rohingya*'s 'nomadology,' to erase entirely their version of history.

After General Ne Win seized power in 1962, the *Rohingya* were openly labeled as 'illegal migrants.' In 1977, Operation Nagamin (Dragon King), a national

effort to register citizens and screen out foreigners was conducted and by May 1978, an estimated 200,000 *Rohingya* fled to Bangladesh. A second wave of expulsions was carried out in 1992. Discrimination toward the *Rohingya* culminated in the enactment of the Burma Citizenship Law of 1982, in which they were declared as 'non-national' or 'foreign residents.' This law effectively reduced them to the status of stateless people. I encountered only two respondents (one from Akyab and another from Kyauktaw) who could still produce their identity cards from before 1982. After the law was enacted, these cards were deemed void and withholding of citizenship has since become a mechanism for discrimination. Respondents most commonly report forced labor, evictions, extortions by the military and restrictions on movement (they are not even allowed to travel from one village to another without special permits) as factors to migrate.

In view of what they have collectively experienced in Myanmar, most respondents think return is unlikely and that a change in regime does not guarantee a change in their plight. One respondent further commented,

> "Of course Suu Kyi will not acknowledge our existence in the country. If she does, she will have to confront history and the fact that her father massacred our people in 1942. In so doing, she will forever mar the immaculate image of Aung San, the father of the nation."[12]

Another respondent, when asked about his thoughts on the opposition, bitterly remarked: "What's *national* about the National League for Democracy (NLD)?"[13] According to him, the NLD was no different than the military government and the opposition was only interested in his people's votes and did not honestly consider the *Rohingya* worthy of citizenship. This sentiment is perhaps not baseless. Answering my inquiries about the *Rohingya*, NLD representatives in Malaysia remarked, "In this matter, the opposition's view is the same as the military government. We view them as Bengalis seeking to be the 136th national race of Burma."[14]

Picture 2.

An Akyab respondent's national identification card from the 1970s.

Malaysia

Interestingly, it is Malaysia rather than Myanmar that appears more often in the *Rohingya*'s narratives. The host country has become more central perhaps because of the frustration brought about by the vagueness and indecisiveness of the government in its policy toward the *Rohingya*. It would be unfair and incorrect to say that Malaysia has never extended assistance, but it does appear that there is an absence of consistent official policy.

When more *Rohingya* entered Malaysia in the early 1990s (following the second expulsion), an immigration pass for them was issued, lasting however only for a few months. In the mid-1990s, the *Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia* (ABIM, the Malaysian Muslim Youth Movement), was involved in assisting the *Rohingya*. Toward the end of the decade, however, Malaysia's involvement gradually diminished as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) took a more active role. The government did not seriously consider issuing the IMM13 (which has been briefly mentioned) until 2005, when this permit was conferred to the Acehnese following the 2004 tsunami.

As Malaysia is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, it does not recognize the refugee status extended the UNHCR. Instead, as in the case of everyone residing in Malaysia without proper documentation, the *Rohingya* are designated as

illegal. Describing life in such setting, a man offered a slogan: '*Malaysia boleh!*' (Malaysia can—originally a political slogan popularized by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to boost national pride and competitiveness). The *Rohingya* can live in Malaysia, but they have to be smart, there are 'ways' which one must observe, life in Malaysia is "not an ordinary life." Respondents in Puchong describe it as "*curi-curi di rumah orang*" (stealing around in another's home).

Rohingya narratives of their daily lives in Malaysia show how statelessness is perpetuated through "microclimates of the workplace, the bedroom, and the birthing room" (Kerber 2007, p. 30). Given their 'illegality,' the kinds of work available and chances for social mobility are limited. *Masuk Melayu* ('becoming Malay') through marriage is difficult. To illustrate, out of 71 married male respondents in Puchong, only one is married to a Malaysian; 34 married *Rohingya* women, 33 married Indonesians and one married a Thai. These marriages illustrate the effectiveness of both the bedroom and the birthing room in excluding the *Rohingya*, as children born to *Rohingya* and Indonesian wives inherit the father's statelessness. Although birth certificates are given, 'foreigner' or 'Myanmar' is entered under the nationality column, denying them Malaysian citizenship. Foreigners are barred from attending national schools, while private schools are expensive. In the long run, this keeps future generations from the workplace microclimate too as they grow up without education. One alternate mechanism to eschew the inheritance of lawlessness to the children is to let them be brought up by Malays as foster children. In recent years, the UNHCR has appointed several organizations to open schools for *Rohingya* communities—these however, offer only basic education. Going further than Kerber's microclimates, even mortality is also regulated by the State. Respondents report how it is very difficult for them to hold funeral and burial practices for their dead.

This series of state interventions is extremely powerful in marginalizing the *Rohingya* because it encompasses both the private and public spheres. Here we observe that under the neoliberal order, the State is still the key actor. It may withdraw from certain areas, but in issues pertaining to citizenship, its hold remains firm. It is still the most efficient actor to police and regulate modern political modes of being, and consequently, population movements. This perhaps explains why global capitalism at this stage continues to maintain the nation-state as a convenient political vehicle.

Also related to exclusion from citizenship is the theme of animality, present in many respondents' narratives. Under the neoliberal order, through exclusions from the microclimates mentioned above, the *Rohingya* are trapped in a vicious cycle that renders many to feel 'not human.' Many liken themselves to animals, usually cows, to denote their limited existence. The longing to become 'human' is repeatedly emphasized. One respondent commented that his people are confined to, "*kehidupan yang liar*" (the wild life). These accounts convey how statelessness prevents individuals from living as they might wish. Envy toward Malaysians who have higher education always comes up in conversations. Only the citizen, 'the intelligent, the human' can actively participate in a world of nation-states.

The ancient Greeks used two terms for the word 'life,' namely: "… *zoê*, which expressed the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or gods) and *bios*, which indicated the form or way of living proper to an individual or group." (Agamben 1996, p. 1). Clearly, the stateless are allowed *zoê* (the natural life), but not the proper living of a citizen (the political life). Citizenship is central for an individual living in a world of nation-states since it is "the right to have rights" (Batchelor 1998, p. 159). In actuality, there are no Rights of Man, only Rights of Citizens. As one respondent remarked, "Human rights? There's no such thing—human rights only exist in books."[15] What is 'life' when 'living' is not allowed? To function in the 'national order of things' without citizenship is dangerous. The cow analogy suggests a condition of perpetually being preyed upon; they live constantly in fear of all dangers—arrest, detention, deportation as well as extortion by the state apparatus and taxation by their own leaders.

It is interesting that the divide in the Muslim body portrayed by the disunited *Rohingya*, can actually be extrapolated to a more systemic level; that is of the *Ummah*—the Islamic world. One person eloquently lamented: "The world we live in is no longer one that is guided by the norms of religion—it does have faith, but it subscribes to a faith in *technology* and *documents*…"[16]

This sentence sums up the entire modern condition, in which secular nation-states (despite globalization) remain central. The keywords of this statement are 'technology' and 'documents.' The constant *Operasi*

conducted by the police, Immigration and *Relawan Rakyat Malaysia or Rela* (People's Volunteer Corps) serves as a stark reminder of an undisputable faith in and obsession with identity documents. Malaysia, a Muslim country, puts the secular nation-state above obligations to brothers of the same faith. Fellow Muslims have been deserted for compliance to the norms of the 'infidel.' Naturally, as a destination, Malaysia is favored by the *Rohingya* not only for its prosperity, but also because of its Muslim identity. Many express a predilection for Malaysia as in that country where they get to hear the sound of *adzan* (Muslim call to prayers) and are free to recite/study the Qur'an. That Malaysians as fellow Muslims behave very differently from the *anshor* (helpers, inhabitants of Medina) who came to the aid of the *muhajirin* (former inhabitants of Mecca who followed the Prophet Muhammad in the pilgrimage (*hijrah*) from Mecca to Medina is seen as deeply disappointing and treacherous, since loyalty is supposed to be directed toward brothers in Islam. The helpful Muslims of the past, the brothers in *Ummah*, have now been replaced by neoliberal citizens, for whom national identity documents are central. The identity card has come to epitomize the dominant technology of self that separates the civilized from the improper masses.

The UNHCR and the True Refugee

Despite the difficulties and disappointments, following Homi Bhabha's line of thought, Malaysia as a place of exile is not to be read as a site of *negation*, but rather as that of *negotiation*. If we insist that a site of negation exists, then Myanmar is that site since negation can only be inflicted once. Malaysia merely repeats what Myanmar has affected. In this setting, the *Rohingya*'s main agent of negotiation is the UNHCR, which looms as a central figure in their delineation. The *Rohingya*, who refer to themselves as orphans of the world, see the UNHCR as their parents.

The UNHCR identification card they hold provides an interesting case because it illustrates how the refugee/migrant dichotomy is false and misleading, since it is impossible for them to live faithfully by such

a divide, which completely separates the political from the economic. If we hold that the dichotomy is true, then a refugee should not be working in the host country, since s/he is not motivated primarily by economic factors. Such an ideal categorization is pervasive and is well observed by the authorities. When stopped by the police, *Rohingya* are usually reprimanded about the nature of their card—it is not a work permit. Working is seen as denying the idealized image of refugees. But how should the *Rohingya* survive if they were not allowed to work? The UNHCR does not provide stipends; these exist in cases of emergency, but the *Rohingya* have been in Malaysia for long and are now beyond emergency. The humanitarian has limits, and even emergency has a deadline. The following is one of the most interesting remarks about the limitations of the humanitarian actor—particularly, the UNHCR:

> "I was coming home from work when a policeman stopped me. He asked to see my documents, I said I have none, I'm a refugee. The only identification I have is this UNHCR card. He examined it and said: "If you are a person of concern to the UNHCR, why aren't you living in their compound? Why are you living in this neighborhood? What assistance does the UNHCR provide to you?" I said that the UNHCR couldn't possibly shelter that many people. It cannot provide a place. It can only give this card."[17]

Here, we observe that humanitarian actors possess less power than nation-states. The ability to protect is diminished significantly in the absence of a territory where the humanitarian can gather and govern its subjects, its people of concern. At best, what the UNHCR can provide is *relief* (giving financial assistance for medical treatment, helping people out of detention camps), *not protection*, since it lacks the ever-watchful eye of the state that jealously guards everyone across its marked territory. Some respondents went so far as to comment that things would be better if they were placed in permanent camps, since only then could the confusion be eliminated.

At present, frustration with the UNHCR centers on the fact that the Chins—who are mainly Christians, who arrived in Malaysia much later and who were in possession of passports—get resettled in Western countries, while the *Rohingya* do not. Unsurprisingly,

some accuse the UNHCR of religious discrimination—but the more important point in protestations against this 'discrimination' pertains more to their insistent claim of 'true refugee'-ness. According to some *Rohingya*, the Chins and other ethnic groups from Myanmar are not true refugees or are less entitled to refugee status because they were never denied citizenship in Myanmar. These *former citizens*—who were handed national identity cards by the government and were in possession of passports—were less deserving.

This point ferrets out the more profound predicament of statelessness and how it is different from refugee situations. My initial cue in understanding the (often delicate) difference came from the late Kenneth Bacon of Refugees International, who referred to statelessness as 'legal displacement.' While denationalization and deprivation of citizenship are often accomplished through the enactment of laws governing nationality in a certain country (usually totalitarian, as Arendt suggested), understanding it as legal displacement risks missing the complete picture of the situation.

Firstly, the legal connotation suggests that the displacing is conducted by a State or government (an entity which makes laws). The case of the *Rohingya* illustrates that this act can also be carried out by the society. *Secondly*, 'displacement' signifies an 'elsewhere'—somewhere, another territory, to which the population in question can be appropriated. Statelessness does not imply this 'elsewhere,' it does not suggest an alternate location. Where does one place the stateless? Cases of statelessness are infamously difficult to 'solve' and pose a great challenge to problem-solving humanitarians. The UNHCR's track-record in solving cases of statelessness lags behind its handling of refugee situations. The traditional three durable solutions (return to country of origin, integration into the local society, and resettlement in a third-country) usually prescribed for refugee situations are often problematic when applied to the stateless, indicating the more complex nature of statelessness.

One case concerning a young *Rohingya* leader was very interesting because it shed light on a third defining feature—namely the deterministic nature of statelessness. After years of frustrating exile, he decided to return his UNHCR card to the respected agency,

claiming that he no longer wished to be a refugee. In this act, we see that one can choose to be or not to be a refugee—it is a status, which one can acquire, and lose, under certain conditions. Both when he was a refugee and no longer one, however, he was unable to escape his statelessness. This deterministic nature of statelessness is also delineated by the strange case of the Indonesian wives' 'voluntary statelessness.' Obviously, the UNHCR is reluctant to issue cards to these women because unlike Myanmar, Indonesia has never stripped them of citizenship. No one can be stateless by choice. As long as there has been no denial of citizenship, statelessness cannot and does not occur. Unlike refugee status, statelessness cannot be extended to spouses. Extension is only through inheritance. Parents pass it down to children. The vertical transfer of the condition mirrors the relationship between an individual and the sovereign. It should be noted that the crushing, deterministic nature of statelessness has increasingly been felt in the post-World War 11 period—as Kerber has shown in her work, the contours of statelessness change over time. Before then, as extensively delineated by James Scott (2009), to choose statelessness was a real option.[18] Today 'the art of not being governed' is a dying art. The luxury of statelessness is quite literally a thing of the past as zones of refuge fast disappear. My respondent's statement (marked in endnote 17) is profound because he—in spite of all his limitations—was remarkably perceptive of how technology (including the formulation of national citizenship as a technology of documents) has greatly aided the modern states' strategy of 'engulfment.'

Time is also on the nation-states' side as the growth of world's population has risen to an extent in which worry over a deficit in manpower is (seemingly) obsolete. If previous Southeast Asian rulers could not afford to be selective about their subjects, nowadays, national governments, with their abundant manpower, have the upper hand. They can select which people they acknowledge as citizens and which ones they wish to exclude. In the current 'national order of things,' then, people cannot afford to be stateless—everyone, whether they realize it or not— wants to be a citizen, wants to be state subject, even if that means being appropriated as a taxable member of the population. My respondents repeatedly uttered assurances that they were worthy of citizenship because they were good, strong workers—emphasizing

their manpower value which in earlier times was sufficient for conferment of citizenship.

To further illustrate the impossibility of refuge and escape to non-state spaces in present times, let us observe the Malay word for "refugee," which is *pelarian*. Read against my Indonesian background, this translates to me as 'runaway,' instead of 'refugee.' Now this is not a nationalistic bias, but 'runaway' illustrates the situation better. Malaysia's refusal to accept displaced populations signifies to me that increasingly, what forced migrants seeking asylum in various countries are likely to find are not zones of refuge, but simply zones of exile. In the setting where the hegemony of nation-states is almost complete, forced migrants can take flight to flee persecution in country of origin, but everywhere they go, they will encounter another state space. In the realm of migration studies, scholars are also increasingly preoccupied with 'secondary movements,' which further signals how escaping the state space is becoming impossible.

I have earlier outlined the *Rohingya*'s obsession to belong. In many narratives, they express such a longing to the extent that they wish the UNHCR would confine them to a camp. The desire for a space is expressed as a request for confinement. Such is the desperation of people who are excluded but paradoxically surrounded by state space everywhere. It is interesting that although often met with no response, the *Rohingya* continue to inundate the UNHCR with letters (either delivered personally or via post/facsimile), medical reports, unpaid bills and other proofs of suffering. Some regularly send the same documents for years. This persistence is a profound manifestation revealing the chronic nature of their plight. Protractedness and the disappointments they face in everyday living in Malaysia have led many to designate Malaysia, and not Myanmar, as the site of illness.[19] Homi Bhabha remarked that *a state of emergency allows for emergence*, but what happens when emergency is absent? Instead of surfacing into attention, the *Rohingya* turn into 'problem patients,' who are both frustrated at and frustrating to their caregivers.

Conclusions

Based on this study in statelessness, I am not sanguine about the viability of non-state actors in their

contributions in the struggle for the *Rohingya*'s belonging in a world of nations. Perhaps there are ways through which they can help alleviate the suffering, but as has been delineated by the discussion, non-state actors' resources and capacity are limited—most only last for emergency situations, while the *Rohingya* problem is clearly beyond emergency. Furthermore, well-intentioned efforts on the part of non-state actors often risk being seen as yet another project and sympathetic outsiders are not unsurprisingly thought of as interested only in making profit out of suffering. To illustrate, my taking photographs for research documentation was seen by a respondent as exploitative—he has seen photographic exhibitions of refugees in which the images came with price tags valued at thousands of ringgit. When a population has suffered from protracted and chronic suffering, is it probable that exploitation will be avoided entirely in advocacy and assistance?

As long as the national order of things prevails in the international system, the only effective and durable solution to this problem is conferment of citizenship—a political act which can only be performed by a nation-state. The *Rohingya* are quite pragmatic—although they would prefer to be citizens of a Muslim country, they are more than ready to take up any national identity provided it does not mean giving up their religious identity.

Given the nature of the boundaries drawn in the aftermath of colonialization, the burden of citizenship first falls with Myanmar—but the fact that this problem has become regionalized means that other countries also must take responsibility. What about the *Rohingdon* children for example? Their mothers are still Indonesian citizens—what has Indonesia done to assist them? And Malaysia—if conferment of citizenship is too costly (considering the magnet-effect), is it imaginable for the government to provide a national, legal identification that protects the *Rohingya* from abuses? That the *Rohingya* are illegal is debatable, but they are surely not criminals. It is crucial that the Malaysian government take a firm decision now on the *Rohingya* question. The minimum, pragmatic measure is to fix the legal status of the *Rohingya*. The IMM13 can be reconsidered and it is acceptable, but taking lessons from the previous failed registration, the people should be registered individually and not through committees and there should not be any reversion of policy. With regard to

the generation born in Malaysian soil, as a state party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Malaysia is under an obligation to extend citizenship, "to every child who is otherwise in danger of statelessness," hence the policy recommendation concerning them is clear. Children are not guilty of parents' migration.

While I have less faith in the subnational non-state actors, considerable thought ought to be given to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), particularly since its leaders have acknowledged the regional nature of the problem. If it cannot persuade Myanmar to accept the *Rohingya* as citizens, is it imaginable to issue a supranational identity card to protect the *Rohingya*? Are the *Rohingya* within our Southeast Asian imagination at all? The problem with ASEAN is that its members are only reminded of the *Rohingya* as a form of neoliberal crisis when a movement of this stateless population occurs and disturbs their fictional but definite boundaries. The *Rohingya* as a regional problem only manifests as a "problem" when they are presented as boat people (no decent modern citizen crosses international boundaries in abject dinghies), evoking the image of improper masses. It is crucial for the ASEAN community to recognize the neoliberal crisis of national citizenship and start extending assistance to people marginalized beyond emergency.

NOTES

[1] Rizal Sukma has hinted that in the 1980s, former Indonesian President Soeharto (who ironically entertained the idea of Indonesia playing the role of 'honest broker' in the region) considered assisting Myanmar in solving the Rohingya problem. This interest was concomitant with his concernment with the Moro in the Philippines. Nothing was ever actually attempted as the Cambodian conflict was then clearly on top of Soeharto's political agenda (given his anti-communist stance). Sukma, R. 1999. *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship*. London: Routledge, p. 182.

[2] The bulk of them were concentrated in Ampang and Klang (around 30 km from the center of Kuala Lumpur). In the first half of the fellowship period (July-December 2009), I visited Ampang, Selayang, Cheras Baru, Puchong, Seremban, Klang, Serdang, Sentul, Kajang, Balakong and Taming Jaya to do a general survey on the dispersed Rohingya population in Klang Valley. The latter half of the research period was focused on Puchong, which presented an interesting site for

the research as it hosted an assorted population of Burmese in exile.

[3] Complying with the UNHCR's demand that the Rohingya appoint just one organization as representative, in 2009 the Rohingya Society Malaysia (RSM) was appointed. In a matter of months however, its authority began to be challenged by some leaders of committees formed earlier.

[4] The difference in dialects seemingly has often caused frustration during interview sessions at the UNHCR. An incident, for example, occurred in November 2009 in which a man originally from Kyauktaw was ruled out as a Rohingya because he used the word *kola* for banana. The UNHCR interpreter apparently used *kila*, which is closer to the Chittangongian pronunciation. Years of intermingling in exile, however, have resulted in a linguistic assimilation and it is perhaps safe to say that they all belong to the same speech community. Often, those from Kyauktaw (who are outnumbered by those from Maungdaw and Buthidaung) adopt the words used by those closer to the border.

[5] Interview in Serdang, September 24, 2009.

[6] Chris Lewa from the Arakan Project, together with her colleague who conducts fieldwork among Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, helped me in understanding this Rohingya/Anikka distinction, noting that, "This word is only used by Rohingya, not in Bangladesh. According to my understanding they called "people from the West" Anikka. For example, Buthidaung people call Maungdaw people "chota Anikka" (or "small Anikka") and they call the Bangladeshis "bara Anikka' (or "big Anikka"). But Maungdaw people only use "Anikka" for Bangladeshis, without adding chota or bara." Email message to author, December 7, 2009. That this term is used by Rohingya only and not Bangladeshis puts considerable weight behind their claims to Myanmar soil.

[7] In addition to reading this peculiar habit (almost a maddening obsession) as protestation against the foreigner label, one can also read this as mimicry. Like a broken mirror, in these acts of "purifying," they simulate what has been inflicted on them by the nation-states.

[8] Multiple narratives.

[9] Malaysia and Myanmar are often described in the narratives as *adik-beradik* (siblings).

[10] Response to questions by the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), April 2004.

[11] This vilification of the movements is imbued with an underlying prejudice against the ethnic minorities which are viewed as supporting the British under the colonial rule.

[12] Interview in Puchong, January 29, 2010.

[13] Interview in Puchong, May 7, 2010.

[14] Interview with NLD Malaysia Chairman, April 5, 2010.

[15] Interview in Selayang, September 14, 2009.

[16] Interview in Kg. Cheras Baru, September 2009.

[17] Interview in Puchong, February 4, 2010. Despite its limited capacity, the UNHCR card is not completely meaningless. If that were the case, we would not have seen forgery of this card among the refugee communities in Klang Valley.

[18] Some of my older informants recall how before the 1970s, their parents could turn their back on the Burmese government and refuse to be incorporated into the state, most notably by refusing to send their children to school and instead insisting on their learning Islamic scripts and Urdu.

[19] In the realm of bodily symptoms, heart disease seems common. Heart problems are mostly associated with constantly living in fear, heartache and heartbreak from the bad treatment they have received. The heart is often the main target, because, said a respondent, of "its soft and fragile nature." Chronic pain is also often reported, even in children.

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Interfaith Dialogue in Mindanao: Sharing a Common Hope and Mutual Fears

Siti Sarah Muwahidah

Introduction

The Philippines is among the countries in Asia with a history of tension between Muslims and Christians. The conflict in Mindanao is not a religious conflict; yet, it has religious dimensions. Deles (2006) describes the Mindanao conflict as a conflict "between those who were colonized and those who resisted conquest; between those who have power to claim the land, and those who lost their homelands; between those who were baptized in Christianity and those who adhered to Islam which had arrived earlier."

During colonial periods, the distribution of economic resources often favors a particular group, thus pushing the marginalized groups to use their ethnicity and religiosity in order to mobilize resistance for the sake of achieving equality (Irobi 2005). Therefore, although triggered by non-religious issues, conflict can be compounded by interreligious tension (Appleby 2000). The colonial policies from the time of the Spaniards to the time of the American occupation of the Philippines dispossessed Muslims and other indigenous peoples of over 80 percent of Mindanao's lands. These policies were preserved by the Philippine government, resulting in the minoritization of the Muslims in Mindanao in their very own homeland; they also created conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Mindanao over agricultural lands (Rodil 2004). Minoritization is also allegedly one supporting justification behind the quest of the Bangsamoro[1] for self-determination.

The Bangsamoro`s struggle for sovereignty, accompanied by asymmetric political power and the social disparity between the Muslims and the Christians in the Philippines, has sustained the tension between the two groups for years. Long periods of political separation and stigmatization have cultivated prejudice between them. Continuing tension and communal strife underscore the urgent need for dialogue. In Mindanao, interfaith dialogue found direct relevance and immediate application (LaRousse 2001).

Objectives

By observing grassroots interfaith dialogue practices in Mindanao, this study intends to (1) examine interfaith dialogue's role in promoting peace and solidarity between Christians and Muslims and (2) investigate the perspective of the Muslims and the Christians as the minority and majority groups involved in the dialogue, respectively, as well as the power relationship prevailing between them.

Methods

This study is based on fieldwork and literature research. Fieldwork was conducted in the Philippines for five months (10 October 2009–10 March 2010): three months in Mindanao and two in Manila. The longest observation was held in Zamboanga City, with additional observations made in Jolo, Davao, Cotabato City, and Marawi City. Data were collected through interviews, participant observation, and literature research.

Zamboanga City

Located in the western part of Mindanao, Zamboanga's name originated from *Jambangan* (a place of flowers) or *Sambuan* (the long pole of the *vintas*, the local boat). Both words came from the early Malay settlers. The Subanonswere the first inhabitants of Zamboanga, followed by the Samals, the Badjao, and then the Tausug. The latter moved to Zamboangawhen the city became an international trading center for the Chinese, the Malays, and other groups (13th–14th centuries CE). Close ties between Zamboanga and the Sultanate of Sulu were created during this period (Spoehr 1973).

The Spaniards introduced Christianity to Zamboanga in the 16thcentury CE. Intermarriages between the locals and the Spaniards produced a new ethnic group: the Zamboangueño. *Chavacano*, a mixture of Spanish and the local dialect, developed through such interaction. During the American era, ZamboangaCity was the capital city of the Moro Province (1903–1913), which encompassed the whole of Mindanao (Spoehr 1973;Malcampo 1996).

Today, Zamboanga is a center of trade and education, and host of police and military bases. It has suffered several bombings, incidents of dissidence, and kidnappings. The city's population is very diverse. Ethnic groups that currently inhabit Zamboanga City include the Subanon, the Samal, the Badjau, the Tausug, the Yakkan, the Zamboangueño, the Visayas, and some migrants from Luzon.

In 1990, the Muslim population was 101,239 (22.96%), the Lumad/Subanon population was 1,790 (0.41%) and the others (predominantly Christian) accounted for 218,163 (49.5%) of the total 440,874 inhabitants.[2] The Philippine government's settlement program eventually brought over Christians from Luzon and the Visayas.Migrations from Sulu during martial law and the all-out war against the Muslim separatist groups[3] in Mindanao increased the Muslim population (Barrios-Fabian 2004;D'Ambra 2008). The city's strong ties with Spanish culture was greatly valued, and inspired Zamboanga City to be branded Asia's "Latin City".

Interfaith Dialogue Practices in Zamboanga City

Zamboanga City is the center of interfaith dialogue in the Philippines (Kato 2008). Many extensive interfaith programs have been developed there since the 1980s. The enormous annual interfaith event known as the "Week of Peace" was initiated in Zamboanga City, and has since been replicated by many cities across Mindanao and Sulu.

NGOs, religious groups, and universities manage the interfaith initiatives in Zamboanga. The following are the profiles of some of these institutions:

The Silsilah Dialogue Movement

Silsilah was founded by an Italian priest, Fr. SebastianoD'Ambra, PIME, who has worked with Christians and Muslims since 1977. Silsilah means a "chain" connecting people and a "link" within human families. Silsilahpromotes commitment to live the spirituality of life-in-dialogue, identified by four pillars as follows: (1) Dialogue with God, (2) Dialogue with oneself, (3) Dialogue with others and (4) Dialogue with Creation. Dialogue is considered a lifestyle that should be sustained every time and everyday. It should not be regarded merely as a (temporary) strategy to achieve a certain goal. Living in dialogue is a path to ultimate peace (Ambra 2008).

Located in a spacious center named Harmony Village, Silsilahhas executed programs in various sectors. Among these programs are: training on the culture of dialogue and peace through aSilsilah summer course, and various regular forums, including those conducted by Silsilah alumni in several cities in Mindanao; community education programs as well as Silsilah's kindergarten and elementary schools; and a dialogue with creation program that includes farmer organizing, training on sustainable and indigenous agriculture, and environmental advocacy. Silsilah also initiated the formation of the *Interfaith Council of Leaders (IFCL)*, a forum of Muslim and Christian leaders that has designed some interfaith programs (Ambra 2008).

SALAM (Social and Literacy Agenda for Muslims Foundation)

SALAM was established by Muslim leaders in Zamboanga in 1994. The President of SALAM is Hj. Ahmad Sakaluran, while its Executive Director is Prof. AlihAiyub. SALAM is an independent NGO funded primarily by personal donations (*waqf*) from the Muslim community. All of its members work for this organization on a voluntary basis. SALAM focuses on Muslim education and development, and on the promotion of understanding between Muslims and Christians. It has collaborated with Peace Advocate Zamboanga (PAZ) and Silsilah in conducting interfaith activities. It also facilitates training on the culture of peace as well as dialogues with different groups (LaRousse 2001).

Peace Advocate Zamboanga (PAZ)

PAZ was initiated by the Archdiocese of Zamboanga City in 1994 to promote peace by developing good relations between Muslims and Christians, and others. The chairman of PAZ is Fr. Angel Calvo, a Spanish missionary who has been working with Christians and Muslims in Basilan and Zamboanga for a long time. PAZ and SALAM are especially famous for their collaboration on the Week of Peace program, which consists of campaigns and celebrations focused on the culture of peace and dialogue. This annual event attended by thousands of people involves a series of activities conducted by many organizations (LaRousse 2001).

The concept behind the Zamboanga Week of Peace was adopted by the government, and has been replicated in other cities. PAZ's other programs include: advocacy through consultations, conferences,

the publication of an alternative newspaper, and a radio program;Peace Educationthroughtraining seminars-workshops; and sustainable activities as well as research and publications.

Ateneo De Zamboanga University (ADZU)

Ateneo de ZamboangaUniversity (ADZU) has been involved in peace and dialogue activities. The school has committed to being an agent of change for peace and development in the city, the region, and the nation. Most of ADZU's peace programs are managed by the Ateneo Peace and Cultural Institutes (APCI), which aims to foster better understanding among multi-cultural and multi-religious peoples. APCI's main program is to develop peace education programs in all levels of instruction and formation in the curricular and co-curricular areas in ADZU. APCI also conducts research, builds networks, and offers programs related to developing a culture of peace for the government, NGOs, the military, and other communities and groups. To enhance the students' spiritual growth, the ADZU Campus Ministry Office sponsors regular activities, including retreats for Muslim and Christian students.

Common features and differences

Most interfaith dialogue initiatives have a common goal: *to achieve peace*. There are some basic commonalities among their methods, such as facilitating interaction between people from different religious backgrounds, promoting a culture of dialogue and a culture of peace, as well as initiating collaboration among religious leaders in a forum or work project, or in releasing joint statements on peace issues.

The content and values promoted in the interfaith program are based on, or at least mention, the Bible, Nostra Aetate,[4] the Qur'an, the Common Word document,[5] and the Philippines government's concept of the six paths of peace.

The differences among those institutions are found along the level of their target groups and styles. For example, ADZU generally focuses on students and academics, using education, training, interfaith encounters, and immersion. PAZ, Silsilah, and SALAM target religious leaders, educators, the youth, and communities. PAZ advocates current peace issues, usually by releasing statements issued by religious leaders on peace and political issues. PAZ also

conducts annual mass campaigns and releases alternative news. Silsilah focuses on making dialogue a way of life, developing dialogue forums, and maintaining continuity and the frequency of dialogues among the regular participants. Silsilah and PAZ also use the local radio for talk shows on interfaith and peace. Lastly, SALAM concentrates on the education and empowerment of the Muslim community. It also collaborates with PAZ and Silsilahon some interfaith programs.

What motivates and hinders participants from joining interfaith dialogues?

Most participants believe that an interfaith encounter is one way of bringing about peace. Through such encounter, participants are motivated to learn about other religions and cultures, and will hopefully work on breaking down the barriers between them. This motivation is sometimes accompanied by a deeper one, spiritual in nature, to go on a spiritual journey together, based on the notion that knowing the religious other would deepen one's understanding of one's own faith. Some treat interfaith dialogues as a religious mission, while others see it as an opportunity to clarify misunderstandings and negative images of their religion—the last motivation being held mostly by Muslims.

There are several different reasons why people hesitate to join interfaith dialogues. *First*, some are afraid that an interfaith dialogue will be used to proselytize. Among Muslims this fear is particularly caused by the fact that some interfaith institutions are led by priests. A Muslim activist explained that this hesitation is not so much because of their distrust of Christians, but of priests. In the past, especially during the colonial period, priests always attempted conversion, so that some Muslims continue to suffer from this trauma and sense of distrust (Anonymous interview by the author, 17 January 2010).

Second, somepeoplebelieve in the benefit of interfaith dialogue but do not trust the facilitator. Their fear does not stem from the prospect of being converted, but from possible manipulation for "other agendas".

Third, Kato (2008) noted the reluctance of some Christian clergy to join dialogues. Their indifference is believed to have partly originated from their distrust of the Muslim community, a stance that has evolved over centuries of disputes.

Fourth, some people believe in dialogue and trust the institution, but do not have the self-confidence to join due to their lack of knowledge of their own religion. They have little to share during the dialogue and feel hesitant to encounter others who might be more religiously knowledgeable.

Fifth, some people do not see significant benefits from dialogue. They see interfaith dialogue as a good concept, but they do not believe that it could eliminate discrimination and prejudice in society. This view is more popular among Muslims. Some Muslims argue that despite many efforts at interfaith dialogue, the anti-Muslim bias remains high. Also, Christian acceptance of Muslims is less than Muslim acceptance of Christians (Rood 2005, 23; Lingga2005, 3).

Strengths and impacts

Interfaith approaches are becoming an increasingly popular means of rebuilding relationships in conflict-affected communities, even when religion is not the root of the conflict. David Smock (2002) observes, "If the opposing groups are differentiated by religious identity, then interfaith dialogue can be productively employed" (Smock 2002, 17).

An interfaith activist in Zamboanga explained that even though Muslims and Christians live in the same area, and some of them marry each other, the tension between them remains:

> ...you cannot just [mingle] with each other, I do not know...basically, we always have these biases deeply seated within...Muslims are afraid of Christians, and Christians are afraid of Muslims....But when they started to talk, they started to share, and they found, "Ah both of us are afraid".....[and then they start laughing]. ...It is very good that we start to talk to each other (Anonymous interview, 8 January 2010)

Interfaith programs provide venues for Muslims and Christians to meet and talk. Their exposure to each other on such occasions enables them to have a better understanding of each other and lessens their prejudice toward others. Such programs also help them build new relationships and, in many cases, pave the way for them to start working together. Through their "bridge-building" activities, interfaith dialogues ameliorate relationships between groups that have been directly and indirectly affected by ongoing conflicts.

The construction of positive perceptions and relationships indicates "micro level change" in the community of dialogue. The positive change in attitude toward other faiths is, indeed, an important element in peace building. A KonsultMindanawreport stated, "The less receptive the public is to other faiths and cultures, the less tolerant it will likely be toward peace building." Though there have been some concerns about the limited reach of such dialogue enterprise (Rood 2005, 12), the growing numbers of people joining interfaith forums indicate a positive future for dialogue.

Dialogue also helps advance reconciliation and cures the traumatic experience of conflict. A participant in one such dialogue, whose three family members were killed by Muslims, said that she was able to resolve her traumatic memory and bitterness toward Muslims after engaging in dialogue and having extensive interfaith interaction with them. She testified that the experience in dialogue helped her achieve reconciliation and has changed her life. She is now able to love her Muslim sister-in-law and niece, whom she previously could not face because of her deep agony. She shared:

> God has blessed me to the level that I [now]see a person as a person. I was able to touch my niece [when] she was already nine months old. I carried her and I was really whispering, "I am sorry, please forgive me." You know, I [had] really wanted to hold the baby, but I could not...because of the anger, because of the [Muslim] mother. Now, [my niece] always tells her mother, I love [my aunt] so much. I think this is how the [bigger]reconciliation will start; it is for the next generation (Anonymous interview, 8 January 2010).

On the societal level, the active involvement of some local religious leaders becomes one key element in disseminating the concept of interfaith dialogue in Zamboanga. The leaders help promote a culture of peace, and influence public opinion on peace issues. The campaign for a culture of peace and a culture of dialogue aims to give alternative perspectives for resolving conflict and to dissuade people from resorting to violence. It is highly expected that by continually educating people on the culture of peace, the cycle of violence can gradually be broken.

Grassroots religious leaders also have the power to preempt violence by communicating publicly on 'vitriolic topics' related to the conflict and by clarifying

divisive rumors that exacerbate tension between communities (Bock 1999). One of the latest examples was the religious leaders' statement on the recent spate of homicides in Zamboanga City.[6]

Furthermore, the interfaith dialogue movement in Zamboanga is not only about conversation, but also action. Participants are not confined to having a classroom conversation/discussion; rather, they use diverse approaches, methods, and media. Besides the conferences, courses, and workshops that make it possible for the people to learn about and discuss interfaith issues, community exposure, mass-campaigns, and festivals give the dialogue direct access to the surrounding community. The movement also has quite good accessstothe grassroots. Many interfaith community programs have improved the lives of a considerable number of people, especially in terms of education and economic empowerment. There are kindergartens, elementary schools, and even *madrasa*[7] that are managed by interfaith organizations, which also offer training for poor women wishing to generate additional income. Indeed, interfaith programs in Zamboangaare not limited to religious issues but also focus on education, women, health, and the environment. The interfaith movement's independence from government also gives it autonomy and increases (improves) its credibility among the people.

Limitations and Challenges

The dynamic of interfaith dialogue is affected by its surrounding socio-historical context and the power relationships among the agents of dialogue. Many challenges are manifested by the imbalance of power between the majority and the minority groups involved in dialogue. The implication here is that the problem is not inherently rooted in Christian or Muslim tradition, but in the power relationship between the Muslims and the Christians.

Asymmetrical dialogue

> There is an inevitable degree of asymmetry in interreligious dialogue [in Mindanao]. Islam has no hierarchy, whereas the Catholic Church is very bureaucratic. Muslims are immersed in the predominantly Christian culture of the Philippines, while Christians have essentially ignored Muslim culture. And, it must be said, the distrust that Christians feel for Muslims is greater than Muslim distrust of Christians (Rood 2005,22).

Ever since the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church has officially supported interfaith dialogue, which it regards as its religious mission. Encouraged by central authority, Christians enjoy better structural and cultural support in executing interfaith dialogue than do the Muslims. This might be one reason why most dialogues in Mindanao are initiated by Christians, and why it is easier to convince Christians to join the dialogue.[8] Also, the absence of a structural hierarchy in Islam may be an indication that Muslim leaders have varying opinions on interfaith dialogue.

The fact that the initiatives and funding of interfaith programs mostly come from Christians contributes to the asymmetry of the dialogue, particularly in terms of bargaining power, style/content, and number of participants per faith. A Muslim activist said that despite his high official position within the dialogue organization, he is rarely involved in the decision-making process:

> I am only there as a name, they do not give me responsibilities. They don't discuss all their issues with me, except issues on the Muslims; other issues, no. They just ask [me]about [my] opinion...like what does the Muslim say about this... But the decision comes from them. They make their own programs (Anonymous interview by the author, January 2010)

He further explained that most of the time, the Muslim staff are only involved in the implementation of the dialogue. The major concept and design of the programs are mainly arranged by Christian leaders and executives. There were instances when his recommendations were not implemented, which propensity might explain why some Muslims still do not feel as though they "own" this movement.

Addressing imbalances of power between the organizer, facilitators, and participants in the dialogue is imperative. Symmetric arrangements should be made in the process and in the design of the program (Nimer 2002;Gopin 2002). The inequality in the program could affect the credibility of the interfaith dialogue itself. This was illustrated by the huge protest launched against the Bishop Ulama Conference in Jolo in November 2008.[9]

But a Muslim activist in Jolo explained that the protest was held, not so much because Muslims opposed the idea of dialogue, but because of 'the one-sidedness of the program.' From the conference program book

(which was released prior to the event), the people learned that there would be only one presentation delivered by a Muslim leader, compared to several by Christian figures. People also knew that the designated Muslim presenter would not be able to attend, since he was on a pilgrimage to Mecca. People similarly criticized the fact that the local *ulama* in Jolo were not consulted about the content of the activities and that the history of Sulu was presented by Christians and not Muslims, despite the fact that Muslims constitute the majority of the population in Jolo (Anonymous interview by the author, January 2010).

The asymmetry may also manifest itself in the nature of the encounter, language, structure, and cultural ethos (Gopin 2002). For example, some Muslims have shared their discontent over the use of the word "baptism" in the Certificate of Baptism of Muslim children, since the word is Christian-centric and has the potential to be misunderstood. The certificate itself refers to the *paggunting* ritual, an initiation ceremony for a Muslim baby. The institution that releases this certificate in partnership with an interfaith institution has the good intention of preparing the document that could temporarily take the place of birth certificates.[10] But though the word "baptism" is not an uncommon substitute for the *paggunting* ritual in daily conversation, some Muslims still see its usage in the formal sense as an insensitive and ignorant gesture. Hayward (2009) notes that minority or marginalized communities, in particular, are touchy about the choice of certain languages. Which language is used, who is comfortable with what language, and what political statements are being made in a symbolic sense by the use of a language should be carefully weighed (Gopin 2002).

Some Muslims also feel anxious about some interfaith activities that make it necessary for them to compromise their Islamic ideals. Some parents thus discourage their children from joining any dialogue since some activities are not Islamic: one frequent example cited is the dancing (one of the youth activities). The same sentiment has been echoed by many young Muslim participants.[11] The recommended solution for this dilemma is not to ban Christian and secular activities, but to balance them with Islamic activities. Hisanori Kato (2008), who observed interfaith activities in Zamboanga some years ago, stated, "It is a concern that the activities and events are mainly Christian-centered. It also reflects the socio-political environment in Zamboanga, probably in the Philippines, in general" (Kato 2008, 31).

The present majority and minority situation in the Philippines is a product of Western colonialism carried over from the past to the present. More an unintended product of Spanish colonialism, it is likewise a product of the colonial order and colonial design during the American regime in the Philippines. Later, the government of the Philippines did not only preserve this colonial legacy, but also institutionalized the status of cultural minorities within Philippine society (Rodil 2004). For instance, government policy has been promoting the migration of people from Luzon and the Visayas, to Mindanao. As a result, Zamboanga today is characterized by a unique Hispanized culture, and the presence of Christians who represent both Zamboanga's majority voice and the national hegemony.

Domination by the majority usually exists at the subconscious level; it can be unintended and invisible. But when domination is internalized by mainstream culture and the social structure, it can be perceived as a norm. The minority group might be unaware of this domination, some of them already having been assimilated to the dominant culture; yet, many others might present some form of resistance. Hence, in the context of the interfaith movement, the reluctance of Muslims to join dialogue could be seen as a sign of resistance.[12]

People usually attribute the Muslim indifference to the interfaith movement to the Muslim's suspicion and historical distrust of Christians, and even to their anti-modernism stance; rather than to the presence asymmetry in the interfaith dialogue. By considering the asymmetry, however, one can view Muslim reluctance to join interfaith dialogue as a form of resistance toward domination, rather thanas an indication of their aversion to Christian and/or modern culture per se. Some Muslims do not see interfaith dialogue as a neutral and liberating venue, since it continues to project the dominating culture in everyday society.

Nimer (2002, 21–22) states,

> Addressing the imbalance of power that exists outside the dialogue room (or in reality) is central in designing and managing an effective interfaith dialogue process.... The interfaith dialogue framework cannot bring such imbalance of power into the dialogue without intentionally addressing it through various arrangements.... If conveners do not seek such balance...they may perpetuate the power imbalance that exists outside the dialogue group.

Therefore, Christians, in their capacity as the majority and major decision makers, should also be aware of their existing cultural domination, both in the small context of dialogue and in the larger social environment. To dismantle the colonial legacy of domination-minoritization,they should start by minimizing the presence of asymmetry, which prevents the development of equal dialogue—a fact that has discouraged the minority group from becoming more involved in dialogue. Many people may not be aware that the domination by the Christian (and modern-secular) culture of some interfaith activities could be seen as a kind of cultural proselytization. While it is subtler than verbal proselytization, it still restrains some Muslims from joining the movement.

Cross-cultural sensitivity as a critical element of dialogue

On the other side, the Christians also hold some fear of Muslims. Islamic methods of proselytization have caused Christians some anxiety. One Christian figure bitterly said that it seems many Muslims do not want to stop proselytizing their religion to Christians (Anonymous interview by the author, January 2010). Similarly, one Christian admitted that he once felt uncomfortable with the passionate "theological sharing" made by one Muslim participant during their personal discussion (Anonymous interview by the author, 21 January 2010).

In responding to this issue, some Muslims argue that they do not force people to convert. Instead, they claim that what they do is simply tell the truth as they perceive it. Indeed, some Muslims are more familiar with the recently popular Muslim-Christian theological debate, and cannot distinguish it from the interfaith dialogue approach. They are unaware that the culture of dialogue "disapproves" of this "proselytization attitude". JacoCiliers (2002, 55) states, "Those engaged in interfaith dialogue should come to the table with the understanding that differences do exist and that the objective is not to 'correct' but to hear and listen to the other side."

In such cases, Muslims should understand the ground rules of interfaith dialogue: it is not a venue for conversion. The Muslims should be more sensitive to the feelings of their dialogue partners by not starting theological debates.

In order to create a more conducive environment during dialogue, Muslims and Christians should cultivate cross-cultural awareness and sensitivity. Strong cross-cultural sensitivity enables people to select appropriate behavior and expressions during interactions with people from different cultures. Considering how interfaith dialogue is not limited to verbal exchange, actions and even gestures should also be taken into account.

One active member of interfaith programs confided that his family, which had initially disapproved of his involvement in interfaith dialogue, became very fond of the calendar published by the interfaith center. They like the calendar because it incorporates the Islamic calendar into the Gregorian calendar and has a list of explanations on Islamic holy days and Islamic terms. On another occasion, I observed two Muslim participants nodding contentedly when they saw Muslim prayer time (prayer break) listed in the schedule of a proposed activity. Simple gestures that show respect for another's culture could be meaningful in the interfaith encounter.

Discrimination and minority rights

The notion of minority rights is rarely mentioned in the interfaith dialogue discourse in Zamboanga City. Though many Muslims were driven to use dialogue as an opportunity to diminish prejudice and to clarify misconceptions about Islam as a minority group, they had not yet seen the interfaith movement as a source of empowerment or protection against discrimination and minoritization.[13]

Discrimination against Muslims in the Philippines is common. Many Muslims report having been rejected while trying to buy and rent properties because they were Muslim. A number have also found it difficult to apply for jobs in Christian schools and malls in Zamboanga. Consequently, some Muslims have chosen to change their names so that a prospective employer would not be able to ascertain their religious identity.[14] Some claim that Muslims have yet to be treated as "real citizens" in this country.[15]

The discrimination mainly originates from the strong bias against Muslims, which fact a survey has disclosed. The same survey noted the reluctance of Christians to hire Muslim workers.[16] Majority of the Christians cannot even accept Muslims as neighbors. According to the same study, 57 percent of the people in Metro Manila would rather pay higher rent for their abodes provided these were far from a Muslim community.

Unfortunately, although discrimination "as a topic" has been addressed in the dialogue, the interfaith dialogue movement has not yet begun to seriously advocate it. A young Muslim staff in a dialogue institution said, "We cannot do anything, because they are majority misconceptions *(the anti-Muslim bias)* nowadays." She added, "Maybe we can take a little step, but not to the extent of solving it right away."[17]

Sometimes, a majority group cannot even sense the discrimination, such that when the minority complains, the majority group considers it a non-issue. For instance, some Muslim students shared how they were asked to remove their headscarf during physical education class, prompting them to complain about this matter to the college ministry officer who organizes interfaith dialogue and was thus expected to have a good interfaith understanding. The officer showed some empathy, but appeared not to have done anything beyond listening to them, as no changes have been effected thus far (Interview with some Muslim students in Cotabato City, February 2010.).

It is not enough to address discrimination during the dialogue session or in normative lectures. Interfaith dialogues should also exert more effort to change the existing social structure that supports discrimination. Religious discrimination should be treated as an "interfaith" problem, and not merely as a minority problem. Discrimination is a form of structural violence that can engender a more extreme form of violence which, in the end, may threaten both minority and majority groups. The emergence of a radicalized minority is one inevitable ramification of perpetual discrimination.

Just as prevalent discrimination has caused exclusion of the minority from economic development, education, jobs, and business opportunities, so has it become a contributing factor to radicalization (Lingga 2006; Rasul 2009).[18] The absence of work and a stable income have driven some Muslim family members to commit acts of violence. One report reveals that some of the youth in Basilan consider it better to become a member of the Abu Sayyaf so they could get some money (KonsultMindanaw2010). Correspondingly, the development of the minority-radicalized group in the Philippines has worsened the anti-Muslim bias and discrimination. Therefore, the vicious cycle of violence has surfaced.

Thus, one way of cutting the cycle of cultural and structural violence would be to de-intensify discrimination. Interfaith movements in the Philippines actually have great potential to do this since the movements have been greatly supported and led by the members of the majority group. The majority group has a better bargaining position and greater access to the policymakers who could amend discriminatory policies and practices toward the minority. Moreover, by maintaining its passivity to the minority problem, interfaith dialogue could lose its credibility. Susan Hayward (2010) asserted,

> Dialogue that does not lead to transformations beyond the dialogue room can result in resentments among participants, particularly those of minority or disempowered communities. For the majority group, the gaining of empathy is often a sufficient final goal of the dialogue sessions. *But*, members of minorities will desire more than talk, hoping that the majority community will subsequently support efforts to gain greater justice for their communities.

Some people who used to participate in interfaith movement told the author that the interfaith dialogue is a niceconcept. But, now, they no longer believe that the dialogue could help the majority understand the predicament of the minority.

The avoidance of sensitive and political issues

An interfaith dialogue leader said that they prefer not to talk about issues, for instance, the kidnapping and killings[19] in the Zamboanga Peninsula and Sulu, that hurt the feelings of a particular group. He said that talking about these issuesin the presence of Muslims would make themfeel very much uncomfortable (Anonymous interview by the author, 27 January 2010).

Nonetheless, avoiding discussion or talk about sensitive issues may well preserve bias and division. In a 22 January 2010 interview, a Muslim activist said that she would prefer to talk about this current form of violence even if it involved acts committed by other Muslims. She would take that dialogue as an opportunity to show Christians that she is against such violent acts,thereby clarifying that Islam does not support terrorism.[20]

A Christian activist also argued that talk on sensitive issues should not be withheld; instead participants should avoid pinning the blame on one group as the source of a problem, or claiming that it is one group's

sole responsibility to solve the problem. The activist maintained that discussion of sensitive issues should focus on how to solve these issues together (Anonymous interview by the author, 22 January 2010).

Given the pros and cons ofdiscussing political issues during interfaith sessions, some interfaith initiatives have altogether avoided engaging in discussions ofdivisive political issues during the dialogue.[21] They claim that it is impossible to have a rational discussion on ongoing political issues, as this would only create conflict between Muslim and Christian participants. To maintain a harmonious atmosphere in the encounter, therefore, they are inclined to merely talk about peaceful issues. The discussion of political issues is also thus mainly restricted to the circles of academics and leaders. The common procedure has been to publish joint statements made by interreligious leaders with regard to controversial political issues. This strategy might be more effective if the majority understood the current socio-political development pertaining topeace issues.

One peace activist said that many people do not have knowledge of the current conflict and peace process. Neither do they have the skill to analyze a sensitive issue objectively. Thus, they are easily trapped by assumptions and misinformation.

The 2010 Konsult Mindanaw report characterized the lack of information and consultation in the current peace process as one of the main factorsthat has caused people to oppose the previous peace agreement, namely, the recently aborted MOA-AD. This report also said that, despite the wide diversity of opinions and perspectives on this hot topic, confusion and misinformation about the contents of MOA-AD were common.[22]

One cannot deny that the official peace process could affect the grassroots peace initiative. The ups and downs of official dialogue have influenced the relationship between Muslims and Christians in Zamboanga.[23] Not knowing about current developments or possible controversial peace arrangements might well contribute to the fragility of interfaith relationships. Though people could avoid political issues in the dialogue session, they cannot escape it in daily life, because the issues are realities that will affect their community.

There are some initiatives for civic dialogue or peace consultations that talk about political issues related to the peace process. Some of them are led by religious figures (usually priests from religious orders: Jesuits, OMI). Muslims, Christians, and the Lumadare involved in such civic dialogue,which they consider to be secular rather than religious.

So how can people talk about these issues in secular dialogue, while avoiding them in interfaith dialogue? It seems that there is an invisible demarcation between what interfaith dialogue should do and not do. This is in stark contrast to the position of some peace experts who suggest using interfaith dialogue to deal with conflict issues. These experts claim that the element of spirituality would help participants pursue transformation or change in their perceptions of conflict (Smock 2005).

By choosing to avoid certain topics, the dialogue deprives the participants of the chance to exercise their critical awareness of the current conflict; even worse, the movement could be seen to support the status quo. A strong critique came from Arquiza (in Diaz 2003) goes:

> Well-meaning religious groups and peace institutions, both Muslim and Christian, have also become unwitting accomplices as counter-insurgency instruments, by propelling interfaith dialogue, and peace and reconciliation programs that are uncritical of historical wrongs and by choosing to evade the issue of *Bangsamoro* identity and the clamor for self determination.

Avoiding discussions of political issues and power-relation issues in the dialogue programs would only worsen the problem. Nimer (1999) asserts that facing and discussing current conflicts are constructive rather than destructive acts.

Conclusion

One should remember that conducting interfaith dialogue in a community that still faces ongoing protracted conflict is not easy. The security situation indicates that dialogue could be risky. Therefore, the existence of sustainable interfaith dialogues in such a community is a significant achievement in itself.

Interfaith dialogue has made significant contributions to relationship building, eliminating prejudice, offering reconciliation, and continuously showing

proof that peaceful coexistence is possible. Also, the participants' experience in encountering "others" could deeply impact their perspective and ease their trauma from the conflict.

However, accomplishments at the interpersonal level have not yet been accompanied by significant transformation in the societal level, namely to eradicate structural violence and cultural domination. The current dialogue has not yet escaped from the asymmetrical power-relationship between the minority Muslims and the majority Christians in society. The considerable degree of asymmetry and the presence of cultural domination are dissuasive and (even) destructive elements for nurturing a just and equal dialogue.

Interfaith movements should address the asymmetry of power within themselves to avoid replicating the existing domination in society. They should also exert greater effort in eradicating prevalent discrimination against the minority. The dialogue cannot avoid the fact that there are conflicts in Zamboanga City and Mindanao. It should incorporate talk about the current political–peace issues to advance the efficacy of the peace–building process. Preserving passivity in advocating minority rights, and ignoring political and power relation issues for the sake of "harmony" in dialogue will only contribute to the escalation of the conflict in the future.

The interfaith movement should empower both majority and minority groups. Empowering the minority group means increasing its ability to criticize the environment and the issues in its internal community, as well as in its relation to the majority group in the community. Empowering the majority group, on the other hand, means increasing the group's awareness of and involvement in the state, in the formulation governmental policies, and in increasing awareness of its political and social responsibilities.[24] By following all these recommendations, the interfaith movement may succeed increasing a genuine and liberating dialogue.

NOTES

[1] TheBangsamoroconsist of 13 Muslim ethno-linguistic groups living in Mindanao, Sulu, Palawan, and Tawi-tawi. The term "Bangsamoro" comes from the Malay word *bangsa*, meaning *nation* or *people*, and the Spanish word *moro*, from the older Spanish word *moor*, which was the Reconquista-period term for Arabs or Muslims (Lingga 2005).

[2] Appendix in Rodil (2004). According to the National Statistics Office (NSO), in 2000, Muslims made up about 5.1 percent of the Philippines' total population of 80.9 million inhabitants; while according to the Office of Muslim Affairs, Muslims made up about 10 percent of the total population (as cited in PHDR 2005).

[3] Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

[4] *Nostra Aetate* is "The Declaration on The Relation of the Church to Non-Christian Religions Proclaimed by His Holiness Pope Paul VI On October 28, 1965" (the Second Vatican Council). The full text is available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html

[5] "A Common Word Between Us and You" is a message that declares the common ground between Christianity and Islam. It was signed by 138 Muslim scholars, clerics, and intellectuals from several countries. It was released by Jordan's Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought at the end of Ramadan on 11 October 2007. It is a follow-up message to a shorter letter sent in 2006, in response to Pope Benedict XVI's lecture at the University of Regensburg on 12 September 2006, where the Pope issued a strong critique pertaining to Muhammad's teaching.

[6] See www.mb.com.ph/node/267535 and http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/regions/view/20100528-272617/Alarm-raised-on-Zamboanga-killings

[7] Islamic religious school

[8] A Muslim interfaith activist explained that Muslims had less funds available for building civil society organizations compared to Christians. Also, initiating an interfaith dialogue is not considered a priority by Muslims. They would rather prioritize poverty reduction and the building of educational institutions, given the fact that these two are the main problems of Muslims in Mindanao (Anonymous interview by the author, January 2010).

[9] For further information on protests in Jolo, see www.bulatlat.com/main/2008/11/29/bishop-ulama-conference-deemed-a-farce/

[10] If the latter are not available, this would be because the children's births were not filed at the office of the civil registrar.

[11] These notions surfaced in some separate interviews with Muslims activists and participants of the interfaith programs in December 2009 and January 2010.

[12] Muslim indifference has been a major concern in the interfaith movement in Zamboanga City and in the Philippines, in general.

[13] Even though it is rarely mentioned during interfaith dialogues, a Christian interfaith leader, when interviewed, shared his concern over the minority issue: "If you see in Jolo, how many Christians are there now? Because there is also a continuous way to discourage them to get their property, [to] try to convert them, [to] try to threaten them. I believe [that] in Jolo and in other parts [of the world], the Christians are under pressure. I would say [that] they are not completely free to remain Christian. If they stay in a place where the majority is Muslim, the Christians have a difficult life. Of course, I can also say that the Muslims also have a difficult life when there is a Christian (dominated area)...but in a different way...so, in some way, we have to protect the minority [from] the majority" (Anonymous interview by the author, January 2010).

[14] I heard these stories from some Muslim interviewees. Similar stories were also found in the *Philippine Human Development Report* (PDHR) *2005*, 53.

[15] A Muslim woman said (January 2010), "We already pay our taxes, but the government does not seem to consider our presence. For instance, the absence of a water container in the public toilet (dry toilet) makes it necessary for us to carry a small bottle everywhere. I also hope that the government would consider separating *halal* meat and non-*halal* meat sections in the wet market, since if there is contact between them, it will no longer be *halal*."

[16] PDHR (2005) reported that from 33 percent to 39 percent of Filipinos hold a bias against Muslims. While some 46 percent of the Christian population would choose to hire a Christian male worker and 40 percent would choose a Christian female domestic helper, only 4 percent preferred to hire a Muslim male worker and 7 percent, a Muslim female domestic helper.

[17] Later on, the staff said that she could only pin her hopes on the youth participants of the dialogue because they tend to have broader minds and fewer misconceptions of Muslims. She expects that, in the future, discrimination will be less (Anonymous interview by the author, January 2010).

[18] Other contributing factors would be weak law enforcement, low level of trust in the government, and the presence of radical ideologies that justify violence.

[19] Some youth activists claimed that this sensitive issue was addressed in the youth forum. What they did was to focus on reconciliation and forgiveness between Muslims and Christians. An activist also observed that the youth are more willing than the adults to talk about sensitive issues. Furthermore, while the popularly suspected perpetrators of the kidnappings and killings were Muslim, some kidnap victims were Muslims, not Christians.

[20] Most Muslims find it important to point out that they are not supporting terrorist acts. They decry how many people always associate Muslims with terrorism. Recent survey findings state that 47 percent of Filipinos (and 57 percent of Mindanaoans) agree that the are probably terrorists and/or extremists;only about 14 percent of them have had direct dealings with Muslims, however (PDHR 2005, 56).

[21] For further explanations, see Hilario M. Gomez 2000, 224p.

[22] The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) is a draft of an agreement that had been negotiated for almost four years by the Government of the Republic of The Philippines(GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with the facilitation of the Malaysian Government. On 5 August 2008, these parties failed to sign the document, prompting the Supreme Court of the Philippines to issue a Temporary Restraining Order in response to the petition opposing the signing of the MOA-AD. Later, the GRP decided to abort the signing of the MOA-AD. AminaRasul (2009) a prominent Muslim peace activist, stated that because of the public's ignorance of the peace process, the contents of the MOA-AD draft, and the history of the Bangsamoro struggle, "public opinion easily fell prey to the misinformation coming from opportunistic politicians."

[23] For instance, the contestation over the MOA-AD has shaken the Zamboanga interfaith relationship. Hatred and racist slurs were spread through short text messages and in an Internet forum. Indeed, the biggest Anti-MOA-AD rally was conducted in Zamboanga City. Local politicians, namelyCelsoLobregat, the Mayor of Zamboanga City, was one of the main opponents of this memorandum, together with Vice Governor Manuel Piñol of North Cotabato. Both were joined later by Lawrence Cruz, the Major of Iligan City. According to Antoine (2008), "They went public in assailing the non-disclosed contents of the MOA especially on the issue of territory as it includes North Cotabato, Zamboanga City, and Iligan City in the expansion areas". Some interfaith activists recalled that they were unprepared to face the shocking problem, for they did not have enough information on the peace process; neither did they have a clear understanding of what was going on.

[24] This definition of empowerment is adopted from Abu Nimer's recommendation for the Arab-Jewish dialogue program in Israel. Though Israel's geopolitical context is different from Mindanao's, I see that the relationship of Arab citizens (as a minority group) with Jewish citizens (as a majority group) in Israel does share some similarities with the majority and minority groups in Mindanao.

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Constructively Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Asia

Soliman M. Santos, Jr.

Introduction

This study, a shorter version of an extended essay, synthesizes my private study and reflections on work, including mine, in constructively engaging non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and insights and fresh perspectives from research, including exchanging notes with other scholars, practitioners and policy researchers in related fields. This paper calls attention to and shares this relatively new area of work; consolidates the case or arguments for it; places it in a wider historical Asian and global perspective; reviews the relatively well-developed work in three main fields; points out gaps in terms of underdeveloped fields and perspectives; presents the motivating forces and key arenas for promoting and developing this work; and proposes what is to be done to move forward with this work in Asia.

NSAGs refer mainly to rebel or insurgent groups,[1] i.e. groups that are armed, use force to achieve their political/quasi-political objectives, and are opposed to or autonomous from the state.[2] These include secessionist movements like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and *Gerekan Aceh Merdeka* (GAM, Free Aceh Movement), and even so-called 'terrorist' groups, including the international or transnational NSAGs like *Al-Qaeda* and *Jemaah Islamiyah*. 'Constructive Engagement' is the dialog and persuasion-based process of seeking to positively influence NSAGs in so far as their operations affect the lives of people and communities. This process entails direct and deliberate contact with NSAGs and encompasses the spectrum of communication activities, including dialog, negotiation, facilitation and mediation.[3] One international peace non-governmental organization (NGO) suggests an inclusive definition of engagement in terms of interaction and participation (Ricigliano 2005, 6).

The Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Year 9 Regional Workshop theme of 'Understanding Confluences and Contestations, Continuities and Changes: Towards Transforming Society and Empowering People' cannot be fully appreciated without considering the role of NSAGs. Many key NSAGs in fact seek to transform society and empower people. If we speak of contestations and conflicts that often lead to changes, we can say that NSAGs are often at the cutting edge of this in terms of alternative leaders and social programs. They often represent the voice of the dominated, oppressed and marginalized, such as Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia. But they do so by also engaging in armed struggle. This is where questions of constructive engagement of NSAGs apply, such as; can they be engaged to move from armed conflict to peace-building and democratization?

Findings

[1] The case for constructive engagement of NSAGs has been well-argued, if not already established, especially for humanitarian and peace purposes. It is now more a matter of consolidating and mainstreaming this argument, clinching the legitimacy of this work, and developing it in new fields.

The importance of this work lies in the role that NSAGs play or can play, for better or for worse, in the world today, particularly in areas they control or where they operate, areas where poor or vulnerable people are usually found. NSAGs affect the lives of people, whether in situations of armed conflict and insurgent transitions, for example from war to peace, or from authoritarianism to democracy. Some NSAGs go on to become governments or part of governments, for example as happened in China, Vietnam and East Timor. In these cases, the shape of the state or government is often determined by its precursor NSAG.

The greater the threat of NSAGs to the human security of innocent civilians, the greater the need for humanitarian *among other forms of* engagement with these NSAGs. The current post-9/11 environment is such that it is particularly difficult to engage with NSAGs at a time when there is a desperate need to do so. (Conciliation Resources, 2004, 14) Whatever the case is for the illegitimacy of NSAGs, this should not detract from the legitimacy of efforts to engage them constructively in the interest of human security. From the perspective of constructive engagement, this is not a matter of support or solidarity for NSAGs but rather a concern for the welfare of the people and

communities in their areas. The appreciation and respect for this orientation will depend much on the respective policies and conduct of the engaging civil society entity, the NSAG being engaged, and of course the state which can either allow (even facilitate) or block the engagement.[4]

There are gaps to be filled in understanding, analytical tools, frameworks, approaches and mechanisms for dealing with and influencing NSAGs in the state-oriented global order. This should be considered part of the rationale for engagement, as only through engagement can these gaps be filled. This non-state or NSAG dimension or side of the real world order should give some pause to concerned scholars, practitioners and policy researchers.

At this point, it must be noted that there are different potentialities when it comes to the possibility of constructive engagement. There are any number of typologies of NSAGs. One current typology by American political scientist Jeremy M. Weinstein uses the terms 'activist' (ideologically motivated, with social endowments) and 'opportunistic' (economically motivated and endowed) to distinguish two kinds of rebellions and consequently rebel groups. Corollary to this is a typology of current armed conflicts: (1) those aiming to capture the political center or the state; (2) those aiming for secession of a part of the state; and (3) those which use violence but have no interest in territorial control (e.g. some ideologically-motivated terrorism). (Weinstein 2007, 9-11, 17) All these types may be said to come under activist rebellion. Opportunistic or predatory rebellions tend to be less real rebellions and to border more on criminality. In sum, the main NSAGs for constructive engagement are the rebel/insurgent groups that are political and ideological, in short, activist.

Similarly, there are different forms of engagement. We deal here with the more constructive forms, from the afore-mention spectrum of communication activities (dialog, negotiation, mediation, etc.) to activities that go beyond that into interactions including taking actions on various common concerns in a broad spectrum of fields which, we shall argue, can no longer be limited to the usual fields of humanitarian, human rights and peace processes. We shall also later point to the need to go beyond the 'usual suspects' of the NGO-advocates-activists sector and closely related academics when it comes to who should be involved in these engagements.

[2] It is useful to first place this work of constructive engagement of NSAGs in a bigger historical and global picture.

This refers mainly to the current context of globalization and the post-9/11 period. Apart from its mainly economic aspect, globalization has an important cultural aspect which complements the uni-superpower status of the United States (U.S.). This cultural globalization is predominantly an Americanization which impinges upon the cultural and religious identities and customs of many peoples, including Asians (Oquist 2003, 35). Globalization has come to mean Western hegemony and dominance in the political, economic and cultural affairs of the world. This has also resulted in growing economic and social disparities between the Global North and Global South, as well as between the elites and the masses in both hemispheres. The various forms of hegemony, dominance and disparities have in turn generated responses including social unrest, internal armed conflict and the recent phenomenon of global terrorism (Muzaffar 2008).

French political scientist Gerard Chaliand, an expert on the classic NSAGs of revolutionary guerrilla groups and national liberation movements, has pointed out their contributions to history, which places them within longer perspectives. He has noted in particular the contributions of the revolutionary or liberation wars of China, Vietnam and Algeria in ending colonialism, 'eras[ing] imperial certainties,' and eventually 'sweep[ing] aside the faith... in the absolute and universal superiority of Western civilization,' thereby 'produc[ing] a radical shift in the way in which the contemporary world is viewed.' (Chaliand 1989, 205-06, 209-11)

On the other hand, as Chaliand and also American sociologist and political scientist Theda Skocpol of Harvard have noted, the metamorphosis, outcomes or full trajectories of social revolutions led by NSAGs and some consequent social revolutionary transformations in the modern world have not always been positive, even after the overthrow of colonialism or dictatorial, oppressive and plundering regimes. Social revolutions have often led to new regimes that tended to be more centralized, bureaucratic and repressive (Skocpol 1994, 19-20). This then becomes one more rationale for the constructive engagement of NSAGs – "so that the slaves of today do not become the tyrants of tomorrow."[5]

Even when revolutionary movements or NSAGs fail to seize state power, the causes or issues they espouse may have instructive value for existing conditions of governance or state-building, pointing to those causes or issues, if not the NSAGs themselves, that must be constructively engaged with. This was articulated well in the *Philippine Human Development Report 2005*: "In a profound sense, all insurgencies hold up a mirror to mainstream society and challenge it to deliver to minority populations and the deprived what it seems to provide adequately to majorities and amply to the socially privileged.... Dealing with them squarely, however, will always provide an opportunity for the current system to peer closely at itself and discover at least some of its defects." (Human Development Network 2005, 32, 51)

[3] The broader context and greatest threat is the danger of a 21st century war stretching from Morocco to Mindanao, but principally based in Asia as the key conflict region. This is seen from the potential for protracted and new conflicts becoming linked and spiraling out of control (Oquist 2003, 33). This geo-political scenario post-9/11 has been played out mainly in the central part of Asia: first Afghanistan, then Iraq, then back to Afghanistan, and now also Pakistan, not to mention Iran. This region has been the main theater of the U.S.-led 'global war on terror' (GWOT), though it co-relates with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the historically volatile Middle East, which is part Asian. There is also the Korean flashpoint in North Asia.

Historically, the Asian cradle of civilization has also been a cradle of notable NSAGs or armed revolutionary movements, including the two most successful ones in terms of mass-based armed seizure of political power; the Chinese revolution under Mao Zedong and the Vietnamese revolution under Ho Chi Minh, both of which have had immense impact and consequences, not just nationally but in Asia and globally, including in the U.S. These "most important revolutionary wars" showed that what was important for their success was "not primarily military, but rather political" and even moral (Chaliand 1989, 35-36). Asia currently "remains home to two-thirds of the world's poor," with increasingly high socio-economic inequality disparities that "could foment social unrest" (Juzhhong 2010).

In the current conjuncture, there is South Asia centered in India—the cradle of Hindu civilization and often referred to in contemporary times as 'the world's biggest democracy,' and now also the cradle of a growing Maoist insurgency present in two-thirds of the states there.[6] This is apart from the jihadist-separatist insurgency in Kashmir contested by India and Pakistan. Two other South Asian states recently featured the extremely contrasting fates of two major NSAGs, with repercussions that are still unfolding: the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [CPN(M)] which came to the pinnacle of power in 2008, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which was militarily defeated by the Sri Lankan Army in 2009.

Southeast Asia—also a meeting (clashing?) place of civilizations—was largely ignored after the Vietnam War, until Mindanao in the Southern Philippines was touted as the 'second front' in the GWOT. It is a most interesting theater where diverse NSAGs currently operate in various stages of engagement, which we can only preliminarily, briefly and incompletely survey here:[7]

- *Philippines*: over four decades there have been two insurgencies on Communist and Moro fronts, led respectively by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the MILF, with increasingly protracted peace processes. On the Moro front, there is also the *sui generis* rebel-bandit-terrorist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

- *Indonesia*: a tsunami-induced peace settlement with the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free Aceh Movement for 'self-government' involving a transition for the transformation of GAM into a political party. This is also the home base of *Jemaah Islamiyah*, supposed to be a regional jihadist terrorist network. There is also the separatist *Operasasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM, Free Papua Movement).\

- *Thailand*: a growing and increasingly violent unrest, if not insurgency, in Southern Thailand with a Pattani militant movement that so far seems more like an irregular 'network without a core' and without a tangible organization or structure.[8]

- *Burma/Myanmar*: an 'anarchy' of 30 or so ethnic armed groups, making it the country with the most NSAGs in Southeast Asia. Some have engaged in ceasefire agreements with the military-backed government, but there has been no serious peace process on ethnic political issues, which are often overshadowed by a high-profile pro-democracy movement.

- *Cambodia*: Though the armed conflict with the Khmer Rouge has long ended and it has become defunct, the country is grappling with a transitional justice and reconciliation in relation to the past 'genocidal' atrocities of the Khmer Rouge.[9]

In sum, the key conflict region of Asia—Central, South and Southeast—the cradle of notable NSAGs, must also be the key arena for further developing the work of constructively engaging them.

[4] The theory and practice of constructively engaging NSAGs has so far been relatively well-developed in three main fields; Humanitarian, Human Rights, and Peace Processes. These engagements have helped to establish the case for constructive engagement of NSAGs, including the legitimacy of this work. That these are the three main fields of engagement may reflect the fact that most of the attention, understandably, has been on armed hostilities—either by mitigating their effects (through humanitarian and human rights interventions) or ending them (through either military victory/defeat or peace settlements). But even these main fields have their gaps or areas for improvement.

Humanitarian Engagement. This is the minimum level for constructive engagement of NSAGs. It includes humanitarian relief and assistance to vulnerable persons in need of medical care, food and water, clothing, shelter, protection and family link-ups, not necessarily in the context of an armed conflict, such as in situations of natural disasters or other emergencies. Humanitarian engagement of NSAGs may simply be a matter of seeking their cooperation for access to victims or needy persons, possibly including seeking a NSAG ceasefire for that purpose. This sphere encompasses international humanitarian law, or the law of armed conflict. International humanitarian law explicitly applies to all parties, whether state or non-state, to an armed conflict. Among the notable actors in this field of engagement are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations (UN) now with an Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD), the now defunct Non-State Actors Working Group (NSAWG) of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and Geneva Call. Although this is the most developed field of NSAG engagement, one international law professor still considers international humanitarian law a "new frontier". He says, "If this law

does not develop on that frontier, it will become slowly, but increasingly irrelevant." He underscores particularly the need "to develop mechanisms, not only for the ideal inter-state world under the UN Charter, but also for the real world in which armed conflicts are as much fought by armed groups as by governments." (Sassoli 2007, 67)

Human Rights Engagement. Human rights are closely related to international humanitarian law, particularly in situations of armed conflict, so engagement with NSAGs on human rights should come naturally. Unfortunately, this has not been the case because of the traditional approach that human rights, human rights obligations and violations are all addressed to the state. In fact, the still unresolved remaining debate about their applicability to NSAGs is one of the major gaps or areas for improvement in this field. Suffice it for now to refer to the seminal work of the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) in studying human rights approaches to NSAGs, in its *Ends & Means* report, written by David Petrasek, which first came out in September 2000 (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2006). Most significantly, this report came up with a synthesis of human rights-based engagement of NSAGs that may well be a two-part basic template for NSAG engagement in general. The first part provides a framework for pre-engagement analysis of the context which pertains to three forces: the NSAG, the civil society engaging entity, and the state. The second part is a survey of possible actions of engagement, their respective merits and difficulties, ranging from 'hard' to 'soft' actions: punishment, naming and shaming, persuasion, and working with NSAGs. Other institutes and organizations have since improved on both the analytical matrix and the engagement menu.

Peace Process Engagement. Much like the case of international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict, a peace process 'takes two to tango,' thus making NSAG engagement natural for this process. Peace processes are therefore not surprisingly second only to international humanitarian law in relation to engagement with NSAGs, and many strides have been made in the past two decades. To move a peace process forward, a third party must engage both parties—the government and the NSAG—sometimes separately (especially on making the initial decision to enter into such a process) and sometimes jointly (notably during actual peace talks). The inherent two-sided as well as political nature of a peace process makes it a more complicated engagement. One international peace

NGO, Conciliation Resources (CR) in London, carried out useful study and synthesis of issues around engaging armed groups in peace processes through its publication *Accord*. It is interesting to note that a key outcome of an international workshop it conducted on that theme "was exposing just how little this issue is understood and how much rethinking needs to be done regarding the engagement of armed groups in peace processes." Nevertheless, key lessons were drawn on five identified issues at the workshop: (1) Understanding NSAGs and how they make choices; (2) Making the case for engagement; (3) Putting engagement in the wider context of peace and conflict; (4) Countering the asymmetries of the state system; and (5) Improving the Track 1-Track 2 relationship. (Conciliation Resources 2004 and 2005). In recent years, the conventional wisdom that one cannot talk, much less negotiate peace, with so-called 'terrorist' groups has begun to be challenged post-9/11, but the theory and practice on this has yet to be fully developed, especially from the local level up and from a Southern perspective.

