

REVIEW OF SOCIAL SUSTAINABILITY PRACTICES WITHIN THE MULTI DONOR FUND FOR ACEH AND NIAS PORTFOLIO

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Executive summary

Introduction

Oxford Policy Management (OPM) was selected to conduct an independent review of the social sustainability practices within the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) for Aceh and Nias portfolio of projects. The review examines how MDF projects have supported and addressed social sustainability in terms of creating access, inclusion and empowerment so that all social groups benefit equitably from projects. The review focuses on how projects have addressed gender, the inclusion of poor/vulnerable people and conflict within their design and implementation. The report provides full explanations and operational definitions of all the terms used.

The aim of the review was to look forward and identify practical and doable improvement opportunities arising from the lessons learnt. It was *not* an impact assessment but, rather, an overall stocktaking and assessment of portfolio and project practices relating to social sustainability and their implementation (including their possible positive and negative effects and any adjustments made based on experiences in implementation). The review took place between June and November 2008.

Assessing social sustainability: Analytical framework and methodology

The review of social sustainability practices within the MDF required a combination of methods and tools which together provided a range of data to understand the contribution of the MDF portfolio to social sustainability. The methodology was underpinned by an analytical framework developed in response to the requirements of the Terms of Reference (ToR). There were five interlinked components of the analytical framework, each one centred on assessing a different aspect of project approaches towards addressing social sustainability. Whilst there are inevitable overlaps between the components, the division of the framework provided an organisational structure through which analysis was made and allowed for meaningful comparison between different projects and differing types of intervention. The areas were: contribution to social sustainability; voice, participation and accountability; inclusion and equity issues; results: benefits and capacities; and, social sustainability practices in the MDF portfolio. All these areas of enquiry were considered within the overall policy context within which the MDF was established and within which both the fund and projects operated.

The methodology involved an extensive literature review of MDF and project documentation together with other documents relevant to the tsunami and earthquake response in Aceh and Nias; key informant interviews with MDF stakeholders (e.g. from the Steering Committee, Secretariat, partner agencies, projects) and other key informants and stakeholders (e.g. representatives of local and international NGOs, civil society, donor organisations, individual specialists, etc.); and, a beneficiary assessment through a rapid participatory community research (RPCR) with six communities in Aceh and two on Nias. The RPCR was conducted in order to add depth and local contextual understanding in terms of how MDF projects addressed and supported social sustainability.

The Multi Donor Fund: Context analysis

In the 26th December 2004 tsunami more than 167,000 died or were registered missing and 127,000 houses were destroyed and a similar number damaged. The subsequent earthquake in Nias on 28th March 2005 killed 850 people and destroyed or damaged 35,000 more houses. In total over 500,000 were homeless, many hospitals and health posts were destroyed, as were 1,488 schools, 230 km of roads and nine seaports. About three quarters of a million people – one in six of the population – were direct victims, but virtually everyone suffered palpably through loss of friends and relatives, lost livelihood or trauma.

In contrast to many other emergency and disaster responses funding was not a problem in Aceh and Nias: following the tsunami, private individuals and governments donated unprecedented sums. With the Government of Indonesia's (GoI) approval donor agencies encouraged the World Bank to set up and manage the MDF as one of the mechanisms to ensure efficient and coordinated delivery of financial support. Many donors initially provided a minimum stake to ensure representation within the fund's decision-making forums. By June 2005 the first round of MDF proposals had been sifted and some accepted.

Overall, donor coordination in the reconstruction phase was not strong. From mid-2005 on, the Indonesian government's Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam – Nias (BRR) grew in capacity and scope and many donors looked towards supporting BRR as a means to achieve government-led coordination rather than concentrating on donor mechanisms. Given this context a majority of donors did not put significant funds into common pools. Where donors did engage in common approaches, much support was directed at a common debt moratorium for the Government of Indonesia, enabling it to reallocate resources of its own to the reconstruction effort. So whilst the MDF has received in total some US\$700 million in pledges from donors as of June 2008, this represents only 10-15% of the total amount pledged globally for Aceh and Nias. Almost 90% of MDF funds come from the European Union (EU) and its member countries.

It is important to see the MDF in this regard when it comes to appraising its practices in and impact on social sustainability in Aceh and Nias. The MDF was set up as a channel to promote rapid project implementation, addressing concerns at the time over the slow response of donors. It fulfilled this early role but did not change greatly over time. With more funds going through other channels, and the BRR increasingly establishing itself as a government coordinating body, the MDF did not assume a deeper or more 'intelligent' role in terms of appraising need or gaps. The MDF continued as a forum for donors to meet and discuss issues. Donors applied early pressure for clear MDF policies on the process of appraising funding proposals, partly in frustration at a perceived preference for WB projects, and the MDF's Recovery Assistance Policy (RAP) was one result of this.

Parallel to post-tsunami support a range of donors became increasingly involved in peace building work. Over time BRR encouraged greater donor involvement in areas of Aceh not immediately affected by the tsunami given that the entire province was indirectly affected in many ways. Gradually, emerging issues of governance also brought donors into Aceh-wide issues linked with promoting sustainable peace. As a result the barriers between peace building work and tsunami reconstruction were reduced over time. However, the vast majority of post-tsunami donor aid cannot realistically be described as 'conflict-sensitive'. Typically, tsunami reconstruction work was fully funded or over-funded whilst peace-related programming attracted far less support. In addition, most major reconstruction programmes integrated little in the way of peace sensitivity except for efforts to reduce potential risk to existing project plans.

MDF portfolio: Approaches to social sustainability

The key message to emerge from the review is that **the MDF does not have the mechanisms and processes through which it can effectively guide, monitor or add value to the social sustainability practices of individual projects.**

The MDF fulfilled its early role as a channel to promote rapid project implementation, addressing concerns at the time over the slow response of donors. In this regard the fund instrument did not change greatly over time. As such, what was “fit for purpose” during relief and the early stages of recovery became increasingly problematic as the MDF moved towards a reconstruction response directed at long term sustainability.

We summarise below the key issues in terms of how social sustainability was addressed in the MDF and its projects throughout the project cycle of selection, approval, implementation and oversight.

Project selection, design and approval

While the MDF was able to exert some influence over the BRR in terms of policy and, to some extent, the selection of projects, this influence did not extend to engendering social sustainability practices. Whilst BRR did build both policies and mechanisms (including dedicated staff) to address social issues, it was felt by many donors and civil society representatives that their impact was limited.

- **No common understanding of the concept of social sustainability**

An overarching concern in relation to social sustainability is that nowhere within the MDF is there a definition or explanation of what is meant by the concept. For all the projects under review we could find no common understanding of the term and, for the most part, it was not a living concept guiding their work. For the UNDP, ILO and WFP projects it is not a term used institutionally and does not appear in internal documents addressing social safeguards. Even within the World Bank, where the term has more purchase, managers of sponsored projects had not necessarily seen the RAP or had differing views about the concept.

- **Recovery Assistance Policy weak in social sustainability detail**

The RAP appeared to have little currency for almost all of the projects under review. It was written after the first four projects funded through the MDF had been approved and some projects were unaware of it. When it had been used it appeared to be more of an aid to supporting funding applications than a set of guidelines for shaping project design, implementation and monitoring. Yet for both the MDF Secretariat and Steering Committee members, the RAP was key to making funding decisions, despite having little to say on social sustainability. The RAP offers no policy guidelines on what is expected from projects from different sectors, of different scope and/or of different size. There is no elaboration, even in the most general terms, on which social issues are important and how they should be addressed by different types of projects. Additionally, the RAP stresses that the MDF Steering Committee should ensure that projects promote gender equity and be sensitive to conflict problems although it is not clear how this was meant to happen without mechanisms to make it happen.

- **The MDF had limited opportunities to influence Project Concept Note (PCN) selection**

There was a limited extent to which the MDF could prioritise social sustainability issues during project screening and selection processes. BRR became the first filter and largely

directed the types of projects to be funded by the MDF. Project Concept Notes (PCNs) from the MDF – like those of all other projects – went through a BRR PCN project workshop at which decisions were made regarding whether to fund or to reject. During the first two years of funding the pressure to disburse funds made it difficult to influence BRR project selections. Given the whole range of other issues involved (e.g. relevance of project, capacity to deliver, risks, etc.) it is understandable that social issues were not the highest priority.

- **Social sustainability in the appraisal process and Project Appraisal Documents (PAD)**

As the fund moves to support “transition”, there has been an increased focus on social issues in the appraisal process, particularly with regard to gender. Nevertheless, and perhaps because of the RAP, there is a strong feeling amongst partner and implementing agencies that the technical review lacks clarity with regard to social issues. It has in cases led to a mechanistic response to reviewer’s comments in order to obtain project approval – for example by omitting the word ‘conflict’ in documents or adding the word ‘gender’ – rather than more engagement in substantive dialogue about the project design. Generally, social safeguard regulations of partner agencies were addressed in the PADs after the initial round of project approval in March 2005. It may be, however, that the guidelines need to be applied with more realism for some projects where unworkable claims were made within the PAD in terms of addressing social issues.

Project implementation: Oversight

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the portfolio was not fully formalised until the mid-second semester 2006; 18 months after the tsunami. In monitoring social sustainability within projects the MDF, and specifically the Secretariat, faced problems in relation to: leverage over partner agencies; availability of social data; its influence over BRR’s own social sustainability practices; and, the time available for Secretariat staff.

- **Limited MDF ground presence in Aceh and Nias**

We suggest that the absence of in-house expertise, concerted consultation or contracted external specialists based in Aceh prevented an institutional understanding and analysis of social issues. That in turn left the MDF Secretariat without the capacity to provide robust oversight with regard to social sustainability. Given the resource constraints within the MDF an alternative would have been closer cooperation with the World Bank’s own Social Development and Conflict sections which are well established in Indonesia with a ground presence in Aceh. This did not appear to happen.

- **Lines of accountability, roles and responsibilities in relation to social sustainability not fully functional**

The lack of reliable supervision and monitoring of social data was a recurrent frustration for the Secretariat. However, Secretariat staff had no real power to hold partner agencies to account or to enforce project adherence to the RAP and PAD commitments. At the same time, partner agencies were not consistently applying their own social safeguards and standards or overseeing implementing agencies in meeting social sustainability conditions in PAD or RAP.

- **Lack of social baseline data and social/gender indicators**

With few exceptions (KDP, UPP and TRWMP for its livelihoods component) the baselines, when they existed, had little in the way of socially disaggregated or gender-specific data. For some large scale infrastructure and logistical projects (e.g. TRPRP, LCRM, WFPSS) socially disaggregated or gender-specific data is not necessarily to be expected. For other projects

(e.g. BAFMP, ILO/RRR and AFEP), however, the lack of disaggregated data is more problematic. Social and gender indicators were also inconsistent. Where they did exist they were often output- and target-orientated (e.g. number of trainings, number of women participating in meetings, etc.) and not social impact-oriented. Only KDP and UPP had extensive and gender disaggregated data set from a baseline with concomitant M&E systems.

- **Supervision and review missions**

Partner agencies were not consistent or sufficiently robust in supervising and monitoring implementing agencies' social sustainability commitments in the PAD or RAP. This makes it hard to judge the social impact of a large proportion of the portfolio. More positively, there were examples of review and supervision enhancing attention to social sustainability issues. The development of joint monitoring missions with donors and partner agencies has been seen as a valuable way of informally influencing social processes in projects.

- **The MDF Results Framework**

The results framework is under review. Currently, social impact indicators are highly inadequate. There are deficiencies in the disaggregation (other than by gender) so that at present it is impossible to tell who is being included and who is being left-out in the delivery of goods and services. Qualitative indicators that could, for example, help track the depth and quality of participation, empowerment of poor/vulnerable people and the levels of accountability between different actors have yet to be elaborated within the framework. Whilst revising the indicators in the results framework is a necessary step in mainstreaming social issues throughout the portfolio, it is not sufficient. The robustness and utility of the results framework is ultimately dependent on the social sensitivity of project monitoring systems. However, the present structure and mechanisms of the MDF make harmonisation of project level M&E with that of the overall MDF portfolio challenging.

The MDF and conflict issues

- **MDF understanding of the issues limited**

MDF documentation mentions tsunami-affected areas and conflict-affected areas (see, for example, part VI para. H of the RAP, March 2006). This division does not demonstrate a grounded understanding of the context: the majority of tsunami-affected areas are also directly conflict-affected to a greater or lesser degree. More widely, 30 years of conflict fundamentally affected governance and politics across all of Aceh. It is not possible to talk of areas 'affected by GAM' (MDF, 2006: Recovery Assistance Policy) as all of Aceh was and still is affected by the conflict.

- **Lack of clarity over where MDF stands on conflict issues**

At the portfolio level there is no evidence of MDF involvement in meaningful conflict sensitivity or even of basic checks on action to ensure a 'do no harm' approach is followed. Some projects were aware of conflict issues whilst others seemed to have little awareness. However, the MDF played no role in this. MDF-funded projects' conflict sensitivity is a function of different agencies' capacities and not a reflection of action on the part of MDF, either through the Secretariat or through technical review. MDF monitoring includes no mention of conflict-related issues. A consequence of the MDF's current operational approach to conflict issues is confusion amongst agencies over MDF rulings on conflict issues. Some MDF partners and external interviewees felt that the MDF could not touch anything to do with conflict; some mentioned that it was unclear; and some felt that it was important to maintain an image of non-involvement with conflict, although they found ways to engage anyway.

- **Wider conflict sensitivity**

More significantly still, a sound analysis of the conflict and peace process in Aceh would demonstrate the obvious links between the two. It is perhaps understandable that donors are reluctant to allow funds donated for the tsunami to be used directly for narrow programmes to assist ex-combatants, but if these programmes are seen as important elements of the future sustainability of Aceh, as indeed they are, then perhaps the role of the MDF should be to explain their significance rather than to deny funding. There are in addition many other elements to supporting sustainable peace beyond aid to ex-combatants or even to victims of conflict. These issues demand wide contextual treatment rather than narrow legalistic interpretation. Conflict-sensitive programming should not rely on individuals in partner/implementing agencies who are willing to spend time finding ingenious, undocumented ways round rules. Some positive examples already exist: The willingness of MDF and its donors to support “transitional governance” helps build the long term institutional sustainability of all interventions to date. This demonstrates that involvement is possible and that a situation in which some agencies felt that they had to “remove the word conflict from all documents” should not have been allowed to develop.

A conflict sensitive approach in future would not stop at the design and implementation of a proposed new peace and development trust fund (valuable as that may be), but also consider conflict implications of other projects in Aceh. This involves political analysis as well as concern for local-level conflict issues, since donors otherwise tend to limit analysis to specific technical issues such as funds for ex-combatants.

Project approaches to social sustainability

The key finding from the assessment is that **some projects have taken a consistent and flexible approach in addressing social issues throughout the whole project cycle and these are showing trends towards social sustainability. However it is not the case for the majority of the projects.** While these projects did address some social issues, this was not in itself sufficient to show a trend towards integrating social sustainability issues within their project approach. This would require changes in project approaches from design, targeting, implementation processes, to engagement with stakeholders, monitoring and evaluation.

There are also two broader issues. Firstly, the extent to which the projects under review were able to substantially contribute to greater access, inclusion, equity and accountability given the approaches taken, and the complex reconstruction and post-conflict environment. A key finding from the review is that there were unrealistic claims and expectations placed on projects to deliver wide-ranging social sustainability goals. This was particularly true for projects taking a Community Driven Development (CDD) approach that were faced with both limited implementation capacity and limits in what could realistically be achieved through the approach itself. Secondly, there is the issue as to whether projects funded and supported through the MDF were better able to address social sustainability issues than non-MDF projects. This is a difficult question to answer; not least because the review was not designed to undertake a comparative analysis between MDF and non-MDF projects. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that MDF funding did little to add social sustainability value in implementation. The review and supervision processes of the MDF Secretariat, for example, did little to aid synergies across the portfolio or to strengthen attention to social issues within individual projects.

Trends promoting social sustainability

Where projects have been consistent in addressing social issues they demonstrated a number of practices which together are likely to encourage social sustainability. Other projects in the portfolio may have done one or two of the actions identified but not a range of integrated practices which add up to a systematic focus on social issues. These include:

- A presence in Aceh and Nias prior to the tsunami and earthquake which enabled projects to build on existing networks, implementation processes and mechanisms for addressing social issues – (for the World Bank, UPP, KDP and KRRP projects only);
- An ongoing, on-the-ground presence of project leaders with sufficient power to engage effectively with communities, government officials at all levels and donors, and to adapt approaches and resources where necessary – (KDP, TRWMP and, to some extent, UPP, BAFMP and REKOMPAK);
- Within the project, attempts were made to develop and apply a contextualised and nuanced understanding of the socio-cultural, political and policy environment in which reconstruction took place, including a socially differentiated understanding of poverty and gender – (TRWMP, KDP and, to some extent, UPP);
- Active attempts to mainstream a gender focus including adhering to existing policies, developing gender strategies and/or responding to monitoring or supervision missions – (KDP, UPP, TRWMP, TRPRP, ILO/RRR and IRFF/IREP);
- Monitoring and evaluation systems were in place which tracked outcomes as well as outputs. Projects had also made some attempt to establish baselines from which indicators of social sustainability could be derived and monitored – (KDP, UPP and TRWMP);
- Some capacity and resources to identify and work with progressive leadership in local government and at the grassroots to optimise opportunities for encouraging active participation, social inclusion, accountability and transparency – (TRWMP, and to some extent KDP, ILO/RRR, UPP, AFEP and the CSOSP at the level of local CSOs);
- On-going processes aimed at addressing and reducing vulnerability in tandem with the provision of tangible assets – (TRWMP, UPP, KDP and to some extent AFEP);
- Attempts made to develop mechanisms for accountability which included and went beyond complaint procedures – (TRWMP, KDP, UPP, to some extent REKOMPAK);
- Application of social safeguards before and during project implementation – (KDP, UPP, WFPSS, TRPRP and to some extent IRFF/IREP); and,
- External reviews and supervision which addressed a full range of project concerns including social issues – (TRWMP and ILO/RRR).

Addressing social sustainability: what's missing?

In the majority of the projects gaining a full picture of how social sustainability issues have been addressed was challenging. This does not mean that projects were not addressing these issues but, rather, that project documentation is extremely patchy in reporting on social issues. Nevertheless, in broad terms we identified a range of actions or processes which have limited a project's capacity to realistically address the social sustainability issues highlighted within its PAD. These include:

- No clear evidence in design and implementation of an applied analysis to the selection of project implementation areas in terms of poverty targeting; reducing vulnerability or supporting conflict sensitive approaches – (ILO/RRR, AFEP and IREP/IRFF);

- Unrealistic claims made within the PAD in terms of addressing social issues with no systems in place to implement them – (ILO/RRR, IREP/IRFF, TRPRP, AFEP and REKOMPAK, which had systems but could not fully operationalise them);
- Limited socially differentiated data, often only gender specific, making it difficult to track who within the project was being targeted, included, gaining or losing from the intervention – (RALAS, BAFMP, AFEP, ILO/RRR, REKOMPAK and CSOSP);
- There are weak monitoring and evaluation systems which have not integrated social issues or developed outcome/impact indicators around which the social sustainability of interventions could be tracked – (BAFMP, AFEP, REKOMPAK, ILO/RRR and to some extent IREP, TRPRP);
- For those projects working with communities, a lack of systems and processes for promoting social inclusion, targeting and reaching women and vulnerable groups – (BAFMP, REKOMPAK, RALAS and to a lesser extent AFEP, whose strategy is now making gains in this regard);
- Gender strategies were not in place or systems and mechanisms for implementing gender-sensitive approaches weakly adhered to – (AFEP, TA to BRR, BAFMP, CSOSP, RALAS – although the issue will be addressed within the gender action plan 2009 – and to some extent ILO/RRR and REKOMPAK);
- Weak or non-existent mechanisms for accountability at local level or between project stakeholders – (RALAS, BAFMP, KRRP and ILO/RRR)
- Lack of attention to conflict sensitivity at project level throughout implementation guidelines, monitoring systems, review and supervision missions – (all projects); and,
- Limited evidence of adaptability to a changing social environment and/or adapting the approach to strengthen attention to social issues – (BAFMP, RALAS and to some extent IREP, TRPRP).

Contribution to social sustainability: Summary of key lessons

It is too early to judge the social sustainability of the projects under review. Projects which are capacity building government departments in tandem with local communities and by doing so opening up spaces for broader-based engagement between community members and local governance structures (e.g. TRWMP) are showing positive trends in this direction.

Overall, the findings from the social sustainability review identified a number of lessons which, if addressed, offer opportunities to strengthen attention to social issues within the MDF portfolio. Findings suggest that for the majority of on-going projects, particularly on Nias, there are opportunities to strengthen both engagement with local government and other actors and operational approaches to issues of equity, inclusion and diversity in targeted communities. The range of lessons learnt from the review can be further grouped together and summarised within five broad headings. It is these five key lessons that open up possibilities for enhancing attention to social sustainability within the MDF portfolio.

- **Address exclusion of the poorest and most marginal groups**

Across the MDF portfolio there has yet to be consistent and conscious engagement with the poorest and most marginal social groups. Evidence suggests that even when poor men and women have received tangible benefits from project interventions they are not always being targeted and included in decision-making and resource allocation processes. KDP, UPP and TRWMP stand out as projects which have put in place operational guidelines, processes and mechanisms which would, over time, increase the social inclusion of the poorest members of targeted communities.

- **Strengthen gender mainstreaming**

Gender mainstreaming within the projects, even in cases where gender strategies have been developed and operationalised, has not resulted in all women being able to access and benefit from project interventions. There was substantial evidence that poorer women and women from marginalised groups (because of ethnicity or geographical isolation, for example) were being left out or excluded from decision-making processes. Realistic and operational gender strategies are needed for all MDF projects. Given the heightened attention gender issues are receiving in Aceh and Nias through the reconstruction efforts, it is disappointing that only KDP, UPP and TRWMP were seen to have operationalised gender strategies, the results of which could be seen at the community level where women who had been involved in these projects, or living in communities where they worked, were likely to report high levels of participation in influencing and managing projects.

- **Mainstream conflict sensitivity mechanisms**

For all projects in Aceh, approaches to conflict-sensitivity merit revisiting. Reconstruction efforts have been undermined through disassociation from conflict issues and peace-building efforts. Whilst community-driven approaches and other mechanisms aiming to provide tangible, direct assistance are important, the inherently political nature of conflict and peace in Aceh should be grasped and remain central to any strategic vision.

- **Make local governance linkages more systematic**

Sustainability and wider replication of effective community level engagement frequently depends on the scope for projects to make linkages between lower levels of government that directly engage with people and higher level authority at the *kacamatan*, *kabupaten* or even provincial levels. Few projects were consistently working on building the capacity of local communities to engage with local governance in tandem with strengthening capacities within local government to respond effectively to increased demand. Efforts were made by various projects to engage with higher levels of government in a concerted fashion but this rarely built institutional support to address social sustainability issues.

