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Working Paper 14 - 002

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400874

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FEBRUARY 2014

ABSTRACT

This note contains a preliminary analysis of patterns regarding (separately) political dynasties, vote buying and the correlates of certain Senators' votes, drawing on data from the 2013 midterm election in the Philippines. The analysis questions the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the political process. The evidence underscores the continued dominance of political dynasties, the prevalence of vote buying, and the powerful influence of name recall. Political dynasties, in the aggregate, appear to be on an upward trend since the election in 2004. Most of this seems due to a large number of dynastic candidates fielded by the most established (and therefore better financed) political parties. On vote-buying, a survey of 360 respondents from approximately the 4th and 5th income quintile living in Metro Manila showed vote-buying incidence of about 20% when a direct question was used—doubling to about 40% when an indirect question was used. Around 80% said they voted for the candidate because they like him/her or for his/her qualifications. This would suggest that vote buying could be used to encourage turnout notably in areas where would-be voters are already inclined to support the candidate. Finally, an empirical analysis of the share of voters cast at the provincial level for Bam Aquino and Nancy Binay suggests that each of these candidates benefited from strong support garnered by their relatives, President Aquino and Vice President Binay. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of votes for President Aquino (Vice President Binay) at the provincial level, translated into a 0.29 (0.19) percentage point increase in the votes for Bam Aquino (Nancy Binay).

JEL Codes: D70; I39; O53; P16

Keywords: democracy; political dynasty; vote buying; name recall

* Preliminary working draft. The authors thank two political experts who shared their insights on political dynasties and vote buying; and who will remain anonymous on their request. Questions and comments should be directed to ronmendoza@post.harvard.edu.

Introduction

According to analysts, the 2013 Philippine mid-term elections provide important insights into the complexion and probable outcomes of the 2016 national elections. Key candidates forming part of the administration coalition ran for office in May (e.g. Risa Hontiveros and Bam Aquino), along with certain opposition candidates that some view act as proxies for potential presidential aspirants (e.g. Nancy Binay as a proxy for her father, incumbent Vice President Jejomar Binay). The 2013 election was also distinct because of the presence of a strong information and advocacy campaign against political dynasties. It was marked by efforts of various advocacy groups (e.g. Anti-Political Dynasty Movement, ANDAYAMO; and Movement Against Dynasties, MAD) to try and emphasize the potentially unconstitutional nature of dynasties, as well as their links to poverty and more traditional patron-client politics, seen inimical to inclusive growth and development. In addition, the election was also characterized by many reports of vote buying. There were even claims that it had become much worse despite the computerization of elections in the Philippines since 2010 (which was partly done to mitigate election wrongdoing and anomalies, including vote buying).

This is an initial note that empirically analyzes data from that election, in order to highlight discernible patterns regarding (separately) political dynasties, vote buying and the correlates of certain Senators' votes. An analysis of these three key areas constructs the framework for political reforms that can be implemented in the last three years of the Aquino administration. Additionally, the results also prove helpful in discerning the forces that are expected to determine the outcome of the 2016 national elections. The empirical evidence herein can be used to immediately assess the extent to which a more effective campaign to build a more inclusive democratic process and system are achievable, by developing key metrics and empirical analyses on issues that underpin the political reform process.

Comprised of three main sections, this note will tackle the following main issues and questions:

1. Political Dynasties: Have political dynasties expanded or declined? If so, in which Philippine regions? The paper will re-visit and update the metrics for political dynasties established in an earlier study by Mendoza et al (2012), in order to examine whether and to what extent political dynasties may have expanded (or contracted) in the recent elections. The goal here is to also extend the Political Dynasties Dataset of the AIM

Policy Center to help monitor this phenomenon across Philippine provinces (as well as their links to the key political parties).

- 2. Vote Buying: Has vote buying become much more rampant? This paper will examine vote buying using a specially designed survey focused on 360 respondents in 17 Metro Manila cities. The goal is to try and assess the extent of vote buying in its various forms. A specific question in this section also relates to the links between vote buying and vulnerability: Are communities with better access to government services more, or less likely, to engage in vote buying?
- 3. Senate Correlates: Analysts contend that some candidates for the Senate ran as veritable proxies for already well-recognized politicians in the country. These include Bam Aquino (cousin of President Benigno Aquino III) and Nancy Binay (daughter of Vice President Jejomar Binay). Did the votes for these Senators closely track those of their namesakes? In a separate sub-section, we will also analyze the extent to which Risa Hontiveros fared during the 2013 elections, notably analyzing correlates and how she did in provinces with stronger concentrations of Catholics. It was suspected that her Senatorial campaign was adversely affected by her stance on the reproductive health (RH) law, an issue the Catholic Church is strongly against.

I. Political Dynasties

Political dynasties refer to members of the same family occupying elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or simultaneously across different positions. Political dynasties are common in countries with very young democratic political systems and high levels of poverty and inequality. In the Philippines, it has been observed that political dynasties are particularly prevalent in poorer regions, suggesting that either poverty brings about political dynasties, or political dynasties fail to reduce, or even exacerbate, poverty.