[5] While there is definitely still room for improvement in humanitarian, human rights (and peace process engagements as the main fields for constructive engagement of NSAGs, the gaps are bigger in underdeveloped fields, especially in protracted conflict situations. David Capie and Pablo Policzer of the Armed Groups Project have stated: "Wars come to an end when one side defeats the other militarily, or when both sides successfully negotiate a peace treaty. Yet many contemporary conflicts go on for years without a clear resolution, despite the massive use of military force or many rounds of peace negotiations. Civilians caught in the middle inevitably suffer and die .... where neither force nor negotiations have resolved an armed conflict, it is necessary to engage armed groups in order to uphold basic humanitarian and human rights standards." (Capie and Policzer 2005)

While correctly noting the protracted character of many armed conflicts,[10] Capie and Policzer seem to limit the implications to the physical security of civilians, thus the need for humanitarian and human rights-based interventions. But these are not the only areas of concern for civilians and their communities who live under the direct or indirect control of NSAGs. Many protracted peace negotiations are accompanied by ceasefires, and so the usual effects of continuing armed hostilities are not a major problem. Other issues include democratization, development

and governance in territories under NSAG control. These are among the underdeveloped fields in constructive engagement of NSAGs that we call attention to here. We now proceed to illustrate some specific concerns and questions in several of these fields.

Democratization. Most studies of democratization viz-à-viz revolutionary movements deal with the impact of the former (i.e. democratization of the national polity) on the latter, usually finding a negative impact on the political coalition prospects, and consequently success, of the NSAGs concerned.[11] Much less attention has been given to democratization and democratic reforms that are both internal to the NSAG and external to it but within its mass base, as distinguished from the national polity. This relates to basic political freedoms and civil liberties like freedom of speech, association and suffrage, and democratic exercises like elections, for the mass base within the guerrilla zone. This also relates to the internal workings of the NSAGs, including tolerance for internal dissent.

The Gender Question. The issue of women and war, including sexual violence in armed conflict, is receiving much attention,[12] as evidenced by UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) on women, peace and security. The matter of sexual offenses and other impacts on women during armed conflict has been addressed mainly through the frameworks of human rights and international humanitarian law, especially, in the case of the latter, by the ICRC.[13] More attention needs to be given to mainstreaming gender issues such as women's rights and lesbian-gay-bisexual-transexual rights within NSAGs, including within their organizations and within their mass base and areas of control.

Development. Most studies of development, such as economic development and human development, viz-à-viz armed conflicts involving NSAGs have focused on the generally negative development impacts of armed conflicts and NSAGs. But what are the possibilities of undertaking development work in NSAG-controlled areas? This can be examined on two levels. One level is the NSAG attitude, policy and treatment of socio-economic development efforts by external development actors, including NGOs, in their areas of their control or operations. Another level is the NSAG's *own* socio-economic development efforts, if any, and the quality of these. Do such efforts merit engagement and on what terms? And what about

sustainable development? Do NSAGs also have a stake in this? For example, how would or should NSAGs handle the relevant strategic and tactical considerations relating to forest protection? How do strategic political objectives relate to the present global problem of climate change which is a matter of global survival? Are there strategic junctures when 'the contradiction between man and man' must yield to 'the contradiction between man and nature'?

Governance. Do standards of good governance apply to rebel or non-state governance, state-building and non-state-building? Do constitutional principles such as sovereignty, acts of state, *parens patriae* (guardians of the people), police power, taxation, eminent domain, bill of rights, and rule of law apply to rebel 'governments'? What laws govern the rebel polity? How are these laws established and enforced? What justice system is there? While still a largely underdeveloped field for constructive engagement of NSAGs, rebel governance has increasingly become a point of academic interest. As a recent example, in October 2009, an academic "Conference on Rebel Governance" was held at Yale University in the U.S.[14]

Moral and Ethical Renewal. To the extent that NSAGs wield, as revolutionary leader Mao Zedong once said, "political power [that] grows out of the barrel of a gun," then this power, even if non-state and not absolute, can also corrupt, following Lord Acton's famous adage. This relates to the issue of moral and ethical renewal, which should necessarily be a part of the culture of governance, whether state or non-state. Democratization is not enough; it must be accompanied by ethical and spiritual renewal that will give rise to "a new political style and a new civic behavior."[15] This involves the recognition and application of spiritual and moral values such as justice, equality, freedom, dignity, compassion and love. Values must be transformed as much as society must be restructured since cultural values underlie and support societal structures. There is a need for more purposive NSAG leadership studies as well as more purposive engagement of NSAG leaders for moral and ethical renewal, given the especially crucial role of leadership, often more than ideology, within NSAGs.

Culture, Arts and Sciences. In situations of armed conflict, international humanitarian law mandates the special protection of cultural property, including buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, education or charitable purposes, and historic monuments, unless they are military objectives.[16] But beyond this minimum, it is still within the realm of possibility that NSAGs might be constructively engaged on matters of the arts and sciences on at least two levels. One level is in exposure of the NSAGs themselves and their mass base to the best that has been created by humanity, e.g. in literature, film, drama, and music, in so far as these nourish the soul, which can only be something positive or constructive. The other level is in whatever contributions the NSAGs can make to and through the arts and sciences, with the lead of artists and scientists who may be in their ranks. Also, the culture and the arts within the NSAGs and their mass base—including "song and dance as a mode of celebration, psyching up or just as a means of relieving pressure"[17] may have their own contributions to indigenous mechanisms for conflict-resolution and peace-building, and "may assist in the constructive engagement of these groups."[18]

[6] Aside from wider fields of constructive engagement of NSAGs, just as important, if not more so, are the perspectives and approaches for this work. We deal here with two areas for deepening or further development: a Southern perspective; and complementary or alternative normative frameworks.

A Southern perspective on conflict is one emanating from the Global South including Asia, Africa and Latin America. It encompasses the perspectives of civil society and local communities, which necessarily situate conflicts in their respective political, economic, social, cultural, religious and ideological contexts, and also within a history of colonialism and post-colonialism. Most NSAGs and their armed conflicts are in the Global South, though they also exist in pockets of the North which may be called 'southern' in the socio-economic sense. Constructively engaging NSAGs is best done for the most part from a perspective that is grounded in and is suited to the Global South. It comes "from within the local stakeholders, from the soil of the conflict, although support may emanate from outside." (Askandar and Abubakar 2008, 4,)

The Global South still means basically the poorer nations of the South, that are subject to the continuing net transfer of resources to the rich nations of the North. But the situation is not quite so simple as this. In both regions there is also the widening gap between rich and poor, between the economic and political elite and the ordinary citizens or the masses. The elite of the South often collaborate, though sometimes contend, with the elite of the North. The ordinary citizens of

the North are often victims of the greed of the elite of the North, as the recent global financial crisis has shown. In both worlds, though usually more acutely in the South, ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples are often the most marginalized not only economically and politically but also socially and culturally. In sum, the Global South, while having a certain common experience and situation *viz-à-viz* the Global North, is not an undifferentiated entity. This has bearing on one's Southern perspective.

Of course, not every perspective or model from the South should be upheld uncritically. For example, the ostensibly successful 2009 Sri Lanka model of a military solution to the Tamil insurgency is already being bandied by some militarists in the South for replication in their own countries, and as some kind of representation of a Southern perspective for conflict-resolution[19] In fact, as a Southern colleague in this work has posited, "the problem seems to be with the Southern State being unable to cope and often unwilling to serve all national, ethnic, political and religious groups under its merely nominal jurisdiction. Why do states fight them instead of engaging them? Why is it in most cases easier to fight than to talk? Is it because they cannot possibly engage them? Should and can others do it?"[20]

We are inspired by and can learn from the example of the Multiversity[21] initiative, which has a base in Penang, Malaysia, and includes Southern and Southern-friendly scholars, academics, activists and public intellectuals "committed to the proposition that there needs to be less conversation with the West and more conversation between peoples of the South" (Lal 2008, 7). Thus, also, the concept of "South-South" networks. The Asian Public Intellectuals initiative is actually already well within this kind of framework. Penang in particular has been a cradle for model Southern NGOs conducting different forms of activism with international impact, some of which are international NGOs in their own right. In Penang one sees a focal point for international networking and initiatives. One sees international visitors coming in solidarity and to learn, contrary to the more familiar pattern of Southerners gravitating to the big centers of the North.[22] We can learn from this 'spirit of Penang.'

The need for this more Southern perspective is underscored by a post-colonial context that is, however, characterized by new or neo-colonial forms that might be called 'academic imperialism' and 'NGO imperialism.' This hegemony obtains especially in the

social sciences and in international NGO work in general, and is starting to dominate in the arena of NSAGs, their rebellions, and the work of constructively engaging them even in the South. Oftentimes, the highly-touted and well-resourced Western (or Northern) academic research on these matters[23] just does not get it right because of a rigid compartmentalized approach or one overly dependent on supposedly more scientific quantitative or statistical analyses. But the most negative aspect of such research is in its often unethical use for counter-insurgency, where there is much civilian 'collateral damage.'

Thus, Malaysian scholar and Sociology Prof. Syed Hussein Alatas had said that there is no other way but for the South to have and develop "our own scholarship" by demonstrating it through good work "which does not bear the stamp of intellectual captivity" and "with our own categories of analysis, giving a different picture and dragging out what they (the West) try to hide. In other words, we have to offer a more complete and true picture, using values which are truly universal and truly moral...." (Alatas 2005, 28-29) It should be clear that we are not calling for a wholesale rejection of Western social sciences and for that matter Western research and technology on NSAG engagement; we are rather calling for more balancing with and respect for Southern perspectives, so that the synthesis becomes truly universal or internationalist—"the best that has been created by humanity." For this to happen, there is a need first for Southern academic or intellectual work to achieve true parity, to restore equality and mutual respect viz-à-viz Western academic or intellectual dominance. This too is a challenge to Asian public intellectuals in particular.

[7] COMPLEMENTARY OR ALTERNATIVE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS is the second area for deepening or furthering the work of constructively engaging NSAGs. The main or usual normative frameworks for this engagement are human rights, international humanitarian law, and other aspects of public international law. This is the international legal framework that Northern-oriented engagement is very comfortable and conversant with. But it is often not what resonates more with NSAGs, especially in the South. Here there is often more comfort with what I refer to as the "3 Rs" of regional cultural traditions, religious teachings, and revolutionary doctrines. Cultural traditions and religions especially are very much part of a Southern perspective. Northern-oriented engagement is in turn very uncomfortable

with these normative frameworks which tend to be looked down upon by the Western rationalist, materialist, secularist, cosmopolitan and modernist outlook. This too has become part of the North-South divide.

For example, an afore-cited Southern colleague says "in Muslim Africa-Asia-Europe, the NSA thing is probably essentially a religious phenomenon (exemplified by the Taliban)," and only those who understand and properly appreciate this, will be able to effectively engage the concerned NSAGs.[24] This entails that the engager has some appreciation of what has been referred to by anthropologists as the religious experience. In recent times, Islamic or Islamist NSAGs, more than Marxist-oriented ones, have gained prominence. Islam, including Islamic law (*Shari'ah*), holds sway for the world's 800 million Muslims or one-third of humanity—thus it is an international law in its own right. At the very least, to be effectively engaged, one must understand, even if one does not necessarily believe in, the normative frameworks that resonate with particular NSAGs. If the engager happens to believe in it too as part of his or her own belief system, that should be a plus for the engagement process and prospects.

Flexibility in legal and normative frameworks for engaging NSAGs is the best policy given the diversity of NSAGs, armed conflicts and country situations. The bottom line is being able to influence NSAGs and their behavior positively and constructively for the sake of the people and local communities. Frameworks serve this bottom line, not the other way around. Such flexibility suits civil society/NGOs at the country level in engaging their respective NSAGS as well as governments.

Apart from normative frameworks, broader social processes and long-term strategies of NSAG engagement, one might say that there are also complementary or alternative methodologies for such engagement. Northern approaches tend to go by the number or by the box with neat successive phases and sequenced steps under each phase.[25] Northern-led implementation often 'complements' such guidelines with a style marked by one-track-mindedness, rigidity and even dogmatism, which is supposed to be 'smart' (as in "specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound"). Southern approaches tend to go more with the flow, not second-guess the process too much, but let it unfold. This is best seen in Southern NGO work.

Conclusions

What is needed to move forward is to expand Southern-led work in constructively engaging NSAGs especially in Asia as a key conflict region. Without neglecting the relatively well-developed main fields of humanitarian, human rights and peace process engagement, we should pay more attention to gaps in developing practice and theory in underdeveloped fields of engagement like democratization, the gender question, development, governance, and moral and ethical renewal, refinement of the Southern perspective and approach for this work; and the use of complementary or alternative normative frameworks.

We should more proactively and effectively harness Southern forces for this work. The vanguard, as it were, would and should still come from the NGO-advocacy-activism sector and closely related academics who are action-oriented. But this like-minded core must expand beyond their circles, to engage other sectors of civil society that may be interested or disposed to participate in or otherwise support this work.

We should strive for the institutionalization and systematization of this work by developing two possible tracks which can inter-link: (1) building regional institutional centers in the South that can help coordinate, systematize and support this work in areas such as learning exchanges, information resources, in-depth research, skills training and capacity building. The regional centers can be interlinked with each other as well as with relevant centers, institutes and programs in the North, (2) introducing or mainstreaming the NSAG engagement dimension as an important concern, where appropriate, in NGO work and multi-disciplinary academic work in the South.

At present, this field of 'rebel studies,' as we may call it, might be said to be in 'the backyard of academics and policy workers.' If at all, it is dealt with under 'security studies' which, however, are generally state-oriented, state-related and state-funded, in short state-dominated. Yet, as we already noted, it is again Western or Northern(-oriented) academics and scholars who are beginning to form a new intellectual vanguard or front yard in 'rebel studies,' unfortunately but understandably lacking much in what a Southern perspective can bring.[26]

Southeast Asian public intellectuals—among them scholars and academics in particular—need not look very far for appropriate subject matter in terms of NSAGs and their constructive engagement. As indicated earlier, Southeast Asia is such a rich and interesting source or venue for this, not to mention the pressing need for this work. In this region there are examples of all three types of activist NSAGs: (1) those to capture the political center or the state [for example the CPP in the Philippines; members of the former Khmer Rouge now under trial in Cambodia]; (2) those aiming for secession of a part of the state [for example MILF in the Southern Philippines; OPM and previously GAM in certain Indonesian islands; the Pattani militant movement in Southern Thailand; the main Burmese ethnic armed groups]; and (3) those that use violence but have no interest in territorial control for example. ASG in the Southern Philippines, *Jemaah Islamiyah* in Indonesia extending to elsewhere in Southeast Asia]. They are at different stages, and have different characteristics, which necessarily has a bearing on the feasibility, content and form of constructively engaging them. Some are still actively waging armed struggle and even terrorism, some are in ceasefires, some are in peace negotiations, some are in post-conflict political transformation and self-governance [GAM; and counting also the former FRETELIN in East Timor].

Thus, a particular challenge is to develop both practical and theoretical Southeast Asian work on constructively engaging NSAGs within the region itself, through local centers, institutes and programs. The other papers in this particular API Year 9 Regional Workshop Panel 2 on "From Conflict to Peace-Building and Transformation: Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia," while not necessarily dealing squarely with NSAGs, nevertheless deal with causes or issues that NSAGs deal with too. These and other papers can also find use as part of the knowledge resources for the work of constructively engaging NSAGs, if we can more consciously look at them through this prism. We hope that more Asian public intellectuals can contribute to this kind of work and, in the process, also further develop Asian public intellectualism.

ENDNOTES

1   "Rebel" and "insurgent" are used here generically, and not in accordance with the obsolete or outmoded traditional public international law categories of "rebels, insurgents, and belligerents."

2   Basically following the definition of "armed groups" in International Council on Human Rights Policy, *Ends & Means: Human Rights Approaches to Armed Groups* (Versoix, Switzerland: International Council on Human Rights Policy, Second edition, 2006), but in our case qualifying the group's objectives as political/quasi-political.

3   This sentence is based on an internal study paper of the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue in 2003.

4   This paragraph addresses certain legitimacy concerns about NSAG engagement work mentioned by discussant University of Sains Malaysia (USM) political science professor Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid at the Panel 2 discussion on 21 November 2010 during the 9th Regional Workshop of the Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Fellowships Program in Penang.

5   Paraphrasing from Filipino national hero Jose Rizal.

6   Yardley, Jim. 2009. 'Maoist rebels widen deadly reach across India,' *New York Times*, 31 October.

7   The most recent relevant comprehensive book is Andrew T.H. Tan (ed.), *A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007). While a good reference, it somewhat disproportionately frontloads terrorism over insurgency in Southeast Asia, which is not reflective of the overall reality and history.

8   Based on Duncan McCargo, *Tearing Apart the Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand* (Ithaca, NY, USA and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 2008) 181, citing Thai peace activist-scholar Chaiwat Satha-Anand.

9   See e.g. Ea Meng Try, *Reconciliation in Cambodia* (Penang, Malaysia: Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network, 2007) and Prok Vanny and Soth Plai Ngarm, "Cambodian Case Study: Post-War Reconciliation and Peace-Building: An Inter-Religious Approach," *The SEACSN Bulletin* (Official Newsletter of the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network), July-September 2002, pp. 4-7.

10 The Philippine case, for example, is one of extreme protraction—marking four decades already since 1968—of two major internal armed conflicts on the Communist and Moro fronts. Based on statistics on 164 civil wars that occurred in five global regions during three periods within 1945-1999, the average median duration of one such war is about 37 months or just over three years, see Table 1 in Nicholas Sambanis, "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil

War," *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 13 No. 3, August 2002, p. 217.

[11] See esp. Jeffrey J. Ryan, "The Impact of Democratization on Revolutionary Movements," *Comparative Politics*, October 1994, pp. 27-44. This article deals particularly with the Latin American context and cases of the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (MIR) and *Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional* (FALN) in Venezuela, the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG) in Guatemala, and the *Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional* (FMLN) in El Salvador.

[12] See e.g. Megan Bastick, Karin Grimm and Rahel Kunz, *Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Global Overview and Implications for the Security Sector* (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007).

[13] See e.g. Charlotte Lindsey, *Women facing war: ICRC study on the impact of armed conflict on women* (Geneva, Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2001); and the *International Review of the Red Cross*, Vol. 92, No. 877, March 2010 themed issue on "Humanitarian debate: Law, policy, action: Women."

[14] See www.yale.edu/macmillan/ocvprogram/ rebel_governance.html.

[15] From a formulation by former Czech President Vaclav Havel, himself earlier a rebel against totalitarianism.

[16] Rule 38.A, per Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, *Customary International Humanitarian Law: Volume I: Rules* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 127. See also the 1954 *Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict*.

[17] Conciliation Resources. 2004. *Accord,* "Engaging armed groups in peace processes," Joint analysis workshop report.

[18] Cristina Atieno, "Engaging in Culture & Arts with Southern Non-State Armed Groups" (Research proposal outline prepared on behalf of the South-South Network [SSN] for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, Nairobi, Kenya, August 2009).

[19] Insight from Kristian Herbolzheimer, Conciliation Resources (C-R) Adviser on Peace Processes, email to the author on 9 November 2009.

[20] Insight from Eduardo Mariño, Colombian field consultant and campaigner, email to the author on 8 December 2009 (hereinafter "Mariño email of 8 December 2009").

[21] See www.multiworld.org.

[22] A good concise account of this aspect of Penang is found in Kunda Dixit, *Dateline Earth: Journalism as if the Planet Mattered* (Pasig City, Philippines: Inter Press Service, Asia Pacific, 1997) 138-39.

[23] For example, take the current "flavor of the month" with such literature: Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

[24] Mariño email of 8 December 2009.

[25] An example of this is Gerard McHugh and Manuel Bessler, *Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners* (New York, NY, USA: United Nations, 2006).

[26] This paragraph addresses concerns about the "backyard" status of NSAG engagement in security studies mentioned by discussant USM professor Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid at the Panel 2 discussion on 21 November 2010 during the 9th API Regional Workshop in Penang.

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Engaging the Role of NGOs in a Conflict Prone Area: Conflict Transformation and Peace Building in Southern Thailand

Erna Anjarwati

Introduction

One of the most devastating legacies of the ongoing violent conflict in Southern Thailand is the polarization of social relationships between the Thai Buddhist and the Malay Muslim communities at the grassroots level. The conditions of human insecurity in the southernmost provinces of the country composed of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala provinces have contributed to social mistrust and acute social prejudice between the two parties.

One of the key elements of peace-building initiatives in Southern Thailand is the involvement of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[1] Trauma healing, peace education, income generation programs and socio-political participation are all methods that can be employed by NGOs working with the middle and grassroots levels of society to support the creation of a sustainable peace. NGOs, for example, can encourage the Thai government and local people to share initiatives, knowledge and skills to participate together in promoting peace-building initiatives, using a bottom-up approach. With their access to civil society and its authority structures, NGOs have a unique potential to strengthen peace-building.

In cases of deadly conflict it is standard to look at the main actors. Addressing middle and lower levels of the societies involved, with the goal of altering conditions within them, either to facilitate the acceptance of a settlement or even to put pressure on the top level, is a more recent phenomenon. The researcher argues that these kinds of roles can be taken up by international and local NGOs. The researcher further argues that Southern Thailand's NGOs fall into the middle level according to Lederach's pyramid model of peace-building.

To provide a greater understanding of the context of this study, the researcher provides information about activities undertaken by a couple of NGOs working on conflict transformation approaches, highlights a few shortcomings, and investigates future prospects for NGO development in Southern Thailand.

Description of what has been happening in Southern Thailand

Fieldwork conducted by the researcher in 2008 in collaboration with the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, aimed to analyze the root causes of the conflict through a conflict management approach. The resulting thesis was entitled: *Manipulation of Multiple Identities in Ethno-Religious Conflict: the case of the Ethnic Malay in Pattani Muslim Communities in* Southern Thailand. The thesis argued that are three main factors in the conflict in Southern Thailand that have contributed to its apparent intractability.

First: Ideas around the glorious past and historical grievances of the Pattani Darussalam Kingdom, which was incorporated into Siam, the old name for Thailand, in 1906. With political power subsequently held by the Thai State, native Malay Muslims were increasingly oppressed and discriminated against. The implementation of 'Thai-ization' or an assimilation policy, impacted on key areas of local lives such as language, religion and education. The imposition of what was experienced as 'cultural violence' by many enabled social prejudice between the native Malay-Muslims and the Thai-Buddhists to rise.

Second, concerns the existence of insurgent groups of Malay-Muslim ethnicity that have been fighting the Thai government by politicizing the issue of *Jihad*.[2] This term is used as an instrument to appeal to Malay-Muslims, especially youth, to keep fighting against the Thai government, which is accused of being an oppressor of Islam. Supporters are encouraged to take back the 'holy land' of Pattani Darussalam from its occupation by the Thai state, known as *Kafir*.[3]

Third, concerns the idea that the conflict cannot be separated from the development gap in the region. The key issues include poverty, unemployment, lack of educational opportunities, substandard infrastructure, inadequate supplies of land and capital, low living standards, and other problems.

Objectives of the Study

Following the above findings, the researcher decided to conduct fieldwork focusing on the roles of NGOs in peace-building efforts. This study aims to examine the effectiveness of activities by NGOs and INGOs and to identify obstacles they face.

Conflict Transformation

Conflict Transformation (CT) is a term which for some analysts is a significant step beyond conflict resolution, but which in our view represents its deepest level. It corresponds to the tasks of structural and cultural peace-building (Lederach 1997, 29). The concept of CT is still relatively new. However, it is clear that most current proponents of transformation attempt to set themselves apart from those of more established concepts such as regulation, management and resolution by adopting a more holistic approach to addressing any given conflict. (Lederach 1995).

CT is supposed to encompass all levels of society and includes at least two types of change. First, changes are supposed to be made within the society or societies in which the conflict is occurring, in order to provide the possibility for (second) transforming the conflict into a productive phenomenon rather than attempting to eliminate or 'resolve' it. (Lederach 1997)

The first CT type is Prescriptive Conflict Transformation (PCT) and uses the pyramid model of peace-building, with especial focus on the middle level. With regard to the middle level, Lederach asserts that '...the middle range holds the potential for helping to establish a relationship- and skills-based infrastructure for sustaining the peace-building process' (Lederach 1997, 51). According to Lederach, typical middle-range actors are sectoral leaders, ethnic or religious leaders, academics and other intellectuals, and NGO leaders, although leaders of indigenous NGOs can also be located on the grassroots level.

Track I: Negotiation, Peace-Keeping, Arbitration, Peace Support, Exchange and Threat Power Dominate

Track II: Good Offices, Conciliation, Pure Mediation, Problem-Solving, Integrative and Exchange Power Dominate

Track III: Peace constituencies within the conflict, Building Social Cohesion, Common Ground, Integrative and Exchange Power Dominate

Source: Lederach Pyramid Model of Peace Building (1997)

The researcher also uses the second approach of Elicitive Conflict Transformation (ECT) in relation to healing of personal and interpersonal hurt of children in a culturally sensitive way. The concept of

ECT builds on the idea of *Many Peaces*[4] and holds that each culture has a system to balance the things that do not run in harmony. Culture for example, stipulates the way in which emotions are expressed, and which

emotions are shown and when. This study employed dance therapy as an appropriate, culturally sensitive method to work on healing the traumatic experiences of children.

Both approaches are used to deal with the process of investigation about peace-building efforts that have been conducted by both INGOs and NGOs in Southern Thailand through conflict transformation approaches.

Methodology

The study was carried out over ten months and conducted in two ways. The first involved carrying out fieldwork to collect primary data through a descriptive qualitative method combined with semi-structured in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders. The second involved collecting supportive secondary data. The fieldwork was conducted between November 2009 and March 2010. Five local NGOs were the main target of study; the Asian Resource Foundation (ARF), the Women's Voices Projects in the Deep-South, the Chumchon Sattha Network, Deep South Watch (DSW), Nong-Chik Hospital, and one INGO, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The contacts built up since the researcher's early studies in 2008 were very helpful in relation to being able to conduct in-depth interviews and visit remote areas to meet key stakeholders. Purposeful and snowball sampling were applied to identify relevant key informants and cases.

Three categories for the samples applied: a) the NGOs and/or NGO activists that focus on peace-building activities through conflict transformation, and b) local political, community and religious leaders from both Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslim communities, who gave their perspectives about the effectiveness of peace-building activities undertaken by NGOs and c) local government officers, who also provided opinions of the peace-building activities of NGOs.

For the ECT approach, dance therapy at Nong-Chik hospital with 15 children was undertaken, constituting a qualitative case study designed through the activity as well as through Focus Group Discussion (FGD). Two forms of data collection were used. The first was the notes made by the researcher who acted as a facilitator during the dance therapy and documented the events. The second was an audio-recorded, semi-structured in-depth group interview conducted by the researcher

following the final dance session. (Contact and communication had been built up since 2008 between the researcher and the Nong-Chik Hospital which had a collaborative project with the Women's Voices Group conducting psycho-social support for children from Yala and Pattani provinces.) The researcher also interviewed three children, who represented the other fifteen participants, to get their deeper feedback about what was happening inside them during the process. Their answers and testimonies provided valuable pointers to issues in regards to the social awareness and social interaction amongst the participants during and after the therapy. The children were of both Malay-Muslim and Thai Buddhist backgrounds and were aged between 7 and 12 years old, or at the mid-development phase.

NGOs and Peace Building Initiatives within the Prescriptive Conflict Transformation Framework

This section describes the work of selected organizations and evaluates how their goals fit into the Pyramid Model of Peace Building suggested by Lederach, in which middle-level actors are supposed to facilitate transformation in both upward and downward directions.

Asian Resource Foundation (ARF)

The Asian Resource Foundation (ARF) focuses its peace-building activities on several aspects around women and children, including peace education, income generation and inter-faith dialogue between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims as well as Christian religious leaders.

ARF promotes peace education initiatives by providing communities with knowledge about the importance of defending their human rights as human beings and as citizens of the country. By 2010, ARF was working with around 30 villages in the three southernmost provinces and in 12 schools in Pattani, including government and religious Buddhist and Islamic schools. ARF had established a Center for Peace Education and Human Rights in 12 elementary and secondary schools and created a peace education club in each school. The aim was to run "peace" activities in the school, such as sharing knowledge about human rights or conducting enjoyable art activities such as painting, and drawing, and facilitating dialog through movies about cultural diversity.

ARF was also working on income generation programs; for example it had introduced duck farming to widows of the Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai tragedy.[5] Through a saving mechanism, the women saved around 20 baht per day.

Women's Voices Project in the Deep-South

This local NGO organized a group of women volunteers who were the victims of or were affected by the ongoing conflict, especially widows from the Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai tragedy. The project aimed to let them speak out and share their stories through a radio program, 'Women's Voices in the Deep-South', which began airing on January 2010. The show also covers general human rights, income generation and other grassroots issues.

Chumchon Sattha Network

The Chumchon Sattha Network can be considered a local NGO working on the issue of poverty through participatory development, based on Islamic Development. It adheres to Islamic religious values, within which it works with four main components of Malay Muslim communities; community leaders, Imam (religious leaders), elder leaders, and women and youth group leaders. It works on trainings related to livelihood and housing issues as key ways to respond to human security issues in a conflict zone.

Deep South Watch (DSW)

This NGO was established in August 2006. It brings together a network of civil society organizations, media, journalists, educators, public health professionals, and local and national academics working in fields related to peace-building activities. DSW has set up acitivity for dialog and peace talks amongst all parties. It also works on promoting organizational and human resource development amongst government and NGOs to encourage broad public participation and to raise awareness about the ongoing violence and conflict.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

This INGO monitors the treatment of detainees and, when necessary, suggests improvements to conditions of detention to the authorities, after constructive and confidential dialog between ICRC staff and prisoners. The program reaches out to the authorities, local leaders, religious leaders, academic circles and the Thai Red Cross to provide knowledge on humanitarian issues and principles to future political and military leaders as well as decision-makers.

The Development of Peace Building Initiatives through the Lens of the PCT Approach

The NGOs in this study were selected for their intensive work helping local communities to cope with the current unsecure situation and finding their own ways to overcome conflict. They are therefore deemed the most likely to have achieved results. Functioning civil society is an important pillar for dealing with human security and human rights issues. There is certain artificiality in the development of civil society institutions, including NGOs in Southern Thailand. From the perspective of the researcher, based on Lederach's Pyramid Model of Peace Building, Southern Thailand NGOs still lack the power to lobby the Thai government for more peaceful policies. Although contacts with politicians are partially in place, these are often based more on existing personal relationships than on a political-cultural context in which functional lobbying plays a legitimate role.

Contacts upwards to politicians have had limited success and possess further potential. Meanwhile, NGOs are not able to fulfill their role as middle range actors as elaborated by Lederach. Downward contacts to the broader society are more strongly seen. Media coverage of the NGO's perspectives and activities has helped bridge the gap between the government and grassroots level of society.

Several factors have influenced the development of the NGO sphere in Southern Thailand. Following the violence in Tak Bai and at the Krue Se mosque in 2004, more NGOs and INGOs started working in the area. Obstacles they faced included:

At the start of the NGO involvement there was little consciousness in the broader society of the need for and usefulness of civil society institutions. This led to initial suspicion of NGO employees and their motives. In the beginning phases, NGOs had to fight not only for their existence but also for recognition from most segments of society, including the Thai government. This held up peace-building activities. To some extent this obstacle continues.

A second factor concerned a widespread lack of human, material and financial resources. The latter has

necessarily led to a search for outside training, equipment and funding. This has had a variety of real and potential consequences. On the one hand, it can introduce a potentially positive element of competition into the emerging NGO realm, forcing organizations to attempt to generate high-quality proposals. However, all too often this initial phase encourages a certain amount of parroting of supposed western civic values in order to obtain grant monies, rather than reflecting any actual internalization of such values by locals.

Nonetheless, the developments are not all negative. While reaching few people, the projects have changed the opinions of some, at least privately, including the NGO activists themselves. They are increasing cooperation with various bodies, including the government, on peace-building initiatives.

Activities with children may have the potential to instill different values among the upcoming generation. Any conclusions must be tentative, but at least the principle of 'do no harm' is being adhered to, and for relatively small budgets the NGOs and their international partners are doing commendable work, although the impact is still tiny. The hope and belief is that the NGOs are laying the groundwork for a more peaceful approach and ultimately perhaps a productive transformation of the conflict. One possibility for overcoming the still inadequate links with the wider society would be to create stronger ties between existing peace-building NGOs, academics and private sector persons doing humanitarian work on the grassroots level. This could help expand contacts with a broader societal base.

It is appropriate to recall that the PCT concept focuses on the goal to encompass all levels of society and to engender two types of change: in the societies, and in the function of the conflict. With regard to the former goal, some success has been achieved in involving middle-level actors as well as grassroots level of society. As for the second goal, the researcher sees that there has been a shift from seeing third-party intervention, in this case, both NGOs and INGOs, as the primary responsibility of civil society organizations, towards appreciating the role of indigenous peace-builders, such as local leaders as well as religious leaders. Instead of outsiders offering the acitivty for addressing conflicts in one-shot mediation efforts, the emphasis is on the need to build constituencies and capacity within societies and to learn from domestic cultures how to manage conflict in sustained way over time.

This suggests a multi-track diplomacy model, in which emphasis is placed on the importance of indigenous resources and local actors, the so-called level III, through developing middle level leadership and local and grassroots interests. Conflict transformation needs to operate simultaneously at all levels. The overall aim is to work to prevent the narrowing of political space associated with escalation and to encourage the widening of the political space associated with conflict de-escalation and transformation.

However, the sustainability of peace-building projects in Southern Thailand remains important to protect the existence of civil society living around the conflict zone. Hence, to resolve conflict, what we need is not merely negotiation and military approach but also mutual understanding, respect for the others' cultural and religious values as well as practicing intercultural communication.

Dance Therapy for Children's Trauma Healing as a Means to Elicitive Conflict Transformation

Trauma-healing grows out of a commitment to peace that includes health and healing, reconciliation and right relationships, safety and security, justice and material well-being. In situations of conflict and or natural disaster, this means that those who choose to be peace-builders are called upon not only to respond to material needs by sending relief kits and food aid, but also to assist in the psychological, emotional and social recovery of individuals and communities who are experiencing trauma. In this case, the researcher acted as a facilitator of dance therapy and will thus use the word "I" to explain the session.

During my time living in Southern Thailand both in 2008 and from 2009 to 2010, I saw that children have in some cases been specifically targeted in attacks by armed groups. In August 2008, two teenage girls were among eight people shot dead in an attack allegedly carried out by insurgents on a bus carrying Buddhist civilians in Yaha district, Yala province. All eight victims of the attack, including the two girls, were reported to have been shot in the head at point blank range. I can imagine that a tragedy of this sort would deeply affect the children who learn about it, and would not be easily forgotten in their minds and hearts, and could well shape their individual narratives to be constructed around feelings of hatred and social prejudice against 'the other'. I felt that dance therapy could be a good entry point for promoting better

understanding among children of self and 'the other.' It could help children build the self-support required to express emotions locked up inside. I hoped it could bring children into the healing process.

Dance therapy as a medium of trauma-healing is based on the idea that dancing can be an effective way to resolve emotional problems and to keep participants functioning in the 'here and now' because it is quite fun and simple, especially for children. Dance is a good medicine because its focus is "I feel" or stillness. The goal is to stimulate connectedness, communion and spiritual experience in children. In my opinion, dance is a good way to express emotional feelings in a creative and culturally sensitive way as well as to communicate directly to the soul. I hoped that inter-cultural dance experiences could help transform feelings of hatred, prejudice, shyness and lack of confidence in children.

When I attended a trauma-healing session for children and widows of Krue Se Mosque conducted by psychologists from Nong Chik Hospital in Pattani province, I was asked to contribute something as a peace builder. It struck me that Gestalt Therapy[6] through dance was a way to contribute. It could help children to have fun, and to surrender and release their inhibitions, blocked emotions, negative feelings and fears. Dance therapy was a form of authentic intercultural communication. It could improve flexibility, self-confidence and respect for human dignity as well as open up the possibility of social contact amongst the participants.

The dance therapy sessions were conducted on two occasions in December 2009 at the hospital. The sessions included a brief meeting with the widows and children of victims of the Krue Se Mosque and the Tak Bai tragedy. At the first session, only Thai Buddhist children were invited to participate while Malay Muslim children were observers and their responses were noted. It was surprising to see the positive response from both sides. I then decided to conduct a second session two weeks later involving all of them together, which included about twenty children.

During the dance therapy, participants engaged in physical contact by holding hands or linking arms. Since the arms were held close to the body, dancers were close to one another. Engagement in physical contact created both social awareness and interaction. Initially participants appeared uncomfortable when

physical contact was introduced but they responded with humor and lightheartedness to lighten the tension.

Participants later identified that the limitations of the dance style allowed them to focus more on interactional factors. The combination of expressive and limited movement structures may have contributed to the social bonding of the group. There was no pressure on the participants. The non-competitive nature of the sessions enhanced learning. The children appeared to move through several stages of group development. This was evident in their identification of how doing the same thing enhanced their learning experience and enhanced social connection. Their willingness to participate in a shared task was important. They said that they would miss each other when the session ended. Such an acknowledgement meant a certain level of trust, understanding, awareness and intimacy.

It was interesting that participants were invested in learning and practicing both as individuals and as a group. Over the session they maintained a balance of focusing on learning the dance and engaging in intimate social interaction, including transferring positive energy and making eye contact. Laughter was common throughout the session. From my observation, I saw a process of intimacy build up among the participants. This happened where after recognizing differences, they began to accept the differences. Participants were then willing to support individual needs and boundaries through becoming more open, supportive, and trusting of each other. (Touching is a process of nurturing, and increases group involvement, perceptions of boundaries, and feelings of closeness. Synchrony between the rhythm and the movement often develops into spatial synchrony in which participants move together in time, helping to develop communication and relationships, activating expression, fostering contact, and promoting group cohesion.)

The experience suggested that the children were more motivated to communicate afterwards, and hopefully this will be a continuing fact in their lives. I therefore consider that it is useful to promote the social benefit of dance amongst children in the South. It can be used as a means of trauma-healing that is very important to open the possibility of intercultural communication amongst children.

Activities carried out during the dance therapy session with children from the Thai-Buddhist community at Nong-Chik Hospital of Southern Thailand

The session of dancing therapy lasted for about 2.5 hours. In this picture we can see that participants engaged in physical contact and laughter, building social interaction.

A Nong Chik psychologist helped me to explain the dance movements to a child. All of the children are speaking in the Thai language because they are Thai Buddhists.

This picture shows about fifteen children from the Thai-Buddhist community in Yala province attending a session of gestalt therapy through dance on December 20th, 2009. Most of them are young boys. They were enthusiastic in paying attention to the example I gave in relation to the rules and movements of the dance.

All photos were taken at Nong Chik hospital on December 20th, 2009 by the researcher.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The impact of NGOs and INGOs depends on the expertise and knowledge of their local partners to identify and meet the needs of the beneficiary communities. At the field level, the complex realities mean that INGOs and NGOs can only effectively implement programs with the knowledge and connections of local partners, such as local community leaders, religious leaders, women's groups, youth and so on. Such strategies open up space for conflict transformation approaches. Furthermore, they give local people an opportunity to work on their own initiatives and implement their own culture to guide local and international partners. In a few cases the involvement of local people is still limited. It is quite difficult for NGOs to resolve issues of lack of trust among local people. NGOs also lack the funding to implement long-term projects and they face difficulties reaching the remote areas or 'red zones.'

This research revealed a multifaceted situation on the ground, in which some local NGOs such as ARF and Chumchon Sattha have developed into strong and independent organizations able to set their own parameters for the kind of peace they want to build. Yet, in general, the limited success by NGOs in reaching the grassroots level runs contrary to some of the existing theory on conflict transformation, which assumes that NGOs are well connected at the mass societal level. Furthermore, there is a shortage of NGOs and INGOs working on peace education. More are needed, especially those that cater for children. Such initiatives could be an entry point to involve as many local people as possible to get involved in peace-building activities in which NGOs can help bridge the gap between the government and local people.

The following recommendations are made:

- "Enhance the role of local NGOs and civil society, particularly community and religious leaders, by enriching and improving their knowledge and skills for setting disputes. Do this by developing religious values, such as underscoring the concepts of non-violence and compassion in Theravada Buddhism and the concept of *rahma* (mercy or compassion) in Islamic values."

- "Promote and support educational arrangements created by local people and encourage the participation of local communities in public and private educational establishments. Local NGOs along with public and private schools may jointly design the curricula for certain subjects, e.g. on peace and cultural diversity.

- "Designate the deep south as an area of high priority in the government's poverty alleviation policies, in collaboration with local and international NGOs that use participatory approaches. Include capacity building and training for religious and community leaders to improve the community's skills and knowledge of peace, and offer income generation programs."

- "To deal with trauma-healing, especially for children and women, dance therapy such as the kind engaged with among children at Nong Chik Hospital could be applied, along with painting, drawing and other art forms. NGOs can play a positive and critical role in this area that the state will never be able or willing to play."

ENDNOTES

1 The term peace-building can be used to describe a varied set of activities or programs, the manner that these programs are implemented as well as their potential outcomes. It refers to efforts undertaken at different levels of intervention and implemented by different actors (Lewer, 1999, 12).

2 *Jihad* is a Qur'anic concept. It refers to exerting efforts, in the form of struggle against or resistance to something, for the sake of Allah. This effort can be fighting against armed aggression, but can also be resisting evil drives and desires in one's self (The Islamic Qur'an)

3 The word *Kafir* has been used in the Qur'an for rejecter of the faith [verses 1-3-4-5]. It is further explained that whosoever does not believe in Allah together with all His attributes, conceals the Ultimate truth about *Tawheed* (oneness of God), declines to have faith in it and fails to obey the instructions of Allah, has committed '*Kufr*' and thus, he is nothing but a '*Kafir*'. (The Islamic Qur'an)

4 This concept is strongly inspired by UNESCO's famous Manifesto 2000, which proposed to turn the new millennium into a new beginning, an opportunity to change, all together, the culture of war and violence into a culture of peace and non-violence.
The six cornerstones of the Manifesto 2000 are:

- Respect the life and dignity of each human being

- Practice active non-violence

- Share time and material resources

- Defend freedom of expression and cultural diversity

- Responsible consumer behavior

- New forms of solidarity. (Innsbruck University, Peace Studies Program, 2000)

5 On October 25th, 2004, 3000 people gathered in front of the provincial police station in Tak Bai district, Narathiwat, demanding that the authorities grant bail to six Malay Muslims who were members of a village security unit. Officials used force to break up the crowd, resulting in six deaths at the scene. About 1,300 people were arrested. During transportation of the prisoners to Inkayuth Boriharn Fort in Pattani, 79 suffocated to death from being stacked one on top of one another for an extended period. (Report of the National Reconciliation Commission, 2006)

6 The key concept of this therapy is to develop an understanding, including evaluating children's contact level, and helping them to identify and express emotions to help them focus on their presence, here and now, and to explore the treatment of these children. Through the awareness and experience of different options of being, humans gain the freedom of choice. In such a way, change happens naturally. Awareness therefore is the goal and path of Gestalt therapy. (Jarosewitsch, 1995, p.1)

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Managing Identity: Muslim Minorities in Asia
(South Thailand, the Southern Philippines, and Penang, Malaysia)

Ahmad Suaedy

Abstract

Within Islamic intellectual discourse there has been little exploration of Muslim minorities within non-Muslim majority or secular states. Where the issue has been explored, the focus has been on the ritual aspects of Islam or application of Sharia law. Yet observation of the social and political dynamics of Muslim minorities in South Thailand, the Southern Philippines and the state of Penang in Malaysia reveals that minority Muslim communities' preoccupations, aspirations and demands concerning economic, socio-cultural and political rights are far greater than those concerning the ritual aspects of their faith. The paper shows that challenges in minority Muslim communities' demands for justice have resulted in shifts in their political emphases and goals, and an increase in the role of civil society groups.

Introduction

Discourse on minorities, including Muslim minorities, has received greater attention in our increasingly globalized world and since the fall of communism in the 1990s.[1] However within Islamic intellectual discourse there has been little exploration of Muslim minorities within non-Muslim majority or secular states, particularly in Southeast Asia. According to Abou al-Fadl[2], the discourse on minorities within *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) was, up to the end of the imperial Ottoman Empire in Turkey, limited largely to a debate over whether or not a Muslim should be allowed to live in a non-Muslim majority region, as it was feared that they would face difficulties in practicing their religion and might have been discriminated against. Today, discourse in *fiqh* or *shariah* (Islamic law) concerning Muslim minorities is more focused on migrant minorities in developed countries. In addition, *fiqh al-Aqalliyat* (*fiqh* concerning minorities) mainly discusses matters concerning ritual religious aspects such as halal food, clothing, prayers, Friday gatherings, burial of the deceased and so on within the context of a non-Muslim majority state.[3] Socio-economic and political matters are rarely discussed.

Yet observation of the social and political dynamics of the Muslim minorities in South Thailand, the Southern Philippines and the state of Penang in Malaysia reveals that aspirations and demands concerning economic, socio-cultural and political rights are far greater than those concerning the ritual aspects of faith.[4] This paper intends to examine the dynamics both within the Muslim communities themselves and their relationships with the national majority and state.

First it is necessary to discuss the many differences in the character of each of these minorities and the unique political situations they find themselves in. For example, there are very different central government policies towards Muslim minority movements in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines and in Pattani in South Thailand. In the Philippines the central government has held formal negotiations and peace talks with the separatist movements during periods of ceasefire. Since the cancellation in October 2008 of the planned Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the Mindanao Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the situation has become increasingly fragile in Mindanao, though the parties continue to hold peace talks. The Thai government approach in responding to the separatist movement in Pattani is very different.[5] The Thai government almost never officially recognizes or pursues open dialog with the separatists, and as a result there are rarely any formal discussions or negotiations between the two, which makes it difficult for the Muslim minority to act above ground. The Muslim minority in Penang has a completely different character to the two aforementioned. There is no separatist movement in Penang, but economic inequalities between the Malay Muslim minority and the ethnic Chinese majority has meant a continued focus by Islamic organizations and movements on the issue of the *bumiputra* (Malays). This has been the case most especially since the 2008 election in which the opposition Pakatan Rakyat (PR) coalition, namely the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which campaigned to abolish the New Economic Policy (NEP), won the election.[6]

Findings from Fieldwork

Mindanao

Peace negotiations between the Philippine central government and the Mindanao Muslims who call themselves the *bangsamoro* have been ongoing since the 1970s. In the early 1970s the *bangsamoro* were represented by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), under the leadership of Nur Misauri. The front split into two when the MNLF deputy head, Salamat Hashim, established his own organization named the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and started negotiating with the Government of the Philippines (GRP). In 1986 the MNLF agreed, although not unanimously, with the GRP to establish the Autonomous Region of Muslim Moro (ARMN), while the MILF continued to demand independence. However, by 2001 the MILF agreed to withdraw its demands and proposed a new formula known as the MOA-AD (Memorandum Understanding of Agreement on Ancestral Domain). The draft MOA-AD was initially planned to be signed in 2008. However the Supreme Court ruled that the draft violated the Constitution and the signing was thus cancelled. Since the cancellation, there has been no official peace agreement, bar a temporary agreement to continue peace talks.

The MOA-AD had been a long time in the making. After the Tripoli Peace Agreement (PA) in 1976 between the MNLF and GRP, there was the MNLF split. In addition, President Ferdinand Marcos introduced a policy that seemed to violate the agreement, by dividing Mindanao into two regions, region XI and region XII. The MNLF believed that the policy violated the agreement over territory as laid out in the Tripoli PA. Both the MNLF under Nur Misuari and the MILF (at the time not yet formally declared as such) under Salamat Hashim boycotted a 1978 plebiscite. It seemed that implementation of the PA had led to the emergence of new problems for the *bangsamoro*.

Nur Misuari, as MNLF leader, was trapped between the MILF, Marcos' government and the *datus* (traditional elders), and this made him revert back to his origins, namely the Tausug ethnic group that had remained relatively loyal in their support of him.[7] It became increasingly clear that the *bangsamoro* had started to split between the ethnic Tausug who formed the majority in the Sulu Archipelago and mostly supported the MNLF, and the Maguindanao who formed the majority in Mindanao Island/Peninsula, and largely supported the MILF. Salamat Hashim was an ethnic Maguindanao based in Cotabato, the capital city of Maguindanao.

President Corazon Aquino's announcement that she would visit Jolo, the capital city of Sulu, revived the hopes of Nur Misuari and the MNLF of realizing the Tripoli PA of 1976, yet at the same time it clearly neglected the aspirations of the MILF. Similarly when President Fidel V Ramos replaced Aquino as president and offered hopes once again for the MNLF and the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) of 1996, this increased opposition and widened support for the MILF. By the time of Estrada's election as president in 1998, the MNLF was facing continual pressure within the ARMM, with MNLF people being replaced by those trusted by the government. There was also a government policy of all-out war against the MILF in 2001.

Meanwhile, the sidelining of Nur Misuari from the ARMM led to criticism of his leadership of the MNLF. When Misuari was arrested and later imprisoned for involvement in riots in 2002, a new group emerged declaring itself to be the new MNLF based in Cotabato. It was led by the two-time mayor of Cotabato, Sema Muslim Sema, who was from the Maguindanao ethnic group. Sema claimed to have more support amongst MNLF supporters and also claimed to represent other communities and to be holding talks with other parties such as the MILF.[8] Leadership rivalry had also emerged within the MILF, from the Tausug ethnic group. Syariff Jullabi[9] claimed to have control over a large part of the Bangsomoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) which was also known as the Mujahedeen Alliance for Bangsamoro. He even said cynically that the MILF under Haji Murad Ibrahim, the MILF High Commandant after Salamat Hashim's death, was just a continuation of the Maguindanao Iranao Liberation Front (MILF). Iranao is the name of a small ethnic group in Mindanao and thus Jullabi's comment meant to say that Haji Murad's leadership was only for the ethnic Maguindanao, and did not incorporate the Tausug or Moro people in their entirety.

Several peace-related efforts were also made by non-partisan civil society activists including religious leaders such as *ulema* and bishops, and by those from non-governmental organization (NGO) circles. Recently these have appeared to gather in strength and

influence.[10] Rood notes that although the role of civil society has clearly increased, there has been an imbalance between movements led by Catholics and those by Muslims, with the Muslims tending to be underrepresented. However, the movement known as the Bishop-*Ulema* Conference (BUC) for instance, holds routine meetings to discuss a variety of peace efforts between Muslim, Catholic and Protestant leaders in Mindanao, both those who are positioned in Mindanao itself and those who are in Manila. The BUC holds annual meetings to share experiences and evaluations, and to increase efforts for future steps (Joint Statement BUC, December 2009; interview Mercado 02/02/10).

There is also the Silsilah Dialog Movement (SDM) in Zamboanga city, which was established by Fr. Sebastiano D'Ambra, an Italian bishop. Silsilah runs various community empowerment and social activities from a peace perspective and that incorporate religious ideas concerning humanity and compassion. The word *silsilah* is inspired by the Arabic and Sufi worlds, after Fr D'Ambra studied Sufism in Italy. SDM intentionally recruits a mixture of Muslims and Catholics to work in its office as facilitators and activists in empowering the wider community. It has established a *madrassa* for Muslim children who cannot afford the fees to study at private or public schools. Fr. D'Ambra has said that he believes peace will be created through empowerment of grassroots society and cultural and community dialog.[11] Another priest, Fr. Alberth Salijo, has made similar efforts by establishing a center for peace and conflict and resolution studies in Mindanao under the Church and Ateneo de Davao University in Davao city.[12]

In addition the Salam Peace Movement (SPM) in Zamboanga city has worked for about four years with SDM and been involved in empowering society at the grassroots levels to work for peace within the Muslim community. Starting by building groups within mosques and *mushalla* (places of worship for small communities), the SPM has developed networks in several villages in Zamboanga. Its director, Dr. Alih S Aiyub, is active in building networks with NGO civil society groups and religious leaders working towards peace.[13] Islamic religious leaders have also made similar efforts. From 24-27 January 2010 the NUCP (National *Ulama* Council of the Philippines) held a conference in Davao for the first time on a national scale. It was attended by at least 500 *ulema*, consisting of about 300 male *ulema* and 200 female *aleemah*, 70 percent of whom came from Mindanao.

Amina Rasul, director and founder of the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID), which was behind the formation of the NUCP, said that although it was the first time NUCP held a national meeting after legally obtaining approval from the GRP, the process had been started at least four years previously with a project to gradually empower *ulema* in all areas of the Philippines starting at the lowest levels, and to then form a politically neutral and nonpartisan organization that aimed at empowering civil society, especially Muslim society and involving all elements and factions within Philippine Muslim society.[14] Amongst other things, the conference discussed the strategy of involving *ulema* and society in peace efforts, conflict resolution and the implementation of a peaceful election in May 2010. The elected NUCP president, Dr. Hamid Barra, spoke of prioritizing consolidation, which meant building collective understanding and determining the roles that the community of *ulama* would play in creating peace by strengthening communities economically.[15]

Radio 'Suara Mindanao,' a public radio station based in Cotabato city is also actively promoting community participation by discussing a variety of problems and developments in Mindanao. According to program coordinator Abdurrahim B Sinarimbo,[16] routine programs run for about four hours every day, and because the discussions relate to community participation and involve many parties, the station almost deserves to be known as a movement. Raheem has said that the station always takes a neutral stance towards issues, while contributors and community members tend to present aspirations in line with those held by the *bangsamoro* people. The station often gives local and central government officials a place to explain issues to the community in Mindanao and receive input and criticism from listeners.

Outside these efforts, the MNLF-MILF relationship continues to be politically strained and competitive as each attempts to win over the community's sympathy. Although representatives from both parties hold regular informal meetings to build mutual understanding and to try and prevent physical clashes, occasional rioting continue to break out.

In negotiating with the central government, although the political groups represented by the MNLF and MILF played a large role, social and civil society movements which took relatively impartial positions have played increasingly important roles, particularly after the Supreme Court's annulment of the MOA-

AD peace agreement. In addition to voicing the demands of the Muslim minority in Mindanao, civil society and social movements have also held internal negotiations with political groups and amongst themselves.

Pattani

Conflicts between the Muslim minority in South Thailand or Pattani and the government of Thailand can be traced back to 1932, and negotiations have been held between the two parties since the 1940s. Following the second election after the revolution, the central government of Thailand introduced an assimilation policy that banned the language and traditional dress which had been symbols of the Muslim communities in the South. The government also arrested some of those who opposed the new policy, including Haji Sulong, a prominent Muslim leader. Since then, some groups have followed the government policy and have become involved in national political parties and bureaucracy, while new movements demanding independence and negotiations have continued to emerge.

The period of 2003-2004 was full of unrest and uncertainty in South Thailand.[17] The central government increased monitoring and tightened control over society in the South. Since then a new phenomenon has emerged, namely the growth of civil society organizations and NGOs addressing these issues.

On March 12 2004, following an increase in violence under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's government in the three provinces in South Thailand,[18] lawyer Somchai Neelapaijit was kidnapped (and later murdered). Somchai had been working *pro bono* to defend victims of kidnappings or imprisonment, and those accused of terrorism in South Thailand. He also supervised junior lawyers from South Thailand who were studying in Bangkok. They became the founders of the Muslim Attorney Center (MAC), which worked *pro bono* to help political victims and their families with advocacy and legal matters. The death of Somchai Neelaphaijit pushed the MAC to maintain a presence in each of the capital cities of the three provinces. The center's work included accompanying victims to court, political advocacy, direct advocacy, investigation, and providing legal education for the public or order to increase understanding of legal procedures and to provide contact persons for assistance. Today each MAC branch has between seven and ten full-time lawyers and 20-30 volunteers who provide free services. The institute is committed to promoting human rights such as the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from death, freedom from fear, and freedom of expression.[19] MAC also publishes an annual report on the political situation in South Thailand and selected cases on the website www.macmuslim.com.

The women's movement currently plays perhaps the most important role in South Thailand's social movement. According to Soraiya Jamjuree,[20] lecturer at the Education Faculty of the Prince of Songkhla University and also an activist, before the violence of 2003-2004 the division of work for women in South Thailand was well established, in that they worked, as was customary, in the home, in the rice paddies or in sewing. Some worked in offices. Today women activists seek to help school children, secure scholarships, find work for widows (although opportunities are limited and rather uncertain), and defend mainly poor victims in court, by working with lawyers prepared to work *pro bono*.[21] To date, government compensation for victims and families affected by violence is very limited.

Zaenab, known more commonly as Yena, and Zubaidah are two such activists whose families are victims of the violence. Yena lost 48 family members, including her children, in the Tak Bae incident during the height of violence that occurred in 2004.[22] Initially, she worked as a tailor, and her husband as an *ojek* (motorbike taxi) driver. Today Yena, a junior high school graduate, is coordinator of a network for female victims of violence for the three provinces. She serves the families of victims by finding lawyers, finding schools for orphans, helping victims make their way to government offices as needed, and accompanying them to court if family members have been accused of involvement in the separatist movement. There are six to ten other colleagues working similarly in each province on a daily basis. Yena and her colleagues receive support from NGO activists and lecturers or researchers at universities, such as activists Soraiya and Alisah Hasamoah, both of whom are lecturers in the Humanities and Social Sciences Faculty of Prince of Songkhla University. All such activities, whether by NGOs, grassroots movements or university groups, are entered into a comprehensive database compiled and analyzed by a research institute under the Faculty of

Technology of The Prince of Songkhla University, known as the Deep South Coordination Center (DSCC).[23]

Malay language, Jawi script (Malay Arabic) and religious education are three important features of Malay-Muslim identity in the region. In South Thailand, a number of *pesantren* (schools) have set aside funds specifically to employ teachers of Malay and to provide extra classes for students. Every semester, the Darut Sat *pesantren* in Sae Buri, about 90 minutes drive from Pattani, allocates funds and time to teach Malay and religious education using the Jawi script. Many foundations, *pesantren* and individuals concerned about the Malay language and Jawi script run independent radio broadcasts. Once such organisation is the Foundation for South Thai Islamic Culture (YAKIST), established by former police officer Tengku Arifin Bin Tengku Chik using money from his police pension. The foundation runs free courses in Malay for the community, especially for children, in the three provinces.

Former businessman and former director of the Young Moslim Association of Thailand (YMAT) Mansor Salleh is involved in a similar endeavor in Yala, where he has established a community radio network to help develop Malay. The station broadcasts five hours a day on various subjects. Salleh also helps increase political awareness within the community, especially amongst children.

Hj Ismail Ishad Benjamith Al-Fatani,[24] a traditional *pesantren da'i* (preacher) works with the Islamic College of the Prince of Songkla University through his institute, The Southern Border Provinces of Thailand (PUSTA), to hold exhibitions of traditional South Thai Malay art. Most exhibitions are held in villages, open fields, *pesantren* and *madrassah*. The institute also promotes local Muslim leaders and *ulama* to help build awareness of local and Malay culture through seminars and other events.

The South Thailand journalist network, known as 'Voice of Peace', has also been highly active. Voice Peace publishes online at www.voicepeace.org. According to chief editor Tuan Daniya Hj Mansor,[25] the network advocates complete freedom of information in South Thailand, and tries to provide alternative information to that presented by mainstream media outlets that have to date been monopolized by investors and controlled by the government. Voice Peace is supported by a think-tank,

also comprised of journalists, called Deep South Watch (DSW). While voicepeace.org places emphasis on news, feature articles and human interest pieces, DSW is focused more on publishing research data on its website (www.deepsouthwatch.org). According to its two founders, Ayub Pathan and Dr. Srisombop Jitpiromsri,[26] DSW is a place where journalists can gain and analyze data that cannot be accessed elsewhere.

Almost all figures and groups mentioned above are pursing peace efforts in their own ways. However, Ahmad Somboon Bualuang specifically emphasizes that his struggle is for the creation of peace and for mediation between groups, especially between separatists/insurgents and the government (local and central). Ahmad Somboon is a senior NGO activist and a civil servant pensioner. For some time he has been involved in peace initiatives and mediation between groups in conflict in South Thailand. He has close relationships with a number of actors in the insurgency and separatist movements even though he himself does not agree with their violent methods, that have recently become more random and arbitrary, with the bombing of streets and markets and other public places. He was appointed to be a member of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), formed under PM Thaksin Shinawatra's government to resolve the violent incidents of 2004. He believes the government has not done enough to bring Malay-Muslims out of their marginalization caused by past repression and current government indifference and neglect of cultural and linguistic differences (for example, the making of Thai or Siam the standard language when Malay-Muslims did not use or understand it.)

Repressive and uncompromising policies on the part of the Thai government towards movements that demand independence and autonomy in the three provinces of South Thailand have meant that no prominent figures or movements amongst the Muslim minority have emerged. However, democratization since the 1990s and the violence that peaked in 2003-2004 has helped consolidate social and civil society movements that have placed emphasis on struggle in the public realm as opposed to the usual underground movements. Nevertheless, they must still negotiate amongst one another and with the underground movements that still exist, in addition to with the central government, in order to struggle for minority rights.

Penang, Malaysia

A policy to favor ethnic Malays over migrant Chinese and Indians in Malaysia has been in place since before independence, when the National Front (BN) was a coalition of many ethnic-based parties. The coalition was led by UMNO (the United Malays National Organization) which was a reflection of Malay majority parties and had been in power since before independence. After violence during the 1969 election, the BN government implemented an acceleration policy to promote the Malays or *bumiputra* in 1971 that was known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). The policy was aimed at achieving economic equality between migrants, particularly the Chinese, and the Malays or *bumiputra*. Since then there have been no significant parties or coalitions that have been able to oppose the power of the BN. However after Anwar Ibrahim, initially the deputy leader of UMNO under Mahathir Mohammad, was released from prison he established an alternative coalition called Pakatan Rakyat (PR) and ran in elections in 2008. He secured a significant number of seats, increasing the seats held by his Partai Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) from one seat to 36, or a total of 40 percent of seats. Anwar also introduced an Alternative Economic Policy (AEP) to replace the NEP.

The context in Penang is very different from that of the Philippines and Thailand. The March 2008 elections saw the government lose five of 13 states to the opposition. The opposition campaigned on the primary aspiration to abolish the NEP which had been applied since 1971 and basically gave priority to the *bumiputra* in state policies. In Penang, the change was felt more clearly because it was one of the areas in which the opposition coalition seized control from the government. Although the governing party prior to the 2008 election was a Chinese majority party, in regard to the NEP they supported the BN's national policy.

In 1971 the *bumiputra* only controlled 1.7 percent of the national economy, in contrast to the percentage controlled by immigrants, particularly the ethnic Chinese who controlled more than two thirds of the national economy. This led to a general awareness and, after interracial unrest during the general election of 13 May 1969,[27] a more concerted push for affirmative action, actualised in what became known as the NEP. In 1981, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad accelerated the NEP. The policy was aimed at creating economic equality, bringing the percentage of Malay control over the economy from 1.7 percent in 1971 to 30 percent in 20 years.[28]

Anwar Ibrahim offered a "New Economic Agenda", arguing that the NEP/NDP/NVP and the policy of Malay or *bumiputra* supremacy was no longer appropriate if Malaysia wanted to compete on both a national and international scale.[29] (Ibrahim, 2008). Although Malays have indeed benefited enormously from the previous economic policy, with the latest government data indicating that they control around 19 percent or more of the economy, inequality amongst ethnic groups, especially amongst the Malays, has increased. Anwar has stated that this is because wealth finds its way largely into the hands of the elite, and the majority of Malays are left with barely anything. Affirmative action must be channelled towards all who require it. Anwar thus proposed the concept of 'People's Supremacy'. According to Anwar, Malaysia must implement fair competition through meritocracy, open tenders and healthy democracy.

Under this PR vision, Penang's Chief Minister, Lim Guan Eng[30] from the DAP launched a blueprint proposing that "Open tenders and capping the private sector profits at a reasonable rate of return will ensure the protection of public interest without sacrificing efficiency and productivity." The DAP-PR coalition is also struggling for a new federal model for Penang that gives more power to local governments, which means more control over natural resources. The Penang government is also more aggressive in making use of global opportunities.[31] It is not surprising that in Penang, the Muslim minority is wary that it may lose its privileges and rights as *bumiputra*.

Though the Muslim minority had the advantage of *bumiputra* status on Penang, this did not mean it was raised to a similar economic and political position to the ethnic Chinese majority. As Anwar Ibrahim has claimed, the Malay Supremacy Policy itself is all about monopolies, collusion and nepotism within the BN elite, both amongst the Malays and the UMNO party representing the Malays, as well as amongst the Chinese Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (PGRM) and the Indian Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). From this perspective, it is clear that the 2008 election results bringing DAP, from the PKR coalition, into power has opened up the opportunity for minorities to regain their rights through open competition. In Penang, the DAP has displayed a vision consistent with that of the PR, led by Anwar Ibrahim.[32] Despite the good

intentions of DAP's policies, interviews with a number of Malay figures in Penang and members of Islamic/ Malay mass organizations and NGOs suggest that they fear that meritocracy and open tenders will further marginalize Malays under Chinese hegemony, because in reality the Chinese are much stronger, especially in open competition.

Islamic organizations in Penang such as Islamic Youth (ABIM), Persatuan Ulama Malaysia (Association of Malaysian *Ulama*), and the Malaysian Islamic Welfare Organization (PERKIM)) have expressed concerns over the marginalization of Malays in Penang, and are increasingly associating themselves with the majority in Malaysia and displaying conservatism in their Islamic understanding. On the other hand, they support the DAP-PR coalition's agenda to remove the draconian laws in Malaysia that have been used by the government to preserve their hold on power. ABIM was established by Anwar Ibrahim, amongst others, in the 1980s. Ideologically the organization was initially similar to the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), which advocated an Islamic ideology. However, Anwar Ibrahim became so powerful as to concern Mahathir Mohamad, leader of the UMNO/BN party. Mahathir thus recruited Anwar Ibrahim into the UMNO party. This caused tension between ABIM, which tended towards PAS's orientation, and Anwar, who was now a part of UMNO.

Now that Anwar Ibrahim leads the opposition, ABIM has become somewhat closer to him once again and supports some of PR's policies. One of the most important issues it supports is the agenda to abolish the NEP, though for slightly different reasons. ABIM's primary argument against the NEP is that it causes corruption within UMNO/BN. Nevertheless, according to Zayd bin Hari[33] the head of ABIM on Penang Island, ABIM is not a political organization and thus its support of the PR agenda is not political support. He said that ABIM is more about giving religious guidance to members. In the current situation on Penang Island, ABIM is most concerned about the morality of Muslim youth. However, it also supports the eradication of corruption and nepotism, and greater transparency. Zayd bin Hari argues that if openness and open tenders are not introduced fairly, it will make the already weak ethnic Malays much weaker in comparison to the ethnic Chinese.

Jemaah Islam Malaysia (JIM) is an NGO that was established in Kuala Lumpur in the 1990s and aimed at reforming Islam. The organization has always been critical of the government and offers a conservative understanding of Islam. It is very popular among professionals. In Penang, according to JIM member Daniel,[34] who is also a dentist, JIM supports the PR agenda, especially with regard to abolishing draconian laws and enforcing human rights, as well as addressing poverty in a non-discriminatory way.

Persatuan Ulema Malaysia (Association of Malaysian *Ulama*) is a relatively young organization, formed in 2000 to help strengthen social organizations and NGOs. According to the PUM coordinator[35] who prefers to remain anonymous, the term *ulema* in the name of the organization refers not to religious leaders but rather to intellectuals who care about social issues. In accordance with its aim, the organization is more of a consortium, and incorporates almost all social organizations and NGOS. The organization does not itself work directly with society but works only through one or more of the member organizations or NGOs. It does however hold a variety of training programs and seminars to increase the skill levels of activists. It does not have a specific stance on the *bumiputera* issue, but aims in general for justice. The reality in Penang, the PUM coordinator says, is one of inequality between the *bumiputra* and the Chinese majority, and as a result the organization is critical of the effect that the abolition of the NEP policy would have in Penang.

The most prominent NGO in Penang since the 1970s is ALIRAN, which was established by renowned intellectuals and activists. Its membership is open to persons of all races, religions and ethnicity. It was originally formed to criticize government policy biased towards a particular race or ethnicity, such as the NEP. The organization is focused on analytical criticism and intellectual awareness. In addition to academic studies and findings, ALIRAN publishes a monthly journal that is easy for the general public to read but that uses an academic approach. According to Mustofa Kemal Anuar,[36] secretary general of ALIRAN, the organization not only critiques government policies that are based on race and ethnicity but also promotes pluralism in politics in Malaysia and Penang.

In response to criticism concerning the fate of the *bumiputra* under the now governing coalition PR party in Penang, the PKR deputy Chief Minister for Penang Island, Mansor Othman said that in order to increase equality and implement open competition, the Penang government has established a program for affirmative action for the poor and needy that is based

on need rather than ethnicity. He said that more than 80 percent of those benefiting from the program are ethnic Malays.

Today, the Penang government which advocates open tenders and equality is facing challenges from two sides; the central government and the Muslim minority which wishes to maintain affirmative action for the *bumiputra* as it fears the Muslim community will increasingly be left behind.

Conclusion

The movement towards openness and democracy in the three countries studied here are indicative of the increasing role played by civil society and social movements play compared to political movements such as separatist or underground movements, in the political struggle of Muslim minorities to achieve their aspirations for equality and justice. Within all these movements there are many differences of opinion. Yet the public realm is playing a larger role in negotiations, both between different Muslim minority movements, and between these movements and central governments.

The rejection by the Supreme Court in the Philippines of the MOA-AD, in addition to threats of escalated violence, has tended to strengthen Muslim civil society which clearly wishes to take a non-partisan position distinct from the two separatist movements by the MNLF and the MILF. Similarly, in Thailand, the result of the peak in violence in Pattani in 2003-2004, the return of power to the military, and the declaration of an emergency situation and introduction of Martial Law strengthened the emergence of several social groups who defined their own agendas and distanced themselves from the separatist movement. These developments do not mean that there is opposition or friction between civil society and the separatist movements in the two countries. Rather, the strengthening of civil society functions as a kind of shock breaker which decreases the level of violence, while it does not neglect the substantial demands of autonomy, eradication of poverty and inequality, and justice for all.

Meanwhile on Penang island the Muslim civil society movement, which existed before the relatively drastic change brought about by the 2008 election, generally speaking welcomed the agenda to abolish the draconian laws (which have always troubled civil

society movements, even Islamic movements), and to eradicate corruption and manipulation. However civil society groups remain unconvinced as to whether the abolition of the NEP will be able to increase the prosperity of the *bumiputra* to be on a par with that of the Chinese majority. Identification with the national majority and a tendency towards Islamic conservatism is increasingly apparent, due to concern over continued inequalities if the *bumiputra* have to compete freely and openly with the ethnic Chinese majority, who are more highly educated and economically savvy.

NOTES

[1] Hugh Poulton and Taji-Farouki, Suha. ed. 1997. *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State*, London, Hurst and Company in Association with the Islamic Council. See also Will Kymlicka, The Internationalization of Minority Rights. *I.CON Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, January, 2008.

[2] Khaled Abou Al Fadl. 2006. Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from 8th to 17th Century CE / 2nd to 11th Century *Hijrah*, Singapore, MUIS Occasional Papers Series.

[3] There are several books that could be mentioned here, all of which focus on Muslim migrants in developed countries but emphasize either the right to worship or instruct on the ways to worship and perform religious ceremonies. See for example Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 2001M./1420M, *Fi Fiqh al-Aqalliyyat al-Muslima—Hayat al-Muslimin Wasat al-Muitam'at al-Ukhro*, Cairo: Dar as-Suruq; Sulamean Muhammad Toboliak, 1997H/1418H, *Al-Ahkam Ay-Siyasiyah: Li al-Aqalliyaat al-Muslimat fi al-Fiqh al-Islamy*, Bairut: Dar an-Nafais wa Dar al-Bayaariq; Shalah Abd al-Raaziq, 2007M/ 1468H, *al-Aqaalliyyat al-Muslimat fi al-Ghorb: Qadloya Fiqhiyyah wa Humuum Thaqafiyah*, Baghdad: Dar al-Hadi; and Shammai Fishman, 2006. *Fiqh Al-Aqalliyah:* A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities, *Research Monographs on the Muslim World*, Series No 1, Paper No 2, October 2006.

[4] This paper is the product of field research in Thailand (July-September 2009), Malaysia (October-December 2009) and the Philippines (January-March 2010).

[5] International Crisis Group. 2010. *Stalemate in Southern Thailand*. Jakarta/Brussels, 3 November 2010.

[6] Ahmad Suaedy, 2010. Islam and Minorities: Managing Identity in Malaysia, *Al-Jami'ah Journal of Islamic Studies*, State Islamic University, Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia, No. 48, Vol. I, 2010, pp. 1-52.

[7] Fainur G. Estino Jairi, 2007. *Misuari's Ideology: A Critical Inquiry on The Islamicity of MNLF Ethnic-Oriented*

Pangluwas-Lungsad (Struggle), Institute of Islamic Studies University of the Philippines, Thesis for Master Degree (Unpublished).

8   Sema Muslim Sema, interview 11/02/10.

9   Syarif Jullabi, interview 18/03/10.e

10 Steven Rood, 2005. Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society, *East-West Center Washington*, Policy Studies 7, Washington 2005. See also Philipp Bück, 2007. Civil Society and Conflict in Mindanao, in Rainer Werning and Peter Kreuzer (eds.), *Voices from Moro Land: Perspectives from Stakeholders and Observers on the Conflict in the Southern Philippines*, Petaling Jaya Kuala Lumpur, SRIRD, pp. 99-123.

11 Fr. D'Ambra, interview 22/03/10.

12 Fr. Alberth Salijo, interview 27/01/10.

13 Alih S Aiyub, interview 16/03/10.

14 Amina Rasul, interview 26/01/10.

15 Hamid Barra, interview 09/02/10.

16 Abdurrahim B Sinarimbo, interview 07/02/10.

17 McCargo, 2009. *Tearing Apart The Land: Islam and Legitimacy in Southern Thailand*, Singapore, NUS Press, hlm. viii-1. Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), "Overcoming Violence through the Power of Reconciliation", 16 May 2006, (Unofficial Translation to English), pp. 9-10. See also Chaiwat Satha-Anand, 2009, Untying the Gordian Knot: The Difficulties in Solving Southern Violence, in John Funston (ed), 2009, *Divided Over Thaksin*, Singapore: ISEAS, hlm. 96-109.

18 National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), "Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation", 16 May 2006.

19 Interview with Anukul Arweaputeh, director of the Pattani branch of MAC, 18 August 2009. See also the official MAC website at http://www.macmuslim.com/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Ite mid=10&lang=en

20 Soraiya Jamjuree, interview 26/08/2009.

21 Zaenab or Yena, interview 24/08/2009.

22 National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), Report of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), "Overcoming Violence Through the Power of Reconciliation", 16 May 2006.

23 Metta Kuning, Director of DSCC, interview 30/9/2009.

24 Ismail Ishad Benjamith Al-Fatani, interview 11/08/2009.

25 Tuan Daniya Hj Mansor, interview 6/09/2009.

26 Srisombop Jitpiromsri, interview 14/08/2009.

27 Kua Kia Soong, *2 May 13: Declassified Document on the Malaysian Riots of 1969*, Kuala Lumpur, Suaram Komunikasi, 2007.

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29 Anwar Ibrahim, 2008. The Malaysian Economic Agenda: An Idea for Development, the PKR 12-page A4 campaign pamphlet distributed during the March 2008 general election.

30 Lim Guan Eng, 2009. A Blueprint for Sustainable Development (Foreword), in Ooi Kee Beng & Goh Ban Lee, *Pilot Studies for a New Penang*, Penang Studies Series, Singapore, ISEAS, pp. XII-XVII.

31 Francis Kok Loh Wah, 2010. Restructuring Federal-State Relations in Malaysia: Fro, Centralized to Co-cooperative Federalism, *The Round Table*, Vol. 99. No. 407, pp. 131-140, April 2010.

32 Interview with the deputy Prime Minister of Penang from PKR, Mansor Othman, 19 December 2009.

33 Zayd bin Hari , interview 10/11/09.

34 Daniel, interview 03/11/2009.

35 Anonymous, interview 12/11/09.

36 Mustofa Kemal Anuar, interview 03/11/09.

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Malaysian Indian Muslim's Oscillating Identity: Swinging Between Home and Host Countries

Erni Budiwanti

Introduction

Malaysia is a highly diverse country, home to peoples of many different languages, religions and cultures of origin. Like other Southeast Asian countries, it faces challenges in maintaining the goal of integrating its diverse aspects as well preserving their uniqueness. Of Malaysia's 29 million population, Malays make up 58 percent, Chinese make up 27 percent, Indians account for 8 percent and the remaining 7 percent comprises *orang asli*[1] (native population), Eurasians and Indonesians.

