



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

# RASKIN: The Challenge of Improving Programme Effectiveness







## **RASKIN: THE CHALLENGE OF IMPROVING PROGRAMME EFFECTIVENESS**

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# Glossary of terms, abbreviations and acronyms

APBN	: Annual National Budget ( <i>Anggaran Pendapatan Dan Belanja Negara</i> )
Bappenas	: National Development Planning Agency ( <i>Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional</i> )
BBM	: Fuel ( <i>bahan bakar minyak</i> )
BDT	: Unified Database ( <i>Basis Data Terpadu</i> )
BKKBN	: National Family Planning Coordinating Board ( <i>Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional</i> )
BLSM	: Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfers ( <i>Bantuan Langsung Sementara Masyarakat</i> )
BPS	: Statistics Indonesia ( <i>Badan Pusat Statistik</i> )
Bulog	: National Logistics Agency ( <i>Badan Urusan Logistik</i> )
DPM	: List of beneficiaries ( <i>daftar penerima manfaat</i> )
HTR	: Price of subsidised rice ( <i>harga tebus Raskin</i> )
IDR	: Indonesian rupiah
J-PAL	: Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab
LKPP	: Government Goods and Service Procurement Policy Agency ( <i>Lembaga Kebijakan Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah</i> )
LP3ES	: Institute for Economic and Social Research, Education and Information ( <i>Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial</i> )
Kemenko	: Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare
Kesra	( <i>Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat</i> )
Kemensos	: Ministry of Social Affairs ( <i>Kementerian Sosial</i> )
KPS	: Social protection card ( <i>kartu perlindungan sosial</i> )
Musdes	: Village meeting ( <i>musyawarah desa</i> )
Muskel	: Urban ward meeting ( <i>musyawarah kelurahan</i> )
OPK	: Market Operation for Sale of Subsidised Rice ( <i>Operasi Pasar Khusus</i> )
Pemda	: Local government ( <i>pemerintah daerah</i> )
PMT	: Proxy means test ( <i>metode uji pendekatan kemampuan</i> )
Pokja	: Working group ( <i>kelompok kerja</i> )
Pokmas	: Community group ( <i>kelompok masyarakat</i> )
PPLS	: Data collection for social protection programmes ( <i>pendataan program perlindungan sosial</i> )
PSE	: Socioeconomic Data Collection ( <i>Pendataan Sosial Ekonomi</i> )
Raskin	: Rice for the Poor Programme ( <i>Program Nasional Subsidi Beras Bagi Masyarakat Berpendapatan Rendah</i> )

RTM	:	Poor households ( <i>rumah tangga miskin</i> )
RTS	:	Target households ( <i>rumah tangga sasaran</i> )
RTS-PM	:	Beneficiaries in target households ( <i>rumah tangga sasaran penerima manfaat</i> )
SKPD	:	District Government Technical Office ( <i>Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah</i> )
SMERU	:	SMERU Research Institute
Susenas	:	National Socioeconomic Survey ( <i>Survey Sosial Ekonomi Nasional</i> )
TB	:	Sharing point ( <i>titik bagi</i> )
TD	:	Distribution point ( <i>titik distribusi</i> )
TNP2K	:	National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction ( <i>Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan</i> )
Wardes	:	Village kiosk or stall ( <i>warung desa</i> )

# Foreword

**R**askin – the Rice for the Poor Programme – has been implemented since 2002 and evolved from OPK (*operasi pasar khusus* or market operation for the sale of subsidised rice), a cross-sectoral national rice subsidy programme implemented in 1998. Rice subsidies are particularly important in addressing poverty since rice accounts for nearly 30 percent of the expenditure of poor households.

Raskin's effectiveness is measured in terms of six benchmarks. Often referred to as the '6Ts', the benchmarks include (i) targeting of beneficiaries, (ii) quantity, (iii) price, and (iv) quality of rice, (v) timeliness of delivery and (vi) programme administration. While the implementation of Raskin is not without its challenges, the government has the time and space to initiate reforms to fulfill the 6Ts in the future.

'The Challenge of Improving Raskin's Effectiveness' highlights the steps, policies and mechanisms applied to the Raskin programme by the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K) over the past four years. The report also examines some of the innovative thinking and strategic breakthroughs needed to move the programme forward. We invite all our readers to provide feedback on the contents of this report in order to improve the Raskin programme in the future.

We would like to express our gratitude to the team of writers who have helped produce this book. I hope the report will prove beneficial to all stakeholders who have a role or responsibility in implementing Raskin, the Rice for the Poor Programme.

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Jakarta, June 2015





# 1

## Overview

## PROGRAMME PROFILE

**T**he Rice for the Poor programme (*Program Subsidi Beras Bagi Masyarakat Berpendapatan Rendah* – hereafter the Raskin programme) is a rice subsidy initiative implemented nationally, across sectors, both horizontally and vertically. The programme aims to help low-income families meet their basic food needs and thus increase food security throughout Indonesia. The idea behind Raskin is that households participating in this programme will be able to use the money they save for other needs.

Raskin was originally set up to deal with the surge in food prices and increasing food insecurity following the financial crisis and the El Niño drought in 1997–1998. It was part of the social safety net programme (*Jaring Pengaman Sosial*)<sup>1</sup> and was referred to as the Market Operation for the Sale of Subsidised Rice (*Operasi Pasar Khusus* – OPK). This initiative aimed to ensure that rice was available at affordable prices. It also sought to overcome food insecurity by relieving the economic pressure on households affected by the crises, particularly low-income households. It was implemented from July 1998 until the end of 2001 (Suryahadi *et al.* 2010: 3).

**In January 2002, the OPK programme became the Raskin programme, with a shift in objectives and an expansion in functions.** From a programme set up as an emergency response to an economic crisis, it transformed into a social protection programme for the poor. Nevertheless, while the programme's functions changed, its implementation processes remained largely the same. Table 1 provides an overview of the programme.

**Table 1: Summary of the OPK/Raskin programme**

Programme name	OPK/Raskin
Implementation period	1998–present
Programme beneficiaries	Low-income households targeted according to budget availability
Size of benefit	70–240 kg a year
Frequency of distribution	9–15 times a year
Unit price	IDR 1,000/IDR 1,600
Quality	Medium to good quality rice
Implementing team	Bulog, Kemenko Kesra, Kemensos, Bappenas
Budget	IDR 18.8 Trillion (2014)

Note: Bulog = National Logistics Agency; Kemenko Kesra = Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare; Kemensos = Ministry of Social Affairs; Bappenas = National Development Planning Agency

When first initiated, the OPK programme included around 9.3 million households suffering food insecurity and officially defined as poor (*rumah tangga miskin* – RTM) (Tabor and Sawit 2001: 272). For the period 1998–2006, the target households – beneficiaries of the OPK/Raskin programme – were categorised as “pre-prosperous families” (*keluarga pra-sejahtera* – pra-KS) and “prosperous families 1” (*keluarga sejahtera 1* – KS1) using an economic approach based on data from the National Family Planning Coordinating Board (*Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional* – BKKBN).

For the 2007–2009 period, the government used the 2005 Socioeconomic Data Collection (*Pendataan Sosial Ekonomi* – PSE) conducted by Statistics Indonesia (*Badan Pusat Statistik* – BPS) to update the list of beneficiaries. Over this period, beneficiaries made up 47-83 percent of households included in the database (Hastuti et al. 2012: 1). For the 2010-2012 implementation period, the government used the 2008 data collection for social protection programmes (*Pendataan Program Perlindungan Sosial* – PPLS), also conducted by Statistics Indonesia, to update the list of beneficiaries which totalled some 17.5 million households (Hastuti et al. 2012: 3).

**Table 2: Programme coverage and participation, 1998–2014**

Year	Target	Data source
1998	9,291,000 <sup>2</sup>	BKKBN
1999	10,507,000 <sup>3</sup>	BKKBN
2000	7,500,000	BKKBN
2001	8,700,000	BKKBN
2002	9,790,000	BKKBN
2003	8,580,313	BKKBN
2004	8,590,804	BKKBN
2005	8,300,000	BKKBN
2006	10,830,000	BKKBN
2007	15,781,884	PSE 2005
2008	19,100,000	PSE 2005
2009	18,497,302	PSE 2005
2010	17,488,007	PPLS 2008
2011	17,488,007	PPLS 2008
2012	17,488,007	PPLS 2008 & 2011*
2013	15,530,897	PPLS 2011
2014	15,530,897	PPLS 201

Source: Tabor and Sawit (2001), Suryahadi et al. (2010), Ministry of Finance regulations (various years), Raskin general guidelines (various years)

Note: BKKBN = National Family Planning Coordinating Board; PSE = Socioeconomic Data Collection; PPLS = Data collection for social protection programmes

\* The period January–May uses the data collection for social protection programmes 2008 as its reference and June–December uses the Unified Database based on the 2011 data collection for social protection programmes.

<sup>1</sup> In general, the social safety net programme execution strategy has four goals: *first*, to ensure food is affordable; *second*, to increase people’s purchasing power by creating jobs; *third*, to maintain public access to basic services, especially in health and education; and *fourth*, to maintain regional economic activity by allocating funds at the local level and by extending credit to small business.

<sup>2</sup> Suryahadi et al (2010: 3).

<sup>3</sup> Tabor & Sawit (2001: 272).

**In July 2012, the government again updated the list of beneficiaries for the Raskin programme, using new data from the Unified Database for Social Protection Programmes (*Basis Data Terpadu* – BDT, hereafter the Unified Database).** The National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (*Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan* – hereafter TNP2K) created the Unified Database from the 2011 data collection for social protection programmes by Statistics Indonesia, using proxy means testing to rank households according to their levels of poverty or vulnerability. Due to government budgetary constraints, not all households listed in the 2011 data were able to benefit from the Raskin programme. Consequently, TNP2K had to process the 2011 data to establish the final list of programme beneficiaries which included 61.58 percent of the target households from the original list. Beneficiaries were drawn from a total of 15.5 million households and constitute about 28 percent of the poorest households.

**During the period 1998–mid-2012, the list of beneficiaries in the target households was updated at the same time that national data was collected.**

To ensure improved targeting, the Raskin programme also updated the data on beneficiaries at village and urban ward levels. This was done through village meetings (*musyawarah desa* – hereafter *musdes*) and urban ward meetings (*musyawarah kelurahan* – hereafter *muskel*), and aimed to accommodate local social, economic and demographic changes. Through these meetings, the village or urban ward administration was able to replace some households with those considered more eligible for Raskin support. This process was necessary as the number of beneficiaries in each region cannot exceed the total allocation stipulated in the provisions for implementing the programme.

**The amount of rice that the Raskin programme distributes varies due to changes in government budget allocations.** Between July and November 1998, the total rice allocation was 10 kgs a month per recipient. In December 1998, the government increased the allocation to 20 kgs a month.

**Table 3: Allocation of benefits, 1998-2014**

Year	Distribution frequency (no. times per year)	Allocation/ household (kg)	Total Rice Allocation/ Year (kg)
1998	9	10 <sup>a</sup> or 20 <sup>b</sup>	70
1999	12	20	240
2000	9	20	240
2001	12	15	180
2002	12	20	240
2003	12	20	240
2004	12	20	240

2005	12	20	240
2006	10	15	150
2007	11	15	165
2008	12	10 <sup>c</sup> or 15 <sup>d</sup>	175
2009	12	15	180
2010	13	13 <sup>e</sup> or 15 <sup>f</sup>	195
2011	13	15	195
2012	13	15	195
2013	15	15	225
2014	12	15	180

Source: Bulog, Tabor and Sawit (2001); Suryahadi et al. (2010); Ministry of Finance regulations (various years) a until December 1998; b December 1998; <sup>cd</sup> a) until November 1998; b) December 1998; c) January 2008; d) February-December 2008; e) January-May 2010; f) June-December 2010

The quantity of rice to be distributed to recipients has varied from 10kgs to 20kgs a month. These variations were not only due to changes in government budget but also changes in government policies, such as adjustments in the fuel price. The government distributed the rice on a monthly basis except in 1998, 2000, 2006 and 2007. In 2013 the government distributed rice 15 times to compensate for the increase in the price of fuel.

The government sets the price for the subsidised rice. Before 2008, the price at distribution points was IDR1,000 per kg (approx. 11 US cents) but in 2008 this increased to IDR1,600 per kg and it had remained at that price up to the time this report was written (2014). Programme beneficiaries should be able to buy the rice in the quantities and at the price set by government regulation. The price of subsidized rice is significantly lower than the market price, (for rice of relatively the same quality). The Raskin programme rice is required to be of medium quality, with no unpleasant odour, free of infestation, with no discolouration and in line with government rice purchasing standards.<sup>4</sup>

## PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION

Prior to 2007, the National Logistics Agency (*Badan Urusan Logistik* – hereafter Bulog) was responsible for programme planning as well as the availability and delivery of rice stock at regency and city levels. Local government was responsible for distributing the rice to households. Since 2007, the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare has overseen the implementation of the Raskin programme, while Bulog has continued to be responsible for delivering the rice to the distribution points. The budget authority over the budget has also undergone

<sup>4</sup> According to the quality of rice as defined by Presidential Instruction No. 7 year 2009 on Rice.

changes. For the periods 2005–2007 and 2010–2011, the authority was given to the President Director of Bulog. For the period 2008–2009, the Budget Authority was under the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare's Deputy for Social Protection and Public Housing. From 2012 until 2014, the Budget Authority for the Raskin programme was under the Director General for Social Empowerment and Poverty Reduction at the Ministry of Social Affairs.

To increase the effectiveness of the Raskin programme, a national coordination team was formed. The team reports to the Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare and, under Decree No. 57 of 2012, consists of a director, an executive and a secretariat. The steering committee includes a chairperson from the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare and members representing: the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry for Agriculture, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry for National Planning and Development, Statistics Indonesia, the Supervisory Board for Finance and Development and the state-owned National Logistics Agency (Bulog).

The central level Raskin Coordination Team consists of a chairperson, deputy-chair persons and members. The Chairperson is the Deputy for Social Protection and Public Housing (Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare).