In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of how political dynasties appear to be proliferating in the Philippines, and motivations for countering them vary. Some argue that political dynasties run counter to the Philippine Constitution, which contains a clause against dynasties in elected office, but lacks an enabling law to give it teeth. Still others warn against the monopolization of political power, with pernicious side effects ranging from promoting patronage-based and traditional politics, consolidating the monopoly of power over politics and the economy among a few families, to crowding out other potential leaders of less well-known pedigree but of equal if not greater capabilities.

In an earlier study the AIM Policy Center published in the *Philippine Political Science Journal*, an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the Philippine Congress revealed that the 15th Congress was heavily dominated by political dynasties (the latter accounted for about 70% of all Congressmen), and on average, there were many more dynastic Congressmen in Philippine regions with higher poverty, lower human development, and more severe deprivation. Dynasties tend to be richer (higher average net worth according to submitted Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth, SALNs) than non-dynasties, upon exclusion of Representative Emmanuel Pacquiao of Sarangani, the boxer turned congressman who dramatically increased the average net worth of non-dynastic representatives. Rep. Pacquiao has since successfully created his own dynasty. After the 2013 National Elections and the 2013 Barangay Elections, Rep. Pacquiao now has five relatives in power with positions ranging from Barangay Chairman to provincial vice-governor.

In a follow up study, the AIM Policy Center examined the direction of causality between poverty and political dynasties, turning to a provincial-level dataset, and using an instrumental variable technique to deal with endogeneity issues. The empirical evidence suggested stronger evidence that poverty entrenches political dynasties, and less on the reverse argument. Given the relatively weak poverty reduction performance of the Philippine economy in recent years, and coupled with the strong anti-dynasty campaign by different groups during the 2013 mid-term election, the question was whether political dynasties have remained resilient or have started to decline across Philippine provinces.

Our mapping of the mid-term election results paints a mixed picture. We updated the same indicators used in Mendoza et al (2012), covering three main indicators for dynastic prevalence:

DYNSHA: An elected official is flagged as dynastic if he or she (1) has a relative(s) that won in any of the three preceding elections (e.g. 2004, 2007, 2010)or (2) has a relative(s) that won in the current elections (e.g. 2013).¹ DYNSHA is the ratio of dynastic elected officials over the number of elective

¹ We turn to the same methodology in calculating dynasties that was developed by Mendoza et al (2013). The goal is to be able to track the changes of these indicators over time.

posts under consideration. The actual number of dynasties encumbering the top local government positions are more precisely measured, and covering the following positions: governor, vice-governor, mayor, vice-mayor, district based representatives, councilors, and provincial board members. DYNSHA is thus a measure of the share of dynasties in all these positions for each province.

- DYNLAR: In order to account for the potentially large size of particular clans or the presence of "fat" dynasties—DYNLAR indicates the number of positions encumbered by the largest political dynasty in each province. DYNLAR helps to capture the possible effect of more concentrated political power even among political dynasties.
- DYNHERF: Another way to capture the presence of "fat" dynasties is to draw on the industrial regulation literature and use a variant of the Hirschman-Herfindahl index applied to political dynasties at the provincial level. Essentially, DYNHERF is the sum of squared shares of the total positions of each political clan, or "fat" dynasty, in each province.

Based on these three indicators, political dynasties (in the aggregate) did not appear to undergo any major change between 2010 and 2013 (Figures 1A, 1B and 1C). Almost half of the total positions studied are accounted for by dynastic politicians (or roughly about 42-44% of total positions in 2010 and 2013). For most of the local government positions, the share of political dynasties appear to have changed very little—with the exception of provincial vice governorships which became much more dynastic (and congress which became slightly less dynastic).

Is this a vindication of dynasties? Not necessarily.

Turning to a disaggregation of the results for the top 2 contending politicians for the governorship, vice governorship and congressional seats, we find evidence that the main competitive choices offered to voters involved a large number of uncontested dynasties (condition A), and dynasties contested by other dynasties (condition B) (Figure 2). In fact, if we examine just the dynastic Governors and Vice Governors who won in May 2013, about half of them ran uncontested or faced another dynastic opponent (Figure 3).







Figure 1(B): Largest Dynasty Metric Values For 2010 And 2013 (No NCR)



Figure 1(C): Dynasty Herfindahl Metric Values For 2010 And 2013 (No NCR)



Figure 2: Typology Breakdown of Top 2 Candidates for Governor, Vice Governor, and Representatives, 2013



Figure 3: Breakdown of Dynastic Winners, Governor, Vice Governor and Representative, 2013

Part of the issue here might have to do with the large number of dynastic candidates fielded by the most established (and in most cases also better financed) political parties. Figures 4 through 9 show, respectively, the candidates fielded by political parties for governor, vice governor, mayor, vice mayor, and representative according to dynastic and non-dynastic categories. For governor, political parties such as the Liberal Party of the administration and UNA of the opposition both fielded roughly 50% dynastic candidates. Further, three-quarters of the gubernatorial candidates of the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) were dynastic. These figures help highlight how political parties are dominated by dynasties, not just because they win in elections, but because they also continue to constitute large shares of candidates fielded in elections by the main political parties.