In 2011 there were around 700,000 Indian Muslims, the majority of them involved in restaurant and retail businesses in urban centers such as Penang, Malacca, Kuala Lumpur, Perak, Taping, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis. In large centers such as Kuala Lumpur and Penang, the Indian settlements have come to be known as 'Little India.' The areas consist mainly of narrow, two-storied shop houses in which owners and shop assistants live and work side by side. The areas also have an Indian mosque or *Masjid India*, and surrounding complexes known as *jalan Masjid Indi* which include *madrasah* (Islamic schools).

Two main questions will be discussed here:

i) How Indian Muslims arrived in Malaysia.

ii) How they managed to remain a distinctive community within the Malaysian entity while also becoming an integral part of the Malaysian citizenry.

Research Method

The research focused on Indian Muslims living in Kuala Lumpur. It involved direct observation of the activities of mosque attendants, *madrasah* pupils, and community organizations. In-depth interviews were carried out with key informants from religious and community organizations, including mosque leaders (*Imams*), mosque organizers (*Pengerusi Masjid*), madrasah teachers, and committee members of non-government organizations (NGOs) who speak the Tamil language as their mother tongue and English and Malay as second languages.

Arrival of Indian Muslim Traders and Islamization

Indian Muslims first came to Malacca in the 15th century, when the area was ruled by King Parameswara. They came mainly as textile traders, but also sold perfumes, spices and ceramics. Gradually, they built up their businesses, and began marrying local people, becoming permanent members of the local communities, and spreading the Islamic religion among locals who had previously subscribed to animist and other beliefs.

Their success may reflect on their trading ethics which emphasized offering good quality items at fair prices. This gave them a reputation for trustworthiness and gained them permanent customers among the locals. The development of cordial relationships facilitated intra-marriages and the Indian Muslims became an integral part of local life.

Some Indian Muslims were known as royal traders since they sold silk, jewelry and spices to local nobles. Trading and intermarriage with royal family members connected them to noble circles, which who were also among the first to convert to Islam.

As Indian Muslims spread the teachings of Muhammad, they built mosques; of which the oldest ones still remaining include Masjid Tangkera and Masjid Kampung Keling in Malacca, Masjid Kapitan Keling in Penang, Masjid India in Kuala Lumpur, and Masjid India Sultan Kelana in Kelang, in the state of Selangor. According to one informant, Datok Tasleem Ibrahim, all early Muslim traders from India had a strong bond with their religion. Wherever they were, they always built a mosque at the heart of the city. The main cities in the country, even in Kuching and Sarawak, still have Indian mosques. Without the Indian Muslims, Islam in Malaysia would not have been as developed as it is today.[2]

Between the 15th and 16th centuries Islam spread into Sultanate territory of the major Malay Peninsula. Judith Nagata described the success of Indian Muslim traders in Islamizing Malaysia as follows:

> It is now widely accepted that the Islamization of much of the Malay Peninsula can be attributed to the influence and activity of Indian Muslim traders, who carried the faith along with their worldly commodities. Some of these traders made regular circumnavigations of the entire Southeast Asian region, including Sumatra and other islands of the Indonesia archipelago, South Thailand, Myanmar (Burma), and then back to Coromandel coasts. A number of them no doubt settled permanently in the region, marrying and becoming absorbed into the local (Malay population).

Mosques, *surau* (places of worship that are smaller than mosques), and *madrasah* (Islamic schools) soon became strategic meeting places for all sorts of social, cultural, and religious gatherings. Today these institutions still perform a crucial role in strengthening the social and spiritual bonds of Indian Muslims tied by common origin, language, culture and religion. Key celebrations and events within the Islamic calendar include:

1) *Mauludur Rasul* (Prophet Muhammad's birthday) is celebrated for twelve days from the 1st until the 12th of Rabiul Awal.

2) *Isra' Mi'raj*. Celebrated on the 27th of Rajab, this is the anniversary of the prophet's excursion from Masjidil Haram in Mecca to Masjidil Aqsa in Palestine (*Isra'*), and from Masjidil Aqsa to Sidratul Muntaha (*Mi'raj* - heaven) to receive Allah's command about the conduct of daily prayer.

3) The *Nispu Syaaban*. Celebrated on the 15th of Syaaban.

4) Fasting month, held during the month of Ramadhan. At the Masjit India the mosque committee holds a free daily distribution of *bubur lambuk* (porridge) and beverage for the breaking of the fast. The porridge is served a few minutes before the *adzan* (call to prayer).

5) *Nuzulul Quran* is celebrated on the 17th of Ramadhan to commemorate the day when the *surah* (chapter) of the Qur'an descended down to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel, marking his prophethood.

6) The *Ied* prayer is celebrated at the end of Ramadhan.

7) The *Hari Raya Haji or Qurban* (Day of Sacrifice) on the 10th of Zuhijah, when cattle and lambs are slaughtered to mark the sacrifice of Prophet Ibrahim and his beloved son, Prophet Ismail.

8) The *Ma'al Hijrah* or Islamic New Year on the 1st of Syawal.

9) The anniversary of the death of Syech Abdul Kadir Jailani, outstanding *Ulama* from Baghdad, who had a large following in India. The celebration takes place from the 1st until the 10th of Rabiul Akhir.

10) The anniversary of the death Syech Shahul Hameed, a venerated religious figure from Nagoore, southern India, is held from the 1st to the 10th of Jumadil Akhir.

11) The anniversary of the death of Azmir Syarif, a respected religious figure from northern India, is held for one day (in India the celebrations last for ten days, from the 1st until the 10th of Rajab.

The mosques are usually named for the home country, i.e. *Masjid India*. The language of sermons and preaching is Tamil, the most widely spoken language among Malaysian Indians. (Besides Tamil-speakers, there are also a small number of Malabarian Muslims who speak Malayalam and maintain a *surau* called *surau* Malabari.)

Cultural Mechanisms in Maintaining Malaysian Indian Muslims' Identity

Shared history and cultural background has always contributed significantly to the construction of Indian Muslims' identity. Today, history still instills a sense of pride in the community's past as royal traders who spread trade and religion in the region.

The present generation of Indian Muslims maintains their ancestral legacy throughout a set of ritual conducts performed in the mosque or *surau* as mentioned above. The legacy of their ancestors is also preserved in cultural elements such as dress code, Indian spices and cuisine, Indian arts and movies, and newspapers and magazines in Tamil, all of which can be found in the areas known as 'Little India.'

The wearing of the *sari* distinguishes female members of the community from Malay women, who usually wear the *baju kurung*. Indian Muslim women's *sari*, with long sleeves and veil, is different from the *sari* worn by Hindu Indians, who wear the *sari* with short sleeves, bare waist, and no hair scarf. More recently, some Indian Muslim women have begun to wear the *baju kurung*, either for fashion reasons or because they wish to identify with the Malay culture.

Indian Muslim restaurants serving halal food[3] and known as *mamak* are found in Little India as well as other areas, and illustrate the wide social acceptance of the cuisine among Malays and Chinese Malaysians. Referring to the wide acceptance of the cuisine among Malays, one informant stated:

> "Where will they find any other *halal* food than the Malay restaurant? The only place that they can go to is the *mamak* restaurant, since it is impossible to go to Chinese or Tamil-Hindus restaurants which are non halal".

Popular aspects of the cuisine include *nasi kandar*, *nasi bryani*, *tandoori* chicken, meat or beef *karee*, *roti canay* and drinks such as *teh tarik*.

Tamil newspapers and magazines read by both Muslims and Hindus include the daily papers *Tamil Nesan*, *Makkal Osai*, *Malaysia Nanban*, *Muslim Murasu*, *Mani Vilakku*, *Nambikai,* and *Ungal Kural*. The Malaysian government provides support for the Tamil language, which is widely used as the medium of instruction in Tamil schools, households, Indian mosques and *surau*. A daily television news program in Tamil, *Vanakam*, is broadcast on channel TV2.

Different degrees of assimilation of Indian Muslims into the wider culture have led to the following categorizations:

1. The descendants of those who have inter-married with Malays are recognized as Malays or are known as *Jawi Pekan* or *Jawi Peranakan*.[4]

2. Those whom may not have inter-married with locals but are seen as a part of the wider Malay culture. They may, for example, wear Malay-style clothing, work and live amidst Malays and follow Malay customs in weddings and other ceremonies.

3. Those who have not inter-married and retain a strong Tamil identity. They may not speak fluent Malay, they read the Tamil newspapers and magazines, and maintain strong links with India. Among the people belong to this category are the Imam (prayer leaders), caretakers of *Masjid India*, and restaurant workers who work in Malaysia under a contractual basis.

The above categories are not mutually exclusive. The assimilation and hybridity referred to in the first category indicates that Indian Muslims have always played a part in the nation-building process in Malaysia.

Indian Muslims and the Process of Nation-Building in Malaysia

National diversity is a matter of social pride in Malaysia. The fact that citizens come from different origins (Indian, Chinese, Malay, and *orang asli*[5]) is an essential part of the country's socio-cultural capital. Reflecting this, the government has set up a policy to celebrate and represent the mosaic of ethnicities, languages, religions and customs through the visual arts and through stories of achievements disseminated in the mass media, including government-controlled newspapers, magazines, and television.

The government is also promoting a tourism campaign known as 'Malaysia - Truly Asia' which further promotes the idea of diversity. The culture of the Indian Muslim diaspora features strongly in this campaign, through its historical sites and objects including the sea ports of Penang and Malacca, and old Indian mosques. 'Little India' is projected as a part of the 'Truly Asia' motif, and also supports ideas around national goals such as 'We are different but remain united' under 'One Malaysia'.

Bumi Putra Rights and the Challenge for Malaysian Nation Building

In Malaysia, the designation of 'indigenous' or 'Bumiputra' (BP) is not generally defined by place of birth, citizenship, or contributions made as citizens and productive members of the nation. It is, rather, decided by the government. The designation of BP provides for helping the poor, especially those living in rural areas and those with low-income status. Support is given in areas such as free admission and tuition in colleges and universities, student loans, business

licenses, bank loans and employment in state agencies. The policy allows beneficiaries to receive supports throughout their lifetimes.

The Malaysian government recently tried to modify the policy by introducing the concept of meritocracy. However the initiatives have not satisfied the Indian Malay population, which has seen the number of Indians recruited in the civil service decline from 40 percent in 1957 to 2 percent in 2005. Although the community has lived in Malaysia for more than three generations, its members are exempt from BP status. When the government granted BP status to other minorities such as the Kadazan and Iban communities in Sabah, the Bidayuh and Dayak in Sarawak, the Portuguese in Malacca, and the Pattani in Kedah, the Indian Muslims tried to demand equal status. The president of PERMIM (Indian Muslim Association in Malaysia), Hj Syed Ibrahim, expressed his concern on the BP issue thus:

> Indian Muslims are around 700,000 people and not all of them are well-to-do families. Around 60 percent of them are poor, low income, laymen. 40 percent are middle class income, "*boleh tahan*"[6]. We urge the government to help the poor families, giving them special privilege of BP. The Portuguese in Malacca, Iban, Dayak, Bidayuh in Sabah and Serawak, they are all Christians, and yet they are BP. The Portuguese are the community with the least numbers, they are around 100,000-200,000 people, but the government helps them.

Malaysia's constitution guarantees that an Indian can become Malay and enjoy BP status automatically if s/he professes Islam, speaks Malay, and conforms to Malay customs and tradition. The constitution thus suggests that Indian Muslims should assimilate themselves to be an integral part of Malay culture. Since there is no religious difference between the communities, intermarriage is encouraged as a way to gain BP rights. However, not all Indian Muslims want to be Malays. They want to retain their own culture, while also gaining BP status. An informant stated:

> "Special BP status through assimilation might take a long time, bearing in mind that many Indian Muslims want to be themselves, rather than pretending to be "like the Malays". Assimilation through marriage has started, but the number is not very big. Now assimilation is not going as fast as before. And now people are even becoming more racially conscious".

Thus the identity of the community as Malaysian citizens of Indian origin is seen as being problematized by the lack of access to the same rights and status as that enjoyed by those identified as Malays or others. The special privileges enjoyed by one sector are seen as impeding the process of nation-building.

Conclusion

Malaysian Indians have a dual identity. Embedded in this identity is a distant memory of their country of origin (India) and the new realities of life as a disapora in a new country.

The diaspora's emotional ties with the country of origin remain strong, and are reflected in mainly religious conduct and the celebration of religious events. Cultural elements such as language, cuisine, and clothing also bind people together.

Indian Muslims perform a delicate balancing act to ensure their double needs i.e. becoming Malaysian without necessarily losing their identity as Muslims of Indian origin. Unfortunately, national policies excluding the community from *bumiputra* status are seen as having restricted the community's position to that of a marginalized minority group.

The *bumiputra* policy is seen as fostering divisions among citizens and resulting deterioration in relationships between those ethnic groups who are beneficiaries and those who are not. It thus weakens the nation-building process and the achievement of goals such as 'One Malaysia'. An integrated Malaysia would rather require the government to ensure equality and justice for all irrespective of faith and ethnic origins.

Malaysians share plenty of aspects that create a shared identity. There are also many elements within the different cultures that create distinct identities. It will be important that these tensions be reconciled. Meanwhile, the Indian Muslim community continues to struggle with the desire to be Malaysian citizens with equal rights to others, without losing the pride they feel in their identity.

Name of Mosque and Madrasah	Location
Masjid India	Kuala Lumpur
Masjid India Tuanku Sultang Klana Klang	Klang, Selangor
Masjid Kampung Kling	Melacca
Masjid Kapitan Keling	Penang
Masjid India	Johor Bahru
Masjid India	Taiping
Masjid India Ipoh	Ipoh, Perak
Surau India :Madrasah At-Ghautiyah	Brickfields, Kuala Lumpur
Surau Malabari	Taman Selayang, Kuala Lumpur
Madrasah Indian Muslim, Kampung Pandan	Kuala Lumpur

Table 1: Indian Mosques and Madrasahs in Malaysia

Name of Organizations	Location
PRESMA-Persatuan Pengusaha Restoran Muslim Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur
Gabungan Syurah Indian Muslims Perak (Perak Indian Muslims Consultative council)	Perak
KIMMA-Kongres India Muslim Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur
PIMP-Persatuan India Muslim Port Dickson	Port Dickson, Seremban
PERMIM-Persekutuan Pertubuhan India Muslim Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur
Kerala Muslim Jema'at	Taman Selayang, Selangor
Persatuan Muslimin, Brickfields	Brickfields, Wilayah Persekutuan
Persatuan India Muslim Marumalartchi Klang	Klang of Selangor
Liga Muslim Pinang (Muslim League Pinang)	Georgetown, Penang
Port Klang Indian Muslim Association	Port Klang, Selangor
Persatuan Kemajuan India Muslim Taiping	Taiping, Perak
Indian Muslim League Johor Bahru	Johor Bahru, Johor
Angkatan Kemajuan Muslim, Selangor	Wilayah Persekutuan & Selangor
Persatuan India Muslim	Selangor & Wilayah Persekutuan
Selangor Muslim League	Selangor
Persatuan Penukar Wang Asing (Muslims Money Changer Association)	Kuala Lumpur
Muslim Paper Merchants Association	Kuala Lumpur
GEPIMA-Pergerakan Belia India Muslim Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur
Pertubuhan Ansarul Islam Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur
Badan Amal Islam	Kuala Lumpur
Kuala Lumpur	Seremban
MIM-Majelis Madrasah India Muslim Malaysia	Kuala Lumpur
Persatuan India Muslim Malacca	Malacca
PERKIM- Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia	Malacca
Malaysia Alaghankulam Muslim Jama'ath (MAMJ)	Kuala Lumpur

Table 2: Indian NGOs

NOTES

[1] Native communities include the Kadazan and Iban in Sabah, and the Bidayuh and Dayak in Sarawak. Communities of Portugese origin are found mainly in Malacca. The Pattani community lives mainly in Kedah.

[2] Judith Nagata. 1993. "Religion and Ethnicity Among the Indian Muslims in Malaysia". In Shandu, K.S. & A. Main (eds). Indian Communities In Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS. pp 515.

[3] Food considered lawful when the animals are slaughtered in the ways prescribed by Islam.

[4] Helen Margaret Brown. 1977. Malaysia: Univesity of Malaya. "The South Indian Muslim Community and The Evolution of the Jawi Peranakan in Penang". M.A Thesis: University of Malaya.

[5] Some of the orang asli or the natives are the Iban, the Kadazan, the Pattani, the Portugese, and the Bidayuh

[6] This means that they can bear their daily living costs and can afford to send their children to tertiary education.

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International Philanthropy in Southeast Asia: Case Studies from Indonesia and the Philippines

Alan Feinstein

Introduction

My Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Fellowship allowed me to carry out research in Japan, Indonesia, and the Philippines on what I feel are some worrying trends in the field of international philanthropy generally, and specifically in a few Southeast Asian countries.[1] Although the research involved gathering a lot of data, ideas, opinions, and supporting materials, it was not academic, my intention being to do a kind of "advocacy research," or something more journalistic than scholarly hypothesis-testing. My own experience working for four international foundations in Asia over a period of 23 years served as a base. I started with a general hypothesis about these problematic trends and elicited the reactions of people on both the grant-giving and grant-receiving ends, in addition to gathering some secondary data. Throughout I have tried to emphasize that more local voices in reaction to those trends need to be heard and directed back to the donors.

Philanthropy has been receiving a lot of public attention lately. We are witnessing, I feel, a shift in paradigms, and even in basic core values, in the assumptions of philanthropic foundations and their role in addressing the key issues of development—poverty and inequity. I will first try to describe this shift and then attempt to bring out its implications—and here is where I hope the connections to the API program, to this workshop, to this panel, and to several crucial, broad social and political issues will become clearer.

Foundations, New and Old

The first part of the argument concerns private charitable foundations. There has been an impressive growth in the number of new, northern-hemisphere-based foundations, with the United States providing the most numerous and largest examples. While most of these foundations were founded to address domestic or local problems, there are some that are ambitiously working internationally, too. Many of the new foundations claim to work in new ways, and explicitly distance themselves from older foundations that have been working on international development and related issues for many decades. So, I am positing here a contrast between "old philanthropy" and "new philanthropy." The gist of the difference centers on how the new and the old foundations answer questions about "accountability," "efficiency," and "impact."

The new philanthropists, also called "philanthrocapitalists,"[2] take as their model for-profit corporations, and extol business-like ways of working, business-like efficiency, and market-driven solutions to social problems. They claim to be accustomed to posing and answering questions about accountability from their experience in business. For example, accounting for programs and grants is like accounting to shareholders or boards of directors. There is still a "bottom line," they claim, but it is not dollar profits for shareholders, but the measurable "bottom line" of social impact. As businessmen, they are used to showing how efficiently their money is spent; in their philanthropy, they will show how much "bang" they get for their "buck."

The philanthrocapitalists have been much in the news recently. Just to give a flavor of what I am referring to, let me provide a few examples.

- Melinda Gates gave an October 2010 speech broadcast on the TED website (Gates 2010), in which she suggested studying the success of the Coca-Cola Company's marketing for salutary lessons for social development. "Coke's success is relevant. . . . They take real-time data and immediately feed it back into the product. They tap into local entrepreneurial talent, and they do incredible marketing. . . . Let's contrast that for a minute to development. In development, the evaluation comes at the very end of the project. I've sat in a lot of those meetings. And by then, it is way too late to use the data. I had somebody from an NGO once describe it to me as bowling in the dark. They said, 'You roll the ball, you hear some pins go down. It's dark, you can't see which one goes down until the lights come on, and then you an see your impact.' Real-time data turns on the lights."

- In his article in *The Guardian* on 13 July 2010 entitled "Inside the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation," Andy Becket reported on the "inside view" of the foundation from interviews with several of its staff: "Foundation staff describe the [grant-giving] process, and indeed all their work, in business-school language—achieving 'leverage,' building the foundation 'brand,' serving 'markets' and 'customers.' Or they use the language of management consultancy and computing. 'Bill is about numbers,' Steiner [deputy director for agriculture] said. 'He wants to see the data. He values data more than ideology'" (Becket 2010).

- Jacob Weisberg in a 2006 article in the *Washington Post* relates the new foundations to an older one: "Just as Microsoft wanted to avoid becoming IBM, the Gates Foundation—despite protests to the contrary—dreads turning into the Ford Foundation."

- Similarly, in a recent talk to students at the University of Michigan, Charles Munger, business partner of Warren Buffet (who has donated or pledged much of his immense fortune to the Gates Foundation), opined that corporations themselves help society more than philanthropies: "'I believe Costco [a chain of retail stores of which he is director] does more for civilization than the Rockefeller Foundation. I think it's a better place. You get a bunch of very intelligent people sitting around trying to do well, I immediately get kind of suspicious and squirm in my seat. . . . I've seen so much folly and stupidity on the part of our major philanthropic groups, including the World Bank,' Munger said. 'I really have more confidence in building up the more capitalistic ventures like Costco'" (Frye 2010).

- Finally, in a *Forbes* article about credit card billionaire T. Denny Sanford, titled "Dying Broke: Where's the glory in creating a charitable foundation that's still around in a century?" Whelan (2007) wrote: "'Very plainly, very succinctly, I look at life as an investor,' he says. 'What will give me or my community the best return?' This just-the-facts approach served him well in building his successful business career, Sanford says. He's now applying it to philanthropy."

So, what am I trying to show with this quick romp through the press clippings of the rich and famous?

Philanthropy, especially American philanthropy involving private charitable foundations newly created by prominent business figures, is currently growing in dollar terms and numbers of foundations, and, is garnering more and more public attention. Partly this is due to the celebrity of the various new philanthrocapitalists; partly it is because of the huge size of the foundations they have created. Finally, it is because of the impressive claims that several of these philanthrocapitalists have made for what their giving programs will produce: "saving the world" or "changing the world," and doing it in "new" ways unlike those of the older foundations.

So, in recent years, along with the growth of a bubble economy, which now looks so disastrous from hindsight, we have seen a rise in what is variously called "venture philanthropy," "new philanthropy," "strategic philanthropy," or "philanthrocapitalism," which proclaims market principles and business models as the sources of strategies to address social problems. These strategies assume that the public sector's role is outmoded and inefficient and that market-driven solutions carried out by private institutions can eliminate the scourges of disease, poverty, and inequity. These claims, while inflated to read "saving the world," actually have to do with the whole set of terms subsumed under the rubric of accountability: effectiveness, efficiency, success, impact, "return on investment," or "bang for the buck." The philanthrocapitalists claim that they are working more efficiently and successfully in effecting positive social change, and that this can be demonstrated in concrete, measurable form.

I now want to shift focus to the older, longer-established American foundations and how their histories, approaches, and claims differ in important ways from the "new philanthropy," and have recently become heavily influenced by it. In fact, it is that influence and a change in the "old philanthropy" that interest me here, and that I want to direct attention to. Of course, the new philanthropies do not *own* the new vocabulary or its earlier versions, and the old foundations, too, have always been concerned with accounting to themselves and to the public for their successes or failures. But they have not been obsessed with strategy and measurable impact to the same degree, and they have tended to make somewhat less grandiose claims for what they are about. I will try to give some examples of the effects of the influence I am talking about and what the trends are.

Older private foundations in the United States (especially the small subset of them that work internationally, such as the Ford, Rockefeller, MacArthur, Carnegie and Pew foundations) have in recent years been undergoing radical retrenchments. In their announcements of cutbacks of staff, closing of offices, and changes in programs, they have blamed the fiscal pressures of their shrinking endowments as major reasons. Part of the retrenching can be put down to the financial and economic crises of late 2008, perhaps—but not all, as some of the plans were afoot before the crisis. What is going on?

I would argue that the rise of the "new foundations" and a trend among independent philanthropic foundations to seek their models from the for-profit business sector may be a big part of it. Actually, I think the big "old foundations" have been going through a period of being scared by the likes of big "new foundations" (often vastly bigger, as in the case of the Gates Foundation)—scared, that is, into thinking that they are old-fashioned, old-hat, old-culture, with outmoded programs that fail to produce the positive "metrics" and "measurables" in the short term that the new foundations, endowed and often run by successful super-rich businessmen, can produce. (This fear is compounded by other fears relating to stricter government regulation of private foundations.)

This has led to a double hit to the grantees and beneficiaries of the large, independent American foundations. First, there are fewer grant dollars to go around. Second, as result of the shift by old foundations into thinking along corporate lines, which preceded the crash, program focuses have shifted, and many of the ways of traditional "grant-craft" have changed as well, often in ways that disadvantage the typical partners and beneficiaries of these foundations.

Let me go through some of these changes in more detail below.

- In the corporate-inspired "new philanthropy," grants are seen as "investments" and are thus expected to yield measurable social "profits," often within a fairly short time frame. The "old philanthropy" approach of building local institutions that would, in turn, develop networks to work for social change or public advocacy, does not fit well with this paradigm, and is becoming less common. In Southeast Asia, for example, the social science training centers that the Ford Foundation helped to set up in

Indonesia in the 1970s would now presumably not fit with the new model, based as it is on short-term measurable impact.[3]

- To satisfy critics demanding to know what the "measurable impacts" of a foundation's "investments" have been, there has been a building up of in-house or externally contracted evaluation capacities to provide evidence of "accountability." New divisions are created to provide the necessary positive "metrics" for evidence of measurable success. Several of the grantees I interviewed complained about the amount of time they must now spend on multiple rounds of proposal reviews, refinements, and strategic planning. In an article criticizing the excesses and mediocrity of what passes for "strategic philanthropy," Susan Berresford, former president of the Ford Foundation, quotes a grantee: "'Foundations and large NGOs have become more focused on developing portfolios of projects, managing risks, and producing outcomes rather than on listening to communities, healing deep inequalities, and supporting innovation. With their new strategies and new staff, foundations today are increasingly treating organizations like ours not as innovators but as contractors who are hired to deliver donors' visions.'" Berresford also warns that the data required for benchmarking progress can sometimes "miniaturize ambition, because they focus on what can be measured in the near-term, and not on what might be the most important long-term goals. Andrew Natsios, who led the U.S. Agency for International Development from 2001 to 2005, has written that over many years, the federal agency has suffered from this phenomenon—a malady he gives the wonderful label 'obsessive measurement disorder'" (Berresford 2010).

- There is a growing suspicion of viewing program staff as "professionals." The "new foundations" aim to be lean and not to waste money on paying the salaries of professional staff that could be more profitably used by beneficiaries or grantees. The founder of the Omidyar Foundation, who created Ebay, is said to have only two staff to help him and his wife spend their $3 billion in foundation assets. One informant told me that the new president of the Ford Foundation, aiming to retrench and reform his foundation, expressed the view that he did not value the term

"grant maker," but preferred "change maker"— someone who understands how to "make change happen," rather than someone trained in a particular field or with a particular expertise. There seems to be a tendency among the old foundations to move away from program staff who are disciplinary experts or experienced in "development" fields, toward those who come from the business sector, especially business consulting, management, and new communications media. Several grantees in Indonesia and the Philippines complained to me that since the program officers they now interact with are not experts in the fields of their work, they have to spend much more time "educating the program officer."

- The "new foundations" have influenced the "old foundations" to look for vertical, top-down solutions that can show measurable results within relatively short periods (three to five years). This implies avoiding the long-term institution-building grants—grants for the capacity-building of NGOs or intermediaries—or grants to individuals that were the "bread-and-butter" of the "old foundations" like Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, Mellon, and MacArthur. In Southeast Asia, such institutions that thrived on the support of the old foundations would include the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore; the economics, population studies, and women's studies departments at the University of Indonesia and Gadjah Mada University; and various key Indonesian NGOs such as Indonesian Planned Parenthood (PKBI), Indonesian Institute of Management (LPPM), Indonesian Legal Aid Society (LBH), Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES), Rural Development Foundation (YPMD), Indonesian Consumers Association (YLKI), Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi), and many others. The new approach devalues patience and the willingness to be in for the long haul to address long-standing, difficult, seemingly intractable problems. Former Ford Foundation program director Michael Edwards refers to "impatience [as] one of the hallmarks of the 'new philanthropy.'" The stated wish of some of the billionaires who have started new foundations to spend their fortunes while they are still alive, or within a fixed period after their deaths, seems to reflect this impatience.

- Another tendency reflecting how "new foundations" influence "old foundations" is the streamlining of program priorities, or what can become an obsession with "focus." In the case of the Gates Foundation, this can mean, for instance, focusing on eliminating particular diseases—and because of its huge endowment size and the US tax requirement of an annual pay-out of five percent of assets, a relatively small number of enormous grants. Huge grants require intermediaries able to absorb and spend that money quickly. This has led to the beefing up of large, usually northern-hemisphere-based intermediaries, and the devaluing of smaller local NGOs as grant recipients. In general, it has also led to an aversion to funding unsolicited requests from the general public. Most of the programs of the Gates Foundation do not accept outside proposals; they know what they want to do and seek out the institutions that they know can use their funds to do it. (And some of those funds go to for-profit grantees or contractors, a tendency the old foundations are emulating.)

- For large "old foundations" that work internationally, a shift is occurring that centralizes decision-making at the headquarters by directors or thematic group teams, instead of devolving decision-making to field offices in various parts of the world and to program officers based in those offices. This shift derives perhaps from the experience of multinational corporations that can move in and out of labor or supply markets, or can outsource, as they wish, and from a view inspired by globalization proponents that geography is no longer important, that the "world is flat," in Thomas Friedman's words. Thus, geography and context are de-emphasized. An effect of this is to work globally, but without regard to differences or nuances of place, language, history, politics, or governance. This attitude, I fear, can be very risky to the success of technical solutions applied in multiple, varying contexts.

- Emphasis on technological or scientific, top-down solutions is related to this—for example, giving large grants to northern-based intermediaries for finding cures for this or that disease, or for the laboratory cultivation of this or that super-seed for greater agricultural productivity. It may account, too, for the preference for "hard science" or "technical" fields

such as agriculture or health, or for social welfare schemes such as insurance or credit, to the detriment of "soft" fields, such as humanities, culture, and the arts. The "new foundations" have little tolerance for these "soft" fields as they seem to deal with immeasurables and stand in the way of the notion that technological solutions applied universally will yield the best metrics. The "old foundations," on the other hand, saw the benefit of supporting work in the fields of humanities and culture. These benefits included stronger cultural structures that take into account local values, histories, and ways of understanding and that may be crucial in the success of technical or development interventions. An outsider foundation that demonstrates its concern for local values may also thereby provide credibility for its work in other, non-cultural fields. In a way, the international philanthropic work led by the "new foundations"—and now taken up in a kind of trendy conformism by the "old foundations"—harks back to an earlier, technocratic style of development practice typical of the 1950s and the Cold War. It is as though they were saying, "The developed world will find the solutions for the developing world (whether new vaccines, new seeds, new forms of credit instruments, or better democratic governance structures); these then need only be implemented locally and scaled up." This attitude thus flies in the face of 60-plus years of hard-learned lessons by development practitioners which show that context, culture, and locally "owned" solutions do indeed matter, and that without taking them into account, the best-intentioned technical innovations or trendiest new ideas can be doomed in practice in the field.

- There is a corresponding devaluing of certain modalities of foundation support that were a hallmark of the old foundations, but do not fit well with the results-driven approach. These include, for instance, support for individual fellowships and scholarships, for which the Rockefeller and Ford foundations were famous; the building up of academic fields and departments; capacity-building grants including operational support for local institutions; and support for developing local philanthropy. None of these have great attraction in the new approach. Support to individuals is seen as just scattering money without being able to show what the "pay-back" is. Providing endowment

funding is seen as ceding to others the control of agendas, which may change over time, and whose impact will be hard to measure. From Southeast Asia we can name the following examples: the Toyota Foundation's support for translation and publishing (the "Know Our Neighbors" program), or for the Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program (SEASREP); The Nippon Foundation's own API Fellowships program; the Ford and Rockefeller foundations' support for media and journalism. None of these fit with the new priorities of the old foundations. Toyota has closed its "Know Our Neighbors" program and has ceased funding SEASREP; the Nippon Foundation is under internal pressure to show what the social impact of API is, and indications are that the awarding of fellowships will cease in a few years. Similarly, the large foundation support for journalism in Southeast Asia is a casualty of the new trends. Susan Berresford quotes a grantee: "'I am trying to strengthen the field of journalism that is so important to the success of our democracy. When I report that our grantees have fostered new kinds of coverage of crucial topics and reached wide audiences, my board says: "So what? What of significance has really changed?" The board used to ask us to have ambitious visions of change. Now their demand for strategies with near-term results is steering us away from more ambitious aims.'"

- Taking a favorite word from the corporate book, the new approach sees "innovation" as a value in and of itself. Sometimes, this means changing the labels of program categories, or putting old wine in new bottles. To a certain degree, this may only be public relations, in other words.

- A complementary trend among the large American foundations (and the virus has spread beyond the United States to Japan and Europe) is the emphasis on "putting out the word," "branding," or "rebranding" the foundations' work—that is, what to its critics seems to be public relations, or mere hype. Excessive attention to "branding" in philanthropy is usually a criticism directed against corporate philanthropies or the practice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) generally. But branding and competition among donors are still problematic even among non-corporate, independent foundations. The approach of the earlier

foundations was humbler and more back-seat, and involved putting forward the work of those they supported and not claiming the credit (or blame, in some cases) for themselves.

A Look at Europe and Japan

So far, most of my attention has gone to American foundations, as these make up most of the "new foundations." And it is the old American foundations with long histories in Southeast Asia that have been most affected by the "new foundations" and are currently going through radical changes. My research, though, also looked at non-American foundations working in Southeast Asia; they are mainly from Western Europe and Japan. These are not exactly the same "animal" as the American foundations, whether new or old. After all, the political economies in Europe and Japan are historically different. They have governments with more of a social welfare role; they allow less of a free rein to the for-profit sector; they have higher personal and corporate taxes; they provide fewer tax incentives for the growth of private philanthropies; their private, non-profit sectors have more connections to government; and their non-profit organizations frequently partner with government donors. But, things have been changing, and foundations in Europe and Japan, too, show signs of being influenced by the "new philanthropy" jargon and paradigms—or at least have reacted to the new accountability movement—though perhaps for different reasons from their American "old foundation" counterparts.

In the United States, emphasis on private philanthropy is built into public policy through tax laws. The philanthropic sector has become an enormous and "successful" sector in 20th- and 21st-century America. But, like so many American institutions and traditions, it is sui generis, and is linked with certain social attitudes and practices that may not be shared in other political or economic systems. For instance, a larger role for private philanthropy seems to be closely linked to an historical American suspicion of "big government," which itself is related to Big Business's suspicion of regulation and to an ideology of market-driven solutions to economic, social, and political problems. Needless to say, these attitudes flourished in the neoliberal Reagan-Thatcher era and persist in the post-Cold War globalization era.

The modern European system of philanthropy—and the Australian, Canadian and Japanese versions used to be closer to the European than the American system, though they are now shifting—is, on the other hand, more geared to complementing the stronger role assigned to the public sector or government. Through higher personal and corporate taxation schemes to fund its public welfare government programs, the European model limited the amassing of enormous pools of private wealth and did not provide tax exemption schemes for private philanthropy. Hence, the private philanthropic sector there has been historically smaller. This has been changing over the past decades, with the triumph of neoliberal market ideologies, and welfare state systems have eroded to some degree in northern Europe, Australia, and even Japan, though Japan still has a very strong government sector.

The Europeans present some interesting hybrid models of overseas funding that involve collaborations across the private, non-profit, and the public sectors. For instance, the Dutch and German systems let private, or semi-public partisan foundations (for example, those connected to political parties in Germany, or to religious or cultural groups in Holland) use public overseas development assistance (ODA) funds in addition to their own funds and funds donated from the public, but according to their own grant-giving agendas. Those agendas look quite different from those of the large bilateral development donors (USAID, AUSAid, Japan International Cooperation Agency [JICA], CIDA, SIDA) and the multilateral banks, and are more akin to the "old foundation" model referred to above. They include funding for social sciences, human rights, advocacy, journalism, or culture, for instance. The funds must be accounted for to the government bodies supplying the funding, of course, as well as to the public at large. So far, the parliaments and the public at large in those countries have not insisted on seeing "something new." But, there are warning signs that things are changing in that direction; there is increasing demand to prove and measure impact in quantitative terms, for instance. According to an interview with a director at the Humanist Institute for Development Cooperation (HIVOS) in Jakarta, the Dutch public is tiring of "the whole foreign aid thing." He predicted that we may be heading for a period when ODA will shrink considerably under pressure from voters and conservative parliaments. The German public's

reaction to the use of German funds for bailing out the Greek and, perhaps, other southern European economies in crisis is remove evidence of donor fatigue and a harbinger of what the HIVOS director was predicting.

Japan is in the throes of a taxpayer/voter rebellion. The election of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is evidence of this, as its platform was specifically to "regain control of the government bureaucracy." The DPJ has been trying to end the cozy relationship that the bureaucracy has had with the private sector—for example, in the case of ODA, with the notorious practices of "tied aid" involving Japanese contractors. And it has been going after semi-governmental agencies, like the Japan Foundation, JICA, the Agency for Cultural Development (Bunkacho), Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), and many others, for having padded budgets, and most importantly, for their basically unaccountable programs. In November 2009, citizen committees were assigned to scrutinize the budget proposals of these agencies and others, and to make decisions up or down on their budgets at the end of the one- to two-hour meetings. The committees were also empowered to decide whether the agencies could hold on to government-provided endowments. These meetings were broadcast live on the Internet for the public to watch. The citizens appointed by the DPJ—with many economists and academics among them—were quite demanding and scathing in denouncing the agencies' ineffectiveness, waste, unaccountability, and lack of transparency. Unfortunately, the effect of the slashes in the budgets of agencies like the Japan Foundation and JICA, and the liquidation of their endowments, may turn out to be quite severe for their overseas beneficiaries and partners. The few Japanese private foundations working internationally, like the Toyota, Sasakawa Peace, and Nippon foundations, are also indirectly caught up in the public cry for accountability for their programs, and questions about the indirect subsidies they receive through tax exemptions or their use of public funds have surfaced. Private foundation boards are alarmed, too, and unwilling to take the risk of defending the future of programs that seem to hold out little measurable impact. No doubt, the focus on accountability was long overdue for these agencies and foundations; but the net effects so far are a big contraction of their funding overseas and the inward-looking, even nationalistic-sounding rhetoric of "Japan first."

Implications

I want to try to draw out some of the implications of the shifts in thinking and practice that I have shown to be happening among international foundations, especially those working in Southeast Asia. And I want to relate them to the questions put to us in this panel on the impacts of globalization on socio-political processes and institutions.

One of the trends or, perhaps better, drivers of the trends, is a huge anxiety about "accountability." And this relates to "good governance," not just by governments themselves, but by the institutions in the private and civil society sectors that are increasingly expected to shoulder the burden of promoting social welfare, as governments in neo-liberal models shrink and decentralize. As Frances Loh has said, for the countries of Southeast Asia previously characterized by authoritarian rule, perhaps better governance is one of the positive effects of post-Cold War globalization.

With respect to my topic, maybe one could ask: "Isn't it good if private philanthropic foundations are increasing in number and in dollars spent?" "Isn't it positive that foundations (and taxpayers) are now finally paying more attention to whether what they are paying for actually has real-world benefits for people in need?" "What is wrong with the new philanthropy and its results-driven approach, then, and why shouldn't the old foundations adapt to this new, more rigorous approach?"

There are some problems with the assumptions behind these questions.

1. Producing social change is not a simple matter, and obsessive emphasis on "results-driven" strategies and measurable impacts resulting from particular inputs can lead to inflated hopes. A simple input-output model may not transfer well to the messy world of the "field." The realities of attacking complex and persistent social and environmental problems (poverty, disease, inequality, inequity, social exclusion, and environmental degradation) may threaten the model.

2. The model may indeed work in solving certain problems that are more amenable to technological fixes. As Michael Edwards (2008) writes, "there is justifiable excitement about the possibilities for progress in global health,

agriculture and access to micro-credit among the poor that have been stimulated by huge investments from the Gates Foundation, the Clinton Global Initiative and others. New loans, seeds and vaccines are certainly important, but there is no vaccine against the racism that denies land to 'dalits' ('untouchables') in India, no technology that can deliver the public health infrastructure required to combat HIV, and no market that can reorder the dysfunctional relationships between different religious and other social groups that underpin violence and insecurity." In other words, philanthrocapitalism may be unable to handle systemic problems that require contextual, nuanced, holistic approaches that may not be amenable to measurement of impact using business metrics. Some fuzziness, uncertainty must be tolerated. Not everything can be measured. Poverty is too crucial a problem to leave to economists alone; it also has political, cultural, historical, and environmental dimensions. These problems may require coalitions of actors working together to change whole systems. Complex and deep-rooted problems of injustice require social movements, advocacy, and informed public debate. Again, to quote Edwards (2008), "systemic change involves social movements, politics and the state," which most of the philanthrocapitalist experiments ignore.

3. The accountability movement has been beneficial, even if it has gone too far and become too mechanistic or simplistic, and has led to distortions of mission and misanalyses of need. Philanthropies need to be accountable, no question, but that includes accounting for what they have omitted to do, or distortions they may have inadvertently caused. There should be more public attention to philanthropies, more critical feedback and pushback where necessary—e.g., where whole fields of work are abandoned to chase better metrics or the latest trend. Now is a time for more critical evaluations of the claims made in the name of business efficiency, or neoliberal trade fundamentalism, or philanthrocapitalism. The general public, and, inevitably, voluntary, elected or appointed watchdog agencies will need to keep a close watch on the ways of working, the governance structures, and styles of those "new foundations." (Note that the

Gates Foundation, the world's largest, has a board of trustees that consists only of three Gates family members, Mr. Buffett, and an ex officio president—not exactly a model of NGO or corporate governance, one would have thought!)

4. There should likewise be more critical examination, even suspicion, of a certain totalizing kind of rhetoric. When people promise to save the world, our antennae should go up. And when everyone starts spouting the same rhetoric and following the same paradigm, we should beware. Let diversity of approach be considered an inherent value, in other words.

5. There needs to be a critical examination of the balance of the three sectors. The neoliberalism of the last thirty years has led to huge growth in the scope and power of corporations. Civil society organizations have grown to a certain degree and civil society resource organizations—such as foundations—have, too, but under very strong influence of the corporate sector. The public sector has been de-emphasized, central governments have devolved power to local governments, and social safety nets and the provision of welfare services have weakened. ODA has been questioned, pledges made, but not met. There thus needs to be a rebalancing, and a reining in of the unregulated corporate sector. Someone should be keeping an eye on the corporate sector's role in philanthropy, too. And there is no one-size-fits-all; not every country needs to aspire to be Denmark or the United States, the Millennium Development Corporation's criteria notwithstanding.

6. All these critical examinations imply the need for better knowledge-building. There is a value to building up independent knowledge—not only commodifiable, market-driven knowledge, but knowledge both theoretical and applied—crucial to analyzing and dealing with social problems. The private foundations historically played a large role in recognizing this and were well placed to support this kind of knowledge-building, but the need now seems to go unrecognized. The negative effects of neoliberalism and globalization on higher education and research have yet to be assessed. In academe, too, whole fields of knowledge are being devalued because they are not

commodifiable; they do not improve the metrics (read, rankings) of universities in competition with each other for customers (read students). We will live to regret the results of this critical shift if it is allowed to continue unabated. Private foundations can play a role in examining, warning against, and resisting that trend.

7. Finally, I must make a personal plea for culture. Context, geography, history, culture do matter. Rather than abandoning the humanities, they should be recognized as part of any holistic analysis of social phenomena and therefore of any solutions. This does not imply a "cultural industries" approach, a narrow "cultural heritage" approach, or the instrumental use of arts for social marketing. Cultural expressions are important ways of representing how people see the world—whole cosmologies, even. These are not only enriching and fascinating to understand in and of themselves; but an understanding of them may be crucial in the struggles for justice and equity, and against poverty and disadvantage.

NOTES

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[2] The term is taken from Bishop and Green (2008).

[3] See Clifford Geertz's account of his involvement as a Ford Foundation consultant in advising on this program in Geertz 1995: 79-80, 179-180.

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Winds of Change:
Globalization and Transformation in Southeast Asian Organizations

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Introduction

In a constantly evolving world, people are regularly confronted with changes whether in society, their homes, or workplaces. Although theorists contend that it is human nature to resist change, there is a growing acceptance that an important life skill is the ability to deal with and manage change.

This is especially true in today's workplace. Globalization has led to the breaking down of economic barriers and more companies are exploring new markets. These developments have given rise to intense business competition that requires organizations to evolve their strategies and practices in order to remain viable. Globalization has also opened doors for workers whose job markets are now the world rather than just their own countries. This means that workers today have to learn how to thrive in an increasingly diverse and dynamic workplace.

However, critics of globalization claim that the playing field is hardly level and that only countries that have more resources and access to technology will reap the benefits of globalization. According to Khor (2000), the reality is that low-income countries may have a marginal role in world trade, but world trade can have major economic and social effects on these countries.

With the emergence of China as a huge market and the strengthening of the economies of other Asian countries, more and more multinational companies want a piece of the Asian economic pie. In an increasingly cutthroat business environment, Southeast Asian organizations are hard-pressed to remain competitive.

How are Southeast Asian organizations responding to this challenge? This study sought to document how local organizations in Southeast Asia are being affected by globalization and how they have transformed themselves to meet its challenges.

Theories of Change

There is a plethora of Western literature on change management. There is the seminal work of Kurt Lewin (1951) who suggests a three-step model to organization change that consists of unfreezing, moving on, and refreezing; and has given rise to a number of other process models of change. Lippit, Watson and Westley (1958) expanded Lewin's model into seven stages: developing a need for change, establishing a change relationship, diagnosing the client system, examining alternative routes and goals, transforming intention into actual change, generalizing and stabilizing change, and achieving a terminal relationship. Kotter's (1996) Eight-Step Model prescribes the following steps: establishing the need for urgency, ensuring that there is a powerful change group to guide the change, developing a vision, communicating the vision, empowering the staff, ensuring that there are short-term wins, consolidating gains, and embedding the change in the culture.

Unfortunately, there is evidence to suggest that there are significant aspects of the Asian culture that may put into question Western change management frameworks and strategies. For example, a key concept in Western change management theory is creating the need for change. Change leaders are expected to articulate what is wrong in the current state and what the vision for the change is (Katz and Kahn 1978). However, this may require a different approach in an Asian culture that values harmony and saving face (Cheung et al. 2001).

Empowerment and engagement in change efforts are also common elements in Western change management theories. But a 10-country study of Aycan et al. (2000) found that China, India, and Pakistan are more paternalistic and have greater power distance compared to countries such as Russia, Canada, and the US. Fatalism is also higher in India compared to other countries. These differences are all the more important because managers in cultures with large power distances assume that employees are incapable of or are unwilling to take initiative.

There is a paucity of published literature on managing organizational change in Southeast Asia. A study by Zain, Richardson, and Adam (2002) compared the implementation of innovation by a multinational

company operating in Malaysia with that operating in Germany. The study found that there were differences in the factors favorable to the successful implementation of innovation across countries. For example, management support and commitment to innovation were not as critical in Malaysia as they were in Germany. Although the German office had a more creative climate than Malaysia, the German office also encountered bigger problems in implementation.

A case study done by Andrews and Chompusri (2001) on the restructuring of a Thai subsidiary of a Western multinational corporation showed how the change created an 18-month struggle within the company. The resistance of the sales department to the change decreased productivity, suppressed profitability, and caused incalculable damage to the organization. The above study emphasized the dangers of merely transplanting Western frameworks and the need to understand the context where change will be initiated. In fact, even contemporary Western change theorists have advocated the assessment of the environment and culture before implementing change initiatives (Jones, Jimmieson, and Griffiths 2005).

This study sought to make a contribution to the literature and practice of change management by looking at this phenomenon from an Asian lens. More specifically, it asked the questions: (1) How has globalization affected local Southeast Asian (SEA) organizations? (2) What barriers and challenges do SEA organizations face as they compete in a globalized world? (3) How have SEA organizations successfully transformed themselves into becoming more globally competitive?

Methodology

This paper reports findings gathered using qualitative methods. Specifically, it draws from interviews and case studies on local organizations in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia that transformed in response to globalization.

Interviews were conducted with five business leaders in each country. These leaders were from local companies and represented various industries: outsourcing, finance, manufacturing, telecommunications, and hospitality.

Three case studies were done of SEA locally-owned companies that had successfully transformed to elicit the challenges to and best practices in organizational transformation. The information from the case studies came from interviews with key respondents in each organization and from the examination of company documents. In the Philippines and Indonesia, the case studies were of manufacturing organizations. In Thailand, the case study was on a bank.

Globalization and Change

The research validated the far-reaching effects of globalization. All organizations reported that they had been affected by globalization in both positive and negative ways.

The primary advantage of globalization reported was the opening up of new markets and the generation of more businesses for some local organizations. This was particularly important for local businesses after the collapse of domestic markets during the Asian crisis. There is the example of Indoporcelain that survived the crisis by shifting to international markets that now comprise majority of its businesses. Even those who were not affected by the Asian crisis see the possibilities that globalization brings. They claim: "Free trade agreements represent opportunities. I believe in competitive advantage. We should focus on what we are good at."

Hand in hand with increased market opportunities, however, local organizations recognized that being globally competitive meant the need to continually improve their products and services. As one Thai leader said, "Change or die—it's as simple as that."

Respondents also noted that innovations had been particularly beneficial to consumers, because these meant better products and services at competitive (even lower) prices. As a Filipino leader explained, "Given global competition, there is a need to make sure that your products are priced competitively. This means lowering cost of production, labor costs."

Globalization has allowed some local companies to partner with foreign companies, thereby increasing their local companies' capital and resources. In the case of PT Wijaya Karya, its partnerships with a Japanese firm and, later on, a US firm, allowed it to expand its operations. Indoporcelain's joint venture with a German organization provided it with the new equipment needed to manufacture its export products.

Beyond knowledge resources, local companies benefit from the exchange of technology that globalization brings. The president of Indoporcelain, for example, regularly attends global fairs regularly to keep abreast of developments in the market and in technology. Information generated is then used by the organization to continuously improve its products and processes. Says a Thai leader, "Looking outside always brings new knowledge. Whenever I visit customers in various countries, I learn how they can do things better than other competitors and be more productive."

Other than the influx of new information, local organizations have benefitted from an increase in knowledge and skills, which have, in turn, improved the capability of their human resources. Some organizations such as Indoporcelain, for example, regularly bring in expatriates who facilitate the transfer of knowledge and technology.

Notwithstanding the positive changes brought about by globalization, respondents also noted what they perceive to be its negative effects, foremost of which is the interdependency of economies. Respondents noted that although globalization has opened up markets for Asian organizations, it has also made the economies of the world more dependent on each other. They cite the current financial crisis in the US and its impact on Asia.

The competition from other countries that bring in products of lower cost has caused a decrease in the sales of local products, leading to the collapse of small industries and loss of jobs. In today's global business environment, it is the organization that can provide the highest quality goods at the lowest price that survives—wherever they are in the world. Says Terry Soetander, President of Indoporcelain, of the current financial crisis,

> Most of our customers don't buy from one vendor. Crate & Barrel, for example, buys from China, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Our product was the number two seller, while the number one seller was from Sri Lanka. But, apparently, this factory was not delivering as expected. So Crate & Barrel transferred its business to us and we now supply the biggest selling products of Crate & Barrel.

Competition from other countries also includes the labor market. Respondents have noted how globalization has also benefitted individual workers whose job market is now global. The downside of this is that local employers are having a hard time keeping their talents, who are sometimes being pirated by employers in the more developed countries.

Conversely, there are also those who note that although expatriates do contribute important capabilities to an organization, their presence sometimes causes feelings of inequity among locals who feel that the expatriates are valued more. This is particularly true when there is a constant flux of expatriates at high levels of the organization, and there appears to be a glass ceiling among local workers.

As for the workers, employers note that the increased pressure on organizations to do more with fewer workers has created an increasingly stressful workplace. Leaders cite the increasingly long hours employees need to put in, because of increased workloads and the need to multi-task.

Ironically, although globalization presents opportunities to expand local businesses, some organizations have also cited two of its negative impacts: the decrease in regular employment and the increase in labor outsourcing. Explains one business leader in Indonesia,

> Outsourcing became popular because of all the strikes we experienced. At the same time, our current laws are very pro-labor. If we have to let go of workers, we are required to pay them a steep severance package—regardless of the reason for the separation. So employers outsource. But I don't really think outsourcing is the answer. The problem is we need them to be permanent so we can train them to be skillful. For people to deliver, they must like what they do. They must have this feeling of ownership—that they belong to and are part of this company. But in outsourcing, employees don't feel like they belong. We are just using them physically and they can let be go anytime.

Business leaders also note that these new employment arrangement has created a workforce that is transactional and with little loyalty to their employers.

Beyond the change in employment arrangements, the influx of new technology, while improving operational efficiencies, has also meant raising the bar in terms of knowledge and skills requirements. A harsh reality of the adoption of technology is the loss of employment

opportunities for those left behind. Recounts one Filipino business leader, "Eventually, we realized we needed a more highly skilled workforce. We felt, for instance, that the engineers would appreciate the equipment better because they had line responsibilities for the uptime of equipment. That also meant less need for our blue-collar, manual laborers." The increasing marginalization of workers who do not have access to quality education and are ill-equipped for today's workplace cannot be ignored.

Confluences in Globalizing Organizations

Despite globalization's negative effects, business leaders are unanimous in acknowledging that globalization is a given and that local organizations have no choice but to try to compete in a new global business environment. Given such, they have now begun to adapt to its demands and the opportunities it offers.

One direct impact on local organizations seeking to expand globally has been the transformation from local to global structures. In the case of PTTPM, an energy company established in Thailand in 2005, the company grew from 65 to 130 employees in five years. Three overseas offices were set up in China, Vietnam, and Dubai because of the huge market opportunities and the agreement with ASEAN to create a free trade zone. According to its Managing Director, "Our having offices in the customers' countries has allowed us to better understand the market and respond quickly. Today, 70 percent of our sales come from exports."

The expansion to other markets has also created the need to obtain accreditation from international institutions that certify the quality of products and services. Recounts an Indonesian leader, "We apply all world-class systems, ISO, Baldridge, etc." Along with international standards, local organizations seeking to compete globally have also adopted international systems, processes, and technologies. For example, a leader of a Filipino manufacturing organization says, "Six Sigma, Kaizen Express—we use these to improve our quality." Others, however, prefer to adapt the systems. Explains one Indonesian human resource manager,

> As we needed a system to measure and reward performance, we looked at McKinnsey's Balance Scorecard. But we felt that the metrics and

rewards were too individualistic. We value meritocracy, but do not want our leaders to compete with each other or to feel that one is more valued. That will not work in our collectivist culture. So we adapted the system so it will fit into our culture.

One interesting phenomenon that has emerged in the past decades and is a manifestation of confluence is the relationship of competitors. Unlike in the past, competitors today are less adversarial and are, sometimes, even cooperative. In fact, Wikipedia defines coopetition as a "a neologism coined to describe cooperative competition. Coopetition occurs when companies work together for parts of their businesses where they do not believe they have competitive advantage and where they believe they can share common costs." The President of an Indonesian pharmaceutical company recounts, "Our line of business has changed. Multinational companies cannot just come in here and put up factories. One of our emerging lines of businesses actually produces for them. We have state-of-the-art production facilities that allow us to be a toll manufacturer for other competitors."

What has allowed organizations across the globe to collaborate is technology. Information and communication technology appears to serve as a vital link in enabling access to data and services. In addition, leaders note that technology has leveled the playing field. Says an Indonesian business leader, "With the Internet, it has become easier to get a potential market. In the 1980s, more of our clients were local. Now, it is very easy to get information and communication so that 20 percent of our earnings comes from overseas."

What is interesting is that local companies that have been able to transform themselves to become global have invested in language and communication skills. Says Khun Narongchai, Assistant MD of PTTPM,

> In our overseas office, we hired local people, as they have a better understanding of the market. In Vietnam, our workforce can speak Thai. Our Chinese workforce communicates well in English. We prepare our Thai employees by developing their English language skills. All of our team members were encouraged to take the TOEIC test. We were first surprised to learn that only 40 percent of our team achieved a score of over 600 marks, so we arranged for English classes to be given to them.

Globalization has also created greater tolerance for diversity. Says the HR Manager of PT Wijaya Karya of Indonesia, "Our workers are very highly skilled. We have 14,000 Indonesian workers in Algeria working alongside people from China, Egypt, India, Algeria." Such diversity has created greater openness to different cultures.

Contestations: Challenges to Becoming Global

Confluences notwithstanding, business leaders are also quick to describe the challenges they face to becoming globally competitive. A common challenge is dealing with resistance to change. The leaders' frustration usually stems from workers' not being open to feedback, their tendency to wait for orders from their superior, their lacking a sense of urgency to change, the absence of motivation in them to take action, their lack of a global mindset, their subscribing to a culture of conformity, their feeling of inferiority. Explains one Filipino business leader, "When I started in 2005, I think we were complacent. The organization was basically coasting along." He attributed the resistance to change to the age of the institution, saying "Maybe it's an old organization, people have been here for a long time. The attitude is—we survived the financial crisis so we must have a good system: why fix it if it ain't broke?" Beyond simple resistance, however is the difficulty of detecting and addressing it, given the Asian culture of conflict avoidance (Ting-Toomey et al. 1993). Explains one leader, "It is not uncommon to get acquiescence only to find out that behind your back, people are complaining and contesting the change."

A common rhetoric among leaders is the inadequacy of workers and the poor quality of education to which they have been exposed. Explains one leader in Indonesia, "Knowledge is always changing. If a teacher teaches something, that changes in a number of years. With information technology, everything is easily available. But in Indonesia, the teacher is a guru. Students are trained to follow the teacher. They learn to copy—there is no discussion or critical thinking. This is the challenge."

Some companies such as WIKA have responded to the lack of preparation of workers by investing in training and development. Says Tonny Warsono, Director of Human Capital & Business Development of PT Wijaya Karya, "We cannot influence the Department of Education. But we can control ourselves. We put up

a learning center because the workers were not prepared. So we are preparing them. That's our contribution to our nation. We have English classes, technical skills training, and leadership programs."

Business leaders have also cited the growing diversity in the workplace because of the younger workers' exposure to a bigger number of global cultures. As one Thai leader says, "We still face the generation gap in our team. Fifty percent were with us from the day of the spin-off, while the remaining 50 percent were newly recruited. Given their differences in educational level and individual styles, these two teams do not always understand each other. The challenge for us is to achieve the right balance and to create team spirit among ourselves."

For some countries, the lack of capability is compounded by labor problems. In Indonesia, the Asian financial crisis, the subsequent stepping down of long-time president Soeharto, and the appointment of a pro-labor minister signaled a new era in labor relations. Unionism became stronger and strikes became commonplace. Recounts a business leader in Indonesia,

> It was like a disease. So I talked to the union. Of course I negotiated. But it hurts, what have we done wrong? Nothing actually. We have given them more than is required by the government. Some NGOs were influencing the workers—and told our workers to ask for more, regardless of what was being given already. It was the climate. Strikes, demos were everywhere.

At the macro-level, business leaders in all three countries cited poor governance as a barrier to globalization. Specifically, they described problems relating to bureaucracy, political instability, and corruption. Explains one business leader in Indonesia,

> The problem is corruption. There is a lack of transparency and that is what is discouraging for investors. Another problem is the inefficient tax system. We are regularly audited and companies such as ourselves are easy targets for unscrupulous tax collectors. But how do you correct a huge problem such as corruption? It's not that easy. Terrorism is a problem. Bali experienced this in 2004 and there was another terrorist attack a couple of years after.

Leaders also cited the lack of government investment in education, and in research and development as a barrier.

Another common barrier cited was the lack of capital, resources, and infrastructure required to compete with global corporations. Says the President of a pharmaceutical company in Indonesia, "There is a popular misconception that the cost of labor is cheapest in India. That is not true. Labor is cheaper here. But the problem is infrastructure. There are not enough roads to transport goods." This appears particularly salient in the case of the Philippines and Indonesia, which are both archipelagos.

Related to this, leaders also cited poverty and social inequality as a barrier to competitiveness in their countries. As a business leader in Indonesia expressed, "There is also the problem of the big gap between the rich and the poor. Here the top 5 percent control 90 percent of the wealth of the country." The lack of social equality is perceived to be a vicious cycle depriving the poor of opportunities for education and employment, which lack effectively marginalizes them from joining the labor force.

Continuities: Strategies in Transforming Asian Organizations

Given such challenges, how have local Asian organizations managed transformation in their organizations? On the one hand, the use of the more "classical" change management theories is evident. Business leaders have talked about identifying change goals, planning the change, communication, the monitoring and evaluation of change—all of which are typical concepts in Western change management literature. However, beyond the "what" of change management, even more striking is the "how". How are these processes carried out? How do they reflect cultural sensibilities?

Personalistic and transformational leadership. Western literature focuses on the importance of leadership behaviors. It describes leaders in terms of their ability to transform and inspire others. To some extent, the characteristics mentioned appear to be in keeping with Kouzes and Posner's (1995) definition of transformational leadership. However, the findings also reflect a paternalistic style. For examples, the Head of HR in the Sahapat Group describes the leadership style of its Managing Director as "paternalistic—he provides direction and support to his team. Employees in the organization trust him, and are obedient and highly loyal to the organization."

The success of Indoporcelain has also been largely attributed to its leader. Soetander has been described as firm, charismatic, and disciplined. According to a subordinate, "He will praise what is good and point out what is bad. He also does monitoring himself."

However, beyond the ability of leaders to inspire transformation, another critical factor appears to be the relationship of leaders with their subordinates. As Matsumoto (2000) suggests, leaders in Asia win loyalty and support by establishing personal contact with subordinates, and showing awareness of their problems and sentiments. In the companies we studied, concern for the person was evident despite management's drive to achieve bigger profits. At Sahapat, there was no layoff policy. Its management believed in the value of each individual and believed that people should be developed or placed in the areas that suited their capability best. For instance, when there were reorganizations in the company which resulted in redundancies, the people would be moved to other companies or subsidiaries within the group.

The personalistic orientation is also evident in how communication is done. Business leaders highlighted the importance of communication in all the stages of change. Beyond using formal means to communicate, however, what was striking was the effort to communicate personally and face-to-face. In the case of one Philippine organization that needed to relocate a plant, a move that would dislocate workers, the effort of the President to talk to each worker, one by one, was cited as the reason why the labor union did not stage a strike. Such leadership behavior inspires trust among subordinates and appears to be important in enabling transformation. This is understandable given a culture where power distance is high and where workers are dependent on and seek the approval of authority figures (Hofstede 2005).

Organization as Family. Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia have all been identified as having a collectivist culture (Hofstede 2005). Although there are those who believe that such could be a hindrance to globalization because of the pressure to conform, there are those that have been able to harness it. Case in point is the Sahapat Group, a Thai conglomerate operating in consumer goods. In 2003, to turn the company around after the financial crisis, management introduced a new approach to organization thinking and strategy called MOP (Mission, Objectives and Policies). Recounts one leader,

In the previous years, management would discuss the strategies and revenue target among themselves. That year, management asked the employees to set the target for the organization. The President asked them how many months of bonus they would like to get, and, from that amount, he worked back to the increase in profit and revenue. With such participation came empowerment. Each team was asked to set its objectives, strategies, and action plans to achieve the target. People suggested ways to reduce expenses by making better use of resources. They suggested new projects to bring in revenues to the organization, such as people development, cost control, sales control, and new distribution channels. Each team was then required to report back within two weeks on its initiatives, actions taken, and the results. The initiatives were so alive and successful that each team across the organization came up with new projects all the time. It also helped the company to achieve substantial increases in performance and revenue.

Leaders also identified a family-oriented organization culture as a contributing factor to successful transformations. According to Matsumoto (2000), Asians tend to view their work groups and the organizations to which they belong as a fundamental part of themselves. Employees who see themselves as being integral parts of the organization are more likely to accept and support changes. This family-culture is harnessed by PTTPM of Thailand, whose motto is, "We move together."

The sense of family is also evident in Sahapat. Its Head of HR explains,

> People here are very nice and cooperative. Most of them stay with the company for a long time and hardly leave the organization. Whenever there were changes in the past, people were cooperative. There was no major resistance or organizational upheaval. The culture of this organization is highly family-oriented. People treat one another like family. Lifetime employment is still seen in certain parts of the organization. The workers feel that Sahapat is their second home. They have Sahapat in their blood.

Beyond feeling as though they were part of a family, the Filipinos' sense of commitment stems from a sense of reciprocity. This is more commonly referred to as *utang na loob* ("debt of gratitude"), which one feels in the face of kindness or aid (Jocano 1999). Interestingly, there is an Indonesian value called *hutang budi* that reflects the same concept (Pye 1999). It seems that when employees feel they are cared for by their employers, they reciprocate by cooperating with changes.

Transforming Asian Organizations

On the one hand, the findings validate Western literature on the importance of sound change management practices such as developing a vision for change, planning the change, finding change champions, creating a change management team, monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the change initiatives, in building commitment to change (Herold, Fedor, Caldwell and Liu 2008).

Yet, the findings also highlight the importance of understanding the context and culture in which change takes place. In the case of the three countries in the study, what appears to be important in transformation is not just the systematic process of change management, but also building trust and good relationships as a foundation for change. This requires investing in building positive relationships among employees, between leaders and employees, and between groups in the organization. When trust, teamwork, and employee commitment are present, it is easier to harness the collective.

The results also emphasize the value of organization communication in successful change management. But beyond what is communicated, the medium of communication is important. Our results suggest that what appears most powerful in the Asian setting is personal communication, which is not surprising, given the region's personalistic culture.

Our findings also show that leaders in these countries need to be sensitive to nuances of cultural communication. They must know how to detect indirect communication and what is not being said. They need to understand the informal social networks that are important in driving communication and influence throughout the organization. Given the importance of trust and relationships, interpersonal skills are a must for leaders. In order for leaders to be effective, they need to learn to reach out to the employees by listening to them and being able to speak their language. It also means being sensitive to what is not being said.

The Role of the State

Beyond efforts on the level of organizations, the results also pinpoint country-level factors that appear to influence the ability of SEAsian organizations to compete globally. For example, business leaders identified the importance of ensuring that the business environment and labor laws are fair to both employers and employees. There appears to be an increasing reliance on outsourcing—a phenomenon that will need greater scrutiny in terms of its long-term social and economic impacts.

Quality of education was cited as a key to economic growth. Developing countries that wish to have a globally competitive workforce will need to seriously invest in improving their system of education and ensuring a better fit between the demand for and supply of labor. It is also important that marginalized and informal workers be provided opportunities to re-tool or enhance their capabilities to become productive members of society.

Underlying all these is the importance of good governance. The private sector leaders specifically identify issues of corruption, inefficient government services, the lack of infrastructure, and the lack of trade agreements and protections as barriers to the competitiveness of local business organizations. Without such support, there is a danger that local firms will merely collapse or be taken over. According to Khor (2000), a major feature of globalization is the growing monopolization of economic resources and power by global firms. He contends that national policies have increasingly been influenced by international agencies and big international corporations. This phenomenon has eroded national sovereignty and diminished the ability of government to protect national interests.

Civil Society

Although the obligation to institute good governance does fall on the State, civil society also has a role to play. For example, the evolution and fragmentation of labor movements also present opportunities for alternative forms of worker representation. In addition, civil society organizations can support informal and marginalized workers by providing capability-building programs or by organizing these workers into social enterprises.

Conclusion

To conclude, transforming Southeast Asian organizations is a challenging process—one that requires collaboration among business, government, and civil society. Currently, however, the onus for transformation falls with the leaders of private organizations. Our results highlight the importance of not just change management skills, but more importantly, of interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity. At the same time, the successful transformation of local organizations that have gone global provides evidence that such transformation IS possible, despite the macro-level barriers that business organizations face. This should provide inspiration to other local business organizations that can choose to be buffeted by the winds of change or to ride them toward greater heights.

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Monitoring Elections: Resistance against Authoritarian Regimes: The case of the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in the Philippines and the *Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu* (KIPP) or Independent Election Monitoring Committee in Indonesia

Amin Shah bin Iskandar

Introduction

This study looks into the importance of elections as a pillar of democracy, especially with regard to the political rights of citizens to monitor electoral processes, with a focus on the Philippines during the rule of Marcos and Indonesia during the rule of Soeharto. It is hoped that the study will benefit various social movements in countries that are still ruled by autocratic regimes, especially in Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines, one of President Ferdinand Marcos' earliest attacks on democracy was his declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972. His justification for this was that it would help to build a 'New Society' in the Philippines and deter communist terrorism. In reality, martial law was widely understood to be a tool for suppressing dissent against his authoritarian government.

Shortly after the declaration, mass arrests were carried out by the military, primarily aimed at opposition politicians, journalists, students, and labor activists. Among those arrested was the already well-known politician Benigno 'Ninoy' Aquino. In all, it was estimated that more than 30,000 people were detained under the crackdown.

Martial Law was eventually lifted in 1981, after intense pressure from the local and international communities.

Meanwhile, in Indonesia, the country's second president, Soeharto, ruled for a total of 32 years. Soeharto's New Order Regime or *Regim Orde Baru*, with the assistance of the Indonesian military or the *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (ABRI) was equally brutal towards its citizens, suppressing criticisms against the regime, with countless activists kidnapped, jailed and even murdered.

How could such brutal heads of states rule for such long periods of time?

At its most basic, the answer is quite simple—both Marcos and Soeharto aggressively manipulated their countries' election systems in order to remain in power. During their dictatorships, election processes in the two countries were heavily marred by fraud, intimidation, vote-buying and other violations.

These longstanding abuses of the electoral process eventually triggered election-monitoring movements in both countries. In the Philippines, the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) arose while in Indonesia, the *Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu* (Independent Election Monitoring Committee—KIPP) was formed. Both groups were devoted to ending the abuses of the electoral process in their respective countries.

Election monitoring: An Overview

Election monitoring can be briefly defined as an activity by one or more independent bodies normally operating as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which aim to assess the conduct of an electoral process on the basis of national laws and international standards.

Election monitoring should ideally cover the three stages of the electoral process. The first stage includes monitoring pre-election activities such as voter registration, voter education, candidate nominations and monitoring the campaigning period. The second stage includes activities that take place during election day, including the opening and closing of polling stations, the voting process and the transportation of ballot boxes to vote tabulation centers. Finally post-election activities include the vote counting process and the finalization and proclamation of the results of the election.

The focus of this study is limited to domestic election monitoring activities, conducted by the two said groups. However, apart from domestic groups, election monitoring today also includes observers from

international organizations such as the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Carter Center.

NAMFREL in the Philippines

Eric C. Bjornlund in his book, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Election and Building Democracy*, highlighted the fact that prior to the emergence of NAMFREL in the Philippines in the 1986 Snap Presidential election, non-partisan election monitoring was widely unknown to the world. He noted that apart from its success in ousting Marcos, NAMFREL should also be credited as an international pioneer in non-partisan election monitoring.

Bjornlund also further refuted the claim that the Washington-based NDI was instrumental in assisting the formation of NAMFREL in the 1980s. According to him, when the NDI sent its first international observation mission to the 1986 Philippines' Snap Presidential Election, it had to rely on assistance from NAMFREL, whose volunteers ended up working closely with NDI on the ground. This partnership helped to further shape the future direction of the NDI.

The NAMFREL Story [1]

The birth of NAMFREL was first mooted in September 1983, when 29 people gathered at the residence of Mars Quesada, a businessman who was previously active in the Caloocan chapter of the Citizens National Electoral Assembly (CNEA), to discuss the dire political situation in the country.[2] CNEA was originally established to guard the balloting process against fraudulent and violent interferences and was active between the 1960s and 1970s. It was during this discussion that the idea of forming an organization similar to the CNEA was first floated.

A month later, another follow-up meeting was convened with the attendance of several prominent figures including Joe Concepcion Jr., a wealthy businessman who owned the RFM Corporation, Jaime Ferrer, the former chair of the Commission of Election (COMELEC), Vincente Jayme, the leader of the

Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP), and the representative of Cardinal Sin, the Archbishop of Manila.

The meeting concluded with the decision to form NAMFREL, although its first known acronym was the NCMFE, (standing for National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections), before it was changed into NACFREL and finally into NAMFREL. Joe Concepcion was to become its first chair, with Mars Quesada as the organization's first secretary general. According to Damaso G. Magbual[3], the group eventually settled on the acronym NAMFREL since it was catchier and easier to remember.

NAMFREL's early success can be attributed to strategic mobilization efforts paved by the Concepcion and Quesada partnership. The organization paid equal attention to garnering support from politically influential and financially well-off Filipinos and ordinary people.

While Concepcion took care to tap support from the 'big shots', Quesada was assigned to focus on mobilizing grassroots support. Concepcion successfully managed to lobby members of the business community, bringing in some influential individuals in the country. Quesada in the meantime completed the publication of a mobilization manual for NAMFREL.

NAMFREL's early founders fully understood the importance of engaging support from two key groups, the business community and the Catholic Church. Without these two players, NAMFREL could not have gained much force within such a suppressed political environment.

Through the Catholic Church, the country's powerful religious symbol and an influential player in national politics, NAMFREL managed to expand its network to all over the country, down to the provincial and municipal levels. On some occasions, provincial and municipal church leaders became leaders of local NAMFREL chapters.

The business community meanwhile supported NAMFREL through cash and in-kind donations. Approximately 20 percent of the contributions from the business community were made in cash, while the remaining took the form of in-kind assistance.

The 'Batasan' or Congressional Elections: May 14, 1984

The *Batasan* or Congressional Elections held on May 14, 1984 was the first test for the newly formed NAMFREL. Held only six months after the formation of NAMFREL, the *Batasan* elections saw Concepcion and Quesada traveling all over the country to publicize and popularize the new organization. Prior to the *Batasan*, NAMFREL forwarded an eight-point proposal to the government to improve the elections:

i) Immunity for candidates from being arrested, questioned and detained for expressing their views. (During the Marcos era, a number of presidential decrees heavily suppressed freedom of speech and assembly in the country. The violation of some of these decrees was punishable by the death penalty. As a result, many potential candidates from opposition parties were fearful of standing for elections).

ii) The military should remain in their barracks on Election Day. (During past elections, there were many reports of the military disrupting the voting process and intimidating voters.)

iii) No polling election district is to be allowed inside the military post.

iv) Ballot papers are to be printed on watermarked paper so as to distinguish them from any counterfeit voting papers.

v) Indelible ink should be used to prevent multiple voting. (During previous elections, there were numerous accusations of 'flying voters'—voters who had managed to vote more than once.)

vi) All candidates should have equal access to the media. (Previously, opposition candidates routinely failed to receive sufficient media coverage.)

vii) Polling should end at 3pm at the latest so as to ensure that the ballot-counting process could be completed before dark. (There were many allegations in the past that ballot boxes went missing in the midst of the counting process, particularly in the evenings.)

viii) A new voter register was needed for the country. (There were serious allegations from the opposition political parties that the then current electoral roll had already been severely tainted.)

Immense pressure from the United States for Marcos to hold a free and fair election this time around resulted in the latter's conceding to all the above demands. Satur C. Ocampo believed that it was Ferdinand Marcos's obsession with legitimacy from the international community that led him to eventually agree to the demands, which were subsequently incorporated into the Elections Code.

The COMELEC meanwhile granted accreditation to NAMFREL as an election watchdog, cementing the latter's status as the official 'citizens' arm' for the COMELEC. NAMFREL then went on to recruit more than 150,000 volunteers for the *Batasan* elections, managing to monitor almost 85 percent of the entire polling precincts.

It was during the *Batasan* elections that NAMFREL first introduced its *Operation Quick Count* (OQC), a procedure for verifying the official vote count tallied by the COMELEC that was done by collecting and tabulating the results from polling stations.[4] Today the OQC is widely regarded as international ground-breaking work that was pioneered by NAMFREL.

NAMFREL's OQC helped to ensure that the official elections results could no longer be freely manipulated. On the whole however, COMELEC's vote-counting manipulation still triumphed over NAMFREL's resource limitations, and the ruling party, the *Kilusang Bagong Lipunan* (New Society Movement—KBL) prevailed with a total of 124 seats as opposed to the opposition's 59 seats.

However, the elections results demonstrated an obvious pattern. In areas where NAMFREL had a strong presence, COMELEC's official results tended to tally with that of NAMFREL's and the opposition tended to win. However, when and where NAMFREL did not have a strong presence, the official results tended not to tally with NAMFREL's count and the KBL tended to win. The OQC was proven to be especially valuable in areas such as Metro Manila, where NAMFREL had strong resources. In Metro Manila, the OQC's conclusion that opposition candidates had won 16 out of 21 seats was confirmed by the official COMELEC tally. In the ten districts where NAMFREL did not manage to deploy volunteers, all the seats were won by the ruling KBL. This suggested that cheating may have been reduced in areas where NAMFREL was present but not in areas where the organization was not able to hold a strong presence.