- **Community facilitation processes need to be longer-term and adapted to context**

Barriers to inclusion and equitable sharing of benefits are structural and reflect entrenched unequal power relations within households, communities and high levels of government. These barriers to inclusion require a range of responses from projects. Few projects were, for example, differentiating between socially-cohesive and socially-fractured communities and tailoring their interventions to take account of these social differences. Community meetings and discussions with the village leadership appeared to be the most common *modus operandi*. These are essential but not sufficient to guarantee that poor and vulnerable people will be able to have equitable access to decision-making and benefits. The mentoring, technical assistance and training needed to build the skills, confidence and capabilities of poor and vulnerable people to actively take part in project interventions takes far longer than was planned for in most MDF projects. Equally, establishing sustainable institutional processes and systems that are accountable and inclusive can only be done incrementally over a long-term time frame for engagement with local governance structures.

Looking forward: Recommendations

The recommendations made are modest practical actions aimed at supporting the MDF strengthen the social sustainability aspects of its work. The review team based its response on an assessment of what is feasible in relation to: the existing structure and timeframe of the MDF; the scope to address the findings of the review in the socio-political context of

Aceh and Nias; and, the current options for addressing social sustainability within development practice. There is considerable scope for enhancing support systems and improving accountability mechanisms for mainstreaming social sustainability. There are a number of strengths on which the MDF can build in order to do this including: a Steering Committee with a stated commitment to social sustainability; a policy in place – the RAP; partner agencies with social safeguards that, if fully functional, provide the foundation for monitoring social objectives; and, a Secretariat well positioned within the World Bank from which to draw on existing networks and fields of expertise to support partner and implementing agencies' social sustainability efforts.

The four recommendations use these strengths as a starting point. Together they provide a route through which the MDF can deliver on its social sustainability obligations. We would suggest that the timeframe for implementation is between 6-12 months, depending on the resources made available. Each recommendation is briefly summarised and Table 1.1 outlines the suggested actions needed to support implementation of each recommendation.

Recommendation 1: Put policy into action – use the lessons learnt to operationalise the Recovery Assistance Policy

In terms of how the MDF engages with social sustainability issues there are few tools at its disposal. The RAP is the critical instrument. Members of the Steering Committee have already voiced their concern that the RAP is not being used effectively to guide projects. If the MDF is to respond to these concerns it requires: a) high-level ownership by the Steering Committee early in the process to give the MDF Secretariat the mandate to act; and, b) an entry point through which to do so. The findings from this review are useful in this respect. The five major lessons learned from the review give substance to the RAP by identifying the areas of endeavour required to optimise the contribution of the projects and portfolio to social sustainability. The main report tabulates the main programming issues and possible indicators of progress in relation to these five lessons. Clearly, however, the lessons learnt do not apply to all the projects within the portfolio. We suggest the following projects would merit revisiting and support: **TRWMP; ILO/RRR Phase 2; IREP; IRFF; KRRP; AFEP; BAFMP; and CSOSP**; and the pipeline transitional governance support project.

Recommendation 2: Define clear guidelines and programmatic choices in relation to the Recovery Assistance Policy and lessons learnt

There will need to be a range of guidelines and supporting documents made available to applicants and projects as well as conditions articulated to: a) show how the RAP is relevant to them; and, b) establish the requirements for funding and PAD approval. An action plan on mainstreaming social sustainability in the MDF drawn up and agreed by the Steering Committee is a starting point and should be included in MDF funding documents. It is an important component in a strategy aimed at providing practical guidance on what the MDF expects applicants to address in relation to social sustainability.

Recommendation 3: Capitalise on existing assets to strengthen capacities to engage effectively around social issues with projects and other key stakeholders in Aceh and Nias

The MDF Secretariat and the Steering Committee will need to review its role in relation to partner and implementing agencies with regard to promoting attention to social issues. Currently it is at best passive and often, from the perspective of the agencies, irrelevant or adversarial. If the MDF is to be seen as more supportive and, indeed, as a service for projects it will need to be far more proactive in the actions it takes to encourage socially sensitive programming. In doing so we suggest there are considerable opportunities for

expanding the knowledge management (KM) role of the Secretariat. This role will inevitably encompass a much broader set of issues than covered by the scope of this review.

Clearly, a changed role involving a greater degree of coordination, knowledge management and facilitation of policy/issue fora calls for increasing the resources made available to the MDF Secretariat. We strongly recommend this course of action. The current role performed by the Secretariat is not adequate for the task of coordination in relation to social sustainability. Nor does it enable the Secretariat to provide robust guidance to the partner agencies in terms of expectations and requirements in relation to optimising contributions to the long-term sustainability of Aceh and Nias. Nevertheless, while this suggests an increase in the budget for the Secretariat, we caution against the expansion of in-house resources, particularly staff. Under the present structure they would have little leverage over or legitimacy for partner and implementing agencies. It would make more sense to make resources available to enable projects to call in appropriate social expertise, strengthen collaborative activities and integrate social issues into their project approaches.

Recommendation 4: Use revision of the results framework to strengthen ownership and attention to social issues by partner and implementing agencies

At the portfolio level an approach that is based around social sustainability impact and outcome indicators is perhaps too crude given the diversity of projects, especially for those projects that have a national profile and remit wider than the MDF. Nevertheless, it is recognised that social sustainability issues can be embedded in the portfolio M&E. However to do so requires, as outlined above, a restructuring of the MDF Secretariat in order to allow it to carry out its oversight function more effectively, as well as an overall increase in budgetary support for M&E issues. For this to happen requires the agreement of all MDF partners and, in particular, the Steering Committee. There are, however, other ways that the MDF can track progress towards social sustainability across the portfolio. It is already seriously considering collaborating with KDP and incorporating MDF-specific objective and research areas within the proposed social impact assessment. We would encourage this course of action for its cost effectiveness and opportunities for a comparative analysis between MDF and non-MDF supported locations.

Monitoring and evaluation is an obvious area that donors can support outside the main pooled fund of a multi-donor funding mechanism. Since the MDF's coordination of monitoring in relation to social issues has been less than effective, it may be useful to consider the use of off-grant funds as a way of opening up projects to other more supportive and collaborative forms of oversight. For example, encourage individual donors, or alliances of donors, to take up opportunities to fund particular aspects of lessons learnt or sector-based social impact assessments.

Projects will also need to identify their own social impact indicators, where they do not exist, and establish their own baselines from which they can track progress. We would caution against the development of multiple social impact indicators under each output. It makes more sense that projects identify at least one priority social sustainability issue per output and develop an outcome/impact indicator by which it can be monitored. Experience suggests that increasing reporting demands around social issues without a) increasing the budget and, b) building capacities to do so is likely to be counter-productive.

Table 1.1 Summary of recommendations and allied action points

Recommendation	Action Points
Recommendation 1: Put policy into action – use the lessons learnt to operationalise the Recovery Assistance Policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Steering Committee meeting on the review findings leading to endorsement of the recommendations and the mandate given to the Secretariat to work on implementing recommendations; • Establishment of a small (4-5 members) social sustainability working group to oversee and provide legitimacy for Secretariat actions; • The Quality Assurance Consultant of the MDF to take forward the recommendations through establishing Aceh and Nias dialogues. We suggest that these take the form of multi-stakeholder processes involving key stakeholders of the MDF (e.g. government, civil society actors, partner and implementing agency managers, WB Social Development unit etc.); • In the first instance, convene a workshop with this group of actors to explore the lessons learnt. Capitalise on their experience of several years of reconstruction efforts and identify locally-defined and realistic solutions to the gaps in social programming identified by the lessons learnt. This enables the fund to build on existing good practice. These can form the basis of an action plan, appropriate to Aceh and Nias, which can be used to enhance project and portfolio capacities to address social and conflict issues; and, • On the basis of Steering Committee approval of the action plan dedicate resources for implementing it. This will include agreeing a budget and time allocation for the Quality Assurance Officer to implement it.
Recommendation 2: Define clear guidelines and programmatic choices in relation to the Recovery Assistance Policy and lessons learnt	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a brief annexe to the RAP which contains simple social checklists for both sector and crosscutting projects. For example, for infrastructure projects a reminder that poverty targeting will need to be integrated within the project and suggestions on how to do this (such as poverty criteria included in the criteria for kecamatan selection); • Within the guidelines and forms for submission of PCN to the MDF include a copy of the lessons learnt (<i>tabulated as Table 5.1 in main body of report</i>) and a question requiring projects to justify what relevance these issues have to the project and how they will be prioritising them in design and implementation. We recognise that not all the lessons need to be taken forward by all the projects. To avoid tokenism or overload, care should be taken in MDF documentation to explain this. The checklists are helpful in this regard; • In the process of PAD submission, applicants to be asked to show how the design, implementing and monitoring arrangements will integrate the priority social issues identified in the PCN. We suggest one of the criteria for PAD approval should be that social sustainability commitments must be linked to a budget, given a timeframe (even if indicative) and integrated into the logframe; • Require projects to disaggregate data appropriate to their level of operation, at the very least gendered, and using level-specific poverty disaggregation within the PAD. Or, if systems for disaggregation are not in place prior to implementation, a requirement that they are set up during an inception phase; • Where projects have an inception phase requiring it to elaborate and finalise the M&E systems, we suggest this is broadened to include a requirement to finalise their social sustainability focus. Specifically, where appropriate, an

	<p>inception phase gives projects the opportunity to carry out a full context analysis of their target areas as an integral part of setting the baseline. The analysis enables them to finalise implementation strategies and monitoring systems incorporating social issues and would include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Clear identification of who, within the project area, is excluded from existing decision-making and resource allocation process and the way in which existing power structures are shaping exclusionary processes;- The measures a project can take realistically to address the key barriers and opportunities for enhancing social inclusion and gender equity;- What the specific measures will be to adapt socialisation and mobilisation processes to the different social context identified;- What capacities, partnerships and alliances will be needed to support improved governance linkages in the different target areas; and,- The precise measures to be taken to address the context-specific conflict issues likely to influence project implementation. <ul style="list-style-type: none">• The resultant strategy from the context analysis provides a baseline and a common basis from which partner agencies and MDF can supervise and monitor the social dimensions of project implementation.
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<p>Recommendation 3: Capitalise on existing assets to strengthen capacities to engage effectively around social issues with projects and other key stakeholders in Aceh and Nias</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Collation, analysis and dissemination of lessons learnt to projects and other key MDF stakeholders around key topics relating to social sustainability themes (e.g. social inclusion, gender mainstreaming and systematic linkages with local governance structure). • Making available via the website an accessible, user-friendly data base of existing good practice tools and methods relating to social sustainability issues (e.g. gender mainstreaming tools; methods for customer satisfaction surveys; conflict mapping tools; vulnerability analysis etc.). These types of tools are all in common usage in Indonesia and familiar to technical advisors from within the donor group on the Steering Committee and within partner agencies themselves. Sharing these kinds of information has the added benefit of supporting greater collaboration between the Secretariat and projects. It also shifts the current focus within the MDF from telling projects what they should be doing to providing guidance on how they might address social sustainability issues. • Establishment of an accessible roster of people with appropriate social development expertise, including M&E of social sustainability, from which individuals can be recommended to projects and used on a draw-down basis to support the way projects address social issues, engage with other key actors or integrate social issues into their monitoring. • There will be a number of services that the MDF can offer, without compromising its neutrality, which will support project capacities to engage around social issues. These include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - focused and regular policy fora addressing social sustainability issues; - support to project managers in developing capacity building strategies in relation to social sustainability for project staff and other key stakeholders; - coordinating and helping projects link in or develop networks between different actors focused on social sustainability issues (e.g., Oxfam, Habitat International, GERAK etc.); and, - off-grant resource support made available for collaborating activities between projects done to increase lesson learning and further social sustainability aims (e.g. in relation to social exclusion, conflict or gender equity).
<p>Recommendation 4: Use revision of the results framework to strengthen ownership and attention to social issues by partner and implementing agencies</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use the revision of the portfolio results framework to: a) build ownership in partner and implementing agencies for tracking contributions to social sustainability; and, b) strengthen the social dimensions of project level monitoring. The process for this should be linked into the dissemination of lessons learnt and the multi-stakeholder process recommended above. It would be premature, therefore, to identify a full range of steps that the portfolio and partners would need to take in this regard. We would suggest, however, that the MDF considers supporting (through external consultants and/or extra resources) collective development of indicators for new projects, or existing projects entering a second phase, working in the same sector or on similar issues (e.g. engaging with local government); • Require new projects to identify and justify the amount of resources allocated to the social dimensions of their outputs and M&E systems and ask for a detailed elaboration in the PAD as to how projects intend to set social base lines appropriate to their level of intervention; • For new projects and projects entering a second phase there should also be requirements, with budgetary support, to (re)structure the M&E system in order to embed social sustainability issues within monitoring and reporting. In order to

	<p>link the process into the results framework, it may be appropriate to make this requirement part of a specific output within the project logframe with its own indicator. By doing so, the MDF Secretariat has the basis of an aggregated indicator with concomitant data sets from which to track progress towards mainstreaming social sustainability within MDF projects. We recognise, however, that the scope of such an output would need to be broader than just social sustainability issues. The output would need to encompass the whole M&E system for a project. Whether or not this is appropriate is more properly a question for the mid-term review (MTR).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regardless of the outcome of the MTR in relation to the results framework, we recommend that the MDF sets a requirement that projects have by the end of the inception phase (or within the PAD, whichever is appropriate), provided a budget or earmarked resources for social impact assessments promised in the PAD. Experience shows that without a budget line to back it up, these types of claims made in the PAD are unlikely to be fulfilled; • Require projects which have direct involvement with local communities (e.g. ILO/RRR phase 2) to plan and budget for carrying out consistent and regular client satisfaction surveys (or other measures aimed at eliciting the extent to which beneficiaries feel they have been involved in, and are happy with, project implementation). This would enable projects to be more responsive to the demands of beneficiaries and systematically track changes in levels of participation, access and inclusion during their lifetime. Moreover, results from customer satisfaction or similar type surveys can be aggregated and fed into the portfolio-wide results framework. For example, for monitoring trends in increasing the quality and level of participation in projects or trends towards greater levels of accountability. • Use earmarked funds to support projects in collating and disseminating lessons learned in relation to social sustainability or, where appropriate, use resources to document and disseminate lessons learned across the projects. The lessons learned in this review are one set of possible topics and provide a baseline (of sorts) from which progress could be documented and reported in eighteen months to two years time. The issues developed through the proposed Aceh / Nias multi-stakeholder process (recommendation 1) offer a second set of topics from which lessons learned could be drawn.
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Abbreviations

AFEP	Aceh Forest and Environment Project
AMDAL	Environmental impact assessment according to GOI standards
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
BAFMP	Banda Aceh Flood Mitigation Project
Bappenas	National Development Planning Agency
BPKP	National Board for Controlling Development Finance
BPN	Badan Pertanahan Nasional (National Land Agency)
BRA	Aceh Reintegration Agency
BRR	Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam – Nias (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi NAD-Nias)
CBO	Community-based Organisation
CDA	Community Driven Adjudication
CDD	Community Driven Development
CFAN	Coordination Forum Aceh-Nias
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CSIA	Continuous Social Impact Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSOSP	CSO Strengthening Project
CSRR	Community-Based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project
DfID	Department for International Development of the United Kingdom
DIPA	Budget execution document
DMC	District Management Consultants
DPW	Department of Public Works
EC	European Commission
FFI	Fauna and Flora International

GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOI	Government of Indonesia
IAIA	International Association of Impact Assessment
ILO	International Labour Organisation
ILO/RRR	International Labour Organisation / Resource-based Rural Road Rehabilitation
INGO	International Non-Government Organisation
IREP	Infrastructure Reconstruction Enabling Project
IRFF	Infrastructure Reconstruction Financing Facility
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
KDP	Kecamatan Development Project
KPK	Anti-Corruption Commission
KRRP	Nias Kecamatan-based Reconstruction and Recovery Planning Project
LIF	Leuser International Foundation
LOGICA	Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh
MDF	Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MTR	Mid Term Review
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OPM	Oxford Policy Management
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PCN	Project Concept Note
PIDG	Participatory Interest Discussion Group
PNPM	National Program for Community Empowerment in Urban Areas
RALAS	Reconstruction of the Aceh Land Administration System Project
RAND	Recovery Aceh-Nias Database

RAP	Recovery Assistance Policy
RPCR	Rapid Participatory Community Research
REKOMPAK	Community-based Settlement Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project
SPADA	Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project
TA	Technical Assistance
TA to BRR	Technical Assistance to BRR
TOR	Terms of Reference
TRPRP	Tsunami Recovery Port Redevelopment Programme
TRWMP	Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Programme
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UPP	Urban Poverty Project
WALHI	Friends of the Earth Indonesia – Indonesian Environmental NGO (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia)
WFP	World Food Programme
WFPSS	World Food Programme Shipping Service
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

1 Introduction

1.1 Background to the review

Oxford Policy Management (OPM) was selected to conduct an independent review of the social sustainability practices within the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias portfolio of projects. The review examines how MDF projects have supported and addressed social sustainability, in terms of creating access, inclusion and empowerment, so that all social groups benefit equitably from projects. The review focuses on how projects have addressed gender, inclusion of poor/vulnerable people and conflict within their design and implementation.

1.1.1 Purpose of the review

The overall objective of the review is to inform the MDF Secretariat and the Steering Committee of:

- the status of compliance with project strategies and Partner Agency standards and the MDF quality criteria;
- results achieved and the beneficiary perspectives on the MDF approaches and results; and,
- recommendations for improvement in terms of the mainstreaming of social sustainability in the second phase of the MDF.

The specific objectives of the review can be summarised at different levels as below:

At the **contextual level**, the review:

- provides an understanding of the social context, the institutional landscape at community level and the effects of this context on women and / or vulnerable groups in Acehese and Nias societies;
- analyses the policy context in which projects operated and developed activities addressing social sustainability
- assesses which vulnerable groups need to be considered in different contexts within Aceh and Nias, and assesses whether they have been adequately considered as beneficiaries of MDF projects;

At the **project level**, the review:

- assesses the approaches chosen during design which supported social sustainability within MDF projects, and reviews the quality of consistent application of these practices within projects and the stated results of this application;
- determines how well approaches took into consideration local conditions and existing social norms and structures.

At the **beneficiary level**, the review:

- assesses the effectiveness of the approaches chosen;
- identifies (where possible) intermediate positive and negative results of the approaches used to enhance social sustainability in reconstruction; and,

- identifies possible areas of neglect in project implementation that have (the potential of) detrimental impacts on social sustainability.

At the **portfolio level**, the review:

- assesses the overall performance of the portfolio regarding enhancement of social sustainability;
- identifies lessons learned and challenges of mainstreaming cross-cutting themes in a reconstruction context, and more specifically in the social and cultural context of Aceh and Nias; and,
- provides recommendations:
 - to improve the performance of projects and the portfolio as a whole regarding social sustainability, where appropriate;
 - to enhance monitoring and evaluation on project level where appropriate and on portfolio level; and,
 - regarding suitable methods for follow-up to this evaluation on the portfolio-level.

It was agreed with the MDF Secretariat that the focus of the review should be on looking forward from the lessons learnt. It also needs to be strongly emphasised that the review is not an impact assessment but, rather, an overall stocktaking and assessment of portfolio and project practices relating to social sustainability and their implementation (including their possible positive and negative effects and any adjustments made based on experiences in implementation). The main effort in the review therefore focuses on the portfolio and project levels, with the contextual and beneficiary levels providing important but secondary data.

1.2 The review team

The review was conducted by a team of five international and national consultants and 16 field researchers over a period of five months (June 2008 – November 2008). All except one of the consultants had previous substantial experience of working in Indonesia and three of the consultants had worked in Aceh and Nias from just after the tsunami for both international NGOs and donors. The majority of the field researchers were either Acehnese or from Nias. Those from other areas of Indonesia had spent significant amounts of time working in Aceh and Nias both prior to and/or after the tsunami and earthquake.

The consultant team consisted of Mary Ann Brocklesby (Team Leader), Adam Burke, Simon Brook, Asima Siahaan, Dave Hampson and Sabine Garbarino.

Mary Ann Brocklesby is a social development consultant with wide experience in the areas of social development policy and practice. She has over 20 years experience of consultancy, advising, training and researching into poverty, rights-based, livelihoods and gender aspects of social development. She has also undertaken over 35 major consultancies with multilateral and bilateral donors, UN agencies and international NGOs, specialising in linking policy processes with social analysis. She has worked on both short-term consultancy and long-term assignments (four years) in Indonesia and is fluent in Bahasa Indonesia.

Adam Burke is a development specialist focusing on social issues in governance and aid coordination, especially in conflict-affected environments. He has worked for DFID, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and the World Bank in Aceh (2005-07) on conflict issues and was previously a Social Development Advisor at DFID.

Simon Brook is a senior consultant and leader of OPM's social development portfolio. He has previously worked with local NGOs, international NGOs and as a consultant for multilateral and bilateral donors. He currently works on issues of accountability; participation; qualitative and participatory methods for poverty and policy analysis; monitoring and evaluation; and civil society strengthening. He previously worked for an international NGO in Aceh (2005-06).

Dave Hampson is a senior manager in humanitarian, relief and development operations and programmes. He has worked for international NGOs as a senior manager responsible for both establishing and developing programmes in a range of contexts, including Aceh (2005) and other conflict affected areas, and also as a consultant for DFID in Indonesia.

Asima Siahaan is a gender specialist and lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of North Sumatra. Her primary research focus is on development and decentralisation and gender related issues. Since 2005 she has conducted many consultancy, training and research projects in Aceh, Nias and Simeulue. Her PhD thesis was on 'Women and Local Governance in Indonesia: A Case Study of Engendering Local Governance in North Sumatra' (Massey University, New Zealand: 2004).

Sabine Garbarino is a social development consultant in OPM's social development portfolio. She has conducted a range of consultancy and research assignments for a range of multilateral and bilateral donors on issues related to voice and accountability, stakeholder consultations to inform and promote inclusive policy making processes, and tools for institutional, political and social analysis.

The review was conducted in two phases: an inception mission of two weeks to Jakarta by Mary Ann Brocklesby and Simon Brook (including a short trip to Aceh); followed by a two week fieldwork phase in Aceh¹. The rapid participatory community research fieldwork was conducted over a three week period before Ramadan and supervised by two of the international consultants. The majority of the team's time was spent in Aceh and Nias.

1.3 Assessing social sustainability: Principles and framework

Our original intention was to use the MDF definition of social sustainability to shape the development of the analysis framework. This proved not to be possible. Whilst MDF documents (e.g. the RAP and the ToRs for this review) described the actions that projects should take to support progress towards social sustainability, nowhere was the term itself defined. This was also true within individual project documentation. We explore this issue in more detail in section 3. We also discounted spending time developing a working definition of social sustainability to guide the analysis. We did this for two reasons:

- We did not want to assess the MDF portfolio and its constituent projects using a conceptual definition not in common usage. This would have been an imposition and undoubtedly biased the findings.
- The time constraints of the review meant that we could not in the time available involve key MDF stakeholders (e.g. MDF Secretariat staff; Steering Committee members; project Task Team Leaders, etc.) in developing and agreeing a working definition for social

¹ This also included a second short trip to Jakarta by the Team Leader to conduct further interviews.

sustainability. Such an agreement, in view of the lack of an existing agreed concept, would have been a prerequisite for ensuring the review followed standard ethical assessment practice.²

The review team discussed this issue at the inception feedback meeting with the MDF Secretariat (03/07/2008). It was agreed that in the review the team would seek examples of social impact³ that would be sustainable beyond the period of major external aid intervention.