Analysts note that the political parties are, in effect, dominated by political dynasties to the extent that these dynasties bring in resources and also control over key political bastions they have occupied for protracted periods. In many cases, the "fat" dynasties (those with multiple family members occupying positions at the same time in certain provinces) also bring control and influence over large parts of the local government infrastructure as well as control over considerable public resources (specifically internal revenue allotments (IRA) and priority development assistance funds (PDAF) or more commonly known as the pork barrel). Upon examining the bigger picture, it is easy to see why political parties would choose to support political dynasties. The prominence and influence of a political party in public affairs is directly proportional to their number of elected members. Given that candidates from political dynasties are expected to have larger war chests and better-organized campaign machineries, and would thus have the best chances of winning, they are often the most sought after candidates by political parties.

Data emerging from certain provinces point to a decline in the "fatness" of dynastic clans such as the Ampatuans in Maguindanao, as well as the continued hold of dynastic clans such as the Singsons in Ilocos Sur (see Figures 10 and 11). Further, the decline of the Ampatuans in Maguindanao has created political space that appears to have been quickly occupied by other dynastic clans, such as the Midtimbangs and the Mangudadatus. This appears to confirm the analysis in the political science literature as well as our recent empirical study (Mendoza et al, 2013) pointing to the dominance of larger political clans competing for political positions that have opened up. It appears that few, if any, cases of new faces are able to successfully compete for these leadership positions that have become contestable. Despite the reduction in some (e.g. Ampatuans), many of the other top dynasties have maintained their grip on power (see Table 1).



Figure 4: Dynastic vs. Non-Dynastic Breakdown across Parties for Governor

Source: AIM Policy Center Political Dynasties Database.



Figure 5: Dynastic vs. Non-Dynastic Breakdown across Parties for Vice Governor

Source: AIM Policy Center Political Dynasties Database.



Figure 6: Dynastic vs. Non-Dynastic Breakdown across Parties for Mayors







Figure 8: Dynastic vs. Non-Dynastic Breakdown across Parties for Representatives

Source: AIM Policy Center Political Dynasties Database.



Figure 9(A): Distribution of Dynastic vs. Non-Dynastic Officials by Type of Elective Office (Provincial - No NCR)



Figure 9(B): Distribution of Dynastic vs. Non-Dynastic Officials by Type of Elective Office (Municipal - No NCR)

	2013		2010				
Rank	Family	Size	Rank	Family	Size		
1	Ampatuan	10	1	Ampatuan	16		
2	Ecleo	8	2	Ecleo	8		
3	Singson	7	2	Singson	8		
3	Tan	7	4	Midtimbang	7		
5	Dy	6	5	Tan (Western Samar)	6		
6	Bernos	5	6	Garcia	5		
6	Dimaporo	5	6	Dy	5		
6	Balindong	5	6	Ortega	5		
6	Lagbas	5	6	Dimaporo	5		
6	Tria	5	6	Mangudadatu	5		
11	Garcia	4	11	Bernos	4		
11	Espina	4	11	Plaza	4		
11	Pascual	4	11	Javier	4		
11	Farinas	4	11	Espina	4		
11	Salcedo, Tupas	4	11	Durano	4		
11	Ortega	4	11	Garin	4		
11	Parojinog	4	11	Mastura	4		
11	Celeste, Espino	4	11	Sangki	4		
11	San Juan	4	11	Sinsuat	4		
11	Escudero	4	11	Lagbas	4		
11	Pimentel	4	11	Tan	4		
11	Ahaja	4	11	Fua	4		
11	Uy	4	11	Loong	4		
			11	Pimentel	4		
			11	Jalosjos	4		

Table 1: Top 20 Families 2010 and 2013(By Number of Family Members Occupying Elected Positions)







Over-all the emerging evidence suggests that political dynasties still appear entrenched, notwithstanding the emergence of strong advocacies against dynastic clans. While efforts to curb the "demand" for dynasties (through strong advocacy and information campaigns targeted at voters) were initiated, little seems to have changed in terms of a stronger "supply" of alternative leaders. The present political parties have not yet been able to address the latter; and part of the challenge lies in the strong role that dynasties already play in the more established parties. This lends credence to the view that new political parties could play a key role in developing clear alternatives to the political dynasties and their traditional politics.

II. Vote Buying in Metro Manila

The Philippines has had two national elections using an automated system—the first in 2010 and another in 2013. The raison d'être behind automation include the effort to lessen the time necessary to arrive at election results, provide a secure platform for collecting information on all votes cast, and also to curb anomalous activities designed to tamper with elections such as vote buying. Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence from the 2013 elections suggests that vote buying still occurred. Prof. Randy David of the University of the Philippines synthesizes the observations of several Church leaders in an article:

- Pangasinan Bishop Mario Peralta: "Vote-buying was really widespread, practically in all the towns. This is a sad development... it has become worse."
- Sorsogon Bishop Arturo Bastes: "Money politics reigned in the May 13 voting. Personal interests and benefits decided the votes."
- Fr. Dave Porcalla, PPCRV coordinator in the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao, noted that cash given away per family of voters ranged from P5,000 to P20,000 in North Cotabato.
- Bishop Pablo David received through mail an envelope containing the campaign leaflet of a party-list nominee and a crisp P200 bill. "All the other priests at my parish got the same envelope through the mail."