Further, manipulation in the 1984 *Batasan* elections extended to all sorts of fraudulent behaviors. Massive vote buying was still rampant—the ruling party was believed to be paying 20 to 50 pesos for each voter bought. Vote switching and ballot stuffing by elections personnel also reportedly occurred, as did irregularities in the new voters' register, naturally tipping the results in favor of the KBL. Opposition candidates also failed to receive fair media coverage as promised by the COMELEC.

Nevertheless, the presence of NAMFREL in the 1984 *Batasan* elections had managed to produce one success—the return of the confidence of the people and the opposition political parties that there was still hope for the election system in the country. This success can also be read from the negative reactions exhibited by the ruling party and COMELEC towards NAMFREL, including their subsequent attempts at discrediting the organization. The COMELEC in fact simply discontinued NAMFREL's accreditation after the 1984 *Batasan* elections.

The 1986 Snap Presidential Election

Following the 1984 *Batasan* elections, national and international pressure forced Marcos to declare the Snap Presidential[5] Election on February 7, 1986, a year earlier than scheduled. The opposition agreed to field only one candidate, Corazon 'Cory' Aquino, the widow of Ninoy.

When COMELEC discontinued its accreditation of NAMFREL soon after the 1984 *Batasan* elections, it was argued that NAMFREL's term as a citizens' election watchdog ended alongside the said elections. NAMFREL was also then further accused of having received funds from the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In the 1950s, the CIA reputedly funded the National Movement for Free Elections, a different organization that unfortunately carried the same NAMFREL acronym. The current NAMFREL then had a difficult time in defending its assertion that the older NAMFREL was not its predecessor.

In its effort to regain its accreditation, NAMFREL attempted to collect one million signatures in a petition addressed to the COMELEC. Although this effort was not immediately successful, NAMFREL continued to lobby nationally and internationally. Finally COMELEC relented on December 24, 1985, under the condition that Joe Concepcion was to

pledge under oath that NAMFREL had not and would not receive foreign funding.

NAMFREL's success in 1984 had in fact caused the organization to become extremely popular amongst Filipinos. With the slogan 'From Batanes to Tawi-Tawi', to demonstrate its nationwide coverage, NAMFREL chapters emerged all over the archipelago. By 1986, NAMFREL had managed to recruit some 500,000 volunteers as poll watchers. Another two million citizens had volunteered to guard the transportation of ballot boxes after voting was completed.

Once again in 1986, NAMFREL's OQC made its mark on the history of the Philippines. On February 9, two days after the election, NAMFREL's OQC showed that Cory Aquino was ahead of Marcos by at least one million votes.

The Filipino people obviously vested their trust in NAMFREL's OQC rather than the COMELEC's official tally. NAMFREL's pioneering work also spilled into the most unlikely places. One of the biggest events of the 1986 Snap Presidential Election was when nearly forty data entry personnel of COMELEC walked out as a protest after receiving an order to manipulate the results. To Joe Concepcion, this incident remained as one of the most memorable events in NAMFREL's history, for it was clear evidence of NAMFREL's success in its campaign for honest, free and fair elections.

On February 14, COMELEC announced that Marcos was the winner of the presidential election. NAMFREL's tally however showed that Cory Aquino was the clear winner. The majority of Filipinos were extremely angered—they clearly had more confidence in NAMFREL's count rather than COMELEC's. The split in the election tallies sent a signal to the military, eventually splitting it too. The then Defense Minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, along with Lieutenant Fidel Ramos, began to plan to stage a coup against the Marcos regime.

When Marcos caught wind of the plan on February 22, Juan Ponce Enrile and Fidel Ramos went into hiding at the Defense Ministry Complex in Manila. By this time, the swell of public fury had reached its peak. Cardinal Sin of the Catholic Church openly instructed Filipinos to protect the two. In the ensuing days, more than one million Filipinos swelled onto the *Epifanio de los Santos Avenue* (EDSA) street, in a historic mass protest, demanding Marcos' resignation.

The majority of NAMFREL volunteers joined other Filipinos for the four-day peaceful demonstrations along EDSA, which eventually forced Ferdinand Marcos to step down and flee to Hawaii with his family.

It was clear that NAMFREL's original work contributed significantly to the events that culminated in what is known today as The People Power's Revolution. NAMFREL clearly pushed the boundaries for free and fair elections in the Philippines and inspired similar movements around the world. For NAMFREL, its success was also a truly Filipino success—Cory Aquino was finally installed as the rightful President of the Republic of the Philippines on February 25, 1986. A new dawn had come to the Philippines.

KIPP in Indonesia[6]

During Soeharto's rule, only the following three political parties participated in the country's elections:

i) *Partai Golongan Karyawan* (Partai Golkar), formerly the *Golongan Karya* (Golkar) and the *Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya* (Sekber Golkar)

ii) *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI)

iii) *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP).

Golkar essentially was Soeharto's. The PDI and the PPP however could not entirely escape from the grip of Soeharto, who even managed to remove Megawati Sukarnoputri as the PDI head during the *Peristiwa 27 Juli*.[7]

The Soeharto regime employed several methods to sabotage the country's elections.

First, the campaigning period then was very short, only around 7-8 days. It was simply impossible for the opposition parties to campaign nationally within a week. This situation was clearly intended to benefit Golkar, which dominated media access and the government machinery in Indonesia. Outside of the elections campaigning period, opposition parties also faced heavy restrictions in their publicity efforts— popular party symbols were banned from being displayed and critics of the ruling party and the government risked military action.

The government also screened all election candidates through the *Ujian LITSUS*, in which the state intelligence body would interview candidates and conduct thorough background checks on them. Essentially this body had the power to qualify or disqualify any election candidate.

Furthermore, government officials were also used to influence voters into voting for Golkar even before the campaign period started.

The state also did not hesitate in threatening or even detaining anyone who dared to propose a boycott of the elections.

As a protest against all these malpractices, KIPP was eventually formed.

It began with the attendance of Rustam Ibrahim, the former Director of the *Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial* (Economic and Social Research, Education and Information Dissemination Organization—LP3ES), in a conference organized by NAMFREL and the NDI in Manila in the 1990s, which saw the participation of various Asian election monitoring organizations (EMOs).

Upon his return, Rustam began to popularize the idea of forming EMOs in Indonesia through his writings and in discussions with several local intellectuals and activists. Eventually in 1996, Mulyana Kusumah, a veteran activist, academic and the executive director of the *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (Legal Aid Center— LBH) began to work on the idea with student, cultural and labor activists as well as intellectuals, artists, lawyers, journalists, religious leaders and other professional groups.

KIPP was officially launched on March 15, 1996 in a rally organized at the *Taman Ismail Marzuki* (TIM) cultural center. This was a symbolic move to show the Soeharto regime that NGO activists, intellectuals, religious groups as well as labor and student activists were all united against the regime.[8] Like NAMFREL, KIPP also became the focal Indonesian organization that strategically unified diverse pro-democracy activists.

The veteran journalist and editor of *Tempo* news weekly, Goenawan Mohammad, became KIPP's first chairperson while Mulyana Kusumah became its first secretary general. KIPP also managed to bring in

important national public figures such as Nurkholis Majid, a religious leader and intellectual, Budiman Sujadmiko, a well-known student activist and Ali Sadikin, the former governor of Jakarta.

In the beginning, KIPP was intended to be a loose coalition of concerned groups but gradually, it began to develop into a formal non-governmental organization. NAMFREL in the meantime, served as its important model due to the similarities in the political background of both Indonesia and the Philippines.

Monitoring the Final Election under Soeharto in 1997

Nobody ever imagined that the 1997 election would be the final election under Soeharto. According to Goenawan Mohammad, after the banning of *Tempo*, they were prepared to face the Soeharto government for another 20 years.[9]

The Soeharto regime meanwhile desperately wanted to increase its election success after suffering a 5 percent drop in votes in the previous election in 1992. Golkar resorted to using threats, intimidation and vote-buying to achieve its end of attaining a more successful election outcome.

KIPP then came into the picture during this very crucial time. It was certainly not an easy task to organize KIPP and to monitor the 1997 election. The government had refused to recognize the organization, and the military terrorized, detained and kidnapped its activists.

KIPP leaders had to endure a high risk of being arrested. According to Goenawan Mohamad, in some areas, KIPP volunteers even had to resort monitoring the election using 'underground' tactics, concealing their activities and identities. Co-founding member Standarkiaa Latief[10] recalled the time when the ABRI surrounded the area where he was supposed to provide training for local KIPP members in Java. With assistance from the grassroots, he managed to escape. Nevertheless, similar incidents were repeated in a few other areas. Once, in Ujung Pandang (now Makassar), the police closed down KIPP's recruitment drive and training activities, although the organization had already earlier complied with all procedures as required.

KIPP nevertheless continued to expand. Paskah Irianto[11], another founding member, recalled the unexpected support received by the organization when provincial groups set up their own KIPP chapters without any assistance from the national office. In support, KIPP's headquarters would usually send its representatives to officiate at the launch of the local chapters.

The political climate also at times forced KIPP to organize outside of the country where it could escape from Soeharto's radar. In October 1996, with the support from the NDI, KIPP conducted a major national level meeting and training in Bangkok, Thailand.

KIPP aimed high, to monitor the entire elections process. Even prior to the elections, it had begun to monitor media coverage on the impending election and other election-related violence and intimidation. By May 29, 1997, KIPP had managed to deploy more than 9,000 volunteers all over the country to assist in its monitoring work, an unexpected success for the organization. According to Goenawan Mohamad, KIPP was further surprised by 'volunteers' who on their own effort began to file reports with the KIPP headquarters in Jakarta. In some areas such as in North Sulawesi, KIPP was not even aware of the monitoring efforts taking place. It was pleased to receive reports from these 'non-recruited' volunteers.

It turned out that these volunteers were linked to many of KIPP's allies such as the Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republic Indonesia (Catholic Student Assembly of Indonesia—PMKRI); Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda Nahdlatul Ulama (Nahdatul Ulama Youth Communication Forum—FKGMNU); Serikat Buruh Sejahtera Indonesia (Good Labor Union of Indonesia—SBSI); Masyumi Baru (New Masyumi); Huria Kristen Batak Protestan (The Batak Protestant Christian Association—HKBP); Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Indonesian Forum for the Environment—WALHI); Gerakan Anak Muda Kristen Indonesia (The Christian Youth Movement of Indonesia—GAMKI); Gerakan Mahasiswa Kristen Indonesia (The Christian Student Movement of Indonesia—GMKI), and many others.[12]

The recruited volunteers meanwhile conducted their monitoring activities but focused on areas where KIPP had a strong local chapter and areas that had experienced various elections-related conflicts. They

managed to cover 600 polling booths all over Indonesia. In addition, volunteers also monitored the counting of the ballots. Unfortunately however, KIPP was not able to monitor the tabulation of votes at the provincial and national levels and it also failed to cover all polling stations to enable it to conduct double-checking of all the election results.

Nevertheless, KIPP was still able to sufficiently expose the fraud, intimidation and other election-related violence to the Indonesian public. Although its efforts did not quite manage to stop the manipulation by Golkar during the elections, the organization's independent assessment of the electoral process attracted national and international attention.

KIPP's monitoring and assessment of the 1997 elections also proved to the Indonesian public that elections under the Soeharto rule were far from free and fair. Like NAMFREL, it also became a catalyst for the eventual People Power Uprising in 1998 that helped to force Soeharto's resignation. Further, the process gave many ordinary citizens their first opportunity to participate in a democracy movement. KIPP's evidence on fraud and manipulation during the 1997 election also eventually led the government to organize a re-election in 1999.

Challenges of NAMFREL and KIPP

Both NAMFREL and KIPP encountered aggressive opposition from their governments.

In the Philippines, Marcos established the Movement of Voters for Enlightenment and Reform (MOVER) to challenge the growing influence of NAMFREL. MOVER membership was largely derived from Marcos's daughter's youth organization. The COMELEC promptly accredited MOVER as another 'citizens' arm' and even went as far as suggesting that NAMFREL conduct poll watching in the morning while MOVER would take over the activity in the afternoon. MOVER was clearly set up to serve the interests of the Marcos regime.

In Indonesia meanwhile, Soeharto's supporters established the Pengawas Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu (Observers for the Independent Election Monitoring Committee—PKIPP) and recruited gang members popularly termed as *preman* in Indonesian slang to monitor KIPP's activities. PKIPP most of the time only disrupted the activities of KIPP

with violence. In one incident, KIPP activists were assaulted by PKIPP recruits. When KIPP's influence grew stronger, PKIPP slowly lost its support and eventually had to disband.

In the Philippines, COMELEC often placed various obstacles to NAMFREL's work, from revoking its accreditation status to the Commission's general reluctance in extending its cooperation to the latter to hurling accusations that NAMFREL was linked to the CIA. In 1986, ten NAMFREL volunteers, mostly working at the provincial level, were murdered as a result of their involvement with the organization.[13]

In Indonesia meanwhile, the Soeharto regime refused to recognize KIPP since its inception and declared it as an illegal organization. KIPP activists were detained, kidnapped and tortured by the Indonesian military. Some like Budiman Sujadmiko, were imprisoned after being accused to be behind the riots following the *Peristiwa 27 Juli*. The government also accused Mulyana W. Kusumah of being affiliated to communist elements, damaging the trust level of some network members and supporters of KIPP.[14]

KIPP was forced to organize training meetings in Bangkok in 1996 to avoid any potential disruptions. According to Paskah Irianto, more than thirty KIPP national leaders had to be flown to Bangkok for this purpose. Most KIPP activists could not work openly.

Unlike NAMFREL, KIPP was still a fledgling organization during the 1997 elections. It did not have a significant amount of time in which to organize. NAMFREL had more advantages because when it started in the 1980s, the Philippines already had a history of some form of election monitoring experience. Moreover, the lack of resources and funding also posed a major stumbling block to KIPP, unlike NAMFREL which had support from the country's business community and the Catholic Church.

As for KIPP, there was no official record on activists kidnapped and killed by the Soeharto government during its monitoring work in 1997, though kidnappings, killings and other human rights violations were very common during Soeharto's era.

Apart from the obstacles from their autocratic governments, both NAMFREL and KIPP faced criticisms from other civil society groups. The key criticism was that the groups' work was in fact

legitimizing the elections process under the two dictators.

In the Philippines, some left-leaning groups had proposed a boycott of the Marcos elections. Thus, when NAMFREL was formed, such groups began to accuse NAMFREL as a 'rubber stamp' for the elections.

But NAMFREL proved that it was right in its strategy, since it directly paved the way for the People Power's Revolution in the Philippines. Essentially, the people's confidence in NAMFREL's OQC led to the installation of a new president for the republic.

Today, both Bienvenido 'Bien' Lumbera and Satur C. Ocampo are of the view that the decision of the Philippines' left to boycott the 1986 elections was a mistake in judgment. Such groups had simply failed to read the sentiments of the masses, who were ready for a massive change.[15]

In Indonesia, even though there was no significant proposal to boycott the elections, some intellectuals and activists did reject the idea to form an election monitoring group, using similar arguments. Countering this, KIPP founding members argued that there was a real need to monitor the elections in order for fraud, abuses, intimidation and vote-buying to be systematically documented so that the public could be shown the hidden truth of the elections system.

KIPP nevertheless proceeded despite the criticisms thrown at it and went on to show that Soeharto's elections were nothing but a scam. In May 1998, the student-led People Power's movement helped to trigger Soeharto's resignation, putting an end to the New Order regime.

Conclusion

Before the success story of NAMFREL in the 1986 Snap Presidential Election, the world had never heard of a citizen's movement in election monitoring. NAMFREL therefore contributed greatly in pioneering citizen's participation in election monitoring at an international level. It was even nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize by a few international organizations that recognized its immense contribution.

Mars Quesada, the first Secretary General of NAMFREL has since traveled to 22 countries around the globe to share the Filipino experience and to convince the world that NAMFREL's work can be reproduced elsewhere. In Asia, KIPP remains the best example of a group that went on to be greatly influenced by NAMFREL's pioneering work.

Election monitoring subsequently became popular and began to be recognized by many governments in Asia. Today, the governments of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan have given accreditation to more than one local election monitoring organization during their elections as well as to international observation teams. Domestic and international organizations normally work closely in solidarity to achieve their goals of empowering citizens in the election process.

Both NAMFREL and KIPP later joined other election monitoring organizations in Asia to form the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) that today conducts international election observation missions and capacity building programs in the region. Since 1997, ANFREL has participated in more than 40 elections all over Asia. It also became one of the signatories to the Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers, signed at the United Nations, New York on October 27, 2005.

Election monitoring efforts by NAMFREL and KIPP not only benefited democratization in the Philippines and Indonesia but also contributed immensely towards global democracy. It is valuable to share the experience of both NAMFREL and KIPP in the Asia region, especially in countries still ruled by autocratic governments. NAMFREL and KIPP have proven that, no matter how strong the ruling regime, it can never stop or 'kill' a genuine citizens' movement.

NOTES

1 Based on interview with a resource person who was directly involved in NAMFREL history and references from several books.

2 CNEA was formed by the then COMELEC chairperson, Jaime Ferrer, Bishop Mariano Gaviola together with Jose Concepcion Jr. Charito Planas was its first secretary general.

[3] Damaso Magbual or "Dammy" as called by friends and colleagues, was a member of the first batch of NAMFREL volunteers for the *Batasan* elections in 1984. Currently (2011) he is the chairman of the regional election monitoring network, the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL) and holds the national membership chair for NAMFREL.

[4] Operation Quick Count (OQC) is an activity to collect and tabulate the results from polling places (stations). OQC aims to verify the accuracy of the official results.

[5] The scheduled Presidential Election should have been in 1987. Pressure from the national and international communities forced Marcos to call the Snap Presidential Election one year earlier.

[6] Based on interviews with resource person who were involved directly with the history of KIPP.

[7] The *July 27 1996 Incident* (*Peristiwa 27 Juli*) occurred when the PDI central office in Jakarta was taken by force from Megawati Sukarnoputri's supporters. The invasion was led by the supporters of Soejardi, the PDI chief of Medan, with help from the Indonesian military. This event sparked riots in a few areas in Jakarta, including the Diponegoro, as well as in Salemba and Kramat. The government accused radical students and the youth group Persatuan Rakyat Demokratik (PRD) of masterminding of riots. The Soeharto government then began a crackdown on PRD and detained some activists. Budiman Sudjatmiko received the hardest punishment, 13 years imprisonment.

[8] During the Soeharto era, any gathering of five people could risk detention by the military. When KIPP announced its existence openly at Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM), it sent a powerful signal to the Soeharto regime that the people no longer had fear of the regime.

[9] *Tempo* magazine was banned by the Soeharto regime following publication of an article on the corruption of the regime. However operations resumed following the fall of the regime. The magazine is still in publication.

[10] Standarkiaa Latief was a founding member of KIPP. He was active with *Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam* (HMI) or the Islamic Student Association during the 1980s. He is currently (2011) a KIPP board member.

[11] Paskah Irianto was also a founding member and strategist of KIPP. Previously, he was actively involved with Mulyana W Kusumah in *Lembaga Bantuan Hukum* (LBH) or Indonesia's Legal Aid Center. He was also one of the founding members of the *Perhimpunan Bantuan Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia* (PBHI) or Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Association.

[12] Nahdatul Ulama, loosely translated as 'The Ulama Awakening' is an influential Muslim organization in Indonesia established in 1926 in reaction to the growing influence of the modernist Muslim movement in Indonesia that rejected many traditional Javanese traditions said to be in contradiction to authentic Islamic beliefs. *Masyumi* is the acronym for Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia or the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations, originally established in 1943, which eventually evolved into a political party.

[13] They were Rodrigo Ponce, Jaime Alcala, Cresencio Barcuma, Fructuoso Javines, Irineo Magbanua, Alexis Parao, Samuel Moulic, Dan Sarmiento, Neoldino Del Corro and Abdulhak Balabada.

[14] Communism is often considered a taboo ideology among the majority of Muslims in Indonesia due to the spread of propaganda during the Cold War era in which communism was often associated with anti-religious sentiments.

[15] Beinvenido Lumbera is a National Artist who currently (2011) teaches at the Department of Filipino and Philippine Literature, University of the Philippines, Diliman. He was a political prisoner during the Marcos era due to his involvement with the anti Martial Law magazine, *Ulos* or Thrust. During this period, he was one of the key people of PAKSA (Writings for the Progress of the People), a group of writers affiliated to the leftist movement.

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The 3R Potential of Household Waste in Bangi, Malaysia

Kohei Watanabe

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

What is the problem of waste? In the process of economic development, more people start to live in cities and, at the same time, an increase in per capita material consumption will occur. As a consequence, the amount of waste handled by the municipality increases drastically. Quality-wise, the waste starts to contain new materials and items that are difficult to treat. Often, the provision of waste facilities fails to keep up with this change, leading to an inappropriate treatment of waste that then causes local pollution. Once and even now, it is believed that arranging for the provision of adequate facilities vis-à-vis the predicted quantity and quality of waste would solve the problem. For this purpose, in highly industrialized countries such as Japan, waste treatment technology and practice have been improved to such an extent that one can hardly smell waste even just outside the facilities. Critical emissions from incinerators have decreased drastically. Hence, theoretically, there is no room for NIMBY ("not in my backyard") complaints. On the other hand, economists and politicians have been trying hard to invent various ways to channel enough money for waste facilities.

This paradigm of "predict and provide", however, is shifting in the light of new public management and global sustainability. In many industrialized countries, there is now doubt whether the huge expenditures for waste facilities are bringing due benefits to society. The one-way stream of mass-consumption and mass disposal has been viewed as incompatible with the earth's limited resources and carrying capacity. It may be economically and environmentally more efficient, therefore, to reduce the amount of waste, and to recycle, instead of dispose.

The waste hierarchy has become an established concept in industrialized countries. This prioritizes source reduction before reuse and recycling, while safe disposal is ranked as the last option. In the primary stage of waste management in a developing country, it is important to first provide for the proper disposal of waste (e.g., engineered sanitary landfill). Subsequently, as the economy develops, there will be a need to tackle the increase in the amount of waste, and this is where the waste hierarchy becomes relevant. For example, Malaysia has experienced a rapid increase in material consumption and, at the same time, waste reduction and recycling activities have become less economically attractive because of the relative decrease in the price of commodities in comparison to labor wages.

In which location would the findings of this research be applicable? From observation, it appeared that any item with value as a resource was collected and recycled, and not disposed of as waste in countries such as Indonesia and Vietnam. Bluntly speaking, secondary resources are traded at world market prices, while the local wages differ. Probably, it could be said that the economics of recycling is determined by the latter, for which per capita GDP could be a surrogate indicator.

Malaysia has a per capita GDP of \$6,950 (IMF 2010), which is one of the highest in Southeast Asia. Hence, the results here may not apply to other major SE Asian countries, but may apply to many countries in South America, such as Brazil and Argentina, which have per capita GDP larger than Malaysia, as do many "transition economy" countries such as Russia, Romania, and Lithuania. Approximately 1.8 billion people live in countries with GDP larger than Malaysia. Less than half of these total live in the "advanced industrialized economies" of North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Consequently, the case of Malaysia may be regarded as representing the middle-income countries, which hold a significant proportion of the world population.

In these middle- and high-income countries, the situation is such that the commitment of the public sector is important, not only in the provision of waste collection and disposal services, but also in encouraging activities higher up the waste hierarchy. For this, we need to assess the potential for 3R (Reduce, Reuse, and Recycle). Only with rigid numerical data can we achieve sound policies and plan accordingly.

Detailed compositional data is required as we pursue measures higher up the waste hierarchy (table 1). For landfilling or incineration, "gross" figures, such as the total weight, total calorific value, or the percentage of biodegradable materials are desired. In order to plan for recycling, the material composition (metal, paper, plastics, etc.) is necessary. To determine the reusability of an item, we need to know whether the item was thrown away because it was broken beyond repair, or if it was thrown away despite its maintaining its functions. In source reduction, we need to identify the actors and activities that added the item into the social material flow. In other words, the context of each waste item becomes important (Had it been goods or had it been packaging? Or, at what stage was the item added as packaging?).

Waste Hierarchy	Typical Data Requirements
Waste Minimization / Source Reduction	Original purpose of items (goods/packaging etc) Target waste creating actors/activities
Material Recycling	Material composition
Incineration	Calorific value/Elemental composition
Landfill	Basic quantity data (weight)

Table 1: Waste Hierarchy and Data Requirements

Policy insights can be obtained from comparisons of the situations in different cities under various conditions and waste management systems. An accurate comparison of the detailed waste composition is very useful in assessing the feasibility of various schemes in these different locations. Currently, the data to make this kind of comparison possible are lacking, especially in the international context. Even when survey results are available, it is difficult to compare one with another, because of the differences in survey methods and categorizations of waste.

1.2 General Methodology

Household waste has a difficult character in that it is rather non-homogeneous. Thorough mixing is one method to make the sample more uniform. On the other hand, mixing will make the sorting more unpleasant and difficult. Another method is to record the items before they go into the dustbin. The shortcoming of this method is that the research activity is likely to influence the household in its waste generation activity. Various bodies have conducted waste composition analyses, and each of them has

devised methods to suit the local conditions and their aims. The methods can be generalized into three types (table 2).

Methods	
Cone Sampling	2-4t Sample (collection vehicle)-> Mechanical mixing->200-300kg handsort (Representative mix/Detailed sorting difficult)
Bag (Bin) Sampling	200-300kg sample in container (Representativeness? Detailed sorting possible)
Panel Survey	Panel Households provided with a scale and recording sheet (Representativeness? influences behaviour)

Table 2: Methods of Waste Composition Analysis

One method for waste composition analysis is that involving "cone sampling" (cf. Warren Spring Laboratory and Aspinwall and Co. 1993). Waste for analysis is collected through a stratified sampling of households. Typically, between 5 tonnes and 7 tonnes of waste are obtained as sample from waste compactor vehicles. Analysis is often carried out after the sample is trommelled (i.e., sorted by particle size). Each size-sorted sample is fractioned by cone sampling. About 300 kilograms of this fractioned sample is hand-sorted. The emphasis is put on mixing well to achieve a representative sample.

This method is good for getting a representative sample for analyzing the elemental makeup (i.e., the proportion of carbon, nitrogen, chlorine, etc. in waste), but the analysis will be "dirty" as everything will have been stirred and soiled. Mixing involves a physical change, which destroys the actual features of household waste. Some items will break, making waste difficult to sort. Mixing also makes it difficult to judge whether the item had been abandoned because it was broken or despite the fact that it was still usable. Moisture migration takes place with mixing and originally dry items will become heavier than at the point of waste generation.

On the other end of the spectrum of methods, there is the "panel survey" (cf. Yamaguchi et al. 1989). Selected "panel" households are provided a survey sheet and a kitchen scale, and during the survey period, they are asked to weigh and record everything that is disposed from the household. This method relies on the cooperation of panel households and does not involve

"dirty" work for investigators. The negative side is that it is difficult to find a large number of cooperative households. There are also chances that the subject households would be a biased sample. In many cases, subject households are approached via certain groups, such as employees of the city council, or members of a cooperative. Volunteers who express their willingness to participate are likely to have a higher awareness of the problems with waste management. Other risk factors of this method are that householders may not record properly, and the survey itself may influence their behavior. It is suspected that during the survey period, householders tend to recycle more than usual, and would avoid producing very wet kitchen waste, as it is difficult and unpleasant to weigh.

Prof. Hiroshi Takatsuki of Kyoto University Environmental Preservation Centre, Kyoto City Council, and ARPA-K Co. Ltd. have been developing the "bin (bag) sampling method" that suits the objective of detailed household waste composition analysis (cf. ARPA-K 1998a, 1998b). For the past 30 years, Kyoto City has been conducting analyses with more than 250 sorting categories every year. Sampling is from three to six housing type areas. Collection is done by flat loading trucks. Receptacles or sacks containing waste are loaded as they are set out for collection. Mixing of waste is avoided as much as possible, to enable the detailed analysis. About 300 kilograms of waste is hand-sorted for each housing type.

This method has less chances of influencing the behavior of the subjects compared to the above-mentioned "panel survey" method, and the sorting can be done relatively cleanly. There is moisture migration while the waste is kept in the bin or sack (Watanabe 1991), but this is to a much lesser extent than with physical mixing. The disadvantage compared to the first method is that as waste from only a relatively small number of households would be sampled, the representativeness can be a question. A larger sample will overcome this doubt, but this means more labor is needed to carry out the work.

1.3 Methods Used for the Project in Bandar Baru Bangi

The aim of my project is to identify the per capita arisings of each detailed waste item from urban Malaysian households, including those that are recycled. Through the waste sampling, sorting, and weighing procedures, the waste composition in terms of percentage and the amount of waste per household were obtained. The items and the amounts recycled (per household), and the number of persons per household were obtained through a questionnaire survey.

1.3.1 Characteristics of the Sampling Area

Due to ease of logistics, I have designated Bandar Baru Bangi (Bangi New Town) area as the sampling area. This is where the main campus of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia is located. B.B.Bangi is a part of Kajang Municipality, in the state of Selangor. It is about 30 kilometers south of central Kuala Lumpur, where a palm oil plantation was converted into residential and industrial land use in the 1980s. Other than universities and related institutions, assembly factories owned by companies such as Sony, Hitachi, and Denso are the main employers in this area. There are also many people that commute to the Kuala Lumpur area. It could be said that this is a typical suburban area in the greater Kuala Lumpur region.

Sampling areas within B.B.Bangi were identified by housing types. After a few site visits and after investigating into the census block data, four neighborhood were selected (figure 1). Two are terraced housing areas, which constitute the major housing type in B.B.Bangi. One area with bungalows and another area with flats were selected. Flat dwellers tend to be less educated and have lower incomes. Many of them work in the nearby factories.

Figure 1 Sampling Area

The door-to-door waste collection service is provided three times a week (Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays; or Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays). Anything other than bulky items and garden waste are accepted in this waste collection. Kajang Municipality delegates the waste collection to Alam Flora Sdn Bhd, the regional concessionary (and its subcontractors). Collected waste is delivered to the "Recycle Energy" MRF /RDF /Incineration facility in Semenyih (within Kajang municipality). In this facility, metals, plastics, and hazardous items are removed, while the rest are incinerated, whereby the generated heat is utilized for electricity generation (the items and the amount recycled in this facility are not included as "recycled" in the discussion below).

Collection of recyclable materials is available in this area, through collectors who circulate frequently for paper and metals, as well as through collection points (recycling centers for paper, plastics, and metals) and donation to charity organizations (mostly clothes and electric appliances). The scope of my project would be the items dealt with by the above-mentioned regular waste collection process and these recycle/reused items.

1.3.1 Waste Composition Analysis

The sampling of waste was conducted with the cooperation of Alam Flora. In the morning of the collection day, waste set out for collection from each household was put into plastic bags labeled with the house number. Waste was then collected on a flat loader truck instead of the regular compactor vehicle, and brought to the site for waste sorting in the engineering department (UKM).

The amount (kg) and volume (ml) from each household were measured before sorting. Volume was estimated by putting the sample into a bucket marked in gradations of five liters. Waste was sorted into about 120 categories, following the category table (see table 5) which was based on those used in the earlier studies by the author in Neyagawa (jp), Cambridge (uk), Freiburg (de), and Aarhus (dk) (Watanabe 2003).

The category table was devised so that the results could be used as base data for discussing various waste management measures. Material types such as paper and plastics (and their sub-types, e.g., "corrugated card") are an important categorization criterion for assessing the potential recyclability and compostability

of an item. Further classifications were made according to the pre-disposal purposes of the items—durable goods, disposable items, advertising materials, packaging, etc.,—as such distinction is useful in identifying actors and activities for source reduction. As packaging is the major item in wastes, this was classified even further, so that the stage in which the packaging item had been added could be identified, along with the kind of product it had been used for (i.e., food /non-food goods). With this information it became possible to indicate the current contribution and the reduction potential of each actor in the packaging chain (producer, retailer, etc). The summary tables (tables 4–6) are a result of various ways of aggregating the detailed categories. They were generated through cross-tabulation using various characteristics criteria.

The category table was modified to suit the local condition. For example, the item "big fruit peels" was added, reflecting the significant appearance of tropical fruits such as durian and rambutan, which does not happen in higher latitudes. Some items were deleted due to their non-occurrence in B.B.Bangi waste.

29 January: Sek4/3 (terraced) 44 houses 215kg
15 March: Sek2/1 (bungalow) 36 houses 282kg
16 March: Sek4/7 (terraced) 34 houses 164kg
17 March: Sek4/3 (terraced) 46 houses 177kg
18 March: Sek1/9 (flats) 10 chutes (3 blocks, 122 units?) 167kg
Total: 282 houses (units), 1005 kg

Table 3: Sampling areas and amounts

After the sorting was complete, each item was weighed and its volume measured. For some items such as bottles and carrier bags, the number of items was also counted. Each day, the analysis of waste from one neighborhood was conducted. This was carried out for five days (in March 2010; except for Terraced A, two analyses were conducted in January and March 2010). The number of houses and the amounts sampled were as indicated in table 3.

1.3.2 Questionnaire Survey

The questionnaire was created in both English and Bahasa Malaysia. Students of the waste management course were assigned house numbers, where they conducted structured interviews based on the questionnaire. The survey subjects consisted of 329 households. These included all the houses that had

their waste sampled, plus some houses neighbouring those. Valid responses were obtained from 248 houses (table 4). The major reason for not being able to obtain a response from some houses was that there was "nobody at home", although students were instructed to make repeated visits to such houses. There were fewer than 10 cases where the householders refused to cooperate in the survey.

The questionnaire sheet included items such as how many persons lived in the house, the items and the amounts collected for recycling in the past two weeks, the presence of any waste disposal methods other than regular collection, the frequency of eating out, etc. Some bungalow households indicated that they burn garden waste on-site. As garden waste is not within the scope of this project, it can be assumed that all wastes and recyclables were captured by the sampling and questionnaire survey.

Seksyen 2/1 (bungalows) 55 houses (valid response: 44)
Seksyen 4/3 (terraced) 82 houses (66)
Seksyen 4/7 (terraced) 83 houses (63)
Seksyen 1/9 (flats) 109 units (75)
Total: 282 houses (units), 1005 kg

Table 4: Subjects of the questionnaire survey (8-31 Mar)

2. Results

Table 5 shows the raw results of the composition analysis. The purpose behind having detailed categories is to create summary tables according to various criteria. Various summary tables are discussed below.

2.1 Household Characteristics and the Amount of Waste

Results indicate that houses with a larger number of people tend to generate less waste per person. The same was also observed of the results from Kyoto. There was no rigid correlation established between per capita arisings and the percentage of meals taken at home, nor the use of takeaways. Households with members that received higher education, households that exert effort to reduce waste, and households that practice recycling, all tend to produce more waste per person. This appears paradoxical, but probably this is due to the fact that each of the above categories has a positive correlation with income.

2.2 Difference Between Household Types

Figure 2: Arisings according to housing types

code	1	2	3	29-Jan 4/3 wt%+rec	15-Mar 2/1 wt%+rec	16-Mar 4/7 wt%+rec	17-Mar 4/3 wt%+rec	18-Mar 1/9 wt%+rec	average wt%	vol%	weight(g)	volume(ml)
	Bangi Household Waste Survey 2010 Side 1											
1101	Pape Produ		Newspapers - recyclable	0.17	0.11	0.20	0.58	0.29	0.27	0.63	1.22	14.99
1100			Newspaper - recyced	6.16	5.76	6.33	6.16	4.22	5.73	13.46	26.10	321.11
1102			Newspapers - heavily soiled used for wrappin	3.60	4.75	2.47	3.36	3.41	3.52	3.07	16.03	73.19
1103			Magazines	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.49
1104			Books	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.49	0.00	0.13	0.05	0.58	1.24
1106			Personal correspondence etc	0.00	0.01	0.61	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.10	0.57	2.50
1109			Other products	0.00	0.21	0.23	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.04	0.43	0.85
		subtotal		9.93	10.99	9.84	10.73	7.92	9.88	17.37	45.04	414.37
1201		Dispo	Tissue Paper /serviettes	1.05	2.38	2.79	1.86	0.51	1.72	1.03	7.83	24.62
1203			paper plates and cups	0.00	0.17	0.07	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.18	0.25	4.19
1209			Other Consumables	0.11	0.33	1.01	0.47	0.38	0.46	0.40	2.10	9.65
		subtotal		1.16	2.88	3.87	2.34	0.92	2.23	1.61	10.17	38.46
1301			Papers used for Advertising	0.52	1.82	1.41	1.47	0.31	1.11	0.86	5.05	20.52
1401		Conta	Drinks tetrapak#	0.53	0.58	0.80	0.58	0.09	0.52	1.68	2.35	40.15
1411			takeaway box	0.51	0.46	0.07	0.60	0.06	0.34	0.88	1.55	20.92
1413			product Box for food	0.35	0.69	0.36	0.80	0.11	0.46	1.07	2.10	25.63
1414			Corrug card boxes for food	0.83	0.14	0.00	0.00	0.57	0.31	0.75	1.40	17.88
1421			Paper mold for eggs	0.19	0.08	0.00	0.45	0.46	0.24	0.54	1.07	12.97
1423			Wrapping for food (wax/plastic)	0.57	0.73	0.83	0.48	0.91	0.70	0.87	3.21	20.65
1424			bags - food retailer	0.13	0.14	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.06	0.21	0.29	5.00
1425			bags - food producer	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1461			Boxes for non-food	0.73	0.85	0.81	0.83	1.18	0.88	1.82	4.01	43.43
1462			Corrug card boxes for non-food	1.93	1.09	0.00	2.27	0.00	1.06	2.48	4.83	59.18
1479			Other non-food packaging	0.01	0.00	0.37	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.11	0.35	2.51
1481			Wrapping (no wax)	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.36
1482			Shopping Bags - with handle#	0.00	0.11	0.44	0.26	0.06	0.18	0.43	0.80	10.23
1483			Cushions / buffer materials	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.20	0.00	0.07	0.15	0.33	3.59
1499			Other container and packaging	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.14	0.00	0.05	0.17	0.24	4.05
		subtotal		5.80	5.04	3.80	6.64	3.45	4.94	11.17	22.54	266.54
1501			Invoice / bills etc	0.40	2.55	0.11	0.60	0.00	0.73	0.86	3.34	20.48
1502			Paper from workplace / school	0.74	0.32	0.04	0.48	0.86	0.49	0.60	2.24	14.30
1601			Miscellaneous	0.87	2.53	1.42	0.42	0.66	1.18	0.67	5.38	16.08
	Total			19.42	26.12	20.49	22.69	14.13	20.57	33.15	93.75	790.73
2101	Plas House		food related	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.25	0.07	0.06	0.31	1.40
2109			non-food	1.26	0.43	0.78	1.46	0.36	0.86	0.99	3.92	23.60
		subtotal		1.32	0.43	0.78	1.49	0.62	0.93	1.05	4.23	25.00
2201		Dispo	food	0.02	0.05	0.00	0.05	0.06	0.03	0.18	0.16	4.36
2209			others (non-food)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05
		subtotal		0.02	0.05	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.18	0.16	4.41
2401		Conta	Drinks bottles pet#	1.73	1.35	1.13	1.33	0.80	1.27	6.44	5.77	153.60
2400			recycled pla bottles (food)	0.20	0.13	0.11	0.19	0.28	0.18	0.92	0.83	21.99
2402			Drink bottles non-pet#	0.47	0.17	0.20	0.36	0.03	0.24	1.01	1.11	24.09
2403			Bottles for sauce etc#	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.49	0.15	0.13	0.71	0.59	17.02
2411			Tubs/Jars/boxes - food prod#(w/lid)	0.12	0.31	0.15	0.25	0.19	0.21	0.75	0.94	17.81
2412			Other hard plastic for food (w/o lid etc)	0.15	0.21	0.19	0.06	0.03	0.13	0.63	0.59	15.03
2413			Takeaway boxes (nonPS)#	0.15	0.00	0.09	0.27	0.11	0.12	0.44	0.57	10.41
2414			exp PS takeaway container#	0.39	0.36	0.42	0.28	0.51	0.39	4.84	1.80	115.51
2415			Cups for takeaway drink	0.17	0.25	0.21	0.25	0.31	0.24	1.49	1.08	35.64
2421			Exp PS trays (for uncooked foods)	0.01	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.13	0.12	3.14
2422			Other trays for food (egg?)	0.08	0.07	0.05	0.08	0.04	0.06	0.38	0.29	8.98
2423			bags - food producer (w/ printing)	2.15	1.40	1.31	1.58	2.19	1.73	3.47	7.86	82.87
2424			bags - food retailer (w/o printing)	2.21	2.01	2.11	1.61	1.83	1.96	2.70	8.91	64.35
2425			bags for food refil products	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2426			Wrap/Clingfilm	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
2427			tubes (food)	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.05
2451			bottles for non-food#	0.74	1.21	1.99	0.77	0.44	1.03	2.34	4.69	55.92
2450			recycled pla bottles (non-food)	0.07	0.10	0.16	0.09	0.14	0.11	0.26	0.52	6.16
2461			Tub/jar/box/tray for nonfood (w/lid)	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.16	0.00	0.04	0.12	0.17	2.76
2472			bags - non-food producer	0.16	0.18	0.03	0.34	0.26	0.20	0.65	0.89	15.51
2473			bags - non-food refills	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.25
2474			tubes (non-food)	0.05	0.08	0.17	0.08	0.13	0.10	0.25	0.47	5.95
2481		Shopping	Large - Department stores etc	0.00	0.11	0.18	0.04	0.01	0.07	0.25	0.32	5.99
2482			Mid - supermarket carrier bags	1.08	0.98	1.16	1.14	0.75	1.02	1.96	4.65	46.82
2483			Small - lightweight corner shop typ	3.53	2.38	3.16	2.45	4.73	3.25	4.09	14.81	97.60
		subtotal		4.61	3.47	4.50	3.63	5.49	4.34	6.31	19.77	150.41
2484			Bin liners (sacks)	0.57	1.19	0.56	0.64	0.97	0.79	1.74	3.58	41.40
2487		Buffer m	Exp polystyrene	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.12	0.01	0.03	0.36	0.15	8.69
2488			Others	0.09	0.07	0.18	0.12	0.03	0.10	0.26	0.46	6.16
		subtotal		0.09	0.09	0.20	0.24	0.04	0.13	0.62	0.61	14.86
2499			Miscellaneous packaging	0.35	0.65	0.31	0.19	0.06	0.21	0.39	0.97	9.34
		subtotal		14.46	12.80	14.03	12.92	14.03	13.65	36.60	62.20	873.08
2501			Plastics from workplace /school	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.55	0.11	0.13	0.51	3.07
2601			Other miscellaneous plastics	0.14	0.71	0.77	0.00	0.12	0.35	0.46	1.58	11.01
	Total			15.94	13.98	15.58	14.48	15.36	15.07	38.42	68.68	916.57

Table 5 Results table 1/2 (original is bangi-smry.pdf)

code	Side 2		29-Jan 4/3 wt%+rec	15-Mar 2/1 wt%+rec	16-Mar 4/7 wt%+rec	17-Mar 4/3 wt%+rec	18-Mar 1/9 wt%+rec	average wt%	vol%	weight(g)	volume(ml)
3101	Text Produ	Clothings	0.11	0.75	1.08	0.18	0.68	0.56	0.52	2.55	12.33
3100		recycled textiles	0.07	0.49	0.00	0.07	0.00	0.13	0.12	0.58	2.78
3109		Other products	0.60	2.03	0.33	0.40	0.18	0.71	1.10	3.22	26.16
		subtotal	0.78	3.26	1.41	0.65	0.86	1.39	1.73	6.35	41.27
3401		Packaging	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.25
3501		Textiles from workplace	0.00	0.00	0.24	0.08	0.00	0.06	0.09	0.30	2.23
3601		Other textiles	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.06	0.05	0.26	1.29
	Total		0.93	3.26	1.68	0.73	1.00	1.52	1.89	6.93	45.04
4101	Rub Household Products		0.00	0.14	1.10	1.12	0.23	0.52	0.36	2.37	8.63
4109		Others	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Total		0.00	0.14	1.10	1.12	0.23	0.52	0.36	2.37	8.63
5101	Leat Household Products		0.36	0.29	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.23	0.28	1.05	6.72
5109		Others	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Total		0.36	0.29	0.50	0.00	0.00	0.23	0.28	1.05	6.72
6101	Glas Produ	Kitchen utensils	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.04
6102		Flourescent tubes#	0.04	0.00	0.17	0.03	0.00	0.05	0.04	0.21	0.87
6109		Other products	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.01	0.05	0.04	0.23	0.93
		subtotal	0.15	0.00	0.17	0.22	0.01	0.11	0.08	0.50	1.84
6401	Conta Beverage bottles#		0.52	0.43	0.13	0.00	0.15	0.25	0.12	1.13	2.94
6402		Bottles and Jars for food#	1.10	1.97	1.76	2.47	0.98	1.66	0.82	7.55	19.49
6403		Bottles and Jars for non-food#	0.01	0.36	0.15	0.21	0.40	0.23	0.06	1.03	1.34
6409		Broken bottles and jars (unidentifyable)	0.43	0.54	0.00	0.00	0.41	0.28	0.10	1.26	2.28
		subtotal	2.06	3.31	2.04	2.67	1.95	2.41	1.09	10.97	26.05
6601		others	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Total		2.22	3.31	2.21	2.89	1.96	2.52	1.17	11.47	27.88
7101	Meta Produ	Kitchen utensils	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.04	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.14	0.63
7103		e-waste#	0.00	1.27	0.02	0.05	0.71	0.41	0.16	1.87	3.91
7109		Other products	0.97	0.23	0.07	0.00	0.02	0.26	0.59	1.17	14.01
		subtotal	0.99	1.55	0.14	0.08	0.73	0.70	0.78	3.19	18.55
7201	Dispo Dry cell batteries#		0.00	0.12	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.21	0.18
7209		Other disposables	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.10
		subtotal	0.00	0.14	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.00	0.24	0.28
7401	Conta Beverage	Aluminum#	0.10	0.11	0.01	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.36	0.35	8.52
7402		Steel#	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.34
		subtotal	0.10	0.11	0.01	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.37	0.41	8.86
7403		Food cans#	0.61	0.49	0.55	0.72	1.20	0.71	1.49	3.25	35.42
7400		cans recycled	0.60	0.33	0.41	0.60	0.14	0.42	0.86	1.89	20.62
7404		Pet food cans#	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
7411		boxes for food#	0.00	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.20	0.28
7419		other metal food packaging	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01	0.07	0.36
7451		Boxes for non-food#	0.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.08
7454		Spray canisters (non-food)#	0.19	0.18	0.39	0.00	0.16	0.18	0.16	0.83	3.85
7499		Other container and packaging	0.00	0.04	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.05	0.07
		subtotal	1.58	1.42	1.38	1.45	1.61	1.49	2.92	6.78	69.54
7601		others	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.17	0.28
	total		2.57	3.30	1.57	1.57	2.37	2.28	3.72	10.38	88.65
8901	Plants/Garden waste		1.14	0.42	2.71	2.25	1.42	1.59	1.33	7.24	31.69
8101	Woo Products		0.02	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.03	0.08	0.65
8201		Disposable items	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.09	0.02	0.04	0.06	0.19	1.43
8401		Container and Packaging materials	0.08	0.25	0.22	0.26	0.08	0.18	0.31	0.80	7.44
8501		from workplace	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.18	0.06
8601		Others	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.03	0.03	0.13	0.73
	total		0.14	0.50	0.29	0.35	0.23	0.30	0.43	1.38	10.30
9101	Cera Products		0.29	0.53	0.95	0.12	0.24	0.43	0.13	1.94	3.17
9401		Containers and packaging materials	0.43	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.04	0.39	1.07
	total		0.71	0.53	0.95	0.12	0.24	0.51	0.18	2.33	4.24
9601	Kitc Unused Food (>1/2 of whole)		10.02	8.35	6.42	9.83	3.93	7.71	3.33	35.14	79.33
9602		General food waste	21.78	18.77	25.30	21.38	36.92	24.83	7.37	113.16	175.76
9603		Big Fruit peels / cores (durian etc)	13.56	7.67	9.33	13.31	7.74	10.32	4.37	47.04	104.27
	total		45.35	34.78	41.06	44.52	48.59	42.86	15.07	195.34	359.37
9901	Misc Diapers#		3.87	6.72	6.61	3.12	11.31	6.33	2.98	28.83	70.99
9902		Cat Litters / Animal Bedding	1.35	1.33	0.86	0.00	0.00	0.71	0.33	3.23	7.83
9903		Medicine	0.06	0.10	0.26	0.69	0.11	0.24	0.16	1.10	3.85
9904		Combustible	0.32	0.35	0.44	0.70	1.27	0.62	0.40	2.81	9.64
9905		Non-Combustible	0.87	0.27	0.00	0.16	0.13	0.29	0.14	1.30	3.23
	total		6.47	8.77	8.17	4.67	12.81	8.18	4.01	37.27	95.53
	Total of all items		95.25	95.41	96.32	95.40	98.35	96.15	100.00	438.19	2385.36
	escaped moisture		4.75	4.59	3.68	4.60	1.65	3.85		17.56	
	Grand Total (original weight/ volume)		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00		455.75	

Table 5 Results table 2/2

A large difference in the amount of waste between housing types was observed (figure 2). This confirms the results of the investigation conducted by JICA in Kuala Lumpur in 2004 (JICA 2006). It is interesting to see that in all housing types, "general kitchen waste" is constant at about 100g/person/day. In flats, there are less of other items; while in bungalows, there are more of recyclable materials such as paper, textile, and metals.

2.3 Average Composition

		B.B.Bangi Weight(g)	Vol(ml)	Neyagawa Weight(g)	Vol(ml)	Cambridge Weight(g)	Vol(ml)
Packaging	Total	103.70	1244	176.62	4252	218.75	3432
	Paper	22.54	267	57.45	1483	52.13	1153
	Plastic	62.20	873	72.17	2335	53.87	1713
	Glass	10.97	26	28.75	64	81.98	196
	Metal	6.78	70	18.11	370	30.36	370
	Others	1.21	8	0.13	0	0.41	2
Food	Total	195.34	359	241.28	369	215.83	500
	General	113.16	175	199.13	274	161.19	342
	Fruit	47.04	104	-	-	-	-
	Unused	35.14	79	31.70	95	50.46	158
Goods		65.84	524	169.16	1105	185.26	817
Disposables		39.59	116	39.62	305	56.19	238
Others		51.28	142	135.30	856	201.97	923
Total		455.75	2385	761.99	6887	878.00	5910

Table 6: International comparison of per capita arisings

The average of five analysis runs is used here as the average composition. Table 6 is a summary table based on the original use of the items, in comparison with past results of the author's investigations in England and Japan (Watanabe 2003). There is less packaging waste in B.B.Bangi, both in terms of percentage and actual weight. Looking at the stages in which packaging is added, it is apparent that the B.B.Bangi samples have the highest proportion of plastic packaging added at the retail stage. As these are mostly carrier bags, they occupy less volume compared to the rigid plastic packaging used more frequently in England and Japan. As households often put kitchen waste in these plastic bags, the moisture content in the sorted plastic bags was high (about 80 percent). It could be said that packaging waste in B.B.Bangi is even less than indicated in the tables (for example, 2,233 plastic bags were found in the total sample of 1,005kg. Their total weight was 33.9kg. On the other hand, 2,233 dry bags would weigh only about 6.7kg).

Minimization and Recycling potential (by weight%) (B.B.Bangi)

Weight %	Total Waste	Currently Recycled	Additionally Recyclable	Reduce Industry	Reduce Consumer
Paper	20.57%	5.72%	6.44%	6.05%	2.23%
Plastic	15.07%	0.29%	4.05%	13.65%	0.04%
Glass	2.52%	0%	2.27%	2.41%	0%
Metal	2.28%	0.42%	1.66%	1.49%	0.05%
Others	59.56%	0.13%	2.12%	0.26%	^14.32%
Total	100.00%	6.56%	16.54%	23.86%	16.64%

^unused food 7.71%, diaper 6.33%

Minimization and Recycling potential (by volume%) (B.B.Bangi)

Volume %	Total Waste	Currently Recycled	Additionally Recyclable	Reduce Industry	Reduce Consumer
Paper	33.11%	13.41%	11.78%	12.04%	1.61%
Plastic	38.44%	1.17%	13.93%	36.62%	0.19%
Glass	1.17%	0%	1.05%	1.09%	0%
Metal	3.72%	0.86%	2.54%	2.92%	0.01%
Others	23.56%	0.12%	1.79%	0.36%	^6.53%
Total	100.00%	15.56%	31.66%	53.03%	8.34%

^unused food 3.32%, diaper 2.98%

Table 7 and 8: 3R potentials

Tables 7 and 8 are summary tables in relation to 3R potential. The main items consumers could make efforts to reduce are "unused food" and "disposable diapers". The percentages of these items in B.B.Bangi are similar to those in highly industrialized countries.

The overall recycling collection rate for B.B.Bangi was calculated as 6.5 percent. This is less than half the value derived from the JICA investigation. It is not clear whether this is due to chronological, locational, or methodological differences. In order to evaluate the value of 6.5 percent, we would need to note that the percentage of recyclable items in waste is lower (23 percent) in B.B.Bangi than in Japan or Europe (30 percent to 40 percent). The recycling rates for individual items are: newspaper not used for wrapping, etc. 96 percent; total recyclable paper, 47 percent; metal containers, 28 percent; clothing, 19 percent; plastic bottles, 10 percent; and glass 0 percent.

3. Conclusion

3.1 Summary

The findings from this project could be summarized as follows:

Waste arisings. There was a tendency that the fewer the number of persons per house, the more waste was disposed of per person. Should Malaysia follow the paths of highly industrialized countries in terms of proliferation of "nuclear" families and single person households, the results imply that the amount of waste would increase, even with other factors remaining the same. There was a large difference in terms of the amount and composition of waste between housing types. Further studies would be useful to identify whether this is due to income differences or other factors. The same could be said about the analyses of the relationship with education levels, meal habits, etc. The population of B.B.Bangi is growing each year, while the development of new residential areas is now focusing on middle- and higher-income groups. This scenario will most probably affect waste generation and recycling activities in the future.

3R Potentials. Reduce: Unused food (7.7 percent) and disposable diapers (6.3 percent) were the largest items that consumers could reduce. Packaging (22.8 percent by weight, 52.2 percent by volume) offers big reduction potential for companies, although the percentages are lower in B.B.Bangi than in Europe or Japan. Results indicate that it would be most effective to address plastic packaging added at the retail stage.

Reuse. From the questionnaire survey, we could identify that some reuse activities do take place (e.g., handing used clothing items to charity organizations).

This type of activity may not have been fully captured in this project. There are other types of reuse, such as the use of refillable bottles. Doing this would eliminate 3.0 percent by weight and 11.7 percent by volume of waste, except that refillable bottles hardly exist in Malaysia, and are also becoming less popular in Europe and Japan.

Recycle. Collection of old newspapers is functioning well, and could be left to market forces at the moment. For other kinds of paper and metals, recycling is taking place; but a bit more awareness and effort would be useful. For plastics, it appears that the costs (including the wages of workers involved in the recycling chain, as well as opportunity costs for storage space in houses) have started to exceed the economic value. Plastics are fetching strong prices from end-users, i.e., demand for recovered plastics is present (Seah 2010). Efficiency improvements in the collection and sorting systems (e.g., schemes such as deposit-return), and/or some mechanism to internalize the external economy (e.g., disposal costs and environmental impacts that were avoided) are desired. Although glass is an environmentally high performance material (could be reused or recycled easily), the usage of glass containers in Malaysia is low, and there is hardly a market for recovered glass. Promotion of glass recycling would not be an easy task.

3.2 What Could be Done to Improve the Results

Improvement in the reliability of numbers is appreciated both from an academic standpoint (e.g., identifying the relationship between affluence and waste), and also from the policy-making perspective.

The sorting and measuring procedures appear to have produced reliable results. This is supported by the fact that the total weight after sorting was always around 95 percent of the initial total weight (a 5 percent loss in weight is natural, as moisture evaporates during sorting). There is a minor issue with moisture content, as mentioned above. Plastic packaging waste appears to have higher moisture content in Malaysia than in either Europe or Japan. This factor may need to be considered when conducting comparative analyses.

For some rarely occurring items in waste, there is an issue with the sampling size. For example, if we were to assess the amount of hazardous items in household waste, I would suggest collecting a much larger sample and just looking through the waste for the items in

question. We found some batteries, fluorescent tubes, pesticide canisters, etc. in this study; but their quantities were rather small to be statistically robust.

More doubts can be cast regarding the total amount of waste. For bungalows and terraced housing, the results turned out that the amount of waste for three days over the weekend was similar to that for two days during the week. This suggests that waste generated on Saturdays and Sundays is one-half of waste during a weekday, which is slightly dubious.

For the flats, sampling was done in units of chutes, each chute shared by 10 to 20 households. It was rather difficult to estimate the occupancy rate. We cannot apply the response rate from the questionnaire survey, as it does not differentiate units that were unoccupied from those that were occupied but happened to have no one present when the students knocked on the door. In the number crunching process, the "no one at home" rate from bungalows and terraced housing was utilized in the estimation of occupancy of flats (76 percent). By observing from outside, one could see that 70 percent to 75 percent of the units had signs of being occupied (clothes hanging, etc.) so 76 percent should not be a far-fetched figure; but, if possible, a more accurate figure is desired.

Another issue with flats is that the waste is collected daily. Under such circumstance, the collection time of the sample waste matters. The usual collection time seemed to be around 11 a.m. while our sampling time was at around 7 a.m. We could have collected only 21 hours' worth of waste arisings instead of a full 24 hours. Repeated door-to-door weighing of waste for consecutive days can produce more accurate figures. There is also the possibility of using weighbridge figures and locational data (this could be gathered by attaching a GPS device to the vehicle) from the regular rounds of each collection vehicle.

The amount recycled is only based on the questionnaire survey, and a triangulation with data from collectors (monitor collectors activities in the sampling area) would enhance the reliability of the figures. As for socio-economic factors, the items asked in the questionnaire in this project were limited and, probably, the census block results from the 2010 census could be used for further analyses.

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Living in the Midst of the Mining Industry in the Philippines and Japan: Community and Civil Society Struggle to Respond

Bampen Chaiyarak

I. Introduction

This report is based on a 10-month field research undertaken in the Philippines and Japan. The research used participant observations and non-structured interviews to collect data. The report documents and compares the situations facing local communities in the two countries within the context of the extractive industry's development. The study was motivated by the researcher's interest in the Thai government's policies to promote mining activities, particularly in the gold mines in the Phetchabun Mountain Range and in the underground potash/potassium and rock salt mines in six provinces in northeastern Thailand.

The research aimed to:

(1) document impacts caused by the extractive industry on the natural environment and life in the communities, especially on the local people's health and rights

(2) learn from civil society campaigns that monitor mining activities in the Philippines and Japan

Research results will be shared as lessons in Thailand, especially with the communities facing the impacts of the extractive industry.

II. RESULTS

II-1. Case Studies from the Philippines
A. Gold Mines in Benguet

Colonial Occupation and Mining

Native peoples living in the mountainous areas of the Philippines used to pan gold that they bartered for rice and salt with the lowland residents. Records of gold trading between indigenous groups and the Chinese, Indians, and Muslims go back to 900 AD, when the Philippine islands were believed to constitute the kingdom of gold. This rumor attracted the Spanish Empire, which decided to occupy the Philippines in the 15th century. Indeed, the Spanish colonialists found the archipelago to be rich in mineral and other natural resources.

The Municipality of Itogon in Benguet Province of the Cordilleras,[1] island of Northern Luzon, experienced 300 years of battles against Spanish colonialists. Then, in the 18th century, the US began to intervene. While helping liberate the Philippines from Spain, the US initiated another form of occupation through its military and the mining industry. This was clear in the case of the gold mines in the Cordilleras, where Benguet Corporation, the oldest modern gold-mining company in the Philippines, was first formed in 1903.

Benguet Corporation contributed 2 percent to the country's GNP in 1903. It had full ownership of the surface and underground resources in Itogon. The company acquired these landholdings either by utilizing colonial laws, which allowed ancestral lands to be titled and gave Americans the same rights as Filipinos to exploit natural resources; or by taking over other mining companies. In 1902, the US passed the Philippine Bill, which required the registration of all lands by individuals. As this contradicted the Igorots'[2] concept of land use, only a few Igorots complied with the law.

The 1905 Mining Act later made all untitled Igorot lands available to outsiders, declaring as it did that all untitled properties could be occupied, purchased, and exploited by any Filipino or American citizen who wanted to invest in mining. Mines that had been owned and run by Cordillera communities for generations thereafter fell into the hands of US businessmen (Ismael et al. 1999, 30-31).

Impacts on Locals

Nope Agigid, aged 81 and a Kankanaeys tribe leader, recalled how during his ancestors' times, traditional ways were used to pan gold. Gold was then exchanged for salt, rice, and other goods that were available in the lowlands. After the Spanish occupation, miners began to dig tunnels which, alongside open-pit mining, became widespread under US rule. Open-pit mines affected local communities, forests, and the surface/underground water so that the communities did not consider it safe to build houses in certain areas, in fear of landslides.

With time, the indigenous peoples' gold panning and other techniques gradually became un-usable. Meanwhile, foreign companies claimed legal ownership of Benguet's natural resources. **Agigid** pointed out how, to this day, as in the past, "Companies think they own everything from the soil to each water drop, and leave behind toxic waste on our lands. The soil is damaged and unable to support our life. Nothing grows or lives in the water, in the toxic slag, or in the poisoned soil."

Communities Strike Back

These negative impacts of mining urged villagers to form the Itogon Inter-Barangay Alliance (IIBA). IIBA, which was supported by the Cordillera People's Alliance (CPA), was a network of 10 communities and more than 1,000 households that fought against a company seeking to expand open-pit mining on more than eight hectares. IIBA justified its claim over land to the government by citing the people's entitlement to their ancestral lands. They shared this information with media.

IIBA's most important tactic in resisting the mining company was to stage protests at the village entrances for several months. As a result, the company withdrew its expansion plan. However, it did expand to other provinces.

B. The Hallmark Nickel Mining Project

The Project

As a result of the government's liberalization policy and modern capitalism, the extractive industry in the Philippines has grown rapidly. One proof of this growth is Hallmark Nickel Mining in Barangay Macambal, located in the Municipality of Mati in Davao Oriental, Mindanao Island. BHP Billiton, the company operating Hallmark Nickel Mining, planned to develop nickel mines and processing plants in Barangay Macambal.

The Hallmark Project[3] was one of the 23 priority mining projects listed under the Philippine government's 2004 Minerals Action Plan. The plan aimed to revitalize the Philippine mining industry through foreign direct investments. The Hallmark Project, which is still at the exploration stage, is expected to begin operations in 2014 or 2015.

The project falls between two national protected areas: Pujada Bay and the Mount Hamiguitan Wildlife Sanctuary. If implemented, it will lead to irreversible losses for the area's biodiversity, particularly its endangered species such as the Philippine Eagle. Mining could also bring about soil erosion and landslides. Mining wastes and chemicals, in particular, can threaten the livelihood of 65,000 people living in communities that border Pujada Bay (Cafod 2008, 30).

Pujuda in the Bandaya dialect means "sweet honey". The bay is so-called because a small island in it is inhabited by many bees. People in their fifties and sixties who live along Pujada Bay at Sopsopon Purok in Macampal Barangay, also recall[4]: "When we were young and swam in the sea, fishes swarmed to nibble us, like we were bait."

The Land and the Indigenous Peoples

"Many indigenous tribes believe humans may not own land, because land is where the soul resides," so said **Roland F. Sayman**, a Catholic priest who researches on the cultural histories of various ethnic groups. He added, "Sopsopon was settled more than 50 years ago. But residents were not entitled to own land under the Land Act, because it had not occurred to them to occupy land. Most now hold one-half to two or three hectares of land for cultivation, but are without a title or deed to it".

In 1997, Philippine Congress passed the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA) after extensive campaigns. IPRA contained the significant provision of establishing processes to formally recognize the land rights of the indigenous peoples (IPs) through the introduction of the Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) and the establishment of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) (Muhi et al. 2009, 4).

May Grace Ellen S. Villanueva of the Legal Rights and Natural Resources Center (LRC) explained that even though IPRA had been issued, in practice, only 107 groups were able to submit their applications for CADT; and only 24 succeeded in obtaining a certification. **Villanueva** asserted, "Even though land is registered, it is just one sheet of paper. NCIP holds the authority to revoke it."

Community Situations

Maximo Lambo, the elderly head of the Lambo Family, recounts how his parents migrated to Sopsopan from a Visayan island. His family had inherited 20 hectares of land and a three-hectare *bangus* fishpond in the *purok*. Before the Lambo family settled in the community, there were villagers in the purok who had migrated from elsewhere.

Migrants reshaped the community and formed Sopsopon Purok 1, which now has about 60 households. Most residents now utilize the land for cultivation and fishing activities. They also hunt in the forest. **Lambo** said, "I need to live here forever; but now, in all of the Lambos' lands, the mining company wants to build plants. Only my family and two or three others have land titles. What about the other residents? Where will they go?"

Ragarane Mabato, the 42 year-old head of Sopsopon Purok 2, explained that, currently, 34 households live in the area. The men fish while the women take care of a small kitchen garden. Some families own two to three hectares of land, which they cultivate. Mabato is himself a fisherman. He has a boat and often fishes with his children and relatives.

According to Mabato, five persons can each get a daily income of Php150 to Php200 from fishing. But two years ago, the barangay captain contacted **Mabato** and asked him to work for BHP. For BHP he planted trees along the streets and received Php9,000 a month for two years.

According to the headman of Sopsopon Purok, most villagers farm and fish locally.

As for education in Purok 2, only 3 to 5 percent of the children graduate from primary school, which is located too far from the area. Further, only four of the villagers have actually gone to high school. Apparently, access to education is one of the many challenges faced by the community, alongside the lack of healthcare and sanitation services.

Some time back, when only a few families had a toilet, the barangay captain collected the villagers' petitions requesting the mining company for assistance. The company thereafter helped the villagers gain access to running water and built public toilets. The mining company also provided each household some mosquito nets and goats, the latter for their livelihood.

The Purok 2 headman concluded, "Some people in this community see mining as a source of employment and welfare."

Divides and Conflicts

Heracued Mulla Teurarta, a 40-year old tribal council member, recalled how the company conducted a survey in 2008. Soon after, the people in the community were divided into two factions: those in favor of mining and those who were not. **Teurarta** himself felt that mining helped improve the local economy. The tribal council and the company had, after all, signed a Memorandum of Understanding stipulating that the company would provide the community with various services, including health care and education. Teurarta further believed that the MOU would prevent the company from undertaking irresponsible mining practices. Since the government did not appear interested in community development, many of the people in the community, like Teurarta, saw BHP's assistance as something from which the locals could benefit, instead.

Vriton B. Aying VR. is a tribal chief in the Supreme Council of Datu Alimaong, an indigenous group established by the IPs themselves, to launch environmental protection campaigns. He said:

> We do not agree with logging and mining. The government does not consult us about its projects, although the IPs' laws state that government must respect and protect us. When it comes to farming, people here do not have to ask permission to till land. Only outsiders have to ask for permission. We are not pro-mining. We are trying to educate ourselves about mining. If mining activities start, they will have big impacts on the lives of people here. When the heavy rains fall, landslides may happen. They will affect the sea. Most people here are fisher folks. So, their livelihood will be negatively affected. As far as my knowledge would take me, IPs do not benefit from mining. We cannot work for mines. Owners of the company earn the most. They take advantage of the *lumads*.[5] If mining pushes through, I guess it is time for us to pack up and leave.
>
> The Alimaong are not in favor of mining. So, the government had to make up a tribal chieftain, who would sign the needed papers for mining operations. Our organization has not signed any

agreement with the company. The government protects the company. We, the *lumads*, the owners of the land, can no longer use it for our livelihood.

Roland Sayman said that the local people had indeed campaigned against mining. However, their power is limited. Locals face threats. The company has powerful support structures.

Peace in the community has deteriorated. Conflicts have surfaced. The local groups attempt to protect themselves.

IPRA aims to promote the rights of indigenous peoples. Indigenous leaders are selected following certain procedures. Each family is entitled to cast one vote during the elections to the Tribal Council.

The Council president chooses a tribal chieftain, for approval by the NCIP. The approval mechanism has resulted in the tribal organizations' being used as a tool for the benefit of interest groups. What followed were conflicts within the community. This was clear in the Hallmark Nickel Mining Project where the benefits from natural resources were taken away from the community and directed to those in power, through government mechanisms and policies.

II-2. Case Studies from Japan

A. Ashio Copper Pollution

The History of Ashio Mine

The Ashio Copper Mine and other mining activities played a key role in promoting capitalistic industrial development in Japan from the late 19th to the early 20th centuries, when copper exports rapidly increased. In 1875, Japan's total copper yield was approximately 2,300 tons, of which it exported 387 tons or 16.8 percent. Fifteen years later, in 1890, Japan produced 19,468 tons of which it exported 8,115 tons or 41.7 percent. In 1915, when copper production went up to 75,416 tons, exported copper rose to 59,579 tons or 79.0% (Sugai 1992, 2-3).

Masuro Sugai, a professor of Kokugakuin University, explained that copper mining was a way by which Japan's economy was modernized under the *zaibatsu* (a family-based conglomerate that controls major businesses including banking) system. Sumitomo, the

third largest *zaibatsu*, was active in copper mining. After Mitsui and Mitsubishi set up the Besshi Copper Mine in southern Japan, Furukawa, also one of the ten largest *zaibatsu* groups, founded Ashio Copper Mine. Copper mining was a base from which to develop chemical, heavy, and other industries. It was also considered a driving force in the expansion of Japan's economy.

Mining activities in Ashio started during the Edo period (between 1602 and 1868), and already then impacted the natural environment and local communities. Mines were thereafter abandoned. Almost ten years later, in 1877, Mr. Ichibei Furukawa purchased unused mines and launched new operations. He brought modern equipment and advanced mining technologies from the West to increase production capacity. By 1884, the company produced 2,308 tons, representing 26 percent of Japan's total copper production.

Pollution

The Ashio Copper Mine is located in the Ashio Mountain in Tochigi Prefecture. It is from this mountain where the 100-km Watarase River emanates. Watarase River is a tributary of the longer Tone River, which flows into Tokyo Bay. The Watarase and Tone rivers sustain the paddy fields in the vast plains between the two rivers.

Ashio has been acknowledged to be rich in minerals other than copper.[6] Mining activities thereat are believed to have improved transportation. Many people have settled in Ashio, leading it to grow very rapidly.

The operations of Ashio Mine have had serious impacts on farmers living in the area. These negative impacts were not confined to economic losses, but encompassed the deterioration of the people's health and, sometimes, death.

Copper excavation released sulfuric acid and arsenic. Separation processes discharged slag and other heavy metals (e.g., lead, bismuth, and zinc) into the environment. Sulfuric acid and heavy metals that came with smoke from the smelting furnaces caused *engai*, which affected forests. No pollution control measures were in place.

During the rainy season, villages in the valley faced flash floods and the floodwaters were contaminated

with slag and wastewater. Rice production declined to zero and the farmers became poor. Serious damage on farmlands and rivers were noted in 1885. Five years later, heavy floods again took place. Farmers in Tochigi and the other prefectures banded together to demand indemnification from government and the mining company. The history of Ashio became a cycle of environmental disasters and the mobilization of villagers who wished to call out for justice.

Tanaka Shozo's Struggles

When Tanaka Shozo became a member of the Diet of Japan representing Tochigi Prefecture, he saw the sufferings of the villagers of Ashio. Collecting data himself, he raised the issue during the Diet sessions. However, the government showed no interest in the matter until 1891, when Tanaka told government to take responsibility for the damage caused by Ashio Mining and to close it, citing provisions in the Constitution[7] (Sugai 1999, 7).

Consequently, the government assured Tanaka that it was surveying the damages and that the company would import modern tools to prevent further damage. Sensing that the government was not serious, Tanaka criticized, "If any government is insensitive to the sufferings of its people, the country is in decline." He then tried to raise the local farmers' awareness of their rights and attempted to promote grassroots democracy, believing that these would help find ways to solve Ashio's problems.

The copper mine continued to discharge toxic waste into the environment, prompting frustrated farmers to stage protests. However, the farmers' movements were silenced as Japan was then engaged in a war with China between 1894 and 1895. In 1896, two big floods occurred which spread the polluted water across the entire Kanto plain.

In March 1897, some 2,000 farmers marched to Tokyo to protest this incident. After one month, the number of protesters who joined the farmers' movements rose to 8,000—a development media continuously covered and reported. Concerned that Ashio had become a national issue, the government sent the police over so that more than 100 leaders who were accused of being traitors were arrested. The farmers' movements were crushed once again.

Meanwhile, Tanaka and his friends worked hard to rescue the arrested leaders, but their efforts were for naught. Government refused to heed their demands, prompting Tanaka to resign from the Diet. In 1901, he wrote a petition to the emperor, requesting him to close Ashio Mine. But Tanaka was arrested before he could give the emperor his letter.

Yet another devastating flood occurred in 1902, when Japan was busy getting ready to fight Russia. In its quest for national unity amidst threats of war, the government decided to build a 3,300-hectare reservoir to prevent floods. The real reason behind the project, however, was government's desire to prevent the contaminated water from flowing into Tokyo Bay. Plans were for the reservoir to be situated near Yanaka Village. However, 2,500 villagers and Tanaka rallied in protest of the project, with the villagers refusing to relocate.

In 1907, the government declared that the villagers had no legal rights to the land in the project site and demolished their houses. But the villagers chose to build temporary dwellings and stayed in the site for 10 more years. In 1918, even after Tanaka fell ill and died at the age of 72 in a small cottage in Yanaka, the villagers continued their protest activities.

Post-war Developments

According to **Mieji Itabashi**, president of the Ota Federation to Resolve the Mining Pollution of the Watarase River, Japan's loss in World War II proved to be a major turning point. For one, the need for the Japanese political system to be democratized grew more pronounced and the farmers' protest activities along the Watarase River, just like other pro-democracy activities, awakened the citizenry. Residents in and around Ashio, along with community leaders and politicians, joined the Ota Federation and succeeded in convincing the government to acknowledge the fact that wastewater from the Ashio Mine had damaged vast agricultural areas. **Itabashi said**, "It was a fight to protect ourselves. We went out to save our lives by fighting against mining. We have the right to live."

The subsequent fights between Ota Federation and Ashio Mine were threshed out mostly through negotiations within democratized systems. Members of the Diet who represented the area raised the issue of pollution caused by the mine with the government, as well.

Debates over Ashio started to focus on the technical aspects. It was agreed that soil with copper content higher than 125 ppm would be considered contaminated, and the company would be required to pay compensation. This copper content standard was less strict than the normal standard of 80 ppm, which could already damage agricultural products.

The villagers decided to accept a weaker criterion because litigations would take up too much time. Further, once an agreement was reached, the implementation of remedial measures, such as the removal of contaminated soil, began. This covered 330 hectares of land. Notwithstanding the implementation of remedial measures, accidents continued to occur. In 1958, one of 14 slag tailing ponds collapsed and toxic wastewater leaked into the rice paddies.

The mineral extraction in Ashio stopped in 1973 and the mine was eventually shut down that year. In 1974, the National Pollution Committee acknowledged the extent of Ashio's disaster and finally admitted that Furukawa had caused the contamination.

The company was ordered to pay ¥1.55 billion to compensate for damaged farmlands. Smelting plants continued to operate, however. Then, amidst increasing mineral imports, all activities in Ashio stopped in 1989.

The Aftermath

Sugai quoted part of Tanaka's speech during a session of the Diet of Japan thus: "The real civilization must not sell the mountain, must not damage the river, must not destroy a community, and must not kill people". He continued, "We cannot calculate the cost of the damage caused by the Ashio Mine. The loss of the natural and social environment lasts forever."

Immediately after the mine was closed, the company started to use mining pits to incinerate industrial waste. It also proposed that Ashio Mountain be made into a landfill for hazardous waste.

As the local communities strongly opposed this plan, it had to be withdrawn. Nothing happened in the next 20 years. Then, quite recently, the company started demolishing buildings and facilities at the mine site. Grass has begun to grow such that a green carpet now hides everything.

Tochigi Prefecture plans to register Ashio Mine as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. But the residents of lower Watarase, who still experience the repercussions of soil contamination, oppose the idea. They are fearful that the company, which they believe to have committed a crime, would be honored.

Given the prolonged economic standstill, however, more people now hope that Ashio Mine, if registered as a heritage site, would boost tourism. Several people have recommended that the entire Watarase basin be registered and that all mining facilities, including incinerators, smokestacks, and tunnels, be maintained to remind future generations of what happened in Ashio.

All throughout her life, **Akiko Ikino** has seen only denuded mountains. When she was much younger, she had wondered why she could see no trees in Ashio's mountains. The same question occurred to many other Ashio residents who have since formed a group to plant trees in Ashio. Many others have joined them. Even schoolchildren now grow tress, while government offices have begun to cooperate. Twenty-five years after the closure of the mine, the government and civil society are finally starting to work together to restore Ashio. The care and concern both sectors share for people and the environment point to a better future for Ashio. Nobody should be allowed to destroy it again.