1.3.1 Components of the framework

The analysis framework developed during the inception mission recognised a number of interlinked themes (see below) set out in the original Terms of Reference and was developed to ensure that all those components were addressed concurrently and not as stand-alone processes. This is because project approaches, if explicit, will inevitably have been interlinked and, even when there has been a focus on one aspect, for example women's participation, there will have been intended and unintended consequences for other areas such as inclusion and access.

The themes identified in the TOR (see Annex AAnnex A) were: setting the framework; enhancing access and inclusion; supporting empowerment; conflict mitigation; intermediate results analysis; and, effects of the reconstruction context.

The framework also took account of the way in which the MDF's RAP recognises that it is attention to all these aspects in unison which leads to social sustainability. However, the ways in which a project addresses these issues depends on: its overall goal and objectives; its design; and the systems and processes used and developed through implementation.

There were therefore five interlinked components of the analytical framework, each one centred on assessing a different aspect of project approaches towards addressing social sustainability. Whilst there are inevitable overlaps between the components, division of the framework provided an organisational structure through which analysis was made and it allowed for meaningful comparison between different projects and differing types of intervention. The areas were:


- Contribution to social sustainability;
 - Voice, participation and accountability;
 - Inclusion and equity issues;
 - Results: benefits and capacities; and,
 - Social sustainability practices in the MDF portfolio.
-

² Nonetheless, every effort was made to elicit opinions about how social sustainability was understood and used within the MDF. During the inception visit key informants (e.g. including MDF Secretariat staff, Task Team Leaders, etc) were asked how social sustainability was understood. This was followed up in phase two of the research. A stakeholder meeting with donors, representatives of Bappenas and project implementers was also held, which explored the concept of social sustainability and how it was understood. The minutes of this meeting are contained within Annex B.

³ That is "the intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and any social change processes invoked by those interventions." (IAIA, 2002: 2).

Combining these areas of enquiry under one framework for analysis, as Figure 1.1 below demonstrates, enabled the team to systematically address and trace the ways in which different projects and their approaches contributed towards increased social sustainability.

Figure 1.1 Framework for analysis of social sustainability



1.3.2 Social sustainability practices in the MDF portfolio

The starting point for the review was an understanding of the social sustainability practice within the projects in the MDF portfolio. This thematic area was the basis for the whole analysis and included attention to the following:

- The intention, design, planning, implementation and M&E of the MDF projects in including and addressing social sustainability issues;
- The differences and commonalities in project approaches to addressing social sustainability issues; and,
- The flexibility of projects in responding to and adjusting their approach in terms of gender equity, inclusion, empowerment, access and conflict in the light of changing circumstances and the phases of the overall response (i.e. relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation).

Specifically, from this understanding, the review of practices focused on the three interlinked thematic areas as explained in the following sections.

1.3.3 Voice, participation and accountability

This area of enquiry looked at the extent to which different social groups are able to express their voices, share their opinions and participate in project activities. By voice we mean measures used by civil society actors, ranging from participation in decision-making and resource allocation to lodging complaints and engaging in organised protest or lobbying, to put pressure on public officials and service providers to demand better outcomes for service delivery and access to resources.

In terms of social sustainability the theme looked at the form that participation takes and what participation leads to. It is important to gain an understanding not only of what participation looks like and appears to lead to but also of what people feel about their participation and the goals which they set for it. For example, did project beneficiaries feel empowered by taking part in the project and what did this sense of empowerment mean to them? We use the term empowerment to mean processes which: increase people's sense of themselves and their worth; build their skills, capacities and knowledge to make a valued contribution to decision-making; shape their destiny; and challenge relationships of power which may undermine their security and well-being.⁴

Linked to voice and participation was the issue of accountability. By accountability we mean that systems, processes and mechanisms are in place to ensure that agreements and contracts (both formal, legally binding agreements and contracts and informal social contracts) made between public officials, service deliverers and civil society members, such as project beneficiaries) are kept and publicised. Additionally, when agreements and contracts are not adhered to there are systems in place for complaint and redress (for example access to justice, ombudspersons or simple complaints boxes in communities).

The assessment aimed to look at who is accountable to whom and for what purpose, and the direction of accountability (e.g. within projects is accountability only upwards? Or do systems for mutual transparency and accountability exist?)

Specific areas for exploration included:

- Patterns of targeting and including women and poor/vulnerable groups in project activities;
- Capacities of, and opportunities for, communities to challenge project staff and decisions, including "who in the community?";
- Processes and systems for transparency and accountability of projects and partners with targeted communities; and,
- Patterns and standards in supporting active participation in decision-making and resource allocation by women and poor/vulnerable groups.

1.3.4 Inclusion and equity

This thematic area had a strong focus on issues of power relationships and how they shaped inclusion and equity. Inclusion was understood to mean "the continuous process of ensuring

⁴ Brocklesby and Crawford (forthcoming 2009).

that all people, including those who are normally marginalised and excluded from full participation in society, can take valued part in decision-making processes and fulfil their rights and responsibilities as citizens”.⁵ In the context of sustainability the term equity has to do with fairness – that is whether all people, regardless of who they are or their status within society, receive similar treatment and respect as well as having similar rights, opportunities and access to decision-making, resource allocation and public goods and services.

Within this theme the review looked at the systems and processes projects use to systematically address issues of inclusion and how they measure progress towards increased inclusion of women and all poor people. From this perspective we are looking for trends in the identification of vulnerabilities and/or vulnerable groups and at how these vulnerabilities are addressed. Here, vulnerability is understood to mean the extent to which people are exposed to the damaging effects of periodic disasters and the negative conditions in their social, economic and physical environment.⁶

Vulnerability therefore describes the factors which make people more exposed to the negative impacts of disasters and their living circumstances. Economic poverty is an obvious vulnerability. Other factors include sudden shocks such as: economic collapse or natural disasters (e.g. earthquake, flood); a lack of adequate understanding and awareness (for example because of insufficient or inappropriate communication of information and ideas); embedded social and cultural attitudes and practices which discriminate against, disadvantage or give precedence to certain people on certain grounds (such as gender or age, ethnicity or religion); attitudes towards people carrying out certain behaviours (such as injecting drugs, working in the sex industry) or reactions to people with different health status (e.g. people living with HIV, people with TB) within societies.

In order to fully understand the extent to which existing power relationships support or undermine inclusion and equity, attention was focused on intra-household and intra-community relationships as well as on the structural relationships formed between projects, institutions and groups. We were seeking to see whether, through project support, relationships between communities and external stakeholders are characterised by increased diversity, openness, equity and accountability. This includes a focus on conflict – in the broadest sense – household, community, GAM- related and aid-engendered.

Themes for exploration included:

- Did projects support linkages between communities and sub-district/district levels and how?
- Partnerships and networks between project and communities – e.g. did they include women and poor/vulnerable people?
- Ways that conflict issues were addressed by projects;
- Accessibility of external stakeholders to community demands – who was listened and/or responded to?

⁵ Brocklesby and Crawford (forthcoming 2009).

⁶ See, for example, Prowse (2003) and Sabates Wheeler and Haddad (2005) for a fuller discussion on vulnerability.

- Information flows between projects and stakeholders including communities – e.g. what were they and did information reach poor/vulnerable men and women?
- Trends in addressing and reducing social exclusion within targeted communities; and,
- Patterns in addressing and promoting gender equity.

1.3.5 Results: benefits and capacities

The third thematic area looked at who benefited and who, if anyone, did not and whether the benefits have been shared equitably. In a period of three years it is difficult to assess the extent to which changes brought about due to the presence of MDF-supported projects can be sustained and institutionalised. However, under this thematic area we aimed to identify trends (negative and positive) in social sustainability in terms of whether skills and other benefits developed by beneficiaries through projects are being transferred into other aspects of human security and poverty reduction. Areas examined included:

- Perceived changes in the capacity of community members, including poor and marginalised people, to apply skills and competencies;
- Perspectives of communities including the poor and most-marginalised people;
- Ability of projects to optimise resource take-up in relation to targets for different social groups in communities; and,
- Likely mid- to long-term results – both positive and negative – on inclusion and equity within the project areas.

1.3.6 Overall policy context

All the above areas were considered within the overall policy context within which the MDF was established and within which both the fund and projects operate. The following areas therefore need to be considered when considering the contribution of MDF portfolio projects to social sustainability:


- The establishment process of the MDF and the opportunities this provided and/or constraints this presented in terms of addressing social sustainability issues;
- The position of the MDF within the overall response coordinated by BRR, including the leverage that the MDF group of donors had to raise issues relating to social sustainability and influence approaches;
- The different phases – relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction – and how the policy environment changed over time as implementation responses changed; and,
- The ways in which the policy environment either opened up opportunities or created barriers for projects to address social sustainability issues in a systematic way.

1.4 Assessing social sustainability: Methodology

The review of social sustainability practices within the MDF required a combination of methods and tools which together provided a range of data to understand the contribution of the MDF portfolio to social sustainability. Each method provided specific data directly relevant to the review, and in combination ensures robustness in analysis by systematic triangulation of data. As Figure 1.2 below indicates, the methodology included: a review of available data from within MDF and secondary related data from other projects and researchers, key informant interviews with stakeholders from all levels of the MDF's

operational scope and a rapid participatory community research which ensured the voices of the targeted beneficiaries were integrated into the analysis as fully as possible.

Figure 1.2 Overview of research methods



1.4.2 Literature review

A review of relevant documents (including project appraisal documents (PAD); MDF partner agency standards and guidelines; Government of Indonesia standards issued for reconstruction in Aceh and Nias; project progress reports; relevant project MIS data; results from independent project evaluations; MDF Secretariat reports; and other available documentation on reconstruction in Aceh and Nias) was undertaken. To a limited extent, experiences in other post-disaster contexts are taken into consideration where possible. The document review provides the basis for an understanding of:

- the social and cultural context in Aceh and Nias;
- the reconstruction context within which the MDF projects are implemented;
- the policy context within which the MDF was established and the portfolio operates, including changes over time during different stages of the response (i.e. relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation);
- vulnerable groups in the reconstruction context of Aceh and Nias, and those most relevant to the review;
- how the MDF defined and described vulnerable groups, and concepts such as social sustainability, participation and inclusion;

- how implementing agencies defined and described vulnerable groups and concepts such as social sustainability, participation and inclusion;
- how social sustainability objectives were reflected in the planning documents of each project, and the results and flexibility/adaptability shown by projects and the MDF in addressing social sustainability issues.

1.4.3 Key informant interviews

Key informant interviews were conducted with, amongst others, project stakeholders, BRR and local government, MDF Secretariat, Steering Committee members and other donors, field staff, other reconstruction stakeholders and local NGOs and CSOs. These were semi-structured and designed to elicit information on a similar range of areas to the document review and in line with the analysis framework described in Section 1.3 (Figure 1.1). The interviews were conducted by the core consulting team.

Key informant interviews enabled a greater depth of understanding regarding the issues above. They also provided explanatory information on how and why social sustainability issues have or have not been incorporated into project design and implementation, and the issues faced in addressing social sustainability objectives. Detailed question area sheets were developed and shared between the core team and the MDF Secretariat. Annex C gives the draft report format for key informant interviews which uses the components of the framework of analysis. Annex D provides a list of the key informants met or contacted by phone/email by the core consultant team (some key informants were met more than once and/or by more than one member of the team).

1.4.4 Rapid Participatory Community Assessment

The third element of the overall review methodology was a rapid participatory community assessment which added depth and local contextual understanding in terms of how MDF projects addressed and supported social sustainability. Whilst the primary focus of the review was on an analysis of data from the first two elements, the participatory community assessment involved a comparatively significant degree of effort and enabled a degree of “traceability” of actions; assessing within communities whether projects were doing what they committed to do under the terms of MDF support and for projects in terms of:

- Addressing social diversity – were projects reaching and working with all targeted beneficiaries;
- Reach – what were the linkages between beneficiaries, local government and other key project stakeholders; and,
- The projects’ attention to and progress towards building capacities of targeted groups.

1.4.4.1 Community selection and sampling

Eight communities were selected to cover a broad range of different contexts within Aceh and Nias. This ensured that as many as possible of the potentially marginalised and vulnerable groups within the overall context of tsunami and earthquake response in Aceh and Nias were identified. The criteria used for community sampling were as follows:

Aceh (6 villages)

- range of MDF supported projects implemented in the immediate area;
- geographical distribution – rural, peri-urban, urban, east coast, west coast, kota Banda Aceh;

- differences in poverty levels (where the data was available below district level);
- impact of tsunami – high and low; and,
- impact of conflict – high, medium and low.

Nias (2 villages)

- range of MDF supported projects implemented in the immediate area;
- geographical distribution – north/south;
- differences in poverty levels (where the data was available below district level); and,
- impact of earthquake – high and low.

A key selection criterion for the MDF Secretariat was the range of MDF-funded projects operating within the community, which itself had implications on the selection process due to limited information available to the Secretariat. Annex E shows the communities in Aceh and Nias selected for field work and the criteria met for each. The selection was based on village lists provided by the MDF Secretariat for relevant projects and information from key informants with knowledge regarding the criteria that particular communities or villages met. The communities selected were agreed with the MDF Secretariat prior to fieldwork.

In line with best practice and standard research protocols, the final report does not include the real names of the villages and communities in order to ensure the anonymity and confidentiality of respondents/participants. Annex E lists the sub-districts and districts but actual names of communities at *Desa* level have been replaced with fictional ones.

1.4.4.2 Rapid participatory community assessment field team

The participatory research team comprised 16 researchers – four field team supervisors and 12 researchers – split into three teams for Aceh and one team for Nias. An aim was to ensure that all the teams for Aceh had a majority of Acehnese researchers, and this was achieved with the Aceh teams comprising approximately 75% native Acehnese researchers. Of the non-Acehnese researchers, all had spent significant amounts of time living and working across Aceh.

In Nias, the aim was also to have a majority of Nias speakers within the team. However, recruitment of researchers from Nias proved very difficult and so only one of the team was from Nias (although the Nias team supervisor had also significant work experience in Nias). Language issues were addressed through the use of a translator who joined the team.

Each team had an equal division along gender lines to ensure two women researchers and two male researchers within each team. This was to ensure that women only focus groups could be held within all social groups in communities including with the most vulnerable and poorest women.

1.4.4.3 Rapid participatory community assessment tools

The community research was conducted through participatory interest group discussions (PIGDs) and used three participatory tools to help understand different vulnerabilities *within* communities and changes in levels of vulnerability, access, inclusion, voice and empowerment over time for different social groups.

Originally it was proposed to use only a Community Score Card instrument to guide a discussion around questions designed to reflect areas of social sustainability. During the inception phase, however, the analysis framework was developed further to incorporate different vulnerabilities *within* communities and changes in levels of vulnerability, access,

inclusion, voice and empowerment over time for different social groups. Two further participatory tools, both of which can be used with all social groups, were used to gather data on and analyse these themes: vulnerability mapping and “spokes”.

Careful consideration was given to methodology design; tools needed both to cover a wide range of review questions and to be relatively simple and easy to complete, so as to avoid excessive methodology explanation time at community level.

The tools are described briefly below, with more detailed descriptions in Annex F.

Vulnerability mapping

A key issue of the review was: “to what extent have the activities of MDF-supported projects in a specific location reduced people’s vulnerability to poverty and social exclusion”. Whilst no one tool provided the answer, taking time to look at vulnerability (what it meant to different interests groups; who they thought were the most vulnerable in their area; how this has changed over time and, what they thought were the causes of vulnerability) went some way in helping to build up a picture of whether or not project activities helped reduce people’s vulnerability.

A vulnerability map is a visual tool used to initiate these types of discussions with selected and specific groups of people chosen, for example, by age, or gender, or livelihood group, or well-being status. Capturing responses from a range of interest groups enabled an analysis of commonalities and differences and to pick up on trends in inclusion.

Spokes

“Spokes” is a very simple participatory activity which is used to explore any number of different themes and topics. Following discussion on a topic, symbols for issues are arranged around the outside of a circle. These are then joined to a central point by lines drawn on the ground, or by sticks etc. to form a wheel. The centre represents “us”, or “the project” or “now”, and the symbols around the edge of the wheel represent things we want to achieve. Participants are asked to discuss together. They then make a mark along each spoke where they think they, or the project, is now (in relation to the things they want to achieve). It is important that participants do not try to give percentage values to the distances they are marking. The marks should show the value in spatial terms and show also the achievement of one issue relative to another. Spokes allows for comparison between what is desired or the ultimate goal of project activities, (the edge of the circle) and where we are now (the markers). For the rapid participatory community research the question area we addressed was:

“What are the different things needed to ensure that all people in the community can feel secure and maintain their well-being now and in the future?”

This helped link the analysis of the specific – the community score card on project activities – to broader considerations of community perceptions of social sustainability.

The key question was tested and refined during piloting. Through this key question other questions relating to access, inclusion, empowerment and equity were also explored.

Community Score Card

A Community Score Card (CSC) is an interactive monitoring tool usually used to increase accountability of service providers by getting the views of different groups of people on the

quality, accessibility and relevance of various public services. For this review of social sustainability, the CSC focussed on issues of access, targeting, inclusion, empowerment, participation etc.

The CSC is described as a “mixed method” tool because it generates both quantitative and qualitative data and analysis. The quantitative data comprise perception scores of specific qualities of service provision, usually scored on a 4 or 5 point scale. The crucial point is that qualitative data and analysis are also elicited during the focus group discussion, diagnosing the scores and providing direct explanations for the scores collected and offers policy makers insights that a quantitative survey would not.

Groups are asked to discuss amongst themselves and provide a group score that reflects the group consensus. The key to a successful CSC session, in contrast with a household survey instrument, is that the scores are not simply elicited as an end in themselves but feed qualitative discussion. For this reason, the facilitators of the CSC session are actively involved in an interactive group discussion, prompting and guiding the discussion, in contrast to survey enumerators who minimise their influence on the respondent in order to reduce bias. The interactive focus group setting of a CSC exercise allows the facilitators to use the scores generated to encourage an in-depth diagnostic discussion by the group.

The questions used in the scorecard activity can be found in Annex F.

1.4.4.4 Disaggregating social groups within communities for PIDGs

The sampling framework was designed to ensure we captured social difference and diversity within the selected communities. The sampling was purposive and stratified in that we targeted particular segments of the community, specifically poor, marginalised and vulnerable people, within each community. As well as more vulnerable and marginalised groups, the sampling also captured better-off groups and both formal and informal leaders within communities.

It is very important that PIDGs should be conducted with homogenous groups of people within the community – i.e. they should be groups of young widowers only, or poor women only, or female youths only, or old men etc. The number and types of group was dependent on the community the team went to and the type of project.

Sampling within communities was therefore slightly different in each location. However, many of the social groups identified were common across Aceh and Nias (e.g. female-headed households; single parents; widows/ widowers; orphan headed households; landless families; the “new poor”) whilst others were specific to particular contexts (e.g. returning conflict-affected IDPs; ethnic groups).

When working with communities, researchers held separate discussions with female and male participants. PIDGs were held with different interest groups in the research sites, which reflected the social context as well as the targeting approach (where appropriate) used by MDF-supported projects in the selected location. In summary the focus groups aimed to include:

- Informal and formal community leaders, including government officers, elected representatives;
- Bangsawan
- Especially poor, vulnerable and/or marginalised people, including widows, orphans, single parents, landless, disabled and chronically sick people, people who receive *zakat*;

- Better-off people in terms of poverty status and livelihood security;
- Older men;
- Older women;
- Men of “adult” status;
- Women of “adult” status;
- Young men;
- Young women;
- Special interest groups: e.g. teachers, medical staff, fishermen, foresters, GAM ex-combatants, conflict affected IDPs etc, relevant to the location and projects;
- People in partner organisations, who are directly working in village on MDF-supported projects (e.g. community facilitators).

For qualitative research, it is unrealistic to be too prescriptive over the number of groups and number of men and women that must be included in the focus groups. This is because of the range of variables determining participation, particularly with regard to extremely poor/vulnerable people who are usually less familiar and comfortable with group discussions. By the end of the research, 78 PIDGs had been conducted with groups in Aceh and Nias plus individual interviews with key informants at community level.

1.4.5 Challenges to the review

A range of challenges were faced during the review, both by the core team of consultants and the field research team. These included:

- **Attribution** – All stakeholders recognise that because of the size of the response and the volume of aid directed at Relief, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (RRR) identifying and isolating direct links between specific projects, the strategies used and changes on the ground is difficult.

This was made more difficult with the selection of communities for research where multiple MDF projects were implemented in addition to projects implemented by other agencies.

- **“Survey fatigue”** – monitoring missions from government, donors, NGOs have been very frequent and targeted-communities have had to deal with, in some cases, an overload of outsiders asking questions. This can pose problems in the field in trying to establish rapport and encourage a range of social groups to participate in the community assessment.

In order to address this issue the field teams spent five days in each community rather than the originally proposed three in order to optimise possibilities to meet with people who would not normally be available for in-depth interviews. However, even with this extra time teams found it difficult to arrange convenient times with busy community members and often worked late at night in order to overcome this problem.

- **Linking intention to action** – There are gaps in documentation and not all projects report at the same level of detail with regard to the social sustainability elements described in the RAP.

To address this efforts were made to develop time lines and profiles for each of the projects under review, including, where appropriate, activities which were integral to a project’s approach but not necessarily funded by MDF, for example in relation to conflict sensitivity. This contributed to a holistic understanding of the ways in which projects both intended to, and in reality did, address social sustainability.

- **Lack of baseline or outcome/impact data** – Not all programmes established a baseline against which progress towards outcomes could be tracked and impacts identified. Nor did all projects report against projected outcomes. This is particularly the case with regard to gender and inclusion where data was often limited to attendance in project groups and did not necessarily relate to way decisions were made, who made them or how capacities to participate changed over time (i.e. empowerment issues).

Approaches to address this included triangulating methods and using secondary data and interviews as “proxy” for gaps in the available base-line and/or impact data.

- **Fractured institutional memory** – Many of the people involved in the first two years of the MDF’s work at project level had left by the time of the review. This compromised the ability to fully understand and analyse how projects adapted their approach to social sustainability issues over time.

Telephone interviews were used, together with email where necessary, to contact and include a sample of ex-project staff (MDF and non-MDF) within the key informants contacted and interviewed.

1.5 Outline of the report

The rest of this review report follows the following outline:

Context analysis

A short section providing the contextual background in terms of the changing environment in which the MDF has operated since inception. This includes political context, immediate aftermath of the disaster and the policy environment (e.g. establishment of MDF / Recovery Assistance Policy and Master Plan) but is not a main focus of the report.

MDF Portfolio approaches to Social Sustainability

This section includes an assessment of: project selection and design (including screening, selection and approval processes); creating synergies for social sustainability; and conflict issues in relation to the MDF.

Project approaches to Social Sustainability

An assessment of individual projects in relation to social sustainability practices in design and implementation, together with lessons learned.

Looking forward: Recommendations

The final section is a series of recommendations structured around a series of key messages emerging from the research.

2 Multi Donor Fund Context Analysis

2.1 The aftermath: Agency response

In the 26th December 2004 tsunami more than 167,000 people died or were registered missing; 127,000 houses were destroyed and a similar number damaged. The subsequent earthquake in Nias on the 28th March 2005 killed 850 people and destroyed or damaged 35,000 more houses. In total over 500,000 people were homeless, many hospitals and health posts were destroyed, as were 1,488 schools, 230 km of roads and nine seaports. About three quarters of a million people – one in six of the population – were direct victims, but virtually everyone suffered palpably, through loss of friends and relatives, lost livelihood or trauma.