Answering questions of whether and to what extent vote buying has become much more rampant requires careful analysis of its various forms and an understanding of the various motivations and contexts, although resource persons opine that vote buying is generally worse when elections are closely contested. In the literature, vote buying has been used as a tool to increase voter turnout. Evidence based on a study in Sao Tome and Principe suggests that vote buying could be part of a strategy to undercut the incumbency advantage (Vicente, 2013). Middlemen also play a key role, by acting as agents of politicians in acquiring votes. In a study in Paraguay, middlemen are shown to target individuals more likely to reciprocate support and favors provided by a politician. These middlemen also gather information on where support for his/her politician may be much higher, and use vote buying techniques to increase voter turnout in these areas (Finan and Schechter, 2011).

It is also not uncommon for middlemen to target particularly poor communities given their need for support (Brusco et al, 2004). Moreover, Schaffer's (2002) study on vote buying in the Philippines distinguishes the different social contexts of offering money for votes. Money could be provided in order to generate votes out of:

- Instrumental compliance—recipient changes (or does not change) votes to secure tangible rewards (money could be used to pre-empt any possible change in votes too);
- Normative compliance—recipient changes votes because the offer convinces them of the "goodness" or worthiness of the candidate;
- Coercive compliance—recipient changes votes so as to prevent reprisal and because of de facto bullying of those making the money offer (fear of refusal).

Furthermore, it is possible that vote buying could take a wide variety of forms, as long as some form of "exchange" is made for votes cast in favor of a certain candidate (or a group of candidates). For instance, it is possible for votes to be acquired in exchange for cash, food, jobs (or at least the promise of such), better public goods provision, continued patronage support by a patron (notably during crises and difficult times), and government positions. Observers, however, disagree on the effectiveness of these methods, with some arguing that only vote buying using money is effective. One reason for this, some analysts and political operators say, is that vote buying using goods and favors has become so ingrained in society that voters look at the distribution of such products, such as rice and groceries, as a moral obligation of the candidates.

The list of methods and techniques of vote buying go on. Nevertheless, based on interviews of politicians and political operatives, we identified several main strategies for vote buying in the Philippine context. Vote buying can be implemented using "wholesale" techniques (i.e. acquiring votes from entire groups such as families or entire barangays, and possibly arranging for votes to be cast on entire groups of candidates) or "retail" arrangements (i.e. acquiring votes by dealing directly with individual voters). Still, others extend help and favors to big and influential families in the community as these are rich sources of votes. More complicated methods include giving money to government offices for them to reshuffle their personnel before the election and bribing survey firms to manipulate survey methodologies in order to elicit desired outcomes. Anecdotally, making the list of voters public allowed candidates to target and strategically identify potential vote sellers, instead of its original purpose of increasing transparency.

It is also possible to pay voters not to vote, such as arrangements typically done the night (or some days) before the elections whereby agents of a candidate are sent to his/her opponent's political bastions. These agents pay voters not to vote—an arrangement that is ensured by marking their fingers with indelible ink (i.e. a practice used by COMELEC to mark voters who already cast their ballot). A different version of this method is paying voters to vote for a "nuisance" candidate, but this arrangement is slightly more difficult to enforce. We also learned from these interviews that vote buying is a long and complicated process that starts before the actual election period begins. A person planning to run would usually start with small donations and support for community events to gain recognition. This will eventually evolve into monetary vote buying as elections near.

As a practical first step towards measurement, the AIM Policy Center commissioned a survey that focused on groups that are, according to anecdotal and other reports, particularly prone to vote selling practices: poor communities in highly urbanized Metro Manila. The survey covered 360 respondents randomly selected using multi-stage area probability sampling from income classes D and E families (i.e. 4th and 5th income quintile approximately) living in 17

cities in Metro Manila. The survey used established techniques to capture vote buying using direct and indirect questioning methodologies.²

The results of the survey suggest interesting differences in survey responses using direct and indirect methods, and referring to cash vs. "in-kind" exchanges. Roughly about 19% of respondents noted the presence of vote buying when a direct question was addressed to them; rising to 39% when using an indirect method. Based on the results, respondents seemed much more comfortable to acknowledge vote buying when an "in-kind" exchange is made.

Roughly about 9-16% of respondents reported food, rice and groceries offered in exchange for votes. And around 10-16% noted help or favors extended in exchange for votes. In both cases, the gap in responses between direct and indirect methods appears smaller, as compared to the use of cash in exchange for votes (Table 2).

Only about 2% of respondents reported vote buying using cash when asked using the direct method; nevertheless, around 23% reported vote buying using cash when indirect questions were used.³

	Direct	Indirect
Cash	1.67%	22.78%
Food, Rice, Groceries	8.89%	15.56%
Other Material Things	6.11%	6.11%
Any help or favor	10.01%	15.56%

Table 2: Share of Survey Responses Noting the Presence of Vote Buying, by Type ofMethod (Note: Respondents are allowed More Than One Response)

Source: AIM Policy Center Vote Buying Database.

²A. There are two screener questions for the direct questionnaire:

[•] In the 2013 elections, were you or any member of your immediate family approached by a candidate, a representative of a candidate, or just anyone to campaign or to persuade you in any way to vote for a candidate?