B. Toroku Arsenic Mining

The Origin of Toroku

Toroku is a small village in Miyazaki Prefecture in Kyushu Island. It is located in a valley of Furosobo Mountain, about 1,633 meters above sea level. Toroku River starts from the north end of the mountain and runs through the village. **Kazuyuki Kawahara**, an independent writer who had published several books on Toroku, testified that strong community ties existed in the village in the past.

The Japanese agriculture production system is labor-intensive. In contemporary Toroku, 105 people are dispersed across 34 households, most of them individuals in their sixties and beyond. According to them, Toroku originated in the following manner: "There once lived a famous samurai named Tadanobu Sato. He was killed in a battle; but his son, Dogen Sato,

fled to Kyushu. Dogen's descendants built Toroku. Many Toroku villagers have the surname of Sato or Santo."

Tsuru Sato is a 70-year old descendant of a Buddhist leader. Her parents taught her to worship Amida Buddha and to live a Buddhist life. Every morning, **Sato** prepares rice and tea to offer as sacrifice and says a prayer, which goes, "Na ma Amida Buddha" ("I worship Amida Buddha").

Sato's grandmother had told her about the strength of Wakokai, a Buddhist organization. Established in 1890, Wakokai aimed to maintain peace in the community. For example, when a theft occurred, the owner of the stolen goods would notify Wakokai. Members would then help locate the thief.

Wakokai also functioned as a community bank. Its members grew cedar trees, sold them, and established a fund using the revenue from the sale of the trees. The members could borrow money from this fund without interest.

Arsenic Poisoning

Tsuru Sato shared a story of her childhood:

> I remember well when I was only five. Takeko was my neighbor. After we played together in a mineral incinerator, she returned home and suddenly got sick. The following morning, her mother carried Takeko on her back and ran to the hospital. In the evening of the same day, the mother carried Takeko on her back to return home, but the girl was no longer breathing.

Takeko was **Sato's** close friend. That day when they played near the incinerator, burned ashes fell all over their bodies. When Takeko got back home, her mother scolded her because she looked so dirty and scrubbed the ashes off her body under the shower. However, Takeko had developed an allergy. She grew very feverish and died.

Strange incidents like this started to occur more frequently in Toroku after an ore-smelting furnace was built on the hillside. Records show that a family named Nobeoka had begun to mine silver in Toroku in 1600 and continued to do so until the 19th century. Other minerals, such as zinc and copper, were also excavated and delivered to smelt.

Mining operations became less active once the minerals were exhausted. In 1920, Nobeoka decided to invite outsiders to invest in the construction of tunnels and to excavate arsenopyrite for the production of arsenious acid. Arsenious acid was a component of insecticide, which was highly in demand in Japan that was then shifting to large-scale agriculture. For their part, the Germans were using arsenic to produce chemical weapons during World War II. Eventually, when the Germans ceased to produce arsenopyrite, Japan became a major arsenopyrite-producing country.[8]

Workers hammered ores into small pieces and molded them with their bare hands before taking them to burn in a kiln. The kiln was designed to filter out arsenious acid. Kilns also produced smoke and ashes containing arsenic. Workers swept the ashes into the Toroku River.

Around that period, villages in and around Toroku were developing a canal system so that water from Toroku River could be used for rice cultivation. The arsenic-contaminated water entered the small irrigation canals in the local communities.

Toroku villagers started to notice changes in the environment after arsenopyrite was produced and burned in kilns. Trees died, wild bees disappeared, mushrooms no longer grew, bamboo shoots turned red, and livestock died mysteriously. All these events caught the attention of a veterinarian, who explored Toroku and performed an autopsy on the dead cows in 1925. His investigation showed that environmental conditions had deteriorated.

The Asia Arsenic Network (AAN 2006, 4) documented the case of Kiemon Sato's family that lived only 100m from a kiln. All seven members suffered similar symptoms, including blackened skin and bad coughs. Five members died between 1930 and 1931. Another died in 1937, and yet another in 1951, all of them still rather young.

The Villagers' Voices Ignored

According to **Komoto Santo**, a 90-year old Toroku resident who continues to suffer from the side effects of smoke and ashes containing arsenic, a village chief took parts of dead animals in bottles to the Miyazaki Prefectural Office and requested that they be analyzed. The officials refused, however, saying that the bottles had not been properly sealed. Miyazaki Prefecture also ignored the veterinarian's survey.

Then in 1941, Wakokai asked the mining company to stop producing arsenious acid. Wakokai also sent representatives to the Department of Mining in Fukuoka. At a meeting, officials told the Wakokai members, "Underground resources are important to the nation. In wartime, two or three villages could be sacrificed to protect the mining industry."

While arsenic production was temporarily stopped in 1941, the company announced that a new kiln would be built in 1951. Wakokai decided to stage a protest. However, some leaders from the company persuaded the villagers to agree to the construction in exchange for compensation. Most who did were men; the women rejected the exchange and felt frustrated with the men.

A new kiln was completed in 1955. Mushrooms and bees started to disappear again. The Toroku Mine was eventually shut down in 1962, but the villagers had to live with the toxic smoke and ashes for 40 years more. Nobody took responsibility for the damage.

A Bitter Victory

A primary school teacher, **Masatake Saito**, conducted a survey in Toroku. He interviewed 46 households constituting about 90 percent of Toroku residents and found out that between 1913 and 1917, or a mere four years, some 92 people, whose ages averaged 39, had died. Seventy-four of the 250 villagers had respiratory and digestive diseases, urinary system malfunctions, and neuropathy.

Saito also made a map to show how destructive mining had been. His detailed map identified the location of the mines, the kilns, and the houses which had the names of the dead villagers, along with the symptoms believed to have led to their deaths. Health experts recognized **Saito's** work, thereby helping the Toroku case gain public attention.

Since the mine had already been closed for nine years when the Toroku case became well known to society at large, it was difficult to establish a clear link between the massive pollution in the area and the mining activities. The Experts' Committee of Social and Medical Surveys on Toroku recommended that dust accumulated on the beams and ceilings of the villagers' houses be collected and analyzed. In some samples, the arsenic concentration turned out to be as high as 8,000mg/kg. The Committee also estimated the plants' conditions by measuring the ring bands of the cedar trees. It was discovered that the trees had not grown well when the mine was operating.

In 1972, Miyazaki Prefecture accepted the fact that the victims who suffered from a black-spot skin disease had been subjected to chronic arsenic poisoning. At the time, they still had not checked if the patients' internal organs were similarly affected.

In 1973, the Ministry of Environment certified that Toroku was an area with serious industrial pollution. Miyazaki Prefecture assumed the role of mediator between the affected villagers and the company as negotiations for compensation proceeded. The patients were not happy with the prefecture and the company's judgment, as their evaluation was based solely on the patients' external wounds and/or other visible damages.

A group of Toroku women therefore organized an alternative movement to criticize the government for not acknowledging anything but external symptoms. The victims themselves established the Association of Toroku Arsenic Pollution Victims to demand redress for human rights violations. Some patients filed a court case to demand compensation. All these activities were widely supported by the Japanese public. The Association to Support the Toroku and Matsuo[9] Mining Pollution Victims was also established.

The victims won the case at both the primary and appeals courts, which ordered the company to pay compensation. In 1990, the Supreme Court also directed the company to compensate victims under the Pollution-Related Damage Compensation Law (PRDCL). These were decided victories, except that by then, too many patients had already passed away without their dignity restored.

It is worth mentioning that PRDCL requires any company which has caused environmental damage to pay the cost of living and medical expenses of the victims. However, the Ministry of Environment and Miyazaki Prefecture set a limit to the compensation by requiring the Toroku victims to submit various medical documents. In February 2006, the government certified 173 patients (85 male and 88 female) as being entitled to compensation. Of this number, 118 (64 male and 54 female) have passed away.

The Toroku case illustrates how Japan's industrialization has led to conflicts between the state-government, the capitalist business sector, and local communities, particularly with regard to the extraction of mineral resources. It is reassuring to know that AAN has exerted much effort to communicate lessons from Toroku to other countries, while continuing to assist the Toroku and Matsuo victims.

AAN has researched and shared its experiences across Asia, especially in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Mongolia. It has also conducted research in communities that are encountering arsenic poisoning from abandoned mines in Ronpiboon, Nakhon-Si-Thammarat in Thailand.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The four case studies show how the extractive industry can completely change conditions surrounding local communities. In the Philippines, a project, whether already implemented or not, marginalizes indigenous communities and violates their rights over ancestral land and natural resources. In Japan, the mining sector was developed to build a strong industrialized economy; but, in the process, the rights of the communities to live and work in healthy environments were given much less priority vis-à-vis the national agenda.

In the Philippines, whether in the past or currently, to represent the power held by the squeeze driving the native community were established before the Philippines state. They were molested drive to be the marginalized people of their own ancestors' lands without any rights of any land and natural resources, government gave the permit to the mining concession cause to infringement on there society and environment that is conducive to healthy.

Philippine civil society groups and the affected communities themselves have campaigned against mining activities through legal systems and political channels. They hope to change the power structure so that the rights of the indigenous communities will be protected.

However, laws often serve only the powerful. Many mining projects still proceed in the Philippines, where the Constitution defines the extractive industry as a "supreme enactment of the country."

As in the past, western corporations continue to enter the country to satisfy their inflated demands and consumption of natural resources. They occupy the land of the local communities and manipulate the power structure so that they can operate above the law. They drive indigenous peoples out of their ancestral lands and alienate them from the local culture and ecology.

In the case of Japan, mining has been defined and developed by the Japanese capital that brought technology from the west in its aim to improve the economy and build up Japan as a capitalist nation with administrative and military power in the pre-war era, able to utilize force to confront western imperialist powers. Mining also led Japan to war as an imperialist nation.

Communities in Japan appear to have taken longer to communicate their concerns to the general public. Local communities, especially those in the remote areas, were ignored for a very long time.

It is important for the younger generations to learn more about their situation. Currently, only a few mines operate in Japan, making it necessary for

Japan to import massive natural resources from Third World countries.

Japan consumes 1.4 million tons of copper a year. This is almost twice as much as the total amount of copper produced during the 400 years of operation of the Ashio Mine (approximately 830,000 tons).

Japan's high mineral consumption can actually be causing pollution in other countries where the governments are usually pro-mining and are insensitive to the conditions of the environment and the local communities. This situation is reminiscent of that which the villagers in Ashio and Toroku in Japan experienced. Japan needs to reform itself so that it will become less dependent on imported natural resources.

In summary, the communities where facing extractive industry is turning to differ with complete reversal. The local people in the two countries have become victims of development in same condition. It is policy ready to herd them to the edge of development even if any communities stand up to fight with mining with many channels, but only engage a bit in negotiation, and entering into channels for power to make changing.

NOTES

[1] The Cordillera is home to several native groups. It covers two-thirds of Luzon, or six provinces including Benguet. The Cordillera is the richest mineral reserve in the Philippines (Ismael et al. 1999, 30).

[2] Igorots are the indigenous peoples in Itogon, which is located in Benguet Province of the Cordilleras.

[3] The project comprises seven exploration permits covering 13,500 hectares. BHP Billiton will operate mines and nickel-processing plants for 30 years (Cafod 2008, 12-13).

[4] A *purok* is a community comparable to a village (Moo *baan*); whereas a *barangay* is a local government unit equivalent to a sub-district (*Taambon*) in Thailand.

[5] The *lumad* is a native belonging to the indigenous groups, which consist of several tribes. They are well known in Mindanao Island.

[6] More than 40 types of minerals were found in Ashio, among them chalcopyrite and iron sulfide (AshioGuide Making Committee 2007, 5).

[7] "When mining or test mining harms public interest, the agriculture and business ministers may cancel permission for that mine," quoted from the Meiji Constitution and provided for in the ordinance on mining (Sugai 1999, 7).

[8] Japanese arsenious acid was mostly produced in Ashio before World War II. Copper is 0.8% to 2% arsenopyrite.

[9] Matsuo is another district near Toroku that was also affected by arsenic mining.

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The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Resource Management: Comparative Study of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines and Indonesia

Wiwat Tamee

Introduction

Conflicts between indigenous peoples and States and/ or transnational enterprises over natural resources take place worldwide, and Southeast Asia is no exception. This paper examines examples of such conflicts in the Philippines and Indonesia.[1] Both countries are home to many indigenous groups whose areas of residence often encompass natural resources such as forests, water sources, seas and valuable minerals.

The Philippines and Indonesia have seen longstanding battles over the seizure of natural resources, dating from the colonial era to the present. In both countries such conflicts increased after independence. This is explained by the fact that many developing countries seek to exploit natural resources with the aim of increasing economic growth under the global market system. This in turn encourages foreign investment in natural resource exploitation, often in areas that are home to indigenous people. The result of such exploitation has profound effects on indigenous peoples' culture and belief systems, as well as on their self-reliance and on the sustainability of their ways of life.

State-led resource exploitation has led to increased vulnerability for indigenous peoples, and the rapid loss of their ability to manage the resources of their own areas, leading to new and increasingly complex problems. It has resulted in increased poverty, the migration of young generations for labor in towns and cities, and even to deaths by suicide and/or assassination. The large-scale destruction of traditional culture causes moral tension and breakdown as traditional societies can often no longer apply local wisdom to manage natural resources or to tackle problems, as they were able to do in the past.

Areas of Study

Two areas in the Philippines were studied. The first was a cluster of *sopsopon* villages (village clusters) that included five communities and seven indigenous tribes, in Mati city, Davao Oriental province, Mindanao.[2] The villages are located in coastal and conservation forest areas. Approximately 95 percent of the indigenous population resides on land plots possessed today by five landlords. The land in the area, which is seen by the indigenous population as part of their ancestral domains, was first surveyed around 60 years ago. In 2011, the land was due to be further opened up to nickel and cobalt mining by the AMCOR and BHP Billiton companies from Australia. The second area studied in the Philippines was Baguio city, in Benguet province, in the Condillera region. Two sites were examined, the Balatoc Gold Mines in Itogon and the Altamoc *barangay* (municipality). Gold mines have operated in the area since 1903 and are located on the ancestral domain lands of the Ibaloi and Kankanaey indigenous peoples.

In Indonesia, the main area of study was Central Kalimantan Province. In 2007 it had a population of 1.9 million, of whom around 30 percent was made up of the Dayak, the original pioneers of the region.[3]

Objectives

The research was conducted over a period of twelve months in 2009 and 2010. Its objectives were to study:

1. The extent to which indigenous groups could access rights to natural resource management

2. The conditions and factors, external and internal, of indigenous peoples' movements that facilitate or obstruct their access to rights to natural resource management

3. Impacts and effects on the ways of life of indigenous peoples, including society, culture, economy and politics.

Methodology

A qualitative approach was taken and the conceptual framework was developed at the beginning of the project by the researcher, who is a member of a tribal group in Thailand. The main theoretical focus

centered on the concept of indigenous peoples' access to rights to resource management. Diverse methods of data-gathering were used, i.e. participatory and non-participatory observations, formal and informal interviews, and focus groups.

Results and Findings

Context

Access to rights to resource management' includes issues such as access to possession, management and utilization of natural resources. Resources are defined as, for example, forest areas owned by tribes for generations or 'the ancestor domain' (in the Philippines) or 'customary land' (in Indonesia). Resources include both residential and arable areas in geographical areas such as lands, seas, islands, swamps, brooks, lakes, and areas containing mineral sources. The paper proposes that indigenous peoples are fully entitled to the right to freely manage and utilize these resources in accordance with their own traditional and customary ways of life, since they were the pioneers of the areas for long periods before the establishment of the nation-state.

The Philippines was colonized for over four centuries. From 1565 to 1898, it was ruled by Spain. During this period all natural resources, including forests, gold, silver, iron and nickel, were controlled by Spain. Traditional feudal land management systems were altered as vast plots of land were transformed into rice paddy fields, coffee bean plantations, tobacco fields and coconut orchards owned by Spain and by members of the local elite. This system continued during the period of American colonization (1898 to 1946) and after independence. By 2011, property ownership continued to devolve to the descendants of such groups. For example in Mati city, Davao Oriental province, Mindanao, huge tracts of land were possessed by a single landlord. Indigenous peoples had no rights to possession of the same lands on which they resided. They could be expelled from the land at any time.

In the period of colonization by the United States, great quantities of natural resources were extracted and consumed to support the growth of the economy under the liberal-capitalist system. Smelting operations were initiated countrywide, mostly in areas inhabited by indigenous peoples such as the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), resulting in battles over the areas' natural resources. Several minorities convened to urge for their rights and for the separation of lands. In the CAR, the Benguet Corporation began extracting mineral resources in 1903. In 2001, extraction continued over a total land area of more than 5,400 hectares. In 2000, a number of private foreign enterprises were waiting for approval of concessions to operate more than 126 new mines in CAR, encompassing lands comprising around 711,965 hectares. The forests of CAR were either conserved or under concessions to private foreign enterprises. Indigenous peoples could not access their right to resource management and their lives were threatened with insecurity.

Indonesia was colonized by The Netherlands from 1592 to 1954. Dutch-controlled territories included Kalimantan where the Dayak people have lived for more than 3,000 years. Kalimantan is a site of significant natural resources, including timber, rattan and various kinds of plants, gold, and coal. After independence in 1945, the Indonesian government initially focused on policies dealing with poverty eradication. In 1967, under the rule of President Soeharto, there was an increased focus on developing the national economy to bring it more into line with global capitalism and free trade. Laws were amended to facilitate investments by foreign business people. New policies promoted enterprises that utilized forest resources. The State also embraced the concept of the Green Revolution for national development. This saw changes from traditional modes of production involving small plots of land worked by households, to a focus on large plots managed by the State. Plantations of mono-crops such as palm and banana trees became widespread. In Kalimantan such plots were operated by private concessionaires and caused the rapid destruction of natural forest resources and changes to possession or rights over land use to private foreign enterprises.

The rights of indigenous peoples were formally acknowledged in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia and were additionally recognized in a constitutional amendment in 1992 to Articles 18B and 28I. In reality however the State has not respected or acted in compliance with the constitution.

In 1994, the Indonesian government announced the formation of a National Park on 1.4 million hectares of lands of indigenous peoples, covering areas of Saba Sarawak West and East Kalimantan. A number of indigenous Dayak were relocated or were controlled

with a prohibition on trespass. Recently, it was reported that a total of 95 companies hold concessions for forest cutting and the growing of oil palms on five million hectares of the ancestral domains of the Dayak in Central Kalimantan.

Internal Conditions of Indigenous Peoples and External Conditions that may facilitate or obstruct their movements

Internal conditions of indigenous peoples

Legitimacy

A key internal factor affecting indigenous people's access to their right to resource management is the issue of legitimacy. Indigenous peoples hold that their legitimacy is evident in their history of pioneering and developing residential and arable areas of lands long before the establishment of the nation-state. The Dayak tribe in Kalimantan contends that its members are the 'first nation' of the Kalimantan and Borneo islands. The Dayak state that they have lived for 3,000 years in the four provinces of Kalimantan island, before their lands fell into the possession of Indonesia after World War II. After independence, the Government of Indonesia adopted the concept of the status and rights of indigenous peoples. These rights were acknowledged in the 1945 Constitution, but have been inadequately or not enacted since.

In the Philippines, tribes have pioneered, developed and resided in Baguio-Benguet province, Cordillera region, for several thousand years. The Filipino government accepts indigenous peoples' rights, as evidenced by the adoption and promulgation of legislation to entitle such rights, e.g. in the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). The government has also set up systems for negotiations in the case of land disputes, and areas of affirmative action for indigenous peoples. However, in the cluster of villages in Mati city, Davao Oriental, indigenous people relocated from the Visaya Islands 60 years ago and who have since been dwelling on plots of lands owned by landlords, remain unable to negotiate for their legitimate rights and can be evicted any time.

Education and local wisdom of indigenous peoples

In the Philippines study areas, most of the indigenous peoples in Baguio-Benguet province are well educated both in the Tagalog (Filipino) and English languages, particularly leaders and those who are involved in Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). They have high levels of English literacy and can therefore participate in global networks, access information worldwide, analyze information, conduct negotiations with governments and investors, and make informed decisions on the direction of their movement. However, the indigenous peoples from the village cluster in Mati city have lower levels of literacy and education. Their lack of English language literacy impacts on their power to make informed decisions and to conduct negotiations. They have been unsuccessful in the negotiation of their rights, which has resulted in forced relocation in some instances.

In Central Kalimantan, Indonesia, most indigenous people receive school education but are not able to communicate in English, including some who work in NGOs. This is an obstacle when they need to communicate in the international arena to articulate their rights and strategies.

Data Collection

A systematic database of information and evidence can help indigenous peoples to collect and elaborate historical evidence. Databases can enable indigenous communities to affirm their ownership and status as pioneering developers on their residential and arable areas.

In Baguio-Benguet province, several indigenous peoples' organizations have effective database systems. The Tebtabba Foundation has compiled a database of tribes in CAR and worldwide through the use of research archives, operational reports, books and photos. Information can be accessed online and can be used to support the development of other organizations and networks of indigenous peoples. The rights of indigenous peoples as stipulated in the 1987 Constitution and the 1997 IPRA were the result of negotiations backed up with strong supportive information and database evidence.

In Central Kalimantan, there are some indigenous peoples' organizations explicitly working on developing database systems, but most of the information has been produced by foreign researchers and NGOs. Whilst there are more than 200 organizations there is no systematic data management system and most related websites are in the Bahasa Indonesia language, which limits the use of the information at the international level.

Leaders or decision makers

The knowledge and capacities of key leaders and decision-makers can assist in the mobilization of indigenous peoples towards the achieving of a sustainable existence. In Baguio-Benguet province, male and female leaders of indigenous peoples are trained and organized by NGOs with a focus on capacity-building. A group of leaders from the Altamoc UCAB Barangay, has, for example, led a movement to protect a symbolic but limited plot of their land, (only 7.5 hectares), from seizure by outsiders. In the village cluster in Mati city, there has been no clear leadership to mobilize the struggling movement, and when their lands were trespassed upon in September 2002 by private enterprises for mine operations, the residents surrendered to relocation, without prior notification and preparation.

In Central Kalimantan, Tjilik Riwut, a Dayak leader, was respected by the Indonesian government as a hero of the state and of the tribe, and was appointed as the first provincial governor n 1975. In 2010 three out of the four provinces of Kalimantan island had Dayak governors. In Central Kalimantan, all provincial governors were Dayaks and 17 of 32 members of the provincial council belonged to the Dayak tribe. The official positions of such leaders, however, put them at a distance from independent indigenous groups and organizations. They were often seen as powerless to challenge, or negotiate with the state and with influential businessmen, resulting in continued abuse of the indigenous population by various groups.

Groups and networks

Strong networks can support self-learning processes, increase opportunities and powers of negotiation and enhance self-dependency. In the CAR, indigenous peoples formed the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) network with members from six provinces, including Baguio-Benguet province, in 1984. The network has achieved changes in laws and policies with respect to indigenous peoples. However there is no group or network working on indigenous rights or protection schemes in the Mati city village cluster.

In Indonesia, indigenous peoples formed the Indigenous People's Alliance of the Archipelago (AMAN) in 1999. This movement now consists of 1,217 tribal communities. Its objectives are to increase and ensure their human dignity, construct their social,

economic and political sovereignties, build the capacities of tribes in the development of local wisdom for the protection and preservation of natural resources, develop the foundations of democracy and develop and prepare the new generation to inherit the movement. Currently, this network plays an important role in the movement to protect rights at the level of community, province and nation. However, the movement is limited to protecting and engaging only members of the network.

Experience of movements

The process of collective struggle at both the national and international level is important to provide a learning process, to reshape new knowledge for future directions, to develop efficient strategies and reduce mistakes.

The indigenous peoples residing in areas of the Baguil-Banguet mine in the Philippines experienced a tenacious three-year struggle starting in 2000 against the state and private enterprise which saw them protect 7.5 hectares of their ancestral domain. This was seen as an important symbolic victory and an inspiration for futures struggle through networks and links. Indigenous peoples from the village cluster in Mati city have not engaged in collective struggle and have not been able to develop a strategic movement to protect their own domain.

In Central Kalimantan, only indigenous village members of AMAN have experienced the struggle process to protect their customary lands. Those who are not members of AMAN do not have experience with this process and when faced with land seizure, often end up with the surrender and loss of their arable and residential areas.

External conditions and factors

Global Trends

The current international concern around climate change and global warming has seen western developed countries proposing global policies to protect the earth from global warming. The United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Program (UN-REDD), for example, was founded in September 2008 in order to motivate developing countries to reduce deforestation and to grow new

forests to replace deforestation. A number of pilot projects were launched in pilot countries and thirteen partner countries across Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America, including Indonesia and the Philippines.

The United Nations announced the Decade of Indigenous Peoples from 2005-2014 and marked August 9 of every year as Indigenous Peoples Day. On September 13, 2007, the United Nations adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. These initiatives around indigenous peoples were great achievements with significant potential for the promotion and protection of rights. Indigenous peoples in Indonesia and the Philippines can use these progressive initiatives to negotiate with their governments and propose policy changes that promote the development of indigenous peoples and the creation of mechanisms to protect their rights.

Policies/ laws/ regulations of the State

Policies and laws are very significant in the facilitation or obstruction of accessibility of rights to natural resource management of indigenous peoples. In the Philippines, there are several constitutional safeguards protecting the rights of indigenous peoples, e.g. the 1987 Constitution, Section 22 Article II, promotion of the rights of cultural groups; Section 5 Article XII, protection of indigenous ancestral domain lands; Section 1 Article XIII, protection of rights eradication of discrimination; and Section 17 Article XIV, protection of rights on preservation and development of indigenous cultures. In addition, the government promulgated the 1997 IPRA, with entitlements on community rights, covering orchards, forests, water sources, seas, and collective propriety rights in relation to islands, reefs and some parts of seas.

According to the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia, and amendments in 1992 to Section 18B and 28I, the government respects and accepts the rights of indigenous peoples with their customary laws, traditions and cultures. In 2008, a proposed master plan entitled "the Regional Regulation of Central Kalimantan Province Number 16, Year 2008" stipulated that Central Kalimantan province would enhance the ways of life, traditions, customary practices and culture relating to systems of management and utilization of arable lands, forest and rivers of the Dayak tribe. The plan also stipulated, however, that the Dayak peoples were only allowed to utilize lands and forest within a five-kilometer radius from river banks to the forest zone for their livelihoods. If tribes people trespassed further into the forest, they would be committing an offence against forest laws. The indigenous peoples felt that the master plan deprived them of their rights and limited their rights. They refused to accept it, and it did not come into force.

Role of non-government organizations

In Baguio-Benguet province NGOs are working on local and international issues to enhance and promote the organizations and networks of indigenous peoples. The NGOs aim to strengthen and build the capacity of indigenous peoples' organizations with training programs, workshops and campaigns. For example, the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) works as a secretariat coordinating networks in six provinces, and the influential Tebtebba Foundation campaigns for the rights of indigenous peoples in international platforms and has the best database on indigenous peoples in the region. (Its executive director, Ms. Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, was the chairperson and committee member of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) in 2007.) Various other organizations also work on the rights of indigenous peoples and on legal affairs concerning the tribes.

In Indonesia, there is only one organization, AMAN, working on campaigns for indigenous rights. It has limited capacity and does not reach the estimated population of 40 million tribal people in the country. While there are almost 200 local NGOs, many of them in Central Kalimantan province, they all work on diverse issues and have not been able to form a network or mobilize a movement.

Human Rights Mechanisms and policies

International human rights mechanisms can benefit indigenous peoples in relation to filing petitions and reporting human rights violations.

Under the United Nations, there are two core mechanisms for protection and promotion of indigenous peoples' rights; the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) and the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In addition, the Special Rapporteur on Indigenous

Peoples investigates violations against indigenous peoples. The UN designated 1994-2004 and 2005-2015 as Decades of Indigenous Peoples, to promote and protect indigenous peoples' rights in the world. On September 13, 2007, the UN adopted and announced the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). However there is wide concern about the application and accessibility of these mechanisms at the national and local levels.

There are also regional networks of indigenous peoples such as the Asia Indigenous Peoples' Pact (AIPP) and Solidarity for Asian People's Advocacy (SAPA). These organizations were established as a result of conventions of indigenous peoples' NGOs with the mandate to link networks of indigenous peoples, jointly investigate human rights violations of indigenous peoples, stimulate the establishment of the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Human Rights Mechanism (currently, this is the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) to monitor and follow-up human rights violation cases and develop a system of information on human rights.

Media and Information

The provision of news and information can affect ideas and attitudes within society, influence changes in policies and mobilize ideas and action on human rights. NGO workers in the Philippines are well educated in English, so they can articulate their ideas to a wide spectrum of media including in the international arena. In Indonesia, official communication is conducted in the Bahasa language. There is limited communication through the English language with the international arena. The Dayak tribe in Central and West Kalimantan has been successful using different forms of communication, e.g. local newspapers and television, to campaign on their concerns and activities at the local level. New media such as websites, web-based video broadcasts and email have considerable potential to help indigenous peoples to link up with Asian and global networks.

Impacts on Tribal Ways of Life on the aspects of society, culture and economy

Indigenous peoples' potential to access their rights to resource management has profound affects on their society, culture, economy and politics. Such effects have been felt in different ways in different circumstances and time periods, as outlined briefly below.

Pre-Colonial

- Before the colonial period, indigenous peoples in the Philippines and Indonesia were respected as owners of ancestral domains where they pioneered and developed residential and arable areas. Prior to the establishment of nation states and the arrival of alien investors, indigenous peoples pursued sustainable lifestyles in mountainous areas, forests, riverbanks, and coastal areas, including islands. Natural resources were respected, preserved and retained for future generations. Modes of production sustained household consumption, with little focus on trade, selling, cash, interest, and other market phenomena. In the midst of adequate and abundant natural resources, indigenous peoples created art, culture, music, song and handicrafts.

Colonization

- Spain and the United States governed the Philippines for more than 400 years. The Netherlands ruled Indonesia for more than 300 years. (Japan controlled both countries for a short period of four years). Under Spanish rule, policies and regulations were introduced to facilitate capitalism and exploitation of natural resources. Timber, gold, silver and metal were heavily exploited and traded. A new system of land management put most lands in the hands of Spanish owners and local elites.

  During the period of colonization, indigenous peoples were forced to face and communicate with alien groups that arrived at their communities under different roles. Their longstanding battles for independence from the colonizers often ended in the death of family members, and defeat for their communities.

Independence

After independence in 1945 Indonesia was concerned to integrate all islets and islands with the mainland and to reshape a united Indonesia, including Kalimantan

Island. This caused the absolute loss of independence and freedom of the Dayak tribe. President Soeharto's policies under the influence of American technocrats focused on economic development within the liberal economic development paradigm, through financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These policies severely affected the Dayak tribe, resulting in the loss of their power to make decisions on the management and exploitation of natural resources. A 2007 report on investigations into human rights and the Dayak tribe found that at least five million tribes people in Kalimantan Island faced a crisis of economy, society and culture, due to proposed large-scale economic development projects.[4] The projects were likely to affect approximately 300,000 Dayak in the immediate future, since their arable and residential areas, forest and water sources were set to be seized, as occurred to tribes in Central Kalimantan. The report forecast that the Dayak would lose their culture and way of life, their social system would be fragile, and their human dignity would be destroyed since they would be forced into taking employment with companies and would fall into circles of debt.

After independence from Spain in 1898, the Philippines became a colony of the United States. This resulted in further cultural assimilation, more control of cultural identities, development of the economy, promotion of education, and the introduction of English as a major language. Many Filipino accepted and admired the cultural and development goals of the United States. A group of Filipino politicians even proposed that the Philippines become one of the states of the United States of America. Whilst there was no widespread resistance to U.S. colonization, groups of indigenous peoples convened as guerrilla bands and fought for control of their lands, with reportedly a great loss of life.

Under the U.S., there was a major drive to exploit and take over natural resources such as gold, silver, chromium, nickel, etc. For example the Benguet Corporation began operating the Balatoc Gold Mines in Itogon, Baguio-Benguet province, Cordillera region in 1903. The gold mines were located in the ancestral domains of the Ibaloi and the Kankanaey tribes, over an area of approximately 5,400 hectares. After the mines were in operation for a decade, local tribes convened and decided to struggle against the enterprises and relevant government authorities. In 2000, they won a symbolic victory when they were able to win ownership of 7.5 hectares. Meanwhile most of

their ancestral domains have been marred by mining activities. There have been severe landslides, contamination of water sources, and general air and water pollution that has resulted in the deaths of animals, plants and human beings.

Since 2000, private foreign enterprises were granted additional concessions for mine operations in nine areas covering 15,064 hectares in Mankayan, Tuba and Itogon in Benguet province. A further 125 mine operations were awaiting approval in the Cordillera Region, covering 711,965 hectares. This has resulted in the forced relocations of many tribes and human rights abuses of members during struggles to evict them from the concession areas.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The results of this study can be summarized as follows:

Right to Resource Management

Before the period of colonialism, indigenous peoples in the Philippines and Indonesia were fully able to access the right to manage and utilize resources in accordance with customary laws and practices. During the period of colonization, indigenous peoples were deprived of many of their rights to access management of those resources. The centralization of colonial state power over resource management and the exploitation of resources for profit caused vast over-consumption of resources, with accompanying rapid physical deterioration of lands. This approach conflicted with the ideologies and beliefs of indigenous peoples on resource management and utilization of resources on the basis of sufficiency, self-reliance and respect for nature. The conflict between the two ideologies resulted in the eventual loss of indigenous rights and to indigenous rights being forcibly reduced and subjugated to the powers of the newcomers.

After colonization state powers continued to perpetuate the central control of resources. In Indonesia the policies of central governance and liberal economics caused changes from the traditional modes of production from small plots of lands for sustainable household consumption to large plots managed by the state. Widespread plantation of mono-crops caused the rapid devastation of forests and changes in possession of lands to private foreign enterprises. Indigenous peoples were marginalized and expelled

from their ancestral domains and became persons living in poverty with severely limited access to land ownership and control of resources.

In the Philippines, after colonization the situation of natural resource accessibility for indigenous peoples remained severely limited as most of the productive natural resources (lands, forests, mineral resources, etc) continued to be possessed by foreign and domestic investors, politicians, churches and Spanish-Filipino elites. The indigenous peoples have become marginalized and poor after the seizure of their ancestral domains.

Conditions and Factors that may facilitate or obstruct the movements

Positive factors that may improve indigenous peoples' access to resource management include internal factors such as the legitimacy of indigenous people's history of pioneering and development of land and resources, and the production of effective databases and information to provide evidence for that legitimacy. The experience of movement-building and network development at the regional and international level can also improve access to resources. External factors which can positively affect indigenous rights include a range of international legal mechanisms focused on indigenous rights, human rights and environment protection, as well as national policy and legislation. The use of media and communication also provides an opportunity for movement building and awareness aimed at challenging the attitudes of society and influencing policy change.

Impacts on the aspects of society, culture and economy

Due to the seizure of their power to manage resources over many generations, indigenous peoples have suffered losses in relation their societies, cultures and economies. The influence of free market ideologies and systems destroys local wisdoms and networks of relationships among groups of indigenous peoples. The indigenous peoples eventually end up being marginalized and facing new problems, including ineffective resource utilization; seizure and contests over limited remaining resources; poverty; commission of suicide; emigration and involuntary displacement; and tensions and stress due to the destruction of local culture. Consequently the current generation of indigenous peoples is losing the old wisdoms regarding dispute management and is not able to deal with potential problems as earlier generations could.

Recommendations

Recommendations towards Directions of Dispute Resettlement of Rights of Indigenous Peoples

In order to achieve resolutions to disputes, reduce conflicts and preserve natural resources for collective usage in the long run, a number of recommendations are proposed as follows:

1. The governments of the Philippines and Indonesia shall respect the rights and human dignity of indigenous peoples by implementation of and vigorous compliance with their constitutions and laws regarding indigenous peoples' rights and their ratified international human rights treaties.

2. The governments of the Philippines and Indonesia shall review, cancel and slow down forest concessions for large palm plantations, cancel the mine concessions of transnational private companies on ancestral domains of indigenous peoples; cancel and slow down the announcement and demarcation of conservation areas in ancestral domains of indigenous peoples, and review all mega-projects affecting the ways of life of indigenous peoples, the environment and biodiversity. The implementation of projects, if any, shall be with respect to indigenous peoples' rights with due and fair consultations and their participation on decision-making process.

3. Major donors, e.g. the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc shall stop supporting any projects that are a risk for human rights violations against indigenous peoples.

4. The indigenous peoples in the Philippines and Indonesia shall convene and establish linkages that foster unity and cohesion among struggling movements.

NOTES

[1] There are 102 tribes comprising approximately 12 million indigenous people residing in the Philippines. In Indonesia there are more than 500 tribes who make up approximately 40-100 million indigenous people.

[2] The cluster of villages consists of Sopsopon 1 and 2, Wagum, Gasnihan, Magum and Gudmunan. The seven tribes include: Mandayan (85%); Calagan (5%); Maubo (2%); Mansabe (2%); Mangguanoon (2%); Maneenua (2%) and Tagacaulo (2%).

[3] The 1.9 million indigenous population includes the following groups; Banjarese (24%); Javanese (18%); Ngaju (18%); Dayak Sampit (10%); and Bakumpai (8%). For more information on the Dayak, see Avé, J. B. (1972). "Kalimantan Dyaks." In *Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia*, edited by Frank M. LeBar. Vol. 1, *Indonesia, Andaman Islands, and Madagascar*, 185-187. New Haven: HRAF Press.

[4] Request for Consideration of the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Kalimantan, Indonesia, under the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination's Urgent Action and Early Warning Procedures Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Seventy-First Session 30 July - 18 August 2007

Socio-economic Security for Poor People Living around the Forest Area

Dwi Any Marsiyanti

Introduction

Socioeconomic security for poor people is a major issue in Third World countries. Some instances occur because state policies do not prioritize the poor people's economic welfare. The problem may occurs as the result of the state's policy; which is favoring macro finance (country and global level, such as only concerns about the number in GDPs) policy and action. Actions and policies for microfinance and the micro level are very much neglected. Moreover, the economic views and paradigms of countries with industry-based economic policies mainly support the big capital models. Some countries in the tropics with forests very rich in high quality woods can attract big capital, especially if the state's policies encourage capital investments.

I started out on this research wanting to compare the socio-economic security of poor people living around the forested areas in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. However, when I was on the field, I was more fascinated to collect all the data and information I could, instead of the variables I had chosen for all three cases. I preferred to enrich my data collection based on the uniqueness of each case. I wanted to cover more issues so as to be able to learn more about the various conditions affecting the socio-economic security of the poor living around the forest areas.

What is socio-economic security?

All humans have particular needs and interests in life. In the quest to fulfill their aspirations, people sometimes have to deal with mother earth. The relationship between humans and nature has been a very popular subject since the late seventies (Irimoto 1981). All the things that humans do to mother earth will certainly have an effect on it and will soon hit back at human life.

For years, man has been cutting down trees in the forests. When we lose so many trees and forests rapidly, the weather changes quickly. We have droughts lasting longer than they should, colder winters, rising sea levels, and tremendously hotter summers—not to mention the changes in agricultural cycles due to the shifting weather. Further, in some areas on earth, the people are facing famine and malnutrition because of the failure of harvests, due either to the drought or cold snap.

Considering the limits of human capabilities to adjust to climate change and the threat of famine, some people have decided to promote lifestyle changes that require going back to nature to prevent unthinkable catastrophes from happening. Not to be forgotten, however, is the fact that human beings have economic, social, and political rights that must be respected. Taking both aspects into consideration, I have chosen to study the socio-economic security condition of people who live in the forest area.

I agree with the definitions of Zhang Yunling[1] of the word "security" as "stability" and "safety". But I want to add two more definitions: "availability" and "sustainability". Economic security entails the maintenance of given levels through access to resources, finances, and the market. Social security concerns the maintenance of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion, social order, and communal identity. For some people or groups, socio-economic security is not yet guaranteed.

In or around forest areas, for example, some groups face the reality of having to fulfill their daily basic needs from forest products obtained through hunting, gathering, and agriculture—and all these in light of the policy of the state which is responsible for protecting and preserving the forest, in some cases of industrial forests, on behalf of national capital growth. The people who live in or around the forests are often blamed for the deforestation because their lives are really attached to the forest. But is it really possible—that they who live in or around the forest are capable of endangering these forests in their quest to fulfill their daily needs?

Many say that profits from the exploitation of natural resource actually go to the state or directly to the investor, who is, most of the time, a stranger to the community. In the meantime, the exploitation of natural resources, including the forests, creates serious

problems concerning environmental sustainability and the welfare of the people in the surrounding areas. The environment is in danger. The socioeconomic security of people, especially the poor,[2] is neglected. The losses for this people are various: infrastructural (damaged village roads), economic (resulting from smaller lands for cultivation), cultural (their ancestral domain is claimed by private companies or investors), social (broken families caused by migration to other areas, for example), or even political (local or indigenous people are sometimes accused of being illegal tenants in the new area). Furthermore, the local people are often blamed for the environmental and nature degradation. Well, this fact does not surely happen in all countries as we shall see in this study.

Objectives

There is surely a need for some mechanism that will accommodate the state's interest (economic growth, forest conservation, and so on and so forth), the people's welfare, and sustainable environmental development and usage. This research aims to examine the case of people living around the forest areas in Thailand, their socioeconomic security, their survival strategies, and the relationship between the local people and the state. It will also attempt to reveal the strategies (including the policies, implementation, and actions) of the government, the local people, and the investor (or company) with regard to this socioeconomic security issue.

Methodology

As I consider this issue to be very sensitive, given that it has to do with the interests of some parties, I used the qualitative method so as to be able to reveal more data and information. I also used the exploratory approach for this research, asking mostly open-ended questions. Secondary data and information, provided these would enrich the research, were also accessed.

I used the exploratory approach to identify the community group perfect for my research. In the first month, I explored several indigenous communities in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai in Thailand, and also in Bukidnon in the Philippines. Thereafter, I gathered information from people who held certain positions or worked with the communities. Cross-cutting the observation, some information gathered from NGOs and academic figures in Chiang Mai University, as well

in the Philippines, reading some references and mix-matching these with requirements from National Research Council of Thailand (NRCT) particularly in Thailand) and my research as well, I chose the Karen communities in Thailand as the subject of my research, for reasons I will explain later. In the meantime, I chose the Bukidnon and Higaonon tribes in the Philippines.

After defining the subject of the research, I made a questionnaire consisting of personal data questions involving my source. I also prepared open-ended questions as tools for my qualitative approach. My research involved participant observations in these regions and the use of primary and secondary sources, to obtain the necessary background data on these regions.

THE PHILIPPINES

Research Site

In the Philippines, the research takes place in the Bukidnon Province (Region X), in Mindanao Island.

Why Bukidnon Province? There is a company named Bukidnon Forest Incorporated (BFI) that is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC). BFI is a joint cooperation f the Philippine and New Zealand governments. Its pilot project is an industrial forest that seeks to support national economic growth, while at the same time meeting the local people's need and ensuring sustainable environmental management.

Moreover and most importantly, in the Philippines, there is a law called the Indigenous People's Rights Act (IPRA) issued in 1997. Republic Act 8371 states that the Philippine government recognizes, protects, and promotes the rights of the indigenous cultural communities/ IP.[3]

The socio-economic situation in Bukidnon

As defined by Zhang Yunling, economic security means access to resources, finance, and the market. Defined thus, it does not apply to many indigenous people in the Philippines where only a few join the labor market or undertake service work. Most IP in the Philippines are still into farming, while some hunt for or gather food in the forest.

The above description of the IP's economic activities applies to the indigenous communities in Bukidnon, as well. Many of them are poor and can afford to eat only twice a day. They merely drink coffee in the morning, eat a banana, cassava, or sweet potato for lunch, and then have a very simple dinner in the evening. Many of them do not eat rice or bread because they cannot afford to buy either. In some extreme cases, they cannot even afford to buy salt.

Their housing conditions are not any better. Made of bamboo and measuring 9 m by 12 m, their abodes, which do not have electricity, house two or three families. On the other hand, the IPs of Bukidnon gets water which they use for drinking, washing, and taking bath from the river. As such, during the dry season, water is in short supply, while during the rainy season, the water quality is not good: it is colored brown because it contains mud. Given these living conditions, the IPs are very vulnerable. The IPs now also has to buy their few modest clothes because they no longer weave.

Let us now examine their access to resources. To make a living, most of them are into agriculture or very simple farming. They plant minimal corn, vegetables, and sweet potatoes but even before they can do this, they need land.

Land has become a very big issue with the issuance of the IPRA law. Most of the IP or indigenous communities are still struggling to get their ancestor's lands titled. The titling process under the IPRA law takes quite a while. In the meantime, the people need land to cultivate. Thus, many of them live on forestland illegally.

However, if the IP or indigenous communities win their claim over their ancestral land under the IPRA law, it will guarantee their secure access to land for their economic activities. In reality, most IPs observe the tradition of using land only as far as their arm can reach. It really means a small piece of land, measuring between 30 and 100 square meters per household. The main keys here are the IPRA law and the Philippines government's will to apply the law.[4]

The IPRA law and its strict application will have direct positive impact on the local people's socio-economic security.[5] However, for their social system related to farming, the IP and government need to think of a win-win solution. As it is, government thinks the *kaingin* system (slash and burn farming) which many IPs practice is not environmentally friendly.

While in the Philippines, I put three indigenous groups under the microscope: the Higaonons and two Bukidnon communities. The Higaonons I studied are quite modern. They live along the sides of the provincial road in Impasug-Ong district. Many of them speak English very well, since it is the second language used in school. They are not bound by traditions any longer. Most of them are busy with their money-making activities[6] but remain poor. When they have to discuss for the preparation of a proposal to be able to claim their ancestor's land, they seem awkward with one another. Worse, there is no strong leadership among the IPs. This group filed their claims over 10 years ago, but up till now, there is no news or update from the Philippine government.

The Bukidnons who live along the side of the provincial road in Sumpong Village, Malaybalay City constituted the second group studied. This group is more divided and more individualistic than the first group. More than 40 years ago, they lived in the forest and did some farming for their daily consumption. But when the road was built, many of them decided to move closer to the main road because they wanted to have a modern lifestyle and thought it might be easier for them to get cash income. They abandoned their land in the forest. When BFI came to take over forest management in the area, this group did not registered as dwellers because they had already moved to the city. Thus, when they did not succeed in the city and wanted to go back to their old land in the area now managed by BFI, conflict erupted, with BFI filing a case in court, accusing the group of illegal entry. To complicate matters, there was internal strife within the group, thereby weakening the bond that held the group together.

Further, when this group wanted to claim its ancestor's land under the IPRA law, it was very hard for the members of the group to say which portion this was. While some said it totaled 80 hectares of the BFI area, some said it was 125 hectares. So, two claims were submitted to the Philippine government. These claims were submitted nine and seven years ago, respectively. That there was a discrepancy between the two claims put the group in a bad light before the Philippine government.

This group now faces multidimensional problems. For one, the group is poor. Second, the bond that held the group together was almost severed. Three, the group is threatening its own chances of wining its claim over the land. Four, the group is facing illegal entry charges

care of BFI. All together, this group will not rise from poverty (using the opportunity given by the government via the issuance of the IPRA law or using its own strength) if it cannot solve these problems.

The third group is made up of the Bukidnons who dwell in Dalwangan village along the side of the provincial road to Mount Kitanglad, under the administration of Malaybalay City. Traditionally, this group is strongly bound. Although the children go to school in the city, the elders continue to teach them traditional values at home. Among the three groups, only the children from the third group are still able to speak their mother tongue, *Binukid*, a local dialect. The children of the first two groups can only listen to and understand their mother tongue, but cannot speak it.

The Bukidnons in Dalwangan village succeeded in recovering 4,200 hectares of their ancestors' domain under the IPRA law—a feat credited to the group's very strong leadership and its holding on strongly to its traditions, values, and culture. After winning the claim, the members of the group declared that their lives had improved. They can now plant whatever they want to plant, while at the same time preserving the forest as their gods' dwelling place.

The Community Development Program of Bukidnon Forest Incorporated

The socio-economic life of local people in the area became more interesting after BFI began operating in the area. As mentioned earlier, BFI is a GOCC established on 2 October 1992 (BFI 2003). It has the right to manage the 39,000-hectare forestland in Bukidnon Province in collaboration with the New Zealand government. The BFI areas are under the administration of 13 *barangays* (villages) in three municipalities (Manolog Fortich, Malitbog, and Impasug Ong) and a city (Malaybalay City). The government (divided into barangays, municipalities, a city, and the province) benefit by 1 percent for each cubic of log released by the BFI. The BFI has its own regular staff and its operations are under the strict supervision of the DENR.

The BFI launched the Community Development Program as part of its integrated forest management initiative. In so doing, the company is also considering the local people's needs (economic, social, and the development of the communities).

Under this program, BFI gives the locals cows, carabaos (water buffalos), swine, and chicken, in keeping with its animal dispersal project. It likewise gives out fertilizer and shares important information on farming (education program). That is not all. BFI also builds roads, bridges, dams, and water facilities for the communities.

BFI has a scholarship program for some of the high school and college students in the local communities. A BFI scholarship covers tuition and fees throughout a scholar's stay in high school or college. BFI also counts the following among its initiatives: a sports development program, women's livelihood projects, an educational training program, a health program, and a literacy program (for adults).

It is BFI's policy to involve as many local people as it can. For undertakings ranging from planting to harvesting, BFI hires locals. It also offers indigenous communities contracts to help operate its forest management program, the Community Based Forest Protection Program (CBFPP). Under this program, families are contracted to protect around 100 hectares of BFI's forests each. Per hectare, a family receives PhP100 per year as incentive, provided that the forest is well protected.

This community development program can be seen as a cross-cutting strategy of BFI in the sense that it allows BFI to fulfill its obligation to the state, while at the same time giving BFI and the communities near the area of operations a chance to build good relationships with each other. While this program seeks to support the daily needs of the local people, it is nowhere near reducing their poverty. Moreover, most of the poor people living around the forest, where BFI is operating, live there illegally and are not the beneficiaries of the program.

On the other hand, the Bukidnons who live in Barangay Dalwangan do not need the BFI community development program since most of them are socio-economically secure. They claim that if they hold on to their ancestor's teachings, they will live happily and well. Moreover, because they hold land titles to their ancestor's domain, they are more likely to secure their livelihood up till the distant future.

THAILAND

Research Site

The Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces in Northern Thailand still have some forests. Among the Thai government's national priorities is to designate 50 percent of its lands as forest area. Now the number of people who live in the forest was down to 40%.

The Forest and the Indigenous People

After the logging ban was imposed in Thailand, only the tree plantation for the pulp and paper company remained. This did not interest me because I found a bigger and more crucial case involving the Thai government's policy on national parks and forest reserves, on the one hand, and the local people whose lives still depended on forest products, on the other. I believe that these locals have the wisdom to manage the forest. I am looking at the Karen people in Nong Muntha, Mae Wang district in Chiang Mai Province and the Karens in Hin Lahd Nai, Wiang Pa Pao district in Chiang Rai Province, that still have a strong bond with the forest. These people have problems with the government because the forest where they live has been declared a national park, which means that they may no longer live in it. Suddenly, the Karen people who had lived in the said forest long before it was declared a forest reserve became illegal tenants.

The forest is very much a part of the Karen people's lives. When a baby is born, the baby's umbilical cord is cut and put in a bamboo tube, after which the tube is tied to a tree, thereby making the tree part of that baby's life. The Karen people also rely on the forest for their medicinal needs.

The forest is extremely important to the Karen people. Therefore, they have a certain rule regarding the village's contour, in their quest to preserve the forest while having it meet their needs. They have a designated water catchment area which consists of the reserved (untouchable) portion of the forest along the highest peak across the slope where the houses are located. In Hin Lahd Nai, below the water catchment, there is the 10 *rai*[7] cemetery. Below the cemetery is the agro-forestry area where the villagers plant some tea trees, just under the big trees that are left alone. They do not cut the big trees at all to plant the tea trees. The agro-forestry area is around 600 *rai*.

Above the area where the houses are, they have a forest measuring around 500 *rai* for their use (to get firewood or wood for building houses, etc.). All of these areas are community lands that everybody in the village is allowed to use. Their motto is: no matter who plants the trees, anyone can use them or harvest the trees together. They say everything is enough and even abundant for everybody in the village. Their system of preserving the forest has become their powerful weapon for gaining the Thai government's faith, enough to allow them to stay in the forest since they, indeed, can be trusted with it.

Socio-economic security and the Karens

Still using Zhang Yunling's definition of socio-economic security, I will now discuss this and how it applies to the Karens.

Some people among the Karens practice intensive farming, but many still practice rotation cultivation. In rotation cultivation(crop rotation?), the trees are cut one meter above the ground and then crops and vegetables are planted between the cut stalks. The Karens stay in the said area for several years. And then they leave the first cultivation area and move to another place where they again stay for a few years. Then after five to seven years, they return to the same place where they had started the rotation cultivation before, and so on. They argue that they do not intend to expand their cultivation area. They just leave the old area where the fertility of the soil is not so good anymore, and move to a new fertile area. By leaving the old one, they let the soil regain its health and its fertility naturally. They say this practice is better than intensive farming, which requires chemical fertilizers to make the soil good enough for production. Furthermore, they believe that chemical fertilizers kill the soil.

Some of the Karens are Buddhists, some are Christians, and some animists. However, all of them still practice their ancestors' tradition of worshipping spirits, which relates to their agriculture cycle. They have a ceremony to honor the spirit of the forest before they start to cultivate their forestland. They hold a ceremony for the spirit of water before they plant rice. Most of the spirits they worship are in the forest.

The Karens still very much depend on the forest for some products, which they either consume or sell: mushrooms and bamboo shoots, herbs, etc. Since they

rely on the forest so much, the Karens live in harmony with the forest. This they proved for hundreds of years in Burma from where they migrated to Thailand around 50 - 120 years ago.

The Karens have their own traditional socio-economic security system for their community. They have a community fund[8] for emergency cases such as when someone meets an accident and needs to go to the hospital, or when a woman needs to deliver her baby, or when someone gets sick (from malaria, for example). From this community fund, they can borrow money for transportation to the hospital and for buying food while confined in the hospital. When they return home, they can give back the money they borrowed to the community fund.

Today, we can see the Karens in Wiang Pa Pao and in Mae Wang living well. They always have agricultural surplus. Moreover, from gathering forest products, the Karens can get a lot of money. In Hin Lahd Nai, in Wiang Pa Pao, Chiang Rai Province, the Karen community of 21 households gets between 100,000 and 200,000 baht (approximately US$3,000) per year from the sale of bamboo shoots gathered in the forest. In the meantime, in Nong Muntha, in Mae Wang, Chiang Mai Province, the Karen community of 28 households eats its produce. The households always have surplus production of rice and vegetables. They say they do not need any ATM (money) but they need eighty hands (to help each other).

As for clothing, some of them buy clothes but they still weave their traditional cloth (white for women who are not married yet, and colored for married women). This system was observed in both villages.

Houses in a Karen community are built of wood. Usually these houses are big. If there are 60 houses in a Karen community, the community is split into two villages. Hence, a big Karen community is very rare.

The Thai government provides the Karen community free health and education facilities. Education is free in public elementary and high schools. For those who want to go to university, the Thai government provides scholarships for IPs. IPs also get free health treatment in the state's hospital.

As for access to resources, when the Thai government declared all forestlands that were not registered as private property as national parks and forest reserves, all people living in the forest suddenly became illegal settlers. For this reason, they had to be relocated to other areas designated by the government. But the IPs refused to budge because they were afraid that the new location would not be as good as the old location. Furthermore, their culture demanded that any new location they would transfer to should have certain traditional qualifications.

There have been some cases where IPs have been allowed to live in the forest because of the goodwill of the lower officer of the national park and the Royal Department of Forestry. As long as the IPs could prove to the officer that they could manage the forest well, they have been allowed to stay in the forest.

The indigenous communities also welcome the government's program to enter the village so as to maintain good relations with the government. For its part, the government includes the IPs' communities in some programs, in order to be able to control the village and supervise the villagers' management of the forest. However, since these people are not protected by law, their access to land and water is endangered. And basically, without land to cultivate, without the forest and water, all of the traditions of the IPs will die.

INDONESIA

I am comparing the results of this research in the Philippines and Thailand with the results of my previous research (2003-2005) in Wonosobo District, Jawa Tengah. In Wonosobo, the company (half of it state-owned, the other half private) that runs the industrial forest is very wealthy, while the people who live around the forest are very poor. The management of industrial forests usually involves the local people in the first two years, letting them plant the pine trees and having them take good care of these trees. In return, the locals are allowed to cultivate the land between the trees. After two years, however, the local people are forbidden from entering the forest. And when it is time to harvest the trees, the local people accept nothing. All profits of the harvest go to the company, which does not contribute to the repair of roads damaged by the trucks that carried wood harvested from the forest. Instead, the local people have to fix the roads using their own money, not to mention whatever environmental damage is brought about by the company's mismanagement of the forest, e.g., the disappearance of springs surrounding the forest area.

The socio-economic situation

The local people's socio-economic condition is very much influenced by the forest and environment because most of them are farmers. When their harvest fails because they do not have enough water, they become poorer and poorer, year after year. Some families cannot afford to eat twice a day. Some of their children only eat rice when their neighbors give them food.

As for clothes, most are not in good condition and are hand-me-downs from their neighbors. The situation is heart-breaking.

Meanwhile, the local people's houses are also in poor condition, being made of whatever material they could get for free. Some of the materials used are poor-quality wood combined with bamboo, hard paper, and rusty metal sheets for the roof. Most of the houses do not have bathrooms and electricity.

Most of the children do not go to school even if the government has a program offering free education. This is because upon entering school, students still need to pay a building maintenance fee, a school supporting fee, and for their books and uniforms.

As government gives health care insurance to the poor, they can get free medication and treatment in the state's hospital or medical center. But because most of the poor people have not had the benefit of a good education, they prefer to stay at home and take herbal medicine that they themselves make, whenever they are sick.

Being simple farmers, the local people have no knowledge of trading or other kinds of work. All they know is farming. The farmers only need land to cultivate but because the population in Java Island is very dense, land for farmers has become smaller, if not more scarce. Moreover, if the farmers have too many children, the portion of land each family gets is so small that produce is no longer enough to feed one nuclear family.

From 1999 to 2002, illegal logging in the industrial forest areas was extensive.[9] Thousands of hectares of forestlands became bald. The company did nothing to reforest the land and the villagers saw this as an opportunity to increase the size of their landholdings. They started to plant several kinds of crops on the bald forestlands.[10] Some even planted hard wood such as acacia.

After several years, the company hired some people to cut down the trees that the villagers had planted. A huge conflict erupted in the area. In the meantime, some local people accompanied by NGOs tried to convince the company to allow the locals to be involved in forest management and to get a share of the profits from the forest products. Since the company was half-state and half privately-owned, government's decision to change the company's policy had to be waited for. Eventually, the new policy known as Community Based Forest Management was released, but it still did not accommodate all the needs of the local people.

It has been five years since the issuance of the rule but the local people are dissatisfied. Some have protested before government but matters appear to be at a standstill. The local people say there is nothing more they can do. Some have made a deal with the lower officer so they could cultivate the land; but, even if they are granted this opportunity, they are in a vulnerable position. Another community, for example, had a deal with the lower officer of a company without government approval.[11] When this particular officer was transferred to another area, the deal was off, and the people had to bear the loss since they had no legal right to a share of the company's profits; the deal they had struck with the officer had been without the government's approval.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC SECURITY

For some local or indigenous communities, social and economic activities cannot be separated. In Karen communities, economic activities sometimes determine the social life of the community, or vice-versa. What is certain is that the economic life and the social life of groups of people who live together in the forest are closely related to each other and cannot be separated.

Up until today, the Karens who live in the forest area have their socio-economic lives secured. However, in the eyes of the law, they remain in a vulnerable position because according to the Thailand National Park Act, nobody is allowed to live in the national park or forest reserve. The Community Forest Bill was formulated by the IPs, the Royal Department of Forestry and some NGOs to find some solution to the

dispute. When the bill was released, some points in it disappointed the IPs and the NGOs, prompting them to make known their objections. The process is still ongoing so that the livelihood of the IPs today is still under threat.

In both Karen villages (Hin Lahd Nai and Nong Muntha), leadership is strong as is their traditional bond.[12] These strengths, I believe, help them confront obstacles and move on. Although Thai law has yet to acknowledge the IP's existence the communities are able to deal with the Thai government without inviting internal conflict among the Karens themselves.

The Karens and the government employ their individual strategies to deal with the problem. The good thing is that neither side wants conflict or confrontation. So government allows a lower officer to decide to let IPs stay in the national park, subject to certain conditions. But in another national park, nobody may stay. In the event that there are people staying in that park, they are doing so illegally. But the IPs do have their own strategy for dealing with the government: they try to maintain good relations with the government.

As for the people who live around the forest area in the Philippines, the situation is quite different. The first two groups (Higaonons and Bukidnons in Sumpong) are not secure at all. Even while living their traditional lives, the IPs still have a hard time meeting their daily needs. Earning money is not easy for them. Since they are not too familiar with the market or any other financial source, they depend on simple farming for subsistence. They still need to learn a lot about finances and the market, and to adjust their traditional way of living, in order for them to become more sustainable and more stable.

It is a different story with the third group, the Bukidnons in Barangay Dalwangan. They are still holding on to their traditional way of life and values. They have strong leaders and strong ties that make them a powerful group. Their strong group manages to deal successfully with the current situation and to benefit from the opportunities given by the Philippines government.

When the IPRA was passed, it felt like manna from the sky. The indigenous communities could have their ancestral domain/land, acknowledged by the Philippine government. This would solve the poor people's demand for land, these poor people being mostly IPs. However, forest management that is considered as environmentally friendly is definitely a must, given the world's condition (global warming and climate changes) today. With the IPs now having rightful ownership of the land, it has become up to them to manage and develop the land and protect the environment.

There have already been cases of IPs selling or renting out their ancestral lands,[13] and this are causes for alarm. In the future, these will translate to hard work for the government, NGOs, environmental activists, and all the other parties that have to ensure the sustainable and environmentally friendly management of forestland. Up until today, the government, the NGOs, and BFI are still trying their best to educate the local people about the importance of keeping the forest green and ensuring sustainable forest management. However, in terms of acknowledgment before the law, the IPs in the Philippines is definitely the most secure, compared to those in Thailand and Indonesia.

In Indonesia, the socio-economic life of the poor people around the forest is not secure. They still rely on others' help to fulfill their needs. The government and the company that run the half-state and half-private industrial forest are not making it easy for the people to gain ground. Moreover, because of the conflicts that occurred before, the relationship between the government, the company, and the local people is only superficially good. Behind their backs, they are still watching each other. The government and the company, especially, are trying to keep the status quo in order to maintain their industrial forest operations in the area, while at the same time trying to prevent further conflicts by issuing the Community Based Forest Management regulation, which has so far still been disappointing the local people. Meanwhile, the local people are still hoping that the regulation will be changed to their satisfaction. Both sides are avoiding conflict.

From the cases of the three countries presented, we can see the differences in the socio-economic conditions of the people who live around the forest area. In Thailand, the Karens' socio-economy daily condition is quite secure, while in the Philippines, the Higaonons and Bukidnons (in Sumpong) are in bad socio-economic shape. Yet, this is not the case with the Bukidnons in Dalwangan. In the meantime, the farmers in Wonosobo, Indonesia are not secure at all.

Conclusion

All locals/IPs demand for more land in order to be able to fulfill their daily needs. They need the state or company's legal acknowledgement of their existence in the forest and their need for it. In the Philippines, the IPs are definitely in the best position since the government has issued the IPRA, making it legal for the IPs to claim their ancestral land/domain. Meanwhile, in Thailand and in Indonesia, the regulations are still unsatisfactory for the locals/IPs, who continues to live on edge. Their positions are very fragile; they always have to depend on a lower officer's policy, which cannot always be counted to be in the people's favor.

Here we can see the difference in the political conditions surrounding the forest policy released by the states and/or by the concessionaries. We also can see the various relations and strategies employed by the state, the company, and the locals/IPs, to keep their interests fulfilled. All three cases have positive and negative aspects. To meet the global need for green forests and to ensure that the human rights of the local people are respected, we need to see several alternatives from which all countries can learn.

The ideal situation that I think will satisfy all parties would be this: the way of life of the Karens happening in the Philippines with its IPRA law. Hopefully, the results of this research can enhance our knowledge and broaden our view in the search for a solution that meets human kind's and nature's respective needs.

Annexes

1. Map of the research site in the Philippines

2. Map of the research site in Thailand

Map of Chiang Mai

Burma

Chiang Rai

N

Mae Hong Song

Mae Taeng

Lampang

Mae Rim

Mueng

Mae Wang

Lamphun

Tak

CHINA
VIETNAM
BURMA
LAOS
Chiang mai

THAILAND
Bangkok

CAMBODIA

INDONESIA MALAYSIA

Legend

Chiang Mai Province

Research Site

3. Map of Wonosobo, research site in Indonesia

NOTES

[1] Zhang Yunling is a professor and Director of Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies in Chinese Academy of Social Science.

[2] At first, I used poor people as my target group (based on the fulfillment of their food, clothing, and housing needs). However, when I was in the field in the Philippines and Thailand, I faced the reality that everybody who dwelt in the forest belonged to the particular group that identified itself as an indigenous people (IP)/community. Later, I began to use the term "indigenous people" for the target group in the Philippines and Thailand, but not for the target group in Indonesia.

[3] This Act also provided for the creation of a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, established implementing mechanisms, and appropriated funds for the

IP, among others. The good thing about this act is that it is implemented in the way it should be, so that many IP benefit from it.

4   For the indigenous people's food gathering and hunting activities, they need the forest the most. When they submit their claim to their ancestors' lands under the IPRA law, they have to prepare a proposal indicating their plan to manage the land. Most of the lands they are laying claim to have been categorized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) as forestland. Therefore, in their proposal they need to specify their intended land management system (agriculture or other forest use (such as gathering forest products)), and signify their plan to maintain the forest and to keep to their traditional practices within the land they claim. It is necessary for all parties to protect the forest. The IPs is allowed to use the forest but only within identified parameters, under the supervision of the DENR.

5   Based on the IPRA law, indigenous communities are acknowledged, may practice their culture and manage their ancestral domain so they can fulfill their needs, not only for food, clothing, and shelter, but also for education and health.

6   When the road was built, many switched from traditional farming to informal jobs, such as motorela (the traditional taxi) driving, food vending along the road, etc.

7   One rai is equal to 0.6 hectares.

8   The community fund is collected from several sources. In Hin Lahd Nai Village, they get 10 percent of the income from selling tea leaf, bamboo shoots, and mushrooms. In Nong Muntha Village, every time the villagers harvest rice, they "cut" 20 percent of their rice harvest and give it to the community rice house. Therefore, when someone has no more rice to cook, she or he can get it from the community rice house, but must return the rice borrowed from the following year's harvest.

9   Illegal logging was prevalent because many local people felt they were treated unjustly. When the Suharto regime collapsed, the people released their anger by brutally harvesting the woods in the state's industrial forests. The odd thing about this was that most of the people who cut the trees in the state's forest were not local people; only one or two villagers were involved.

10 Cassava, vegetables, corn, dry rice, and herbs.

11 At that time, some NGOs, farmer activists, and the House of Representative were still lobbying the government. Some communities were not patient enough and decided to make a deal with the company by themselves.

12 In Thailand, the Karens are famous for their strong tradition and disciplined practice of their cultural traditions.

13 A few Bukidnons in Barangay Dalwangan who already won the claim over their ancestral domain are suspected to be renting out their ancestral lands to some big fruit plantation company.

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New Nature: New Evidence of Naturalistic Pantheism in the Contemporary Art and Culture of Japan and the Philippines

Prabda Yoon

Introduction

Before we can discuss "new nature", we cannot avoid asking and answering the question, "What is nature?" and with this seemingly simple question, we immediately set ourselves against one of the most difficult and problematic ideas in the history of human intellect.

To members of contemporary urban culture, the word "nature" may often imply holiday destinations, outdoor recreation, or something to "develop" into commerce. To "nature lovers," it may mean a retreat from civilization, something to "return" to, something to revere and preserve. To scientists, nature is where all knowledge comes from and is, in turn, a condition to be constantly conquered by becoming more and more knowledgeable about it. Finally, to many "spiritual" persons of diverse faiths, to be "in" nature is one of the noblest ways to recognize and, possibly, connect with the Divine. Higher powers are said to "send" messages to us "through" nature.

However much these perspectives differ, they all share one general outlook: they perceive nature as separate from humans. Nature is "something" or "some place" we must overcome, utilize, protect, respect, worship, study, etc. In short, nature is there for our benefit, one way or another. This outlook necessarily suggests that we have control over nature and, therefore, we are not merely a part of it, even though evidently we are in it. We have long recognized and accepted numerous sets of laws and called them "natural"; yet, when it comes to human activities, we prefer the idea that events happen according to our independent intentions, that we are driven by the mysterious and elusive "free will," a concept that inevitably implies a separation between humans and nature. We even regard certain substances, conditions, and behaviors as "unnatural."

Logically, however, in order for something to be unnatural, it has to possess unnatural substances and the ability to exist completely detached from all that is natural. (It should at least normally exist exclusively in the environment that creates and accommodates it, for instance.) But if that were possible, it would be absurd

for something unnatural to possess the capability to coexist with the natural, within a natural environment. Human-made plastic may be different from wood, but essentially it cannot be "unnatural." It is created by natural substances (humans), from natural substances (chemicals found in nature), in a natural substance (the world), and by natural laws (the physical laws of our natural universe). Plastic is as natural as trees and rivers; it simply just materialized as plastic much later.

The idea that something can be unnatural comes, perhaps, from our collective tendency to discriminate against diversities, against the discovery and materialization of the new, and more importantly, against the notion that what is disagreeable to us and our well-being is just as natural as the opposite.

We are particularly suspicious of the new. "New", in this context, means "new" only to our senses, but not new in nature. Because the new seems to have sprung into existence only in recent history or in our lifetime, it is easy for us to perceive the new as unnatural. But, following the logic of the natural, nothing can ever be new in that sense, since everything comes from nature and is therefore "natural" by definition, by necessity. What is even more crucial is that nothing can ever be new in the sense of having "never been before," either. For something to be able to come into existence in nature, the possibility of its existence must already exist. Something cannot come from nothing, as some ancient Greek philosophers have proposed. Plastic, therefore, is essentially one and the same with the "possibility of plastic." There may be countless other "possibilities" in nature that we have not yet discovered, understood, or utilized; but whatever they are they will always be natural.

In the history of western philosophy, pantheism is the concept that comes closest to this way of thinking about nature. The term "pantheist" was supposedly first coined by the late 17th century Irish thinker, John Toland, even though similar ideas had long existed, at least, since ancient Greece. In Toland's time, the definition of "pantheist" had a decidedly religious implication, as was true of anything under the Christian influence of the era. Pantheism equated God

with nature, proposing that they were one and the same. If God were a body, then everything in nature was a part of that body, including humans. For pantheists, we are always with God. Indeed, we are also God, in a real sense, since God and everything else cannot be separated. This view was, understandably, controversial, and considered blasphemous by the Church because it basically suggested that the Church and all of its traditions were superfluous.

However, pantheists are not always atheists or secular. On the contrary, many individuals with pantheistic beliefs can be considered very religious. They are religious in the sense that they see the oneness, or nature, as highly spiritual and inspiring—something, perhaps, even with purpose. Pantheists, then, are generally not nihilistic. They have "faith" in something higher than themselves (the "totality of nature" beyond humans' comprehension, for instance), and the notion that they all belong in this oneness enriches their lives. They "worship" the oneness of nature and therefore respect it whole.

In many ways, early pantheistic sentiments made modern science possible. And in contemporary society, many hold at least some fragments of pantheistic beliefs whether they know it or not, because physics has proven some aspects of pantheistic propositions to be valid. Many of us, even those who think of themselves as spiritual or religious, are now comfortable with the idea that the conventional God may not exist, but none can perceive life without natural laws. We have been informed by science that all of us are partly made up of ancient stardust, that the DNA coding that makes us human differs only slightly from the coding in other living organisms, that, in short, everything in the universe is interdependent, related, and more similar than we previously believed. And all of these facts are, can only be, very "natural."

With modern scientific knowledge and understanding of life and the universe, pantheism can now be a spiritual belief completely detached from the concept of God. Everything can be reduced to just one word: nature. The answer to the question "What is nature?", then, can be nothing else but "Everything."

If nature is everything, then everything is nature; and, evidently, nothing can be "new" in nature. So then what is "new nature?"

"New", in this context then, is "new" attitude, "new" outlook, "new" perspective, "new" respect, and, perhaps, even "new faith" toward the concept of nature.

Art and Nature

Art is yet another word that has different meanings to different people. The uniqueness of art in the context of nature is that it seems to exist only in humans. Several other animals can be technically regarded as toolmakers; yet none "designs," "decorates," "imagines," and "interprets" the way we do. Whatever it means, art is as old as civilization itself; and even though there are people who claim to not "understand" art, humanity without art is simply unthinkable. Art is human nature.

Art as a vocation, however, is a different story. The "professional artist" has gone through many phases throughout history. Because there is usually a need for art in all functions of society, artists have had a reasonably wide influence over their culture, sometimes even extending to foreign cultures. Indeed, oftentimes, the artists themselves help create a culture. The value, even the "beauty," of art may have always been difficult to grasp in comparison to other social necessities; but there is no doubt about its profound contribution to shaping and directing the course of civilization. One may admit the inability to appreciate art; but it would be absurd to deny that art, one way or another, has influenced his or her life.

The evolution of the art profession took a rather different turn around the middle of the 20th century. The intense and rapid growth of industrialization and capitalism, mostly in the west, somehow turned modern art into a serious commodity among the elite, eventually creating a hugely successful "industry" out of it. New artists whose works attracted galleries, art critics, and collectors could become millionaires overnight. Many of them, mainly in America and Europe, did indeed become very wealthy.

The contents of art works also changed drastically, partly because of artistic evolution, but largely because the industry—the "art world"—demanded certain trends, trends that would generate big hype and, therefore, big business. As a result, art in modern times gradually distanced itself from the general public. Artists no longer needed the "approval" of the people. They only had to manage themselves properly within the hierarchy of the art world. Their livelihood did not depend on showing their works in public; only a few

important pairs of eyes behind gallery walls and in auction rooms mattered. Art became a sort of island amidst society. And, as time passed, the bridges connecting this island to other areas in society were destroyed, one by one, by the islanders themselves.

Ironically, this modern condition provided the lucky artists themselves with unprecedented artistic freedom, allowing them to "express themselves" in any way they wished, be it in a skillfully sublime or a shamelessly devious manner. Once famous and in demand, a modern artist could attach a price tag to anything he or she dreamed up. In fact, the artist has become the product. Even without any physical work, the modern artist can get away with selling only his or her own name. (To modern artists, it has become a matter of selling of their "ideas.") The gap between modern art and the general public has grown wider ever since, and has continued to tear apart throughout the century, up to the present.

The later generations of modern artists are often attracted to the theme of alienation, as they feel that the general public fails to understand them and their works; but they rarely, if ever, take into account the influence that the "system" of the commercialized art world has on their thinking. The general public is in no way obliged to take notice of art or artists, since art is natural to them. As a result, the place of Contemporary Art in contemporary cultures is ambiguous. Even when the art community attempts to participate in social issues, it usually fails to make much impact on anything beyond itself. Many artists who commit themselves to the industry can still become very successful and wealthy; yet, the general public is oblivious of them and their arts.

It would make little sense for contemporary artists to try to please the public, of course. Since art is a natural human activity, there should be no restriction as to what art is for. However, just as it is possible for humans to perceive nature afresh by having a "new" attitude toward it, a new attitude toward nature in Contemporary Art could offer inspiration beyond itself, as it occasionally did throughout the course of history, especially before the Industrial Age. And, through this attitude, a new kind of connection between art and the general public could occur—not necessarily a connection to promote better understanding of art, but a connection to suggest and reveal the oneness, the "naturalness," the pantheistic principle of the known universe.

The Philippines

Among Southeast Asian countries, the Philippines differs from the rest in many ways. The Spanish, Catholic, and American influences are obvious, and, in the early 20th century, art and culture in the Philippines flourished faster and more intensely than in its neighboring countries. Because of its European and American connections—let alone the impressive fact that many of its historical national revolutionaries were writers and artists—modern art reached the Philippines very early, producing an impressive number of artists and intellectuals of highly sophisticated works in all mediums. Many of them were regarded with great respect internationally. However, the devastating political and economic conflicts in later decades of the century affected the artistic directions profoundly, and led Filipino artists to look inward rather than continue exploring foreign influences. At present, trends of "international" Contemporary Art can certainly be detected in several Philippine artistic communities; but they are not nearly as prominent and as influential as domestic sensibilities.