- The Deputy Chairperson I for Planning Policy is the Director of the Food and Agriculture Board (National Development Planning Agency);
- The Deputy Chairperson II for Budget Policy is the Budget Director under the Directorate General of Budgets (Ministry of Finance);
- The Deputy Chairperson III for Implementation and Distribution is the Director of Public Service (Bulog);
- The Deputy Chairperson IV for Sector Facilitation, Monitoring and Evaluation and Complaints is the Director of Community Economic Enterprise of the Directorate General for Village Empowerment (Ministry of Home Affairs); and
- The Deputy Chairperson V for Control and Reporting is the Director of Government Institutions Supervising Public Welfare (Supervisory Board for Finance and Development).

See annex 1 for an organisational chart of the Central Raskin Coordination Team.

**Through the Central Raskin Coordination Team, the government sought to increase the role local governments play in ensuring the rice is correctly distributed from distribution centres to beneficiaries.** Based on the way the Raskin programme is organised at each level of government, a programme team was established. Those in charge of the programme at the various levels are: the governor at provincial level; the regent or mayor at regency or city level; the district head at district level; and the village or urban ward chief at the village or urban ward levels. In the villages and urban wards, the team also coordinates the Raskin work unit from Bulog, particularly with regard to distribution and administration.

Every year the Central Raskin Coordination Team issues a set of general guidelines on overseeing the Raskin programme nationally. Based on these guidelines, each governor draws up implementation instructions and in turn the regents or mayors release a set of technical guidelines. To avoid contradicting the general guidelines, the implementation instructions and technical guidelines make allowances for the various local conditions encountered in implementing the Raskin programme.

## DISTRIBUTION MECHANISMS

**Based on the general guidelines, the implementation instructions and the technical guidelines, the Raskin rice is distributed using three models.** With the first model, often referred to as the regular model, Bulog distributes rice to the distribution centres, which are usually located in the village or urban ward offices. Then, with local government funding or through community self-help, the rice is delivered to sharing points which are usually handled by small community associations.

At the distribution points, eligible households can access the Raskin rice (see figure 1).

**Figure 1: Distributing rice – the standard method**



Source: Technical Guidelines for the Implementation of Raskin

With the second model, Bulog delivers the rice to village stalls or kiosks. Beneficiaries get their rice directly from these stalls. Typically, each village or urban ward is served by several stalls. In this model, operational costs are borne by the local government (see figure 2).


**Figure 2: Distributing rice via village stalls**



Source: Technical Guidelines for the Implementation of Raskin

The third model involves community groups and is similar to the first model, except that community groups rather than village officials distribute the rice. Bulog delivers the rice to the distribution point, then the community group delivers the rice to the sharing point where the head of the community subgroup distributes the rice to beneficiaries (see figure 3).

**Figure 3: Distributing rice via community groups**




Source: Technical Guidelines for the Implementation of Raskin

## PROGRAMME BUDGET

**At the national level, the Raskin programme is fully funded by the national budget and the amount set aside for it is larger than for other social protection programmes.** On average, it receives 30 percent or more of the entire social protection programme budget. Also, the budget has been steadily increasing in nominal terms (except between 2005 and 2007 and between 2013 and 2014). In 2005 the budget was around IDR6.4 trillion (approx. USD 0.7 billion) and this had grown to IDR18.8 trillion by 2014. However, the total budget allocation for the programme reached its highest point in 2013, with a figure of IDR21.5 trillion (see figure 4). In 2013 the Raskin programme was one of the measures used to compensate for the rise in fuel prices which explains the budgetary increase that year. Also, in 2013 the rice was distributed 15 times.

**Figure 4: Increasing budget allocations for the Raskin programme, 2005–2014**



Source: Government Goods and Service Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP) (2012), *Financial Note – National Budget 2010, 2012, 2013, 2014*  
 Note: Realisation figures (LKPP) to 2012, revised budget figures for 2013 and the state budget figures for 2014.

Although the Raskin budget continues to increase, its proportion as a percentage of the total budget for social protection programmes has declined. In 2007 the proportion of the budget allocated to Raskin was 43 percent, while in 2014 it was 31 percent (see table 4). One of the reasons for the decline in the proportion of the budget received by the Raskin programme is that the other social protection programmes were expanded.

**Table 4: Budget for the Raskin and other social protection programmes (IDR trillions), 2007 – 2014**

Type of Program	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Food subsidy (Raskin)	6.6	12.1	13.0	15.2	16.5	19.1	21.5	18.8
Askeskin/Public health insurance (inc Jampersal)	4.4	4.7	4.5	5.1	6.3	7.2	8.1	-
*Beneficiary contributions (PBI) Health Insurance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.9
Cash transfers for poor students (BSM)	-	2.3	3.0	3.7	4.7	6.2	14.1	6.6
Conditional Cash Transfers programme for Poor Families (PKH)	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.9	3.6	4.5
National Programme for Community Empowerment (PNPM) Mandiri	3.5	5.9	9.2	12.4	12.8	12.1	11.9	9.3
Public Credit (KUR)	-	-	-	-	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>15.3</b>	<b>26.0</b>	<b>30.8</b>	<b>37.7</b>	<b>44.0</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>61.2</b>	<b>61.1</b>
<b>Total food subsidies (percentage)</b>	<b>43.1</b>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>42.2</b>	<b>40.2</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>39.4</b>	<b>35.1</b>	<b>30.8</b>

Source: Government Goods and Service Procurement Policy Agency (LKPP) (2012); Financial Note – National Budget (2010, 2012, 2013, 2014)

Notes:

- Figures: LKPP (2012); APBN-P (2013) and Annual National Budget (APBN) (2014)
- PBI Health Insurance has replaced the budget for Askeskin/Jamkesmas since 2014
- Does not include other cluster 1 social protection programmes such as Social Security for Elderly (JSLU), Social Assistance for Disabled People (JSPACA) or other programmes within the Ministry of Social Affairs.
- Askeskin = health insurance for the poor; Jampersal = programme to accelerate the reduction of maternal and newborn deaths; Jamkesmas = public health insurance; PBI = beneficiaries of government assistance towards payment of health insurance premiums



# 2

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## Challenges in Implementing the Raskin Programme



Over the 16 years that the Raskin programme has been running (1998–2014), considerable efforts have been made to improve it. The programme's reach has been expanded, participation has been upgraded and reference data has been amended, with social protection cards (*Kartu Perlindungan Sosial – KPS*) being issued to identify beneficiaries. Apart from the various challenges along the way (discussed in this section) the Raskin programme has contributed significantly to easing the burden on low-income households. Table 5 illustrates consumption expenditure patterns for average and poor households.

Through the Raskin programme, the money beneficiaries should be able to save equals the difference between the market price of rice and the subsidised price, multiplied by at least 15 kgs per month or 180 kgs a year. The programme also supports poverty reduction in the sense that money spent on rice accounts for a large proportion of spending for households below or near the poverty line. Table 5 shows that for poor households, food accounts for the largest proportion of expenditure (around 65 percent) and rice alone accounts for 29 percent. Through the rice subsidy, beneficiaries effectively get an “additional income” amounting to approximately IDR109,575 (or 9 US dollars) a month.<sup>5</sup> Theoretically, the subsidy reduces household expenditure by around 8 percent but in reality, the reduction has only been 2 percent. This is because beneficiaries have not received the full rice allocations they were entitled to under the programme.

**Table 5: Commodity items in household expenditure**

Items	Proportion (%)		
	Expenditure: average household	Expenditure: poor household	Note
Rice	15	29	65% of poor
Other foods ingredients	15	28	household
Pre-cooked food & tobacco	17	8	expenditure
Housing	26	17	consists of
Clothing	7	4	food, with rice
Health	4	3	accounting
Education	7	4	for 29%
Transport	19	7	
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	

Source: Statistics Indonesia (BPS) and National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K)

<sup>5</sup> Based on the national average price of medium quality rice as of 27 September 2014 and amounting to IDR8,905 per kg ([http://ews.kemendaggo.id/.](http://ews.kemendaggo.id/)).

**The Raskin programme has not yet reached its expected targets.** Internally, there are benchmarks to measure programme effectiveness. These are referred to as the '6Ts'<sup>6</sup> which are of targeting, quantity, timing, price, quality and administration. However, various institutions (including the SMERU Research Institute, the World Bank and the National Team for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction) have concluded that the programme has not met the 6T criteria and that its effectiveness has been limited. The Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK 2014) reached the same conclusion and has recommended that the government redesign the Raskin programme.<sup>7</sup>

## TARGETING POOR HOUSEHOLDS

Targeting is one of the six measures of programme effectiveness. To meet its target the Raskin programme needs to fulfill two criteria. First, the rice needs to be fully distributed and only to officially listed beneficiaries and, second, the beneficiaries on the list need to have been verified through village and urban ward meetings and their eligibility confirmed by the local leader. However, neither of these criteria has been fulfilled by the Raskin programme.

### Box 1. What is meant by effective targeting?

The biggest problem in implementing social protection programmes is incorrect targeting. Targeting is effective when a programme reaches individuals or households that are entitled to assistance. If a programme's target is poor households, then only households classified as poor should benefit from it. In technical terms, effective targeting aims to minimise any errors of inclusion or omission.

**Figure 5: Targeting of programme beneficiaries**

	Poor	Non-poor
Beneficiary	✓	✗ <i>Inclusion Error</i>
Non-beneficiary	✗ <i>Exclusion Error</i>	✓

<sup>6</sup> The 'T' here stands for tepat in Indonesian which means 'correct', so the criteria measure six elements that need to be correct.

<sup>7</sup> <http://kpk.go.id/id/berita/siaran-pers/1781-tidak-efektif-kpk-minta-program-raskin-didesain-ulang>

**Incorrect distribution of the Raskin programme is evident in the large discrepancy between the actual number of people receiving the subsidised rice and the number of beneficiaries on the official list.** Analysing National Socioeconomic Survey (Susenas) data and programme distribution administration data for the period 2002–2006 reveals that more than double the intended number of households had received the subsidised rice (see table 6). The highest rates occurred in 2005. At that time the target was 8.3 million households but the programme actually reached 22.9 million households, a discrepancy of 176 percent. For the period 2006–2009, after setting goals based on the results from the Socioeconomic Data Collection (PSE) and from the data collection for social protection programmes (PPLS), the number of households not on the list receiving Raskin rice declined in proportional terms. However, over the 2010–2013, this number again increased consistently. In 2013, the total number of recipients returned to more than double the number on the list (115 percent) which was the highest number of households ever to benefit from the programme (17.8 million households that were not on the beneficiaries list received Raskin rice).

**Table 6: Target and actual programme beneficiaries, 2002–2014**

Year	Target beneficiary households	Actual beneficiary households*	Difference between actual and target	Proportional difference between actual and target (%)	Reference
2002	9,790,000	20,943,085	11,153,085	114	BKKBN
2003	8,580,313	22,519,131	13,938,818	162	
2004	8,590,804	19,537,271	10,946,467	127	
2005	8,300,000	22,939,778	14,639,778	176	
2006	10,830,000	24,545,069	13,715,069	127	
2007	15,781,884	29,412,414	13,630,530	86	PSE 2005
2008	19,100,000	30,542,384	11,442,384	60	
2009	18,497,302	30,171,692	11,674,390	63	
2010	17,488,007	31,021,803	13,533,796	77	PPLS 2008
2011	17,488,007	31,747,723	14,259,716	82	
2012	17,488,007	33,639,699	16,151,692	92	
2013	15,530,897	33,346,713	17,815,816	115	BDT PPLS 2011
2014	15,530,897	N/A	N/A	N/A	

Source: National Logistics Agency and the National Socioeconomic Survey, re-tabulated.


Note: \*Based on National Socioeconomic Survey data

BKKBN = National Family Planning Coordinating Board; PSE = Socioeconomic Data Collection; PPLS = Data collection for social protection programmes;

BDT = Unified Database

Figure 6 shows that, according to National Socioeconomic Survey data for 2010 and 2013, rice was distributed to all income groups, although there was a proportional decrease among higher income households. Furthermore, in 2010, 78 percent of poor households (decile 1) received Raskin rice and in 2013 this increased slightly to 80 percent. Conversely, some 10 percent of higher-income households (decile 10) still received rice from the programme. Based on this data, we can conclude that the Raskin programme has not been well-targeted over the last 16 years because recipients have been relatively evenly<sup>8</sup> spread across all income groups. According to both internal and external agency studies on the Raskin programme's approach to distribution, several models exist for equitable distribution. One of these models is based on periodic distribution, although it has a lower number of recipients than provided for in the programme. Another model for equitable distribution includes distributing the same amount of rice in different periods to different households, otherwise known as the rotating model.

**Figure 6: The level of accuracy in targeting the Raskin programme, 2010 and 2013**



Source: TNP2K

## QUANTITY: SPREADING THE BENEFITS TOO THIN

**Over the 16 years the programme has been running, the amount allocated to beneficiaries has varied.** The Raskin programme could fulfill its quantity criteria if the designated households received their benefits in accordance with the government's directive. Analysing combined data from the National Socioeconomic Survey and from administrative sources for 2002–2014 shows that on average households received less rice than they were officially allocated. Table 7 shows that beneficiaries received between 36 percent (2005) and 61 percent (2008) of the legally stipulated amount of

<sup>8</sup> In local terms this is often called "bagito" or "bagito roto" (average rate) and refers to the idea of taking turns.

rice due. Studies by TNP2K in 2012 found that poor households received on average only 6.1kgs of rice per month while non-poor households received 4.8kgs. Figure 7 also shows that for the years 2010 and 2013, problems of misallocation still occurred.

In 2010 households received on average 4.5kgs of rice per month and in 2013 they received 4.2 kgs. However, in 2013 the total allocation of Raskin rice was 3.4 million tons, more than in 2010 when it was 3.2 million tons. Beneficiaries clearly lost out as they were entitled to receive 15kgs of rice per month. This issue is partly related to the actual number of Raskin recipients being far greater than the target number on the official list of beneficiaries. This is due to the phenomenon of “*bagito*” which literally means “taking turns”. The practice of ignoring long-standing variations in Raskin targeting has become the “norm” over time and any discrepancies are no longer regarded as infringements.