[•] Are you a registered voter in [mention name of city]?

[•] Vote buying question: Is there anything offered to you or to your immediate family in exchange for your vote or the vote of your immediate family?

B. For the indirect, the questions are:

[•] Screener. In the 2013 elections, do you know anyone in [mention name of city], aside from you or your immediate family, who was approached by a candidate, a representative of a candidate, or just anyone to campaign or to persuade him/her in any way to vote for a candidate?

[•] Vote buying question: Is there anything offered to any of these persons you know in exchange for his/her vote?

³ There is only a minor difference in the reported amount of cash offered between direct and indirect methods. Respondents in the former group reported an average PhP400.00 cash offer, while for the latter, PhP471.88.

Most of the respondents noted that offers were accepted (86% for indirect questioning and 88% for direct questioning). Of this, 50% to 69% noted that the recipient voted for the candidate who made the offer. The latter implies a surprisingly high compliance rate for the implicit contract involving the vote buyer and seller⁴. A notable result is that only about 22% of those who complied, reported voting for the candidate because of the money, food or favor offered. In contrast, around 80% said they voted for the candidate because they like him/her or for his/her qualifications (multiple responses are allowed here). It is possible that these voters already were pre-disposed toward the candidate to begin with. This result coheres with evidence in the literature that vote buying is used by political operatives to encourage stronger turnout notably in areas where would-be voters are already inclined to support the candidate.

The differences in responses elicited from the two methods used (direct and indirect) suggest that people are still generally not comfortable admitting to selling their votes (or even receiving offers in exchange for their votes). The figures also suggest that vote buying has become a major challenge for advocates of clean election processes. Computerization of the election has not stopped vote buying, and may have even funneled this activity into a few methods for acquiring votes (thus giving the impression that it is even more prevalent now when compared to the past).

Survey results likewise suggest that there could be "targeting" of voters that certain candidates attempt to buy votes from. This is very similar to findings in the empirical literature focused on other developing democracies. By comparing the average socio-demographic characteristics of those who reported being offered something to those who did not, we found that there are statistically significant differences between the two groups. Those who received an offer have fewer tangible assets, suggesting that among the poor, those who have even less are targeted more. Income, on the contrary, has no significant difference, strengthening the hypothesis that there can be targeting (i.e. vote buyers can look at the appearance of the house but not be able to determine the family's income). As an example, there is a higher proportion of 4Ps recipients among the respondents that received an offer than respondents that did not.

⁴ The 69% compliance refers to respondents of the direct questions. The 50% refers to the respondents of indirect questions, although a "Did Not Know" option is included here.

	Received an Offer	Did Not Receive an Offer	Difference
Income	PhP9,453.93	PhP9,331.07	-122.86
Age	47.7	46.8	-0.84
Assets	3.88	4.94	1.06**

Table 3: Comparing the mean characteristics of those who were solicited to sell their vote vs. those who were not (Mean characteristics using t-test)

*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%

Note: Computations for this table only include the direct question respondents.

Table 4: Comparing the mean proportion of those who were solicited to sell their vote vs. those who were not (Mean proportions using z-test)

	· I I	0 ,	
	Received an	Did Not Receive an	Difference
	Offer	Offer	
Male = 1	0.35	0.21	-0.14*
4ps Recipient	0.29	0.16	-0.13*
Experienced Calamity in the Last	0.82	0.53	-0.29**
Year			
Has an Immediate Source of Credit	0.65	0.54	-0.11
Employed	0.50	0.49	-0.01
Owns House	0.82	0.71	-0.11
Raised in Metro Manila	0.35	0.52	0.17*
Believes Candidate Knows Who	0.24	0.19	-0.04
They Voted			

*Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%

Note: Computations for this table only include the direct question respondents.

Moreover, there is a significantly higher proportion of females in the group that received an offer compared to the group that did not. Likewise, those who experienced a calamity in the past year and migrants to Metro Manila (those who were raised outside the NCR) are more likely to be offered something in exchange for their vote. Those who experienced a calamity possibly have more needs and may be considered easy targets by vote-buying politicians. These results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.

While this survey gives us insights on vote buying and its possible correlates in Metro Manila, it is entirely possible to observe different trends in other areas of the Philippines. Differences in culture, transparency, strength of law enforcement, and concentration of political power are some of the factors that may affect not only the incidence of vote buying but also the likelihood that it will be reported. Thus, what were reported here should be taken as insights rather than statistical evidence of how vote buying works. Conducting similar studies in other areas is needed to better understand vote buying in the country and is a recommendation for future studies.

For instance, a similar survey conducted in the province of Isabela shows both differing and similar findings⁵. Thirty two percent of more than 800 respondents reported vote buying in cash when asked directly. This is a far cry from the less than two percent reporters of vote buying in Metro Manila. The figure trumps the 23 percent money vote buying incidence reported using the indirect question. This may indicate not just that vote buying may be more rampant in certain areas; but also that voters there could be much more willing to admit to vote buying, which, in turn indicates that the social acceptance of vote buying differs geographically.