The facts that the Philippines is an archipelago of more than 7,000 islands and that many of them were once inhabited by different ethnic groups give "domestic sensibilities" a complex meaning. Yet, Contemporary Art in the Philippines seems to have a genuine and increasing interest in combining pre-colonial and indigenous traditions, with modern, western-inspired elements. It is precisely this condition that allows pantheistic concepts to seep into many contemporary artistic practices.

The most modest, but arguably most influential, kind of artist is perhaps the art teacher. Ric Obenza, a teacher at Calinan High School in Davao City, has for many years been devoting himself to the difficult task of teaching children about ecology and the importance of the environment through art. A calm, quiet, simple man with a determined yet generous character, Ric Obenza's love of nature is in fact his true profession. As painter, he is self-taught, and, his work, usually images of natural landscapes painted in oil or pastels, clearly displays an "Outsider Art" sensibility. Technically, he might be limited and unsophisticated; but his genuine desire to capture nature's beauty, together with his unpretentious eyes, manages to create vivid, clean, and touching images that perfectly reflect his passion. His art would be considered

"amateurish" no doubt, if propped against the gallery-friendly works of "contemporary artists"; but the fact that he is not "professional" does not have any effect on his artistic intention. He does not make art to impress the art community. He makes art in order to show children and, hopefully, everyone else, that art and nature are related; that art is not about making it as an artist in the art world; but that it is about understanding our place in the planet and our connection with it.

Obenza takes children into the wild and provides them with simple art supplies. He asks them to draw the landscape and teaches them about seeds, then together they plant real trees. Afterward, the children return to their trees regularly to record the progress by drawing them, until the trees are strong enough and sure to survive. This is an activity Obenza has been doing regularly for many years, with several generations of children. His intention is not only to plant trees but also to "plant" the sense of connection between humans and the external world into the conscience of the children themselves. By starting to experience other kinds of life in nature from an early age, Ric Obenza's students often grow up with a deeper awareness of ecological issues, than children whose daily routines have offered them only urbanized versions of nature. Obenza feels that his art succeeds not when his paintings are bought or hung on gallery walls, but when former students have grown up and returned to thank him for teaching them the value of the environment. The children, after having drawn their own trees from the first day of planting, each end up not only with drawings of a growing life, but also with memories of their participation in a life-giving process. The lesson, says Obenza, is not how to best capture nature by drawing it, but how to realize the humans' place in nature better. And how to be responsible for that place.

Needless to say, a figure like Ric Obenza does not belong to the Contemporary Art scene; but, his concerns, especially with regard to environmental issues, are indeed very contemporary. Fortunately, several "official" contemporary artists seem to share Obenza's concerns and are fully aware of pantheistic concepts.

Rishab Tibon, a Baguio-based sculptor and painter, has created works that deal specifically with the immediate problem of climate change. His sculptural installation for the 2008 Guandu International Outdoor Sculpture Festival in Taiwan, entitled "The Shield",

for instance, is a good example of art "for and about" nature. The "shield" is "a dome-like structure made of bamboo, reed grass, natural fiber robe, twine, and rattan strips," with openings all around for visitors to enter and exit freely and randomly. The interactive structure is "symbolic of the damaged ozone" where, because of the many holes, the protective function fails completely. Tibon's sculpture looks attractive and friendly, and the openings are clearly inviting. However, once inside, one realizes that the structure, while still pleasant to the senses, cannot shelter one from sunlight, rain, wind, dust, or predators. Its beauty is ultimately useless. Tibon's intentions are to create awareness of our place in the environment, and to suggest that, perhaps, our ongoing civilization that sees itself as a conqueror of nature may eventually end up being the very cause of its, our, own demise.

Even in a more accessible art form such as pop music, there seems be a handful of people trying to create serious dialogues about how humans can see our connection with nature more clearly. Joey Ayala is an acclaimed musician who has been recognized in the Philippine music industry as a modern composer who successfully utilizes ethnic musical instruments in his pop song arrangements. He is also at the forefront of artists who devote much of their time to social and educational causes. Many of his songs are about nature, featured in albums with titles such as "Songs of the Earth-Guardian" (*"Mga Awit ng Tanod-lupa"*), "Song of the Seafarer" (*"Awit ng Magdaragat"*), and "As Long As There's Bananas" (*"Basta May Saging"*). Ayala says that he does not consider himself an environmentalist; that his songs, though most of them refer to nature in some ways, are metaphorical. But, because his music uses nature as metaphors, the message of his music can be interpreted both as an environmental message and as a message about the human condition in the natural world. Furthermore, he does not like to bombard his listeners with righteous or didactic contents. Ayala prefers questions to answers; he thinks questions live longer and create deeper "resonances."

As for the human-nature relationship, Ayala has the habit of mapping out surprisingly detailed and systematic diagrams to use in his workshop tours around the country. The diagrams attempt to illustrate the connections between everything. One of his well-known songs written in the late eighties and entitled *"Magkaugnay"* has a clear pantheistic message: *We all come from one place, one tribe, and we are all journeying in the same direction. Everything is interrelated, beings of the earth, the sky, the water.* Ayala says that when he

wrote the song, he wrote it with the intention of communicating with children, to pass on to them the "scientific facts" about life.

Japan

In contrast with the Philippines, contemporary Japan generally regards itself as a secular society. Though perceived by foreigners as one of the most fascinating hubs for Buddhism in the world, the modern Japanese rarely call themselves Buddhists. This is usually surprising to visitors, since most of the important and popular tourist attractions in the country are Buddhist temples and customs inspired by Buddhism. To make matters even more confusing, the typical Japanese family continues to follow Buddhist rituals, and occasionally organizes or participates in ceremonies of Buddhist origin. But these are done mostly as tradition, without a proper understanding of historical connections to religion. (This behavior, of course, is true in many contemporary Buddhist countries.) Even Zen, the Buddhist sect of the Mahayana school made fashionable in western cultures by modern Japanese monks, is of little interest to contemporary Japanese people.

However, the same Japanese individual who proudly announces the absence of religion in his or her life, may well be offended if thought of as being without spiritual ideals. The Japanese people's collective belief in spirits, particularly spirits in nature, comes not from Buddhism, but from another, homegrown faith: Shinto. Even though it shares similarities with the folk and indigenous features of other cultures, especially in its animism, Shinto is unique. It is perhaps the only faith of indigenous origins still active and immensely influential in the everyday life of modern society. Each Japanese individual may interpret the meaning of the Shinto concept *"kami"* (god or spirit) differently; but most seem to hold the same view that "the world" is a complex community of related, interdependent "energies," estimating, in a traditional expression, that there are "eight million gods" in all, meaning there are a lot of gods and they are everywhere.

Shinto in Japanese culture is so deeply ingrained that most Japanese people grow up with at least some pantheistic outlooks, without realizing that such outlooks come from the influence of Shinto. Most Japanese may dismiss the concept of an all-powerful, all-knowing God; but many will say that they believe everything possesses a spirit, that in everything there is a "god".

Zen Buddhism is considered a "creative" and artistic tradition by those who pay serious attention to its legacy and cultural offspring. Indeed, Zen philosophy and practices have inspired many modern artists and intellectuals worldwide, especially in America and Europe of the mid-20th century. Countless books have been published on the art of Zen, and there will certainly be many more to come; but few, if at all, have in the past attempted to connect Shinto with contemporary art and culture.

Hara Kenya, the prominent and influential contemporary Japanese designer, is, perhaps, the only famous personality in the artistic industry who has deliberately established links between contemporary Japanese design and Shinto aesthetics in his lectures and writings. *"Shiro"* ("White"), his passionate 2008 essay about "whiteness" and "emptiness" in Japanese culture, is also a casual but informative study on the design of the Shinto shrine. Hara points out that a Shinto shrine is called *"shiro"* or *"yashiro"*, which suggests the "embracement" of emptiness; meanwhile, "whiteness" in Shinto is a symbol of this principle. In the "Emptiness" section of his essay, Hara chooses the Ise shrine, Shinto's most sacred site, and one of the oldest in the country, to demonstrate the Shinto sense of emptiness. The Ise shrine is unique among other Shinto shrines in that the shrine itself gets rebuilt every 20 years. This custom, called *"shikinen zotai"*, has been in practice for many years. It means that the physical shrine is essentially never the original, ancient shrine. What is considered sacred about Ise, then, is the concept of Shinto itself, the embraced emptiness, the spirit of the space. Hara elaborates that this emptiness does not mean "nothingness" in the negative sense; rather, it describes "becoming" and "transformation." Things cannot have movement if there is no "empty" space for it to move. The 20-year cycle, the symbolic "renewal" of the Ise shrine, sounds almost like a work of Conceptual Art or Installation Art. Yet, the reason behind it is beyond art for art's sake.

Because nature is considered sacred, especially the nature surrounding the shrines, Shinto sites also function as conservational spaces. Ancient forests still survive throughout Japan today, because of Shinto. And, whereas all famous Buddhist temples require entrance fees, Shinto shrines are generally open to the public with no admission charge; thus, Shinto shrines also function much like public parks. The "emptiness" in Shinto, then, has the positive implication of "letting free," of "no restriction," of "natural power and

freedom," and of the exchange between entities, living or inanimate, in nature. Shinto is perhaps the most eco-friendly, most pantheistic faith still in practice in the world today.

But another crucial point of pantheism is that since everything is natural, it is not necessary to talk only about nature. It is almost more to the point to "experience" nature in all of its forms. And a "fascination" with nature has a great and rewarding pantheistical quality in itself.

One of the most successful, most sought-after, and most promising artists in the Japanese art world of late is the Kansai-based sculptor and professor, Nawa Kohei. At just 35, it is safe to say that Nawa represents, at least, several aspects of what contemporary art means in Japan today. A former student of Nomura Hiroshi, a prominent conceptual artist whose work deals with science, Nawa shares his mentor's fascination with scientific experiments. However, while Nomura's art is highly conceptual and unconventional, Nawa's sculptural outputs are almost traditional, even conservative. He creates objects and puts them on display in a white, clean space. What makes Nawa's art surprising is the unpredictability of his process and his subtle, at times elusive, allusions to nature.

To be sure, Nawa is a contemporary artist flowing along willingly with contemporary trends and lifestyles. He belongs to SCAI, a successful contemporary gallery in Tokyo. His sculptures are popular among foreign buyers, making him one of the gallery's biggest young stars. He is as much interested and is sometimes inspired by high-tech gadgets, as he is obsessively seeking out new ways to experiment with natural textures and spaces. He, like Hara Kenya, also takes inspiration from Shinto's philosophy of nature; but his way of showing this spiritual inspiration is not by addressing it, but by attempting to create dialogue about it through the "surfaces" and "textures" of things. Before we can understand the "essence" of something, we always have to deal with its skin first—that is Nawa's basic theme. Nawa deliberately creates, or manipulates, surfaces in order to provoke inquiries from the spectator. And once the spectator starts to pay attention and inspects the surface for him or herself, a sense of connection, of knowledge, even of emotions, begins to blur the separation between the object and the spectator. This process is precisely how pantheistic perception can be most rewarding as a way to appreciate art.

Probably, Nawa's most recognizable works—they are certainly his bestsellers—are the sculptures in the "PixCell" series. Objects of all kinds and sizes, from outdoor statues to found cigarette buds, get completely covered with clear glass beads of slightly different diameters, creating an optical effect that hides, distorts, and transforms the true surfaces of the objects. Usually, the objects still retain their identities but do not look quite like themselves. They make the spectator slightly uncomfortable about and uncertain of what they are seeing. The "PixCell" objects that seem to get the most attention are the stuffed animals, most of them deer and elks. This is perhaps telling. People are often fascinated by their own manipulation of nature, of animals. Nawa's strange, yet attractive, stuffed animals, entirely covered in crystal beads, inspire at first a kind of blank reaction; perhaps, the same kind of "emptiness" in Japanese design suggested by Hara Kenya. The method doesn't seem to express anything in particular, yet it provokes curiosity. For animal lovers, it might even provoke anger. This is one of Nawa's ways of inviting the spectator to cross the boundary between his or her internal world—the self—and the external world: in other words, to start thinking about peeling off the dividing skins. It is perhaps we, not the artist's animals, that are always covered in something, protecting ourselves from nature, from seeing it clearly. Perhaps, it is we who are being manipulated.

Dance is sometimes thought of as the manipulation of regular, natural movements; but is it also not natural to dance, even for animals? Contemporary dancer Tanaka Min is a unique character in the Japanese art community. Professionally, he is one of the country's most respected theatrical performers, having successfully crossed boundaries from Butoh-inspired, avant-garde theater, to film and TV dramas. In 1985, he founded a small farming community in a rural area in the Yamanashi prefecture, where he now lives. He called this communal project "Body Weather", with the curious intention of tracing the origin of Japanese dance through agricultural activities. Also, Tanaka and his colleagues in the artistic and intellectual community started an unconventional summer festival called "Dance Hakushu," and an annual camp for children and their parents called "Art Camp"—both of them in Hakushu, another rural part of Yamanashi. Both events offer parents and their children, mostly in their teens, the chance to meet established artists of diverse disciplines, watch their performances, see their work process, learn from them, and even participate in their workshops. The campers spend three to four days

together in an outdoor site, amidst a breathtaking natural setting, surrounded by rice paddies, animal farms, mountains, and forests. There are few, if any, modern facilities.

Apart from the artistic activities, Tanaka Min and his staff also provide the campers with real, hands-on farming experiences. For Tanaka, working in the field and practicing dance moves are related activities. They are systematic body movements with forms and rhythms that are not only interesting to the eyes of the spectators, but also "teach" and "discipline" the bodies of the famers/dancers themselves.

Being in a rural environment is, for Tanaka—who was born and raised in Tokyo—equivalent to taking lessons at a pace much slower than that followed in a big city. In this "slowness" there is much inspiration to be discovered. As a dancer, Tanaka is interested not in perfecting dance moves or creating attractive dance "styles." He feels, for example, that to call himself a "Butoh dancer" means nothing, because there is no such thing as "Butoh." It is only a name, a word created by someone, he asserts. Even though Butoh is sometimes understood as referring to an experimental dance that takes inspiration directly from nature, such as animal movements, tree branches, etc., there is no reason to assume that the dancers intend to make the connections. Tanaka thinks that if there is no "interaction with the external" on the dancer's part, then the performance is devoid of true value. It is the interaction, especially with the natural flow, that counts. Nature, with its particular pacing and perpetual movements, is the best teacher.

Like Ric Obenza in Davao City, Tanaka Min is not only an artist, but also a passionate educator whose textbook is nature. The two may seem worlds—the former, an unknown high school teacher in the Philippines; the latter an internationally acclaimed Japanese actor. Yet, their deep respect for nature and their "belief" in the value of realizing the connectedness of everything put them on the same path.

Interestingly, many contemporary artists who have strong pantheistic principles tend to work also in education, both officially and independently; as if they feel that there is a deep necessity for contemporary society to "understand" nature—which includes ourselves—better, or at least in a fresh way. Perhaps it is the isolated condition of the Contemporary Art industry that compels the art form to seek out causes beyond the art world. By doing so, they may not be able to change, transform, or improve anything, if all is already "natural." But pantheism is never about change or improvement, in the first place. It is about accepting our role as a part of the whole. Even more importantly, it is about learning, and particularly about our special ability, as humans, to learn.

Through this teaching and learning process, this pantheistic "emptiness," art could inspire society to become more aware of our actions and their consequences. Far from being a pessimistic philosophy, pantheism perceives that which we call "beauty" to be our source of virtue; and that which we call "tragic" to be our source of knowledge.

VideoLetter to my First Grandson (from an Asian Rice-Terrace Stalker)

Kidlat Tahimik

PreQuel:

A famous Soliloquy might help give an overview of this API Fellow's dilemma:

"*To SQUARE... or not to Square (the round Peg)... That is the question...*" (with apologies to Shakespeare's Hamlet sequel)

That's been Kidlat Tahimik's queezy question... since Square O as an API fellow.

Consistent throughout the API fellowship, (while applying for API grant, during country visits, prior to the Penang Workshop... and now, blurbing the catalogue blurb)... it remains the same tug of war within Kidlat Tahimik (K.T.):

"To Square... or not to Square..."

And now its endgame: For his "intellectual" output to enter the final *Square Z*, (the batch 09 catalogue.) The filmmaker is tasked now to encode for posterity, his *written* piece about his *visual* piece. And this sequel must be in a format that segues with the formal reports of Batch '09 fellows who are sharing the same table of contents.

How does KT mould his *Round-Peg* process with the *Square-Hole* requirements as a final testament to his year as an Asian Public Intellectual?

SeeQuel (sic):

Storytellers combine sequels to complete their tale. Filmmakers are storytellers who tell it with visuals. A filmmaker's output is to be seen. Yes, in a *SeeQuel*. (sic) But if the cineaste has had a lifetime history—of *taking up a lifetime* to finish any of his Round-Peg films—how does he submit his SeeQuel to fit in a Square-Hole deadline?

If my image *cut-and-paste processes* (a.k.a. editing) involve cosmic timetables (read: no hard deadlines) how do I please my new imagined community? (read: my "Asian intellectual" community?) How do I submit before the clock strikes the hour, when normally the flow of my film creativity rules out the tick-tock hardline finales. (Note: KT understands the need for protocols. KT just doesn't know how to live with protocols. That's why he missed the connecting flight to Penang, remember? That's why he can't do a commercial flic with deadlines by bankers, *comprenez vous*?)

That's why all KT films are works-in-progress. Never finally nailed in a coffin.

Please take the above in good faith. See it as an artistic confession to frame the *submission* (sic) of this report. I submit, therefore I am...

Rest assured we are not mocking the API Catalogue process. We're simply admitting: I am submitting (before the deadline), therefore I am an API alumnus. My *SeeQuel* may not yet be fully cooked, to be served in the API 09 Banquet. But I submit it anyway with my heart, as a soft-boiled work-in-progress (read: an *unfinal cut* because the final *poinggg* in this ping-pong process is not yet... (i.e. not yet eligible for a protocol stamp of "*game over*." No definitive "The End" *a la fin du flic*.

FlashBack-Quel

A recent experience is a helpful flashback: in 2001 KT invited to write an article for an anthology on the Philippine-American War (1899-1902) published by NYU. But KT's article was edited out... because his creativity flow was expressed in *Tag-lish* or Tagalog English. Ironically the clash between NYU's prescribed King's English and the relaxed creole Tag-lish texts can be viewed as microcosm of the whole Phil-Am War. (Lingering skirmishes after a bloody war one century ago!)

Was it a subconscious rejection by culture-colonizing habits.? Of course there is the possibility that KT's article was badly written. Or, it was too outlandish for academic protocols of a university press. Or, KT's alien broadband humor had its own chauvinistic frequency (undecodable by an earthling receiver.) Or simply it was out of place amongst the distinguished writers.

Or to be safe, lets just say, KT's ouvre was "*Ni-Ha, Ni-Ho*" (A cure-all Filipino expression which means "Neither this, Neither that..." Which says it all!

Proto-Quel (Protocol-quel)

At the 2010 Penang API Workshop, KT presented an audiovisual "*Letter to my first grandson.*" He projected his roughly-edited images with a live narration by the grandfather (KT) It has evolved since then.

For the catalogue of Batch 09, KT is herewith submitting the same footages, with added sequels on grandson Kalipay, edited by his parents–fashioned into some sort of "*Reply to my Grandfather*"

Currently the work has become a ping-pong of visuals clusters between Lolo (grandfather) and his Apo (grandchild.) No, don't expect to watch an exciting interchange between Obama and daughters, a la BBC.

Just glide along with a philosophical meandering—of a senior-citizen cineaste whose awareness is *Asianized* by visits to Asian rice terraces. The grandpa's stream of thought is interspersed with imagined thought-bubbles from his meandering grandson (as in—learning to crawl all over the living room floor before taking his first steps alone.)

Its not a real conversation: just the old man's thinking aloud (over visuals of Asian rice-terraces) met by the kiddie gobbledygook of an infant.

Pre-Proto-Quels

At this point it might be good for my API colleagues to understand my unorthodox filmmaking process. In a positive review, New York Times called it "primitive movie-making". Godard said "a film you might have found in a bamboo hut..."

Most standard films start with the written word. KT is known for his script-less films. His works grow on the editing table (trial and error editing) - with daily happenings daring to enter his storyline. It's a road-film without a road-map.

The final script (i.e. encoded dialogues/narrations) is actually an after-the—fact dialogue list. It didn't start from a wordsmith. Words sprout only after a playful editing of images. Guided by the auteur's playful *inner duwende*.

Duwende? Think of a loving mentor, playfully brewing an elixir of personal experiences and cultural potions. This homegrown brew forms the unique worldview that only this artist can frame.

Such un-pre-scripted output can only be serependity-driven. Ergo its organic. And it goes on... without a "The End." Because the last SeeQuel is the beginning of the spectator's turn to churn the film.

Now-Quels and Yester-Quels

My API year coincided with the countdown to my first grandson's landing on planet earth. So, I tried to reserve a window, in between country visits. I wanted to be in Kalipay's delivery room (yes doctors gown, operating mask and hood included) armed with my movie camera.

But that didn't happen. Visa protocols jammed the ideal timetable despite API-Bangkok's valiant efforts to expedite releases. (Hail MichicoY, Hail Shanya.) The rice terrace road map- for filming plantings and harvests- had a built-in window for the filmmaker to experience the "*grandpa moment*" at birth.

Alas KT was to experience euphoric red-shirts in Chiang Mai, while baby Kalipay entered this world euphorically (without his grandfather shooting...) Who knows, a subsequent editing of the film might include the passionate Thai protestors in their Red-shirts- intercut with shots of my grandson's indigenous dance in his crimson G-string. (A docu about Red Movements.)

The "H"-A.P.I. SeeQuel:

Inevitably, Kalipay did enter my API Video Essay. Because Kalipay happened. Like Merapi happened. Erupting after I had shot Borubudour's terraces and left. Merapi's overacting begged to enter the SeeQuel in the Penang WorkShop. This prompted me to re-cycle my 1991 footages of Pinatubo's eruption.

As I said, spontaneous happenings enter my films ... framed by my advocacies. Pinatubo's grey ashfall became a metaphor for the cultural "ashfall" from our TV overdose of "American Idol" programming.

PostQuel

Kalipay's name means *Happiness*–with a capital *"H"*. Merged with my API Asian rice terraces fellowship, it became a "H"-A.P.I. SeeQuel.

In the following pages- is the printable "script." I submitted... therefore I am... As this API 09 Catalogue is released, the E-link below will lead you, my fellow API alumni, to the "H"-A.P.I. sequel—an interim version of Kidlat Tahimik's video Ping-Pong with his grandson:

www.api-fellowships.org

So, dear API friends, to see *"The End"* of the final "H"-A.P.I. SeeQuel, you might have to wait for our next lifetime...

By which time, Kalipay might be already "filming" his own SeeQuels—in the latest post-video technological formats of the future... Of course, his footages will show rice terrace cultures, like his grandfather, starring his grandfather, dignifiedly dressed... in his crimson *virtual-G-string...*

Letter to My First Apo (grandson)		
A Video-Ping-Pong by Kidlat Tahimik/ and Kalipay (A Work-in-Progress catalyzed by the Batch 9 API WS in Penang)		
Kidat Tahimik Narration Track: (Grandfather's Voice Over) 	Kalipay Reply Track (grandson's replies are subtitled "translating" baby's gobbledygook) 	Visual Track (Probable flow of video images corresponding to text flow.)
Dearest Kalipay, Thank you very much for making me a Lolo (grandfather). I regret I was not present at Notre Dame Hospital 6 months ago, when you arrived and gave me that rank of "grandfather". Sorry, I was in Indonesia shooting... No, Lolo wasn't hunting lions and elephants in an African Safari. But yet, Lolo was "shooting"...taking shots of rice terraces with his video camera. Yes...you can say your grandpa was some sort of a "Safari..." Let's call it my "Asian Safari". So excuse me...that I failed to document your arrival on May 11, 2010 in this planet.	I came to visit this world 30 minutes before Talay's (papa's) birthday. I could have waited a bit longer. But the doctor knocked on my door and told me to come out.	

	My umbilical chord went around my neck 4 times…necklace… You were not there. The first warmth of skin I felt was Lola's (grandma's). But I saw you, Lolo…a refection in her eyes…	
Arrivals and departures. Hurried comings and goings. Lots of those… In the past 6 months—during short transit stops in Baguio—Lolo played with you.. Yes, eye-blinks—between jet-setting pilgrimages to Asian tanadas (rice terraces).		
	Just like you, Lolo, I've been travelling I've tasted mother's milk…on land… On the seas..in the sky. I was also breastfeeding while the Ifugao Shamman invited the spirits to our new house.	
It clearly dawned upon me – my Asian-ness.. While walking along gracefully curving terraces carved out of mountain slopes.. While tanking gentle steps past green carpets of rice-stalks.. While trekking along narrow terrace walls.. My visions, gliding over newly planted stems in pools..mirroring clouds floating lazily above.. Keeping me high.. Walking meditations… Heightening your grand fathers awareness of his Asian-ness.		

Although I have been conscious that I am a citizen of Asia,
It had never been so clear—the *common-ness* of our majestic rice-terraces..
Truly Asian landscapes.

Instead of expensive plastic toys, I found out that a leaf is more interesting to play with.
I love its crunching sound. I love its smell.
I don't like how it tastes.
But I love the inter-connecting veins of the leaves.

While trekking the terraces along
The *verdant green* slopes in Bali,
Along *golden yellow* harvestable Steppes in Sarawak...
Along *arid brown* contours in Himalayan foothills of Chiang Rai

All the shades of *riceness*...
Asserting the rainbow hues of nutritious energies...

for millions of Asians in the past, for Asians now, and yet unborn.

And for newly born YOU, Kalipay
Soon, you too will begin chewing the Asian staple that is rice.
What we all Kanin.

Rice is not just a common food.
It is a way of life... a bonding... of our Asian rootedness
And a Spiritual linking with the upper-worlds...And their natural care for us grounded mortals.

It is our common Asian nature.
Beyond the rice in our stomachs...
Ahh, staple for our souls.

Are the Asian cultures you mentioned
As connected as the veins—in the leaves that I played with?

Kalipay, your father knows, since he was a boy
Your grandfather is moving to Ifugao's mountainsides...
Romancing those ancient stone terrace...

My never-fading romance with our 300-year hand-carved steepness...
More ancient than the stone terraces of Egypt's pyramids...
More ancient than the giant snaking stone wall of China...
As ancient as the stone terraced temples of Borobodour...
And those gracefully embracing boulders of Machu Pichu rice terraces...

The never ending ripples of stone walls along slopes...
Built to feed stomachs for millennia and a day...

Like a newly found love, your grandfather wishes to planted Permanently...
In the fields that nourished our people.

With the gift of Maknoman and other upper word deities...
The life giving grains of rice.

Above Ifugao's terraces,
Lolo has built his own hut
Away the urban memories of over-development.

Immersing, in testaments of sustainable development...

Ancient rice terraces as memories of indigenous people in harmony with their environment.

Trekking the terraces in Thailand, Indonesia and Sarawak, I was welcomed by the embracing tribal rituals of the host cultures.

In the warmth of their longhouse, the Kelabit womenfolk serenaded their visitor with ancient song.

And so your grandfather donned their warrior headdress / shield and picked up their beat.

And gulped their special Bario rice wine. And entered their world.

Wow, I felt at home in the Kelabit rice-culture. A tribute to life!

And so with life's ephemerality... The Balinese rice terrace cremation provided a different warmth... Heat actually...

Reminding us death is but one hue in life's color spectrum...

All these immersions in landscapes and people-scapes...

All these cultural ping-pongs have fertilized my budding Asianess.

Even the mechanized Cultures of Niigata tanadas for rice grains in their Japanese sake rice wine.

We reminded them of the ancient kayabuki thatched roof houses without nails...

And their fundoshi culture when Japanese farmers wore G Strings like our Ifugao elders.

The Rice Terrace safari has enlightened my thinking ...and lightened my feeling and breathing like an Asian kid flying his kite...

And yes, soaring – like an Asian eagle.

If you feel you are a giant eagle soaring in the sky,
Then I am a fish swimming in the sea.
Maybe in our next life we can meet halfway...neither in the blue sky nor the deep blue sea. But somewhere in between.

Each year our planet goes around the sun. Each birthday is an orbit that takes 365 days. Like now, I have just completed my 68 orbit around the sun.

On May 11, you shall have completed your first orbit. When you come to visit me in my hut atop the Ifugao rice terraces, I will tell you stories of Asian rice terraces and their people and their culture and their duties And yes, Asian yum yum cooking. My orbit-day present to you, my first grandson, will be to introduce you to the genius of our Filipino indigenous culture. I will introduce you to the similarities with our fellow Asians Our shared cosmos in the rice cycle.		
When you visit me we shall walk up the terraces – what Ifugaos call the stairways of the gods.		
When I meet you in the sun, I will tell you much.		
Your loving grandfather Lolo Kidlat Tahimik		

Southeast Asian Robinsonades: A Study on the Translations of Joachim Heinrich Campe's *Robinson der Jüngere* (1779/1780) into Tagalog (*Ang Bagong Robinson*, 1879) and Bahasa Melayu (*Hikayat Robinson Crusoë*, 1875)

Ramon Guillermo

Introduction

This study presents a preliminary comparative translation analysis of Joachim Heinrich Campe's pedagogical work *Robinson der Jüngere* (JDR) into Malay and Tagalog. The Malay translation is entitled *Hikayat Robinson Crusoë* (HRC), and the Tagalog one, *Ang Bagong Robinson* (ABR). Since the objective of this study is partly to gain some insights into the problems of cultural transference by means of translation analysis, it does not aim to assess or measure so-called "fidelity" or "translational accuracy" (House 1997). Rather, it seeks to compare the conceptual systems and discursive elements informing the three texts in question, specifically with respect to the translation of German political-economic concepts. Following the perspective of Edwin Genzler (1993, 196), it is evident that the contrastive resources which the techniques of translation analysis provide can bring to light the specificity of the discursive elements and conceptual histories informing the respective texts in question. Given this objective, that HRC is a "relay translation" from Dutch of an original German text and ABR is a "relay translation" from Spanish of the same original German text can be considered a secondary problem in the context of the overall study.

The translations will be read on their own terms with respect to their distinctive discursive characteristics. It should be emphasized that this is not a study in linguistics, but an exercise in attempting to combine what have been called "discourse analysis" and "conceptual history."

Text 1: Robinson der Jüngere

Daniel Defoe's (1660-1731) novel, *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe*, was first published in 1719 and is considered the first English novel. Due to its great success among the reading publics of Europe, it also became one of the most well known, widely translated, and frequently adapted works in world literature. Among the 18th century German *Robinsonades*, the most popular and most successful on a European-wide scale was *Robinson der Jüngere: Zur angenehmen und nützlichen Unterhaltung für Kinder* (The New Robinson: Agreeable and useful entertainment for children, 1779-1780), done by the Enlightenment pedagogue, Joachim Heinrich Campe (1746-1818). Campe was one of the most prominent figures in the German Enlightenment and was well known throughout Europe in the 19th century for his innovative educational and linguistic theories. He was part of an eminent group of educators that included Johann Bernhard Basedow (1724-1790) and Christian Gotthilf Salzmann (1744-1811). They were known as the *Philanthropen* (those who love humanity) and their educational approach was called *Philanthropismus*. They frowned upon rote learning and corporal punishment, criticized the authoritarianism of adults in the learning process, and rejected the treatment of children as "small grown-ups." It was in the 1770s when Campe was running a school in Hamburg that he wrote *Robinson der Jüngere* (RDJ), considered the first work in German literature intended for children.

Campe's seventeen-year old hero from the German city of Hamburg was named "Krusoe" (rather than Robinson). Against all the wishes of his parents who had failed to give him a proper upbringing due to their excessive fondness for him, he decides to set out to sea to find his fortune. Various untoward incidents intervene, which he interprets as punishments for disobeying his parents, until he finds himself the lone survivor of a shipwreck on a remote island in the Caribbean.

David Blamires (2009), who believes that Campe had succeeded in crafting a "miniature history of human development," divides Campe's novel into three periods:

> In the first, he is alone and has to make shift with just his head and his hands. In the second he gains a companion, Friday, and learns to value

human society. Finally, in the third the wreck of a European ship provides him with tools and other things that make for a more civilized life and eventually permit him to return first to England and then to Hamburg, where he is reconciled with his father and finds that his mother has died (30).

The central, and in Campe's view, quite crucial, distinction between his and Defoe's works was that, where Defoe's Robinson had at least a gun, some tools, food and drink to get him started, Campe's had nothing but the clothes on his back and some songs he had learned by heart.

Throughout the 19th century, Campe's RDJ would be read and translated into innumerable languages, including Malay and Tagalog. Data gathered from Hermann Ullrich's (1898) bibliography of Robinson Crusoe and various other Robinsonades spanning the period 1770-1870, not including the Tagalog and Malay translations, show that RDJ was translated into at least twelve languages during that period and was translated most often in French (with 14 translations), Danish (7) and English (5) (cf. figures 1 and 2).

Text 2: Hikayat Robinson Crusoë

It was Adolf Friedrich von Dewall, a Eurasian born in Cirebon on 28April 1834, who translated Campe's RDJ into Bahasa Melayu. While in government service, he had such mastery of Melayu, Sundanese, and Javanese that he became the official translator of adventure stories and popular scientific works intended for education (Molhuysen and Blok 1930, 386).

Being a translation then probably meant the work would be used for teaching "proper" or "high" Malay; therefore, HRC most likely served as a school textbook and was reprinted eight times by the Government Printing Office, until 1910 (Jedamski 2002).

Doris Jedamski's pioneering research on the HRC was likely to have been the first to stress its importance for Malay and Indonesian literary historiography. Although she considered this translation to be the first literary work to successfully introduce the novel form to a Malay audience, Jedamski justifiably entertained doubts regarding its efficacy with respect to its Malay readership. She sensed great difficulties regarding the transmission of "alien" European concepts such as

"individualism" to a very different religious and socio-cultural context. She also noted impediments in actually measuring the impact of this work on the development of Indonesian literature as a whole (2002, 29). Still, the language of HRC appears to follow closely the linguistic conventions of *hikayats* or Malay sagas of the same period. Waruno (n.d., 25) observes that "the language is a remarkably good example of classical 'High' Malay."

One of the more pressing problems in analyzing the HRC as a relay translation is establishing its immediate Dutch language source text—more so than with respect to the ABR, because the Malay version represents a significant abridgement of RDJ along with several, more or less, significant textual revisions. However, Jedamski (2009, 199) seems to have finally identified the source text as being Gerard Keller's translation entitled *Geschiedenis van Robinson Crusoe verkort* (The Abridged Story of Robinson Crusoe, 1869). An interesting sidelight to the history of HRC is the fact that Von de Wall's translation was considered attractive enough to be published twice in the daily *Bintang Sorabaia* (Star of Surabaya), without proper attribution by other people claiming to be its author—the first time in 1888-1889 and the second, under the false title *Hikayat Anoewari, anaknja saorang miskin* (Story of Anoewari the younger, a poor man), in 1901-1902 (Jedamski 2009, 177-179).

De Wall later died in Jakarta (formerly Batavia) on 6 July 1909.

Text 3: Ang Bagong Robinson

Joaquin Tuason, the Tagalog translator of Campe's *Robinson der Jüngere* (1879), was born on 19 August 1843 and died on 27 September 1908. Little is known about him but for the fact that he was the son of a landowner–merchant in Pateros and studied at the Ateneo Municipal de Manila (Mojares 2006, 430). He worked as a translator of Spanish religious and moral treatises, and wrote poetry from the mid-19th to the early 20th century (Quirino 1995).

His translation of RDJ was entitled, *Ang bagong Robinson, historiang nagtuturo nang mabubuting caugalian, na guinauang tanungan nang icatuto at icalibang nang manga* batang babayi,t lalaqui (The new Robinson, a story that teaches good conduct, that was made into a question and answer form so that girls and boys can learn and be entertained). Like the Malay

version, Tuason's translation was not done direct from German, but was a relay translation from Tomás de Iriarte's (1750-1791) *El Nuevo Robinson*, first published in 1789. Iriarte's translation is said to have been a popular textbook in Spanish schools, long before Defoe's original was finally translated into Spanish in 1835 (Pym 2010). In his "Translator's Prologue," Iriarte heartily recommends Campe's version, while praising the "justified banning" of Defoe's *Robinson* by the Tribunal de la Fe in 1756 (Campe 1820, ix). However, he also informs the reader that he had taken the liberty of suppressing, adding, or changing Campe's text in not just a few places to (i) correct some factual errors, (ii) clarify some ideas which seemed too difficult for children to grasp, and (iii) reduce the number of bothersome digressions and repetitions (xii). (One of his interventions was to correct Campe's description that llamas had "humps" (*corcoba*).)

Tuason's ABR was the second work in Tagalog (?) novel form to be introduced to a Tagalog reading public. It came after the Tagalog translation of Enrique Perez Escrich's *El Martir de Golgota* in 1872. Significantly, the Tagalog translation was commissioned and published by the Dominican Colegio de Santo Tomas. Tuason, like Iriarte, also admitted making changes to the text: "In translating this work, I have removed what I deemed of no use to Tagalogs; in the same way, I added prayers to the benevolent Virgin whenever Robinson faces misfortune." Tuason also announced that he added eight strophes to a poem in its fifth chapter and several notes in the course of the text, to clarify certain passages for Tagalog readers.

The current paucity of information on the translators and the translations is a real problem which faced this study. Given the "marginal" position of translators and translations in the literary canon, this is to be expected. Unfortunately, unless new sources can be found, an actual reception study of these two translations cannot be undertaken.

Translation Analysis

Any finite translation analysis cannot deal with all aspects of the texts in question, but has to discover a conceptual point of entry or fulcrum. Finding and selecting a central point upon which to anchor the translation analysis requires a period of reflection on the textual materials. The preliminary analysis

indicates that a useful point of entry would be the comparison of the respective languages of "political economy" in RDJ, HRC, and ABR. This may seem somewhat odd, given that Campe's text is primarily a moral–pedagogical treatise. Among the major preoccupations of RDJ were to satisfy the pressing needs of Robinson as he was stranded on the island and to find the means by which he would succeed in doing so. RDJ may, in actual fact, be one of the first texts translated into Malay and Tagalog, with significant discussions on modern European economic themes.

In Marx's famous reference to *Robinson Crusoe*, he wrote: "Because political economy is fond of Robinsonades, Robinson appears at first on his island. Humble as he may be, he nevertheless has various needs (Bedürfnisse) to satisfy and must therefore perform different kinds of useful labor, make tools, fabricate furniture, tame llamas (Lama zähmen), fish, hunt etc." (1956, 90)

It can be noticed here that Marx mentions Robinson's taming "llamas" rather than "goats," which are more properly found in Defoe's novel. This may lead one to suspect that Marx had actually read Campe's version with its "humped llamas," rather than Defoe's hairy goats. It would, however, be rash to conclude this since Campe's Robinson was a German from the city of Hamburg, while Marx specifically refers to Robinson in the continuation of the passage above as being a "good Englishman." It may, therefore, be the case that Marx was familiar with both versions, and his portrait of Robinson in *Capital* is a kind of composite from Campe and Defoe.

Marx offers a way of reading *Robinson Crusoe* as an economic parable which could profitably be taken up in this study. However, using his concepts to analyze Campe's specifically economic discourse would probably lead to unwanted anachronisms. In light of the 100-year gap between RDJ and *Das Kapital*, it would be quite unlikely that they would be speaking the same economic language. Fortunately, the first foreign language into which Adam Smith's *The Wealth of Nations* (WN) was translated was German. This was in 1776 (and then again in 1794), the same year its first edition was also published in English, and three years before the first printing of RDJ (Waszek 1993, 167; Tribe 1995) (cf. figure 3). Given that the first German translation of WN and RDJ are almost contemporaneous, it might be possible to take up Marx's insight on the economic content of the Robinsonade as a literary genre, in general. In so doing,

it can be applied to the RDJ, while carefully avoiding anachronisms through the use of WN and its early German translations as the main discursive reference points. Although there are indications that Campe had some awareness of the prevailing economic doctrines of his time, it is not actually necessary to assume that he had read WN in its original English form or its German translation, in order to compare the implicit economic ideas in RDJ to their 19th-century translations in Malay and Tagalog. It is sufficient that he was evidently dealing in some economic terms and notions in RDJ, in their general usage during the late 18th century.

Table 1 shows selected lexical elements from RDJ that are related to the thematics of political economy. The old spellings from the 18th-century German text and the 19th-century Tagalog and Malay texts shall be maintained when quoting from these in the course of the analysis.

Figure 4 shows the "economic" terms selected from RDJ, HRC, and ABR in relation to some central concepts from WN and *Das Kapital*. The foregoing translation analysis will look into some salient economic notions as translated from RDJ to HRC and ABR. The most central of these notions (not all them explicitly formulated in WN) are "exchange value," "use value," "division of labor," "abstract labor," "socially necessary labor time," and "needs." However, given space limitations, only the concept of "needs" can be discussed below.

Needs

The German concept of *Bedürfnis* (need) in the quote from RDJ is said to have undergone a fundamental transformation in the 18th century. According to Müller (1973, 442), "Up to the last decade of the 18th century, the word *Bedürfnis* was used quite rarely, the frequency of usage increased from around 1740-1760, and from around 1770 onwards it entered into general usage. The spectrum of meanings which it shows in the last decades of the 18th century is no longer substantially different from that of today." *Bedürfnis* was formerly used as a synonym for *Nothdurft* (call of nature) or *Armut* (poverty), while *Bedarf* originally referred to the basic necessities of life. However, during the European Enlightenment, *Bedürfnis* began to be used more frequently in its plural form, *Bedürfnisse*, to refer more and more to "needs," corresponding on the one hand, to changing cultural and economic living standards; and, on the other hand, to particular individualized needs or preferences. An "escalation of needs" (*Bedürfnissteigerung*) accompanied by the "dissolution of its limits" (*Bedürfnisentgrenzung*) came to the fore.

The analysis of the translation of *Bedürfnis* can usefully begin with a selected quote from RDJ and its translation in HRC (cf. table 2). The quote from RDJ may be read as a capsule narrative of the development of the concept of *Bedürfnis*. Starting with the concept of *Noth* (hardship/necessity), which may be read as pertaining to the most basic needs, it moves to the concept of *Bedürfnisse* (needs), which possesses the broader and more modern definition. The quote from RDJ shows how the effort of human beings through "labor" (*Arbeit*) to satisfy their needs gives rise to (i) the process of development of human knowledge about "nature" (*Erde*) and (ii) the "invention" (*Erfindung*) of various tools (*Werkzeuge*) and machines that would facilitate the satisfaction of these needs. According to John Bellamy–Foster (2000), Marx used a term borrowed from the German chemist Justus von Liebig's (1803-1873) usage of "metabolic interaction" (*Stoffwechsel*), to characterize the human labor process, in general. If the relevant passage from RDJ is understood as an illustration of human metabolic interaction with "nature"/"earth" (*Erde*), then it could be seen as concentrating all the earlier economic themes into the structure of needs and productive labor as these developed in the late 18th and throughout the 19th century in Germany and Europe. Labor as an abstract is, potentiality, here understood as the confrontation of human beings with nature in order to satisfy their ever–increasing and complex needs, thus necessitating the development of technology, complex organizations (such as the division of labor), a reduction in socially necessary labor time, and so on and so forth.

In HRC, the version presented of this passage is obviously quite different. *Hadjat* (desire/need) and *kesoesahan* appear in the corresponding translation as the equivalent of *Bedürfnis* and *kesoesahan* (difficulty/adversity) for *Noth*. Similar to the idea present in RDJ, "human beings" (*manoesia*) are said to be confronted with *kesoesahan* and imbued with various *hadjat*, which sharpens "thinking" (*pikiran*) and deepens "knowledge" (*ilmoe*). However, the HRC version does not translate *Erde* (earth, or in this case, nature) and *Erfindung* (invention). Because of these omissions, the macro–narrative of "mastery of nature" through human technology and "invention" does not seem to

arise in HRC. *Pikiran* (thinking), however, is developed so that *kesoesahan* can be overcome, all *bahaja* (danger) pushed aside, and the various *hadjat* satisfied. It seems that HRC refers to the sharpening of a skill rather than to the development of a technology in overcoming these difficulties and satisfying these desires. *Kesoesahan* and *bahaja* in HRC clearly refer to situations which, even if they occur often enough, do not constitute the normal state of things. *Hadjat* on the other hand, may refer to a "longing" or "desire" beyond the more basic necessities of life (Wilkinson 1919). HRC therefore includes a qualifier of *hadjat* as having to be *patoet* (decent/proper). The quote from HRC therefore seems to refer to zones "below" (*kesoesahan/bahaja*) and "above" (*hadjat jang patoet*), the norms of everyday need, which being extraordinary experiences necessitate the development/advancement of thinking and knowledge. On the other hand, the concept of *Bedürfnisse* in RDJ, whatever its subjectivization, refers neutrally to needs which presumably can be satisfied by the confident advance of human mastery over nature.

Further analysis of HRC would also show that beyond the development of skills for evading hardship, the most obvious "solution" to *kesoesahan* in HRC is *pertolongan* ("help," whether from God or from other human beings). Out of 21 usages of the word *kesoesahan*, eight collocate *pertolongan* (cf. tables 3, 3.1 and 3.2). There is apparently no surface collocational structure corresponding to this in RDJ. Though the social and religious themes of "help" are not completely excluded in RDJ, the tendency in HRC contrasts strongly with RDJ—this tendency being, to focus on ethical competence rather than the almost completely excluded notion of technological competence in overcoming hardships, resolving the problem of lack of resources, or "mastering" nature. If the life situation is situated below the norm, then HRC points to *pertolongan* (help/aid) as the unfailingly dependable solution for human beings.

In contrast to HRC, the translation in ABR closely mirrors the conceptual arrangement of RDJ in this passage. Unlike HRC, which does not translate *Erde* (earth/nature) and *Erfindung* (invention), ABR translates these terms, albeit rather ambiguously, as *lupa* (earth/land) and *mabubuting paraan* (effective/good means). It should be noted that the translation of *allerlei Erfindungen* (various inventions) as *mabubuting paraan* (translation) is not sufficient in itself to generate the technological themes present in RDJ. The two ideas of *Noth* and *Bedürfnisse* are conflated in ABR (as they are in Iriarte's translation, which uses the Spanish term *necesidad*) as *pagcacailangan* (need). The key to discovering the discursive specificity of ABR therefore has to be sought elsewhere.

The second example (cf. table 4) may serve as a preliminary illustration. In RDJ, Robinson prays that he will be blessed with *Stärke zur Ertragung* (the strength to withstand hardship) in going through or experiencing *Leiden* (suffering). It can be noticed that the same sentence, as translated in HRC, once again contains a collocation of *kesoesahan* and *pertolongan*. Here, Robinson pleads for the *pertolongan* of God so that he can withstand (*menderita*) the extreme difficulties he faces (*kesoesahan jang terlampau berat*) with calm/patience (*sabar*). On the other hand, the version in ABR uses two words to describe the attitude towards *cahirapan* (suffering/harship), namely *pagtiis* (to bear) and *pagbata* (to endure). However, *pagtitiis* and *pagbata* do not exhaust this theme in ABR. In addition, a person needs *catibayan nang loob* (strength of the will) to be able to bear and endure hardship for an extended period. *Catibayan nang loob* here does not necessarily pertain to an "active will" but leans more to a kind of "passive will" to "endure" everything for as long as necessary. It has been observed that HRC is unique in relation to ABR and RDJ in its emphasis on *pertolongan*. For its part, ABR seems to dwell on the notion of enduring suffering more than either RDJ or HRC. Given the wealth of its lexicalizations on this theme, ABR can be said to have an "elaborated code" on "suffering," as opposed to the relatively "restricted codes" of HRC and RDJ.

The previous observation can be made even more evident by studying the collocations of *hirap/cahirapan* (difficulty) in ABR (cf. table 5). In contrast to the collocational structure formed in HRC by the pair *kesoesahan–pertolongan*, the ABR reveals a significant collocational structure formed by *hirap/cahirapan* (difficulty/ adversity/ poverty) and several phrases corresponding to the "strength" or "weakness" of the *loob* (will).

These phrases pertaining to the state of the "will" (*loob*) are as follows: *catibayan nang loob* (strength of the will/steadfastness), *malulupaypay ang loob* (the weakening of the will), *pahihinain ang loob* (the will shall be weakened), *humina ang loob* (to lose resolve), *di macapaghina nang loob* (shall not weaken the will). It can be seen that in ABR, the subject confronted by *cahirapan* vacillates between a strong and weak will.

However, only a "strong will" or *catibayan nang loob* can allow the subject to "bear" and "endure" suffering. A concordance listing of the polarity of "weak will (*loob*)" and "strong will (*loob*)" would show how powerfully this theme works within the total ideational structure of ABR. The phrases referring to a "strong will (*loob*)" are the following: *catibayan nang loob* (resilience), *lacas nang loob* (strength of the will), *capanatagan nang loob* (confidence), *di nasira ang loob* (unweakened resolve), *hinapang nang loob* (strengthening of the will). The phrases referring to a "weak will (loob)" are the following: *mahina ang loob* (weak *loob*), *nasira ang loob* (crushed resolve), *caligaligan nang loob* (restlessness), *malupaypay ang loob* (weakened will), *pagsaulan nang loob* (to console), *catacutan sa loob* (fear/trepidation). (For the sake of comparability, only the sections in which HRC overlaps ABR have been scanned for relevant collocations, cf. tables 5.1 and 5.2.)

A third example may lend further insight into the discursive specificity of ABR (cf. table 6). This particular quotation is particularly important because it represents a short exposition of the basic core of Campe's educational philosophy, as embodied in the term *Selbstüberwindung* (self-overcoming). According to Campe, the development of the capacity to postpone satisfaction or deprive oneself voluntarily of immediate desires in an "overcoming" of the self can strengthen one's personality so that every difficulty in the future can be faced with *gelassener Standhaftigkeit* (calm resolve). The term *Selbstüberwindung* is not translated directly in ABR, but rather substituted with an explanatory translation as the condition of being "accustomed to the lack of whatever comfort even that which you most desire." The phrase in RDJ, *stark am Geist und Herzen* (strong in spirit and heart) is translated in ABR as *catibayan nang loob* (strength of the will); *gelassener Standhaftigkeit* (calm resolve) is translated as *matitiis na mapayapa* (can be endured calmly). While RDJ does not specify what shall or must be "endured in calm resolve," ABR collocates *catibayan nang loob* here with *cahirapan* (difficulty) and *caralitaan* (poverty). It could therefore be asserted that the main semantic polarity in ABR is *cahirapan* (difficulty/poverty) versus *catibayan nang loob* (strength of the will).

Conclusion

The notion of *Bedürfnisse* and its connection to science and human invention is apparently discursively specific to RDJ with respect to HRC and ABR. The tendency in RDJ is to develop a discourse around the fulfillment of unlimited needs by increasingly developed (though still bounded) technological means. This conceptualization of needs and their fulfillment in RDJ are neutral in relation to the situation in which the subject finds herself/himself. On the other hand, HRC seems to posit an unstated norm of satisfaction of basic needs or, more controversially, of "original affluence" (Sahlins 1974). It is only when human beings (*manoesia*) are confronted with an exceptional situation below (or above) the norm, referred to as a state of *kesoesahan* (difficulty), that poverty or deprivation looms as a possibility for the human subject. However, instead of appealing to technological invention as a solution to this "difficulty," the predominant tendency in HRC is to look toward social and ethical solutions to the problem of deprivation or lack. Evidence for this is provided by the strong collocational pair *kesoesahan–pertolongan*. Indeed, this can even be connected to the notion of *gotong royong* (Koentjaraningrat 1961). The other categories of political economy ("exchange value," "use value," "division of labor," "abstract labor," "socially necessary labor time"), which so tightly cohere in RDJ as various aspects of human–nature metabolism, seem to fall away in HRC.

ABR, on the other hand, seems to emphasize the normativity of suffering and deprivation. If the situation of Robinson stranded on an island is considered in HRC as an exceptional state of *kesoesahan* and *bahaja* (danger) requiring *pertolongan*, it is, on the contrary, deemed exemplary of the human condition in ABR. This latter work almost seems to posit a situation of "ontological scarcity" (or as Iriarte put it, *la miseria y necesidades del hombre en este mundo* (the misery and needs of man on this earth)) and inescapable suffering, with a very strong Catholic flavor—perhaps reminiscent of the lives of saints which Tuason also translated into Tagalog, in which individual human beings have to learn to bear the difficulties inherent in life itself. This interpretation rests on the strong collocational pair *cahirapan–catibayan nang loob* (difficulty–strength of the will). Similar to HRC, the languages of political economy in RDJ seem to fall away in ABR as being insignificant in relation to the central problem of "bearing suffering."

The differences between RDJ, HRC, and ABR are schematically represented in Figure 5. It is evident that ABR and HRC do not share the interpretative grid upon which RDJ rests, that provided by the material

development of industrial society in Europe of the late 18th and 19th centuries. Notions central to RDJ such as "unlimited" human needs, human–nature metabolism (*Stoffwechsel*), and scientific–technological innovation do not therefore figure prominently, if at all, in HRC and ABR.

The HRC represents a position which depends upon ethical and social solutions to exceptional situations of scarcity, adversity, and deprivation. In a hypothetical situation of limited needs where sufficient means exist to supply these needs for a community, this is perhaps not an unusual outlook. The explanation for the particular discursive elements in ABR may most likely reflect the fact that the delicate balance between limited needs and sufficient means has been interrupted by the deprivation of these previously adequate means by extractive colonialism, for example. The aim of ABR in Tagalog as an even more emphatically moral–religious treatise was, as with many deeply ideological works in the colonial religious canon, the preaching of endurance and suffering within the context of colonial exploitation. The experiences of *kesoesahan* and *cahirapan* in HRC and ABR are qualitatively different from the "relative impoverishment" occurring in societies of developed industrial production, since the revolution of "needs" had not yet taken place within their material and discursive worlds. It should be underlined here, however, that no broader generalizations are being made regarding any purported "Malay" or "Tagalog" character or worldview.

In RDJ, the solution to fulfilling human needs is the development of adequate technical means and the attainment of efficient productive organization. In other words, the means by which societal prosperity is to be achieved is through increasing human domination over nature. In contrast to this, the solution to *kesoesahan* and *cahirapan* in the colonial contexts of the HRC and the ABR seems to be the continual development of various discourses of critique in combination with various kinds of oppositional practice. What if *pertolongan* were inflected to mean the collective action of the *rakjat* (people) against the colonial oppressor? What if *catibayan nang loob*, instead of being conceived as a passive acceptance of one's fate, became understood as the strength of the will to overcome the *cahirapan* (hardships) of the struggle in pursuit of the *himagsikan* (revolution)? (cf. figure 6) Some evidence has been shown elsewhere, at least for the Tagalog case, that

these types of critique would eventually articulate and form connections with the discourses specific to the nationalist struggle (Guillermo 2009b) and, eventually also, with notions of labor and production within the discourse of the early radical labor movements (Guillermo 2009a). In these early receptions, the discourses of political economy presented in RDJ would therefore not simply be abrogated or rejected, but rather reimagined and reconfigured discursively in a new constellation in which conceptions of exploitation and liberation would displace the centrality of ideas of technical progress and mastery over nature.

This preliminary study has hopefully succeeded in demonstrating the usefulness of a comparative approach in translation analysis, in working toward new insights on the history of political ideas, concepts, and discourses in a broader Southeast Asian context. A deeper and more sympathetic understanding of these histories of political ideas and ideologies is indispensable for anyone working toward the transformation and betterment of society. Given the fraught and complex contemporary history of political ideas in this region, such insights are obviously not merely of academic or historical interest, but are relevant to all those working for political transformation and social change.

Figure 1: Number of Translations of Robinson der Jüngere and number of languages translated into per decade from 1770 to 1870 (Ullrich 1898).


Figure 2: Number of Translations of Robinson der Jüngere per language from 1770-1870 (Ullrich 1898).

Figure 3: Timeline of Relevant Works

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Arbeit (33), arbeiten (13), Arbeitsamkeit (1), Bedürfnis (6), Einbildungskraft (3),
Eintheilung der Zeit (1), Erfindung (1), Fleiß (7), fleißig (3), Gehülfen (6), Geld
(6), Gold (12), Hülfe (19), Kauf (1), kaufen (2), einkaufen (3), kostbar (2),
kosten (10), Kräfte (16), Mühe (12), Mühseeligkeiten (3), Noth (14), Nothwendigste
(2), nüzen (1), nüzlich (7), unnüz (2), Schaz (3), Ware (1), Werk (12), Werkzeug
(15), Werth (7)
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*Table 1: Selected "economic" terms from RDJ with frequency of appearance*

Figure 4: Selected "Economic" Terms from WN, RDJ, HRC, ABR and Das Kapital

Die Noth lehrt uns vieles, was wir sonst nicht wissen werden. Eben deswegen hat ja auch der gute Gott die Erde und uns selbst so eingerichtet, daß wir mancherlei Bedürfnisse haben, die wir erst durch Nachdenken und allerlei Erfindungen befriedigen müssen. Diesen Bedürfnissen also haben wir es zu verdanken, daß wir klug und verständig werden.	Sjahdan maka njatalah bahwa kesoesahan itoe memberi 'akal kepada manoesia maka sebab itoelah Allah ta'ala memberi kesoesahan dan berdjenis-djenis hadjat kepada manoesia soepaja mereka itoe terpaksa menadjamkan pikirannja pada djalan mentjahari 'akal dan 'ilmoe akan menolakkan segala bahaja dan memenoehi hadjat jang patoet.
Hardship teaches us a lot that we would otherwise not know. It is because of this that the benevolent God has seen to it that we and the Earth are made in such a way that we have various needs that we can only satisfy by means of reflection and various inventions. We have these needs to thank that we become intelligent and wise/rational.	So it is clear that these difficulties/hardships give rationality to human beings and because of this God gives difficulties and various needs/desires to human beings so that they are forced to sharpen their minds on the way to find reason and science for the purpose of overcoming all danger and satisfying appropriate desires.

Table 2: HRC and RDJ

```
mereka itoe bahwa boleh mereka itoe mendapat pertolongan didalam kesoesahannja itoe.
Sjahdan maka tatkala matahari terbit nampaklah

oleh mendapat pertolongan kelak djika sahaja kena barang soeatoe kesoesahan. Maka
djoeragan itoe dipaksanja djoega disoeroeh

 kepada Allah dan harap akan pertolongan Allah didalam sesoeatoe kesoesahan maka
djanganlah chawatir. Maka perkataan itoe diseboetnja

llah dengan memohon pertolongan Allah soepaja boleh ia menderita kesoesahannja jang
terlampau beratnja itoe dengan sabar djoega.

ang ia akan pertolongan Allah jang telah diterimanja didalam hal kesoesahannja itoe.
Hatta maka kemoedian redalah hoedjan dan angin

pertolongan kepadanja se'oemoer hidoepnja istimewa poela didalam kesoesahannja dipoelau
itoe. Maka Robinson merasa hatinja ketjoet

oedah ada seorang kawan jang boeah djadi pertolongan didalam hal kesoesahan meskipoen
beloem boleh diartikannja kepadanja dengan

s boekit memboeat api jang besar soepaja orang jang dilaoet jang kesoesahan itoe boleh
tahoe bahwa mereka itoe boleh dapat pertolongan

[21 kesoesahan; 8 pertolongan]
```

Table 3: "Kesoesahan" and "Pertolongan" Collocations in HRC

```
moela-moela kapal itoe tiada dapat kesoesahan didjalan soeatoepoen tiada tetapi kemoe
tiadalah sekali-kali ia ingat akan kesoesahan jang barangkali boleh didapatnja lagi k
 itoe mendapat pertolongan didalam kesoesahannja itoe. Sjahdan maka tatkala matahari
k djika sahaja kena barang soeatoe kesoesahan. Maka djoeragan itoe dipaksanja djoega
rlajar kenegeri orang jang didalam kesoesahan itoe maka diserahkannja mereka itoe sek
 ak menerkan dia. Maka didalam hal kesoesahannja itoe terkenang poela ia akan iboe ba
ertolongan Allah didalam sesoeatoe kesoesahan maka djanganlah chawatir. Maka perkata
n Allah soepaja boleh ia menderita kesoesahannja jang terlampau beratnja itoe dengan
 hadi. Sjahdan maka njatalah bahwa kesoesahan itoe memberi 'akal kepada manoesia maka
sebab itoelah Allah ta'ala memberi kesoesahan dan berdjenis-djenis hadjat kepada mano
ikian itoe maka merasalah Robinson kesoesahan orang jang tiada berkawan. Djika ada s
jang telah diterimanja didalam hal kesoesahannja itoe. Hatta maka kemoedian redalah
al karena semendjak ia ada didalam kesoesahan itoe ia mentjahari goenanja barang apa
 jang terlampau miskinnja nistjaja kesoesahankoe ini koerang beratnja karena bolehlah
r hidoepnja istimewa poela didalam kesoesahannja dipoelau itoe. Maka Robinson merasa
oeah djadi pertolongan didalam hal kesoesahan meskipoen beloem boleh diartikannja kep
  Akan tetapi adalah masih soeatoe kesoesahannja jaltoe ia terlaloe amat chawatir kal
ar soepaja orang jang dilaoet jang kesoesahan itoe boleh tahoe bahwa mereka itoe bole
tika kapal itoe datang kepoelaunja kesoesahan Robinson soedah banjak koerang sebab so
aja boleh menolong sahabat didalam kesoesahan ini. Maka djawab seorang dari pada mer
 akan melepaskan sahabat dari pada kesoesahan ini dan lagi djika djandjinja bahwa sah
```

Table 3.1: "Kesoesahan" (Adversity) HRC Concordance List

```
gal tetapi itoepoen tiada mendjadi pertolongan karena kapal makin lama makin sarat djo
g hendak karam itoe hendak memberi pertolongan akan segala orangnja. Maka oleh karena
 saratnja moeat orang. Maka dengan pertolongan Allah sekotji itoepoen sampailah kekapa
  jang kita bawa itoe. Maka dengan pertolongan Allah tiada dapat tiada poelang-poelang
e bahwa boleh mereka itoe mendapat pertolongan didalam kesoesahannja itoe. Sjahdan ma
n mereka itoe djika tiada ia dapat pertolongan didalam bahaja itoe. Nistjaja sekotjin
n dan sekalian anak boeah akan hal pertolongan ini jang tiada terbalas oleh manoesia.
ni tiada boleh sahaja terima sebab pertolongan sedikit itoe karena sahaja tiada berboe
japoen harap djoega boleh mendapat pertolongan kelak djika sahaja kena barang soeatoe
gis jang amat sedih seraja meminta pertolongan kepada Allah ta'ala dan mengampoenkan d
kesana kemari tiada boleh mendapat pertolongan. Maka tatkala Robinson lagi ada dinege
 kepada Allah ta'ala serta meminta pertolongan Allah akan mendapat djoega makanannja m
irinja kepada Allah dan harap akan pertolongan Allah didalam sesoeatoe kesoesahan maka
 poela kepada Allah dengan memohon pertolongan Allah soepaja boleh ia menderita kesoes
kian itoe karena terkenang ia akan pertolongan Allah jang telah diterimanja didalam ha
a tiada koerang harap kelak dengan pertolongan Allah boleh djoega mendapat garam. Mak
i jang tetap dan dengan harap akan pertolongan Allah djika tiada hari ini nistjaja bes
dja jang amat sangat akan mendapat pertolongan didalam hal kesoekaran itoe. Maka mele
elah memeliharakan dia dan memberi pertolongan kepadanja se'oemoer hidoepnja istimewa
jatanja dan setelah soedah memohon pertolongan kepada Allah ta'ala maka iapoen berdjal
la sendjatanja maka iapoen memohon pertolongan kepada Allah soebhanahoe wata'ala seraj
ada seorang kawan jang boeah djadi pertolongan didalam hal kesoesahan meskipoen beloem
ahoe bahwa mereka itoe boleh dapat pertolongan dipoelau itoe akan tetapi serta api ito
ia tahoe bahwa binatang itoe minta pertolongannja. Kemoedian maka Djoem'at berseroe m
adah kelangit seperti hendak minta pertolongan Allah ta'ala. Hatta maka Robinson hati
 djaib. Maka kata Robinson, Segala pertolongan datang dari pada Allah ta'ala. Hai sah
```

Table 3.2: "Pertolongan" (Help) HRC Concordance List

Er warf sich mit Inbrunst auf seine Knie vor Gott, gelobte Geduld und Unterwerfung in seinen Leiden, und bat um Stärke zur Ertragung derselben.	Maka Robinson poen menjerahkan badan dan njawanja poela kepada Allah dengan memohon pertolongan Allah soepaja boleh ia menderita kesoesahannja jang terlampau beratnja itoe dengan sabar djoega.	Capagca uicà nito, ay nagticang tiisin at batahin ang manga cahirapan, at humihinging auà sa Dios na big-yan siya nang catibayan nang loob sa pagtitiis.
He fervently fell upon his knees before God, vowed patience and submission in his suffering, and prayed for the strength to bear this.	Thus Robinson surrendered his body and spirit also to God and asked help from Him so that he can face/bear this extreme suffering with patience.	Upon saying this, he prepared himself to bear and endure the hardships and asked mercy from God that he be given the strength of spirit in bearing these.

Table 4: HRC, RDJ and ABR

```
 ng capalaran. Capagca uica nito, ay nagticang tiisin at batahin ang manga cahirapan, at
humihinging aua sa Dios na bigyan siya nang catibayan nang loob sa pagtitiis. Nang
pagsaulan lacas si Robinson, ay ipinatuloy ang caniyang pag

malulupaypay ang inyong loob sa anomang bagay na inyong gagauin, cahit anong hirap, houag
lamang di ninyo pagtiticahang matibay hangan sa di ninyo maquitang matapus. Ang
casicapan, ang lalong pagcucuro, ang catibayan nang loob, ay

 g di mayayari. Cailan ma'y houag ninyong pahihinain ang loob, cahit anong cahirapan ang
nacahahadlang sa anomang bagay na ibig ninyong gauin; cundi acalain ninyo na cung lalong
malaqui ang pagpipilit na quinacailangan sa paggaua na

 nasimulan ang putol. Cung mayroong bagay na totoong matagal at totoong pinaghirapan si
Robinson, ay ang pagputol nang cahoy ay siyang pinacapangulo. Ang iba'y sucat humina ang
loob; at bibitiuan ang palacol sa unang pagtaga, at aa

 at caya nga quinacailangang butasin. Itong catipunan nang di mamagcanong cahirapan ay di
macapaghina nang loob cay Robinson sa pagpapatuloy nang caniyang binabanta. Yayamang sa
caniyang pamumuhay na masipag ay nacamtan niya yaong

[61 hirap; 6 loob]
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Table 5: "Cahirapan" and "Catibayan nang loob" Collocations in ABR

```
Dios na bigyan siya nang catibayan nang loob sa pagtitiis. Nang pagsaulan lacas si
ng lalong pagcucuro, ang catibayan nang loob, ay siyang iquinayayaring madali nang m
  Sa catapusa'y pinagtibay ang caniyang loob sa manga bagay na dadalhin, at inaacala
n din ang parang nagpalacas sa caniyang loob na libutin niya ang tabing dagat, at na
ng paglacad nang boong capanatagan nang loob. Tinica niyang sa caniyang paglacad ay
 niya ang catapatan at capanatagan nang loob nang binatang ito, at lalong lalo na an
g malaquing catapangan at di nasira ang loob sa pagpanhic na muli sa caniyang hagdan
 atayan. Dito nanghinapang ang caniyang loob sa manga paggugunamgunam na ito, na nag
, ay pinapanghinapang niya ang caniyang loob, sa paghahanda sa camatayan sa pamagita
nanghinapang niyang madali ang caniyang loob: saca biglang nanaog na nahahanda sa pa
, at pinapanghinapang nila ang canilang loob sa pagtatangol nang canilang buhay. Tu
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Table 5.1: "Catibayan nang loob" (Strong will) and variants, ABR Concordance List

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ailan ma'y houag ninyong pahihinain ang loob, cahit anong cahirapan ang nacahahadlan
o'y totoong nacapagpahina nang caniyang loob; at nang matapus na niyang mapagtimbang
 acapangulo. Ang iba'y sucat humina ang loob; at bibitiuan ang palacol sa unang pagt
t sa caniyang mucha ang cahinaan niyang loob na nacapipiguil sa paglibot niya mula s
g pagcagulat at catacutan nang mahinang loob na si Robinson sa pagcaquita lamang nan
panucala at iniudyoc nang cahinaan nang loob, at nagisip ng manga ibang bagay na ini
canong cahirapan ay di macapaghina nang loob cay Robinson sa pagpapatuloy nang caniy
  ang apuy? Totoong nasira ang caniyang loob sa capighatian; at bago magsacdal sa Di
an sa malaquing pagcasira nang caniyang loob. Nagbangong madali at nang siya'y maca
 an siya. Sa malaquing caligaligan nang loob ay ualang matutuhang gauin; datapoua't,
hilanan nang pagcaligalig nang caniyang loob. Itinuro sa caniya ni Robinson ang dao
gaalinlangan at malulupaypay ang inyong loob sa anomang bagay na inyong gagauin, cah
agpilitan ni Robinson na pagsaulan nang loob ang caniyang casama na tapat na loob.
aqui ang catacutang pumasoc sa caniyang loob, na hindi man lamang macalingon sa lico
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Table 5.2: "Cahinaan nang loob" (Weak will) and variants, ABR Concordance List

|	
Nichts anders, als dieses, daß ihr euch schon jetzt in eurer Jugend übet, oft ein Vergnügen versagten, dessen ihr für euer Leben gern genossen hättet. Diese oft wiederhohlte **Selbstüberwindung** wird euch stark machen, **stark am Geist und Herzen**, um künftig mit **gelassener Standhaftigkeit** Alles, Alles **ertragen** zu können, was der weise und gute Gott zu eurem besten über euch verhengen wird.	Uala na cundi ang cayo,y, maghirati sa pagcauala nang alin mang caquinhauahan cahit ang lalong ninanasa; ang pagtatagumpay na ito,y, inyong paghihirapan cung bagobago pa, pagcatapus ay di na ninyo lubhang mamabigatin; at sa cauulit ay magcacaroon cayo nang isang **catibayan nang loob,** na sa boong buhay ninyo,y, inyong **matitiis na mapayapa ang manga cahirapan o caralitaang** ipahahatid sa inyo nang marunong at maauaing may ari nang capalaran nang lahat nang tauo.
Nothing other than this, that you now in your childhood practice to deny yourself some enjoyment that you would have liked to have. This often repeated self-overcoming will make you strong, strong in spirit and heart so that you can face everything that the wise and benevolent God imposes for your own good in the future with calm steadfastness.	Nothing other than that you become accustomed to the lack of whatever comfort even that which you most desire; it will be difficult at the beginning but later you will no longer feel it so much; and with constant repetition you will develop a strength of spirit so that in your whole life you will bear calmly the suffering or poverty imposed upon you by the wise and merciful owner of the fates of all humanity.

Table 6: RDJ and ABR

Figure 5: Robinson's Situation in RDJ (norm neutral), HRC (below and above the norm), ABR (within the norm)

Figure 6: Interconnection of Concepts: "Bedüfnis" - "Kesoesahan" -"Cahirapan"

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Western Texts in Uncolonized Contexts: English Studies in Japan and Thailand

Zawiah Yahya

Background

English Studies first evolved to become an academic subject in Britain in the 19th century, out of a nationalistic fervor to replace the Greco-Roman classics at the heart of its intellectual enterprise. The emergence of this academic discipline coincided with 19th- century British imperialism that brought with it English language and literary texts into the class and lecture rooms of its far-flung colonies.

Along with the language and the literature came the literary theories, teaching methodologies, and critical tools of analysis that were based on a tradition informed by its Christian roots and Eurocentric perspectives. This tradition assumed that western values and concepts of language, genre and pedagogical models had universal applications across time and space, that somehow the Buddhist-Mandarin learners of Hong Kong, the Muslim-Malay learners of Malaya, and the Hindu-Tamil learners of India would negotiate western texts in the same way as would learners who were white, Anglo-Saxon and Protestant.

In the post-colonial era that followed the end of Empire, enlightened scholars of language and literature in ex-colonies began the process of self-examination by questioning past assumptions of universality. Consequently, some post-independence countries became dynamic sites of pedagogical innovations as researchers, scholars, and teachers brought local specificities into theory and methodology.

Today, the United States of America, the English-speaking world power, has picked up where Britain left, and English has flourished even more than before as a global language. The desire to master English has become increasingly overpowering because of its international and economic value. Countries across the globe are now trying to establish English language studies in their nation's curriculum where before there was none, or to expand the study where it already exists, or to consciously upgrade English language teaching (ELT) where before it was neglected.

In Asia, countries that had a history of colonization by Great Britain (e.g., Malaysia) and by the USA (e.g., the Philippines) have had a head start in the management of ELT because English was the medium of instruction in their education systems under colonial rule. Such ex-colonies now constitute what in English-language pedagogy are collectively called the English-as-a-second-language (ESL) context.

The ESL context is where learners, whose mother tongue is not English, learn the English language early through the nation's education system, use it regularly in a generally English-speaking environment, and have wide exposure to it in the written and electronic media. In the university, English proficiency courses are required university courses, often packaged differently for the different needs of each faculty. They are known as English for Special/Specific Purposes (ESP) courses. For example, a packaged proficiency program for an English major student in the English Department will use literary materials for language teaching to bring student proficiency to a level that can help them cope with the demands of required core literature courses in the English Studies program. Literature used this way, that is, as a resource for language teaching, is called 'literature with a small l'. Unlike the proficiency courses, the required core-discipline literature courses deal strictly with critical analysis of literary works, usually from the canon, using analytical tools drawn from available critical theories. Literature taught as a separate discipline in this way is called 'literature with a big L'. The medium of instruction for all English language and literature courses is English.

On the other hand, in countries without a history of colonization by any English-speaking power, English lacks all the characteristics of a second language and a well-established ELT tradition. Japan and Thailand fall into this category, and constitute what is collectively known as the English-as-a-foreign-language (EFL) context.

In the EFL context, English is not the means of communication for the majority of its population and enjoys no special status as an official language. In this

non-English-speaking environment, English may only be a necessary part of the educational system, designed primarily to equip students for possible careers in organizations with international links. University students in this context will invariably follow the ESP proficiency courses that cater strictly to the needs of each faculty, to produce professionals who can understand the discourse of their discipline in English. More often than not, the medium of instruction is the native or national language.

Also, the distinction between English language teaching and English Literature teaching becomes blurred in an EFL context, where the main business of the English Department may not be English literature (big L), but English proficiency. Literary material (small l) may not be used at all as a resource for language teaching; and what passes as big L may, in some instances, be part language and part literature teaching, as will become obvious later in the case of Japanese universities. In an EFL institution where English is one of many foreign languages offered as part of cultural studies, and where part of the process of learning a foreign language is the reading of major literary works in the language, English literature then becomes an integral component of the English Studies program under the Department of Foreign Studies or Modern Languages, where the medium of instruction used is the native language.

Obviously, there are differences in curriculum and methodology between the ESL and the EFL contexts. As with the 'inner circle' of English-speaking countries, English Studies in the ESL context traditionally means the study of English literature (big L). In recent times it has become the site of resistance to the colonial legacy and this may be reflected in the choice of syllabus content and teaching methods. For instance, the texts chosen may not be all canonical: teaching methods may go against the grain of western pedagogy, and reading approaches may be consciously informed by postcolonial, even homegrown, theories of reading.

Such a climate of resistance is not present in the academia of countries with no history of colonization by Britain. The likelihood is that, without the colonial baggage, the tradition of English language and literature will be happily adopted with unquestioning reverence, sometimes with disastrous results when low proficiency is unable to cope with the high demands of big L for literary competence.

Objective of the Research

The objective of this research was to identify, describe, and analyze reading approaches to literary texts that were adopted for English Studies in Japan and Thailand. More specifically, the research aimed to explore how British/American Literature (henceforth and collectively grouped under English Literature) was taught in selected universities in the capital cities of Japan and Thailand. The choice of these two non-colonized countries was intended to highlight how such countries dealt with English literary texts as a form of cultural import in their institutions of learning. It was also intended to highlight how such institutions in a non-English-speaking environment were dealing with the 'foreignness' of the texts.

Research Questions

- Are there problems of English proficiency among students studying English literature in a non-English-speaking environment?

- What are the teaching approaches used for the reading and analysis of the literary texts chosen, and to what extent have western critical theories informed teaching methodology?