The initial emergency phase involved assistance from the Indonesian and foreign militaries, along with a vast number of international and domestic relief agencies. Accommodation was provided for most victims either in tents or in temporary 'barracks'. Most people in need were reached by a combination of government cash support and provision of goods and services from many different bodies; this operation was relatively effective given the scale of the disaster.

As agencies moved from an emergency-footing to longer-term reconstruction, donor pressure for coordination of the response increased. In April 2005 the Indonesian government responded with a Master Plan and set up a coordinating body to oversee the response: the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam – Nias (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi NAD-Nias) or BRR.

In contrast to many other emergency and disaster responses, funding was not a problem in Aceh: following the tsunami private individuals and governments donated unprecedented sums. The challenge in early-mid 2005 was mobilising a reconstruction response in challenging operating conditions: the disaster affected hundreds of miles of coastline and the worst-affected areas were made inaccessible by damaged roads. Aceh was a new field for many international staff of agencies, who therefore had little knowledge of the context. The scale of the tragedy meant that government was not functioning in many fields; even before the tsunami political change across Indonesia and long-term violent internal conflict in Aceh limited the scope of what government could do.

2.2 Establishing the Multi-donor Fund (MDF) for Aceh and Nias

The World Bank (WB) aimed to use its position as a coordinating donor to good effect soon after the tsunami. It set up what was designed as a multi-donor office in Aceh, mirroring similar WB-led operations in Jakarta and in Makassar for eastern Indonesia. It also promoted 'CDD' – community driven development – as a basis for all interventions in a series of meetings.⁷

⁷ Also promoted more widely – see Cliffe, Guggenheim and Kostner (2003) Community-Driven Reconstruction as an Instrument in War-to-Peace Transitions. WB CPR Working Paper No. 7, August 2003

With the Government of Indonesia's approval, donor agencies encouraged the WB to set up and manage the Multi Donor Trust Fund (MDF) as one of the mechanisms to ensure efficient and coordinated delivery of financial support. Many donors initially provided a minimum stake to ensure representation within the fund's decision-making forums.

By June 2005 the first round of MDF proposals had been sifted and some accepted. Understandably, given pressure to avoid delay, many of these funding proposals were largely based on extensions of existing projects. However, there was consternation at the time that only WB projects were accepted. Other agencies with implementing capacity tried to access MDF funds but were not successful. Over time some UN agency projects, along with one NGO project managed by the WB, were also funded, but a perspective remained that the MDF was a body that agencies could fund, but that would not in turn fund them.

Overall, donor coordination in the reconstruction phase was not strong. The dominance of international NGOs (INGOs), some of which had budgets of hundreds of millions of dollars, meant that standard donor coordination mechanisms missed out over half of the international funding. Additionally, the high profile of the tsunami in donor nations meant that agencies (NGOs and bi-laterals alike) preferred individual projects to pooled funds. From mid-2005 on the Indonesian Government's BRR grew in capacity and scope and many donors looked towards supporting BRR as a means to achieve government-led coordination rather than concentrating on donor mechanisms.

Given this context a majority of donors did not put significant funds into common pools. Where donors did engage in common approaches much support was directed at a common debt moratorium for the Government of Indonesia, enabling it to reallocate resources of its own to the reconstruction effort. So whilst the MDF received in total some US\$700 million in pledges from donors as of June 2008, this represents only 10-15% of the total amount pledged globally for Aceh and Nias. Almost 90% of MDF funds come from the European Union (EU) and its member countries. Some of the largest donors – such as Japan, Australia – either did not contribute to the MDF or provided token amounts. Some international NGOs also considered donating to the MDF in what would have been a highly unusual move but in the event chose not to.

It is important to see the MDF in this regard when it comes to appraising its practices in and impact on social sustainability in Aceh and Nias. The MDF was set up as a channel to promote rapid project implementation, addressing concerns at the time over the slow response of donors. It fulfilled this early role, but did not change greatly over time. With more funds going through other channels, and BRR increasingly establishing itself as a government coordinating body, the MDF did not assume a deeper or more 'intelligent' role in terms of appraising need or gaps. The MDF continued as a forum for donors to meet and discuss issues. Donors applied early pressure for clear MDF policies on the process of appraising funding proposals, partly in frustration at a perceived preference for WB projects, and the MDF's Recovery Assistance Policy (RAP) was one result of this.

2.3 Reconstruction in Aceh: the post conflict context

Social conditions and sustainability in Aceh are heavily affected by three decades of civil conflict. After several rounds of negotiations between the GoI and GAM, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in August 2005. This was a highly significant event for Aceh and the unfolding peace process strengthened over the subsequent months.

For most donor tsunami aid, both the conflict and the peace process made little difference, however. Some donors such as UNDP and the WB had ongoing peace-related programmes

in other parts of Indonesia, but even so most agencies rarely managed to apply such experience to post-tsunami reconstruction in Aceh.

Parallel to post-tsunami support, a range of donors did become increasingly involved in peace building work. The EU had backed the political peace process and supported additional development activities to run alongside it. Other donors were then asked by GoI to assist, including UNDP and the World Bank. Some bi-laterals (USA, Japan), implementing agencies (International Organisation of Migration) and NGOs (Oxfam, MSF) also aimed to support efforts towards peace in different ways.

Over time BRR encouraged greater donor involvement in areas of Aceh not immediately affected by the tsunami, given that the entire province was indirectly affected in many ways. Gradually emerging issues of governance also brought donors into Aceh-wide issues linked with promoting sustainable peace. As a result the barriers between peace building work and tsunami reconstruction were reduced over time.

However, the vast majority of post-tsunami donor aid cannot realistically be described as 'conflict-sensitive'. Typically, tsunami reconstruction work was fully funded or over-funded whilst peace-related programming attracted far less support. In addition, most major reconstruction programmes integrated little in the way of peace sensitivity except for efforts to reduce potential risk to existing project plans.⁸

2.4 Recent developments in the Aceh-Nias policy context

The BRR has always had a defined timeframe for coordinating the reconstruction efforts in Aceh and Nias and is currently winding down operations in line with the end of its mandate in April 2009. After this date, rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes will return to normal state mechanisms with planning being coordinated by Bappenas and programmes implemented by line ministries and Penda (local government).

This has had several impacts on the cooperation between BRR and MDF, for instance with the MDF Steering Committee meeting less regularly now than in the past. It is also unclear to what degree Bappenas is able to seriously address and include social sustainability issues with its reconstruction role and its dealings with MDF in the future.

⁸ See, for example, Barron and Burke (2008) Supporting Peace in Aceh. Policy Study 47, East West Center, Washington.

3 MDF Portfolio: Approaches to Social Sustainability

3.1 Overview: Ensuring social sustainability

The key message to emerge from the review is that **the MDF does not have the mechanisms and processes through which it can effectively guide, monitor or add value to the social sustainability practices of individual projects.**

The MDF fulfilled its early role as a channel to promote rapid project implementation, addressing concerns at the time over the slow response of donors. In this regard the fund instrument did not change greatly over time. As such, what was “fit for purpose” during the relief and the early stages of recovery became increasingly problematic as the MDF moved towards a reconstruction response directed at long term sustainability. Moreover, the modest costs of the administration, monitoring and evaluation of the MDF⁹ may be appropriate for a funding conduit but such “light touch” dispersal and oversight does not necessarily lead to establishing a pro-active and longer-term developmental focus on social sustainability.

Arguably, in relation to the fund’s structure, the responsibility to promote and mainstream social sustainability issues in projects was not wholly MDF’s. Partner agencies and the BRR had more direct responsibility for ensuring projects addressed social sustainability: the role of the MDF, and specifically its Secretariat, was for oversight and coordination. Limited staff time and resources restricted its ability to engage with and influence partner and implementing agencies and therefore to integrate social issues into projects. MDF accountability mechanisms were also weak, limiting its ability to oblige projects to fulfil the social sustainability intentions outlined in project PADs. Throughout the project cycle of selection, approval, implementation and oversight there have been deficiencies in the mainstreaming of social issues and, in particular, with regard to conflict sensitivity.

3.2 Project selection, design and approval

There is a recurring argument from both within and outside the MDF that BRR was ultimately responsible for ensuring social sustainability. There is clearly truth in this assertion. One of the acknowledged strengths of the MDF has been the use of the MDF Steering Committee by donors to form common agendas on issues of significance, enabling more effective co-ordination with BRR. As BRR’s directive role increased it successfully encouraged MDF funding of work not supported elsewhere. MDF received respect from BRR and donors for such gap-filling flexibility and for fully supporting domestic government ownership of policy direction.

While the MDF was able to exert some influence over BRR in terms of policy and, to some extent, the selection of projects, this influence did not extend to engendering social sustainability practices. Whilst BRR did build both policies and mechanisms (including dedicated staff) to address social issues, it was felt by many donors and civil representatives that their impact was limited. Familiar development challenges involved in mainstreaming social issues into programming emerged within BRR. Gender policies, for example, were formed on the margins and not fully implemented. It is beyond the scope of this review to

⁹ Set at a maximum target of 2% of grants, and in the early years -2005/2006 - was well below that.

assess BRR's work in this regard. However, we would highlight that the MDF appeared limited in being able to use its position as a joint donor fund to influence and promote greater attention to social sustainability in project design and delivery.

- **No common understanding of the concept of social sustainability**

An overarching concern in relation to social sustainability is that nowhere within the MDF is there a definition or explanation of what is meant by the concept. The Recovery Assistance Policy (RAP) comes closest (RAP: Part IV: C-H) by outlining the actions that projects are expected to take in order to support progress towards social sustainability – good governance, poverty reduction, gender, conflict sensitivity, etc. These are the range of social issues that would be expected to be addressed in good development practice anywhere. However there is no discussion or statement about what social sustainability is or, more importantly, what it might look like in Acehese society post-tsunami or Nias post-earthquake. This is a serious gap as it gives potential applicants and supported projects no real indication of what they are being asked to achieve in terms of social sustainability.

For all the projects under review we could find no common understanding of the term and, for the most part, it was not a living concept guiding their work. For the UNDP, ILO and WFP projects it is not a term used institutionally and does not appear in internal documents addressing social safeguards. Even within the World Bank, where the term has more purchase, managers of sponsored projects had not necessarily seen the RAP or had differing views about the concept. Clarifying the concept is more than a policy exercise. At its simplest a clear operational definition provides the basis for the social benchmarks and indicators (outcomes and impacts) that can be used to track progress towards social sustainability.

- **Recovery Assistance Policy weak in social sustainability detail**

The RAP appeared to have little currency for almost all of the projects under review. It was written after the first four projects funded through the MDF (KDP, UPP, RALAS and REKOMPAK) had been approved and some projects were unaware of it (for example, BAFMP, WFPSS and AFEP). When it had been used it appeared to be more of an aid to supporting funding applications than a set of guidelines for shaping project design, implementation and monitoring.

Yet for the MDF (both for the Secretariat and the Steering Committee members) the RAP was key to making funding decisions and it guided review and assessment both in the technical sub-committee and the full Steering Committee. However, it has little to say on social sustainability. The RAP offers no policy guidelines on what is expected from projects from different sectors, of different scope and/or of different size. There is no elaboration, even in the most general terms, on which social issues are important and how they should be addressed by different types of projects. It appears to suggest a "blueprint approach" to the social dimensions of reconstruction and recovery. Social sustainability issues are not, for example, the same in large scale infrastructure projects as they are for a civil society strengthening project or a forest conservation initiative. A more detailed elaboration of the way cross-cutting social issues are expected to be addressed would have provided standards and benchmarks against which different types of projects could be assessed and appraised. This could have been undertaken with senior implementing managers providing the first draft analysis and targets, backed up by MDF staff with expertise on social development issues. Arguably such a move may have increased project ownership and the seriousness with which issues were addressed and, therefore, social impact; it may have also reduced time spent on appraisal and review processes.

Additionally, the RAP lacked teeth. There were no mechanisms put in place to ensure the policies were pursued. Even where the RAP mentions appropriate social terminology there is little concrete to follow it up. The RAP stresses that the MDF Steering Committee should ensure that projects promote gender equity and be sensitive to conflict problems. It is not clear how this was meant to happen without mechanisms to make it happen.

- **The MDF had limited opportunities to influence PCN selection**

There was a limited extent to which the MDF could prioritise social sustainability issues during screening and selection. BRR became the first filter and largely directed the types of projects to be funded. Project Concept Notes (PCNs) from the MDF – like those of all other projects – went through a BRR PCN project workshop at which decisions were made regarding whether to fund or to reject. During the first two years of funding the pressure to disburse funds made it difficult to influence BRR project selections. Given the whole other range of other issues involved (e.g. relevance of project, capacity to deliver, risks etc.) it is understandable that social issues were not the highest priority.

3.2.1 Social sustainability in the appraisal process and PADs

During the early years of the MDF the technical review focused on the structure of the proposal and design to the detriment of a full assessment of its social dimensions and potential impacts. As the fund moves to support “transition” there has been an increased focus on social issues in the appraisal process, particularly with regard to gender¹⁰. Nevertheless, and perhaps because of the RAP, there is a strong feeling amongst partner and implementing agencies that the technical review lacks clarity with regard to social issues. It has in cases led to a mechanistic response to reviewer comments in order to obtain project approval – for example by omitting the word ‘conflict’ in documents or adding the word ‘gender’ – rather than more engagement in substantive dialogue about the project design.

Generally, social safeguard regulations of partner agencies were addressed in the PADs after the initial round of project approval in March 2005. In RALAS the initial project design did not disaggregate data by gender and well-being levels. This is not in accordance with World Bank guidelines and has yet to be fully addressed (at least with regard to well-being) in implementation. It may be, however, that the guidelines need to be applied with more realism for some projects where unworkable claims were made within the PAD in terms of addressing social issues. For example, in the PAD for the ILO/RRR substantive claims were made for gender mainstreaming within the project. However, there were no clear or adequate budget lines, implementation mechanisms or M&E strategies to show – or even allow – that these claims would be met. The discrepancy appeared to be a result of the PAD narrative not keeping pace with negotiations and the subsequent budget. The TRWMP equivalent of a PAD appears to have been written after May 2005 and has no reference to social safeguards. The social safeguards staff based at the World Bank admitted that they had limited engagement with UN-led projects.

Similar claims were made by IREP/IRFF and AFEP, but again without the mechanisms and budgets in place for implementation. IRFF made claims regarding the spread of HIV/AIDS and ensuring the equitable treatment of widows and other marginal groups but the required

¹⁰ The CIDA gender adviser has been instrumental in inserting more detailed gender analysis into the appraisal process.

staffing, monitoring system, budget and mechanisms for implementation do not appear to be in place to ensure such laudable goals. At the same time, however, it is unrealistic to expect large-scale infrastructure projects like IREP or IRFF, in which social sustainability issues are not necessarily central, to address all aspects of it. It was unclear to the review team why the PAD, in this case, was not revised to a more modest but attainable set of objectives. This clearly highlights the need for clear and realistic social sustainability guidelines, laying out the expectations and standards expected, within the MDF.

3.3 Project implementation: Oversight

Monitoring and evaluation of the portfolio was not fully formalised until the mid-second semester 2006; 18 months after the tsunami. This was despite the fact that the MDF already had well-defined requirements for partner and implementing agencies in terms of establishing monitoring and evaluation systems, conducting regular supervision missions and six-month reporting on performance indicators. The delays and deficiencies in agencies adhering to this have been documented elsewhere¹¹. In monitoring social sustainability within projects, the MDF and specifically the Secretariat, faced further problems in relation to: leverage over partner agencies; availability of social data; its influence over BRR's own social sustainability practices; and, the time available for Secretariat staff. A major complaint from Secretariat staff was that the time-consuming heavily-administrated process of PAD approval left little time to carry out their oversight role.

- **Limited ground presence in Aceh and Nias MDF**

The RAP mentions, 'seeing the big picture'. There is little evidence, however, that on socially relevant issues the MDF succeeded in doing so. Understanding of social issues in Aceh is not likely to emanate from Jakarta and whilst the MDF Secretariat did have staff in Aceh, they did not have sufficient time, authority, consultation or social analysis skills to build locally appropriate responses. This is especially significant given the friction between Aceh and the centre (Jakarta) that has resulted historically not just in poorly planned projects but also in decades of violent conflict. We suggest that the absence of in-house expertise, concerted consultation or contracted external specialists based in Aceh prevented an institutional understanding and analysis of social issues. That in turn left the MDF Secretariat without the capacity to provide robust oversight with regard to social sustainability. Given the resource constraints within the MDF, an alternative would have been closer cooperation with the World Bank's own Social Development and Conflict sections which are well established in Indonesia with a ground presence in Aceh. This did not appear to happen.

- **Lines of accountability, roles and responsibilities in relation to social sustainability not fully functional**

The lacks in reliable supervision and monitoring of social data was a recurrent frustration for the Secretariat. However, Secretariat staff had no real power to hold partner agencies to account or to enforce project adherence to the RAP and PAD commitments. There is little in the way of legally-enforceable contractual obligations; or even little in the way of formal systems and procedures through which social sustainability practices can be promoted. At the same time, partner agencies are not consistently applying their own social safeguards and standards or overseeing implementing agencies in meeting social sustainability

¹¹ Particip GmbH (2006) Mid-Term Evaluation of the Supervision, Monitoring and Evaluation Systems and Procedures within the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias.

conditions in PAD or RAP. A review of MDF M&E in 2006 (Particip GmbH;2006) had recommended that Steering Committee members should seriously consider the introduction of sanctions to be adopted in the case of implementing agencies and/or Partner Agencies seriously underperforming in their monitoring and reporting. The recommendation has yet to be implemented.¹²

- **Lacks in social baseline data and social/gender indicators**

With few exceptions (KDP, UPP and TRWMP for its livelihoods component) the baselines, when they existed, had little in the way of socially disaggregated or gender-specific data. For some large scale infrastructure and logistical projects (e.g. TRPRP, LCRM, WFPSS) it is not to be expected. For other projects (e.g. BAFMP, ILO/RRR and AFEP), the lack is more problematic.

Social and gender indicators were also inconsistent. Where they did exist they were often output-and target-orientated (e.g. number of trainings, number of women participating in meetings, etc.) and not social impact oriented. Only KDP and UPP had extensive and gender disaggregated data set from a baseline with concomitant M&E systems. KDP also carried out the 2006 village survey in Aceh. However, these are longstanding national programmes with well institutionalised systems of audit and oversight: the MDF Secretariat oversight of their M&E was incidental. These lacks in basic social data compounded the difficulties of the Secretariat in tracking social/gendered results at the portfolio level. This was particularly the case in terms of tracking issues of equity, inclusion and conflict sensitivity and in being able to document lessons learnt about the social sustainability trends of projects.

On the other hand, there were implementing agencies which were addressing social issues quite substantially (e.g. KDP). These reported their frustration that they were collecting and using qualitative data to monitor changes in, for example, gender equity but felt that this data was not apparently valued by the MDF Secretariat because its monitoring system required only quantitative data.

3.3.1 Supervision and review missions

Partner agencies were not consistent or sufficiently robust in supervising and monitoring implementing agencies' social sustainability commitments in the PAD or RAP. This makes it hard to judge the social impact of a large proportion of the portfolio. A key aspect of progress towards social sustainability is that projects should aim to maximise the positive social impacts and minimise the negative impacts. There is little evidence from the supervision documents of the majority of projects that these kinds of issues had been discussed or projects supported in developing appropriate social strategies.

Much has been made within the MDF Secretariat about the UN partner agencies – specifically the UNDP – not fulfilling their supervisory and reporting requirements. However, unlike the World Bank, UN-implemented projects had evaluations, often external, from which social issues pertaining to projects could be assessed. The World Bank projects until recently did not conduct external mid-term evaluations (mid-term reviews of REKOMPAK and AFEP were ongoing during this review and therefore not available to the team). Mid-term evaluations were in the form of brief in-house aide-memoires which rarely covered social

¹² Particip GmbH (2006) Mid-Term Evaluation of the Supervision, Monitoring and Evaluation Systems and Procedures within the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias.

issues in any depth. The focus was more on project and financial management. Indeed, the MDF Secretariat acknowledges that the emphasis in WB reporting is on sustainability of project achievement and not on the broader issue of social sustainability.¹³

More positively, there were examples of review and supervision enhancing attention to social sustainability issues. The development of joint monitoring missions with donors and partner agencies has been seen as a valuable way of informally influencing social processes in projects. Deficiencies in relation to gender mainstreaming were uncovered through the mid-term evaluation of ILO/RRR which led to remedial action being taken and a considerable increase in women's involvement in the project. The struggles and errors of REKOMPAK's work with the Department of Public Works (DPW) led to more effective interventions in Yogyakarta, after the earthquake, because the WB and the DPW were able to apply the lessons learnt, through REKOMPAK, about local mechanisms and community approaches.

3.3.2 The MDF Results Framework

The results framework is under review (and the results from this review will feed into the revision of indicators and targets). Currently, social impact indicators are highly inadequate. There are deficiencies in the disaggregation (other than by gender) so that it is impossible to tell who is being included and who is being left out in the delivery of goods and services. Qualitative indicators that could, for example, help track the depth and quality of participation and empowerment of poor/vulnerable people and the levels of accountability between different actors have yet to be elaborated within the framework.

Whilst revising the indicators in the results framework is a necessary step in mainstreaming social issues throughout the portfolio, it is not sufficient. The robustness and utility of the results framework is ultimately dependent on the social sensitivity of project monitoring systems. However, the present structure and mechanisms of the MDF makes harmonisation of project level M&E with that of the overall MDF portfolio challenging. There are a number of reasons for this.

- The operations manual has up to now not clearly articulated what was expected within the logframes of projects in terms of inputs, outputs, outcomes and indicators relating to social sustainability. There was therefore limited common reference for projects and the MDF Secretariat about what was expected and how it would be operationalised under an agreed logframe. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that projects do not necessarily prioritise collecting and utilising the range of qualitative impact and outcome data that the results framework would need to function
- There does not appear to have been sufficient clarity about what the purpose of the results framework was and how it fitted with the RAP requirements in relation to social sustainability and conflict sensitivity. If it was to be fully outcome orientated with social outcomes integrated into it, then one would have expected greater dialogue between the Secretariat and projects on, a) what the priority social impact indicators would be for assessing the impact of the portfolio, and b) what, if any, modifications, would be needed in data collection and monitoring systems in order to track such priorities. We recognise

¹³ It may also be, as one senior partner agency staff indicated, that the real reviewing and revising of project approaches is done through the mission itself. The aide memoire is a tool for advocating with and influencing government and not as such a monitoring document for the MDF.

that resource constraints within the Secretariat and, in particular, the lack of time available for designated staff to consult and work with projects has been a challenge. Nevertheless, dialogue and consultation over the results framework in relation to social sustainability did appear limited.¹⁴

- Moreover, within the present structure Partner Agencies, rather than the Secretariat, are the key players in M&E given their overall responsibility in supervision, monitoring and evaluation at the project level. Without the baselines or systems in place at project level through which the appropriate data can be channelled to the MDF, the higher level social indicators can not be used effectively to track portfolio progress. The issue raised above, in relation to lines of accountability for social sustainability, is particularly pertinent to the Results Framework. It can not function effectively if systems are not in place to ensure partner agencies adhere to RAP and PAD commitments in their own M&E systems.
- Finally, there is no mechanism (or dedicated budget) in place that can support projects revise or strengthen their existing M&E frameworks from a social perspective. The Secretariat registered concerns early on in the MDF that social issues were not being fully addressed, as did the MTR of the M&E in 2006. However, no mechanisms appeared to be put in place to address those concerns. It may have been more appropriate, for example, as new projects came on stream to expect projects to budget and plan for strengthening their social monitoring processes and systems at output and outcome level. Not only would this have given the Secretariat a mechanism for overseeing individual project's progress in relation to social sustainability; it would have also provided a portfolio level indicator for tracking the mainstreaming of social sustainability issues throughout the portfolio.