**Table 7: Allocated and actual Raskin rice totals per recipient household**

Year	Allocation (tons)	Target households	Allocation/ households	Actual Total		Actual beneficiary households*	Average total rice/ recipient/ year (kg)	Actual proportion/ households
				Ton	Actual Proportion			
2002	2,349,600	9,790,000	240	2,235,141	95.1	20,943,085	106.72	44.47
2003	2,059,276	8,580,313	240	2,023,664	98.3	22,519,131	89.86	37.44
2004	2,061,793	8,590,804	240	2,060,198	99.9	19,537,271	105.45	43.94
2005	1,991,897	8,300,000	240	1,991,131	100	22,939,778	86.80	36.17
2006	1,624,500	10,830,000	150	1,624,089	100	24,545,069	66.17	44.11
2007	1,736,007	15,781,884	110	1,731,805	99.8	29,412,414	58.88	53.53
2008	3,342,500	19,100,000	175	3,236,644	96.8	30,542,384	105.97	60.56
2009	3,329,514	18,497,302	180	3,254,103	97.7	30,171,692	107.85	59.92
2010	3,235,281	17,488,007	185	3,074,003	95	31,021,803	99.09	53.56
2011	3,410,161	17,488,007	195	3,364,635	98.7	31,747,723	105.98	54.35
2012	3,410,161	17,488,007	195	3,372,819	98.9	33,639,699	100.26	51.42
2013	3,494,452	15,530,897	225	3,431,935	98.2	33,346,713	102.92	45.74
2014**	2,795,561	15,530,897	180	1,039,809	74.39	N/A	N/A	N/A


Source: Central Raskin Coordination Team, Bulog and the National Socioeconomic Survey

Note:

\*Estimated numbers based on National Socioeconomic Survey calculations

\*\*In 2014 six distributions up until April were reallocations from November and December for March and April

Figure 7: Average amount of Raskin rice received by households, 2010 and 2013, by region



Source: Adapted from the National Socioeconomic Survey (2010–2013)


Figure 8: Total Raskin programme benefits – target and actual figures



Source: World Bank (2012)

The location of the rice distribution points is an important factor in determining the amount of rice beneficiaries receive. Results from internal studies carried out by TNP2K show that variations in the sharing points influence the amount of rice delivered to beneficiaries. In Java, sharing points located in the houses or offices of local village or urban ward heads tend to distribute relatively more rice than distribution points at either community or neighbourhood association levels (the lowest and next-to-lowest levels of village governance) or those run by local community leaders. The opposite occurs outside Java where sharing points located in the houses of village chiefs distribute more rice than those in other locations.

Figure 9: Average monthly Raskin support per target household by sharing point, 2012




Source: TNP2K (2012)

### TIMING: NOT MEETING EXPECTATIONS

**Timeliness is another measure of the Raskin programme’s effectiveness.**

Officially, the Raskin rice is to be distributed each month during the fiscal year. In certain years the government has cut the number of deliveries, for example in 2006 and 2007, when they were reduced to 10 and 11 times a year respectively. In contrast, in 2010 and 2011 government stipulated that the rice should be distributed 13 and 15 times respectively. The reason for the cuts was insufficient budget. When government has distributed the rice more frequently, it has been due to either price volatility in the domestic market or the need to compensate poor people for extra expenses, such as when the fuel price was adjusted.

Figure 10. Timeliness of Raskin Distribution to Villages, 2012




Source: TNP2K (2012)

However, in the field it seems that the frequency of distribution has not been in line with government expectations. A study carried out by TNP2K in 2012, found, for example, that 43 percent of villages had not received any rice in July while 24 percent of villages had not received any rice in October (see figure 10).

**Four main reasons explain the failure to distribute the rice on time (figure 11):**

- First, when an area within a district or village experiences problems with administration, payments or arrears, Bulog will not distribute rice to that region until the matter is settled and the amount owed has been paid. This same issue was raised in a study by the Indonesian Institute for Social and Economic Research (LP3ES, 2013). Furthermore, the regional and subregional divisions and the local logistics offices often request upfront payments for various reasons and any areas that have not yet paid or are unable to pay do not receive their Raskin rice allocation.
- Second, Raskin rice allocations to relatively small areas are done on the basis of the agreements that the regional and subregional divisions and the local logistics offices make with the subdistrict or village heads to distribute the rice to their regions (Prisma LP3ES, 2012).


**Figure 11: Reasons for inaccuracies in Raskin rice distribution, 2012**



- Third, delays may be caused by Bulog, the party responsible for distribution, not distributing the rice to local areas in good time.
- Fourth, the process of verifying the list of beneficiaries is still not well implemented. This process is meant to be carried out through meetings at the local level before the rice can be distributed so it inevitably delays the distribution exercise.

These distribution issues involving Bulog and the list of beneficiaries appear to be declining, while the cumulative distribution method seems to continue to be the major cause of problems concerning the timing of distribution.

**Figure 12: Monitoring regional distribution based on frequency of rice distribution**



Source: TNP2K-LP3ES

Joint monitoring by TNP2K and the LP3ES in 2012 revealed that not many areas distributed rice on time. Of the 220 villages that were monitored, only 45 percent had received the Raskin rice on time or every month and 54 percent of other sample villages had not received their rice on time. These inconsistencies were due to: transport difficulties arising from distances and geographical conditions; the village heads considering the beneficiaries list incorrect and delaying the distribution schedule; and the village government being in arrears, leading to the regional and subregional divisions and the local logistics offices delaying the next delivery of Raskin rice until the outstanding amount was paid off.


**Furthermore, at the beneficiary household level, the frequency of Raskin rice distribution does not reconcile with deliveries to distribution or sharing points.**

Although the rice may be distributed to the village and urban ward level, this does not mean that beneficiaries always automatically receive their allocation. This is partly due to the “*bagito*” phenomenon – the system where recipients have to “take turns” to receive the rice. Based on internal TNP2K studies and research by the SMERU Research Institute, beneficiaries do not get rice each time it is distributed. They receive their allocation only during some months and, over a 12 month period, the frequency of households receiving the rice varied from one to ten times.

## PRICE: PAYING MORE THAN THE SUBSIDISED RATE

For the programme to meet its price criteria, beneficiaries should pay the price set by government at the distribution points. The government set the subsidised rice price at IDR1,000 per kg prior to 2008 and since then it has been set at IDR1,600 per kg. However, as shown in figures 13, 14 and 15, and in table 8, correct pricing has not been established in the programme, and this is only partly due to variations in the market price of rice. Consequently, poor households have had to pay higher than the stipulated subsidised price for the Raskin rice.

**Figure 13: Average price per kg households paid for Raskin rice, 2010 and 2013, by region**



Source: Adapted from the National Socioeconomic Survey (BPS)


In 2010 and 2013, nationally, households paid respectively around 26 and 41 percent more than the subsidised price fixed by government. Differences in prices varied widely between regions. For example, in 2010 and 2013, households in Kalimantan paid 48 percent and 58 percent more respectively – the highest compared to other regions. The region with the least variation was Sulawesi, where households paid 21 percent more in 2010 and 26 percent more in 2013.

**Table 8: Differences in prices paid by recipients, 2009–2014, by region**

Region	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Sumatra	2,032	2,086	2,146	2,159	2,208
Jawa	1,949	2,020	2,034	2,070	2,306
Kalimantan	2,161	2,362	2,406	2,490	2,535
Sulawesi	1,824	1,936	1,984	2,005	2,015
Bali-Nusa Tenggara	1,743	1,811	1,873	1,897	1,956
Maluku-Papua	2,027	2,280	2,526	2,436	2,239
Average	1,950	2,029	2,063	2,089	2,263

Source: Adapted from the National Socioeconomic Survey (BPS)

The variations in the price of Raskin rice are due to several reasons, including the location of the distribution and sharing points. TNP2K studies revealed that on the island of Java the variation in price is relatively small if the sharing point is located at the office of the head of the village or urban ward, compared to at sharing points in other locations. The opposite occurs outside Java. Relatively small variations occur at sharing points located away from the office of the head of the village or urban ward. As figure 14 shows, in general Java has greater variations in prices than other areas.

**Figure 14: Average price recipients paid for Raskin rice by type of sharing points, 2012**

Source: TNP2K (2012)

**Figure 15: Comparison of subsidised rice prices, by monitored regions**




Source: TNP2K-LP3ES (2012)

Not all areas have been unable to apply the right price for Raskin rice. According to joint monitoring by TNP2K and the Institute for Economic and Social Research, a small proportion of areas have succeeded in using the right price. Of the 220 villages monitored, 32 percent were selling rice at the correct subsidised price. Other sample villages that set the price at IDR1,600–2,000 per kg made up 39 percent of the villages while 29 percent set the price at more than IDR2,000 per kg.

Explanations regarding the variations in prices in relation to the different regions, distribution and sharing points cannot be separated from the additional costs imposed according to local procedures. One example is the collection fee charged to recipient households. In Java, the average fee is IDR445 per kg, while outside Java the average is IDR483 per kg. Of all the villages studied, 15 percent of villages in Java and eight percent outside Java applied a Raskin management fee.

**Figure 16: Proportion of villages that collected fees from Raskin beneficiaries,<sup>9</sup> 2012**




Source: TNP2K (2012)

<sup>9</sup> The collection fee is charged to the recipient to pay the officers who deliver the rice to the village and its subdistrict levels, where they unload and weigh the rice, and also to pay for plastic bags.

In addition to paying the collection cost, Raskin recipients also have to pay for transport. This is an additional fee charged to cover the delivery of rice from the distribution centre to the households. TNP2K studies show that 45 percent of villages and urban wards sampled in Java and 13 percent outside Java incur this transport or delivery charge.

**Figure 17. Proportion of Villages that Pay Additional Transport Costs - Java and Outside Java, 2012**



Source: TNP2K (2012)

**Table 9: Difference between official Raskin price at the distribution points and the price paid by recipients, by consumption decile, 2004– 2014**

Year	Deciles										Average
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
2009	1,930	1,899	1,931	1,930	1,944	1,977	1,976	2,021	2,030	2,063	1,950
2010	1,991	1,978	2,027	2,030	2,041	2,035	2,036	2,085	2,096	2,132	2,029
2011	2,026	2,023	2,049	2,037	2,062	2,066	2,088	2,142	2,165	2,156	2,063
2012	2,048	2,051	2,072	2,069	2,083	2,094	2,111	2,156	2,177	2,207	2,089
2013	2,211	2,265	2,334	2,201	2,239	2,308	2,216	2,311	2,323	2,279	2,263


Source: Adapted from the National Socioeconomic Survey (BPS)

## QUALITY: LACK OF CONSISTENCY

According to government stipulations for the Raskin programme, the criteria for the rice supplied require that the rice of medium quality, in good condition, have no odour and be free of infestation. Technically the rice is required, among other standards, to have a water content no greater than 14 percent, to contain no more than 20 percent of broken grains and 2 percent of husks, and to have a minimum of 95 percent suitability for milling (Presidential Instruction No. 3/2012). If the rice does not conform to these requirements, the district Raskin coordination team, the implementing distributor, or the beneficiaries themselves are entitled to refuse the rice and return it to the Raskin work unit to exchange for rice that fulfills the required standards.

In practice, the quality of the rice has not been consistent. Results from studies and reports by the SMERU Research Institute, research agencies and the media have found that the quality of the rice is not always up to standard. Although the recipients of the rice may not always be completely satisfied with its quality, they generally accept it. They believe this issue of quality is due to the rice being cheaper than rice sold at the market price.

**Figure 18: Quality of rice according to distribution to monitored areas**



The quality of the rice continues to be an issue. Joint monitoring exercises conducted by TNP2K and LP3ES found that in a number of locations the quality of the Raskin rice had been below standard. Out of 220 villages sampled, only 37.7 percent had received rice that met the required standards while the remaining 62.3 percent had received substandard rice. Some villages had even received rice that was unfit for consumption as it was discoloured and infested, and had an unpleasant odour.

## **ADMINISTRATION: INCORPORATING REGULAR REPORTING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

**The sixth measure of success for the Raskin programme is how effectively it is administered. This includes how completely, correctly and efficiently the programme is implemented and run.** An audit of the programme carried out by the Supervisory Board for Finance and Development did not find fault with the administration systems in place although the full value of these administrative processes, in terms of their monitoring and evaluation potential, had not been fully exploited.

The Raskin programme's tiered system of reporting (from village to district and then provincial levels) adds value to some of the smaller, supervisory aspects of the programme and could be used to improve programme performance. However, the administrative component currently works in isolation, more as a background formality, and does not fulfill its monitoring and evaluation role.

Additionally, reporting procedures are slow, with time lags of around three months in resolving issues that should have quick responses. To help resolve this problem, each level in the system needs to issue specific reports on each monthly distribution of the Raskin rice.

Bulog's weekly and monthly reports could help in developing a reporting system for the Raskin programme. Accurate and immediate reporting systems need to be put in place to determine, for example, which areas are experiencing delays in rice deliveries or issues with rice quality. Real-time reporting can also be used to monitor and evaluate the programme.



# 3

Improvements  
in Programme  
Implementation

**T**he government has used various approaches to make the Raskin programme more effective. These include: using the Unified Database to identify target households; issuing social protection cards to beneficiaries; updating the lists of beneficiaries at the local level; involving local governments in the distribution of rice; overseeing the sale of rice at distribution points; extending outreach activities to the community, especially to beneficiaries; and dealing with complaints as part of the overall supervision of the programme. The aim of all of these actions was to improve the implementation of the Raskin programme and bring it in line with its original stated aims.

**Figure 19: Monthly Raskin distribution in 2013**



Source: National Development Planning Agency (2013)  
 Note \* Fuel price hikes implemented on 22 June 2013


## USING THE UNIFIED DATABASE

Since mid-2012 the government has used the Unified Database to identify target households. Changes in socioeconomic conditions at the household level are important in updating the programme's membership. The information in the Unified Database comes from Statistics Indonesia's data collection for social protection programmes in 2011 (PPLS 2011). It provides a more representative reflection of current conditions as it is the most up-to-date information available. This marks the first step towards improving accuracy in the programme strategy.

### Box 2: Overview of the Unified Database (BDT)

A key requirement in creating a coherent system is having a national database of up-to-date, comprehensive information about individuals and households to identify potential beneficiaries for social protection programmes. Using this rationale, TNP2K set up the social protection database known as the Unified Database (*Basis Data Terpadu* – BDT).