Similar to our Metro Manila survey (which yielded 88 percent acceptance), a clear majority of those who were offered cash in the Isabela survey (74 percent) accepted it. The share of those who received an offer and voted for the candidate who made the offer was almost similar at 70 percent. These suggest that vote buying behavior in the country can be heterogeneous across regions.

III. Senate Correlates

An empirical analysis of the votes garnered by some Senators could also provide some useful insights on the correlates of their election performance. For instance, some analysts claim that Senator Nancy Binay was elected on the force of her father's popularity and political clout. The same has been alleged for Senator Bam Aquino. The goal here is to analyze, using voting and other data on the provincial level, whether and to what extent certain factors that supported the election of President Aquino and Vice President Binay have also been influential in the election of Senators Bam Aquino and Nancy Binay.

In addition, we will also examine the patterns of support for Risa Hontiveros based on the 2013 election results. Since this is merely an analysis of empirical correlates, we do not interpret any of the results to suggest causality; rather we are merely showing empirical associations among the variables of interest.

Senator Bam Aquino, President Aquino's cousin, was elected in the 2013 national elections placing seventh among about 30 candidates. We examined if the provinces that

⁵ We would like to thank Prof. Cesi Cruz for allowing us to refer to her Isabela vote buying survey data for comparison with the results of our survey.

delivered votes for President Aquino also delivered votes for Senator Aquino. Initial statistics shown in Figure 12a compare the number of votes garnered by the two Aquinos in 2010 and in 2013, while Figure 12b shows the same comparison in terms of shares of voters in each of these regions. While it is difficult to draw conclusions based on these figures, there are indeed a few regions where the measure of support appears very similarly matched.

Empirical regression analysis offers a better platform with which to compare the votes garnered by Sen. Aquino with those of Pres. Aquino, while also controlling for other provincial socio-economic, political and religious characteristics that could influence voting outcomes. As expected, President Aquino's votes in 2010 turned out to be one of the strongest determinants of Senator Aquino's votes in 2013. That variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that support for the President may have also been reflected strongly in support for Senator Aquino. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of votes for President Aquino at the provincial level, translated into a 0.29 percentage point increase in the votes for his cousin, Bam Aquino.

Interestingly, other variables proved significant as well. More dynastic provinces (measured by the share of political dynasties to the total positions in the province) produced fewer votes for Sen. Aquino. The number of AM radio stations – a rough proxy for information dissemination in the province – also proved significant and negative. The full regression results are shown in Table 5.

Using a similar regression model to analyze the votes cast for Senator Nancy Binay, we also found evidence that votes for Vice President Binay were among the significant determinants of Senator Binay's votes. This suggests that the popularity of the two highest public officials in the country indeed helped in electing their close relatives into office. The results suggest that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of votes for Vice President Binay in each province was associated with a 0.19 percentage point increase in the votes for his daughter, Nancy Binay. Provinces with less inequality and fewer AM radio stations also produced more votes for Sen. Binay. The full regression results are shown in Table 6.

VARIABLES										
Share of Voters who Voted	0.338***	0.335***	0.330***	0.336***	0.324***	0.296***	0.347***	0.348***	0.357***	0.288***
for Pres. Aquino	[0.0657]	[0.0674]	[0.0687]	[0.0689]	[0.0709]	[0.0695]	[0.0695]	[0.0699]	[0.0721]	[0.0828]
Powerty Incidence		0.000209	0.000393	0.000541	0.000507	0.000598	0.000674	0.000710	0.000778	0.000607
Poverty incidence		[0.000461]	[0.000548]	[0.000568]	[0.000572]	[0.000554]	[0.000532]	[0.000538]	[0.000557]	[0.000559]
Human Davalonment Index			0.0656	0.0888	0.0849	0.109	0.162	0.135	0.169	0.124
Tuman Development Index			[0.106]	[0.109]	[0.109]	[0.106]	[0.104]	[0.113]	[0.131]	[0.132]
Gini Coefficient				-0.142	-0.111	-0.157	-0.0863	-0.0634	-0.0441	-0.0713
Ohn Coefficient				[0.143]	[0.150]	[0.146]	[0.143]	[0.149]	[0.154]	[0.153]
Education Index					-0.000306	-0.000476	-0.000620	-0.000625	-0.000487	-0.000422
Education mdex					[0.000417]	[0.000410]	[0.000397]	[0.000399]	[0.000479]	[0.000474]
Dynastic Concentration						-0.112**	-0.0826*	-0.0805*	-0.0837*	-0.0888*
Dynastic Concentration						[0.0477]	[0.0471]	[0.0475]	[0.0482]	[0.0476]
Number of AM Radio							-0.00399**	-0.00388**	-0.00387**	-0.00393**
Stations							[0.00156]	[0.00158]	[0.00159]	[0.00157]
Share of Population Who are								0.00284	0.00356	0.00490
Iglesia ni Cristo Members								[0.00472]	[0.00494]	[0.00494]
Share of Population Who are									0.000284	0.00109
Muslim									[0.000539]	[0.000728]
Share of Population Who are										0.00105
Roman Catholics										[0.000650]
Constant	0.183***	0.177***	0.135*	0.170**	0.199**	0.274***	0.222**	0.220**	0.171	0.138
Constant	[0.0190]	[0.0247]	[0.0725]	[0.0806]	[0.0903]	[0.0929]	[0.0914]	[0.0919]	[0.131]	[0.131]
Observations	72	71	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.274	0.269	0.273	0.284	0.290	0.347	0.409	0.412	0.415	0.440
Standard errors in brackets										

Table 5: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Share of Voters in the Province who Voted for Senator Aquino).