Addressing these existing deficiencies in monitoring social issues at project level will mean more attention is required in relation to: a) how monitoring is conducted (e.g. social impact assessments, participatory M&E and qualitative surveys); and, b) the amount of dedicated resources they need in order to ensure that social issues are integrated into M&E systems.

Issues relating to the overall M&E of the MDF are beyond the scope of this review and are to be addressed in the Mid-term Review. Nevertheless, we would point out that while the Secretariat may well be meant to play a key role in coordinating M&E information between the different components of the fund, it has little leverage in which to do so. For example, Secretariat staff reported that while they were always informed of upcoming supervision missions by World Bank supported projects, time constraints meant they usually did not attend; for UN-supported projects, they were not regularly informed of supervision missions or provided with copies of mission reports. This affects its ability to use effectively the results framework for portfolio monitoring and is detrimental to mainstreaming social sustainability throughout the MDF.

3.3.3 Monitoring and evaluation – examples from other donors

Donors and other agencies acknowledge that monitoring of the social dimensions of reconstruction has been a weak spot across Aceh and Nias. The BRR monitoring system – the Recovery Aceh Nias Database (RAND) – was seen to be particularly weak in this regard,

¹⁴ We would emphasise that these broader issues relating to the results framework are the concern of the MTR. We have therefore tried to limit our observations to the social sustainability aspects of the results framework.

with a focus on budget spent and quantitative outputs delivered rather than on any qualitative impacts on social sustainability issues.

Some donors have chosen to address the issue proactively by establishing external monitoring processes. The ADB, for example, collaborated with Syiah Kuala University to set up a monitoring system which involved external and objective oversight. AusAID developed a project monitoring support group made up of external specialists, including social development specialists. The aim was to build up a collaborative and constructive relationship between projects and the project monitoring group members. Specialists visited projects regularly and provided on-demand desk reviews to feed inputs into project implementation. Recommendations were kept short and focused on improvement opportunities in project implementation. The merit of this approach was that it was seen to be adding value for implementers, who now ask for monitoring visits.

3.4 Creating synergies for social sustainability

MDF funding mechanisms were not directed at creating synergies between projects that could have strengthened social sustainability practices in projects. Secretariat staff, resources and expertise were not available to identify and promote opportunities for synergy between projects; nor did there appear to be a culture within MDF for finding ways to encourage collaboration between grantees. One implementing agency compared the absence of any information sharing within the MDF or links with similar sector projects in the portfolio unfavourably compared to their experience with a bilateral donor that hosts a monthly dinner for informal information sharing between grantees.

The opportunities for collaboration were significant and arguably would have done a great deal to improve mainstreaming of social issues throughout the portfolio. Infrastructure reform projects in the portfolio (ILO/RRR, IREP and IRFF), for example, attempting to mainstream new techniques and ways of working into government are not benefiting from MDF-led exchange of experience. So whilst MDF is funding “Transitional Governance projects” aimed at supporting a sustainable future for Aceh, there are no discernible efforts to promote sustainability of other projects. ILO, for example, got information from their own projects and international comparisons across ILO, rather than from any other actors in Aceh.

- **Insufficient fora for discussion and/or policy analysis**

There is also little evidence of space within which to discuss the policy context and social issues. Donors all commented on the limited opportunities within which to debate and to develop a portfolio view on social issues. The Steering Committee meetings were not the appropriate forum given the managerial or diplomatic status of participants (i.e. too high-level for technical issues) and little else existed. One INGO that had seriously considered funding the MDF decided not to do so partly on the grounds that they were not confident that the Steering Committee process would enable sufficient consideration of social issues.

If the MDF was intent on keeping its own operations lean and trying to avoid adding extra staff, then one response might have been to use project funding to promote interchange of ideas or policy level analysis on the part of recipient agencies. This was done to some extent through the policy dialogue fora that the MDF Secretariat instigated in Aceh, but these were limited in intention, open to all interested parties and aimed at sharing ideas and lessons on

specific issues. In mitigation, however, it should be noted that the context of excessive funds removed from all implementers the usual funding incentive to coordinate¹⁵, let alone learn lessons. Inter-agency contacts were minimal across the response and the reconstruction nature of the response meant that some actors had less concern with broader social issues than with simply rebuilding what was physically lost, particularly in the context of huge pressure from domestic constituencies to deliver. In conclusion, although limited policy dialogue was a problem, it was one for which the MDF, in its entirety, was not wholly or even largely responsible.

Equally, the MDF is not using its position as a pooled fund to strategically build up knowledge and share lessons with portfolio projects or more widely across Aceh and Nias. We found no examples of MDF projects collaborating within and through the fund structures (or even outside of fund structures). With many of the projects facing similar cross-cutting social issues (such as poverty targeting, gender mainstreaming and engaging with local governance structures), the MDF is well-placed to influence and shape pro-poor policy issues across the whole transitional governance agenda.

When projects did work together it was either unsuccessful, such as IREP/IRFF's slow performance in taking over TRWMP sites, or outside and without the support of the MDF, such as ILO conducting training with KDP facilitators on road projects (including construction management and using local resources and funding from CIDA) and on small group business development/micro credit.

3.5 The MDF and conflict issues

3.5.1 MDF understanding of the issues

MDF documentation mentions tsunami affected areas and conflict affected areas (see, for example, part VI para. H of the RAP, March 2006). This division does not demonstrate a grounded understanding of the context: the majority of tsunami affected areas are also directly conflict-affected to a greater or lesser degree. Most tsunami affected districts, including Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Bireuen and Aceh Utara, were affected by both conflict and tsunami. Conflict directly affected low-lying and coastal areas as well as inland or upland zones. Furthermore, combatants rarely lived in remote upland forest areas; most of them were in towns and villages, including many tsunami-affected areas.

More widely, 30 years of conflict fundamentally affected governance and politics across all of Aceh. It is not possible to talk of areas 'affected by GAM' (MDF: RAP) as all of Aceh was and still is affected by the conflict. Such terminology also fails to account for state actions as well as anti-state actions, presenting a one-sided view of the conflict that may be a common view in Jakarta but is not in Aceh itself. It does not appear that conflict expertise was applied in devising the 2006 RAP, despite its ready availability to the World Bank, both in-house and externally. This is not an issue that has been overcome since: the terms of reference for this social sustainability review include similar wording.

¹⁵ This can be seen in the number of responses – just two – that the EC had to its two emails following up on the Lessons Learned Workshop agreement to set up a policy dialogue forum and soliciting items for discussion (MDF: 2007: Minutes of the 10th Steering Committee Meeting).

- **Lack of clarity over where MDF stands on conflict issues**

At the portfolio level, there is no evidence of MDF involvement in meaningful conflict sensitivity, or even of basic checks on action to ensure a 'do no harm' approach is followed. Some projects were aware of conflict issues, and others seemed to have little awareness. But the MDF played no role in this. MDF funded projects' conflict sensitivity is a function of different agencies' capacities and not a reflection of action on the part of MDF. MDF monitoring includes no mention of conflict-related issues (see for example Portfolio Review Aide Memoire, September 07).

A consequence of the MDF's current operational approach to conflict issues is confusion amongst agencies over MDF rulings on conflict issues. Some MDF partners and external interviewees felt that the MDF could not touch anything to do with conflict; some mentioned that it was unclear; and some felt that it was important to maintain an image of non-involvement with conflict, although they found ways to engage anyway (Box 3.1 shows the range of interpretations currently being applied by projects in the MDF). The basis of MDF reluctance to engage with conflict issues was attributed variously to: the EU as the largest donor; other smaller bi-laterals with more rigorous rules on not using tsunami assistance for non-tsunami related activities; BRR; and the MDF itself. It seems that there is an element of self-censorship at play at various levels, partly as a result of this lack of clarity¹⁶.

Box 3.1 Project understanding of MDF's rulings on conflict

There are three main ways in which projects understand MDF's view on conflict. These can be summarised as follows:

- **Agency interpretation One:** MDF cannot fund anything to do with ex-combatants.
- **Agency interpretation Two:** MDF can fund anywhere in Aceh but only if it does so equally and does not single out conflict-related recipients. (note: it remains unclear as to how to define who is a conflict-related recipient).
- **Agency interpretation Three:** MDF cannot mention conflict.

Source: Interviews with MDF implementing agency staff.

More significantly still, a sound analysis of the conflict and peace process in Aceh would demonstrate the obvious links between the two. It is perhaps understandable that donors are reluctant to allow funds donated for the tsunami to be used directly for narrow programmes to assist ex-combatants, but if these programmes are seen as important elements of the future sustainability of Aceh, as indeed they are, then perhaps the role of the MDF should be

¹⁶ The clearest explanation suggested to the social sustainability review team is that MDF lawyers (i.e. World Bank in-house legal expertise) interpret MDF donor policies on how funds can be spent. There appears to be an unnecessarily 'lowest common denominator' in operation, with the strictest MDF donor rules having to apply to all. At a higher level, it could be concluded that OECD/DAC Paris Declaration commitments to harmonisation through trust funds and other means make the same agencies' aid and peace building principles impossible to operationalise, particularly in cases where conflict is low on the national agenda (OECD, 2005; OECD, 2001).

to explain their significance rather than to deny funding. There are in addition many other elements to supporting sustainable peace beyond aid to ex-combatants or even to victims of conflict. These issues demand wide contextual treatment rather than narrow legalistic interpretation. Conflict-sensitive programming should not rely on individuals in partner/implementing agencies who are willing to spend time finding ingenious, undocumented ways round rules.

Some positive examples already exist: The willingness of MDF and its donors to support “transitional governance” support helps build the long term institutional sustainability of all interventions to date. This demonstrates that involvement is possible, and that a situation in which some agencies felt that they had to “remove the word conflict from all documents” should not have been allowed to develop.

3.5.2 Engagement outside the tsunami affected area and wider conflict sensitivity

In 2006, BRR quietly decided to work outside the tsunami affected area, and MDF followed suit (see RAP VI, H.). In reality the MDF had been funding projects outside the tsunami affected area from its start, for instance through KDP and SPADA in particular. So for the MDF, this may have been a formal recognition of existing practice rather than a new conflict-sensitive approach or even new coherence with BRR.

On its own, expanding the area of activities does not amount to conflict sensitivity. There is no evidence that MDF has a clear definition or understanding of what conflict sensitivity might mean, and no evidence of MDF efforts to promote conflict sensitivity in projects. This is significant. Efforts to link conflict sensitivity with aid provision globally have grown in the past decade. Aceh - with massive provision of international aid as a peace process took root - could have been an unprecedented context within which to apply such experience whilst remaining supportive of GoI policy.

A conflict sensitive approach in future would not stop at the design and implementation of a proposed new peace and development trust fund (valuable as that may be), but also consider conflict implications of other projects in Aceh. This involves political analysis as well as concern for local-level conflict issues, since donors otherwise tend to limit analysis to specific technical issues such as funds for ex-combatants The MDF RAP (2006) states:

“Conflict sensitive approach – if the activity is proposed to take place in areas affected by the conflict, then the activity would be checked so as to ensure that it will not unintentionally provoke further conflict or cause harm.”

3.5.3 Conflict sensitivity – examples from other donors and funds

MDF is not alone in having weak contextual conflict awareness. In interviews, staff and consultants for several of the large international NGOs involved in tsunami reconstruction work commented that most aid projects ‘actively avoided any conflict issue’ (sic.), only engaging reactively when a crisis occurred (e.g. intimidation by ex-combatants, threats of extortion by military, occasional violent incidents).

However, many donors and INGOs have also funded a wide range of peace building programming, including working directly with former combatants and victims of conflict, as well as community-based approaches, local governance initiatives, awareness-raising and confidence-building exercises, capacity building measures for democratic institutions,

exchanges of experience, etc. A major current exercise is a “Multi-Stakeholder Review” of the peace context in Aceh and of the relative contributions of different actors. Various MDF donors / partner agencies / implementers are involved, including UNDP and the World Bank, and the findings may contribute to the design of a possible future peace and development trust fund for Aceh.

4 Project Approaches to Social Sustainability

4.1 Overview

In this section we examine the way individual projects within the MDF portfolio dealt with social sustainability issues. We also explore, where appropriate, the perceptions of project beneficiaries of the ways in which projects supported access, participation, equity, inclusion and accountability. In addition, **Error! Reference source not found.** presents the detailed summary of the project assessments undertaken as part of the review. This enables us in this synthesis report to concentrate on the commonalities in social sustainability practices without losing sight of the distinct differences in the scope and focus of individual projects¹⁷.

There were three projects – the Lamno-Calang road maintenance project, the TRPRP and the WFPSS project – which were designed in the first two cases to be infrastructure-rebuild projects and in the last to be a logistical support service. They were short term inputs designed to address urgent needs in the aftermath of the disasters. Whilst social issues were addressed, social sustainability practices were not part of the approaches or indeed entirely appropriate. We include issues arising from the assessments of these three projects, when they have bearing on the findings from the overall review.

Here we present findings around four key areas:

- Approaches to social sustainability taken by projects;
- The ways in which projects promoted, implemented and tracked participation; capacities of beneficiaries to voice needs and demands; and processes of accountability;
- The extent to which projects supported increased (i) social inclusion of women, poor people and other marginalised groups (e.g. ex-GAM combatants and/or supporters, orphans, etc.) and (ii) equity in decision-making and the distribution of benefits and,
- Who benefited and who did not from project interventions. Specifically, whether the benefits gained (or not) through project intervention show a trend towards social sustainability.

4.2 Summary of findings

The key finding from the assessment is **that some projects have taken a consistent and flexible approach in addressing social issues throughout the whole project cycle and these are showing trends towards social sustainability. However it is not the case for the majority of the projects.** While these projects did address some social issues, this was not in itself sufficient to show a trend towards integrating social sustainability issues within their project approach. This would require changes in project approaches from design, targeting, implementation processes, to engagement with stakeholders, monitoring and evaluation.

¹⁷ Due to implementation delays in SPADA, it is too early to judge the extent to which the programme has/will put in place its proposed processes and mechanisms for addressing social issues. Therefore, while SPADA was included in the assessment, we only bring findings from the assessment into the synthesis report where it refers to design, partnership and overall approach.

There are also two broader issues. Firstly, the extent to which the projects under review were able to substantially contribute to greater access, inclusion, equity and accountability given the approaches taken, and the complex reconstruction and post- conflict environment. A key finding from the review has been that there were unrealistic claims and expectations placed on projects to deliver wide-ranging social sustainability goals. This was particularly true for projects taking a Community Driven Development (CDD) approach that were faced with both limited implementation capacity and limits in what could realistically be achieved through the approach itself.

Secondly, there is the issue as to whether projects funded and supported through the MDF were better able to address social sustainability issues than non-MDF projects. This is a difficult question to answer; not least because the review was not designed to undertake a comparative analysis between MDF and non-MDF projects. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that MDF funding did little to add social sustainability value in implementation. The review and supervision processes of the MDF Secretariat, for example, did little to aid synergies across the portfolio or strengthen attention to social issues within individual projects.

Finally, we note that during the rapid participatory community research (RPCR) very few MDF projects were known by name to community participants. Given the plethora of projects, both MDF and non-MDF, working in some of the sites this is not altogether surprising. However, it was clear that those projects that were known to participants were those which had committed community facilitators working at community level to engage and include a wide range of community members. These included KDP, UPP, TRWMP and, to some extent, ILO/RRR and REKOMPAK.

4.2.1 Trends promoting social sustainability

In brief, we identified some common elements which either supported a coherent approach to social sustainability or limited attention to social issues. We also highlight some of the key findings which emerged in relation to conflict sensitivity. Where projects have been consistent in addressing social issues they demonstrated a number of practices which together are likely to encourage social sustainability. Other projects in the portfolio may have done one or two of the actions identified but not a range of integrated practices which add up to a systematic focus on social issues. These include:

- A presence in Aceh and Nias prior to the Tsunami and Earthquake which enabled projects to build on existing networks, implementation processes and mechanisms for addressing social issues – (for the World Bank UPP, KDP and KRRP projects only);
- An ongoing, on-the-ground presence of project leaders with sufficient power to engage effectively with communities, government officials at all levels and donors, and to adapt approaches and resources where necessary – (KDP, TRWMP and to some extent UPP, BAFMP and REKOMPAK);
- Within the project, attempts were made to develop and apply a contextualised and nuanced understanding of the socio-cultural, political and policy environment in which reconstruction took place, including a socially differentiated understanding of poverty and gender – (TRWMP, KDP and to some extent UPP);
- Active attempts to mainstream a gender focus including adhering to existing policies, developing gender strategies and/or responding to monitoring or supervision missions – (KDP, UPP, TRWMP, TRPRP, ILO/RRR and IRFF/IREP);
- Monitoring and evaluation systems were in place which tracked outcomes as well as outputs. Projects had also made some attempt to establish baselines from which

indicators of social sustainability could be derived and monitored – (KDP, UPP and TRWMP);

- Some capacity and resources to identify and work with progressive leadership in local government and at the grassroots to optimise opportunities for encouraging active participation, social inclusion, accountability and transparency – (TRWMP, and to some extent KDP, ILO/RRR, UPP, AFEP and the CSOSP at the level of local CSOs);
- On-going processes aimed at addressing and reducing vulnerability in tandem with the provision of tangible assets – (TRWMP, UPP, KDP and to some extent AFEP);
- Attempts made to develop mechanisms for accountability which included and went beyond complaint procedures – (TRWMP, KDP, UPP, to some extent REKOMPAK);
- Application of social safeguards before and during project implementation – (KDP, UPP, WFPSS, TRPRP and to some extent IRFF/IREP); and,
- External reviews and supervision which addressed a full range of project concerns including social issues – (TRWMP and ILO/RRR).

4.2.2 Addressing social sustainability: what's missing?

In the majority of the projects, gaining a full picture of how social sustainability issues have been addressed has been challenging. This does not mean that projects were not addressing these issues, but rather that project documentation is extremely patchy in reporting on social issues. Nevertheless in broad terms, we identified a range of actions or processes which have limited a project's capacity to realistically address the social sustainability issues highlighted within its PAD. These include:

- No clear evidence in design and implementation of an applied analysis to the selection of project implementation areas in terms of poverty targeting; reducing vulnerability or supporting conflict sensitive approaches – (ILO/RRR, AFEP and IREP/IRFF);
- Unrealistic claims made within the PAD in terms of addressing social issues with no systems in place to implement them – (ILO/RRR, IREP/IRFF, TRPRP, AFEP and REKOMPAK, which had systems but could not fully operationalise them);
- Limited socially differentiated data, often only gender specific, making it difficult to track who within the project was being targeted, included, gaining or losing from the intervention – (RALAS, BAFMP, AFEP, ILO/RRR, REKOMPAK and CSOSP);
- There are weak monitoring and evaluation systems which have not integrated social issues or developed outcome/impact indicators around which the social sustainability of interventions could be tracked – (BAFMP, AFEP, REKOMPAK, ILO/RRR and to some extent IREP, TRPRP);
- For those projects working with communities, a lack of systems and processes for promoting social inclusion, targeting and reaching women and vulnerable groups – (BAFMP, REKOMPAK, RALAS and to a lesser extent AFEP, whose strategy is now making gains in this regard);
- Gender strategies were not in place or systems and mechanisms for implementing gender-sensitive approaches weakly adhered to – (AFEP, TA to BRR, BAFMP, RALAS – although the issue will addressed within the gender action plan 2009, CSOSP and to some extent ILO/RRR and REKOMPAK);
- Weak or non-existent mechanisms for accountability at local level or between project stakeholders – (RALAS, BAFMP, KRRP and ILO/RRR)
- Lack of attention throughout implementation guidelines, monitoring systems, review and supervision missions to conflict sensitivity at project level – (all projects); and,

- Limited evidence of adaptability to a changing social environment and/or adapting the approach to strengthen attention to social issues – (BAFMP, RALAS and to some extent IREP, TRPRP).

4.3 Lessons learnt

4.3.1 Approaches to social sustainability

The ToRs for the review identify three types of projects enhancing social sustainability:

- Community Driven Development;
- enhancing public service through stakeholder consultation; and,
- demand-led infrastructure¹⁸.

On paper these are useful distinctions but in reality projects were far more diverse and could not be so easily categorised. Projects varied in scope from very large technical infrastructure projects like TRPRP and BAFMP to small scale essentially pilot projects such as the ILO/RRR. The focus of projects also differed widely from land titling in RALAS, for example, to capacity building CSOs. The majority of projects were categorised post-approval as the decision to fund was not, in the main, based on the approach taken but on BRR and sector priorities. We have, therefore, avoided comparisons across approaches and focused on communalities and differences in the ways social issues were addressed by projects. That is with the exception of six projects – KDP, Nias-KRRP, UPP, RALAS, REKOMPAK and SPADA – all operating with the World Bank as a partner agency. Funding to these six projects totalled \$246.91 million or almost 50% of the total allocation.

- **Six CDD projects: the cornerstone of MDF funding**

The six projects above were presented as a coherent strategy all based around “community driven development” (CDD) approaches. The clarity of the strategy means that there are some useful lessons regarding the capacity of this approach to deliver social dividends around promoting equity, inclusion and accountability in tandem with tangible assets for community members.

CDD approaches use the KDP mechanism of community facilitators to deliver village grants through a process involving community input. The relative success of KDP across Indonesia in reducing corruption, increasing accountability and promoting bottom-up involvement in decisions over the use of small local government development funds is well documented. Other projects build on this in an explicit coordinated strategy¹⁹. The NIAS-KRRP was a KDP programme adapted to the specific conditions on Nias. KDP’s urban equivalent, UPP, operates similarly, whilst SPADA builds on KDP and aims to move up to the level of the Kabupaten. These three programmes were expanded in Aceh following the tsunami, and two additional programmes – RALAS (land titling) and REKOMPAK (housing) – were designed to link up on the ground, operating through KDP mechanisms and supporting each other. .

¹⁸ It was also noted that RALAS and AFEP fell under two approaches (community driven development and enhancing public service approaches); and TA BRR was too high level in its area of support to be categorised in this way.

¹⁹ See for example p.17, Project Management Guidelines for REKOMPAK August 2005

- **Partially meeting expectations**

In the event, this did not happen for a range of reasons. KDP and UPP managed to expand, but the need to recruit large numbers of additional facilitators slowed the process. Struggling to manage their own expansion, they were not well equipped to take on additional tasks asked of their systems and staff by further projects.