**Figure 20: Basic process for collecting social protection programme data**



Source: TNP2K

The first important step in establishing the database was to collect information on the whereabouts and the socioeconomic conditions of individuals and households. Indonesia has rich experience in collecting household data for programme targeting. In 2005, Statistics Indonesia conducted the Socioeconomic Data Collection, which was used to identify household beneficiaries for the Unconditional Cash Transfer programme (BLT) in 2005 and 2008. A similar exercise in 2008 was the data collection for social protection programmes (PPLS) that was used to target beneficiaries for the Conditional Cash Transfers for Poor Families (PKH) programme and other national programmes. Although the move to develop the Unified Database was initiated as early as 2005, at the time there was not much support for using the 2005 Socioeconomic Data Collection or the 2008 data collection for social protection programmes to establish beneficiaries of the social protection programmes.


**Figure 21: The basic process for developing the Unified Database**



Source: TNP2K


TNP2K played an important role in coordinating efforts to establish the database. Beginning in 2011, activities for the data collection for social protection programmes were designed to provide relevant data for the Unified Database. To ensure data collection methods were appropriate for Indonesia, TNP2K worked with the World Bank and the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). With these two institutions, TNP2K researched and tested various targeting methods in a number of locations. This research found that the proxy means test (PMT) provided more accurate results than other methods and allowed the community to identify poor people more accurately.

**Figure 22: Estimated targeting errors according to the targeting method used**



Source: TNP2K, 2012

**Figure 23: Percentage of deciles targeted by method**



Source: TNP2K, 2012

Recommendations from this research were important in being able to innovatively correct the Statistics Indonesia 2011 data collection for social protection programmes.

Several innovations that TNP2K included in the 2011 data collection for social protection programmes are:

1. Increasing the scope of household data to 45 percent of Indonesia's population. The 2008 data included just 29 percent of the population;
2. Using the 2010 population census to develop a "poverty map" as a reference for an initial list of households to be included;
3. Consulting with poor communities to identify poor households that had not been registered; and
4. Adding variables to the characteristics of individuals and households to better predict their socioeconomic situation and to accommodate the needs of individual programme.

Once collected, the data was used to estimate the socioeconomic status of each household. A significant innovation during this phase was improving the estimation model used – the proxy means test (PMT). Predictive variables were chosen and added and pertinent socioeconomic conditions were included. Furthermore, the proxy means test model was adapted to the individual needs of each district or city. The proxy means test approach made it possible to rank households according to their socioeconomic status. Based on this ranking, 40 percent of households with the poorest socioeconomic status – or approximately 25 million households of 96 million people – were included in the Unified Database which is managed by the TNP2K secretariat.

As of 2014, the Raskin programme had used the Unified Database twice to determine changes in programme membership. During the second half of 2012, nearly 17 million households from the Unified Database were used in the list of beneficiaries that year. In 2013–2014, over 15.5 million households were included in the list. The reduction was partly attributed to a decline in the national poverty rate but also to the state budget programme funding being limited to only 15.5 million households.

Table 10: Comparison of Raskin allocations by provinces, 2011–2013

Province	2011	2011	2013	Province	2011	2011	2013
Aceh	529,752	368,512	356,720	NTB	559,280	483,162	471,566
North Sumatra	838,363	792,166	746,220	NTT	553,770	425,201	421,799
West Sumatra	257,438	276,815	275,431	West Kalimantan	346,675	241,655	233,922
Riau	253,750	241,673	227,656	Central Kalimantan	138,341	86,478	83,711
Jambi	133,137	174,095	162,779	South Kalimantan	169,419	169,739	161,592
South Sumatra	596,942	459,561	419,579	East Kalimantan	188,997	159,008	147,718
Bengkulu	120,602	125,593	121,574	North Sulawesi	115,795	162,612	161,089
Lampung	739,994	617,819	573,954	Central Sulawesi	159,126	210,501	201,239
Bangka Belitung	28,408	43,370	41,635	South Sulawesi	514,120	506,922	484,617
Kep. Riau	74,601	67,429	64,732	Southeast Sulawesi	253,157	166,021	158,716
DKI Jakarta	180,660	256,469	226,462	Gorontalo	70,517	94,056	89,918
West Java	2,840,534	3,114,036	2,615,790	West Sulawesi	90,573	78,926	75,453
Central Java	2,888,361	2,937,464	2,482,157	Maluku	144,336	122,897	119,825
Yogyakarta	201,628	341,291	288,391	North Maluku	56,260	56,955	55,531
East Java	3,079,822	3,401,749	2,857,469	West Papua	112,093	92,869	90,547
Banten	629,318	585,944	526,178	Papua	487,434	446,157	435,003
Bali	134,804	180,862	151,924	National	17,488,007	17,488,007	15,530,897

Source: TNP2K (2012)

**Using the Unified Database as the reference, the total number of programme beneficiaries for 2012–2014 and their allocations were drawn up for each region and for each village and urban ward.** The list of target households was determined using Unified Database data that shows the levels of poverty in each region. Annex 2 shows an example of the beneficiaries list being used at the village or urban ward level.

**The Unified Database has made programme targeting more accurate and so has had a positive impact on the programme.** According to studies conducted by TNP2K, using the results from data collection to determine programme targeting can also improve target accuracy. This better targeting is also reflected in the decline in the number of households actually participating in the programme in relation to the total number of households targeted. Furthermore, more low-income households, the original target for the programme, have benefited from the programme since the new the UDB data has become available.

Nevertheless, there are still shortcomings in using the Unified Database to determine target households. For example, data on households in the Unified Database cannot

be updated directly which affects the list of beneficiaries for the following period. Additionally, provincial governments have criticised the updating exercise and in 2012, some provincial governments complained about the decline in allocations for their regions. Although nothing had changed at the national level, the distribution of Raskin allocations to each province had changed considerably. As shown in table 10, there was a change in the Raskin allocations between 2011, when PPLS 2008 was used as the distribution reference, and June–December 2012 when the Unified Database was the reference. A significant change occurred, for example in the rice allocation to Central Kalimantan, which experienced a 37 percent decline while the allocation to DI Yogyakarta increased 69 percent. Generally, the larger increases in Raskin allocations occurred on the island of Java, while declines commonly occurred elsewhere. This resulted in numerous complaints from local governments although the 2012 Raskin allocation, based on a new list of beneficiaries from the target households, reflected the reality on the ground more accurately. Similar complaints about the rice allocations have been made by governments at the regency, city, district and village levels, with some even refusing to accept the revised allocations. This issue arose because regional governments did not have enough information and were not given clear instructions about the programme, at both the central and village level.

## ENCOURAGING LOCAL PARTICIPATION


**At the implementation level, programme participant lists are updated to improve targeting and to minimise inclusion and exclusion errors.** This also helps in dealing with complaints arising from the preceding period. An important change in 2013 was applying a “negative list” as well as making changes in programme membership at the district and village level.

The negative list works by applying steadily more stringent criteria or conditions to households, making it increasingly likely that they will be struck off. Some of the criteria on the negative list deployed by the Unified Database included, for example:

- The head of household works as a civil servant, police officer, military officer, state-owned enterprise employee or legislative assembly member;
- The head of the household has a Bachelor’s degree or post-graduate qualification;
- Household assets include a car.

Out of all the households on the Raskin programme’s target list, 103,483 households were put on the negative list for 2012 (0.6 percent). This negative list was then used to update the list of programme participants.

Figure 24: Proportion of villages that updated beneficiary figures, 2012



Source: TNP2K-LP3ES, 2012

In addition to using the negative list to adjust membership, the ceiling for the number of households was updated. The ceiling had been in place since the June–December 2012 implementation period and needed to be adjusted to reflect socioeconomic changes that had affected households. The changes were intended to accommodate beneficiaries who had been on the list for the June–December 2012 period but had not qualified for the programme for the following reasons:

- They had moved to an address outside the village or urban ward;
- They had died and, as with most single-member households, all other household members had already passed away;
- The household had been recorded more than once at the data collection stage or been duplicated on the beneficiaries list;
- The household had been considered more economically advantaged when compared to households that were not part of the target list.

The changes made to membership in the programme at the village and urban ward level were based on consensus-driven village deliberations (known as *musdes* and *muskel*). Factors considered in updating the membership included: the size of the household; whether the head of the household was female; how 'liveable' the

house was; and if the household income was low and irregular. Any changes to the membership list had to remain within the number of beneficiaries already on the list in the villages or urban wards concerned. Furthermore, during the meetings, the village or urban ward had to fill in a “replacement summary form” noting the changes to the beneficiaries list. These forms are submitted to the regency or city level Raskin coordination team during the Raskin rice distribution process at the village and urban ward level.

**Although membership was updated at implementation level, national implementing policies impose some prerequisites before these updates can be approved.** For example, to ensure consistency in the socioeconomic criteria used, replacement households must come from the Unified Database. Also, to accommodate logistical requirements, villages included in the Unified Database must still have at least five beneficiaries after the replacements are made.

**Updating programme participation at implementation level is official procedure but not all regions do it.** Some areas continue to use the equitable sharing system. A joint monitoring study by TNP2K and LP3ES found that only 22 percent of villages update the list through village deliberations in their areas. Sometimes updates were decided by village government or by the heads of villages or neighbourhood associations. Moreover, they found that 23 percent of villages still share rice equally with all households and 26 percent of villages do not update the list at all. The study included 220 sample villages with 110 villages that used social protection cards and 110 control villages that did not use cards.

Reports received after the information from the replacement summary forms was compiled show that only a small proportion of households were replaced on the 2012 programme beneficiaries list. These updates done through the forms submitted after village deliberations show that 18,922 beneficiary households or 0.1 percent of the households had either moved or the household member or members had died.

Figure 25: Mechanism for updating social protection cards (KPS)



The method of updating the beneficiaries list at the local level was changed after social protection cards (KPS) were introduced as a beneficiary identification mechanism for social protection programmes. The village meetings are still organised but the outputs from these deliberations are presented in the form of “poverty letters” that declare the official poor status of a household. Households issued with these declarations of poverty are considered equal to households that hold social protection cards.

## ISSUING SOCIAL PROTECTION CARDS

The launch of the social protection card system was aimed at improving social protection programmes. The card is a part of the government's Programme for Expanding and Accelerating Social Protection (known as P4S) that compensated households for the impact of the increase in the price of fuel in mid-2013. The compensation packages included the Raskin programme, Cash Transfers for Poor Students (BSM), the Conditional Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Families (PKH) and the Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfers (BLSM).

Figure 26: Sample Social Protection Card



Source: TNP2K (2013)

There are several ways in which the social protection cards help achieve the objectives of the social protection programmes:

- They help identify household beneficiaries for the Raskin, Cash Transfers for Poor Students and Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfer programmes;
- They encourage complementarity between the various social assistance initiatives;
- They help local governments to better design and target the distribution of local social protection programmes; and
- They increase public awareness about the social protection programmes, especially among potential beneficiary households.

### Social protection cards were expected to have a positive impact on the government's food subsidy policy implemented through the Raskin programme.

The cards were expected to improve programme targeting and reduce the number of non-target households that benefit from the programme. Figure 27 shows how the social protection cards are meant to be used.


Households with social protection cards should be able to:

- Access the Raskin rice and benefit from the Cash Transfers for Poor Students and Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfer programmes;

- Show their cards to Raskin distribution centre staff as an early notice of their status as beneficiaries; and
- Buy 15 kgs of subsidised rice per month at a price of IDR1,600 per kg or according to the officially set price.

In other words, only social protection card holders are entitled to full Raskin programme benefits.


**Figure 27: Illustration of how the social protection card is used with the Raskin programme**



Source: TNP2K (2013)

**Although an important instrument for implementing programmes in the field, the social protection card approach still faces challenges in areas where the cards have not been fully established as a means of accessing benefits.** Ineffective public awareness initiatives, inadequate supervision and limited support regulations issued by governments and programme implementers have hampered the cards' success. Only a small proportion of distribution centres at the village or urban ward level accept the card as a legitimate way of claiming subsidised rice. Further, a lack of government oversight, via the Raskin coordination teams and programme implementers in the field, has contributed to the limited use of the card. This has implications for the bid for more accurate targeting in the Raskin programme.

**Figure 28: Comparison of subsidised rice prices in areas using and not using social protection cards**



Source: TNP2K-LP3ES (2012)

Prior to launching the social protection cards in mid-2013, a number of internal trials were carried out. One of the findings from these trials was that when the social protection cards are used, more villages tend to use the government fixed price. In the areas where the cards were being tested, 57 percent of villages used the IDR1,600 per kg price fixed by government while 43 percent of villages used a higher price. Meanwhile, in the control areas where there were no cards, only 7 percent of villages used the official fixed price and the remaining 93 percent of villages sold the rice at a higher price (see figure 28).

A similar study was conducted by TNP2K in collaboration with the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) in 572 villages from six regencies or cities. The study found that 378 villages had received social protection cards while 194 had not and concluded that the card system effectively improved community awareness, increased the number of beneficiaries who received subsidised rice and improved the accuracy of targeting. In villages using the card system, households received approximately 1.9 kgs of rice compared to 1.1 kgs and at a lower price, as indicated by the lower price differential of IDR55–93 per kg compared to the control areas.

## INVOLVING LOCAL GOVERNMENT

**Internal and external studies by research agencies and universities show that variations in the subsidised rice price still occur in a number of regions.**

Local government cooperation is essential in dealing with this issue. One action taken to keep the price more closely aligned with the set subsidised rice price has been to ask local authorities to provide transport costs in each area. This was included in a circular issued by the Minister of Home Affairs in 2013 (No 900/2634/SJ 2013) that dealt with the “Allocation of the cost of distributing Raskin from the distribution point to the sharing point”. This regulation involved two important aspects. First, it appealed to local governments to enhance the success of the Raskin programme by allocating part of their budget to transporting the rice from the distribution points to the beneficiaries. Second, if the budget funds were not planned and so not available, local governments could draw the funds from their emergency budget allocation which is an essential part of any local government budget (as in article 162 of the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation 13 of 2006 on Regional Financial Management Guidelines and as amended by the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation 21 of 2011).