- What are the steps taken to manage problems of teaching methods and foreign texts?

Research Methodology

The research methodology of choice was the qualitative approach. This research is unapologetically subjectivist, based on the view that any interpretative truth/knowledge claim is always probabilistic and contestable, and that the human investigator could only produce a working hypothesis, a contextualized temporary knowledge, or a provisional truth.

Triangulation is used in this research to double-check findings, by collecting data from multiple sources. Findings from such sources as documents, interviews, and observations were corroborated to form an adequate ground for a compelling interpretation.

Information-gathering for triangulation involved three methods of data collection:

- **Reading and reviewing:** Various books, journals, set textbooks, and other related literature were read and reviewed.

- **Interviewing lecturers and students:** All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and summarized.
- **Conducting classroom observations:** These were done systematically and repeatedly over varying classroom situations in various sites.

This research also chose the route of case studies that explored a phenomenon (in this case, literature teaching) within temporal, social, and physical boundaries (in this case, in the current English Studies of selected universities in Tokyo and Bangkok). Explorations were empirical, observational, reflective, and interpretative in nature. Because they were context-based, these case studies were concerned with local meanings, not abstract, unequivocal universal truths. They required the researcher to spend substantial time on-site, to be personally engaged in activities and operations, and to reflect on and constantly revise the meanings of the unfolding phenomena.

Findings: English Studies in Japan

This section presents the results of selected readings, 12 teacher interviews, 23 student interviews, and 17 class observations conducted in six universities around Tokyo. The discussion is organized around important issues represented by the three research questions stated earlier.

Problems of English proficiency

The English language is taught as a foreign language in Japan and is a required subject in almost all institutions of higher learning. Although it is not a state-required subject in the school system, the fact that it is a compulsory sub-test in university entrance examinations, as well as a required subject at the university level, has forced over 10-12 million 18-year-olds, and another million or so university students to study English (Eades et al. 2005, 247).

From elementary to high school, Japanese students entering universities in Japan are the products of a national school system where Japanese is the medium of instruction and grammar is the focus of learning English. In the university, the English proficiency program offered to them is ESP. It is utilitarian in nature, catering to the disciplinary needs of each faculty in terms of types of register, discourse, and reading materials used.

The focus on grammar continues as does the medium of instruction; but the university program, unlike the school program, covers all the skills of reading, writing, and speaking (including debating and public speaking). The university program is supposed to develop communicative skills that students can successfully carry with them into the job market and work place. As a result, students who have studied English grammar in school to prepare for the multiple-choice questions and fill-in-the-blanks statements of the university entrance examinations are caught by surprise by the new demands of the university English studies program and find themselves struggling in their first year at the university. Some of these students proceed to become English majors in their third and fourth years.

English major students in the Department of Foreign Studies or Modern Language Studies follow programs that appear to aim at a combination of language acquisition, literary competence, and cultural enrichment. How this combination is configured seems to depend largely on the needs of each university and the choices made by its English teachers. A university known for its Foreign Studies, for example, will push for a program in which literary texts are studied more for their cultural representation, than for their literariness through textual analysis; the teaching may even be in the learner's first language which is not English. A professor whose specialization is Shakespeare, for instance, will choose his own corpus and methodology, and will push for teaching literature with the big L through the analysis of themes, conflicts, literary devices, the portrayal of human strengths, and weaknesses. It is when literature is taught with a big L like this that the problem of English proficiency becomes a stumbling block to the kind of real engagement with the texts required for big L teaching and learning.

There is a general consensus in Japanese academia that the level of English proficiency of Japanese university students is inadequate for coping with the linguistic and literary demands of English literature. This is despite attempts at reforming ELT over the past 50 years (Koike 1978; Tanaka et al. 1987; Terauchi 1996, 2001), a national obsession with English proficiency, its touted linkages to better employment and internationalism, and a state preoccupation as reflected in projects such as the JET (Japanese Exchange and Teaching) program which handles the annual invitation to Japan of over 4,500 non-Japanese assistant English teachers (AETs).

Yet, Japanese students seem unable to master linguistic competence which, incidentally, is a prerequisite for literary competence. According to the 1993 TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) statistics, Japanese candidates achieved lower scores than China's 531, South Korea's 504, Taiwan's 503, and Vietnam's 511 ("Japan tops TOEFL entrants; ranks only 149th in scores," 1993, in McVeigh 2002:151). According to a report published four years later, scores of Japanese students on the same test had not improved over three decades ("Corporate leaders lament: Japan needs English classes" 1997, in McVeigh 2002, 151).

Various reasons have been offered to explain the phenomenon. The historical revisionist view puts it down to the insular, "island nation" (*tan-itsu minzoku*) syndrome of the Japanese. The culturalist argument is that the self-perceived uniqueness of the ways Japanese do things is a stumbling block to accepting ELT reforms. The sociologist view blames it on the state machinery, economic interests, and the resulting politico-economically managed education system, for an elaborate testing mechanism to evaluate and place individuals at appropriate levels in the workplace (McVeigh 2002). The linguistic view (e.g., that of Loveday (1996) and that of Aspinall (2003)) is that the sociolinguistic environment in Japan does little to encourage effective communicative skills in the English language due to many factors: the linguistic dissimilarity between English and Japanese, the linguistic disparity between the freedom of expression in English and the disciplined style of the Japanese, the lack of a real need for communication in English in a monolingual society, and a non-English support system that confines language practice only to the classroom. The system of education was also blamed for its use of the outdated grammar-translation method and for the rote-learning demands of entrance examinations; while the institutions were blamed for their conservative culture of teacher-centered instructions and their obsession with perfection and absolute correctness (Loveday 1996, 95-99).

The students' lack of English proficiency was the reason given by Japanese lecturers for their choice of Japanese as a medium of instruction and for their choice of the grammar-translation approach (*yakudoku*) as a preferred teaching methodology for Anglo-American Literature. They said that this lack of proficiency made it impossible to adopt a more interactive or student-centered way of teaching. While acknowledging that, in an ideal situation, English

should be the medium for teaching English literature, they claimed that realities on the ground made it necessary to use Japanese instead, "unless exposure is done earlier in school". In school, English is taught in Japanese and the focus on grammar leaves little room for students to practice their oral skills. Students interviewed confirmed that this was indeed true.

To complicate the issue further, there were students of English literature interviewed who were, in fact, taught in English; still, they felt that expressing ideas in Japanese sounded more "academic", while doing it in English sounded "unsophisticated" in comparison— a point dismissed by foreign native speaker lecturers who felt that students needed to be taught "enough English" to move up to that sophisticated level.

"Enough English" in the expatriate teachers' vocabulary was precisely "teaching English in English", based on a pedagogical maxim that links language acquisition to language use. They claimed that they had successfully taught literature in English through an interactive approach to texts and by perpetually challenging the students' thinking because "there is a lot to unlearn before learning can begin". This was done with the conviction that students "thrive on this approach", that they "desire for more challenging content".

It was quite clear from my library research, interview data, and class observations that there was generally a serious lack of English proficiency among Japanese university students, but that there was little agreement on how to arrest the problem. Japanese and expatriate teachers were still divided on matters of medium and methodology.

Teaching approaches

After sifting through the details of the practical classroom procedures of what appeared to be big L sessions, as well as from teacher-interviews and class-observations, it was discovered that students were never formally introduced to contemporary critical theories, to inform their text-analysis. The teachers were, in fact, only using two broad approaches to literature: the *yakudoku* approach and the reading methods of American New Criticism called **close reading**.

The *Yakudoku* approach

This is a teacher-dominated method of teaching reading, defined as "a technique or a mental process for reading a foreign language in which the target language sentence is first translated word by word, and the resulting translation reordered to match Japanese word order as part of the process of reading comprehension" (Hino 1988, 46). It is a tradition that goes back to the Nara and Heian periods (710-1185 AD), when Japanese Buddhist scholars were influenced by Chinese-written language without regard to oral proficiency.

Today, the *yakudoku* is still used for teaching both language and literature. Two nationwide surveys by the Japan Association of College English teachers showed that 70 percent to 80 percent of Japanese teachers in high schools and universities use this method (Koike et al. 1983, 1985 cited in Norris 1994, 25–38). In the context of foreign literature teaching, the basic method consisted of the teacher providing the model translation by correcting the accuracy of the students' translation and conducting lectures in which he dictated his own interpretations of plot, theme, character, and semantic meaning.

In the universities visited, *yakudoku* was the basic approach adopted by Japanese teachers for courses on Shakespeare. The normal routine was to have students translate a Shakespearean play, page by page, into Japanese, and then present the translation in class. The teacher would then comment on the accuracy of the translation, which would be indicative of the student's comprehension or the lack of it. The rationale given for such a detailed study, done at a slow rate of one play per semester, was that once the technique of reading Shakespeare was mastered thoroughly with the first text, the mastery would stand in good stead for all the other Shakespearean texts to come.

Today, the *yakudoku* method used in literature teaching has, however, been liberalized by its practitioners to accommodate student response, discussion, and even dissension. The translation routine is still there, but most teachers have become less autocratic, less likely to push for their own interpretations, and more likely to give their students a fair hearing first. Furthermore, the old method of translation is often complemented by the use of modern technology, which provides an audio-visual reconstruction of the literary period for context.

Where the study of the language was an essential part of an undergraduate literature course, literature was used as a double-edged tool for both English language teaching and as an introduction to literature.

In a few literature seminar classes for English majors in the third and fourth years, some uncomplicated concepts of gender and race were included in the discussion, for a little widening of the horizon in what was otherwise a closed and rigid approach to teaching. However, it is interesting to note that, even at graduate seminars, whether conducted wholly (rarely) or partly in English, students' analysis displayed only as much intellectual sophistication as their proficiency would allow them.

The New Criticism approach of close reading

Apart from *yakudoku*, close reading was the most common approach used for text-analysis. This reading methodology started by I. A. Richards in 1929 dominated pedagogical practice in literature around the world for much of the 20th century. At the center of the approach was the doctrine of "close reading" of "words on the page", the slogan associated with a critical theory called New Criticism. The attention to words on the page essentially ruled out historical contexts, the author's biography or intentions, from the process of meaning-making. Students were trained to concentrate on, and to extract information from, the words on the page in front of them. The objective was to understand the "literariness" or the formal properties of literary language. This method lent itself extremely well to the teaching of poetry, which stresses the importance of constructing meanings derived from analyzing the poet's negotiations with literary devices like metaphor, symbols, rhyme, rhythm, assonance, and alliteration.

Close reading was also widely used for the study of fiction. Students were taught to trace the development of a plot, from the rising action to the falling action; and to look for the formal elements of fiction such as the plot, character, point of view, and other devices of representation which, taken together, make up the central meaning or theme of the work. To comb for evidence to connect the dots, theme-hunting thus anchored class discussion on a specific idea or issue, through close reading.

Managing the problems of teaching methods and foreign texts

The two approaches mentioned were considered by their practitioners as the best ways to deal with students who came to them with limited proficiency. The *yakudoku* practitioners managed the problem by either treating translation as a tool to improve English proficiency through grammar; or by treating English literature as a foreign cultural product that could be studied in any language. Either way, both method and medium were legitimated. But the translation regimen itself was tedious and slowed reading down to an average rate of one novel or play per semester.

On the other hand, the New Criticism practitioners, especially expatriates teaching in English, were convinced that their medium (English), coupled with their method (close reading), had improved both linguistic and literary competence. The fact remained, though, that it was an uphill task because of the mismatch between the EFL proficiency of Japanese learners and an imported program meant for first language proficiency.

My interviews with students across universities showed mixed reactions to both approaches. Most, however, wanted a balance based on their perception that the Japanese method provided 'knowledge' (i.e., content), while the English method taught literariness.

No doubt, the introductory and survey courses also provided useful background information to help students negotiate cultural terrains so different from their own. The cultural problem was partly created by the choice of difficult texts from the canon of English Studies in universities of the inner circle (the UK, USA, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia). For instance, Shakespeare is temporally, linguistically, and culturally distant to Japanese students; and, yet, it is what is most coveted by them for its bragging-rights value. To ease the problem, teachers had to provide extra reading/viewing materials and simplify all conceptual complexities.

Findings: English Studies in Thailand

The findings in this section are the results of reading, 8 teacher interviews, 12 student interviews, 26 student questionnaire feedback, and 8 class observations. As with the Japan chapter, these findings are organized based on the same three research questions stated earlier.

Problems of English proficiency

A brief look at the history of ELT in Thailand would reveal that English had been made compulsory in all government secondary schools since the 19th century. English was taught then based on rote memorization and grammar translation, which was replaced by the audio-lingual approach in the 1960s when there was greater emphasis on English for international communication in the curriculum. Further curricular changes brought in a new method called the "communicative approach" in the 1980s, a teaching methodology that the omnipresent ELT agency called the British Council helped to promote by providing ELT specialists for training courses.

Then in 1996 English became a compulsory subject in primary schools, thus making the language mandatory from Grade 1 to the end of high school. The English language curriculum was consequently revamped based on a new functional—communicative approach designed to lay the foundation for "international communication, the acquisition of knowledge, the use of English in higher education, and career prospects" (Methitham 2009:37).

Despite these efforts, many critics have acknowledged a failure in English education in Thailand (Debyyasuvarn 1981; Broughton 1996; Wiriyachitra 2001; Meteetham 2001; Wongsothorn 2000, 2003; and Wongsothorn et al. 2003; all cited in Methitham 2009:200). However, my own on-site class observations and interviews indicated a higher level of English proficiency among Chulalongkorn students than what was to be expected in an ESL situation. Students majoring in English in the English Department from their first year onward had all their literature (big L) classes conducted in English and responded freely in reasonably good English in class. Though their critical analysis lacked depth, they were comfortable with the language. Even the non-English major students had their ESP classes in English, and most were quite proficient and actively engaged in the class discussions.

All things considered, the bottom line is that Thai university students (as represented by those engaged in my project at Chulalongkorn) appeared to be much more fluent in English than their counterparts in Japan (as represented by those engaged in my project in six universities in Tokyo). This was a surprising discovery since there seemed to be so much similarity

in the education systems of the two countries. Both have the same 6+3+3 structure in their school systems; both have the English language as a compulsory section with the same multiple-choice format in the centrally controlled university entrance examinations; both are morally/culturally guided by Buddhist values that teach humility and reverence for figures of authority, often blamed for inhibiting critical freedom in class discussions; both are monolingual and therefore do not provide the right environment for learning English; and, more importantly, neither had ever been colonized by any English-speaking power or ever allowed English to be the official language of administration in the country. Yet, the academic environment of Chulalongkorn University seemed to be more ESL than EFL.

A side-research conducted found that some kind of exposure to English instruction happened quite early in the lives of Thai students. Grammar was taught in all schools mostly in the Thai language; but all the other skills—writing, speaking, reading, and listening—were taught at progressive levels of complexity starting from the elementary right up to the secondary levels. English was also a compulsory subject at every level.

What this little investigation revealed was that the long road to English proficiency began in school. When students entered the university, they were more or less ready for English as a medium of instruction. The findings had thrown some light on how study enclaves of ESL could be created within the four walls of a classroom, even whilst the world outside was all EFL. As a result, the literature teachers interviewed did not see any proficiency problem as a stumbling block to teaching English literature in English.

Teaching approaches

In the larger scheme of things, the English Studies system, as a whole, seemed to provide a built-in methodology. The choice of courses and course content, the fixed schedule of what had to be taught first and what had to wait until the fourth year, the academic staff trained or hired to fill up the right slots in the program, the support system of hard- and soft-wares—all these together seemed to suggest a centrally-controlled strategy. There was a sense that the literature programs were run by a tested system, not by powerful individual subject specialists with absolute autonomy over their individual territories working in isolation. There was a sense that the system was conceived as a whole, and structured in a way that would provide a systematic training ground for students to acquire both proficiency and literary knowledge. For instance, English major students were required to do linguistic and translation courses, as well as nine proficiency courses in which literary passages were used for teaching language as a way of building a two-way support system between literature and language. Also, within the program, there was a network of committees and coordinating bodies for material production, evaluation, and general course management, to keep the machinery running on track, no matter who taught what. It is little wonder, then, why, with such careful conceptual and structural planning, the students were adequately prepared to do the entire program in English.

In the classroom, though, the preferred methodology was still the traditional New Criticism approach of close reading because understanding the plot was deemed essential to attempting interpretations of meaning and themes, or linking them to the contemporary Thai context. Students were only formally introduced to other theories (in the western critical tradition) in the fourth year, which were taken to a higher level of complexity in the Master's program. However, there seems to be no attempt by local academics at devising local reading alternatives centered on the specificities of Thai culture and literary tradition.

In comparison to the English Department programs, the Comparative Literature graduate program was conducted in the Thai language, and adopted an interdisciplinary approach to literature. An interface between literature and other disciplines in "Literature and Human Rights", or "Seminar in Women Literature" went beyond a stylistic or plot-character-theme analysis typical of the English Department program.

To get an idea of how fluid and current the Comparative Literature program is, here is an interview-transcription:

> I've got a science student who did his Master's with us and his thesis is on science fiction… If we do detective fiction, we may move from *Oedipus* to *Sherlock Holmes* and also [to] how detective fiction came to Thailand during Rama VI, a period of cultural imperialism…. As for gender studies, it might be about women as a minority

group somewhere in Asia and comparing this with the Thai context or the Chinese context without reference to the West. It can be less totally Eurocentric.

Right there is a most compelling argument for not necessarily privileging English as a medium of instruction, when literature is conceived as an area of study in its own right and not as a tool for language acquisition. More importantly, this interdisciplinary approach promises an academic space where local material and perspectives could be made to count in literary analysis, even when a western theory or methodology is used to do it. However, apart from this effort at factoring in local content, it was clear from interviews with the staff that indigenizing methodology or contesting western critical theories was regarded as unnecessary by them; they were, in fact, quite comfortable with what was already available.

Managing the problems of teaching methods and foreign texts

The many introductory and survey courses greatly eased students into English literature. The way the preliminary courses were structured, covering basic literary periods, principles, and genres guaranteed adequate literary knowledge and skills to cope with the greater demands of selected topics in the third and fourth years.

In addition, individual teachers also provided students supplementary materials prepared by a committee or coordinators of team-teaching, including selections of short literary texts more relevant to Thai learners than readymade textbooks meant for the universal reader. Some teachers even wrote their own course books, some in Thai, others in English, because books written by foreigners were found to be difficult or inappropriate for Thai students. These were attempts to fill the gaps in the student's literary experience and to reduce the "foreignness" of western texts.

My observation is that, though the proficiency problem was well managed, there was little attempt made to develop a Thai perspective in reading foreign literary texts. This was extraordinary considering that there were five Thai-related courses on Thai civilization, literature, and language, as well as six Thai-English/English-Thai translation courses in the undergraduate English program.

One would think that these courses, together with a lifelong experience of being Thai, would engender a certain way of reading that could take on board, the specificities of being Thai. This did not seem to tally with the spirit of the Education Act of 1999 for schools to raise the students' awareness of local wisdom, local mores, local customs, and local values, through what was called the "learning methods for Thai people". According to this Act, study materials were to be revamped to avoid foreign influence, in order to strengthen the Thai identity and culture. It was a move that expatriate teachers thought was "the very thing that is holding back the education system" because students were "inhibited by their culture".

Surprisingly, though, Thai teachers seemed equally unwilling to incorporate Thai perspectives deliberately into their courses. It was argued that, in the era of globalization, international theories helped "us to understand what's going on". In Thailand where modernization meant westernization, which was a top-down process initiated by itself and not imposed by a foreign power, there was embrace instead of resistance.

Discussion

This research revealed that western texts in un-colonized contexts were valorized products from a revered literary tradition considered worthy of study, even at great odds to both teachers and students. It did not seem to matter that these texts were plucked from the canon of British/American English Studies programs and transplanted into local EFL institutions; or that the methodology of reading would reduce a Thai reader to a universal reader with western perspectives. Whatever transplantation problems arose out of the mismatch—whether it was lack of proficiency or the foreignness of text and context—had to be sorted out by the academic system and the sheer passion of teachers. This was variously done by beefing up language courses to close the proficiency-gap, by using a translation-based methodology or the close-reading approach to bridge the comprehension gap, and by offering a series of introductory courses to fill up the knowledge gap.

In fact, the ESL situation in ex-British colonies is also bedeviled by the same problems, albeit to a lesser extent. The difference, however, is that the post-colonial ESL situation has moved from a place of worship, to a site of contestation and self-examination. What has resulted from these moments of great doubt

and skepticism is the creation of a culture of inquiry into alternative canons, methodologies, and reader perspectives. Here, running alongside traditional courses are those that teach students to re-read the English canon in new ways. English texts now also share the same stage with local and regional literatures in English or in English translation. In addition, there are attempts made to indigenize reading methodologies and to even devise alternative reading theories drawn from local value systems or ancient texts. Such a move empowers students to de-center the 'colonized' mindset and make their local specificities count, in the process of meaning-making.

The same spirit of resistance is absent on the EFL front. One reason might be that non-colonized countries like Japan and Thailand do not carry any postcolonial baggage. In fact, their own emperor (Meiji) and kings (Rama V and VI) were the ones who sought to introduce the Language to the court and the country, as a tool to access western technology for modernization. It was exactly what they wanted, not something politically forced upon them.

That may not be totally true because studies show there is, in fact, a de facto colonialism going on even in ELT. According to Canagarajah (2002, 135) the export of ELT materials is a major income earner whose operations are assisted by agencies of 'linguistic coercion', such as the British Council and TESOL organizations. These teaching methods are first gloriously reviewed and promoted by western language experts in the media, before they are popularized globally through publishing networks and academic institutions. Teachers of ESL and EFL are really consumers trapped by the marketing strategies of western businesses with huge investments in global scholarship.

Teaching methods devised are usually based on principles that will safeguard western interests. According to Cumaravadivelu (2003, 254 in Methitham 2009), the demand that the teaching of English as a foreign and second language should be entirely done through the medium of English is for the preservation of the English language. This 'monolingual tenet', according to Holliday (2005, 10), dictates that every step be taken "to ensure that other languages are not allowed to interfere with the learning of English, and that the 'native speaker' is the best person to teach English worldwide". This means that interference by one's mother tongue is to be avoided like the plague, and English native-speakers should be

hired to provide models of correct pronunciation which, by the way, is a standard set by western linguists in the first place.

That is why using the mother tongue to teach English has been discredited, and Japanese and Thai teachers who need to deal with practicalities on the ground find themselves on the defensive for flouting this rule. Japanese teachers are equally apologetic about using the grammar-translation method, which has also been discredited by western scholars, despite the fact that foreign language teaching in Britain was, for a long time, based on the same method. As for native speaker models, Japan went headlong into the native-speakerism project and hired native speaker teachers by the thousands for the communicative approach, possibly quite unaware that the communicative approach was, in fact, designed to value a native-English speaking everyday lifestyle and culture at the center of the communication. The notion that the ideal teacher is a native speaker is a notion supported by Noam Chomsky that, according to Holliday (2005, 6), has resulted in a negative self-perception of those labeled non-native speaker.

Pace Chomsky, there are studies which argue that local non-native teachers are an invaluable factor in effective language acquisition. Seidhofer (1999, 238) maintains that "non-native teachers [and their students] have been through the process of learning the same language...through the same 'filter'....This shared language experience should thus constitute the basis for non-native teachers' confidence, not their insecurity".

Western methods too may not be compatible with local culture in the ELS and EFL contexts. According to many linguists (Cook 1999; Hadley 2004; Holliday 2005; Kramsch and Sullivan 1996; Kumaravadivelu 2003; Leung 2005), methods developed in the West have a tendency of prioritizing western cultures and centralizing western interests, while willfully marginalizing local teachers and the needs of children of a lesser English. According to the linguist Pennycook (1998), if local teachers are not made aware of such unequal power dynamics, they are, in fact, at risk of internalizing defeatist self-perceptions and familiarizing their students with a colonialist worldview.

Expatriate teachers in Japan and Thailand speak of Asian culture's being in the way of interactive learning and critical thinking among their students. Japanese

and Thai students have been repeatedly characterized as being excessively obedient to authority figures, unresponsive in class, uncritical and unreflective when they do respond, and perpetually haunted by the fear of making mistakes, being ridiculed, and losing face.

While such claims may be true to a certain extent, a totalizing tendency is a dangerous game to play. Expatriate teachers are ready to jump on aspects of local culture as the most common denominator for classroom failure. But it may be possible to think of the cause for an unsuccessful class interaction to be outside the control of these cultural inhibitions. For instance, in his damning evidence for a failure in Japanese higher education, McVeigh (2001) believes that "it could be a 'vague fear' resulting from a specific kind of schooling focused on taking examinations". In other research studies by Cheng (2000, 436 in Methitham 2009), and Liu and Littlewood (1997, 372-373 in Methitham), specific factors were blamed for student reticence, such as teaching methodologies and level of proficiency.

The other truth is, silence in Asian societies is a cultural sign of respect, especially if the speaker is an older person or someone of high social status, such as a teacher. Buddhist concepts of gratitude to parents/teachers and considerateness to others train both teachers and students to avoid confrontation, competition, and conflict in their relationships. Being obedient to teachers and not challenging their authority are practices highly valued in Japanese and Thai societies. Those being so, instead of bringing down the cultural barriers just so a communicative and interactive class can work, has anybody tried to work out a teaching methodology that can train students to argue with decorum and not convert a debate into verbal assault in the name of intellectual freedom? Should not local scholars offer an alternative methodology or build a critical theory that can take into account their own culture without selling the soul of their nation?

The Last Word: Thinking Aloud

Literature teaching must move with the times. The old text-centered New Criticism approach that dwells on literariness will find itself caught in a time warp, while irreversible socio-economic-political events swirl around the globe. Debates on globalization are raging out there, indifferent to either the practice or the pursuit of literary criticism. It is up to the people engaged in this field to make the discipline relevant and to ask not what globalization can do for literature, but what literary studies can do for the understanding of globalization (Gupta 2009).

After all, literary texts concretize a kind of reality about given geopolitical contexts, ordinary lives, and everyday transactions. Identity-based political positions have a tradition of being expressed there. The politics of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity, as well as the politics of difference, multiculturalism, pluralism, marginality, and post-colonialism, do get debated in literary studies.

Contemporary critical theory, informed by linguistics, philosophy, psychoanalysis, and politics, especially of the politically aware and agency-seeking strand within the discipline, has the tools that can make literature become potentially relevant and socially responsible. It has also enabled subaltern groups and literary intellectuals on the margins in Asia to speak up. For example, some have called for an opening up of the Anglo-American canon to the literature of the marginalized identities. And some have already published their own critical approaches as counter-discourse to western theories of reading. Others have called for dropping "English" from English Studies and substituting it simply with "Literary Studies", to circumvent loss of specific national or regional traditions. Yet others envision the globalization of literary studies in the form of World Literature as literature's response to the world at large. And there are debates on the prospect of a globalized English Studies that de-center its location from its Anglophoneness.

In short, we need not fear globalization or its implications of homogenizing the worldwide process of modernization. The truth is, while cultural processes have been homogenized at the global level, they have to work with local variations. In fact, globalization processes have given rise to more emphatic localized claims.

Besides, there is globalization from above and there is globalization from below. There is the transcultural or cosmopolitan elite moving across boundaries, and there is the localized opposition to global processes moving below. Literature becomes the ground on which these political identities play out. And Literary Studies has a role to play: to deal with these contradictory narratives.

In order to understand the complexities of present-day issues, there should be some adjustments in the teaching methodology in the EFL context, where limited English proficiency is unable to cope with the new demands of literary studies. Through the process of translation, such complexities can be better understood, and the course can be made relevant to immediate local realities and everyday life. English Studies will become a site where the local perspective can be foregrounded by frames of references provided by the discipline. Used this way, English Studies can indeed be the site to engage local concerns which can then be brought to global forums. This is probably what Pennycook (1998), who uncovers the politics of ELT, means by proposing a "teaching back" practice to the center.

We can profitably be engaged in all the beneficial aspects of globalization and still keep our soul. Indeed, to keep it is the best contribution we can make to the process. Globalization actually pluralizes the world by recognizing the value of cultural niches and local abilities. In fact, globalization celebrates cultural pluralism by acknowledging cultural particularism. Thus, in order to truly participate in the pluralism of the globalized world, our contribution must necessarily bear the stamp of our own particular identity.

Basically, I am arguing for giving real options for our literature students to be able to choose what works best for them, by pushing the critical perimeters beyond Eurocentric boundaries. I am also arguing for local perspectives in reading that will empower these students, by taking onboard their local specificities in the process of meaning-making. As educators, we have an ethical obligation to engage in pedagogical practices and make decisions about curriculum which we believe are in the best interest of our students. The university is the site of social reproduction and social change. Those of us who are institutional agents must begin to take responsibility for the social effects of our pedagogical and curricular decisions.

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Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari's Ideological Influences on Intellectual Discourse and Activism in Indonesia

Mohd Shaiful Ramze Endut

Introduction

This paper examines the impact and ideological influence of Iranian thinkers Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari on intellectual discourse and social activism in Indonesia. Shari'ati and Motahhari were selected because of their contributions to the development of Islamic thought and the Shi'a movement in Indonesia, as reflected in many books and in the work of foundations and other groups. After the Iranian revolution of 1979, much of the revolution's ideological discourse was channeled from Iran to other Third World countries, including Indonesia. There is little in Indonesia's socio-religio-cultural ethos that is similar to that of Iran. Yet many publications and ideas from Iran have made their way to Indonesia, perhaps for the purpose of knowledge sharing, or perhaps to spread Shi'a ideology and propaganda.

Literature review

To my knowledge, there has not been a comprehensive study of the contributions of Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari in Indonesia, though some studies have indirectly addressed the topic. These include doctoral dissertations by Zulkifli (2010) and Ali (2002). There are several translations of books by Shari'ati and Motahhari with forewords by Indonesian scholars. Books about Iran and Shi'a in the Indonesian language include those written by Sihbudi (1989), Tamara (1980), and Hashem (1994, 2002). A study by Zainuddin and Basyar (2000) also focuses on Shi'a and politics in Indonesia. Though none of these examples provide quantitative perspectives on the impact of the two thinkers in the Indonesia context, all agree that Shari'ati and Motahhari have had the most impact of all Iranian thinkers.

The history of Shi'a in Indonesia

There are two theories of how Islam penetrated into Indonesia, or as it was known earlier, Nusantara. (Nowadays the term "Nusantara" refers to Southeast Asia.) The first theory states that the earliest Islamic

communities in Nusantara were Sunni Muslims; (Hamka 1974 and Azra 1992, 1995). The second theory claims that the first Islamic communities in the region were Shi'a Muslims (Fatimi 1963; Hasyimi 1983, Azmi 1981, Aceh 1977, 1985, and Sunyoto 1987). Sunyoto has proposed that the Shi'a tradition is found to have been embedded in Javanese culture through the Wali Sanga (Nine Saints), who propagated Shi'a traditions among the people of Java (especially Sunan Kalijaga and Sheikh Siti Jenar).

Regardless of whether or not Shi'a Islam was the first to arrive in the area, there is evidence for early Shi'a in Indonesian culture. For example, studies by Iqbal (2006) and Dahri (2009) discovered many Shi'a elements embedded in Indonesian traditions. These include *ashura* (the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn), *nisf Sha'ban* (the celebration of the 15th day of the eighth month in the Muslim calendar), *milad* (the annual commemoration of the birth of Shi'a Imams), *hawl* (the annual commemoration of the death of Shi'a Imams), *tahlilan* (a common ceremony practiced by Muslims in Southeast Asia), and *tawassul* (a 'means' through which to reach a certain goal). There are many examples of local literature related to Shi'a and Iranian culture. These include the *Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyyah* (the Epics of Muhammad Hanafiyyah), a major Shi'a literary text which was translated from Persian into the Malay language in the 14th century. The *Sejarah Melayu or Malay Annals* edited by Brown (1970), is the most famous and the best classical Malay prose ever produced and contains many Persian influences. The book written by an unknown author was attributed to Tun Seri Lanang as its first editor and has been claimed to have been begun in 1612. However, some scholars think that the original text was written prior to 1536 and underwent changes in 1612. Azra claims that the 'Shi'a theory' is too uncritical of local information that cannot be verified.

Rakhmat has proposed a theory of three waves of Shi'a movement into Indonesia. The first wave was by Arab descendents who migrated to Indonesia from Hadhramaut, Yemen, beginning in the 19th century. Arriving into the midst of a Sunni majority, they were

forced to hide their denomination through the practice of *taqiyya* (dissemination). According to Zulkifli (2010), there have been three prominent figures from Shi'a communities in Indonesia: Sayyid Muhammad bin Ahmad al-Muhdar, (1861-1926), Sayyid Ali bin Ahmad Shahab, (1865-1944), and Sayyid Aqil bin Zainal Abidin, (1870-1952). Shi'a was propagated only to their families and clans, and thus did not spark any conflict within the wider Muslim society, although the communities were stigmatized by the majority Sunni.

Rakhmat emphasizes that interest in Shi'a thought surged in the public sphere after the Iranian revolution. Yet certain religious scholars played a huge role in sending students to Iran before the revolution. These include Ahmad al-Habsyi, who in 1974 founded Pesantren (religious school) ar-Riyadh in Palembang, an area which has many Alawiyyin families. (Alawiyyin refers to a group with blood relatives of the Prophet Muhammad). Ahmad al-Habsyi was a dynamic and non-dogmatic religious leader. According to Umar Shahab (2009), Pesantren ar-Riyadh was the first institution to send Indonesian students to Qum for the purpose of acquiring Islamic knowledge. Umar Shahab has said that his own early personal intention was to focus on Islamic studies in Qum, not specifically to study Shi'a. But after a period in Qum, he converted to Shi'a.

After the Iranian revolution, the founder of the Yayasan Pesantren Islam (YAPI) Hussein al-Habsyi played an important role in sending Indonesian students to Qum. According to Zulkifli, al-Habsyi was well known for his charismatic leadership among all the Shi'a community in Indonesia during his lifetime. In 1976, Pesantren YAPI was founded in Bangil, Surabaya. Although the institution was not directly declared as a Shi'a *pesantren*, it was well known as a Shi'a learning center and several of its publications clearly indicated the tendency of its beliefs. The initiative to send Indonesian students to Qum was inspired by the spirit of what was seen as one of the greatest people's revolutions in the world. It was clear that Indonesian students were sent to learn Shi'a theology for the purpose of disseminating that ideology once they returned. According to Zulkifli (2010), the idea to send students from Pesantren YAPI originated in 1982. In that year, Iranian government representatives Ayatollah Ibrahim Amini, Ayatollah Masduqi and Hujjat al-Islam Mahmudi came to Indonesia, visited Pesantren YAPI and met

Hussein al-Habsysi. The meeting was a success and Pesantren YAPI subsequently started delivering students to Hawza 'Ilmiyya in Qum.

Meanwhile, there was also excitement about the Iranian revolution in university campuses, where some students hoped that it was an answer to western modernity and world hegemony by a unilateral political power. According to Rakhmat (1997), this was the second wave of the Shi'a movement in Indonesia. During this period Nasir Tamara, a student at the University of Paris-Sorbonne in France, gave favorable accounts of the Iranian revolution in the book *Revolusi Iran*. An important part of the book included Tamara's record of the flight of Imam Khomeini from Paris to Tehran in February 1979. The book was valuable to Indonesian students interested in understanding the beginning of the Iranian Revolution. It was actually written mainly for Indonesian students at Qum. According to Rakhmat, Qum alumni went on to create the third wave of the Shi'a movement in Indonesia. The alumni taught Shi'a ideology, translated texts, and promoted and organized events related to Shi'a and Iranian thinkers. For example, after Zahir Yahya, Ahmad Barakbah, and Abdurahman Bima from Pesantren YAPI returned from Qum they built several schools and *pesantren* to teach Shi'a directly or indirectly.

Despite the growing number of Shi'a followers in Indonesia after the Iranian revolution, it is still very hard to determine exact numbers because not all Shi'a want to declare themselves as such. Various attempts to reach a number have resulted in very different conclusions. Mughniyya (1973) reported that there were one million Shi'a in the country. Ahmad Barakhbah who leads Pesantren al-Hadi in Pekalongan, Central Java, stated there were 20,000 Shi'a followers. Mahayana (2000), the former leader of Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bayt Indonesia (IJABI) estimated a figure of three million. At the time of writing this paper, there has yet been no authoritative data on the actual number.

The Emergence of Iranian Thought after the Revolution

This section will focus on the development of Iranian thought in Indonesia after the Iranian revolution, and look at the contributions of Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari, among other Iranian thinkers. Hernowo (2010) is among those who have observed the

emergence of intellectual discourse focusing on Iranian thought just after the Iranian revolution. Groups in Yogyakarta discussed Shari'ati's books and were motivated to translate and spread his works and thoughts. Books by a variety of Iranian modern thinkers were translated into the Indonesian language. The book *Ideals and Realities of Islam* by Sayyed Hossein Nasr was translated by Abdulrahman Wahid with the title *Islam antara Cita dan Fakta. Man and Islam* by Amien Rais was translated under the title *Tugas Cendikiawan Muslim*. Wahid and Rais were prominent Indonesian scholars and respective leaders of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah mass religious social organizations. Their translations gave additional weight to perceptions of the legitimacy and intellectual abilities of Iranian thinkers. The works of Morteza Motahhari introduced readers to more systematic thought on Islam and philosophy. Shariati and Motahhari both provided a progressive Islamic worldview. Other thinkers whose works were translated into the Indonesian language included Khomeini, Tabataba'i, Baheshti, and Bani Sadr. These all helped acquaint Indonesian Muslim society with revolutionary ideas, Islamic philosophy and progressive thought. Most of the books were translated from Arabic, English, and even Persian.

The next generation of modern Iranian thinkers in Indonesia, including Jawad Amoli, Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, Ali Rahnema, and others, were almost all students of Shari'ati and Motahhari. Intellectual societies were also becoming familiar with Iranian classical thinkers frequently mentioned in modern Iranian works, including Hafiz, Saadi, Rumi, Jalal-e Ahmad, Sadeq Hedayat, and Ahmad Kasravi.

Indonesian intellectuals began to write about Iranian thinkers, especially Shari'ati and Motahhari, in journals, bulletins, magazines, news outlets and blogs. At the time of writing this paper, five Qum alumni had completed doctorates related to Iranian and Shi'a thought at the Universiti Islam Negeri Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta (UIN Syarif Hidayatullah). The study of Iran and Shi'a is also seen in undergraduate projects, theses and dissertations at almost all Islamic universities in Indonesia.

The Islamic Cultural Center (ICC) has established twelve 'Iran Corners' in Indonesian universities, and the number is expected to increase. The ICC was established in 2003 in Jakarta and is fully sponsored by the Iranian Embassy in Indonesia. Opening the Iran Corner in the Universitas Muhamadiyyah Jakarta, the ambassador of Iran to Indonesia, Farazandeh (Tehran Times, 2010) said that cooperation between Iranian and Indonesian academics was a "necessity" and stressed that sharing experiences in academic achievements was "fundamental to strengthening the Islamic world." The Iran Corners function as libraries, theatre centers, and sites for Persian classes and any events that promote Iranian culture. At the government-to-government level, an event titled "International Seminars on Historical and Cultural Relations between Indonesia-Iran 2010" was held in Jakarta on April 27-28th 2010, to commemorate 60 years of diplomatic relations between the two countries. There are now many Shi'a foundations and organizations such as the ICC, the Islamic College for Advanced Studies (ICAS), the Muthahhari Foundation, the Rausyanfikir Foundation, the Fatimah Foundation, the al-Jawad Foundation, and others.

Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari in the Indonesian context

The influence of Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari's in Indonesia is illustrated by data gathered from the ICC catalog, and other catalogs. The tables below show 139 books by and on Shariati and Motahhari published in Indonesia. The books are sold in Indonesia's most popular bookshops, *Gramedia* and *Gunung Agung*. They are also sold at religious events held by the ICC, the IJABI, and other Shi'a foundations. The ICC, the Muthahhari Foundation, the Rausyanfikir Foundation, ICAS, and many more have public libraries containing Shi'a books. ICAS is an institution under the al-Mustafa International University in Iran. In 2003, ICAS was the only Shi'a oriented institution offering formal academic courses in Indonesia. In 2010 it started to offer doctoral level degrees. It has also published a book by Motahhari titled *Keadilan Ilahi* (Divine Justice) in a joint initiative with Mizan publishing.

Publishers, including Lentera, Hidayah, and Mizan Publishing have been important in the spreading of Shari'ati and Motahhari's thought. Mizan Publishing is the biggest publisher in Indonesia and focuses on a wide variety of subject matters, after shifting its identity from primarily that of a Shi'a organization.

Ali Shari'ati in the Indonesian Context

Ali Shari'ati, also known as Ali Syari'ati in Indonesia, is noted as the architect of the Iranian revolution. Though Shari'ati passed away before the peak of the revolution, his thought, and Marxist approach, had a large role in influencing young Iranians to fight and subsequently overthrow the Shah Iran regime. However, the main issue here is how Shari'ati as an Iranian Shi'a thinker was able to influence Indonesia, which has a majority of Muslim Sunnis. Ghamari-Tabrizi (2008) interestingly relates Shari'ati's influence on the ideas of President Soekarno on "guided democracy."

Below, Table 1 and Graph 1 indicate publications by/on Shari'ati (Table 1 and Graph 1) over 30 years (1979-2009) in Indonesia. Table 2 shows which publishers issued the books.

Types of book	Numbers of books
Books by Shari'ati translated into the Indonesian language	44
Books on Shari'ati by Indonesian authors	4
Books on Shariati by non-Indonesian authors translated into the Indonesian language	1
Books on Shari'ati written by Indonesian authors in which at least one chapter is devoted to Motahhari's views	4
Books written by non-Indonesian authors in Indonesian Language which at least one chapter is devoted to Shari'ati's views	2
Total	55

Table 1: Books by / on Shari'ati

Graph 1: Books by / on Shari'ati according to year

Publisher	Number of Books
Pustaka Hidayah	9
Penerbit Mizan	7
Penerbit YAPI	6
Shalahuddin Press	4
Zahra Publishing House / Pustaka Zahra	3
Penerbit Pustaka	2
Lentera	2
Islamic Culture Center / al-Huda	2

Muthahhari Paperbacks	2
Penerbit Erlangga	1
Grafiti	1
Paramadina	1
Yayasan Obor Indonesia	1
STAIN	1
Pustaka Pelajar	1
Karya Anda	1
Grafikatama Jaya	1
Penerbit IQRA	1
CV Rajawali	1
Penerbit Teraju	1
Penerbit Ananda	1
Risalah Masa	1
RajaGrafindo Persada	1
Abudzar Press	1
Tahira	1
Penerbit Misbah	1
Pintu	1
Total	55

Table 2: Number of books by / on Shari'ati by publisher

As Hernowo (2010) has stated, Shari'ati's thought first entered Indonesia just after the Iranian Revolution, possibly first through a youth group in Yogyakarta which discussed sociology via Shari'ati's thought. Discussions on Shari'ati grew when Amien Rais returned from the University of Chicago in 1981 and began translating Shari'ati's *Man and Islam*. Rais wrote: "Meanwhile, the book in the reader's hand is not a book hailing the revolution. In his book, Shari'ati urged the Muslim community to think radically, especially on human dignity, on ideology and worldviews, on refreshing Islamic culture and resources with Islamic guidance and said that this should be carried out by Muslim intellectuals." More translations of Shari'ati's books soon followed. Well-known translators of Shari'ati and other Shi'a books include Afif Muhammad and M. Hashem. Almost all the translations have been accompanied by a foreword by an Indonesian scholar. Quality forewords have been written by Dawam Rahardjo, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, Haidar Bagir and others.

Books on Shari'ati have been authored by Indonesians including Supriyadi (2003), Malaky (2004), and Suwito (2004). The final book edited by Ridwan (1999) entitled *Melawan Hegemoni Barat: Ali Syari'ati dalam Sorotan Cendikiawan Indonesia* (Against Western Hegemony: Ali Syari'ati from the Indonesian Intellectual's Perspective) contained eight essays discussing Shari'ati by Indonesian intellectuals. Books by non-Indonesian writers have been translated into the Indonesian language, including titles by Lee (2000) and Rahnema (2000). All of these efforts have received positive reviews. Dawam Rahardjo, a leader of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), expressed how Goenawan Mohammad praised his foreword for *Kritik Islam atas Marxisme dan Sesat-pikir Barat lainnya* (Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique). According to Rahardjo (2010), "Goenawan Mohammad said that Dawam's foreword is better than Hamid Algar's foreword in the English edition of the same book." Pabotinggi (1986) gave constructive criticism of Shari'ati in a book he edited titled *Antara Visi, Tradisi dan Hegemoni Bukan-Islam* (Between Vision, Tradition and non-Muslim Hegemony).

Academic activities around Shari'ati have expanded not only in academic institutions with an Islamic image like Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) all over Indonesia, and ICAS in Jakarta, but also to 'secular' institutions such as Universitas Indonesia (UI), Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta (UNY) and Sekolah Tinggi Filsafat Driyarkara (STF Driyarkara). Discourse on Shari'ati can also be found in non-Islamic journals, such as *Prisma, Rahima*, and *Diskursus*.

Shari'ati's thought also influences activists in Indonesia. For example, the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam-Majlis Penyelamat Organizasi (HMI-MPO), Masjid Salman ITB and Flamboyan Shelter use Shari'ati perspectives on the problems affecting Muslim societies. (According to Al-Mandari (2010), in 1986 HMI split into two organizations: HMI-MPO and HMI-Diponegoro. Members of HMI-MPO began reading Shari'ati's books as these resonated with the more Islamic students. Shari'ati's books started to become compulsory reading for HMI-MPO cadres and were incorporated into the syllabus). In Bandung, Rakhmat gave talks in Masjid Salman ITB, and often quoted Shari'ati's views. The compilation of his lectures produced two books, titled *Islam Alternatif* and *Islam Aktual*. In UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, according to Ridwan (2009), the Flamboyan Shelter discussed Shari'ati's thought together with the ideas of other Islamic thinkers such as Hasan Hanafi and Seyyed Qutb.

Shari'ati's thought has also inspired the establishment of Shi'a foundations such as the Rausyanfikr Foundation in Yogyakarta. The word '*raushanfikr*' was often used by Shari'ati to refer to "enlightened intellectual." Leftists in Indonesia were aware of the links between Shari'ati's thought and the left movement or socialism. According to Rakhmat (2010), Budiman Sudjatmiko from Parti Demokratik Indonesia (PDI) invited him to give a talk on Shari'ati to leftist audiences. In mid-1980, seminars on Shari'ati

were given by presenters such as Martin van Bruinessen, a Dutch anthropologist and specialist on Indonesian Islam, and Amien Rais. Muhammad (2010) stated that undergraduate projects on Shari'ati were being undertaken in Indonesian campuses since the 1980s and stil continue. Indonesian democracy increasingly encourages a variety of views and in this context the stigma around Shari'ati as a Shi'a thinker is being dispelled.

Morteza Motahhari and the Indonesian Context

Motahhari's thought is very popular within the Shi'a community in Indonesia. Motahhari, or Muthahhari in Indonesian spelling, is better known as an *ulema* (religious teacher) than as an intellectual. Motahhari and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were ideologues for the system that provided for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Motahhari focused on responding to Muslim problems and dilemmas and tried to develop the self-esteem of Iranian Muslims. The Muslim world at that time lacked prominent *ulemas* who could integrate religious thought with western thought. Motahhari took on the challenge via a philosophical approach. We will be looking at how far Motahhari contributed to Indonesian intellectual growth and how his thought was able to ignite activism in Indonesian society, especially in the Shi'a community. The following two tables and one graph give an indication of his intellectual impact in the Indonesian context.

Types of book	Numbers of books
Books by Motahhari translated into the Indonesian language	82
Books on Motahhari by Indonesian authors	0
Books by non-Indonesian authors translated into the Indonesian language	1
Books on Motahhari written by Indonesian authors in which at least one chapter is devoted to Motahhari's views	1
Books written by non-Indonesian authors in which at least one chapter is devoted to Motahhari's views	0
Total	84

Table 3: Books by / on Motahhari

Graph 2: Books by / on Motahhari according to year

Publisher	Number of Books
Pustaka Hidayah	16
Penerbit Lentera	13
Penerbit YAPI	9
Mizan Publishing	7
Islamic Center Jakarta / al-Huda	6
Pustaka Zahra	5
Penerbit IlMAN	3
Yayasan Muthahhari / Muthahhari Paperbacks	3
Penerbit Cahaya	2
Risalah Masa	2
Grafiti Pers	1
CV Firdaus	2
Yayasan Bina Tauhid	1
Propagasi Tablighat Islami	1
Risma	1
Penerbit Pustaka	1
Penerbit PT Beunebi Cipta	1
Penerbit CV Rosda	1
Amanah Press	1
Shalahuddin Press	1
Penerbit Gua Hira	1
Penerbit Basrie Press	1
Penerbit Hikmah	1
Iqra Kurnia Gemilang	1
Serambi	1
El-Faraj Publishing	1
Penerbitan Rasir Utama	1
Total	84

Table 4: Number of books by / on Motahhari by publisher

The first discourse on Motahhari in Indonesia was initiated by Rakhmat, in a long foreword in *Perspektif al-Quran tentang Manusia dan Agama* (Quranic Perspective on Man and Religion). Motahhari then started to gain attention in Indonesia, in line with the rise of the Islamic revolutionary spirit. After Rakhmat, Bagir (1988) celebrated seminars on Motahhari with a book titled *Muthahhari: Sang Mujahid Sang Mujtahid* (Muthahhari: A Fighter, A Reformer). This book is still the only book on Motahhari written by an Indonesian. Ahmad Rifa'i Hasan wrote a chapter on Motahhari in *Konsepsi Manusia Menurut Islam* (The Concept of Man in Islam) edited by Rahardjo (1985). According to Rakhmat (2010), Mizan Publishing played a significant role in introducing Motahhari in Indonesia. Mizan Publishing issued many books by Iranian thinkers and was considered a threat by others. Some *pesantrens* banned its books because they worried that their *santris* (religious students) would be influenced by Shi'a ideas. Motahhari's thought also appeared in undergraduate projects, master's theses, journals, and bulletins.

After the formation of the Motahhari Foundation in 1988, Motahhari thought dispersed rapidly in Indonesian society, especially among the Shi'a community. The Muthahhari Foundation's tag line is, "For the enlightenment of Islamic thought." According to the foundation (1989), there were three reasons behind the name of the foundation. First, Motahhari is a very inclusive Shi'a thinker, and very appreciative of Sunni thoughts, and this fits perfectly within the Indonesian context. Second, Motahhari really understood western thought. Third, Motahhari had the ability to link the dichotomy between intellectuals and *ulemas*. For these reasons, Motahhari's views were inspirational. The Muthahhari Foundation published *Siri Pemikiran Muthahhari* (Series on Muthahhari Thought), held seminars on Motahhari, documented intellectual treasures of Motahhari, and even provided facilities to advise students doing research on Motahhari thought. It set up the Lembaga Pembinaan Ilmu-ilmu Islam (LPII) and published the *Jurnal al-Hikmah* to address Motahhari's ideas. In 1992, the foundation established the Muthahhari (SMU Plus) School to adopt Motahhari's views on Islamic education, which later became deeply-rooted in Indonesian society, especially in Bandung. Its students were not limited to Shi'a. Motahhari's views continue to ignite an intellectual discourse that inspires activism such as that from the ICC, the Rausyanfikr Foundation, the Fatimah Foundation, ICAS and others.

Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari and Indonesian Intellectual Discourse

Compared to the growing number of Shi'a followers in Indonesia, the number of intellectuals who consistently discourse on Shari'ati and Motahhari is still low. This appears to be in contradiction to the seemingly high number of publications and amount of activism relating to the two thinkers. Two intellectuals, Jalaluddin Rakhmat and Haidar Bagir, have consistently commented upon, quoted, and written books on Shari'ati and Motahhari. Rakhmat is currently chairman of IJABI, the national Shi'a organization. IJABI was established on 1 July 2000, aiming to be an umbrella for all Shi'a organizations in Indonesia. Bagir is an intellectual and director of Mizan Publishing. Other intellectuals who have written about Shari'ati at least once include Azyumardi Azra, Muhammad Nafis, Riza Sihbudi, Nadirsyah, Mun'im A. Sirry, Noryamin Aini, Nasaruddin Umar, Ahmad Nurul, Dawam Rahardjo, Mulyadhi Kartanegara, Afif Muhammad, Amien Rais, Eko Supriyadi, Hadimulyo, Mohtar Patobinggi, NS Suwito, and Ekky Malaky. Rais, for example, has written two books with Shari'ati influences entitled, *Cakrawala Islam: Antara Cita dan Fakta* (Islamic Firmament: Between Ideal and Fact) and *Tauhid Sosial: Formula Menggempur Kesenjangan* (Social Faith: Formula to Demolish the Gap). Ahmad Rifa'i Hasan, Muhammad al-Baqir, Fachry Ali, Arif Mulyadi, H. Satria Effendi M. Zein, and a few others have also written about Motahhari. However, we will limit our discussions to the perspectives of Jalaluddin Rakmat and Haidar Bagir.

Ali Shari'ati and Indonesian Intellectuals

Jalaluddin Rakhmat wrote the foreword for the Shari'ati book translated as *Idealogi Kaum Intelektual: Suatu Wawasan Islam* (Ideology of Intellectuals: An Islamic Vision). In the foreword, Rakhmat discussed the concept of intellectualism according to Shari'ati, and included a short biography of Shari'ati's works. For Rakhmat, an intellectual according to Shari'ati is synonymic with a Persian word, *raushanfikr*, which means, "enlightened thinker". *Raushanfikir* does not mean 'academic'. Rather, *raushanfikir* connotes someone more ideological than academic. According to Rakhmat, all dimensions of Shari'ati, including his mind, writing, and speech, were ideological and were aimed at the realization of his practical intellectualism. In *Islam Alternatif*, Rakhmat covered Shari'ati's views

on prophetic history and the difference between the Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic prophets. He reflected on Shari'ati's views on how current generations determine future generations. He also discussed Shari'ati's influence as an architect of the Iranian revolution who fought for the *mustadh'afin* (oppressed people). In *Islam Aktual*, Rakhmat again touched on Shari'ati's views on for example inclusiveness, the role of intellectuals, the revolutionary spirit in Islam, and women's rights.

Haidar Bagir discussed Shari'ati much more intensively in his foreword for the translation of Shari'ati's book, *Ummah dan Imamah* (Society and Leadership). Bagir used controversial language to depict Shari'ati's character: "An anti-Marxism Marxist and a Sunni Shi'a." Bagir investigated Shari'ati's thinking on the relationship between intellectuals and clerics, and compared the thoughts of Shari'ati and Motahhari. According to Bagir, Shari'ati and Motahhari did not oppose one another personally and both agreed with the mission of the Islamic revolution. However, Motahhari could not tolerate the Marxist approach consistently used by Shari'ati. (Davari (2005) shows that Shari'ati intended to modify his earlier Marxist thoughts in discussions with Motahhari. However, he died before they could meet). Bagir believed that the Shari'ati approach could bridge Marxist traditions with Islamic traditions, even if the approach was somewhat controversial in nature. Bagir stated that Shari'ati was really a "*Le représentant de l'Humanité*" (representative of humanity).

Morteza Motahhari and Indonesian Intellectuals

Jalaluddin Rakhmat has written at least three forewords to translations of Motahhari's books in Indonesia; *Membumikan Kitab Suci: Manusia dan Agama* (Grounding the Holy Book: Man and Religion); *Manusia Sempurna* (The Perfect Man), and *Kepimpinan Islam* (Islamic Leadership). In the foreword of *Grounding the Holy Book: Man and Religion*, Rakhmat referred to Motahhari as a model of the ideal theologian. In order to understand Motahhari, he said, we must first understand the concept of *Wilayatul Faqih* (the Jurist's Guardianship), because that is the starting point of Motahhari's thought. The Jurist's Guardianship was proposed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. It refers to the continuity of religious leadership after the Prophet

Muhammad. Rakhmat stated that the quality of Motahhari's thought could challenge that of Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber, and answer the concept of freedom proposed by Bertrand Russell. In the foreword for *The Perfect Man*, Rakhmat indicated how Motahhari took the 'perfect man' discourse from Ibn Arabi, though with different explanations. According to Motahhari, as stated by Rakhmat, the view by Ibn Arabi is predominantly based on Sufism, and not on the *Quran*. Motahhari did not criticise Sufism as a whole, only extremist attitudes among Sufis. In the book *Islamic Leadership*, Rakhmat examined Motahhari's views on the concept of *wilayah* (authority) and *bara'ah* (ultimatum), which became important themes in the principles of Islamic leadership. Rakhmat said that according to Motahhari the *nubuwwah* (prophethood) concept is an extension of the concept of leadership by Ahl Bayt, the major tradition in Shi'a.

Haidar Bagir also consistently discussed Motahhari. He authored the book *Muthahhari Sang Mujahid, Sang Mujtahid* (Muthahhari: A Fighter, A Reformer). In it, Motahhari is presented as a defender of freedom of thought and freedom of faith. Bagir also wrote a foreword for a translation of a Motahhari book titled *Pengantar Pemikiran Shadra: Filsafat Hikmat* (An Introduction to Shadra's Thought: Wisdom Philosophy). The foreword includes a short biography of Motahhari, including his life, education, and activism. In *Islam Agama Keadilan* (Islam the Religion of Justice), Bagir discussed Motahhari's concept of justice in Islam, referring to early Islamic history. In his foreword for *Menguak Masa Depan Umat Manusia: Suatu Pendekatan Filsafat Sejarah* (Revealing the Future of Mankind: A History of the Historical Philosophy Approach), Bagir wrote about Motahhari's commitment to fight for Islamic ideology. Other books in which Bagir discussed Motahhari include the *Pandangan Para Pemikir Syiah: Ali Khamenei, Ali Syariati, Murtadha Mutahhari* (The Perspective of Shi'a Thinkers: Ali Khamenei, Ali Syariati, Murtadha Mutahhari) and *Pengantar Ilmu-ilmu Islam* (Introduction to Islamic Sciences). In these books Bagir explained Motahhari's views on the position of clerics and intellectuals, and discussed the Islamic enlightenment project, comparing Motahhari's views and the Aristotelian concept of *eudemonia* (happiness achieved in a lifetime through the exercise of moral virtue, practical wisdom, and rationality).

Analysis of Shari'ati and Motahhari's thought in Indonesia

Three decades after the Iranian Revolution, Iranian thought still attracts audiences from around the world, including Indonesia. However, in order to stay relevant, this thought must contend with different forces. The role of Shari'ati and Motahhari thought in Indonesia must be considered in relation to national history. Before 1998 Indonesia was under a totalitarian regime, and most political movements, including political Islam, was under the control of the government. Iranian thought was regarded as a threat. According to von der Mehden (1993), "The Malaysian and Indonesian governments recognized any political and religious activities that are related to Iran as threats. Consequently, this recognition has led Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur to together control Islamic ideas perceived as subversive or detrimental in order to restore 'peace and order'." Tamara (1986) stated, "The Indonesian government keeps vigilant eyes on Iran and Libya. Graduates and young people who have ties with these countries often feel that they are under suspicion." But, after the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia has undergone democratization and politics is now very different. Some have said Shari'ati and Motahhari thought is irrelevant in the current socio-cultural atmosphere. Tamara (2010) was correct when he stated that current Indonesian thinkers are more relevant than Shari'ati and Motahhari. During democratization, Indonesia gained freedom of expression and a democratic atmosphere was quickly inaugurated. This so-called "Reformazi" sparked a new intellectual paradigm, which made Shari'ati and Motahhari' thought lose its grip on the non-Shi'a community. However, their ideas still continue within the Shi'a community. For example the ICC and the ICAS still carry out public lectures referring to Shari'ati and Motahhari's books. Translations of books written by the new generation of Iranian intellectuals, most of whom were students of Shari'ati and Motahhari, continue to be published. This gives hope for the preservation of Shari'ati and Motahhari's intellectual heritage in new dimensions.

Indonesian scholars are generally more open to and comfortable with Shari'ati than with Motahhari. Shari'ati's teaching is not shaped exclusively for the Shi'a group. In campuses and even non-Islamic campuses, more students are interested in writing theses investigating Shari'ati thought. Discussions on Motahhari's thought takes place among Shi'a groups only, for example through the *Jurnal Hikmah*, the journal of the Motahhari Foundation. Almost every year there are seminars on Motahhari, but not on Shari'ati. While Shari'ati's books are published by various publishers, Motahhari's books are almost all published by pro-Shi'a publishers. Some scholars argue that this is a result of background and education; Shari'ati had a secular education, while Motahhari had an Islamic education. The Iranian government has paid more attention to the spread of Motahhari's thought, because many books by Shari'ati were quite critical and questioning of the status of clerics. Shari'ati's thought was more dynamic and was widely appreciated by young people, especially students.

The most important issue is for the Shi'a in Indonesia to recognize the need for an epistemic shift. Borradori (2003) has explained the relevance of the views of Jurgen Habermas, one of the most prominent social and political theorists of our age. Habermas claimed: "Every religion entails a dogmatic kernel of belief, which is the reason why every religion needs an authority entitled to discriminate between orthodox, or valid, and unorthodox, or invalid, interpretations of dogma." In addition Habermas suggested that: "religion has to face the complex challenge of relativizing its position vis-à-vis other religions without relativizing its own dogmatic core." According to Mandieta et al (2011) this is the meaning of "the epistemic situation" which needs mutual understanding, mutual learning and reciprocal recognition for both sides: religious and secular citizens.

Looking at the current position of Shi'a in Indonesia through a Habermasian view, we can make correlations with Indonesian multicultural traits, and with its constitution. Labib (2010) stated, "Shi'a in Indonesia should be differentiating itself from Shi'a in Iran." Shi'a in Indonesia must have its own uniqueness, and be able to integrate with local culture. This was understood by Rakhmat (1997) when he emphasized that the Sunni-Shi'a dichotomy was no longer relevant, while Bagir (2010) emphasized some Sunni perspectives as positively leaning towards Islamic attitudes compared to Shi'a. This attitude is crucial for the survival of Iranian thought in Indonesia. Shi'a in Indonesia must be rational and strong enough to avoid emotional debate on the Sunni-Shi'a conundrum. Shi'a in Indonesia must be "made in Indonesia" and not "made in Iran" and Shi'a's universal messages can thus go beyond narrow matters.

Critical Reviews

There are a few critical points to make in regard to the developmental period of Shari'ati and Motahhari's thought in Indonesia. After Indonesian alumni of Qum returned to Indonesia, some Shi'a movements in Indonesia became more conservative. For example, many books on rituals, doctrine and *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) were translated into the Indonesian language. This trend challenged the philosophical and intellectual culture that was very popular in the Indonesian Shi'a community in the earlier stages after the Iranian revolution. The Shi'a community has also questioned its ability to live within Indonesian culture and its effort to fit its ideology within the national context. This question is important because the Shi'a community usually divides its patriotism between Iran and Indonesia. Thus, some might argue that Shi'a in Indonesia is actually engaged in the Iranization of Indonesian socio-cultural elements, rather than transferring Shi'a knowledge to Indonesian culture. Also many have claimed that after the formation of IJABI internal conflicts broke out in many Shi'a communities. Since then, the Shi'a community has been divided into two groups: reformist and conservative. This has caused the Shi'a in Indonesia to question their ability to form solidarity with their fellow Indonesian citizens. These factors are indirectly linked to the survival of Shari'ati and Motahhari thought in Indonesia. Its survival depends on the ability of the Shi'a community to contextualize Shari'ati and Motahhari's thought in relation to the problems of Muslims in Indonesia. In other words, they must intensively rationalize (via argumentative reason) Shi'a thought to correlate with the multicultural paradigm of the country. Otherwise, their thought in Indonesia will be lost in the flood of other thoughts, especially from the West.

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Changing Identities of Japanese Traditional Music in Twenty First Century

Thitipol Kanteewong

Introduction

In many countries in Asia, music has always been part of the people's lives. It has a role to play in both their spiritual and the temporal worlds. It is both sacred and secular since it has a place in religious ceremonies and rituals, just as it has a place in entertainment.

Japanese traditional music has characteristics which set it off from the music of the rest of the world. Studying its nuances could help in The Clash of Civilization. As Huntington expressed (1993, 1-23)

> ... To understand cultural and social movements in the Twenty First Century, we might concentrate particularly on cultural aspects rather than on political and economic ones. Cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones.

During the feudal age, folk music expressed what life was like for people in a small community. Later, when there were kingdoms and monarchs, music played in the royal courts was referred to as classical. During and after the Japanese industrial revolution, music became pop—something the masses could relate to and which also served as a tool for spreading information and promoting certain causes. But even in the modern period, Japanese music contains lyrics reminiscent of traditional Japanese music.[1]

The experimental integration of foreign music and traditional Japanese music began in the nineteenth century. This led musicians and the general public to appreciate the uniqueness and value of Japanese traditional music, which subsequently started the Japanese cultural reform.

The enlightened society that appeared in Japan during the 19th century manipulated traditional Japanese music. It led to changes in the music notation system, in musical forms and functions, in teaching styles, music education, music philosophy, and in the sense of beauty inside music. The meaning of music changed as a result of different social contexts in various times.

The modification of traditional Japanese music manifested itself in new forms during the postwar period. Traditional music was qualified and conserved by the traditional learning system—the "*iemoto*" system.[2] On the other hand, modern society concentrated on high-technology features that changed traditional music and made it more authentic.

In the 1960s, Japan was attempting to reform the national culture by concentrating on Western cultures, which had been introduced during the postwar period. Classical music composers attempted to use traditional Japanese music in their music compositions. Traditional Japanese music was introduced to the world and was made well-known by a masterpiece ("November Steps") of Toru Takemitsu in 1967. Takemitsu began to explore new sound materials by using the "*shakuhachi*" and "*biwa*" double concerto in his musical compositions. Japanese musical instruments were incorporated into Western music, which introduced the Japanese musical identity to the modern world

Traditional musical instruments were promoted in world music genres, and were more popular in the beginning of the 1990s. Traditional Japanese music was then a major brand in world music and represented the Asian musical identity at that time.

After the 1990s, traditional Japanese music was transformed into various genres. There were collaborations with Western classical music and with several favorite musical genres such as pop, rock, jazz, folk music, etc. that may have caused traditional Japanese music to lose its identity in modern Japan.

The diversification of Japanese music became more pronounced in the 20th century. It was widely accepted so that it inspired more experimentation that facilitated its entry into the mainstream. Contemporary music was created by talented musicians who had developed good technique in several traditional music genres such as "*tsugaru jamisen*", Okinawa "*sanshin*", "*koto*", "*biwa*", "*shakuhachi*", "*gagaku*", "*taiko*", "*tsuzumi*", vocal, and various other kinds of folk music. Traditional musical instruments were also involved in reforming Japanese musical style in a modern way.

Objectives and significance of the study

This research sought to understand the changing identity of traditional Japanese music in the 21st century. The shift in the social paradigm has been noted to be highly and mutually beneficial to everyone in the fields of art and culture.

The research concentrates on the transmission process with regard to traditional music in Japan. It is particularly focused on musical styles and social perspectives. It uses a cross-field study in ethnomusicology and sociology. It also focuses on musical collaborations that have brought together traditional Japanese music and the musical instruments of northern Thailand.

Methodology

For the research, three main groups were interviewed to serve as primary sources: 1) music scholars, 2) traditional Japanese music composers and musicians, and 3) audiences. These primary sources were used to organize and analyze the changing identity of traditional Japanese music in the 21st century. They were asked about the following topics: the definition of traditional, contemporary, and neo-traditional music; the national policy on public organization, Japanese neo-traditional music; and the traditional musical identity of the Japanese nation.

The secondary sources used for the research included academic papers, texts, and journals dealing with the history and social background of music, systematic music theory, and social analysis. From them were derived information on Japan's musical history, the role of traditional Japanese music in farming and fishing, the traditional music learning system, the change in the Japanese social paradigm, the industrial culture after World War II, the reformation of Japanese music education, traditional music during the Meiji period, and modern Japanese music.

Participative activities have taken on the forms of attendance at musical concerts and a musical collaboration involving Northern Thailand's neo-traditional music and traditional Japanese music, resulting to contemporary works. The result of this collaboration/experiment will be described.

This research will act as a case study for understanding the collaboration between traditional forms of music that exist in each country in the 21st century. The sample music recordings and the musical notations will be used to analyze and group musical styles as they appear in 21st century Japan.

Results

The experimental works of "Lanna Thai"[3] and Japanese neo-traditional music are a significant part of this research. The music systematic of traditional music is remarkable in terms of both music theory and historical background.

The string instruments of Lanna are used in Japanese neo-traditional music. Three major strings instruments—the "*seung*", a plucked four- or six-string instrument; the "*salor*", a two-string fiddle; the "*pin pia*", a harmonic four-string plucked instrument; and a flute— were chosen to play in four groups of Japanese neo-traditional music and performances. These groups were: 1) the Mahora group, a new "*gagaku*" ensemble; 2) the Kurobyoushi, a new Japanese "*taiko*" drum group; 3) Sana Hayashi, a "*shamisen*" and "*koto*" player; and 4) Jun, a Japanese contemporary dancer.

The traditional Japanese music philosophy is the most significant aspect when it comes to creating new forms of musical compositions. The art's aesthetic such as the "*ma*", a space or silence, and the "*sawari*", a drone sound, were parts of the significant fundamental approach which came from Japanese religious philosophies, namely, Zen Buddhism and the Shinto religion. The philosophies of Zen Buddhism and the Shinto religion emphasize a respect for nature and the need to coexist harmoniously.

From the beginning of the 21st century, however, small art spaces or private theaters were gradually raised in importance equal to that of grand theaters in Japanese contemporary society. The small number of people in the audience are thus able to appreciate the natural sound of musical instruments and sit closer to the musicians and performers, so unlike the set-up in music concerts to promote a CD or organized by music companies. Indeed, the compact live concert has become increasingly recognizable in Japanese society.

Moreover, the Japanese traditional learning system called the "*iemoto*" still plays a part in preserving traditional music. Amateur musicians, patrons, and central government support it.

As for the changes in traditional Japanese music, these can be divided into three new major types, as follows:

First, the advancement of old traditional Japanese music through the introduction of new playing techniques has created new musical repertoires. Second, traditional Japanese music has taken on a more popular style, which promotes such music through popular music reforms performed by a younger generation of musicians. Marketing campaigns are resorted to in an effort to attract mass audiences through media. Several popular musical styles have accompanied traditional Japanese music, among them pop, rock, blues, and jazz. Traditional musicians have been promoted like pop stars and have become well known amongst the Japanese people. Lastly, experimental versions of traditional Japanese music have been developed by contemporary musicians and artists who have demonstrated their creativity in new art forms through the co-creation process, with several musical cultures from outside Japan.

Figure 1 The concert of Kumiko Nonaka in the Yaosada restaurant, Kyoto

More importantly, experiments in traditional Japanese music have affected the Japanese cultural identity in the 21st century. They have also resulted in three different outputs involving neo-traditional music, as follows:

1) Experimental music. It has improved the playing techniques used in traditional Japanese music. Experimental music has also considerably enhanced the philosophy of neo-traditional music.

2) Japan's cultural identity or "Japaneseness". Traditional Japanese musical instruments are recognized as the Orient's sound and are represented in Western contemporary musical compositions under the classification of "exoticism".

3) The co-creation process. It has incorporated Japanese culture by using Japanese musical philosophy to exchange ideas with different musical cultures from all over the world.

In the end, the co-creation process is recognized as a significant system by traditional Japanese musicians, because it has allowed them to create new musical forms with diverse musical cultures, their collective output now making up what is known as Japanese neo-traditional music. Learning about different musical cultures helps people understand the co-creation process that, in turn, enables them to live peacefully with other persons, societies and countries.

However, as a result of significant circumstances in the 21st century, the world's paradigm has changed and people from all around the world have awakened. They have come to realize that they face similar problems such as international terrorism, global warming, and the economic crisis. The world crisis serves to remind people of the unstable living conditions that exist, prompting mankind to find a shared solution, with nature taken into consideration.

Traditional Japanese musical philosophy has been transformed to inspire musicians to create several new genres of music. The sensitive and perfect sound of traditional Japanese musical instruments certainly symbolizes the Japanese musical identity.

The distinctive changing identities of traditional Japanese music in the 21st century can be seen from many viewpoints, but only three will be discussed here: the change in systematic music, changes in social movements, and the changing Japanese music culture.

Let us first consider the changing systematic music of traditional Japanese music. Japanese musicians have freely created new music modes or scales as part of their musical repertoire, in collaboration with other musicians. Also, new ensembles have been formed as a result of new orchestration. New music compositions have been rearranged into harmonic textures as has been the case with Western music. Perhaps, they were played using heterophony or polyphony textures, using different musical instruments tuning from 438 - 445 hertz in concert A sound. The chromatic scale is used more frequently in the new compositions, as well as in jazz music.

Second, the changing social movements are demonstrated by the new trends in music marketing.

The value of music has been diminished by technology, which allows music to be uploaded from music data sources in the Web. People can now select and download their favorite songs without having to buy an entire album. Small live concerts have become fascinating to many people who are keen about the acoustic sound of instruments and the exotic sounds made by traditional Japanese musical instruments. Likewise, Japanese folk music from several areas such as Amami Island, Okinawa Island, and the Aomori prefecture is now accepted by people in the urban areas. The Japanese themselves have awakened to contemporary art and music. Music concerts are no longer confined to formal ones; musicians now hold casual concerts in restaurants, a short bar,[4] an arts space, or a mini private theatre. Neo-traditional music's audiences differ in terms of age and gender, and may be broken up into various small groups depending on their preferred musical styles. Moreover, traditional Japanese musicians normally illuminate certain aspects of a traditional musical instrument's historical background and the traditional philosophy of musical repertoires to audiences during their performance.

Third, the changing musical culture of the Japanese has led to the introduction of new forms of traditional musical styles, while the "*iemoto*" tradition of household learning and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology have rightly preserved traditional Japanese music. Traditional Japanese music is part of Japan's new educational system, and Japanese junior school students are required to learn Japanese traditional music while at school. It is important for the Japanese to realize that their traditional musical culture needs to keep up with Western music in the 21st century.

Indeed, the Japanese people should pay attention to their traditional music and cultural identity. These should not be used to promote nationalism the way it was in the past. Instead, the Japanese should develop an understanding of their own cultural identity. They should focus on ensuring that it is in harmony with other cultures in light of globalization.

The world crises seem to spell trouble for people everywhere; everyone is confronted with similar problems. That this is so has inspired traditional Japanese musicians to co-create new forms of traditional music with other musicians from different cultures, using the traditional Japanese philosophy which is related to the belief in, and respect for, nature.

In short, the Japanese cultural identity should resurface through new forms of Japanese traditions like "Japanese neo-traditional music".

Problem with regard to collaboration

In previous examples of collaborative works, the aesthetic of the new form of traditional Japanese music was represented by various traditional playing techniques. As mentioned previously, there are the "*ma*", a space or silence and the "*sawari*", a drone sound. However, there are some problems in playing techniques with regard to collaborative works involving traditional Japanese music and the music of Northern Thailand.

The following example shows how the traditional music of Northern Thailand has different tunings. It has seven tones which can be played in two simple modes: (1) the major pentatonic mode (C D E G A) and (2) the minor pentatonic mode (C Eb F G Bb). Meanwhile, traditional Japanese music has twelve tones[5] created in several modes and scales in the traditional style. Moreover, the traditional musical character of Northern Thailand is played continually to create the heterophony texture without a rest note or pause, while traditional Japanese music concentrates more on the silence between one sound and another.

Figure 2 The Collaboration concert of Sana Hayashi and Thitipol Kanteewong, Kobe

Although several problems in terms of collaboration have been encountered, rearranging new music compositions and retuning as far as possible the musical instruments used, solved the problem. In short, the musician's experience is a necessity when it comes to co-creating new solutions with other musicians. The solution to the problem of collaboration has created new forms of Japanese neo-traditional music.

Definition of Neo-traditional Music

The term "neo-traditional music"[6] has appeared in several countries in the 21st century. It refers to a desire to continue a country's own traditional music and the transmission of traditional music from the past to the present. Neo-traditional music means "a new style of traditional music that has been reformed and changed in terms of musical styles in order to serve its new social function in the 21st century". Traditional music had changed systematic music to include three main styles: (1) the development of new ensembles by involving several Western and non-Western musical instruments and performances, (2) the development of new styles of traditional music that have been reformed to popular music with influences from jazz, pop, rock, and world music, and (3) the use of experimental traditional musical instruments in new musical compositions influenced by avant-garde music.

Neo-traditional music is a new style of traditional music that has been changed by social movements and paradigms to affect music and its philosophy. Neo-traditional music in the 21st century will become the traditional music of the future.