REKOMPAK was not able to use KDP / UPP facilitators for community level work and had to rely on its own staff who were not well trained in community issues; as a result of this, the project suffered. SPADA has been heavily delayed through a range of administrative problems and RALAS was delayed and failed to fit land registration into the housing programme.

- **But, unrealistic aims in the first place**

In addition to its own expansion and proposed use as part of RALAS and REKOMPAK, KDP mechanisms were also heavily promoted in April-May 2005 as a broad mechanism for tsunami reconstruction across Aceh. Then, in late 2005 and into 2006, KDP was promoted as a solution to funding reintegration needs of conflict affected people, and was then used as a means to channel some community grants to villages in former conflict areas. A further MDF project, ILO labour intensive rural roads scheme, also linked with KDP local facilitators. Other agencies, for example, the Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA) project of AusAID also explored possibilities of using KDP facilitators to support project implementation. In the event, it did not happen; slow processes of facilitation and disbursement were a key factor because KDP did not have the time, resources or staff to operate effectively outside its own programmed activities. With hindsight it appears that KDP was over-stretched by these many and various demands, and therefore unable to deliver beyond a certain level. This is not seen as a weakness of KDP but a comment on the unrealistic expectations placed on its structures.

There was also undoubted confusion amongst many outside observers over precisely what CDD mechanisms could or could not do. There were unrealistic expectations about the approach's strengths in reaching and working with very vulnerable groups. Within KDP, for example, assessments of the approach were much clearer – it was not designed to reach the poorest and most marginal:

"It's very difficult and we are not satisfied that we are fully involving the marginalised and poorest, but you have got to remember KDP works on majority rule. That inevitably means that some will get left out." (*KDP senior staff member*)

- **Effective, yet limited capacity**

Community Driven Development mechanisms promoted by the World Bank in Indonesia can achieve certain tasks. However, the scale and nature of tsunami reconstruction was beyond what they could manage in their current form. More broadly, it is not justifiable to assume that programmes are socially sustainable simply because they aim to use a community driven approach. First, the capacity may not exist to implement. KDP, for example, had to deal with the loss of some of its own field staff in the Tsunami and staff leaving for better paid jobs with the many international agencies in Aceh post-disaster. Second, there are limits to what existing community driven approaches can achieve even if the capacity to deliver local funds does exist. Many social issues require different approaches. Longstanding development issues of weak government capacity, limited access to political power, unequal social relations, marginalisation of minority groups from economic activity etc, demand long

term responses and are not tackled by community driven funding of local works. As one World Bank observer remarked:

“It (CDD) does not particularly empower local facilitators to address equity or broader issues of vulnerability; they... (the community facilitators) have tasks to perform and a limited time to do them in.”

In places where there is room to use KDP-style mechanisms for a wider set of tasks, some local facilitators may be able to play a limited role in community level conflict resolution, for example. But any such initiative, even around limited objectives, demands careful appraisal of capacity and sustainability.

4.3.2 Addressing voice, participation and accountability²⁰

Tracing the correlation between social sustainability practices within projects and their effects on voice, participation and accountability at community level has been problematic. Few of the projects had operational guidelines which fully addressed the approach to be taken to encourage activate participation of community members or strategies for fostering accountable and transparent processes. KDP and UPP were the strongest in this regard, with clear procedures for mobilising communities and setting targets for the participation of women and poor people in project activities. REKOMPAK had systems, but because it was unable to fully work through KDP mechanisms has not been able to implement them. TRWMP, working in a sector based environment, has shown flexibility and adaptability in revising and strengthening strategies aimed at increasing the participation of women and poorer social groups in project activities. It recognised early on that it underestimated the length of time needed for socialisation and community mobilisation²¹ and has subsequently increased the length of time spent working with its target groups. AFEP has worked through “*Seraket Mukim*” – a group of elected community leaders – with mixed results and, in some of the more remote communities at the forest edge, low levels of participation amongst women and poor people²². BAFMP has yet to fully institutionalise community participation approaches and has had limited success in promoting women’s participation. Women’s involvement in the trash management committees, for example, is limited to one member; a much lower level than that of similar groups within TRWMP²³.

4.3.2.1 Patterns of participation

In the communities visited, participation levels were mixed. Some groups of people were actively participating in project activities, but much higher levels of participation were evident amongst senior community members, both women and men, and the village leadership. In general, poorer and more marginal men and women appeared as beneficiaries of project activities but not shapers and decision-makers in project management.

²⁰ This section is mainly concerned with the following MDF projects: AFEP, KDP, UPP, RALAS, BAFMP, REKOMPAK, ILO/RRR and TRWMP, all of which involved communities through consultation and participation in the project.


²¹ Interview with the waste management advisor and see also the mid-term evaluation for TRWMP.

²² See AFEP project assessment

²³ See the BAFMP Project Assessment and WB mid-term review mission 2007

This is seen clearly in the following Figure 4.1 showing the responses of different groups of community members to three scorecard questions on consultation (as a level of participation) and influence on projects. Community leaders answered that they were asked their views and were able to influence the projects implemented in the community. They also strongly agreed with the suggestion that everyone in the community could influence the decisions that affected them. Although this last view was also supported by a group of male community facilitators, other groups of more marginalised and less powerful men and women generally said that they were not consulted on projects and that their views did not lead to projects changing the way they were implemented.

Figure 4.1 Levels of participation and influence in *Rambutan* community, Aceh Jaya



There were, however, exceptions to this trend. In *Salak*, Aceh Besar, for example, a wide range of groups were consulted from the village elites to young men, widows and landless women all felt they could voice an opinion and actively influence decision making. In a few locations, community members could identify projects which had enabled them to influence resource allocations and manage project activities. For example, women in Banda Aceh highlighted how being a member of a UPP self group²⁴ had empowered them to be more confident and vocal in community meetings and project activities (*Women's PIGD, Mangga*).

²⁴ Receiving support from PMI (The Indonesian Red Cross)

- **Village leadership matters**

In line with findings from other research in Aceh, post-Tsunami, communities with open and representative leadership experienced increased levels of participation, accountability and transparency²⁵. In *Mangga*, Banda Aceh and in *Salak*, Aceh Besar, for example, there was evidence that the majority of community members felt processes for project management were clear and accountable, albeit not as socially inclusive as they would wish.

“At the beginning of a project, all the community is invited to attend and can in that meeting voice their opinion about what they want, then we make a decision that’s put on the village notice board.” (FDG *Salak*, Aceh Besar).

In contrast, weak and unrepresentative leadership was a major barrier to community participation and subsequent satisfaction with the outcomes of project activities. Unauthorised payment to the village leadership was raised in Aceh Besar, Nias Selatan and in *Annas*, Banda Aceh. There, women refugees living in barracks reported:

“Every time we ask signature of *Geuchik* (village head) to get assistance, we also have to give him ‘*uang capak*’. Look at the project from KDP for orphans, such as clothes and school books or the support for widows during Ramadan 2007 – people had to pay the *Geuchik* ‘*uang capek*’ first before they got support”.

4.3.2.2 Transparency and accountability

MDF projects, along with all other aid programmes in Aceh, face a challenging operational environment in which decentralisation processes are being shaped by the post-conflict peace agreement and the scope of the Acehnese government to implement special autonomy provisions. Local government capacity is limited and levels of trust and engagement between communities and government are weak, fractured and shaped by the long-term impacts of the conflict. In this context, the degree to which local processes of accountability and transparency can be fostered and institutionalised within communities is dependent on the capacities of projects to encourage greater engagement and partnership between communities and local government structures. For long-term social sustainability, this will be vital.

However, only a minority of MDF projects were building capacities within communities to work with local government and hold it to account. KDP and UPP, for example, were hampered in their efforts to encourage accountability by the short time-scale of their interventions within communities. The ILO/RRR project in its first phase of operation transferred most of the responsibility for community engagement to local consultants. This lack is being remedied in phase 2 of the project (due to start in 2009), with a stronger focus on mainstreaming into local governance structures. TRWMP stood out in this regard as a long term project (2005–2009) which is gearing its efforts towards greater social sustainability in the provision of municipal services.

²⁵ See KDP (2007) 2006 “Village Survey in Aceh: An Assessment of Village Infrastructure and Social Conditions” and ACARP (2007) “The Acehnese Gampong Three Years On: Assessing Local Capacity and Reconstruction Assistance in Post-Tsunami Aceh”.

The AusAid-funded LOGICA project, as Box 4.1 illustrates, took a different approach which suggests that local accountability and transparency can be built from the bottom up. The LOGICA project was predicated on a long-term engagement in target communities aimed at opening up and transforming relationships between community members and local officials. Substantial resources and time was given to the challenging process of reaching down to poorer and vulnerable sections of communities in order to create more inclusive and participatory decision-making processes.

Box 4.1 The LOGICA Project: fostering local accountability and transparency

The AusAid Local Government and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh project was designed to support local communities to decide for themselves, and to manage, all that needs to be done to re-build vital local governance infrastructure and services. Working in three districts (Aceh Jaya, Aceh Besar and Aceh Barat) it linked strengthening sub-district governments (in order to increase responsiveness to the needs of local communities) with re-establishing village-level communities (through strategic infrastructure and capacity building assistance). Over 2,000 community leaders across 200 villages have been trained on leadership, motivation and empowerment. More than 51% are women. At the same time, facilitators worked closely with government officials in 17 sub-district offices and provided training and workshops on sub-district planning, administration and service delivery. Facilitators worked on a demand-led basis in communities so that communities could call in technical assistance and support if and when needed. This approach is designed to foster social sustainability by progressively transferring skills and responsibilities to representative village institutions and authorities. Successes from the project include:

- Facilitated village elections for representative development committees – in two locations, women were elected as village leaders;
- The establishment of “one-stop shops” for improving access by communities to the range of services offered at kacamatan level. A move which promoted greater transparency and enhanced information flows between communities and sub-districts;
- Establishing notice boards at village level which listed all projects being implemented giving details of components and budgets. An intervention applauded by the Governor of Aceh and ordered to be replicated throughout the province;
- Use of a small grant facility for small-scale village infrastructure whereby communities controlled and managed resources to implement their own projects;
- Set up village level mechanisms to monitor construction and counteract corruption in implementation; and,
- Facilitators used their position as a political leverage to actively link communities in to sub-district and district level planning which led to Kabupaten being formally recognised in the province and awarded for good governance practices.

Source: Interviews with LOGICA staff and ex-staff and AusAid (2007)

Notwithstanding the above caveat, the trends suggest that there has over time been a greater attention to issues of transparency and accountability by MDF projects in Aceh. In this regard, MDF projects are in line with general trends across Aceh. However the impacts of this are not necessarily filtering through to all sections of the community. Women, in particular, were likely to be less satisfied with levels of transparency and accountability.

Findings from the RPCR resonate with comments and findings from elsewhere²⁶. Open and responsive local leadership appears key to promoting increasing levels of transparency and accountability in communities. However, community facilitators also played a significant role in awareness raising, information provision and mobilisation of poorer and marginalised groups. In the majority of the locations visited, community facilitation processes were not consistently engaged with poorer and isolated sections of the community. They appeared to rely heavily on the local leadership and senior community members to inform and mobilise community members, regardless of the nature of the leadership structure or socio-cultural tensions within the community. In some cases, this approach fuelled project-related conflicts and deep dissatisfaction with the transparency and accountability of projects Box 4.2.

²⁶ This issue was raised by most external observers interviewed by the review team and is also explored in ACARP (2007) *The Acehese Gampong Three Years On: Assessing Local Capacity and Reconstruction Assistance in Post-Tsunami Aceh*.

Box 4.2 Project fuelled conflict in Aceh Barat


In *Pisang*, Aceh Barat where several MDF projects (UPP, REKOMPAK and TWRMP) have been working, all the social groups consulted complained about the unwillingness of the village head to work with and include all community members:

“... the current village leader is too busy with his business. He took some villagers’ money for his own business and he recruited his relatives to the village structure.” (*PIDG, Women’s group*).

This view is in stark contrast to that from the village leadership group, which comments:

“There is consultation between... (projects) and the community, such as about roads and bridges and the KDP rehabilitation project. These are all fully managed by the community.”

Given these differing views, it is unsurprising that there are profound social tensions within the neighbourhood in part fuelled by disagreements and frustrations over the way project support and management has been coordinated in the village. It has been one of the reasons why there has been a rapid turnover of village heads; five since the beginning of 2007. The village leadership and other senior or elite members of the community have, in particular, been in dispute over the allocation of benefits with the young men of the area. They now barely interact and the younger men will only attend village meetings if each one of them receives a written invitation. Results from the community scorecards (see for example the results from *Pisang*, Aceh Barat below) showed the overwhelming majority of those consulted believed that the projects had created disagreements between different people and groups in the community.



Source: Community scorecards and PIDGs in Pisang, Aceh Barat

On Nias, the overall picture is less encouraging than in Aceh. In Nias Selatan, as Box 4.3 illustrates, community members expressed deep dissatisfaction over lack of transparency and levels of corruption relating to project implementation. In Nias District, the majority of those consulted were dissatisfied with the response of projects to their demands and also to the lack of open and accountable complaint systems. This view tallies with the perception of some BRR senior staff who expressed grave concern at the high levels of corruption in some

villages in Nias and, in particular, in Nias Selatan. Weak village level institutions and low capacity in local government were cited as the main reasons for the challenges involved in embedding systems of control and oversight in project.

Box 4.3 Nias Selatan community members powerless to hold village leaders to account

In *Belimbing* village, Nias Selatan, there were few signs that the reconstruction activities had helped to “build back better”. The bridge at the edge of the village connecting it to the main road had yet to be rebuilt, despite being two years under contract. Villagers voiced many complaints concerning the unauthorised payments they had to make in order to get support. They claimed over Rp.500, 000 per family had to be paid to the village head as “appreciation money” for housing reconstruction aid and transportation fees of Rp.100, 000 in order to get seeds and a hoe for their farms. Households in one *Dusun* populated by the minority ethnic/religious group reported sadly that they had no regular access to water as the newly refurbished well was controlled by the village elite who were part of the majority group. They tried to complain but felt powerless and threatened if they did make complaints:

“We are blamed if we make a report to the village head and even though we informed the BRR consultant about changes and needs in housing water and roads, nothing happened.”

BBR staff confirmed that in Nias Selatan, community members often have little information about their rights within community decision making or about the limited powers the village head has to take payments or make decisions on their behalf. This makes it very difficult for them to demand transparency or hold projects to account for perceived deficiencies.

Source: PIDGs with women farmers, teachers and small holder male farmers in Belimbing, Nias Selatan

- **Mechanisms for supporting transparency and accountability not reaching the poorest**


Village leadership and groups of higher social status expressed a higher degree of satisfaction in the circulation of information about projects and available benefits than other community members.

Poorer groups of men and women, especially those living some distance away from village notice boards, young people and more marginalised sections of communities were more likely to express dissatisfaction about the way information about projects was disseminated and the lack of follow-up if complaints were made. For example, a range of women’s groups in *Pisang*, Aceh Barat raised issues about the lack of consultation and accountability within the REKOMPAK project:

“They don’t want to listen at all to our input and advice for the housing project; that’s why houses from REKOMPAK are terrible compared to... (other projects).” (*Women teachers, Pisang, Aceh Barat*)

In *Annas* community, Banda Aceh, most PIDGs (whether male or female) responded by strongly disagreeing that they were given lots of information about projects (see Figure 4.2). Around half of these PIDG were IDPs either still living in barracks or relocated to other communities.

Figure 4.2 Provision of information on reconstruction projects in Annas, Banda Aceh



- **Complaint systems worked imperfectly**

Findings from the RPCR indicate that very few of those consulted knew if there were formal systems of complaint attached to projects through which they could seek redress. Only UPP and REKOMPAK were mentioned by name by some participants (senior members of the community in Banda Aceh and Aceh Barat).

This is keeping with findings from the project assessments. Only KDP, UPP, REKOMPAK and to some extent RALAS had operational complaints systems. REKOMPAK, for example made considered efforts to openly present information and to invite complaints through a publicised process. Complaints were registered on an MIS and many dealt with. Evidence of local level corruption was at times addressed by insisting funds were returned. KDP recognise that their complaints systems could have been expanded and point to the fact that some of their initiatives such as a dedicated P.O. Box and SMS line were stalled by BRR²⁷. For other projects under review, complaints procedures were acknowledged as not being widely understood or known to communities.


However, the presence of a complaint system is not sufficient to guarantee accountability. It should be the point of last resort. More promising for social sustainability is when community members feel they have control over and can influence the way projects are managed, without needing to seek redress. We note that where projects were seen to be clear and transparent in the allocation of resources, the conditions for working on project activities, the payment schedules and were able to respond flexibly to community concerns, then formal systems of complaint were not necessarily valued. What was important was that projects could respond swiftly to concerns and were being seen to act. For example, in Aceh Besar,

²⁷ KDP also piloted village level audits and in some villages went back to report the findings, a move which positively supported transparency within communities.

men, on the whole, were dissatisfied with the lack of responsive complaints systems for some of the projects. In contrast, they singled out the ILO/RRR project as a good one for being transparent, open and flexible in implementation. They were unaware that, in their community, it had no complaint system in place.

In *Rambutan*, Aceh Jaya, for example, there were marked differences between male PIGDs who strongly agreed they were able to complain about projects and other PIGDs (e.g. women and male youths) who either disagreed or did not know (see Figure 4.3).

Figure 4.3 Differences in ability to complain across social groups in Rambutan, Aceh Jaya



4.3.3 Addressing conflict issues at project level

There was evidence to show that MDF projects had avoided unwittingly contributing to conflict in Aceh. This is a positive finding given that other projects, for example in housing, had incited conflict²⁸ (e.g. by actively excluding ex-GAM combatants from project benefits). Assessing conflict sensitivity at the project level has been challenging, since none of the projects under review have monitored trends in relation to conflict or analysed conflict impact in any depth. World Bank projects are especially deficient in this regard, lacking broader external Mid-Term Evaluations. Significantly, a major finding of the review has been the lack of clarity and confusion amongst agencies over MDF guidelines on conflict issues, an issue addressed in Section 3.5.

- Some projects did contain information on conflict sensitivity, notably SPADA, which is the clearest example of a PAD that addresses conflict-related issues in detail. Most others do

²⁸ Personal communication with Aceh Conflict Monitoring Unit

not. However, it is accepted that there may in cases be good reasons for avoiding direct discussion of politically sensitive issues in printed documentation.

- More significantly, all projects showed weak contextual conflict awareness, in line with practice across the board in the Aceh reconstruction effort. Most aid projects actively avoided any conflict issue²⁹, only engaging reactively when a crisis occurred (e.g. intimidation by ex-combatants, threats of exhortation by military and occasional violent incidents)³⁰.
- **ILO/RRR:** ILO staff accepted that they avoided local conflict issues by expecting contractors to deal with them. There was no evaluation of how this had happened or of its implications. This approach was common to the other reconstruction projects³¹, in which local level issues are dealt with locally, in the absence of any broader strategy.
- **SPADA:** Conflict training for SPADA District level facilitators is being undertaken with other funds (provided by DFID, an MDF donor), but outside MDF since it is seen as not eligible for MDF funding.
- **KDP:** KDP, as well as SPADA and UPP, use community-based approaches that aim to reduce local conflict (amongst other objectives).
- **RALAS** was also designed to reduce conflict over land ownership, and through its initial community-driven processes probably achieved this as a by-product. But there is little evidence that MDF-funded elements of these projects have been able to address conflict explicitly or consider how they might be adapted, despite links between community-based funds and conflict issues. KDP programmes directly linked to building confidence in conflict-affected areas were not funded by MDF. More local level conflict mitigation might have been possible through amended community-based approaches that address relevant issues. However, it is also recognised that the approaches generally play a positive (or neutral) role at the local level in other ways, and that further delays in order to accommodate conflict-sensitive adaptations would have delayed implementation.
- **REKOMPAK** encountered long-running community level conflicts in villages. Bireuen Kabupaten provides a good example of common local conflicts. One village in a heavily conflict affected area, (former conflict actors, and victims involved in local disputes and previous intra-community conflict issues – such as GAM informants etc.), had little scope for community management. REKOMPAK managed to bring the community together and achieve a consensus on housing plans. Once they had left, after the community housing process, in 2006, inter-group rivalry in the village led to a murder. REKOMPAK was confident that, whilst project intervention may have brought the issue to a head, there was little that they could have done about it since it reflected deeper longstanding problems. But it is likely that additional funding provided at the village level stoked existing tensions, and in three communities REKOMPAK pulled out of delivering assistance under the recommendation of the Bireuen Bupati (Kabupaten head).

²⁹ See Barron and Burke (2008) *Supporting Peace in Aceh: Development Agencies and International Involvement*.

³⁰ This could be seen as ‘working around conflict’ as described in Leonhardt (2001) who explains a tendency for projects to address conflict issues only in so far as to ensure project plans are not disrupted, rather than actively addressing the issues and considering links with project outputs.

³¹ And is true for non-MDF funded infrastructure projects.

4.3.3.1 Top-down and bottom-up conflict issues

Where community-based approaches look at conflict, they tend to focus on local level tensions within or between villages (see various World Bank publications in Indonesia). Local disputes can become extremely violent in Aceh and across Indonesia. With limited sanctions against violence, and little recourse to formal justice mechanisms, people can take issues into their own hands, with violent consequences.


However, there is a risk that development agencies focus on local level issues at the expense of a more sophisticated and political understanding of conflict. The conflict in Aceh is essentially more top-down than it is bottom-up, the key issues at stake being distribution of power between Jakarta and Aceh rather than local level community dynamics. For example, when a local level dispute erupted into violence between former GAM and other groups in central Aceh in March 2008, the situation was calmed by political intervention in Aceh and in Jakarta. Whilst such local flashpoints are likely to remain a common feature of Aceh (and Indonesia) into the future, the critical issue here is whether higher level bodies choose to foment or to damp down violence. For donors this implies looking at conflict issues beyond community level interventions.

4.3.4 Addressing equity and inclusion

This was difficult to track at project level because of the lack of baseline data and social impact indicators in the monitoring systems. Supervision reports for all projects did not consistently address social issues and when they did, rarely went to the level of detail necessary to understand inclusion issues. There was little information about how budgets were determined and resources allocated in order to strengthen attention to equity and inclusion. The majority of projects had gender training for staff and/or contractors but we could not find examples of training in, for example, addressing power structures in communities or techniques for reaching and working with the poorest and most vulnerable. Nor was it clear whether flexibility in time allocated for working in remote areas or in engaging with marginalised groups had been embedded in project approaches.

It is recognised that in Aceh and Nias there are particular challenges in reaching and including poor and marginal women in project activities and MDF projects are not alone in being unable to show significant progress in this regard. Nevertheless, some projects in the portfolio have responded to the challenge. TRWMP targeted and included scavenger communities and other marginalised groups in the early part of its livelihoods work for example, and this was remembered and appreciated at community level. KDP and UPP have guidelines for facilitators to help them in supporting poor women and men address the barriers they face in participating actively in decision-making processes. In KDP, these include scope for by-passing weak and divisive village heads; identifying trusted and respected people to be on the project committee and informally consulting with women when attending meetings is problematic for them. In practice, however, many facilitators did not do this because of time constraints in project implementation and low-levels of capacity. In UPP, socialisation and inclusion processes emerge as a weak spot, compared to other community programmes under the World Bank³². Nevertheless, for both projects, attention to inclusion and equity issues remain stronger than for most programmes of their size.