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1
Note: Analysis here is from provinces with available data for both 2010 and 2013 elections.</pre>

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VARIABLES										
Share of Voters who Voted	0.282***	0.250***	0.243***	0.206**	0.240***	0.247***	0.246***	0.215**	0.213**	0.185**
for VP Binay	[0.0825]	[0.0832]	[0.0860]	[0.0834]	[0.0807]	[0.0810]	[0.0799]	[0.0824]	[0.0826]	[0.0837]
Doverty Incidence		-0.00131**	-0.00120**	-0.000807	-0.000665	-0.000626	-0.000568	-0.000493	-0.000611	-0.000745
Foverty incluence		[0.000499]	[0.000580]	[0.000574]	[0.000551]	[0.000552]	[0.000545]	[0.000544]	[0.000560]	[0.000561]
Human Davalonment Index			0.0402	0.116	0.126	0.132	0.172	0.117	0.0585	0.0310
Tuman Development Index			[0.113]	[0.112]	[0.107]	[0.107]	[0.108]	[0.115]	[0.132]	[0.131]
Gini Coefficient				-0.393***	-0.485***	-0.506***	-0.453***	-0.403***	-0.437***	-0.460***
Onn Coenteient				[0.146]	[0.144]	[0.145]	[0.147]	[0.150]	[0.155]	[0.154]
Education Index					0.00107***	0.00102**	0.000876**	0.000838**	0.000618	0.000752
					[0.000397]	[0.000400]	[0.000403]	[0.000401]	[0.000468]	[0.000472]
Dynastic Concentration						-0.0464	-0.0312	-0.0250	-0.0172	-0.0121
Dynastic Concentration						[0.0469]	[0.0471]	[0.0470]	[0.0479]	[0.0475]
Number of AM Radio							-0.00259*	-0.00232	-0.00242	-0.00280*
Stations							[0.00153]	[0.00153]	[0.00154]	[0.00154]
Share of Population Who are								0.00677	0.00562	0.00755
Iglesia ni Cristo Members								[0.00495]	[0.00511]	[0.00521]
Share of Population Who are									-0.000483	0.000275
Muslim									[0.000529]	[0.000723]
Share of Population Who are										0.000877
Roman Catholics										[0.000578]
Constant	0.238***	0.290***	0.266***	0.370***	0.265***	0.291***	0.268***	0.271***	0.350***	0.295**
Constant	[0.0230]	[0.0313]	[0.0769]	[0.0833]	[0.0887]	[0.0926]	[0.0923]	[0.0917]	[0.126]	[0.130]
Observations	72	71	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.143	0.229	0.227	0.304	0.375	0.384	0.411	0.429	0.437	0.458
Standard errors in brackets										
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1										

Table 6: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Share of Voters in the Province who Voted for Senator Binay).

Note: Analysis here is from provinces with available data for both 2010 and 2013 elections.



FIGURE 12a (left): Number of Votes received by President Aquino and Senator Aquino by Region. FIGURE 12b (right): Share of Voters in the Region who voted for the Aquinos

Analysis here is from 71 of the Philippines' 80 provinces with available data for both 2010 and 2013 elections

As for the votes garnered by Risa Hontiveros, the variable for Pres. Aquino's votes was a significant and positive determinant of Hontiveros' votes at the province-level. This is not surprising because she ran under the administration ticket. Some socio-economic indicators are also significant determinants of Hontiveros' votes. Provinces with a higher Human Development Index (HDI) produced more votes for her. Provinces with lower inequality (measured by the Gini Coefficient) are also associated with higher votes for Hontiveros. These two results suggest that Hontiveros' main support comes from provinces that display stronger development outcomes.

Similar to the results for Sen. Aquino, provinces that are more dynastic are associated with lower votes for Hontiveros. None of the three religion variables – share of Catholics, Muslims and Iglesia Ni Cristo members in the population – proved to be significant. (This casts doubt on the so-called "Catholic vote" or the call of the Catholic Church not to vote for candidates who supported the Reproductive Health Law, including Risa Hontiveros.) Interestingly, provinces with a lower education index are associated with more votes for her. We take this result with a grain of salt since this indicator does not necessarily capture education quality or voter awareness. The full regression results are shown in Table 7.