In addition to providing financial support, **local governments are required to safeguard the implementation of the programme.** The same circular states that local governments should minimise any fraudulent actions or misappropriation by improving their complaints management system at the provincial and regency or city levels.



However, while the legal framework clearly defines the local government role in the programme, only a few local governments adhere to this and allocate budget for the programme. This suggests that the bid for local government involvement has had minimal impact and, furthermore, beneficiaries continue to pay around IDR2,262 per kg (2013) for their subsidised rice.

Apart from price issues, similar problems have arisen in relation to accurate targeting and to the correct quantity and quality of rice. This shows that central government efforts, through the Ministry of Home Affairs, to involve the regions in monitoring and overseeing the programme at the local level, have had far from optimal results. The results of the joint study by TNP2K and LP3ES show that only a few regions or areas strive to make the programme more effective. Only two of 22 monitored areas have addressed the issues of targeting and the quantity and quality of rice by, for example, boosting public awareness, holding neighbourhood discussions and allocating operational funding for “out-of-pocket” costs and honorariums for implementing officials.

In addition to the minimal role played by most local governments, some areas still refuse to implement the Raskin programme. These include, for example, the Regency of Muko-Muko in Bengkulu province, the Regency of Malinau in East Kalimantan province and the Regency of Mentawai in the West Sumatra province. Their reasons for not implementing the programme include their own concerns about the accuracy of targeting and the quality of the rice intended for distribution.

## ORGANISING DISTRIBUTION TO HOUSEHOLDS

**Supplying rice to the distribution centres is the responsibility of Bulog and its personnel working at the local level. These include the regional and subregional division staff as well as staff from the Logistics Office.** Since 2012, the local government, through the village head, urban ward chief or local government head, has been able to choose from a range of alternatives for the distribution of the rice. The main task is to deliver the rice from the distribution centres to the sharing points and then to the target households, in accordance with the official beneficiaries list and with the requisite timing, price and quantity. Alternative means of distribution include work groups (known as *pokja*), village stalls or kiosks (known as *wardes*), community groups (known as *pokmas*) or the labour-intensive Raskin work schemes.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Raskin's distribution system involves community empowerment whereby the beneficiaries are required to contribute to improving the productivity of the area using compensation payments made through the local government budget. No further clarification could be obtained about the Intensive Raskin scheme other than that “.....it will be organized later”

Of the various forms of distribution available, the most common is through the Raskin work groups at the village or urban ward level. Other alternatives, such as stalls or kiosks, community groups or the labour-intensive Raskin work schemes, are still not fully operational. One of the problems is that distributors need to collect a large amount of money in advance because Bulog requires payment upfront. Alternative distributors, such as kiosks, may be able to operate better if they were able use vouchers.

Internally, the Raskin programme has assessed policy options for the role of distribution centre overseers. The study with the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab in 2013–2014 formulated an alternative way of appointing distributors through an auction or bidding approach. The study was carried out in 572 villages with 191 villages being authorised to bid, 96 being supervised through the implementation of a distribution plan and 285 forming the “control” group. The need for upfront payment is the main obstacle to implementing an auction or tendering system. However, the study concluded that the method used to appoint the distributor had little impact on the programme’s effectiveness.

## ENHANCING THE PUBLIC AWARENESS PROGRAMME

**To increase community awareness and understanding of the Raskin programme and its attendant rights and responsibilities, TNP2K and the programme implementers need new methods and a broader scope of activities.** Several studies have found that Raskin programme beneficiaries have limited knowledge about the programme and about their rights and obligations in relation to it (Hastuti *et al.* 2008; LP3ES-TNP2K 2012). Since 2012, efforts to inform the public have included:

- Sending out posters about the beneficiaries list to be displayed at village and urban ward offices and other public places in villages throughout Indonesia;
- Distributing guidelines on the Raskin programme to villages throughout Indonesia; and
- Issuing Raskin recipient identity cards that contain general information about the rights and obligations involved in the programme (piloted in a number of areas).

Information has also been disseminated through meetings at different levels and by distributing informative printed materials, issuing press releases and making public service announcements on television, radio and in the print media at national and local levels. With regard to local government, these activities have at least increased relevant knowledge about administering Raskin according to its original design and

goals. However, as for the beneficiaries, several studies have concluded that they know little about the programme. One reason for this is the lack of external support in creating public awareness about the programme, for example through promotional activities that go beyond traditional paper-based approaches.

The asymmetric information in the field is partly due to the lack of transparency and accountability at the implementation level of the programme has had the following ramifications:

- Many of the beneficiaries at the village and urban ward level knew nothing about the beneficiaries list or the quantity of rice allocated to their area, as only a few village governments made this known in their constituencies;
- Beneficiaries did not know when the rice would be distributed and whether it would be rotated among households or distributed to households outside the official list;
- Most beneficiaries did not know what quantity of rice they were entitled to;
- Most beneficiaries were unsure of how much they would pay for the rice because local government often amended the price to cover additional distribution costs;
- Beneficiaries were unsure about what quality of subsidised rice they should accept or how to compare it with the medium quality rice the government had stipulated; and
- People were unaware of the total amount of subsidised rice available for national



<sup>11</sup> For further information see Olken (2006)

and regional distribution, making it difficult to monitor and control the amount of rice<sup>11</sup> going missing in the distribution process.

One important lesson learnt has been that, without effective interaction with the community, public awareness efforts do little to increase overall understanding among programme beneficiaries or the general public. One way to improve communication would be to use people-driven approaches, such as those using extension or outreach and involving volunteers and facilitators from non-governmental organisations.

One internal study conducted with LP3ES showed that only some of the areas monitored had implemented awareness activities and this varied between regions. Of 220 village areas monitored, 110 had instituted some form of public information programme or mechanism. One of the awareness programmes was associated with the beneficiaries list and represented the target recipients' perspective, giving information, for example, about any reductions in allocations, the price of subsidised rice, the quantity of rice each target household was entitled to and the system for changing participants. Out of all of the public awareness activities conducted, the quality of rice received by beneficiaries attracted the least attention at the implementation level. Overall the study concluded that local governments are not inclined to improve the Raskin programme through community awareness initiatives.



## COMPLAINTS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Raskin coordination teams at central and regional levels, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, are responsible for managing complaints through their complaints handling units. The ministry has issued specific guidelines on managing complaints from the public. At the local level, the complaints unit is the responsibility of the District Government Technical Office (SKPD) which is in charge of community empowerment and poverty reduction. The unit acts as a complaints clearing house, ensuring that complaints are sent to the correct authority. Complaints about programme targeting are directed to TNP2K while complaints about programme management are sent to the Raskin coordination team at the national level, as well as to TNP2K. Complaints relating to the quality and quantity of rice are sent to Bulog and are reported to the central coordination team.

Officially, the complaints management system not only handles complaints but is also a means of carrying out surveillance, monitoring, tracking and evaluation. The system produces two essential reports, one on the complaints received about programme implementation and another that provides detailed information about the programme.

However, the coordination of the complaints system with the central Raskin coordination team was undertaken for only the first three months after the social protection cards were introduced, from June to August 2013. This was mainly due to limited inter-ministerial support. For the period September 2013–September 2014, the system was fully coordinated by TNP2K with support from the Presidential Working Unit for Development Supervision and Control (UKP4).

**Table 11: Status of social protection card queries and complaints by category and follow-up status, June 2013–June 2014**

Programme	Follow-up status						Total
	Yet to be examined		In process		Yet to be examined		
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	Total	Percent	
BLSM	1,327	78.3	5	0.3	362	21.4	1,694
BSM	611	13.6	161	3.6	3,721	82.8	4,493
Jamkesmas	9	52.9	0	0	8	47.1	17
Membership	2,621	91.5	1	0	243	8.5	2,865
PKH	80	83.3	0	0	16	16.7	96
Raskin	1,253	57.1	32	1.5	908	41.4	2,193
<b>Total</b>	<b>5,901</b>	<b>51.95</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>1.75</b>	<b>5,258</b>	<b>46.3</b>	<b>11,358</b>

Source: Adapted from <http://monev.tnp2k.go.id/lapor/> (accessed on June 20, 2014)

Note: BLSM = Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfers; BSM = Cash Transfers for Poor Students; Jamkesmas = Public Health Insurance; KPS = social protection cards; PKH = Conditional Cash Transfer Programme for Poor Families

**The Raskin coordination team and TNP2K jointly follow up queries and complaints about the programme.** They deal with any issues that do not relate to the quality of rice while Bulog handles queries or complaints about rice quality. From June 2013 until mid-June 2014, there were 11,358 queries and complaints following the launch of the social protection cards and 2,193 of them involved the Raskin programme (see table 12). From the overall total, some 41.4 percent have been addressed, 1.5 percent are being processed and 57.1 percent are yet to be processed. The Raskin programme received the third largest number of queries and complaints, after the Cash Transfers for Poor Students programme and queries regarding social protection cards.

Out of the 2,193 queries and complaints specifically about the Raskin programme, 82.4 percent were complaints. The largest cause for complaint (32 percent) was the quantity of rice received, while the accuracy of targeting households was the second largest (14.9 percent). On the other hand, 17.6 percent could be categorised as requests for information. Within this group, 10.4 percent asked about programme management. Queries about quantity and price constituted the second and third largest percentage of the requests for information at, respectively, 3.4 and 3.1 percent.


**Table 12: Total number of Raskin queries and complaints, June 2013 – June 2014**

Raskin Sub Category	Total SMS	Percentage
<b>TYPE OF REPORTED COMPLAINT</b>		
Total complaints	545	30.1
Total complaints about price	190	10.5
Total complaints about targeting	83	4.6
Total complaints about timeliness	53	2.9
Complaints about targeting	270	14.9
Complaints about administration	131	7.3
Complaints about price	123	6.8
Complaints about timeliness	62	3.4
Complaints about quality	23	1.3
Two or more other types of complaints	327	18.1
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF REPORTED COMPLAINTS</b>	<b>1,807</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION</b>		
Information about administration	40	10.4
Information about amounts	13	3.4
Information about prices	12	3.1
Information about quality	2	0.5
Two or more other types of requests	18	4.7
Combined complaints and requests	301	77.9
<b>TOTAL NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION</b>	<b>386</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>TOTAL REPORTS</b>	<b>2,193</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: adapted from <http://monev.tnp2k.go.id/lapor/> (accessed on June 20, 2014)

With regard to geographical distribution, the largest number of queries or complaints came from the regions on the island of Java. Compared to other areas, Central Java had the largest number of queries or complaints (134) with East Java (128) and West Java (116) not far behind. The least number came from North Maluku, with only one complaint related to the Raskin programme. These disparities between the number of queries and complaints about the Raskin programme in different areas suggest that community awareness activities, complaints mechanisms and public information services need to be improved considerably. This would ensure the future of the programme because efforts to understand and address these queries and complaints is indispensable in meeting the programme performance indicators in the official implementation guidelines, namely the 6T criteria (targeting, quantity, price, timing, quality and administration).

**Figure 29: Queries and complaints about Raskin already handled, by province, June 2013 – June 2014**



Source: adapted from <http://monev.tnp2k.go.id/lapor/> (accessed on June 20, 2014)

Although a complaints management system is in place, much needs to be done to make it more effective. The system still identifies queries and complaints by their responses, which mostly come from the central implementation level. This is reflected in the fact that the programme's performance indicators still do not fulfill expectations. Better reporting systems need to be developed to improve the programme's performance and ensure that the administration is more responsive to queries and complaints and can therefore have a greater impact on the ground. The reporting system would also serve as a measure of how effectively the programme has been implemented.

The role of participants – both household beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries – is vital to developing a successful reporting system to benefit all concerned.

### Box 3: The role of social protection cards

In June 2013 the government launched the social protection card system as a means of accessing social protection programmes, including Raskin. The card should be able to be used to obtain a number of benefits but problems remain with its implementation. While 15.5 million social protection cards were distributed to target households to make government assistance programmes easily accessible, this has not succeeded in the case of the Raskin programme.

Only minimal use is made of the cards to obtain benefits. Observations drawn from the online Public Needs and Complaint Service (LAPOR!) show there are still complaints about the card not being accepted as a means to access benefits. For example, in the village of Gentasari in the Kroya district, which is part of the Cilacap regency, households with social protection cards were not supplied with rice when the Temporary Unconditional Cash Transfers (BLSM) programme was implemented. Moreover, in Palebon, Semarang, applicants were told that the social protection cards were not acceptable in claiming rights to the Raskin rice.

These reports demonstrate that the cards have not been effective in improving the programme in the field. Consideration needs to be given to improving the process through public information strategies that reach out to the public in general and to target households in particular.

**“I, [personal details redacted to protect individual’s identity], sincerely hope we can once again get our ration of Raskin rice.**

**At the age of 67, and with only one remaining leg,  
I desperately need the rice to fulfill my needs.”**

**(LAPOR! UKP4, 2013)**



# 4

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
## Achieving the Raskin Programme's Potential



## OVERVIEW OF THE PROGRAMME'S CONTRIBUTION TO POVERTY REDUCTION

**F**ood is one of the main expenses for households, especially for poor households, and rice makes up a larger proportion of food expenditure than any other food item. Thus rice is the most common food for the population in Indonesia and this makes the poor especially vulnerable to increases in food prices. Furthermore, food is given a heavy weighting in determining the poverty line, especially if there have been increases in commodity prices. In this context, the role of the Raskin programme needs to be expanded in the overall social protection strategy.

Figure 30: Proportional comparison of household expenditure by group



Source: National Socioeconomic Survey (2012)

Raskin's intention is to target poor households. The Statistics Indonesia report on poverty says that rice accounts for on average 26.92 percent of total spending per capita in cities and 33.38 percent of total spending per capita in rural areas. Rice consumption is the highest of 52 food commodities used to determine the poverty line.