New Forms of Neo-traditional Music

Japanese neo-traditional music has four different musical forms which have led to collaborative works. These include: (1) new forms of rearrangements with traditional Japanese repertoires, (2) new forms associated with playing Western classical repertoires, (3) new forms of free improvised sessions, and (4) new forms of Japanese musical compositions.

The new forms of rearranging Japanese traditional repertoires involve the process of preserving and developing traditional Japanese music in the 21st century. Traditional Japanese musicians have developed solo techniques with their musical instruments by using more complicated, high-level techniques; or by arranging new orchestration that uses Japanese musical instruments in the new ensemble. This process is appropriate when it comes to preserving and developing traditional Japanese music in the 21st century.

Figure 3 The concert of 'Otoki' group, Osaka

Second, the new way of playing Western classical repertoires has been influenced by Western classical music. Japanese musical instruments have been used to play famous Western classical repertoires by applying Western musical theory. Particular types of Western musical instruments have been replaced by Japanese musical instruments. For instance, the string parts of Western music have been replaced by "*kokyu*", "*koto*", and "*shamisen*" Japanese musical instrument. The wind instruments, on the other hand, have been replaced by the "*ryuteki*", "*nohkan*", "*shakuhachi*", and "*sho*", which were selected due to their ability to offer appropriate timbres and ranges. Most Japanese audiences readily appreciate this new form of neo-traditional Japanese music.

Third, the new forms of free improvised sessions give freedom to musicians. They allow the musicians to play what they want and to derive new melodic forms by using traditional music modes or scales. Musicians determine the structure of the music composition before they begin the performance, but the experimental melodies do not restrict their playing techniques.

Finally, the new forms of Japanese neo-traditional music composition are a significant process in transforming the old Japanese traditions through the new conceptual music philosophy, as a means of identifying Japanese culture in the 21st century. Most new music compositions are related to the traditional religions of Buddhism and Shintoism, that concentrate on the spirits of nature. The new forms of Japanese neo-traditional music have appeared in both instrumental repertoires and in music for accompanied performances.

In conclusion, the four different new forms of traditional Japanese music have made their cultural appearance in the 21st century. Japanese neo-traditional music has transformed old traditional music to new traditional music through experimental and co-creational processes. The world's paradigm is concerned with the security of life from the social, economic, political and natural perspectives. In the 21st century, the world has been confronted by the global warming phenomenon, the world economic crisis, and international terrorism that have affected mankind and remind us of these problems. These problems have inspired many musicians to create their music and to perform them in light of conceptual co-creation and in terms of their relationship with nature.

Understanding the concept of diversity with regard to culture is a significant step to learning how different things outside Japan are. People must be open-minded and must be accepting of different cultures. They must learn to live together in harmony.

Japanese Neo-Traditional Music in the 21st Century

The trend in contemporary music in the 20th century changed to neo-traditional music at the beginning of the 21st century. The world had shifted from industrialization to globalization in the 20th century. As previously mentioned, contemporary music was developed using technological methods. People believed in the power of human beings to conquer nature through technology.

Traditional Japanese music represented Japan's national identity to the world, which was confronted by the dangers of climate change that made people more conscious of similar problems in the 21st century. Japanese neo-traditional music itself has concentrated on collaborating with various genres of music and has crossed the different boundaries separating nations. The most conceptual part of neo-traditional music has been its relationship with the spirits of nature, which is compatible with traditional Japanese music such as the sacred music of Shintoism and Zen Buddhism.

Traditional Japanese music had an impact on the Meiji cultural restoration in the modern era, when Western music was introduced to the Japanese. Western classical music from Europe was considered mainstream music by virtue of national music education. Therefore, most of the younger g.eneration of Japanese familiar with Western classical music do not understand traditional Japanese music. Japanese people appreciate European art more easily than they do their own traditional art.

Although Western music has had an influence on the traditional music of Japan, it proved advantageous for the younger generation to develop their musical skills through western music education before they became interested once more in traditional Japanese music in the 21st century.

The distinctive musical styles of Japanese contemporary music in the 21st century can be seen from several viewpoints. However, we discussed only three significant styles in this thesis: Western-influenced music, popular music, and experimental music styles.

To begin with, the influence of Western music continued from the 20th century to the first decade of the 21st century. There have been some contemporary Japanese music composers who have worked with traditional Japanese musical instruments and they have become renowned in Japan and overseas, among them Toru Takemitsu, Yuji Takahashi, and Jo Kondo. The avant-garde music of these contemporary composers has influenced many contemporary music composers to incorporate traditional Japanese musical instruments in their music compositions. For example, Toshio Hosokawa's contemporary music compositions use traditional Japanese musical instruments. He composed the "*Komponisternporträt*" for chamber music that includes the Arditti Quartet, and the "*sho*" performed by Mayumi Miyata in 2008.

There is an audience keen on Western-influenced music. Although it is an alternative form of music, there are CDs of this type of music sold in the market. While it has been difficult to appreciate avant-garde music because of the conceptual composing process that uses serialism and objectivism which are complicated with unpleasant sounds, the exotic sounds of Japanese musical instruments have attracted a certain audience.

Secondly, popular music produced using traditional Japanese music is one of the three main styles that exist throughout Japan. New trends in traditional music have made a comeback in Japanese society after people realized the culture of their own nation in the late 20th century. The sound of traditional Japanese music is present in some contemporary music compositions. Also, Japanese folk songs have been influenced by a

popular western music accompaniment called the "enka" (演歌)[7].

Besides, television and radio broadcasts have been promoting the new styles of traditional Japanese instrumental music. Music recording companies have released CD albums produced by young Japanese neo-traditional musicians. New idols of neo-traditional music have emerged in Japan in the persons of the Yoshida brothers ("*tsugaru jamisen's*" player), Togi Hideki ("*hishiriki's*" player) and Agatsuma Hiromitsu ("*shamisen's*" player). They are promoted as musician pop stars in the mainstream music scene. The album has been a success in terms of publicizing the new trend in traditional Japanese music from the urban areas to many other cities in Japan. In short, the masses support the traditional Japanese popular music style.

Finally, the experimental music style associated with traditional Japanese musical instruments has created new forms of music that are related to the old traditional music, combined with the new tradition of the 21st century. The process of "co-creation" is a significant method with regard to the collaboration of traditional Japanese music with other musical genres and performances. The experimental music is not mainstream music in terms of being a popular style, but it has been dispersed in many areas. Musicians have engaged in collaborative work in more confined spaces where the audiences are able to participate closely in the performance.

Furthermore, it is not only the traditional techniques of playing that have been used in the collaborations. Traditional Japanese music philosophies are also widely used in the new works. For example, "*ma*", which means silence or signifies spacing between sounds, is used in the new compositions which affect human emotions by requiring listeners to envision different images, depending on their experiences with silence. Traditional Japanese music has a strong character in terms of systematical music, so that new musical forms can be identified by the "co-creation" process with other musical genres. Indeed, traditional Japanese music is still being played in Japan, despite the fact that new forms of traditional music are being experimented on.

In conclusion, neo-traditional music has transformed playing techniques, musical skills, traditional songs, and the philosophies of traditional music from generation to generation. Indigenous knowledge inherent to traditional music is a significant basic element for the new generation, which can be identified as part of Japanese culture in the 21st century. "Co-creation" is a process of cultural transmission from the 20th to the 21st century.

The diagram of traditional Japanese music in the 21st century shows the process of traditional music development based on several genres of traditional Japanese music. The eight groups are the *"syommyo"*, *"gagaku"*, *"noh"*, *"shakuhachi"*, *"shamisen"*, *folk music*, *"koto"* and the *"biwa"*. "Co-creation" is an important method of experimentation in traditional Japanese music. There are several kinds of music from Japan and overseas that transformed traditional music into neo-traditional music in the first decade of the 21st century. As a result, neo-traditional Japanese music in the contemporary style can be divided into three main styles: (1) the development of new ensembles, (2) the new styles of traditional music that have been reformed to popular music, and (3) the use of experimental traditional musical instruments in new musical compositions.

Figure 4 The diagram of Japanese traditional music in the twentieth first century

In summary, traditional Japanese music is still being played in Japan nowadays, with the existence of certain traditional music that have been appropriately changed to new forms but still of the traditional style in the 21st century. Although certain traditional Japanese music styles have changed from the old traditional music to neo-traditional music, Japanese musicians nevertheless still preserve the philosophy of traditional music by creating new techniques of playing, new musical repertoires, and new ensembles; and through their conceptualization of performances, and through the collaboration forged using oriental and occidental musical instruments.

Conclusion

In the world as it exists today, the social paradigm is changing from industrialization to information technology, where people can swiftly communicate with one another from any place around the world. External cultures have influenced Japanese culture. As a result of this cultural exchange, Japanese traditional arts are being converted to neo-traditional styles that also affect the world. The Japanese art philosophy is one of the most renowned Oriental philosophies across several fields. It is evident in modern minimalist

visual arts, in the use of silent sounds in contemporary music, and in the design of emptiness in terms of using space in architecture.

Furthermore, the terms traditional, contemporary, and neo-traditional with regard to music have different interpretations on the part of many scholars. These terms are key or significant words when it comes to comprehending the situation of the changing Japanese musical and cultural identity, that are reflected in Japan's social paradigm in the 21st century. In short, the definitions of these significant terms have been argued about and discussed by a number of scholars in different fields. From whichever point of view, three main key terms may be distinguished with regard to music: the traditional, the contemporary, and the Neo-traditional.

Changing traditional Japanese music is one method of cultural preservation. It identifies Japanese culture in new forms of systematical music as part of the process of globalization in the 21st century. Japanese neo-traditional music has defined Japan's cultures in a new paradigm that has clashed and joined external cultures. New forms of traditional music have transmitted the old style of traditional music in contemporary music that emphasizes the transformation, creation,

dissolution, and preservation of traditional Japanese music within modern society through the process of "co-creation".

In conclusion, Japanese tradition is contributing to the establishment of a cultural identity through cultural productions and consumption. Japan's culture is a significant tool that presents her unique personality within the world community.

NOTE

1 Which are included; 1) "*Koten*" - Japanese classical music, 2) "*Shinkyoku*" - new music, 3) "*Gendai Hogaku*"- new traditional music.

2 The term "*iemoto*" system means under a house or school head. The "*iemoto*" is actually a top musician, or has the highest status of a musician in one school that has its own pupils, passing down in a self-replicating structure. It transforms music styles from generation to generation, that has more traditional Japaneseness.

3 The term "*Lanna*" means Kingdom of Million Rice Fields. Located in the northern part of Thailand it is now divided into eight provinces; Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Lamphun, Lampang, Prae, Nan, Prayao, and Mae Hong Sorn.

4 A small-sized bar found on/under ground in the urban areas.

5 The "*ichikotsu*" (D), "*tanqin*" (D#), "*hyojo*" (E), "*shosetsu*" (F), "*shimonu*" (F#), "*sojo*" (G), "*fusho*" (G#), "*oshiki*" (A), "*rankei*"(A#), "*banshiki*" (B), "*shinsen*" (C), and "*kaminu*" (C#).

6 The term "neo"- means modern, or new; it is used with many nouns and adjectives to make nouns and adjectives refer to or describe things that exist in the present, in forms slightly different from the way they existed in the past.

7 Japanese traditional popular music. The "*enka*" flourished during the post-war era, and was adapted in Japanese traditional songs with western music; it represented the nationalism of Japan in the modern period.

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Lineages, Networks, Centers and Peripheries: Musical Exchanges in Maritime Asia

Arsenio Nicolas

Introduction

This short account of the music history of Asia focuses on more recent periods, particularly the past 7,000 years—from the spread of language families in Asia, and the appearance of bronze drums in present-day Vietnam and South China, to the development of gong music cultures from about the 10th century or earlier, and then onward to the more contemporary trends in music–making in Asia. Historical memory may be said to be inscribed in musical artifacts from archaeological sites. Regional and national identities—some of them porous, some highly defined—change over time as populations move, and as music and languages interact across borders.

A history of music in Asia would illuminate some of the themes related to the changing national and regional identities of cultures and nations. Contemporary writings on history tend to impute on the past the current fascination for identity, nationalism, and claims to ancestral heritage. The slow pace of archaeological research in relation to music history and the dominance of studies on empires and kingdoms—largely based on writing, temple architecture, and dynastic histories—have all diminished focus on musics at the margins, less on cultures without music notation, and less on peoples without histories.

Writing a long-term history of music necessarily entails the use of multiple sources; and music historians, archaeologists, geneticists, and linguists in Asia will certainly fill in the many lacunae in this short study. Much of these histories are still unexplored and the current interests in music research in Asia have produced writings in Asian languages. The aim of this study is to present an outline of this history toward a better understanding of the shared musical and cultural heritage in Asia.

Chronology: Outline of a History of Music in Asia

The following can be proposed as a chronology of a history of music in Asia.

1. The migrations of the Austro-Asiatic, Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, Tai-Kadai, Sino-Tibetan, Austronesian, and Oceanic language groups (comprising more than 3,000 languages with over three billion speakers today); the use of these languages in vocal music, in chants, epics, love songs, alternating songs and ritual music; and the early musical exchanges among the peoples of Asia through maritime and inland trade routes.

2. The use of bamboo, wooden, and other natural materials for musical instruments like bamboo tubes, bamboo slit drums, flutes, pipes, wooden percussion logs, pairs of sticks, rattles, xylophone blades and bars, among others.

3. The use of bronze in the manufacture of bells from about the fifth millennium BCE and of bronze drums from about the mid-first millennium BCE, and of flat gongs and bossed gongs from about the tenth century CE or earlier.

4. The spread of Indian and Chinese religions in Asia; the construction of temple and court complexes that gave rise to a new aesthetics in music as well as in architecture, language and literature, from the beginning of the first millennium CE onward; the arrival of Middle Eastern religions that brought new ideas to the music cultures of Asia. While India, China, and the Middle East provided new music structures and practices, how the rest of Asia exchanged with or introduced musical ideas into India, China and the Middle East is not as widely known.

5. The European conquest of Asia, the introduction of Christianity and European music and aesthetics, from the mid-sixteenth century to the contemporary period.

6. The twentieth century and the global movement of ideas in music, the invention of digital technology, and the marketing of music as a commodity that continually threaten a diversity of musics all over the world.

Bamboo and Wood

In ancient Asia, the domain of the sacred was nature: the earth, the waters, the sky, with the earth considered as the most immediate domain. Man's habitat was regarded as the habitat of the sacred, and as this space was shared, the rites of veneration and propitiation were required to maintain the balance between man, nature, and the world of ancestral souls and spirits.

The various types of bamboo musical instruments in the Philippines—stamping tubes, half-tube percussion, two-stringed zithers, polychordal zithers, buzzers, xylophone bars, xylophone staves, bamboo pipes, scrapers, slit drums—are also found in Java, Bali, among the Orang Asli in west Malaysia, the border regions between Assam, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam and South China, in Indonesia, and in some islands in Oceania (Kaudern 1927; Nicolas 1975; 1994; Yuan and Mao 1986; Niles and Fischer 1986; Yraola 1998; Maceda 1998; Sam Ang Sam 2002; Vorreiter 2009).

Numerous types of musical instruments were designed to use bamboo, whose natural shape produced stamping tubes, pipes, zithers and buzzers. There also were several devices that did not play composed sound. There are two modes of producing musical sound. The first mode is dependent on the presence or absence of natural forces, as when the wind blows; or when water in a river, a stream, or a rice field is used to propel the devices. Examples of two different kinds of instruments dependent on natural forces are bamboo windpipes. The first type is the bamboo plant that has not been cut from its roots but on whose upper nodes holes have been bored. When the winds blow and hit these holes, various tones are simultaneously emitted, as if there were as many players as tones heard. The other type is the cut bamboo pole—posted in the middle of rice fields, like in Bali (*sunari*); along the seashore, in Madagascar; or mounted on top of trees or elevations to catch stronger streams of wind, as done in Malaysia (*buluh perindu*) (Nicolas 1994).

A news item published in *Kompas* in Jakarta on 1 November 2010 reported that during the impending arrival of a tsunami on 25 October, a *kentungan* (bamboo slit tube percussion) saved the lives of a whole village because the village chief started beating one, prompting the villagers to flee to the hills, away from the 12-meter high waves that leveled off all their houses (*Kompas* 2010b). This bamboo tube slit percussion instrument is used in many communities in Southeast Asia, to send off signals for various reasons: to announce the arrival of guests, to call a meeting, to ward off evil spirits, and, in the aforementioned case, to warn people of an impending danger or catastrophe. In the same manner, thousands of *kentungan*, along with gongs, cymbals and drums, are beaten in Bali on the eve of the New Year (*Nyepi*), to usher in a new cycle, and ward off bad spirits and malignant forces from the village and the entire island.

Bronze Drums

Recent researches date the appearance of bronze drums to the mid-first millennium BCE, either in the region now called DongSon, Vietnam, or in Yunnan, South China. From there, bronze drums spread to Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Bernett-Kempers 1988, Nguyen van Huyen et al. 1989). The spread of bronze drums in Southeast Asia extended from Burma to Kei Islands, East Indonesia, and Banggi in north Borneo, an island south of Palawan, Philippines, where one latest find is a bronze drum. In Sembiran, Bali, the discovery of a clay stamp or mold used in the manufacture of bronze drums and dating back to the first century CE, confirms the localization of bronze technology and the production of musical instruments whose protoforms came from mainland Asia (Ardika 1998). Bronze drums are cast with bas reliefs—examples of which are found in Vietnam and Indonesia—of men riding long boats, clad in headhunting attire and playing the bamboo mouth organ. The distribution of bronze drums and bamboo mouth organs in Burma, South China, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Borneo, attest to the concurrence of the bronze and bamboo musical traditions in Asia.

Gongs, Bells, and Cymbals

In maritime Asia, there are presently 20 sites with bronze musical instruments in a maritime archaeological setting. Their chronology may be divided into two general periods. The first period covers the 9th to the 13th centuries CE, during which time cymbals, bells, and flat gongs appeared in maritime and inland archaeological sites. The second period began in the 13th century and lasted up to the

17th century, during which time bossed gongs dominated the maritime records in shipwrecks and buried boats along the coastal regions. These sites are found in Luzon, Java, Borneo, Java, Sumatra, Thailand, and Cambodia, which are along the principal maritime trade routes that connected Asia to Africa and the Mediterranean. The dating of the shipwrecks is obtained primarily from the ceramics and tradeware in these ships, as well as from radiocarbon dating and dated coins. Three types of gongs have been found in these shipwrecks: (1) flat gong with narrow, straight rim; (2) small, bossed gong with low boss and straight, narrow rim and (3) big, bossed gong with low boss and narrow, turned-in-rim.

In the 9th and 10th centuries, gongs, bells, and cymbals simultaneously appeared in Borneo and Sumatra. The earliest dated shipwrecks with flat gongs and bells appeared during this period off the coast of Tanjung Simpang, Sabah and are dated to the 10th century. By the 13th century, bossed gongs appeared in shipwrecks in Butuan, Mindanao, Sumatra, and Thailand. Three shipwrecks from Thailand (*Rang Kwien, Sattahip and Phu Quoc*), dated from the 13th to the 16th centuries, transported bossed gongs to Indonesia and the Philippines. Bossed gongs are well represented in temple reliefs in Cambodia (12th century, Angkor Wat and Bayon) and Java (*Panataran, Kediri, Kedaton*). They date back from the 11th to the 13th centuries, about the same time that bossed gongs began to appear in shipwrecks in Thailand, Vietnam, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Palawan, and Mindanao. Twelfth-century illustrations on the bas-relief of gong circles are found in Angkor Wat (12th century); while in Brunei, a 14th–15th century site yielded a small gong fragment (*gulintangan*, gongs-in-a-row; *kulintang* in Mindanao and Sulu) that may have been used as part of ritual offerings, buried together with Ming, Sawankhalok, and Sukhotai ceramics (Nicolas 2009, 2011b, 2011c).

Gongs play music during many important rituals and ceremonies, when offerings of food and other paraphernalia are placed on ceramic plates and in jars. In Palawan, rice wine drinking among the people is accompanied by the playing of a bossed gong (*agung, sanang*) and drum ensemble. Rice wine stored in jars is also used during the recitation of chants and epics among the Ifugao in Northern Luzon. The dances performed by the *mumbaki* (ritual specialist) in front of sacrificial pigs are accompanied by an ensemble of flat gongs (*gangha*) (Maceda 1994: 75-106, 136-140). In Mindanao, gongs called *agung* are played in life cycle

ceremonies among the Manobo, Bagobo, Tiboli, Pa'lawan, and among the Maguindanao, Maranaw, Tausug, Sama, Yakan, and Bajao, where both indigenous and Islamic elements are syncretized.

In Java, gongs are played in the contexts of ancient village cleansing rites called *bersih desa* to accompany the Javanese *wayang* (shadow puppet plays). Performed in more varied contexts and settings, the *wayang* relates stories from the Ramayana, Mahabharata, the Bhagavad Gita, the life of the Buddha, the life of Christ; and more recent nationalist themes. Revered as sacred heirlooms, ancient gongs in the courts of Java are associated with power and spirits. In the large pavilions and halls reserved for the entertainment of the aristocracy, the *gong ageng*, measuring a meter in diameter, is a symbol of the wealth and spiritual power of the reigning monarchs. It is believed to be inhabited by spirits, for whom periodic offerings of incense and flowers are made.

In the mountains of Mindanao, Palawan, and Borneo, the number of gongs (known as *agung, egung, tawak*, among others), rather than their size, indicate the owner's power, wealth, status, and prestige. Unique perhaps to Borneo is the practice of a high-status villager sitting on top of two or three *agung*, as he or she recites a proclamation affecting the village. It is the sole prestige of the successful headtaker to dance on top of the gong, in his honor, in full regalia consisting of hornbill feathers and multicolored cloths. In the same manner in the past, successful headtakers in Northern Luzon were welcomed in their villages to the sound of flat gongs called *gangsa*.

Temple bas-reliefs

Upon the introduction of Hinduism and Buddhism in China, Japan, Korea, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, West Malaysia, Sumatra, Java, and Bali, an Indic ritual system was instituted, around which a repertoire of musical performances evolved, either inspired by Indian models or drawn from the indigenous musical practices of that period. A discussion of music, ritual space, and its relation to the temple systems in Asia where Buddhism and Hinduism had spread, necessarily brings into focus the transformation of indigenous musical systems into new forms.

Temples were adorned with reliefs illustrating the sacred and the secular, with depictions of musical instruments, musicians, singers, and dancers. Temple

complexes in Asia with extensive illustrations of musical events provide historical data for many aspects of music in the region. These are the Borobudur and the Prambanan temples in Central Java (9th century), Panataran (12th century) in East Java, Angkor Wat and Bayon (12th century) in Cambodia, and the Cham temples in Mi-son and Tra-kieu (8th to 10th century) in present-day Vietnam. Sculptors carved bas-reliefs of narratives using either volcanic stone, sandstone, bricks or andesite. A chain of Hindu and Buddhist temples which can be found from Sumatra to the Thai-Malay Peninsula towards Ayutthaya and Lanna (Kampar in Sumatra, Bujang Valley in Kedah and Tumpang and Ayutthaya in Thailand) (Proceedings of the Seminar on Thailand-Malaysia 2005), as well as those in Pagan in Burma, have very little information on music. With only one artifact from the Dvaravati period of four female musicians (playing a pair of sticks, cymbals, a 5-stringed lute and a singer) now housed in the National Museum in Bangkok, music history during the Dvaravati period of the Mon and Khams (6th-11th century), Srivijaya (6th-14th century), and the Yonok Chiang-saen (8th-12th century) remains unexplored (Roongruang 1999:34 ff.).

Musical terms: Languages, etymologies, inscriptions

Musical data from inscriptions in the many court languages in Asia provide information on ancient musical terms, although what the inscriptions may tell us may be similar to written literary texts found mainly in the courts or temples, with little or no reference to village musical life. The corpus of literary works is yet another source of musical data, but problems arise when manuscripts are copied over time by scribes or rulers. To the old texts, new styles of writing, music, dance and theatrical performances may have been added. What were practiced in the wider expanse of village and mountain societies remain unknown (Nicolas 1975, 1994). From the early first to the mid-second millennium, new musical languages were introduced in Asia—Indic in the case of Sanskrit, Pali and Tamil; and Middle Eastern in the case of Arabic, and European.

Indic musical terms: Sanskrit, Tamil

Sanskrit loan words referring to musical instruments in the paleographical literature of Java and Bali appeared in inscriptions during the Central Javanese Period (9th-10th century), but slowly fell out of use during the East Javanese Period (10th-14th century)

(Nicolas 2011). During the Central Javanese period, six Sanskrit terms referring to musical instruments (*ghanta, mrdangga, muraba, gangsa, sangkha, bangsi*) appeared, while only three Old Javanese terms emerged during the same period (*regang, curing, marga maregang*). One Old Balinese term was mentioned, *gendang*, which today refers to cylindrical drums. Four of the Sanskrit musical terms—*gangsa, padahi, sangkha, rawanahasta*—were still mentioned in inscriptions in East Java from the 10th century to about the end of the 11th century. From this time on, a shift in the use Javanese and Balinese musical terms signaled a return to Javanese ideas of music, a phenomenon that was also seen in literature, temple architecture and religion (Nicolas 2007). Similar phenomena occurred in Angkor after the death of Jayavarman VII ca. 1218, during which after his reign, great temples ceased to be built and eloquent Sanskrit inscriptions were no longer incised (Woodward 1980).

Compiled by Yraola (1998), the tables of native terms for music instruments and the language groups to which they belong in the Philippines are a rich source for comparative musical paleoarchaeology. For example, the individual names of flat gongs in Northern Luzon are local in origin, but the generic terms for them (*gangsa, gangha, changsa, kangsa*) are derived from the Sanskrit *kangsa*.

Two Sanskrit musical terms, *keccapi* and *kangsa*, are today used by music communities in Thailand, Java, Mindanao, and Borneo. Similar names for *keccapi* are *krajjapi* (crocodile zither) in Thai, *kechapi* (board zither) in Javanese, *kudyapi* (two stringed lute) in Mindanao, and *sampe* (two- or three-stringed lute) in Borneo. The Sanskrit term *kaNsa* (bell metal) is expressed in Javanese and Balinese as *gangsa* (metallophones), which is, in turn the term for flat gongs in highland Northern Luzon. These musical affinities point to a local root rather than to Indian roots, as there are as well numerous local terms for flat gongs and two-stringed lutes in the Philippines (Nicolas 2011). Sanskrit was already known in Luzon by the 10th century, as indicated by the 32 Sanskrit words identified in the Laguna Copper Plate inscription dated 900 CE (Francisco 1995). Sanskrit and Tamil words are known in several Philippine languages, just as several images of Hindu gods and Bodhisattvas have been found in Negros, Palawan, and Agusan (Francisco 1964). The gong term *mongmongan* was evident in 17th century Tagalog, along with Chinese terms for gongs. It is related to the

mong in Thai, Malay, Sumatra, Javanese, and Balinese musical nomenclature (Nicolas 2009). Sanskrit terms used for gongs and lutes are complemented by the profusion of local terms used to identify or name these gongs and lutes in each language group.

Chinese musical terms

Trade provided impetus for the development of new musical forms and the intensification of musical activity in kingdoms and polities. Chinese musical practices and music terminology surfaced when maritime trade between Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean intensified, especially during the Ming Period. Flat gongs from the 10th to the 13th centuries were generally borne by Chinese ships, and may have originated from mainland Asia. The possible shift in naming flat gongs using Chinese or Sanskrit, to Northern Luzon musical terms, certainly predates the 16th century, when Spanish and Portuguese accounts referred to similar terms. Today, the terms for gongs, drums, and cymbals that are used for dragon dances in the Philippines are Tagalog, rather than Chinese. The musicians and dancers are of Chinese ancestry, but they no longer speak their mother language. Similar groups in Indonesia use local terms rather than Chinese. The Thai Chinese dragon dance and opera groups, however, have retained some Chinese terms, which they use together with Thai terms (Nicolas 2010).

Very little is known about musical exchanges between China and the Philippines. Chinese records mention the *Luzoes* (people of Luzon in northern Philippines) who sailed and waged war along the southern coasts of China (Scott 1990). Musicians from Java, Burma, Champa and Vietnam, and from central and south Asia, visited the Tang court, and these musical exchanges reached an apex during the Ming dynasty. At the time, embassies and missions of various countries in Asia exchanged trade items with China and returned with silk and porcelain. In these exchanges, musical ideas were also circulating within Asia. Chinese communities began to settle in Southeast Asia, building temples and music associations that played Chinese music. Spanish accounts from the 16th to the 18th centuries described performances featuring Chinese rituals and theatrical plays along the Pasig River, in Manila, Laguna and Cavite. Ships from China continued to sail to Manila to provide silk and porcelain for the galleon trade during the Spanish colonial period (Nicolas 2010). Musical references to the Chinese by Spanish

chroniclers from 1570 to 1788 described theatrical performances, processions, and dragon dances spitting fire, but did not mention musical terms (Nicolas 2007). Despite the long history of Chinese trade in maritime Asia and the presence of Chinese temples and musical activities in Chinese communities in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, very few musical terms of Chinese origin (Yuan and Mao 1986, Trasher 2000) can be found in the Philippines and Indonesia (Nicolas 2009, 2010), Thailand (Miller and Choenpairot 1994; Lau 2001; Miller 2010), and Malaysia (Tan Sooi Beng 2007).

Music history and musical shifts–archaeology, linguistics, genetics

Recent researches on the archaeology, genetics, linguistics and history of Asia have focused on the role of sea and maritime trade as avenues of musical exchanges and transmissions connecting the Mediterranean, Africa, Asia, and Oceania. This metageography maps a history of music in human civilization, linking all the continents into one world system.

The Philippines: Musical shift in the sixteenth century

The early musical relations between the Philippines, Champa, Indonesia, Thailand, and Cambodia date back to the prehistoric period. On the basis of archaeological finds in Magsuhot, Bacung in Negros, and the Kalanay Cave in Masbate (Philippines), Central Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia, movements of peoples may have occurred from the third century CE to 500 CE, and later (Dizon and Ronquillo 2010). The existence of prehistoric links between Thailand and the Philippines has been proposed, based on studies on the Mun River in Thailand, inferring a transmission of art forms from the Philippines (Gosling 2004:14). Three shipwrecks with gongs found in the Gulf of Thailand—Rang Kwien, Sattahip and Phu Quoc—dated from the 13th to the 16th centuries, were bound for Indonesia and the Philippines. During this period, bossed gongs had already been carved on the bas-reliefs of Angkor in Cambodia, and Panataran and Kediri in East Java. However, two types of bossed gongs have not been found in shipwrecks: (1) bossed gongs found in Mindanao, Borneo and Sumatra—high-bossed gongs with wide, turned-in rims (*agung*, *egung*); and (2) large, low-bossed gongs (measuring about one meter in diameter) with narrow, turned-in rims that are more common in Java and Bali (*gong agung*) (Nicolas 2009).

Eleventh-century Cham ceramics have been found in Butuan, north Mindanao (Burns and Brown 2003). References to the term "Orang Dampuan" or people of Champa from southern Annam (Vietnam) indicate that Sulu had early relations with Cambodia and China (Beyer 1947). Furthermore, a recent study show that Cham and Philippine scripts share similar origins (Wade 1993), and Sanskrit words in the Philippines may have come by way of Cham (Gonda 1952). Today, two flat gong music cultures are found in Northern Luzon and in the highlands of central Vietnam. In both musical styles, musicians play one flat gong each in an ensemble to create an ostinato or repeated melodies of indefinite pitches; in a unique style, musicians beat these gongs and dance at the same time.

During the Ming Dynasty, Chinese ships were banned from sailing southward and consequently more ships from Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia sailed with ceramic cargo from their areas. After the sixteenth century, the flow of musical ideas became more restricted, a result of new territorial boundaries established by the European colonial system. Consequently, the spread of gongs diminished as music communities in the Philippines shifted to Spanish and Latin liturgical music, and to European music taught in schools or patronized by the elite. What evolved in Luzon and the Visayas Islands, therefore, was a music newly created based on western harmony, using European musical instruments—the organ, the piano, the harp, the guitar, and the flute. The military band became ubiquitous even in far-flung towns (Maceda 1973). This shift has not been fully documented, analyzed, or critiqued in the light of the many studies on dominance and globalization that have preoccupied the discourses on global studies and music studies.

Archaeometallurgy

The appearance of bronze in Asia produced bronze drums, cymbals, bells, and gongs. The ancient technology of producing quenched high-tin bronze was known in India (Rajpitak and Seeley 1979; Srinivasan 2010), in the Thai-Malay peninsula (Karafet et al. 2005; Murillo-Barroso et al. 2010; Higham 2011), as well as in Vietnam and China. It was later used in the manufacture of bronze drums and gongs. Recent excavations in Sungai Petani, Kedah, West Malaysia yielded early first-millennium sites with iron industries. By the time flat gongs and bossed gongs appeared in the Philippines, Indonesia and

central Vietnam, technologies for manufacturing high-tin quenched bronze were already known in India, Thailand, Vietnam, Java, and China. While Chinese Shang and Zhou bells and Dong Son bronze drums are casted and forged, highland Northern Luzon (*gangsa*) and highland central Vietnam flat gongs (*chieng*), Maguindanao gongs-in-a-row (*kulintang*), and the Javanese *gong ageng* are forged and hammered. Today, gong manufacturing is known in Borneo, Java, Bali, Burma, Laos, Thailand, West Malaysia, and Vietnam. One characteristic of these gongs is their high-tin content ranging from 15 to 25 percent, with prehistoric precursors in India, Thailand, Vietnam, and China. Current archaeological findings, however, have not provided a clear picture of gong manufacturing since not one site has yielded data on the manufacture of bronze gongs.

Population Genomics and Biomusicology : Populations, Languages and Musics

Looking at Asia's long history of demic population migrations, cultural diffusion and language spread, recent archaeological and genetic studies provide music historians a long-term perspective of the histories of music in Asia. The Callao Cave in the province of Cagayan in Luzon, Philippines yielded a human third metatarsal (foot bone) dating to a minimum 66,700 years ago, making it now the oldest known human fossil in the country. Modern humans inhabited Niah Cave in Borneo (40,000 to 42,000 years ago) and Tabon Cave in the island of Palawan, Philippines (47,000 years ago) (Mijares et al. 2010). Recent genetic studies suggest multi-directional demic migrations of populations in Asia and several theories have been postulated on the peopling of Asia in terms of several centers of dispersals, the direction of movement, and the time frame of these dispersals (Tabada 2010, Karafet 2010, Oppenheimer 2008). Genetic studies allow for attempts to distinguish the influence of demic and cultural diffusion for prehistoric events, which differ with linguistic and archaeological analysis (Cavalli-Sforza et al. 1994; in Min-Sheng Peng et al. 2010).

Two migration routes from India to Asia emerge from several recent genetic studies, with implications for music history and the spread of musical ideas across the continent eastwards. The first, an overland route—a direct link of population migration from northeast India to mainland Southeast Asia, with Austro-Asiatic groups of Northeast India providing genetic link between South Asia, particularly the Khasi-Khmuic

Austro-Asiatic populations and Southeast Asia, particularly the Mon-Khmer, Hmong-Mien and Tibeto-Burman—reinforce the idea that Northeast India has acted as a corridor for initial movement of populations, with a dating of 19,000 before the present (Reddy 2007). Another study suggests that the Mundari populations separated quite early (dating to some 40,000 years ago) and migrated to and settled in Southeast Asia, while much later, another wave of migration by the Mon-Khmer people from Southeast Asia through Thailand and coastal southern Burma to Andaman and Nicobar Islands (Kumar 2007). The second, a maritime route—research on the genetics profiles of a number of relict populations in southern India and Southeast Asia suggested that these populations might be the descendants of earlier dispersals from Africa to Asia and beyond. Older maritime routes from India via the Thai-Malay Peninsula to Australia is proposed as a possible dispersal route, based on the analysis of complete mtDNA genomes from the Orang Asli, the aboriginal inhabitants of Malaysia and the principal relict group in southeast Asia, in relation to other eastern Eurasian and Australasian lineages (Macaulay et al 2005).

Studies on Y-chromosomes point to a link between populations in East and Southeast Asia, with Southeast Asia posited as the source of East Asian populations (Ding et al. 2000; The HUGO Pan-Asian Consortium 2009), suggesting a unidirectional movement to the north which can be traced to the Hmong-Mien and Mon-Khmer (Cai et al 2011). The migration of the Autronesians groups from south China, around 5,000 to 7,000 years ago, to Taiwan, then to the Philippines, further split into two trajectories—one towards the west through Borneo, Sumatra and West Malaysia, extending to Madagascar, and the two, to east Indonesia and Oceania. The Philippine mtDNA pool has a high 95 percentage consanguinity with Taiwan groups, considered to be the home of the Austronesian. The Taiwanese groups belong to the haplogroups of post-glacial and pre-Neolithic origin, previously identified in East Asian and Island Southeast Asian populations (Tabbada et al. 2010).

These studies on the genetics of the populations of Asia provide a working model for a reconstruction of music history with the following examples from Champa, Bali, Malaysia, and the Philippines illustrating possible movements of populations, languages and musics in the region.

It is now well established that Cham is an Austronesian language, although earlier studies by Schmidt in 1906 described Cham as Austroasiatic mixed language due to Mon-Khmer borrowings (Thurgood 2005:490). A recent study proposes that the Chams possess a closer genetic affinity with the Mon-Khmer populations in Cambodia and southern Thailand, than with the Austronesian populations on Island Southeast Asia (ISEA), and that the potential homelands of the Chams in ISEA cannot be detected. Although the Chams have significant links with Austronesian speakers from ISEA in language and culture, the features of the Cham mtDNA variation show much weaker genetic links between the Chams and the ISEA populations. The arrival of the Austronesian immigrants involved extensive genetic admixture between one expanding Austronesian language (proto-Chamic) and the Mon-Khmers, the major genetic donors to the Chams, who contributed minor loan words to the Chamic language. Thus, the diffusion of the Austronesians in ISEA was mainly a process of language shift by indigenous populations (Min-Sheng Peng et al. 2010). The Kingdom of Champa lasted more than one millennium with a zenith from the 7th to the 10th centuries CE, over the coastal plains and the interior highlands in Central Vietnam, extending its domain to as far as Angkor later. Similarly, some of the stylistic features of Cham temples combine Austronesian and Austroasiatic elements (Tranh Ky Phuong 2006). Such an earlier language shift may have involved as well, a musical shift, in the use of language for vocal music, that is, from Mon-Khmer or Austroasiatic to Austronesian.

Tracing the South Asian-Southeast Asian routes of population movements, two haplogroups (or lineages) found in Bali point to an Austronesian migration from 4,400 to 5,630 years ago, and an Indian presence some 2,600 to 3,100 years ago. The Balinese mtDNA composition suggests that 83.7 percent of the gene pool are indigenous and can be traced to the Austronesian roots from the north (Taiwan, via the Philippines), while a 12 percent paternal gene group can be traced to an Indian pool (Karafet et al. 2005). In Sembiran, north Bali, a site about 100 meters from the present coastline has yielded a fragment of a volcanic tuff stamp or a mold used for impressing decoration onto wax in the production of bronze drums of the Pejeng type. The site is dated first century CE, in association with one Indian rouletted ware bearing Kharoshthi script known in the area of Arikamedu, northwest India, and used from about 300 BCE to 400

CE. It is now held that the presence of Indian trade pottery in Sembiran indicates the position of Bali as the "farthest-flung identified node" in the trade network linking Indonesia to China, India, and Rome by the first century CE and antedating the appearance of the first kingdom around 800 years after (Ardika 1996). From the fifth century or earlier, Hindu Brahmans from India brought Sanskrit to Java and Bali. From then on, Balinese and Javanese languages developed into a highly complex literary and courtly language used in epics and songs, some of which were sung in the Sanskritized vernacular.

A new finding on the population genetic structure of Malay sub-groups (Javanese, Minang, Bugis) confirms their ancestries to Indonesia. The Malay Kelantan group, however, forms an independent clade and is genetically different from the other Malay sub-groups. This is partly explained by their geographical position in the north and a possible genetic admixture between Malay-Kelantan and Indians that dates back to the Hindu-Buddhist period (Hatin etal 2011). In general, Malays, by tradition, are admixed with Siamese, Javanese, Sumatran, Indian, Thai, Arab, and Chinese groups (Comas et al. 1998). On the other hand, all of the Orang Asli groups have undergone high levels of genetic drift. Semang ancestry can be traced back to Africa some 40,000 years ago, and Senoi maternal lineages can be traced back to the ancestors of the Semang and about half to Indochina (see also above Macaulay et al 2005). Aboriginal Malays are more diverse, showing connections with island Southeast Asia (Hill et al. 2006).

This diversity in populations and languages in west Malaysia is reflected in its contemporary musical traditions (Nicolas 1994; Matusky and Sooi Tan Beng 2004). In the past two decades or so, the effects of economic prosperity brought about a fascination for pop music culture. Traditional music, dances, and theater fell into disuse as the Malay *kampong* or villages disintegrated, and new prohibitions from Islamic practices targeted traditions, without corresponding sanctions on mass media, film, television, and the music industries. Islamic aesthetics started to impute itself on music, drawing from Middle Eastern music traditions, and the Kelantan state and Malay *ulamas* banning the *wayang* and *main puteri*. Similar genres, however, are very much alive in southern Thailand and Riau, Sumatra. A similar phenomenon recurs in Java and in the other islands in Indonesia, analogous to Christianization in many parts around the world since

the sixteenth century. Spanish colonial documents from the 16th century onward attest to the musical shift from indigenous music systems in Luzon and the Visayas, to the European idiom. Ancient musics in the Philippines disappeared after Spanish colonization and Christianization, and were replaced with music based on European scales, melodies, and harmony. Only about 10 percent of the population was able to preserve an older Asian heritage as these communities were isolated, until recent times, in the mountain regions of Northern Luzon, Mindoro, Palawan, and Mindanao (Maceda 1973). A tension arising from the idea that religion is the basis of ethnicity since the sixteenth century has resulted into the destruction of indigenous cultures, a legacy of colonial discourse that continues to malaise contemporary societies.

A new finding on the serial founder–effect model used to trace human genetic origins to a recent expansion from Africa had been applied to global phonemic diversity in order to search for the origin and expansion of modern human languages. Similar earlier studies explained "patterns of variation in other cultural replicators, including human material culture, and birdsong" as well as "a range of possible mechanisms predict(ing) similar dynamics governing the evolution of phonemes and language generally" (Atkinson 2011). Such new approaches augur well for possible applications to music, identifying stable structural elements, deep genetic relationships, lineages and networks between musics of the world. In vocal music, not much is known across prehistoric and pre-colonial Asia and Europe about relationships between scales, melodic patterns and texts, especially for older forms like shamanistic songs, epics, lullabies, or repetitive alternating chants. Etymologies of musical terms have not been extensively undertaken. Language and music are systems of signs and meanings. Both unfold in time, and are in the domain of biology and culture.

Music History Today:
Changing metageographies and globalized soundscapes

Kebudayaan Tunggal Dunia or "one world culture" is an Indonesian phrase recently coined to refer to the continuing dominance of Western culture all over the world (Kompas 2010a). In the 1930s, Indonesia engaged in what its intellectuals called *Polemik Kebudayaan* or the "Polemics of Culture" (Hidayat 1977). The debate focused on the role of tradition in the early modern period of Indonesian artistic and

literary history, that came about as a new Indonesian literature was nascent. Javanese intellectuals proclaimed the primacy of Eastern traditions and the historical past of Asia as the basis for the development of the arts in the future. Meanwhile, writers in the new Indonesian language countered that modernity was to be modeled after the West.

Such tensions are still echoed today and are articulated in artistic expressions in many parts of Asia, in the quest for a rapprochement between the 'civilizing mission of the west' and the cultural freedom that the world aspires to. In the face of the global reach made possible by digital technology—the Internet, whose power aims to advance radical economic and social change; cable television, the recording industry—the variety of musics all over the world has become peripheral, and many have disappeared, amidst the onslaught of technology. Just as ethnomusicology was conceived to document the diverse musics of the world during the European colonial period, the last decades of the 20th century brought it into direct confrontation with its local context—aristocratic patronage replaced by mass, globalized urban culture, tourism (in Bali, even tourists decry the assault of world music that the Balinese at times had become mere consumers and spectators), the commodification of music, and the growing introspection into one's own music world, the Western musician and their encounters between musicians and styles from the metropolitan West and other places, travels around the world in airplanes or through digital technologies, producing hybridities that collapse different musics into one category, the world of music in the Europeo-American context (Zuberi 2007, Cottrell 2010).

Music as commodity has become what can be described as Appadurai's "global chaos," or a contagion of western ideas and aesthetics. This opposition between the music of the West and that of Asia may be perceived from two perspectives. Laurence Picken, in his study of the Japanese *gagaku*, proposed that "the musics of Asia and Europe constitute a single continuum . . . musical evolution in Europe is not to be understood in isolation from Asia, any more than evolution in East Asia is to be understood in isolation from processes in Central and Western Asia, in the Ancient Middle East. . ." (1977:1, quoted in Maceda 2001). On the other hand, the long-term historical developments in Asia and Europe produced a separation or dissimilarity. In his study of the music structures of the courts musics of Java, Thailand,

Japan, Korea, and Tang Court China, Jose Maceda expressed: "the similarity points to a common source of ideas concerning structure, or that structure emanates from separate sources, if not from dissimilar philosophies" (Maceda 2001:144).

The themes of exchanges, borrowing and indigenization recur in several ways: in musical terms, in the localization of the uses of musical instruments, in instruments having native names, and in the creation of new music that may have been adapted from existing older music structures. Musical exchange takes place in a network where musical ideas flow from one frontier to another, from one island to another, and within one defined geographic space with diverse musical histories and traditions. Over several periods of music history in Asia, new musical ideas and musical practices were periodically and continually introduced. Some 7,000 years ago, the Austronesians started a journey and sailed thousands of miles from their home islands to what are now the Philippines and Indonesia, and later to Madagascar in East Africa, moving on to the Easter Islands in the Pacific. The transition from the Neolithic Age to the Bronze Age that produced bronze drums, to the period when cymbals, bells and gongs dominated musical practices was repeated in the 16th century when new musical ideas from Europe began to be introduced in Asia. The trade of gongs, bells, and cymbals from the 9th to the 17th centuries did not occur on a global scale at the time; yet, the musical ideas that came with the trade reached far beyond Asia. Polanyi described these phenomena as circulating between ports-of-trade that were autonomous or semi-autonomous, but were linked to each other by the exchange of commodities for everyday life. From these ports-of trade, gongs were brought inland through riverine routes and mountain passes. But while the movement of musical ideas may have come about by way of trade exchange, their uses for ritual, ceremony, and religion were subsequently far more paramount.

The rebirth of new musical ideas must emanate from this heritage, where the use of bamboo, wooden, and bronze musical instruments, and the numerous vocal traditions in several thousand languages, are in the offing. More discourses on the disappearance of the world's languages have recently surfaced than have been on the musics of the world. While these historical and cultural contexts have constructed musical histories, research on music processing in the brain and the cognitive functions may, in the future, provide new

perspectives in the understanding and appreciation of music diversities, reflecting the legacy of thousands of years of cultural evolution. Tracing this history will require various disciplines working together. Recent developments in studies in archaeology, archaeometallurgy, linguistics, and genetics provide new directions for a continuing research into the musics of Asia. Knowledge of the history of these musical exchanges may enlighten us in nurturing our own traditions amidst the demands of modernity, and the onslaught of global music industries and the one-world culture. It may similarly continue to foster unity in diversity.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:

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Appendix I

Workshop Schedule

The Ninth Workshop of the API Fellowships Program
November 20 – 24, 2010, Penang, Malaysia

<u>Day 1, Saturday, November 20, 2010</u>

1800 - 1930	Registration for Opening Ceremony and Photo Sessions
2000 -	Opening Ceremony and Dinner

Welcome Address:
Tham Siew Yean, Director of API Partner Institution in Malaysia;
and *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*, Program Director of API Coordinating Institution

Welcome Speech:
Yohei Sasakawa, Chairman of The Nippon Foundation

Introduction of the Keynote Speaker:
Tham Siew Yean

Keynote Address:
Sharom Ahmat, Chairman of Socio-Economic & Environmental Research Institute (SERI)

Dinner Toast:
Y.B. Liew Chin Tong, Executive Director, SERI; Member of Parliament

<u>Day 2, Sunday, November 21, 2010</u>

0830 - 1020	**Workshop Overview and Introduction of Participants**

Chairs: *Tatsuya Tanami*, Executive Director of The Nippon Foundation & *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*

Overview of the Workshop: *Francis Loh*, Workshop Director

Self-Introduction of Workshop Participants

1010 - 1025	Coffee Break
1025 - 1210	**Panel I: Development and Marginalization: the Poor, Indigenous Peoples and Forced Migrants**

Chair: *Yoko Hayami*, Professor, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University

Discussant: *Toh Kin Woon*, Head of Center for Economic Studies, Socio-Economic and Environmental Research Institute

1210 - 1300	Open Forum
1300 - 1430	Lunch
1430 - 1650	**Panel II: From Conflict to Peace Building & Democratization: Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia**

Chair: *Azyumardi Azra*, Director of Graduate School, State Islamic University, Jakarta

Discussant: *Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid*, Associate Professor, School of Distance Education, Universiti Sains Malaysia

1650 - 1740	Open Forum
1900 -	Dinner

Day 3, Monday, November 22, 2010

0830 - 1120   **Panel III: The Impact of Globalization on Socio-political Processes and Institutions: The Search for Regional Alternatives?**

Chair: *Taufik Abdullah*, Chairman of Social Science Commission,
Indonesian Academy of Science

Discussant: *Lim Mah Hui*, Research Fellow, Center for Economic Studies,
Socio-Economic and Environmental Research Institute

1030 - 1120   Open Forum

1120 - 1230   Screenings by Fellows

1230 - 1430   Lunch

1430 - 1650   **Panel IV: People in the Margins, Sustainable Development, and Our Relationship with Nature**

Chair: *Koji Tanaka*, Program Manager (Project-Specific Professor),
Young Researcher Development Center, Kyoto University

Discussant: *Lye Tuck Po*, Senior Lecturer, Anthropology and Sociology Section,
School of Social Science, Universiti Sains Malaysia

1650 - 1740   Open Forum

1900 -   Dinner

Day 4, Tuesday, November 23, 2010

830 - 1100   **Panel V: The Flow of Cultural ideas, Texts, Practices: Contestations, Continuities, Changes**

Chair: *Jose M. Cruz, S.J.*, Dean of School of Social Sciences,
Ateneo de Manila University

Discussants: *Shakila Abdul Manan*, Associate Professor, English Language Studies Section,
School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia & *Tan Sooi Beng*, Professor of Ethnomusicology
at School of Arts, Universiti Sains Malaysia

1100 - 1150   Open Forum

1220 - 1400   Lunch

1400 - 1700   **Field Trip: George Town Inner City**

1800 -   Dinner

Day 5, Wednesday, November 24, 2010

830 - 1200   **Roundtable Discussion: From API Fellows to Asian Public Intellectuals**

Chairs: *Francis Loh* and *Mary Racelis*, Professorial Lecturer, Department of Anthropology,
Graduate School, University of the Philippines, Diliman & *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*
(special presentation by *Yeoh Seng Guan* representing API Regional Committee)

1200 - 1330   Lunch

1330 - 1530   **Concluding Panel**

Chairs: *Francis Loh, Tatsuya Tanami* & *Surichai Wun'Gaeo*

1900 - 2200   Closing Dinner and Cultural Night

Appendix II

Workshop Participants

The ninth Workshop of the API Fellowships Program

November 20-24, 2010, Penang, Malaysia

(Information at the time of participation)

FELLOWS

INDONESIA

AHMAD SUAEDY, Executive Director, WAHID Institute

AVYANTHI AZIS, Assistant Lecturer, Department of International Relations, University of Indonesia

DWI ANY MARSIYANTI, Researcher; Community Member, Yayasan Tandabaca

ERNA ANJARWATI, Independent Researcher

ERNI BUDIWANTI, Senior Researcher, Research Center for Regional Resources, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PSDR-LIPI)

SITI SARAH MUWAHIDAH, Associate Researcher, MAARIF Institute for Culture and Humanity; Assistant Lecturer, Center for Religious and Cross-Cultural Studies, Gadjah Mada University

JAPAN

KOHEI WATANABE, Associate Professor, Teikyo University

MICHIKO SUGAWARA, Researcher, Asian Rural Institute

SAYA KIBA, Researcher, Graduate School of International Corporate Studies, Kobe University

MALAYSIA

AMIN SHAH BIN ISKANDAR, Executive Director, National Institute for Electoral Integrity (NIEI)

MOHD SHAIFUL RAMZE ENDUT, Editor, *Ummahonline.com*

ZAWIAH BINTI YAHYA, Guest Scholar, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia

PHILIPPINES

ARSENIO NICOLAS, Visiting Professor, College of Music, Mahasarakham University; Senior Lecturer, College of Music/Archaeological Studies Program/Department of Anthropology/Center for International Studies, University of the Philippines

KIDLAT TAHIMIK, Filmmaker and Artist

MA. REGINA HECHANOVA, Executive Director, Ateneo Center for Organization Research and Development; Associate Professor, Department of Psychology, Ateneo de Manila University

RAMON GUILLERMO, Professor, University of the Philippines, Diliman

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Human Rights and IHL Lawyers; Peace Advocate; Book Author; Judge, the 9th Municipal Circuit Trail Court of Nabua-Bato

THAILAND

ALAN FEINSTEIN, Consultant, World Bank, Jakarta, in charge of a pilot project on Philanthropies in Indonesia; Visiting Fellow, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, Faculty of Arts, Thammasat University

BAMPEN CHAIYARAK, Coordinator, Ecological and Cultural Study Group

PRABDA YOON, Writer; Publisher; and Artist

THANYATHIP SRIPANA, Researcher, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University

THITIPOL KANTEEWONG, Music Composer; Lecturer, Thai Art Department, Faculty of Fine Arts, Chiangmai University

WIWAT TAMEE, Independent Researcher

KEYNOTE SPEAKER

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WORKSHOP DIRECTOR

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API REGIONAL COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVE

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RAPPORTEURS

MARIAN CHUA

AZMIL M. TAYEB

BENNY TEH CHENG GUAN

CHIN YEE WHAH

SOON CHUAN YEAN

Appendix III

Abstracts of Papers

Panel 1: Development and Marginalization: the Poor, Indigenous Peoples and Forced Migrants

Identity and the Diversity of Political Behavior among the Urban Poor

Saya Kiba

It is often presumed that poor people in Third World countries are passive subjects of both political control by elites and mobilization by organizers from NGOs, political blocs, and other groups. There is little doubt that the numerical strength of the urban poor makes them an attractive target for political leaders and political blocs, particularly during election season. This study presents an image of urban poor communities in the Philippines and Thailand as autonomous decision-makers and independent actors. Over the last decade, the political behavior of urban poor communities in both countries has been marked by growing divisions, resulting in the increasing fragmentation of urban poor movements. This fact alone is evidence that to regard the urban poor and informal urban settlers as a homogenous sector or unified class would be a mistake. The study will first describe how the urban poor have been politically divided by examining different approaches employed by organizers over the historical evolution of Community Development (CD) and Community Organizing (CO) movements in each of the two countries. Second, it tries to clarify how the urban poor deal with the variety of outsiders attempting to intervene in their political behavior. In conclusion, the study will show that urban poor groups are rational actors with clear critical capacity for assessing the outsiders that engage them within a context of rapidly changing domestic and international political spheres. The study tries to explain discordant and fragmented political behavior as rooted in the urban poor's diverse identities, their critical views of outsiders and strong sensitivity relating to perceptions of 'being used.'

The role of NGOs and Farmer Leadership in Ensuring Food Security in Rural Sumatra

Michiko Sugawara

Food security is a complex issue incorporating many arenas, from production to energy, environment, policy making, and even international speculation. It is ironic that rural areas, where most food is produced, have become increasingly vulnerable to food insecurity. In North Sumatra province in Indonesia, research indicates that small-scale farmers are increasingly dependent on the wider capital market system to sustain their everyday lives. Farmers' groups have yet to build up the leadership and capacity to deal with the increasingly capital-centered nature of global production and consumption of food. A number of local NGOs are providing technical supports to farmers. Yet the NGOs struggle within limitations created by funding arrangements that reflect the interests of international donors. The paper argues for the importance of securing income and building food self-sufficiency in rural societies, as well as addressing the injustices in the current food system, so that small-scale farmers are resilient in the face of global food crises. NGOs can play an important role in this. NGOs should foster leadership by farmers. More collaboration between farmers, NGOs, government, international organizations and private companies is needed to build rural resilience.

The Socio-Economic Plight of Vietnamese Labor in Malaysia

Thanyathip Sripana

Vietnam considers the export of labor a way of alleviating poverty, especially of people living in the rural and mountainous areas in the country, as it eases domestic underemployment and unemployment. Through the export of labor, Vietnam aims to develop human resources and technical skills, create employment opportunities, raise the income of workers, and increase the inflow of hard currency, remittances, and national revenues.

Since the 1980s, Vietnam has been exporting labor to the socialist bloc, including the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Since the 1990s, on the other hand, it has been exporting labor to non-socialist countries like Malaysia. Thus far, the biggest markets of Vietnamese labor are Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, and Japan, with Malaysia ranking second among the destination countries of Vietnam labor in Asia, next only to Taiwan. In 2006, the number of Vietnamese workers in Malaysia exceeded 100,000; in 2010 it exceeded 80,000. Employers in Malaysia recognize the fact that most Vietnamese workers are hard-working, fast, ready to learn, and eager to be trained. However, Vietnamese workers need more professional and language training to be able to meet the high requirements of the labor market.

This paper intends to examine Vietnam's labor export to Malaysia so it explores the size of the country's labor market and the sectors where the Vietnamese are. It also goes over the recruitment process, the push and pull factors, and the employers' perceptions. Furthermore, it looks into the working and living conditions of Vietnamese workers in Malaysia, particularly the problems of the Vietnamese factory workers. Finally, it tries to identify the causes of these problems.

Finding Room for the Stateless: Locating the Rohingya in a Difficult World of Nations

Avyanthi Azis

This study details the predicament of the Rohingya, a Muslim minority from Myanmar. The case highlights Myanmar's ethnic minorities problem, which is often overshadowed by focused attention on the paramount struggle between the military government and democratic forces. Tracing along two major narratives, the central argument of this article is that the Rohingya should be understood first and foremost in terms of their statelessness. In addition to recognizing it as "lack of citizenship," statelessness is delineated as "exclusion from citizenship." The consequent marginalization resulted by this twin-process is profound and deterministic, rendering the problem protracted and chronic in nature. Discussion is further focused on the limitations of non-state actors in resolving statelessness—and how this regional problem can only find durable solution in the willingness of nation-states to confer citizenship.

Panel 2: From Conflict to Peace Building and Democratization: Muslim Minorities in Southeast Asia

Managing Identity: Muslim Minorities in Asia (South Thailand, the Southern Philippines, and Penang, Malaysia)

Ahmad Suaedy

Within Islamic intellectual discourse there has been little exploration of Muslim minorities within non-Muslim majority or secular states. Where the issue has been explored, the focus has been on the ritual aspects of Islam or application of Sharia law. Yet observation of the social and political dynamics of Muslim minorities in South Thailand, the Southern Philippines and the state of Penang in Malaysia reveals that minority Muslim communities' preoccupations, aspirations and demands concerning economic, socio-cultural and political rights

are far greater than those concerning the ritual aspects of their faith. The paper shows that challenges in minority Muslim communities' demands for justice have resulted in shifts in their political emphases and goals, and an increase in the role of civil society groups.

Malaysian Indian Muslim's Oscillating Identity: Swinging Between Home and Host Countries

Erni Budiwanti

Malaysia is a multi-ethnic society. Of the total population of 29 million, around 700,000 or 3 percent are Indian Muslims. This paper considers the origins of the Indian Muslim community, and its identity both as a diaspora and as an integral part of Malaysian society. The paper looks at government policies promoting 'One Malaysia' and finds that Indian Muslims face challenges in enjoying equal status to fellow citizens of Malay and other cultures of origin.

Interfaith Dialogue in Mindanao: Sharing a Common Hope and Mutual Fears

Siti Sarah Muwahidah

Amidst the ongoing protracted conflict that has divided people for hundreds of years, some recent interfaith dialogue initiatives have started seeding peace by narrowing the gap between the Muslims and the Christians in Mindanao. This paper examines the interfaith movements in Mindanao, and the perspectives of Muslims and Christians as minority and majority groups involved in the dialogues. The findings indicate that interfaith dialogue has been successful in eliminating hatred and stereotypes at the interpersonal level, and in building positive relationships between interfaith participants. The remaining challenge is to bring about significant transformations at the societal level, especially in terms of eradicating structural violence and cultural domination.

However, the disparity of power between Muslims as the minority group and Christians as the majority group in the Philippines has added to the complexity of dialogue. There is a risk that the dialogue may perpetuate an asymmetrical relationship and cultural domination in Philippine society. Therefore, additional awareness and sensitivity are needed to establish an equal and a liberative interfaith dialogue.

Keywords: interfaith dialogue, majority-minority relationship, Muslim-Christian relationship, asymmetrical dialogue, Mindanao, Philippines.

Engaging the Role of NGOs in a Conflict Prone Area: Conflict Transformation and Peace Building in Southern Thailand

Erna Anjarwati

This research employs the concepts of prescriptive and elicitive conflict transformation to analyze the roles of international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in peace-building activities in Southern Thailand, the site of a long-running ethno-religious conflict between the area's Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists. A Focus Group Discussion (FGD) approach was used to look at the social interactions and experiences of children engaged in and practicing dance therapy that aimed to heal their traumatic experiences. Based on findings gathered in the field, the researcher argues that NGOs must adopt a long-term perspective and take on crucial roles as middle-level and grassroots actors encouraging local people to work together to build peace.

Constructively Engaging Non-State Armed Groups in Asia

Soliman M. Santos

The case for constructive engagement of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) has been well-argued, if not already established, especially for humanitarian and peace purposes. It is now more a matter of consolidating and mainstreaming this argument, clinching the legitimacy of this work, and developing it into new fields. As a region that continues to experience conflict, Asia is a key arena for further developing this work. While there is room for improvement in humanitarian, human rights and peace process initiatives as the main fields for engagement, the gaps are larger in underdeveloped fields such as democratization, the gender question, development, governance, moral and ethical renewal, and culture, arts and sciences. Just as important, if not more so, are the perspectives and approaches adopted. Two areas for further development are: a) a Southern perspective, and b) complementary or alternative normative frameworks for engagement. The latter include the '3 Rs;' regional cultural traditions, religious teachings, and revolutionary doctrines, which generally resonate more strongly than international law with NSAGs, especially in the South. Given all the circumstances, what is needed to move forward is to expand Southern-led work in constructively engaging NSAGs. It is hoped that more Asian public intellectuals can contribute to this work and, in the process, further develop Asian public intellectualism.

Panel 3: The Impact of Globalization on Socio-political Processes and Institutions: The Search for Regional Alternatives?

International Philanthropy in Southeast Asia: Case Studies from Indonesia and the Philippines

Alan Feinstein

There is a recent growth of new private foundations, many founded by prominent businessmen who aim to apply the models and values of business in addressing social problems. These "philanthrocapitalists" implicitly criticize the development strategies of government donors and the large "old foundations" as unaccountable, inefficient, and, ultimately, unsuccessful in effecting measurable social change. In response to these critiques and reacting to the larger phenomenon of demands for public accountability in all spheres, the "old foundations" have taken up the business-oriented approach of the philanthrocapitalists, and in some cases have radically changed their programs and ways of working. This trend represents a potentially worrying shift in values.

In Southeast Asia, long-standing "partners" or grantees of the old foundations find that the rules have changed: there is a demand for evidence of measurable impact within short time frames; the donors are no longer interested in areas of work that require longer time frames to show results or that are less amenable to measurement; there is declining interest in building and strengthening civil society organizations, in working with and through governments, and in supporting social movements. The new philanthropic model (rooted in American assumptions, such as suspicion of "big government," and in American tax and political structures) is influencing foundations and donor agencies in other countries—in Europe and Japan, for instance, too. The net effects on government and civil society efforts in Southeast Asia to support social justice are as yet uncalculated, but are distinctly worrying and deserve more public scrutiny and feedback.

Winds of Change:
Globalization and Transformation in Southeast Asian Organizations

Maria Regina M. Hechanova

Globalization has led to the breaking down of economic barriers and has given rise to intense business competition that requires organizations to evolve their strategies and practices to remain viable. Although a number of Western models describe what actions and strategies organization leaders need to take to best manage the change, there is a dearth of published research on the matter in Asia.

This study involved interviews with business leaders and case studies of organizations that have successfully transformed the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Findings reveal both the positive and the negative outcomes of globalization, as well as confluences, as seen in global markets and structures, coopetition, technology as a link, international standards and processes, adoption and adaptation, multiple languages in the workplace, and a greater tolerance for diversity. However, the need for change is hampered by factors such as: resistance to change, lack of resources, inadequate capabilities, labor issues, poor governance, poverty, and social inequality.

The case studies validate Western theories of change management, but also highlight cultural nuances especially in terms of leadership behaviors and the importance of relationships as foundations for change.

Monitoring Elections: Resistance against Authoritarian Regimes: The case of the National Citizen's Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in the Philippines and the *Komite Independen Pemantau Pemilu* (KIPP) or Independent Election Monitoring Committee in Indonesia

Amin Shah bin Iskandar

This study aims to record, document and analyze the role and impact of election monitoring in the Philippines and Indonesia, with a particular focus on the periods of rule by Marcos and Soeharto. The paper looks at the importance of elections as a pillar of the democratic process, and examines the civil and political rights of citizens to monitor the electoral process within the context of authoritarian leadership. Elections under the Marcos and Soeharto regimes were marked by fraud, intimidation, corruption, abuse of power, use of government machinery, money politics and many other injustices. However the existence of local monitoring groups such as NAMFREL in the Philippines and KIPP in Indonesia helped to restore the power to choose to the people and to expose hypocrisies within the two systems.

The 3R Potential of Household Waste in Bangi, Malaysia

Kohei Watanabe

Gathering quantitative data on waste arisings is crucial to waste management. It is essential to the optimization of operation, the formulation and evaluation of policy schemes, and sound governance. As policy measures higher up the waste hierarchy are pursued, the need for more detailed waste composition data increases. In response to this demand, a method for very detailed composition analysis with bin sampling was devised and conducted for household waste in Japanese and European cities. This same method was applied to waste in B.B.Bangi, Malaysia. Overall, about 1,000 kilograms of waste was sorted into about 120 categories. At the same time, a questionnaire survey was conducted among the households that were the subjects of waste sampling. The results gave interesting insights into the mechanism, or the factors influencing waste arisings. Regarding the waste hierarchy (3R), it was indicated that there is similar waste reduction potential for Malaysian consumers as for consumers in Japan or Europe. Paper recycling is practiced relatively thoroughly in Bangi, but for other materials especially plastics, government intervention would be desired. There is not much potential for certain items that are popularly recycled in Europe, for example, glass, which is not as widely used in Malaysia.

Panel 4: People in the Margins, Sustainable Development, and Our Relationship with Nature

Living in the Midst of the Mining Industry in the Philippines and Japan: Community and Civil Society Struggle to Respond

Bampen Chaiyarak

The mining industry in the Philippines started during the Western colonial days. Colonialists then used force to take possession of the country's rich mineral resources, particularly gold. Colonization led to certain changes in the land tenure system, including the laws on land entitlements. These laws laid the foundation for Western mining companies to claim large areas of indigenous peoples' lands.

At present, the Philippines is known for its liberalized policies on mining. The Philippine Constitution defines the mining sector as key to the country's development. The government invites foreigners to undertake surveys and excavations of the country's mineral resources. But the mining industry has often caused conflicts over land, environmental impacts, and human rights violations involving indigenous communities.

In Japan, an economically powerful country, the extractive industry used to be a key industry first operated by the government and then privatized. It has benefited from the transfer of new technologies from Western operated mines, including coal and copper mines. The extractive industry and other related industries were an important resource that supported Japan as it evolved into a modern industrial country with a strong military force. The industry played a particularly crucial role when Japan tried to develop itself into a modern industrialized state about 150 years ago. Communities living around the mining areas suffered serious environmental, social, and health impacts, however. These damages have yet to be restored.

These days, only a few small-scale mining operations are seen in Japan. Japan thus tries to secure its needed natural resources by importing them from Third World countries. Japan may eventually learn from past mistakes and ensure that similar ones are not committed elsewhere.

The Right of Indigenous Peoples to Resource Management: Comparative Study of Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines and Indonesia

Wiwat Tamee

This paper explores the accessibility of rights to natural resource management among indigenous peoples, focusing on two case studies in the Philippines and Indonesia It explores factors and conditions that contribute to or impede this access and looks at the social, cultural and economic impacts of access conflicts. The paper concludes that accessibility of rights to natural resource management is importantly related to three key factors, including a) internal factors such as awareness levels within an indigenous community b) external conditions such as state policies and attitudes c) social transformation activities that can affect policy making. The issue of accessibility is related to broad historical events and milestones. In the post-colonization era, indigenous peoples have become a part of unitary states and their lands annexed, with negative effects on their ability to access their rights and to access power over their territories and destinies.

Socio-economic Security for Poor People Living around the Forest Area

Dwi Any Marsiyanti

Socioeconomic security especially for the poor turns out to be the heaviest challenge for both developing countries and developed countries. The burden becomes heavier for the nations when they need to initiate policy and/or actions to guarantee the fulfillment of socioeconomic security while at the same time considering the need for sustainable nature and environmentally-balanced development, in order to maintain Earth as an inhabitable place to live for all creatures. This paper is crucial to examining and finding opportunities and alternatives, whether it be via state policy or local wisdom, that might support the fulfillment of socioeconomic security for the poor who live in the forest areas in the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, while at the same time maintaining environmental security. The research discussed in this paper is on these three countries where a perfect system that accommodates the socioeconomic security of the poor and environmental security simultaneously, especially when relating to the individual state's policy, has not yet been achieved.

Keywords: Socioeconomic Security, Poor, Forest, Policy, Local Wisdom

New Nature: New Evidence of Naturalistic Pantheism in the Contemporary Art and Culture of Japan and the Philippines

Prabda Yoon

Pantheism is regarded traditionally as, or at least associated with, theology. The idea was developed or generally inspired by very religious men. Religion is an undeniable force in uniting people and promoting profound faith in an individual, but because there are so many religions in existence, oftentimes conflicting beliefs in the world religion have unfortunately also been the cause of devastating violence and ongoing destructions throughout human history. Even though traditional pantheism equates God with Nature rather than a particular superior entity, it still suggests something absolute, something with "divine" powers. My interest lies not in the traditional religious outlooks of pantheism, but in its proposition that humans are part of nature rather than separate from or superior to it. While it is true that most pantheists are religious, and that most indigenous peoples around the world practice animism out of genuine beliefs in their gods, I think that pantheistic philosophy, as well as animistic rituals, can exist without the traps of superstitions and the fear of the supernaturals. Therefore, I would attempt to suggest in my project that a "scientific" or "natural" way of perceiving, even practicing, pantheism and animism is possible, and possibly more beneficial for the humanity as a whole. By "scientific" I mean the scientific spirit or the questioning, observing, and studying of nature, not scientific progress or technological development. And, therefore, by "scientific (or naturalistic) pantheism" I mean faith in nature (that is, everything) as we see it, live it, respect it, and try to understand it, rather than a faith triggered by ignorance and fear.

VideoLetter to my First Grandson (from an Asian Rice-Terrace Stalker)

Kidlat Tahimik

This Report consists of 3 parts:

1) PreQuel to PostQuel (Roadmap of an un-orthodox filmmaker's mindset)

2) Dialogue List of an ephemeral AudioVisual (i.e. the readable flow)

3) E-link for the Rice Terrace-cum-Grandson film (i.e. the viewable flow)

Southeast Asian Robinsonades: A Study on the Translations of Joachim Heinrich Campe's *Robinson der Jüngere* (1779/1780) into Tagalog (*Ang Bagong Robinson*, 1879) and Bahasa Melayu (*Hikayat Robinson Crusoë*, 1875)

Ramon Guillermo

Joachim Heinrich Campe's *Robinson der Jüngere* (The New Robinson, 1779/1780) was one of the most successful adaptations of Daniel Defoe's original novel, *The Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe* (1719). Attaining popularity as a pedagogical text reflecting the educational ideals of the Enlightenment, it was almost immediately translated into all major European languages and subsequently reprinted in several editions. It is a little known fact that this work was also translated almost simultaneously into Bahasa Melayu (*Hikayat Robinson Crusoë*, 1875) and Tagalog (*Ang Bagong Robinson*, 1879) toward the end of the 19th century. This study attempts to do a comparative analysis of the Tagalog and Malay translations of the developing German idioms of political economy in the 18th century. Through the comparative analysis, it is proposed that insights can be gleaned from some significant aspects of the differential histories of social thought in the three languages concerned.

Western Texts in Uncolonised Contexts: English Studies in Japan and Thailand

Zawiah Yahya

This paper analyzes reading approaches to literary texts currently adopted in English Studies programs in non-colonized, English-as-a-foreign language (EFL) contexts by focusing on how British/American literature is taught in selected universities in Tokyo and Bangkok. Among the problem-solving measures looked at are the institutional choice of medium of instruction and the inclusion of various support/introductory/survey courses built into the program as an attempt to reduce "foreignness" and to close the students' proficiency-comprehension-knowledge gaps. Among the more contentious issues discussed are related to the wisdom of transplanting the canon of western universities into non-English-speaking institutions, the appropriateness of imported teaching methodologies and the absence of local perspective input.

Ali Shari'ati and Morteza Motahhari's Ideological Influences on Intellectual Discourse and Activism in Indonesia

Mohd Shaiful Ramze Endut

The paper investigates how Iranian thinkers Ali Shariati and Morteza Mutahhari have influenced the social, cultural and religious landscape of Indonesia since the Iranian Revolution in 1979. It explores the two thinkers' influence on groups within the Indonesian Shi'a movement, on activism and on intellectual discourse. The paper presents a literature review, a brief history of Shi'a developments in Indonesia, and an examination of Iranian thought in Indonesia. It examines and analyzes the thought of Shari'ati's and Motahhari within the Indonesian intellectual context, and ends with some critical notes.

Changing Identities of Japanese Traditional Music in Twenty First Century

Thitipol Kanteewong

The objective of this paper is to understand the changing identities of Japanese traditional music, which is undergoing a social paradigm shift. The paper also aims to be beneficial to everyone in the fields of art and culture in the 21st century. This research points to the transmission process in Japanese traditional music, which has affected musical styles and social perspectives. It focuses on collaborative works featuring Japanese traditional music and Northern Thailand's musical instruments. The discipline of ethnomusicology was used as a fundamental method in the field work along with the observation of participants and formal and informal interviews. This research is a product of a cross-field study of ethnomusicology and sociology.

The research shows that Japanese traditional music has undergone significant transformations that can be seen in the development of new ensembles, the reworking of traditional music to popular music, and the use of experimental traditional musical instruments in new musical compositions. The co-creation process has resulted in four new forms of Japanese neo-traditional music, as follows: rearrangements of traditional Japanese repertoires, new forms associated with playing Western classical repertoires, new forms of free improvised sessions, and new forms of Japanese neo-traditional musical compositions.

Japanese neo-traditional music both impacts and is, in turn being impacted by three significant changing contents: in the musical systematic, in the social movements, and in the Japanese musical culture. The old Japanese traditional music is preserved by the "*iemoto*" traditional household system, while the new generation of musicians who had been well trained in the traditional system have developed neo-traditional music.

Lineages, Networks, Centers and Peripheries: Musical Exchanges in Maritime Asia

Arsenio Nicolas

The music history of Asia, particularly that covering the past 7,000 years, can be traced from the spread of language families in Asia, on to the appearance of bronze drums and the development of gong music cultures from about the 10th century or earlier, displacing an ancient bamboo and wooden music culture, and, finally, to the more contemporary trends in music–making in Asia in the age of electronic and digital technology. Regional and national identities—some porous, some highly defined—change over time as populations move, and as music and languages interact across borders. The history of music in Asia illuminates changing national and regional identities. Contemporary writings on history tend to impute on the past the current fascination for identity, nationalism, and claims to ancestral heritage. The slow pace of archaeological research in relation to music history and the dominance of studies on empires and kingdoms—largely based on writing, temple architecture, and dynastic histories— have all diminished a focus on musics at the margins, less on cultures without music notation, and less on peoples without histories. Writing a long-term history of music necessarily entails the use of multiple sources; and archaeologists, geneticists and linguists will certainly fill in the many lacunae in this short study. Much of these histories remain unexplored, with the vibrant current interests in music research in Asia producing writings in Asian languages. This study aims to write an outline of this history towards a better understanding of the shared musical and cultural heritage in Asia.

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