VARIABLES										
Share of Voters who Voted	0.272***	0.269***	0.256***	0.269***	0.258***	0.243***	0.257***	0.255***	0.239***	0.198***
for Pres. Aquino	[0.0484]	[0.0480]	[0.0471]	[0.0433]	[0.0444]	[0.0440]	[0.0458]	[0.0459]	[0.0464]	[0.0534]
Doverty Incidence		-0.000725**	-0.000261	8.16e-05	5.18e-05	0.000102	0.000123	8.57e-05	-5.03e-05	-0.000151
roverty incluence		[0.000328]	[0.000376]	[0.000357]	[0.000358]	[0.000350]	[0.000351]	[0.000353]	[0.000358]	[0.000361]
Human Davalonment Index			0.171**	0.225***	0.221***	0.235***	0.249***	0.276***	0.208**	0.182**
Tuman Development Index			[0.0728]	[0.0684]	[0.0685]	[0.0671]	[0.0684]	[0.0744]	[0.0842]	[0.0853]
Gini Coefficient				-0.329***	-0.302***	-0.327***	-0.308***	-0.331***	-0.370***	-0.386***
				[0.0901]	[0.0939]	[0.0925]	[0.0941]	[0.0975]	[0.0990]	[0.0986]
Education Index					-0.000271	-0.000365	-0.000404	-0.000399	-0.000676**	-0.000637**
					[0.000261]	[0.000259]	[0.000262]	[0.000262]	[0.000308]	[0.000306]
Dynastic Concentration						-0.0619**	-0.0539*	-0.0561*	-0.0496	-0.0526*
Dynastic Concentration						[0.0301]	[0.0310]	[0.0312]	[0.0310]	[0.0307]
Number of AM Radio							-0.00109	-0.00120	-0.00122	-0.00125
Stations							[0.00103]	[0.00104]	[0.00102]	[0.00101]
Share of Population Who are								-0.00288	-0.00432	-0.00353
Iglesia ni Cristo Members								[0.00309]	[0.00318]	[0.00319]
Share of Population Who are									-0.000571	-9.61e-05
Muslim									[0.000347]	[0.000470]
Share of Population Who are										0.000621
Roman Catholics										[0.000419]
Constant	0.101***	0.126***	0.0164	0.0976*	0.124**	0.165***	0.151**	0.154**	0.252***	0.233***
Constant	[0.0140]	[0.0176]	[0.0497]	[0.0507]	[0.0565]	[0.0588]	[0.0602]	[0.0603]	[0.0843]	[0.0845]
Observations	72	71	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
R-squared	0.311	0.347	0.397	0.500	0.508	0.539	0.547	0.553	0.573	0.588
Standard errors in brackets										
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,*p<0.1										

Table 7: OLS Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Share of Voters in the Province who Voted for Risa Hontiveros).

Note: Analysis here is from provinces with available data for both 2010 and 2013 elections.

IV. Main Findings

This note contains a preliminary analysis of patterns regarding (separately) political dynasties, vote buying and the correlates of certain Senators' votes drawing on data from the 2013 midterm election in the Philippines. The evidence underscores the continued dominance of political dynasties, the prevalence of vote buying, and the powerful influence of name recall. For the most part, we find striking evidence of patterns that raise concerns over the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the Philippine political process.

- 1. Political Dynasties: Political dynasties, in the aggregate, appear to be on an upward trend since the election in 2004. Nevertheless, this does not mean that voters necessarily prefer dynasties over alternative candidates. The main competitive choices offered to voters involved a large number of uncontested dynasties (condition A), and dynasties contested by other dynasties (condition B). Summing these two scenarios and dividing by the total number of positions contested reveals that one in ten governorship positions and 3 in ten vice governorship positions had outcomes that were already predetermined in favor of a dynastic winner even before the election. A large number of dynastic candidates were fielded by the most established (and therefore better financed) political parties. For instance, for governor, political parties such as the Liberal Party of the administration and UNA of the opposition both fielded roughly 50% dynastic candidates. Further, three-quarters of the candidates for governor of the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) were dynastic. These figures help highlight how political parties are dominated by dynasties, not just because they win in elections, but because they also continue to constitute large shares of candidates fielded in elections by the main political parties.
- 2. Vote Buying: The vote buying survey covered 360 respondents from income classes D and E families (i.e. 4th and 5th income quintiles approximately) living in 17 cities in Metro Manila. The results of the survey showed vote-buying incidence of about 20% when a direct question was used; and this doubled to about 40% when an indirect question was used. About 9-16% of respondents reported food, rice and groceries offered in exchange for votes, while another 10-16% noted help or favors extended in exchange for votes. About 90% of respondents mentioned that the vote-buying offer was accepted; and of this, up to 70% of recipients actually voted for the candidate. Nevertheless, only about 22% of those who complied reported voting for the candidate because of the

money, food or favor offered. In contrast, around 80% said they voted for the candidate because they liked him/her or for his/her qualifications (multiple responses are allowed here). This result coheres with evidence in the literature that vote buying is used by political operatives to encourage turnout notably in areas where would-be voters are already inclined to support the candidate.

3. Senate Correlates: An empirical analysis of the share of voters cast at the provincial level for Bam Aquino and Nancy Binay suggests that each of these candidates benefited from strong support garnered by their relatives, President Aquino and Vice President Binay. A 1 percentage point increase in the share of votes for President Aquino at the provincial level translated into a 0.29 percentage point increase in the votes for Nice President Binay in each province was associated with a 0.19 percentage point increase in the votes for his daughter, Nancy. Similarly, Risa Hontiveros benefited in provinces that supported President Aquino. In addition, none of the three religion variables – share of Catholics, Muslims and Iglesia Ni Cristo members in the population – proved significant. (This casts doubt on the so-called "Catholic vote".)

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