**Table 13: Contribution of food and non-food commodities**

Commodity	City	Commodity	Village
<b>Food</b>			
Rice	26.92%	Rice	33.38%
Filter cigarettes	8.67%	Filter cigarettes	8.23%
Eggs	3.51%	Sugar	3.86%
Chicken	3.12%	Chicken egg	2.61%
Sugar	2.77%	Instant noodles	2.30%
Tempe	2.44%	Tempe	1.96%
Tofu	2.15%	Tofu	1.60%
Instant noodles	1.59%	Red onion	1.51%
Onions	1.32%	Coffee	1.50%
Red chillies	1.26%	Tuna/fish	1.35%
<b>Non-food items</b>			
Housing	8.70%	Housing	5.78%
Education	2.71%	Children's apparel	1.76%
Fuel	1.91%	Electricity	1.55%
Transportation	1.86%	Adult's apparel	1.46%
Children's apparel	1.79%	Gasoline	1.43%

Source: adapted from Susenas, September 2012

A policy simulation, using the percentage of household consumption spent on rice and household poverty line figures, defines the role of the Raskin programme as a key instrument for reducing poverty. Preparing policy simulations to measure poverty reduction involves technical issues. First, the simulation must include assumptions drawn from key economic indicators that impact poverty levels. Second, the outputs, consisting of several scenarios based on assumptions and anticipated economic conditions need to be observed.

Inputs to the simulation consist of several assumptions used to describe the economic conditions households face. The parameters needed for the most up-to-date Raskin simulation include the impact of fuel and food prices on inflation, and

the latest economic figures, such as the growth in gross domestic product (GDP), the growth in household consumption, as well as the growth in the workforce by sector or field of work. In short, this simulation involves two underlying assumptions: one about price and one about growth.

#### Box 4: Simulating the impact of Raskin based on poverty projections

The policy simulation of the impact of the Raskin programme on poverty was achieved by integrating it with the Poverty Projection instrument (Datt dan Walker 2002). Estimations of poverty levels involve assumptions about prices and macro-economics. Assumptions about prices require estimates with general price indicators, the price of subsidised commodities (in this context, the price of fuel), the weighting for commodity components in the National Socioeconomic Survey consumption bundle module, and the weighting in the consumer price index.

Projections of per capita consumption expenditure growth for a specified period consist of two elements, the growth in consumption components for the previous period and the components that experience inflation. Within the growth in consumption components there are two sub components: economic growth and population growth. This growth will come from each sector or field of work. This price increase will include inflation in the price of foods derived from poverty line calculations in the National Socioeconomic Survey consumption module that was developed from the general consumer price index. It can be expressed in the following equation:

$$c_{i,t} = c_{i,t-1} (1 + g_t^{S_i} - \eta_t^{S_i}) \cdot f_t^{-1}$$

Where:

$c$  : per capita household consumption expenditure

$i$  : household

$t$  : period

$g$  : economic growth

$\eta$  : population growth

$S$  : sector or field of work

$J$  : sector unit or business field, from either agriculture, industry or services

Notation  $f$  presents a general function of the components of the development of inflation that can be broken down into:

$$f_t = \left\{ w_p(1 + \Delta P_t^F) + \frac{(1 - w_p)}{(1 - w_c)} [1 - w_c(1 + \Delta P_t^F)] \right\}$$

Where:

$w$  : weighting

$p$  : the proportion of food commodities per poverty line

$c$  : the proportion of food commodities in the consumer price index

$P^F$  : food price

After calculating the projected household consumption expenditure per capita it is possible to determine the poverty projection figure (PO) and the poverty gap index (P1). Among the parameters needed for the Poverty Projection instrument for the Raskin simulation is the poverty reduction target. Then, based on the parameters already obtained, using the funding in rupiah in the Annual National Budget along with the total number of households that have become part of the programme, it is possible to calculate the benefit already received by poor households. The poverty rate is currently calculated on the assumption that the inaccurate targeting based on National Socioeconomic Survey estimations is now the baseline. The rate is then projected with minimal inaccuracies (for example, dividing the target accuracy up to 50, 60, 70 and 80 percent).

**Table 14: Example of Raskin simulation assumption**

<b>Growth</b>	
Annual real consumption expenditure (%)	<b>1.90</b>
Agriculture (%)	<b>0.23</b>
Industry (%)	<b>3.19</b>
Services (%)	<b>1.21</b>
<b>Fuel subsidy</b>	
Fuel subsidy reduction	<b>Rp 2,000,-</b>
Original price (premium)	<b>Rp 6,500,-</b>
Original price (diesel)	<b>Rp 5,500,-</b>

Source: Internal analysis findings

In building scenario simulation tools, it is possible to make an initial scenario creating economic conditions that run normally, free of any shock from policy decisions or other causes that could potentially impact key economic conditions. This is known as a “natural scenario”.

Alternatively, a scenario can be created that contains shocks stemming from policies, especially policies that affect prices, for example, creating a scenario that includes a reduction in the fuel subsidy. Table 15 illustrates two types of policy scenarios.

### Box 5: Simulating the effect of better targeting, timeliness and pricing

Analysis using National Socioeconomic Survey data from September 2013 shows that on average only 36 percent or 5.4kgs of the 15kgs of rice allocated per household was received. This is a difference of 9.6kgs compared to the targeted figure. Based on the official Statistics Indonesia figures, the poverty rate in 2013 was about 11.47 percent.

**Table 15: Simulation for calculating poverty rate figures**

	Current situation	If the increase in rice received by households is			
		50 percent	60 percent	70 percent	80 percent
Rice percentage/household	36 percent	50 percent	60 percent	70 percent	80 percent
Rice quantity/household	5.4 kg	7.5 kg	9.0 kg	10.5 kg	12.0 kg
<b>Natural scenario</b>		<b>Projected Poverty Rate</b>			
Subsidised rice price: IDR1,600/kg	11.47	11.13	10.89	10.64	10.40
Subsidised rice price: Free	10.80	10.38	10.07	9.77	9.47
<b>Shock scenario – reduction in fuel subsidies</b>					
Subsidised rice price: IDR1,600/kg	11.63	11.29	11.04	10.79	10.55
Subsidised rice price: Free	10.80	10.38	10.07	9.77	9.46

*Note: Allocation of rice per household: 15 kg/month (equivalent of IDR 101.180/household)*

The poverty level can be estimated by applying the Raskin simulation programme to the natural scenario, based on the current average amount of rice received by households (36 percent). A simulation was conducted with households receiving 50 percent, 60 percent, 70 percent and 80 percent of their 15kg rice allocation. The amount of rice received then increased respectively as much as 7.5kgs, 9kgs, 10.5kgs and 12 kgs per target household. These figures show the magnitude of the impact on poverty if the Raskin programme was accurately targeted.

The natural scenario simulation shows that if Raskin can increase the amount of rice that target households receive, it will have a significant impact on poverty reduction. With a subsidised rice price of IDR1,600 per kg and the equivalent of 36 percent of the intended allocation, the poverty rate for September 2013 would have been around 11.47 percent. Assuming that the amount of rice per beneficiary rose to 7.5kgs, the poverty rate would be 11.13 percent. If programme managers could increase the rice received to 9kgs, 10.5kgs and 12kgs, it is estimated the level of poverty would be, respectively, 10.89 percent, 10.64 and 10.40 percent.

The level of poverty can also be measured through the Raskin programme using shock scenarios, especially regarding policies that affect basic commodity prices. One such policy evaluated this way used the Raskin programme to compensate for a “shock” reduction in fuel subsidies. In this scenario, the subsidy for both premium grade fuel and diesel each dropped IDR2,000. This led to the price for premium fuel increasing from IDR6,500 to IDR8,500, and diesel from IDR5,500 to IDR7,500.

Based on these assumptions, the estimated poverty rate during natural conditions for September 2013 equaled 11.63 percent, with the amount of rice, amounting to 5.4kgs received by each target household. If the rice received by households increased to 7.5kgs, the estimated poverty rate for that period would be 11.29 percent. Assuming rice was received by households during a period when the cost of fuel did not increase, then the poverty rate would be 11.04 percent if each household received 9kgs. Meanwhile, if the rice received by households increased to 10.5kgs and 12kgs, the estimated poverty rates would be, respectively, 10.79 percent and 10.55 percent.

The results from the above simulated scenarios show that Raskin would have a greater impact on poverty reduction efforts if the rice distributed was available to households for free. Nevertheless, the above policy choices are of no more significance when compared with increasing the effectiveness of programmes already operating according to prescribed indicators, namely, at full capacity. Accuracy of targeting beneficiaries, the amounts distributed, timeliness and price all play an important role in overcoming poverty through the Raskin programme. Further, it is no less important to enhance the role of the various stakeholders, including local governments, in monitoring and overseeing programme implementation.

## CHANGES TO DISTRIBUTION GOVERNANCE

**Those involved in implementing the Raskin programme, from the central government to the local level, are key to ensuring the programme achieves its benchmarks.** However, to date, the Raskin coordination team, has not had a structured control and supervision system for administering the programme. This can be seen in the discrepancies between the results achieved at the implementation level and the objectives in the original design of the programme. Two factors could potentially improve management with regard to distributing benefits, these are increasing the level of control mechanisms and sharing responsibility for implementation.

**Bulog's role in distributing the subsidised rice is limited to tracking it from the warehouse to the distribution points.** In general, they do this manually and no standard approach is used across regions. However, if a system were in place, management control could be conducted periodically and display the latest information using the most up-to-date technology. An electronic system is needed to control the flow of available stock of rice and its storage until it is distributed. This would help ensure the integrity of the whole process but would require transparent and accountable management. By instituting management control processes, the programme would be more likely to achieve its stated benchmarks and objectives.

Since Bulog has only been responsible for delivering the rice to distribution centres, tracking the distribution of rice to households has been difficult. Several parties are involved in this process, leading to significant discrepancies in deliveries. A mechanism is needed to separate the control and supervisory aspects of the programme from the distribution process. The government needs to oversee control

and supervision, while Bulog and its partners in local areas need to handle distribution. Designated partners can take the form of working groups, stalls or kiosks, community groups, Raskin labour-intensive work schemes or other arrangements better suited to local conditions. The partners would be fully responsible to Bulog, the distribution operator. With Law No. 6 of 2014 on Villages, village government will oversee programme monitoring and control at village level.

**If feasible, Raskin management needs to be under one authorised agency responsible for implementing the programme in the field.** Programme performance was not being evaluated effectively because the evaluators of the programme were also the implementers of the programme. By establishing an agency fully responsible for implementation, the government will have full authority to monitor and control all the activities associated with it. Whether or not the programme achieves its goals in relation to the government success indicators, the implementing agency will remain fully responsible for upgrading the programme and improving on the performance indicators.

## **IMPROVING PROGRAMME SUPERVISION, CONTROL, TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY**

**Since initial implementation in 1998, the government has updated the Raskin programme five times.** These updates were aimed at ensuring the beneficiaries were being accurately targeted. However, as described in this report, the programme still encounters many obstacles, mainly in relation to membership, quantity of rice, quality of rice and timeliness of delivery. All these issues relate closely to the supervision, control, transparency and accountability of the programme's implementation. The Supervisory Board for Finance and Development (BPKP), under the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry for Social Welfare are responsible for supervising the distribution of Raskin, in line with the relevant legislation.

**Although the institutions related to supervision have been formulated, problems still remain in improving the effectiveness of the programme in terms of its main objectives.** The involvement of central and local governments in monitoring the programme needs to improve and include surveillance by authorised agencies and non-governmental organisations working in poverty reduction. Studies have shown that lack of supervision results in a failure to meet primary goals. Supervision needs to be done in phases and with effective administration. If possible, the instruments used as benchmarks need to be combined with the performance indicators currently in use for monitoring programme administration. This should help to quickly identify the causes of problems in the field and allow for responsive and timely follow-up.

**Regarding supervision, management control related to implementation has until now only involved administrative reports for fixed periods and these tended to be more a formality.** This indicates that the programme has not yet achieved its **6T** goals (correct targeting, quantity, price, timing, quality and administration). Control measures need to be tightened up and reports on the benchmarks required to effectively implement the programme need to be developed. A paradigm shift is needed so that control is no longer seen as a mere formality, as evidenced in the placement of programme guidelines in appendices. Control through other instruments that can verify the accuracy of information presented by officers in the field are needed for comparative purposes. Such controls could be integrated with the implementation of the programme.

**The question of transparency needs particular attention.** The external constraint which is the biggest challenge is citizens' awareness and participation and their role in ensuring accountability in the Raskin programme. Citizen engagement as an aspect of public scrutiny needs to be intrinsic to implementing the programme. From the perspective of public policy, community engagement will encourage citizens to learn more about the programme and to develop a sense of social responsibility. As yet, voluntary participation has been largely absent from Raskin. The community tends to accept what it is told by the centre and plays a minimal role in driving Raskin's success.

In line with the implementation of Law No. 6 of 2014 on Villages, there is great potential for villages and urban wards to play a significant role in overseeing the transparency and accountability of the programme. By doing this, the supervision and control of the programme become part of the responsibility of village government and can be used to measure the performance of government at the village level.

## **FULFILLING RASKIN'S ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES**

Various attempts have been made to improve programme implementation. These have included: using the Unified Database as a reference for the Raskin beneficiaries list; issuing social protection cards; updating lists of participants at the implementation level; involving local governments; managing distribution from the distribution points to the households; enhancing public awareness efforts; and implementing a complaints management system. Nevertheless, these efforts have not achieved optimal outcomes. A number of studies have evaluated the Raskin programme and reached various conclusions. They have also identified numerous challenges the programme faces and made recommendations as to how to over-

come them. However, to become effective, as a poverty reduction programme, the Raskin programme needs to improve across all the six benchmarks (6T) outlined earlier: targeting, timeliness, quantity, quality, price and administration.

## REGULAR BENEFICIARIES LIST UPDATES, VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION

Despite the many changes made to improve targeting and ensure an accurate beneficiaries list, the Raskin programme is still unable to accurately target beneficiaries according to the programme's original design and objectives. Subsidised rice is intended only for low-income groups, yet studies have shown that non-poor groups have also been receiving the rice.

Several factors can cause inaccuracies in targeting. Firstly, there may be internal inefficiencies caused by inadequate staffing. Secondly, although data has been updated at implementation level in many areas, this may not have been synchro-



nised with the central data-handling process so the changes are not reflected in the Unified Database. Thirdly, there is no disciplinary system to deal with programme implementers who choose to disregard the official beneficiaries list and to share the rice evenly across all income groups.