³² See the Aide Memoires and field notes from the World Bank supervision missions.

Figure 4.4 Levels of consultation in *Belimbing*, Nias

The overall pattern with regard to inclusion and equity is a mixed one. Whilst the systems and mechanisms to mainstream inclusion and equity are not necessarily institutionalised within projects, there were trends, with some exceptions, towards the increasing inclusion of women and poor people, and several factors may account for this. Firstly, the levels of funding available and the policy commitments of GoI/BRR towards poverty reduction and gender equity meant coverage within communities was inevitably directed towards women and the poor, no matter how imperfectly. Secondly, and with greater implications for social sustainability, engagement with the formal and informal institutions within communities has opened up spaces to rebalance relationships of power leading to enhanced inclusion and equity for the less powerful and more marginal groups. Opportunities have been missed to capitalise on this process by the majority of projects because of limited understanding and attention to the nature of power relations and the role and characteristics of village leadership.

In four of the communities consulted the review team met with long standing factionalism, tensions and disputes within communities (Aceh: *Annas*, *Pisang*, and *Rambutan*; Nias: *Belimbing*) which had hampered efforts at increasing involvement of poorer and more marginal groups. Such situations are not uncommon across Aceh and Nias. ACARP suggests that agencies can address these tensions and have a significant impact on the depth and quality of participation in communities through processes of careful, inclusive and responsive facilitation (ACARP, 2007). Yet, with the exception of TRWMP, UPP and KDP, (and for the latter two, only to a limited extent), the community-focused projects showed limited evidence of: a) a social analysis informing a context-based approach to work with communities; and, b) adaptability in changing and refining strategies in response to local social dynamics (see summary of project assessments in Annex G). The approaches taken by most MDF agencies with projects in those communities did not appear to have been adapted and refined in order to be responsive to these difficult underlying social dynamics. Marginalised and poorer groups in all four sites mentioned above felt there have been few opportunities for them to participate in or influence decision-making, although in one location (*Annas*, Banda Aceh) three groups (women in a PKK group, poor women and poor men) did

highlight two projects as actively involving them in management: an NGO housing project and UPP.

The main lessons emerging in relation to equity and inclusion are explored below.


- **Information not filtering down to poor and marginal groups**

Without access to information, poor and marginalised groups are highly vulnerable, denied access to support; skills and benefits with could improve their well-being. Yet, there is no easy way to improve information flows to the poorest: a problem that besets programmes generally. In Aceh, KDP funds paid for local information facilitators aiming to help co-ordinate reconstruction programmes. Their impact is not clear in terms of reach into and across communities, although anecdotal evidence suggests that they were appreciated by some agencies even if they did not play a decisive role. In Aceh, the exchange of information was much higher than on Nias. There, communities generally felt they had little access to information about aid delivery. Senior staff of BRR-Nias also admitted to the difficulties of disseminating information about projects widely through Nias.

Some projects were hampered in their efforts to open up information flows by weak facilitation processes. REKOMPAK's efforts to disseminate information downwards, for example, met with limited success. In many cases information was limited to senior community figures rather than the whole community. And sometimes urgent project demands to meet targets hindered attempts at being more inclusive in information circulation:

“Not all the families here got money from the housing reconstruction fund because UPP very late at night came to me and asked me to collect all the data. Besides that, they wanted me to prepare data on all the families in this neighbourhood. So really, it was only those families that I succeeded in contacting that got the funds.” (*Village head, Mangga, Banda Aceh*)

Social capital plays a part in open information flows – the stronger the levels of mutual trust, the greater the circulation of information. Unsurprisingly, therefore, villages with higher levels of rivalries and factionalism showed the lowest level of satisfaction with access to information in their communities (see Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.5 Relationship between social capital and information provision

In other communities there was also a sense that for some groups, accessing project information (as opposed to community news) was frustrating at best. In *Salak*, women homemakers and farmers said they had:

“...no time to attend meetings or find out about project activities.”

While time was obviously one factor, more entrenched barriers relating to social exclusion were more insidious in curtailing access to information. Marginalised groups, such as youth and widows, reported limited access to information in several communities (e.g. *Annas*, *Salak* and *Pisang*).

- **Deliberate exclusion of ex-GAM combatants from decision making processes**

In *Rambutan* (Aceh Jaya) and *Salak*, both areas affected by conflict, a disturbing finding was that ex-GAM community members were being actively excluded from community meetings by the village leadership. Whilst there was no evidence that projects had initiated or supported this situation, there was also no evidence that projects had identified and included ex-GAM in their activities. This is an equally worrying finding given that other research has shown that communities “where ex-GAM have been incorporated in to the village government apparatus....(all) benefit from increased unity, motivation and overall effectiveness of recovery efforts.” (ACARP, 2007:viii).

- **Strategies needed for reducing social exclusion**

Findings from the RPCR suggest more attention needs to be given to reducing social exclusion of marginal groups. In all communities, people reported that the elderly, orphans and young people were marginalised within communities and cut-off from project support,

even when eligible for inclusion in, for example, housing projects (Banda Aceh, *Rambutan* and *Belimbing*, Nias).

There was also the issue of geographical isolation. An obvious point is that there is a correlation between proximity to the village centre and/or leadership and inclusion in village decision-making and resource allocation. It is not just about geographical distance but also about the nature of relationships with the power holders and leaders in the community. Women were disproportionately affected by the isolation. For example, women in an isolated *dusun* (hamlet) in *Rambutan*, Aceh Jaya, covered by AFEP, explained that:

“... because our hamlet is 2.7 km from the village centre there is no reason to come and tell us about assistance or projects.”

A similar view was expressed by women in *Salak*, Aceh Besar and *Pisang*, Aceh Barat. In *Belimbing*, Nias Selatan, women's distance from the centre was linked to ethnicity and religion, with the minority ethnic/religious group living in a separate hamlet and facing not just physical barriers to participation but also social and cultural ones.

Youths and ex-GAM in *Rambutan* also highlighted that their distance from the centre of village power compounded their exclusion:

“Our area is far from the village centre; normally the village facilitator just goes to the village centre. It means nobody is asking about our opinion”. (Young person, *Rambutan*, Aceh Jaya).

In Banda Aceh (both locations) and in *Jeruk*, Pidie, neighbourhoods were geographically distant because of ethnic and cultural differences. Elsewhere, Catholics in *Belimbing* and Pidie and Javenese ethnic groups in *Salak* were also isolated from community decision-making.

4.3.4.2 Gender equity and inclusion of women


Overall, there were trends towards increased inclusion of women in decision-making and project activities. Findings from the RPCR reflect those of a previous study³³ which also identified positive trends towards greater gender equity in decision-making across Aceh. Figure 4.6, for example, shows differences between the level of consultation perceived between male PIGDS and female PIGDs but these are not perhaps as high as could have been expected. Nevertheless, there were disparities between locations and between women of different social status within communities consulted.

- **Women of a higher social status showed higher levels of participation**

In Aceh, women leaders such as teachers, relatives of the village leader (male) and women in existing village institutions such as PKK or self-help groups were more likely to report than they had participated in community meetings and had their opinion heard.


In *Pisang*, Aceh Barat, for example, women teachers expressed a much higher degree of satisfaction with their access to decision-making processes and the opportunities to

³³ ACARP (2007) *The Acehese Gampong Three Years On: Assessing Local Capacity and Reconstruction Assistance in Post-Tsunami Aceh*.

Figure 4.6 Gendered differences in levels of project consultation

participate fully in project discussions. This view was echoed by PKK women in *Annas*, Banda Aceh. Both these locations were urban, which may be a factor in why certain groups of women were more likely to participate than others. Yet there was also some evidence from the rural areas. Female farmers organised in a self-help group by an NGO in *Rambutan*, Aceh Jaya suggested that if women were involved in an existing group they had legitimacy within the community which enabled them to actively participate in community meetings, a view shared by PPK women in *Belimbing*, Nias Selatan.

In two RPCR locations women from other social groups were also participating. There was evidence that particular groups of women – widows and landless women – had been actively encouraged to participate. In one case (*Annas*, Banda Aceh), it was due to the presence of an INGO and in the other (*Salak*, Aceh Besar), it appeared to be a combination of KDP and ILO/RRR community processes. In *Manggis*, Nias, because of the relative homogeneity of the community, women had a presence in community meetings yet still expressed dissatisfaction at the limited opportunities to voice opinions and actively participate in decision-making (see Figure 4.7).

Figure 4.7 Limited voice for widows in Manggis, Nias

- **Disparities in benefit sharing**

In a number of communities, women reported that they were likely to get less aid support than men. In *Rambutan*, Aceh Jaya for example, women resented that they were being paid Rp.10,000 per day less than the men working on the village road and irrigation projects. They felt powerless to challenge the project staff.

- **Targeting isolated and marginal women**

There was, across all the RPCR sites, little evidence that targeting for inclusion of poorer and more marginalised women had been institutionalised and embedded into community facilitation processes. The majority of poor/vulnerable women met during the RPCR reported lower levels on participation and involvement in decision-making and managing community projects.

Where targeting had taken place, poorer women were able to actively influence and shape project outcome. The ILO/RRR project operating in *Salak*, Aceh Besar was highlighted by a number of women's groups because they felt actively involved in discussions and activities. Widows and landless women valued being able to give their opinions and getting clear benefits from the process:

“We worked on the project (road); we piled up the rocks before smoothing them down.”

And in Banda Aceh some women reported that involvement in UPP supported their access to decision-making:

“Women were involved in the committee of KSM (project formed self-help groups), and one of us even became a finance officer” (*Mangga*, Banda Aceh).

Box 4.4 Including vulnerable women: different experiences in Aceh and Nias

In ***Mangga village, Banda Aceh***, UPP has been helping to build back community infrastructure with projects that rehabilitated walkways and drainage facilities. In the *Jempa* and *Teratai* neighbourhoods of the community, women were actively involved in all aspects of the project implementation, including the widows of local tsunami victims.

They formed a self help group which provided them with some much needed credit. It also gave them the confidence to take part in wider community discussions and decision-making. One of their members was elected on to the UPP project implementation committee as finance officer. Their UPP project was considered a success by the whole community, with one local businessman even remarking that “it was the best in the whole of *Mangga* district”. Frustratingly for the women, some of them, especially the widows, were often not told about community meetings and would miss important decisions, although they said if they did get to go along, they did at least get a chance to speak out and be heard. This was not, however, the experience of women in the *Melati* neighbourhood of *Mangga*, whose UPP project did not generate such changes. They still got left out of meetings and had difficulty in finding out about what was happening in their neighbourhood. They said they felt excluded and marginalised from the community.

In ***Belimbing village, Nias Selatan*** the review team met a widow, Ibu A, with three children who was living in a tent. Before the earthquake she lived in her father-in-law’s house. Afterwards, because the house was destroyed, her parents-in-law were re-housed through BRR. But it was too small to accommodate her small family as well, so she left. She has already paid Rp.50,000 to the village head and Rp.35,000 to BRR as her contribution towards a new house. Still she waits in her tent for which she and her family had to pay money. She has no savings and her only source of income is farm labouring. She is dependent on the good will of the owner of the land where she pitches her tent and he is losing patience; he wants her to go. Ibu A has no idea what she will do if he does manage to evict her. She feels nobody is listening to her. Whilst Ibu A’s case is extreme, many other widows in *Belimbing* reported feeling isolated and excluded in the village. They had never been invited to community meetings and often heard about possible support for themselves and their families after the aid had been allocated.

Source: RPCR in Mangga village, Banda Aceh and Belimbing village, Nias.

The TRWMP was singled out in a group discussion with male refugees in *Annas*, Banda Aceh because women were actively included and participated in the village clean-up programmes, although some pointed out that widows did not participate in the activities.

The lack of gender strategies will have a negative impact on social sustainability in areas where the other projects work. The effective targeting for promoting enhanced inclusion and gender equity requires careful analysis of the context-specific barriers women face (e.g. status, ethnicity and family circumstances) linked to implementation strategies, robust monitoring systems and on-going training and mentoring for staff. These have yet to be put in place. For example, in phase one of the ILO/RRR project, outreach work at the community level was not done. A contract was signed with the contractors and it was their responsibility

to recruit the labour force and include poorer women (and men). No targets or quotas were set in this regard. However, individual contractors, building on existing village facilitation processes by other agencies such as KDP, as was the case in *Salak*, Aceh Besar, were able to bring poor women into the workforce. Nevertheless, institutionally, there are signs of progress, with gender recruitment guidelines being developed for use during phase 2. AFEP and BAFMP are, somewhat belatedly, in the early stages of developing more coherent approaches to gender. Prior to this gender issues have been poorly incorporated into project strategies. RALAS has experienced continued difficulties in ensuring all women, and especially more vulnerable groups such as widows and orphaned young women, have access to information and support which would allow them to gain land titles³⁴. There is no operational gender strategy or disaggregation of the data by well-being levels and gender issues remain weakly addressed. The Widows subproject of KDP offers an alternative approach.

Box 4.5 An alternative approach: Women's empowerment at the centre of a project

In Aceh, the Program for Women Headed Households in Indonesia – PEKKA – programme for widows and female heads of households offers an alternative approach. Funded by the Japan Social Development Fund, it is implemented and is linked to the KDP. With over 1,200 members in Aceh, it aims to not only provide micro-credit for small businesses or scholarships for child education but also training in vocational and leadership skills with the aim of empowering them in a context in which they are often marginalised within their own communities, and becoming more marginalised with the implementation of Shariah law. This project has a clear focus on empowering women, not just economically through livelihood support, but also socially and from the start (nationally) had an aim of ensuring that a “rights” perspective is equally valued with the project's development goals. It was described by one senior World Bank staff member as one of the best projects in Aceh.

Source: Interview with World Bank staff; “Indonesia Women Headed Household Program (PEKKA)” available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/pekka> and “The Widows of Tampoek Blang” available at: <http://go.worldbank.org/Q4FBFYK240>

4.3.5 Sustainable local capacity

In Aceh there were positive trends to suggest that some projects were beginning to develop networks and partnerships between communities, local government structures and other actors. Progress has been slow and in this respect MDF projects reflect the overall trends in aid delivery. The process was most advanced in TRWMP, which linked up with communities and worked through Dinas sanitation departments from its beginning in 2005. AFEP's *Mukim* associations are also, after five years, beginning to become more representative of the communities they serve. UPP's programme in the community is now being supplemented for the National Program for Community Empowerment in Urban Areas (PNPM) under its third phase of operation. The challenge for all projects, will be in ensuring partnerships developed are representative of, and trusted by, all social groups.

Sustainability of community level interventions often depends on the involvement of local government structures. Overall, the record of MDF supported projects in this regard is mixed.

³⁴ See for example Fitzpatrick (2007) and the project assessments from this review.

Whilst the context did present a range of challenges, short project time-frames and limited engagement at the village level restricted the focus on building links between citizens and the lowest levels of government representation. This applies to projects using WB Community Driven Development approaches as well as other projects with less obvious community elements.

Those MDF-funded projects engaging at community level were rarely able to draw closer links between government representatives, such as the village leader, and those community members already marginalised or excluded. Most projects did not take sufficient steps to ensure that better connected or more affluent members did not dominate relationships with government figures.

4.3.6 Results: benefits and capacities

There were gains reported across all the locations in Aceh, particularly in housing and small scale infrastructure, even when sections of the community were not wholly satisfied with the results. Much greater satisfaction with the outcomes of infrastructure projects was reported by communities if they were kept informed and involved in project implementation. Housing projects, in particular, were viewed in communities as frustratingly difficult to navigate and to control in terms of being able to negotiate the size, style or type of accommodation appropriate to their needs. In *Pisang*, Aceh Barat, a range of community members reported that REKOMPAK spent little time consulting with them or coordinating reconstruction which left them insecure and anxious for the future because houses had been built, against their wishes, too close to the seafront or without sea defences. In *Mangga*, Banda Aceh, women participants contrasted favourably the INGO housing project which was managed by community members with the BBR/UPP housing support which seemed slower to deliver and was blighted by lack of consultation, information and co-ordination.

Roads were valued for speeding up their economic and livelihood recovery. For example, in *Salak*, Aceh Besar, several groups mentioned how important the ILO/RRR road project had been for the community because it gave them better access to markets and much needed health facilities. Communities also highlighted the wider benefits that infrastructure projects brought to them. In *Annas*, Banda Aceh, groups reported how the UPP support for street lighting had improved security in the neighbourhood. In *Mangga*, Banda Aceh, the UPP pathways and drainage project was seen as a great success (see Box 4.4) and in *Salak*, Aceh Besar, the ILO/RRR project was singled out not just for the benefits but also for good management. Where communities felt there had been poor co-ordination and communication between themselves and projects there appeared to be little ownership and a great deal of dissatisfaction over the quality and appropriateness of the aid.

On Nias there were clear disparities between the two locations. In Nias Selatan all community members were clearly dissatisfied with the way reconstruction activities had been carried out and the lack of vital infrastructure – roads, electricity and water supply. Only women who have been re-housed through BRR were satisfied. In *Belimbing*, elite capture of the benefits meant that many groups (young people, poorer men and women and teachers) felt there had been few significant or positive changes to their lives in the aftermath of the earthquake (see Box 4.4).

- **Places to meet and to socialise perceived as an important benefit in rebuilding social capital**

Community members in several locations of the RPCR raised the importance of having places to meet and socialise in keeping communities together and promoting social cohesion. The issue appeared of particular significance in relation to young men, a group

more likely to voice concerns over lack of participation and exclusion. In *Annas*, Banda Aceh, for example, where the youth were in dispute with the village leadership, several groups expressed regret about the loss of recreational facilities:

“In the past we had a volleyball pitch that was a place that brought us together, created solidarity and allowed us to socialise. But now it’s gone, it’s not been built back.” (*PIDG with men in Annas and reported in three separate women’s PIDGs*)³⁵.

It’s a finding which resonates with data from ACARP (2007) who also reported the value in reviving and supporting social and cultural practices in communities for rebuilding social capital.

- **Demand for economic and livelihood-based projects strong**

Across all the RPCR sites community members were confirming, as a priority, the current aid focus on small-scale economic activities. The support they had received so far, while valued by some, was seen as inadequate to help them recover their livelihood:

“What is the use of a house if we can not eat?” (*Woman farmer, Rambutan, Aceh Jaya*)

The only project singled out by participants in the RPCR for its livelihood activities was TRWMP. In particular, despite the short term nature of the intervention, the cash-for-work programme, which employed scavengers, was highly valued, not just because of the economic benefits but also for positively changing attitudes towards a hitherto marginalised group.

The most common complaints in relation to livelihood and economic support were two fold. Across all locations participants reported dissatisfaction with the quality and appropriateness of the types of materials or stock and equipment provided. In *Rambutan*, Aceh Jaya for example, women farmers complained that while there was a patchouli seed distribution scheme, they already had the seeds and would have benefited from alternative seeds being offered. In *Belimbing*, Nias Selatan, farmers reported problems with availability of agricultural equipment and the lack of access to credit to buy fertilisers and seeds. In four locations, women and men criticised the lack of training support that would have helped them diversify their livelihoods (*Jeruk*, Pidie; *Annas*, Banda Aceh; *Pisang*, Aceh Barat; and *Salak*, Aceh Besar). These findings have implications for future MDF support for economic recovery and strongly suggest that supported projects will need to pay close attention to demand-led assessment and market research before implementation.

Secondly, as explored in section 4.3.4 above, there were issues of targeting and equity. Women and also young men were likely to report concerns that they were being left out of income generation activities. Although for women there was evidence of targeting and inclusion in, for example, the road project by ILO/RRR in Aceh Besar; the waste clearance activities of TRWMP in *Annas*; the UPP projects in Banda Aceh; and the capital business programme linked to KDP which prioritised widows.

³⁵ This issue was also raised in *Rambutan*, Aceh Jaya; *Annas*, Banda Aceh; and *Manggis*, Nias.

- **Follow-up and support for maintenance of community infrastructure**

The time needed to develop clear roles, responsibilities and resources for the maintenance of community infrastructure appears to have been greatly underestimated. A recurrent concern for communities across Aceh and Nias was the lack of support for maintenance. The KDP project in *Jeruk*, Pidie for example was criticised by all groups consulted for no budget to maintain existing facilities. Concerns were also raised in both locations in Banda Aceh and in Aceh Besar and on Nias. Some projects have already identified this as a problem (KDP and UPP), although given it is now in a new phase of implementation (PNPM), it is too early to say whether sustainability measures will be effective. Project Assessments also highlighted that this was an issue for BAFMP which appeared not to have fully planned for post-construction maintenance.

- **Building capacities: reducing vulnerabilities**

Opportunities were missed in the reconstruction efforts of most MDF projects to build capacities and skills amongst all recipients which could reduce their vulnerability to future livelihood shocks and disasters. This calls in to question the social sustainability of the project interventions. Social sustainability is dependent on building capacities to adapt to changed and changing conditions; to positively make use of resources which have been made available and to protect and maintain those resources. Skills in negotiation, mediation, techniques in accountable and inclusive decision-making are much needed competencies for promoting social sustainability at community level.

There was evidence in Aceh that amongst village leaders and senior members of the communities visited, capacities to negotiate, communicate and mediate between government, project officials and community members had been strengthened through the use of external facilitation (KDP and UPP stand out in this regard). There appeared to be an assumption in the communities we visited that these capacities would filter through and across the population. However, the transfer of these capacities appeared fractured and inequitable with few poor women and marginal groups receiving sustained mentoring and capacity building support. TRWMP, through its long-term 2-3 year livelihood activities with targeted groups linked to awareness-raising around gender, labour rights etc was the exception. (*Mangga*, Banda Aceh, and *Salak*, Aceh Besar were the two locations where participation, equity and inclusion appeared to receive greatest attention

In communities where the legitimacy of community leaders was in question (Aceh: *Annas*, *Pisang* and *Rambutan*; Nias: *Manggis* and *Belimbing*), there was little sign that facilitation processes had taken account of the specific social dynamics and worked to build inclusive, equitable relationships between power holders and poor men and women. This, of course, takes time, a commodity in short supply for projects with a short timeframe in which to complete their tasks.

4.4 Contribution to social sustainability: summary of key lessons

It is too early to judge the social sustainability of the projects under review. The projects, like TRWMP, which are capacity building government departments in tandem with local communities, and by doing so opening up spaces for broader-based engagement between community members and local governance structures, are showing positive trends in this direction.

Overall, the findings from the social sustainability review identified a number of lessons which, if addressed, offer opportunities to strengthen attention to social issues within the MDF portfolio. Findings suggest that, for the majority of on-going projects, particularly on Nias, there are opportunities to strengthen both engagement with local government and other actors and operational approaches to issues of equity, inclusion and diversity in targeted communities. The range of lessons learnt, from the review can be further grouped together and summarised within five broad headings. It is these five key lessons that open up possibilities for enhancing attention to social sustainability within the MDF portfolio.

- **Address exclusion of the poorest and most marginal groups**

Across the MDF portfolio there has yet to be consistent and conscious engagement with the poorest and most marginal social groups. Evidence suggests that, even when poor men and women have received tangible benefits from project interventions, they are not always being targeted and included in decision-making and resource allocation processes (see 4.3.4). KDP, UPP and TRWMP stand out as projects which have put in place operational guidelines, processes and mechanisms which would, over time, increase the social inclusion of the poorest members of targeted communities.