A number of further measures could be taken to improve programme management and targeting, particularly at the implementation level:

- Ensure intensive cooperation between programme managers at the national level and the local Raskin coordination teams;
- Establish and enforce standard operational procedures with follow-up actions for any misdemeanors, such as abuse of the targeting policy;
- Update membership at implementation level regularly (every six months) to accommodate changes in people's socioeconomic situations;
- Ensure that updates to the beneficiaries list made in the field are communicated to the central coordination team and are entered into the Unified Database;
- Integrate all updates done at the implementation level with the centre's goal-setting data;
- Verify and validate any new households to be added at the implementation level if they are not listed in the Unified Database;
- Publish the results of efforts to determine programme participation and disseminate them to village level, urban ward level and to individual households where necessary.

## PACKAGING RICE ACCORDING TO REQUIREMENTS

Officially, Raskin beneficiaries are entitled to 15kgs of subsidised rice a month. However, as discussed earlier in this report, they generally receive much less. A number of explanations have been given for this. First, more households are supplied with rice than are on the official beneficiaries list for the area. It has been argued that this is because more households are eligible for the subsidised rice than are listed, suggesting the fault lies with the list. However, another view is that these are "leakages" or "inclusion errors", implying that the rice received would be enough to fulfill Raskin's target in the community if only those households on the list were supplied. Second, beneficiary households are poor and, even if the rice is subsidised, they may not always have enough money to pay for their full allocation when it arrives. Third, local governments have apparently had to quell protests from community members not included on the beneficiaries list which ultimately could have affected distribution. Fourth, distributors can take advantage of their role and, as one study found, rice can go missing in the process of being moved from distribution points to sharing points in some areas.

Targeting is also at the root of the quantity of rice problems and the following steps could be taken to improve targeting and ensure that households receive the correct amount of rice:

- Make it compulsory for everyone associated with the programme to accept or use social protection cards as the only means of identifying beneficiaries but ensure that they have full information about the system and clear instructions for handling any attendant situations or queries that may arise.
- Ensure that only decisions made through the village and urban ward meetings mechanism are used to update the beneficiaries list to make targeting more accurate and to minimise conflict at the implementation level.
- Package rice according to the amount officially allocated to each beneficiary to minimise the risks of leakage and of rice going missing during the delivery process.

## **APPLYING A MAXIMUM PRICE FOR SUBSIDISED RICE**

As discussed earlier, the price of the subsidised rice varies from area to area and only a percentage of communities manage to respect the government stipulated price for the subsidised rice. There are various reasons for this including accessibility, transport and fees charged. Some important measures could be taken to minimise the increases in the subsidised rice price are:

- Set an official maximum price that the government will authorise for the rice based on a limited percentage variation from the government stipulated price, depending on local circumstances.
- Strictly monitor price deviations at the central and regional government level by implementing standard operational procedures and ensuring they are followed.
- Insist that all local governments meet their obligations to allocate budgetary funds for the cost of distributing Raskin rice to the household level.
- Ensure that all village governments overseeing the subsidised rice price are involved in implementing the Village Law (article 78, paragraph 1) that requires village governments to fulfill the basic food needs of their community members.

## **MAKING RICE DISTRIBUTION REGULAR AND RELIABLE**

Officially, Raskin rice is distributed on a monthly basis, except when the government has good reason to change the schedule. However, as discussed earlier, at the beneficiary level this regular timing is rarely achieved for various reasons, ranging from regional administrative systems to local issues of transport and accessibility. To improve timeliness the following steps are required:

- Ensure that local governments set aside funds to buy and distribute the subsidised rice at the start of the budget year to minimise administration issues and to anticipate the costs of distribution.
- Insist that local distributors deliver the rice on the same date and at the same time each month so households are able to budget for it and can rely on it to fulfill part of their household food requirements.
- No longer accept any excuses from local governments for not respecting the rice distribution schedule, such as shortfalls in allocations or lean economic times.
- Institute a system whereby regional governments cooperate with village governments to control and supervise the beneficiaries list verification process, avoiding delays and ensuring timeliness.

## **SAFEGUARDING THE QUALITY OF RICE**

Despite the government provision that Raskin rice should be of medium quality and be acceptable according to various other standards, challenges prevail. Several measures are required to ensure the rice is always of the required standard:

- Local government and local coordination teams carry out regular quality control to ensure the rice that is distributed is fit for consumption.
- Ensure that the rice government purchases is not infested, does not smell, is not discoloured and meets the stipulated standards.
- Provide warehousing, at least at the district level, to shorten the distribution processes and ensure the quality of the rice does not deteriorate.
- Protect the rice from humidity by using appropriate packaging.

## **ESTABLISHING ADMINISTRATION AS THE BASIS FOR SUPERVISION**

While adequate management systems have been devised for the Raskin programme, the supporting administration has not fulfilled its role as an essential means of supervising, monitoring and evaluating the programme. The success of a programme of this nature is its ability to respond quickly to the situation on the ground and to constantly evolve to achieve optimal performance. Since the programme began, administration has been seen as a mere formality and it needs to play a much greater role if the programme is to be effective. To refine the administration practices and ensure they can fulfill their expected role, the following actions need to be taken:

- Establish a single agency to implement the social protection programmes. This agency needs to have a vertical nature, creating channels from the centre

to the regions and focusing on the Raskin programme as one of its key poverty reduction strategies.

- Develop a computerised system at the centre and in the regions to handle administrative reporting and ensure a timely flow of information and feedback for monitoring and control.
- Increase the participation of local governments, particularly village governments, as well as the public, in monitoring the Raskin programme's implementation process.

## MANAGING COMPLAINTS AND THE CORRESPONDING LEGAL FRAMEWORK

So far the Raskin programme has had no clear, structured complaints system. It was hoped that the social protection cards would improve the situation but complaints handling remains poorly coordinated. While the current system is able to receive complaints, it is not yet able to offer quick responses or solutions. Furthermore, any irregularities that have occurred in the programme, whether to do with quantity, quality, price or the right to become a beneficiary, have carried



no legal consequences. Legal consequences can only occur if reports are made to an appropriate legal body and no such body has been assigned to this role. In a similar way, although the programme has failed to reach most of its targets, it continues to operate largely unimpeded by any financial supervisory agencies, such as the State Audit Agency, the Supervisory Board for Finance and Development or the the Corruption Eradication Commission. Audit results have been based only on reports submitted by the implementing programme, meaning that the achievements stated in the reports tend to match objectives set out in the original planning. The following actions could help to improve this lack of accountability:

- Set up a specific unit to address public concerns and respond to criticism in the media. The unit needs to be backed by a clear, structured complaints-handling system in the field and an unambiguous legal framework.
- Put the programme under the surveillance of law enforcement representatives and agencies such as the police, the Corruption Eradication Commission or the Attorney General so that any violations will have legal consequences, whether criminal or civil, as was done with the subsidy for fuel.
- Synchronise administrative audits with what is actually happening on the ground to ensure the administrative processes are commensurate with the amount of rice received by the programme's target households.

#### **Box 6: The Corruption Eradication Commission requests redesign of the Raskin programme**

The Corruption Eradication Commission proposed that the Raskin programme be redesigned to make it more effective and suggested the following changes in the system:

- First, the Raskin programme needs a full review that takes into account the various issues that could make the programme more effective. These issues include: improving programme management; making targeting more accurate; improving the quality of the rice, harmonising the Raskin subsidy policy with the food diversity programme and the national rice policy; and increasing understanding of the programme among all parties involved.
- Second, the government needs to tighten up its policies and make the subsidy calculation method more transparent and accountable. This requires, at the least, close attention to the regulatory elements of the programme to reduce the risk of fees that are beyond Raskin's

standard distribution costs being added to the rice price.

- Third, the government should strengthen the programme's supervision and control systems.

The Corruption Eradication Commission has focused closely on the management of the Raskin subsidy scheme, particularly because of its nationwide scope and its relationship to "food security plus" (agriculture, fisheries and forestry, plus education and health). Furthermore, this subsidy increases year to year meaning that the state budget needs to be managed effectively and efficiently.

## OPTIMISING THE PUBLIC AWARENESS INITIATIVE

While information has been disseminated in various ways to raise awareness among the public and the beneficiaries about the Raskin programme, such efforts have not succeeded. A review of performance indicators for the Raskin programme shows that none of the predetermined targets have been achieved. Problems still occur with targeting, timeliness, quality, quantity and price of Raskin rice. Given the large gap between goals and achievements, greater public awareness about the programme is vital as, without commitment from all stakeholders, the programme will never be able to achieve its stated aims.

Some actions that could be taken to heighten public awareness and commitment are as follows:

- Involve local governments actively in public awareness activities.
- Integrate monitoring and supervision systems with the public awareness campaign at the local level so that everyone becomes involved in improving the programme.
- Expand outreach activities that require human resources by involving state agencies and non-governmental organisations more actively in disseminating information, particularly with regard to the rights and obligations of beneficiaries.
- Improve the current public awareness programme by developing a system that is more informative and appropriate to the needs of the public and to programme beneficiaries.





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
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## ANNEXES

## Annex 1: Organisational structure for programme implementation



Source: Raskin Programme Guidelines, 2006

Annex 2: The beneficiaries list, June-December 2012, Pulau Tidung Village, Thousand Islands (South)

NO	Nama Kepala Rumah Tangga (KRT)	Nama Pasangan KRT	Nama Anggota RT Lain	Alamat
1	KRUMADZON	CAHYATI	RODI KURNIAWAN	PULAU PAYUNG RT 006 RW 04
2	ABDULHAK	HENDON	NURHALIM	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 04 NO 47
3	ABD RAHMAN	MARSIYAH	TRISAWATI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 02
4	ABDULHAK	TASYATI	SUPANDI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03
5	ABD SAMAD	KUSUMAH	SUPA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 03
6	ABD SAMIT	ISKANDIYAH	PUSPA SARI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 04 NO 15
7	ABDUL HAKIL	NUR LILAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 01 NO 14
8	ABDUL HAKIM	ASMAHA	HENI YATIANI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 01 NO 03 RW 01 RT 006
9	ABDUL KADIR	HALIMAH	ASEP JURMEDI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 005 RW 03 NO 30
10	ABDUL KADIR	MARIEKHAH	JAMRUD	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 01
11	ABDUL MURAD	ASNAWATI	SUWANDI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 04 NO 35
12	ABDULLAH	NINGSIH		PULAU PAYUNG RT 006 RW 04
13	ABDURAHMAN	MURSIYAH	BURHA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03 NO 39
14	ABDURAHMAN	MARIS	ABDULLAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 02 NO 20
15	ABDIN	LIBIYAH	APRIYANTO	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 01
16	ABD RAHMAN	SARINA	NETI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03 NO 16
17	AGUS	TRI KURNIAWATI	ASMA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 04
18	AGUS AFENDI	SUBARNI	SUPRIYADI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 04 NO 10
19	AGUS SAMI		STI MARSAROH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03 NO 25
20	AHMAD	WAY SUTRAY	SAMI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 03 NO 01
21	AHMAD BUBRO	SUBAHH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 03 NO 27
22	AHMAD FALDI	DESI SUSILAWATI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 04
23	AHMAD FALDI	ASMAHYAH	AFRIANI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 52
24	AHMADION	MAHARJO	SAHRUDI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 005 RW 03 NO 19
25	ALJANNAR	TASBIYATI	SANTANI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 04
26	ALPINI	MARSIYAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03 NO 24
27	AMANAH		BURSAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 02 NO 06
28	ANIS WUJAYA	SARAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03
29	ANIS	MARSIYAH	KIKI JATIWIJAYA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
30	ARISAD	MARSIH	MAHJUB	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
31	ARISOM	HERIYAH	SARJUNI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03 NO 34
32	ASELI	FABBA	NURMANSTYA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 01 NO 30
33	ASIAH			PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
34	ASRIH SURON		ERINA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 03
35	ASRIH	FAUZIYAH	MARSIYAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 03
36	AS AMIYAH		ARIYANTO	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 14
37	ASWAD	SACCAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 01
38	ASWAR	ELIUS SODAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03
39	ASWARIAN	SARAH	MARNI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 03 NO 06
40	ASWIN	MULIYATI	MARTINI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 3
41	ASWINDAH	RIKA TANIA		PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 03 NO 55
42	ASWIRI	SALPIAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 03 NO 25
43	ASWIRA	SOPAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 005 RW 03 NO 24
44	ASWIK MAMUDRI	RIKIANI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 04
45	ATMUAL	MULIYATI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 04 NO 17
46	AYAHAN	BADRIYAH	STEFANIA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 03
47	AYOB SUPARDI	SULISTIO HUCAFANAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 04
48	AYUBA			PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
49	BAHAR	ELIYATI	SUPANJO	PULAU TIDUNG RT 005 RW 03 NO 23
50	BAHAR	MURDAH	ABDUL AGUS	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 01 NO 11
51	BADIAN		ASULANA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 03 NO 42
52	BUKHARI	ROJAT	JUNALYATI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03 NO 9
53	BURHANUDIN	TRISAWATI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03
54	CAHYONO	HAMIDA		PULAU TIDUNG RT 005 RW 02
55	CECEP PRADI		MARANI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 04 NO 02
56	DARSA	ARISNA	HASAN	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 04 NO 33
57	DARSIT	HAYATI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 04 NO 14
58	DEDI	RASDA	SANUSI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 02 RW 02 RT 002
59	DOAN	NURDANI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 04
60	DOA SERYADI	KUMIYATI		PULAU PAYUNG RT 005 RW 04
61	EKO FARMULU		MOHAMAD ZEN NAWWI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 09
62	ENKANG MULYATI		SUHENDAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03
63	FARBI	STIANA		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03 NO 2
64	FERRI BUJAN	SURYATI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 03
65	FIRMAN SUDRAJAT	PADALIAH	DEFI LESTARI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 04
66	FALIAH			PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 04 NO 08
67	FAMIZAH	HALIMAH	FEBRI FIRMANSYAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 01 NO 32
68	FANAFI	ASMAHA	STI MAHWA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
69	FANAN	MURAYA	SURAYA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 01 NO 13
70	FANSAH		MUHAMMAD HADAYAT	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 01 NO 19
71	FANUSI	ROKATON		PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 34
72	CAHYATI			PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 01
73	FASAN	SARYATI	SRI ANCORANI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 02
74	FASAN	HASANAH	AFENDI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 03
75	FASAN BASRI	HERYANI	RIKA TRIAWATI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 02
76	FASALAH		RASWATI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 04 NO 14
77	HASYBI MA MON	SACDIYAH	PRATIWI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 01 NO 04
78	FIRMAN HIDAYAT	SUBERPAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 01
79	FUSUN	SAENA		PULAU TIDUNG RT 005 RT 02 NO 1 RW 02 RT 005
80	IBRAHIM	WINDRI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 01 NO 2
81	IBRAHIM	HAYASARI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
82	IBRAHIM HUSBI	ELZA KURNIAWATI	MURTASAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 03 NO 4
83	ILYAS	JURMEDI	SOLIHON	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 04 NO 22
84	ILYAS	MEKA	MARIQ	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
85	IBRAHIM	YUSWIN	ALMUDON	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 52
86	JADAH	SUMARDI		PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 02 RW 02 RT 002
87	JANI	USNAYAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 02
88	JAMALUDIN	USNAYAH		PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 02
89	JANI		SAWINI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 04 NO 13
90	JAMRIH	RIYKA SARI	ROSAHSANITO	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 01 NO 26
91	JULIAN	MELDA		PULAU TIDUNG RT 003 RW 04 NO 2
92	JUNGAL	UMSANAH	AMRIYATI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 004 RW 03
93	JOKO SUPARTO	MULYA DEWI	STEFANILLA	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 02
94	JULIANI		RUTHIRAWAN	PULAU TIDUNG RT 002 RW 02
95	JULIANI	SUPRIANTI	JUBRO	PULAU TIDUNG RT 005 RW 01 NO 01
96	JUMA MUSTAM			PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 24
97	JUMASAN	BAHAR	ROHAYAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03 NO 28
98	JUMANA HEVA		TAMMAH	PULAU TIDUNG RT 006 RW 03
99	JUNARDI	ARNAWATI	JANI	PULAU TIDUNG RT 001 RW 01 NO 04
100	JUNARDI	RUPIN		PULAU PAYUNG RT 005 RW 04

Daftar nama ini berdasarkan Base Data Terpadu untuk Program Perlindungan Sosial hasil pendataan PPLS 2011

Source: TNP2K (2012)

### Annex 3: Sample Replacement Summary Form (FRP)



**Formulir Rekapitulasi Pengganti (FRP)**  
**Rumah Tangga Sasaran Penerima Manfaat (RTS-PM)**  
**Program Raskin Juni-Desember 2012**



Provinsi : \_\_\_\_\_ Kecamatan : \_\_\_\_\_  
 Kab/Kota : \_\_\_\_\_ Kelurahan/Desa : \_\_\_\_\_

PENGGANTIAN/PERUBAHAN RTS-PM DALAM DAFTAR PENERIMA RASKIN DILAKUKAN MELALUI MUSYAWARAH DESA/KELURAHAN DAN TIDAK DIPERKENANKAN MENGUBAH JUMLAH PENERIMA RASKIN DI DESA/KELURAHAN.

**USULAN RTS-PM YANG DIKELUARKAN DARI DAFTAR PENERIMA MANFAAT (DPM)**

No. <i>(sesuai nomor dalam Poster DPM)</i>	Nama Kepala Rumah Tangga (KRT) <i>(nama lengkap sesuai di dalam Poster DPM)</i>	Nama Pasangan Rumah Tangga (PKRT) <i>(nama lengkap sesuai di dalam Poster DPM)</i>	Alamat Lengkap	Alasan Dikeluarkan <i>(beri tanda "v" di salah satu kotak)</i>			
				RT Pindah	Seluruh anggota RT sudah meninggal	RT tercatat lebih dari 1 kali (duplikasi RT)	RT Kaya
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
				<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

\*Formulir ini dapat diperbanyak

**CATATAN:**

USULAN RTS-PM YANG DIMASUKKAN KE DALAM DPM HANYA UNTUK MENGGANTIKAN RTS-PM YANG DIKELUARKAN DARI DPM DAN JUMLAHNYA HARUS SAMA DENGAN RTS-PM YANG DIKELUARKAN (PADA HALAMAN 1)

**USULAN RTS-PM YANG DIMASUKKAN KE DALAM DAFTAR PENERIMA MANFAAT (DPM)**

No.	Kepala Rumah Tangga (KRT)		Pasangan Kepala Rumah Tangga (PKRT)		Alamat Lengkap
	Nama	Bulan / Tahun Lahir	Nama	Bulan / Tahun Lahir	

.....2012  
Kepala Desa/Lurah

( ..... )

\*Formulir ini dapat diperbanyak

Source: TNP2K (2012)

## Annex 4: Illustration of Raskin Socialisation and Informational material , 2012



Lembar Informasi dan Sosialisasi  
**PROGRAM RASKIN**  
 Juni-Desember 2012

#### Apa itu Program Raskin?

- Program Raskin adalah salah satu program penanggulangan kemiskinan dan perlindungan sosial yang diselenggarakan oleh Pemerintah Pusat berupa bantuan beras bersubsidi kepada rumah tangga berpendapatan rendah (rumah tangga miskin dan rentan miskin).
- Program Raskin adalah program nasional lintas sektoral baik vertikal (Pemerintah Pusat sampai dengan Pemerintah Daerah) maupun horizontal (lintas Kementerian/Lembaga), sehingga semua pihak yang terkait bertanggung jawab sesuai dengan tugas pokok dan fungsi masing-masing untuk kelancaran pelaksanaan dan pencapaian tujuan Program Raskin.

#### Apa tujuan Program Raskin?

Program Raskin bertujuan untuk mengurangi sebagian beban pengeluaran rumah tangga sasaran dalam memenuhi kebutuhan pangan pokok dalam bentuk beras.

#### Siapa yang berhak menerima beras Raskin?

- Rumah tangga yang dapat menerima beras Raskin, atau juga disebut Rumah Tangga Sasaran Penerima Manfaat (RTS-PM) Program Raskin adalah rumah tangga yang terdapat dalam Daftar Nama dan Alamat RTS-PM Program Raskin Juni – Desember 2012 yang diterbitkan oleh Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Kesejahteraan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (Kemkeno Kesra) dengan surat nomor B-1128/KMK/DEP.II/V/2012 tanggal 22 Mei 2012.
- Tahun 2012, Program Raskin menyediakan beras bersubsidi kepada 17.488.007 RTS-PM dengan kondisi sosial ekonomi terendah di Indonesia (kelompok miskin dan rentan miskin).

#### Bagaimana daftar Rumah Tangga Sasaran Penerima Manfaat (RTS-PM) Program Raskin ditetapkan?

- Penetapan RTS-PM Program Raskin 2012 mengacu pada hasil Pendataan Program Perlindungan Sosial tahun 2011 (PPLS 2011) yang dilaksanakan oleh Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS).
- Hasil PPLS 2011, yang meliputi data dari sekitar 25 juta rumah tangga, diserahkan dari BPS kepada Tim Nasional Percepatan Penanggulangan Kemiskinan (TNP2K) dan diolah menjadi Basis Data Terpadu untuk penetapan sasaran program-program perlindungan sosial.
- Semua rumah tangga yang masuk dalam Basis Data Terpadu diperingkat berdasarkan status kesejahteraannya dengan menggunakan metode indeks kesejahteraan yang obyektif dan spesifik untuk setiap kabupaten/kota.
- Sesuai dengan pagu nasional Raskin, TNP2K mengidentifikasi sekitar 17,5 juta rumah tangga yang paling rendah tingkat kesejahteraannya dari Basis Data Terpadu. Dengan demikian mereka yang didata pada PPLS 2011 tidak serta merta menjadi RTS-PM.

- Pagu Raskin per provinsi, kabupaten/kota, kecamatan, dan desa/kelurahan mengacu pada sebaran jumlah RTS-PM yang termasuk dalam 17,5 juta rumah tangga yang paling rendah tingkat kesejahteraannya dari Basis Data Terpadu sebagaimana dijelaskan di atas.
- TNP2K menyerahkan data pagu daerah beserta nama dan alamat RTS-PM Raskin Juni-Desember 2012 kepada Tim Koordinasi Raskin Pusat.
- Deputi Menko Kesra Bidang Koordinasi Perlindungan Sosial dan Perumahan Rakyat selaku Ketua Pelaksana Tim Koordinasi Raskin Pusat menetapkan pagu Raskin provinsi dan jumlah RTS kabupaten/kota berdasarkan data dari TNP2K dengan surat Deputi Menko Kesra Bidang Koordinasi Perlindungan Sosial dan Perumahan Rakyat nomor B-910/KMK/DEP.II/IV/2012.

#### **Mengapa pagu Raskin Juni-Desember 2012 di beberapa daerah berbeda dengan pagu sebelumnya?**

- Pagu Raskin Juni-Desember 2012 di beberapa daerah yang telah ditetapkan dapat berbeda (lebih kecil atau lebih besar) dengan pagu sebelumnya karena pagu Raskin Juni-Desember 2012 didasarkan pada hasil PPLS 2011 yang merupakan pemutakhiran dari hasil PPLS 2008 yang menjadi dasar penentuan pagu sebelumnya.
- Pagu Raskin Juni-Desember 2012 menunjukkan perubahan kondisi karakteristik rumah-tangga yang berbeda dari data PPLS 2008 dan PPLS 2011.
- Faktor lain yang juga dapat menyebabkan perbedaan pagu antara lain pemekaran wilayah, perubahan tingkat kemiskinan, dinamika perekonomian daerah, atau perubahan jumlah penduduk (misal: migrasi, lahir, mati).

#### **Apakah memungkinkan mengganti RTS-PM yang sudah terdaftar dalam Daftar Penerima Manfaat/DPM?**

- Mungkin, apabila RTS-PM yang terdapat dalam Daftar Nama dan Alamat RTS Program Raskin Juni – Desember 2012 (atau selanjutnya disebut Daftar Penerima Manfaat/DPM):
  - a) Pindah alamat ke luar desa/kelurahan,
  - b) Meninggal (seluruh anggota rumah tangga sudah meninggal),
  - c) Tercatat lebih dari satu kali (duplikasi rumah tangga), atau
  - d) Kaya.
- Penentuan dan penetapan RTS-PM pengganti tersebut dilakukan melalui musyawarah desa/kelurahan.
- Perubahan/penggantian yang diputuskan musyawarah desa/kelurahan tersebut tidak diperkenankan mengubah jumlah RTS-PM di desa/kelurahan tersebut.
- Rumah tangga pengganti RTS-PM diprioritaskan bagi rumah tangga yang memiliki jumlah anggota rumah tangga lebih besar (terdiri dari balita dan anak usia sekolah, dan/atau kepala rumah tangganya orang lanjut usia), kepala rumah tangganya perempuan, kondisi fisik rumahnya kurang layak huni, dan/atau berpenghasilan lebih rendah dan tidak tetap.
- Mengenai perubahan tersebut, Kepala Desa/Lurah mencatat data RTS-PM yang pindah, meninggal (seluruh anggota RTS-PM meninggal), tercatat lebih dari satu kali (duplikasi RTS-PM), atau RTS-PM kaya dan mencatat rumah tangga penggantinya dalam Formulir Rekap Pengganti (FRP). Kepala Desa/Lurah menyampaikan FRP yang sudah diisi kepada Camat (melalui Tim Koordinasi Raskin tingkat kecamatan) selaku penanggung jawab pelaksanaan Program Raskin di wilayahnya. FRP yang telah diisi disampaikan selambat-lambatnya akhir Agustus 2012. Petugas PT. Pos Indonesia akan mengambil FRP yang telah terkumpul di kecamatan dan mengirimkannya kepada Kemendagri sebagai Unit Pengaduan Masyarakat dalam Tim Koordinasi Raskin Pusat.

**Berapa jumlah beras Raskin yang dapat diperoleh RTS-PM?**

RTS-PM Raskin berhak untuk menerima beras Raskin sebanyak 15 kg per RTS-PM per bulan selama bulan Juni-Desember 2012.

**Berapa harga tebus beras Raskin?**

Harga tebus beras Raskin adalah Rp 1.600 per kg di Titik Distribusi (TD).

**Bagaimana RTS-PM dapat menebus dan mengambil beras Raskin?**

- Beras Raskin disalurkan oleh Perum BULOG ke Titik Distribusi (TD) yaitu lokasi yang ditentukan dan disepakati oleh Perum BULOG dan Pemerintah Kabupaten/Kota.
- Pemerintah kabupaten/kota bertanggung jawab mendistribusikan Raskin dari TD ke Titik Bagi (TB) yaitu lokasi tempat penyerahan beras Raskin kepada para RTS-PM, untuk selanjutnya dibagikan kepada RTS-PM Raskin.

**Bagaimana memastikan RTS-PM mendapatkan haknya sebanyak 15 kg beras Raskin per bulan?**

- Tim Koordinasi Raskin Pusat telah mencetak daftar nama dan alamat RTS-PM dan mengirimkan ke setiap desa/kelurahan untuk ditempelkan di kantor desa/kelurahan. Dengan cara ini, RTS-PM dan masyarakat umum dapat mengetahui rumah tangga mana saja di desa/kelurahan tersebut yang berhak menerima beras Raskin.
- Tim Koordinasi Raskin Pusat juga telah mencetak poster berisi informasi tentang Program Raskin untuk ditempelkan di kantor desa/kelurahan supaya informasi Program Raskin dapat diketahui oleh masyarakat umum.
- Pada waktu penyerahan Raskin kepada RTS-PM, dibuatkan tanda terima beras Raskin oleh Pelaksana Distribusi Raskin.

**Kemana masyarakat dapat bertanya untuk memperoleh informasi tentang Program Raskin?**

Pertanyaan mengenai Program Raskin dan pelaksanaannya dapat disampaikan kepada Sekretariat Unit Pengaduan Masyarakat (UPM) Program Raskin yang berada di bawah koordinasi Badan/Kantor Pemberdayaan Masyarakat di tingkat kabupaten/kota maupun di tingkat provinsi (sesuai Pedoman Umum Penyaluran Raskin 2012).

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ISBN 9786022751458



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