- **Strengthen gender mainstreaming**

Gender mainstreaming within the projects, even in cases where gender strategies have been developed and operationalised, has not resulted in all women being able to access and benefit from project interventions. There was substantial evidence (see 4.3.4.2 above) that poorer women and women from marginalised groups (because of ethnicity or geographical isolation for example) were being left out or excluded from decision-making processes.

Realistic and operational gender strategies are needed for all MDF projects. The results from the review indicate that gender strategies are not fully effective in the majority of the projects under review. Given the heightened attention gender issues are receiving in Aceh and Nias through the reconstruction efforts, it is disappointing that only KDP, UPP and TRWMP were seen to have operationalised gender strategies, the results of which could be seen at the community level where women who had been involved in these projects, or living in communities where they worked, were likely to report high levels of participation in influencing and managing projects.

- **Mainstream conflict sensitivity mechanisms**

For all projects in Aceh, approaches to conflict-sensitivity merit revisiting. Reconstruction efforts have been undermined through dissociation from conflict issues and peace-building efforts. Whilst community-driven approaches and other mechanisms aiming to provide tangible, direct assistance are important, the inherently political nature of conflict and peace in Aceh should be grasped and remain central to any strategic vision.

- **Make local governance linkages more systematic**

Sustainability and wider replication of effective community level engagement frequently depends on the scope for projects to make linkages between lower levels of government that directly engage with people, and higher level authority at the *kacamatan*, *kabupaten* or even provincial levels. Few projects were consistently working on building the capacity of local communities to engage with local governance in tandem with strengthening capacities within local government to respond effectively to increased demand.

Decentralisation across all of Indonesia, and the implementation of Special Autonomy in Aceh, have presented opportunities but also compound serious weaknesses in local

governance which make these issues critical. Efforts were made by various projects to engage with higher levels of government in a concerted fashion but this rarely built institutional support to address social sustainability issues.

- **Community facilitation processes need to be longer-term and adapted to context**

Barriers to inclusion and equitable sharing of benefits are structural and reflect entrenched unequal power relations at household, community and within high levels of government. These barriers to inclusion require a range of responses from projects, although few projects were showing such adaptations. Few projects, for example, were differentiating between socially-cohesive and socially-fractured communities and tailoring their interventions to take account of these social differences. Community meetings and discussions with the village leadership appeared to be the most common *modus operandi*. These are essential but not sufficient to guarantee that poor and vulnerable people will be able to have equitable access to decision-making and benefits. The starting point is a careful appraisal of barriers to inclusion and opportunities for strengthening levels of mutual trust between community members in order to tailor social inclusion strategies to the local context.

At the same time community facilitation processes need to be longer term. The mentoring, technical assistance and training needed to build the skills, confidence and capabilities of poor and vulnerable people to actively take part in project interventions takes far longer than was planned for in MDF projects. Equally, establishing sustainable institutional processes and systems that are accountable and inclusive can only be built incrementally over a long-term time frame for engagement with local governance structures.

5 Looking Forward: Recommendations

5.1 Overview

In this section we address practical actions that the MDF can take to strengthen portfolio and project attention to social sustainability. Our recommendations are based on an assessment of what is feasible in relation to:

- the existing structure and timeframe of the MDF;
- the scope to address the findings of our review in the socio-political context of Aceh and Nias; and,
- current options for addressing social sustainability within development practice.

Good practice development experience suggests that for social sustainability issues to be mainstreamed within projects there are three related pathways. These include:

- **Focusing** – Making it a full objective of the project;
- **Supporting** – Partner agencies and/or fund management identify and implement strategies for adding value and supporting projects to address and integrate social issues into design, implementation and monitoring; and,
- **Obligating** – Developing and agreeing shared processes of accountability for mainstreaming social sustainability, including, in extremis, sanctions.

The diversity of projects within the MDF portfolio, its limited administrative capacity and the well-established government ownership over the fund caution against taking a prescriptive or focused approach. There is, however, considerable scope for enhancing support systems and improving accountability mechanisms for mainstreaming social sustainability. There are a number of strengths on which it can build in order to do this, including:

- A Steering Committee with a stated commitment to social sustainability;
- A policy in place – the RAP;
- Partner agencies with social safeguards that, if fully functional, provide the foundation for monitoring social objectives; and,
- A Secretariat well positioned within the World Bank from which to draw on existing networks and fields of expertise to support partner and implementing agencies' social sustainability efforts.

The four recommendations outlined below use these strengths as a starting point. Together they provide a route through which the MDF can begin to deliver on its social sustainability obligations. We would suggest that the timeframe for implementation is between 6-12 months, depending on the resources made available.

5.2 Recommendations

5.2.1 Recommendation 1: Put policy into action – use the lessons learnt to operationalise the Recovery Assistance Policy

In terms of how the MDF engages with social sustainability issues, there are few tools at its disposal. The RAP is the critical instrument. Whilst there are not the mechanisms in place to

operationalise its social elements, there are the criteria and principles from which to mainstream social issues throughout the portfolio. Members of the Steering Committee have already voiced their concern that the RAP is not being used effectively to guide projects. If the MDF is to respond to these concerns it requires: a) high-level ownership by the Steering Committee early in the process to give the MDF Secretariat the mandate to act; and, b) an entry point through which to do so.

The findings from this review are useful in this respect. The five major lessons learned from the review (see 4.4 above and Box 5.1 below) give substance to the RAP by clarifying what the social elements of the RAP mean in the context of rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. That is, they identify the areas of endeavour required to optimise the contribution of the projects and portfolio to social sustainability.

Box 5.1 At a glance: The five key lessons learned

- 1. Address exclusion** (there is no consistent or conscious engagement with poorest and marginal groups)
- 2. Strengthen gender mainstreaming** (poorer women are being excluded)
- 3. Mainstream conflict sensitivity mechanisms**
- 4. Make local governance linkages more systematic** ("Voice" – the community and other key stakeholders – and institutional response are de-linked)
- 5. Community facilitation processes need to be longer-term and adapted to context** (projects are not generally differentiating between socially-cohesive and socially-fractured communities, and livelihood components are not demand-led enough)

Table 5.1 suggests what the programmatic issues will be against each of the five lessons. It also suggests possible indicators for projects to track and mainstream the issues. It is beyond the scope of this review to suggest which existing projects should do this or what might be the entry points for new projects. However, if the RAP is to be the guiding force for MDF, as it clearly was meant to be, then a focus on these five issues is imperative. The actions points following the table are indicative of what will need to be done.

Table 5.1 Lessons learned, programming issues and possible indicators

Lessons	Project Programming Measures	Possible Indicators
1. Address exclusion: (e.g. no consistent or conscious engagement with poorest and marginal groups)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identification of poorest / marginal groups. - Well-being and poverty disaggregation appropriate to level of project. - Monitorable inclusion strategy with benchmarks. - Prioritisation of beneficiary locations / groups according to poverty. - Budgetary tracking of resources over time (by local government) to test pro-poor expenditure (i.e. by area). - Levels and quality of active participation. - Social audits, benchmarking, guidelines and filters as an integral part of planning mechanisms, MIS, etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inclusion of vulnerable groups in resource allocation / decision making processes according to agreed benchmarks. - % increase in people from marginalised groups in positions of leadership or other influence over resource allocation.

<p>2. Strengthen gender mainstreaming: (e.g. poorer women being excluded)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encourage and utilise religious groups and institutions to support women's participation and gender equity. - Application of locally defined and proven ways of promoting women's rights - Gender strategy for projects - Integrating gender with poverty analysis, to focus on poorer women - Use of disaggregated data where relevant. - Gender sensitive budgets. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - % of women in positions of authority / decision-making, in project, and in local governance structures. - Presence / implementation of a strategy of representation, inclusion and empowerment of women appropriate to the project.
<p>3. Mainstream Conflict sensitivity mechanisms</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Peace and conflict impact assessments / reviews, considering sustainability of Acehese bodies as well as conflict mapping and conflict analysis of project area. - Understanding local power structures to enable more positive engagement at a community level. - Consideration of local conflict issues in community based / driven approaches. - More staff based in Aceh / more Acehese staff at higher levels. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identification of different groups and analysis of whether they have received assistance. - Monitoring conflict incidents including village level tensions. - Number of incidents / tensions relating to project contracts / partners / employment.
<p>4. Make local governance linkages systematic (e.g. "<u>Voice</u>" – the community and other key stakeholders – and <u>institutional response</u> are de-linked)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Government involvement from conception, in Aceh and Nias, and considering social sustainability. - Further linkages at appropriate levels built over time. - Transparent / accountable contracting procedures. - Capacity building of accountable local government. - Local agreement over roles and responsibilities widely disseminated. - 'One-stop-shop' or other village level initiatives to improve equitable access. - Indicators: user satisfaction with services. - Social contracts / service obligations between service providers and users). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Planning at kecamatan and kabupaten level reflects social diversity of target communities. - Number of acted-upon recommendations within local government relating to transparency, accountability, and focused on vulnerable groups. - Level of client satisfaction with services provided.
<p>5. Community facilitation processes need to be longer-term and adapted to context (e.g. projects not generally differentiating between socially-cohesive and socially-fractured communities, and livelihood components are not demand-led enough)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Demand-led interventions where appropriate. - Community led facilitation given more attention (including community '<i>sosialisasi</i>'). - Training / mentoring government officials. - Adaptability to change through regular reviews, process-based planning. - Realistic timeframes for design and initial implementation, giving space for socialisation and awareness within communities and government. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Level and quality of active participation in project processes. - Levels of skills, knowledge and attitude relating to social mobilisation, social inclusion, equity, accountability and conflict sensitivity. - Flexible process-based

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Consideration of staff employment terms and flexibility to ensure quality facilitation staff - e.g. to attract married couples or young independent women. - Appropriateness and range of mechanisms for communication, management and decision-making between projects, beneficiaries and other stakeholders. 	indicators able to progress over time, and also reflect differences between communities.
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Clearly, not all the issues raised in table 5.1 relevant to all MDF-supported projects. However, we suggest the following projects would merit revisiting and support³⁶:

- TRWMP
- ILO/RRR Phase 2
- IREP
- IRFF
- KRRP
- AFEP
- BAFMP
- CSOSP
- Pipeline projects such as the support to transitional governance project

Action Points:

Once the results from this review are disseminated the following actions are suggested:

- Steering Committee meeting³⁷ on the review findings leading to endorsement of the recommendations and the mandate given to the Secretariat to work on implementing recommendations;
- Establishment of a small (4-5 members) social sustainability working group to oversee and provide legitimacy for Secretariat actions;
- The Quality Assurance Consultant of the MDF to take forward the recommendations through establishing Aceh and Nias dialogues. We suggest that these take the form of multi-stakeholder processes involving key stakeholders of the MDF (e.g. government, civil society actors, partner and implementing agency managers, WB Social Development unit etc.),³⁸
- In the first instance, convene a workshop with this group of actors to explore the lessons learnt. Capitalise on their experience of several years of reconstruction efforts and

³⁶ We were not given the PADs and accompanying documents for the Disaster Risk Reduction or the Ports Capacity Building projects. We therefore make no comment on the applicability of the issues raised to the projects.

³⁷ The MDF may want to consider the utility and appropriateness of having this meeting facilitated by an external facilitator to allow all Steering Committee members, including the co-chairs, to air their views.

³⁸ Given the very different socio-political conditions in Aceh and Nias, it would make sense that there are two parallel processes: one in Aceh and one in Nias. This, of course, would depend on the resources available to the Secretariat.

identify locally-defined and realistic solutions to the gaps in social programming identified by the lessons learnt. This enables the fund to build on existing good practice. These can form the basis of an action plan, appropriate to Aceh and Nias, which can be used to enhance project and portfolio capacities to address social and conflict issues; and,

- On the basis of Steering Committee approval of the action plan dedicate resources for implementing it. This will include agreeing a budget and time allocation for the Quality Assurance Officer to implement it.

5.2.2 Recommendation 2: Define clear guidelines and programmatic choices in relation to the Recovery Assistance Policy and lessons learnt

There will need to be a range of guidelines and supporting documents made available to applicants and projects as well as conditions articulated to: a) show how the RAP is relevant to them; and, b) establish the requirements for funding and PAD approval. The action plan is a starting point and can be included in MDF funding documents. It is an important component in a strategy aimed at providing practical guidance on what the MDF expects applicants to address in relation to social sustainability. There are other actions that will need to be taken which we outline below.

Action Points

- Develop a brief annexe to the RAP which contains simple social checklists for both sector and crosscutting projects. For example, for infrastructure projects, reminder that poverty targeting will need to be integrated within the project and suggestions on how to do this (such as poverty criteria included in the criteria for kecamatan selection);
- Within the guidelines and form for submission of PCN to the MDF include a copy of the lessons learnt table (Table 5.1) and a question requiring projects to justify what relevance these issues have to the project and how they will be prioritising them in design and implementation. We recognise that not all the lessons need to be taken forward by all the projects. To avoid tokenism or overload, care should be taken in MDF documentation to explain this. The checklists are helpful in this regard;
- In the process of PAD submission, applicants to be asked to show how the design, implementing and monitoring arrangements will integrate the priority social issues identified in the PCN. We suggest one of the criteria for PAD approval should be that social sustainability commitments must be linked to a budget, given a timeframe (even if indicative) and integrated into the logframe;
- Require projects to disaggregate data appropriate to their level of operation, at the very least gendered, and using level-specific poverty disaggregation within the PAD. Or, if systems for disaggregation are not in place prior to implementation, a requirement that they are set up during an inception phase;
- Where projects have an inception phase requiring it to elaborate and finalise the M&E systems, we suggest this is broadened to include a requirement to finalise their social sustainability focus. Specifically, where appropriate, an inception phase gives projects the opportunity to carry out a full context analysis of their target areas as an integral part of setting the baseline. The analysis enables them to finalise implementation strategies and monitoring systems incorporating social issues and would include:
 - Clear identification of who, within the project area, is excluded from existing decision-making and resource allocation process, and the way in which existing power structures are shaping exclusionary processes;
 - The measures a project can take realistically to address the key barriers and opportunities for enhancing social inclusion and gender equity;

- What the specific measures will be to adapt socialisation and mobilisation processes to the different social context identified;
 - What capacities, partnerships and alliances will be needed to support improved governance linkages in the different target areas; and,
 - The precise measures to be taken to address the context-specific conflict issues likely to influence project implementation.
- The resultant strategy from the context analysis provides a baseline and a common basis from which partner agencies and MDF can supervise and monitor the social dimensions of project implementation.

5.2.3 Recommendation 3: Capitalise on existing assets to strengthen capacities to engage effectively around social issues with projects and other key stakeholders in Aceh and Nias

An unexpected finding from the review was the weak engagement and influence MDF has over middle and local level stakeholders in Aceh and Nias. Yet, to support the next phase of reconstruction post-BRR and promote long-term social sustainability, this level of engagement is essential. It will require Secretariat staff, and in particular those tasked with taking this review forward, to spend considerable time in Aceh and Nias in order to build the relationships and partnerships necessary to ensure the MDF and, specifically, its Secretariat:

- is able to respond flexibly and swiftly to a changing and volatile situation (e.g. local responses to the forthcoming 2009 election in Aceh);
- develops a relationship of collaboration and support with partner/implementing agencies and other key actors;
- has networks and processes for engaging with local government; and,
- institutionalises and activates working relationships with the WB Social Development and Conflict units based in Aceh.

The MDF Secretariat and the Steering Committee will need also to review its role in relation to partner and implementing agencies with regard to promoting attention to social issues. Currently it is at best passive and often, from the perspective of the agencies, irrelevant or adversarial. If the MDF is to be seen as more supportive and, indeed, as a service for projects it will need to be far more proactive in the actions it takes to encourage socially sensitive programming. In doing so there are, we suggest, considerable opportunities for expanding the knowledge management (KM) role of the Secretariat. This role will inevitably encompass a much broader set of issues than covered by the scope of this review. However, we would highlight three ways in which strengthening the Secretariat's KM function would contribute to enhanced attention to social sustainability issues across the portfolio.

- Collation, analysis and dissemination of lessons learnt to projects and other key MDF stakeholders around key topics relating to social sustainability themes (e.g. social inclusion, gender mainstreaming and systematic linkages with local governance structure).
- Making available via the website, an accessible, user-friendly data base of existing good practice tools and methods relating to social sustainability issues (e.g. gender mainstreaming tools; methods for customer satisfaction surveys; conflict mapping tools; vulnerability analysis etc.). These types of tools are all in common usage in Indonesia and familiar to technical advisors from within the donor group on the Steering Committee and within partner agencies themselves. Sharing these kinds of information has the

added benefit of supporting greater collaboration between the Secretariat and projects. It also shifts the current focus within the MDF from telling projects what they should be doing to providing guidance on how they might address social sustainability issues.

- Establishment of an accessible roster of people with appropriate social development expertise, including M&E of social sustainability, from which individuals can be recommended to projects and used on a draw-down basis to support the way projects address social issues, engage with other key actors or integrate social issues into their monitoring.

Expanding the role of the MDF Secretariat along these lines means that there will be a number of services that the MDF can offer, without compromising its neutrality, which will support project capacities to engage around social issues. These include:

- focused and regular policy fora addressing social sustainability issues;
- support to project managers in developing capacity building strategies in relation to social sustainability for project staff and other key stakeholders;
- coordinating and helping projects link in or develop networks between different actors focused on social sustainability issues (e.g. Oxfam, Habitat International, GERAK etc.); and,
- off-grant resource support made available for collaborating activities between projects done to increase lesson learning and further social sustainability aims (e.g. in relation to social exclusion, conflict or gender equity).

Clearly, a changed role involving a greater degree of coordination, knowledge management and facilitation of policy/issue fora calls for increasing the resources made available to the MDF Secretariat. We strongly recommend this course of action. The current role performed by the Secretariat is not adequate for the task of coordination in relation to social sustainability. Nor does it enable the Secretariat to provide robust guidance to the partner agencies in terms of expectations and requirements in relation to optimising contributions to the long-term sustainability of Aceh and Nias. Nevertheless, while this suggests an increase in the budget for the Secretariat, we caution against the expansion of in-house resources, particularly staff. Under the present structure they would have little leverage over or legitimacy for partner and implementing agencies. It would make more sense to make resources available to enable projects to call in appropriate social expertise, strengthen collaborative activities and integrate social issues into their project approaches. However, we also accept that the findings of the MTR will have a bearing on the much broader issue of whether, and if so how, the MDF Secretariat should be restructured. There may well be a case from this broader perspective for restructuring the Secretariat to include a specific knowledge management role and more staff resources given over to coordination tasks.

Given this caveat, Table 5.2 below lays out a number of actions and the roles that the MDF Secretariat may consider at project and portfolio level as it attempts to strengthen social development capacities.

Table 5.2 Strengthening the social sustainability focus within the MDF Secretariat: roles and measures

Role	Possible portfolio mechanisms:	Possible cross-project collaborative work:
Knowledge management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion of project level Social Impact Assessments. - Separate funds for some overall actions: monitoring and evaluation, reviews, etc. - Sourcing training for MDF project staff on issues of concern, e.g. conflict and peace sensitivity, gender awareness, community based approaches, M&E for monitoring social sustainability. - Explore and develop a range of mechanisms through which the MDF at the portfolio level can routinely gather a civil society perspective and feed findings throughout the fund – Steering Committee, partner and implementing agencies. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Shared information and dissemination efforts. - Host regular get-togethers (as suggested by the donor model described earlier in the report – section 3.4) to encourage information exchange and informal networking between projects. - Shared cross-project approach to social impact analysis, analysis of poverty, identification of vulnerable groups, spatial distribution of poverty, conflict. Use of existing resources within or outside partners for this work.
Co-ordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion and monitoring of collaboration between projects / on issues. - Develop and maintain links with other government or donor assessments. - Reservation of small % of funds per project for portfolio-wide objectives. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Joint approaches to capacity built outside the project at government or community level. - Sharing successful partner agencies between projects.
Facilitation of policy/issues fora	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alongside MDF, parallel analysis of issues / support for monitoring / assistance for joint training / steps to share experience. To be funded by interested donors / implementing agencies / partners. - Networks to influence practice etc. or promote linkages between projects – joint plans, shared goals / objectives etc. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sectoral meetings / policy forums. - Encourage and support exchange visits between project staff working in the same sector or on similar issues.
Oversight	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inception review of social impact plans at the same time as finalising monitoring systems (i.e. 6 months into projects). - Modest but realistic targets to promote project attention to wider social sustainability issues and to increase focus on social sustainability within the project. - Insistence on external mid-term reviews. - Ensure wider representation in MDF sub-committees. - Require that projects elaborate a networking/partnership strategies for consistent collaboration with, where 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Require all projects to budget a set amount for joint activities with other relevant projects – without such a provision, cross working does not function effectively and synergies are not optimised.³⁹ - Require and facilitate peer reviews to encourage consolidation of good practice across sectors and around specific issues – e.g. poverty targeting in large-scale infrastructure projects or linking ‘voice’ and response in local governance

³⁹ A budget of \$20,000 has been suggested. However, given the widely different budgets of projects it may be better to require that a designated percentage of the total budget is set aside for joint activities.

	appropriate, research institutes, private sector, non-traditional civil society (religious bodies and institutions) etc. Again it will require dedicated resources clearly identified in budgets for new projects. For existing projects with 18 months or longer to run, it may be appropriate to make extra resources available.	structures.
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Recommendation 4: Use revision of the results framework to strengthen ownership and attention to social issues by partner and implementing agencies

At the portfolio level an approach that is based around social sustainability impact and outcome indicators is perhaps too crude given the diversity of projects, especially for those projects that have a national profile and remit wider than MDF. Nevertheless, it is recognised that social sustainability issues can be embedded in the portfolio M&E. However to do so requires, as outlined above, a restructuring of the MDF Secretariat in order to allow it to carry out its oversight function more effectively, as well as an overall increase in budgetary support for M&E issues. For this to happen requires the agreement of all MDF partners and in particular, the Steering Committee.

There are, however, other ways that the MDF can track progress towards social sustainability across the portfolio. It is already seriously considering collaborating with KDP and incorporating MDF-specific objective and research areas within the proposed social impact assessment. We would encourage this course of action for its cost effectiveness and opportunities for a comparative analysis between MDF and non-MDF supported locations. We outline below other actions that could be taken.

The lessons learnt (and allied table) above are a starting point for encouraging partner and implementing agencies to revisit and redefine the ways in which they monitor social issues. Column 3 in Table 5.1 gives an indication of the type of social impact indicator that will need to be used at project level. Projects will need to identify their own indicators and establish their own baselines from which they can track progress. We would caution against the development of multiple social indicators under each output. It makes more sense that projects identify at least one priority social sustainability issue per output and develop an outcome/impact indicator by which it can be monitored. Experience thus far also suggests that increasing reporting demands around social issues without either increasing the budget and/or building capacities to do so, is likely to be counter-productive.

Monitoring and evaluation is an obvious area that donors can support outside the main pooled fund of a multi-donor funding mechanism.⁴⁰ Since the MDF's coordination of monitoring in relation to social issues has been less than effective, it may be useful to consider the use off-grant funds as a way of opening up projects to other more supportive and collaborative forms of oversight. For example, encourage individual donors, or alliances of donors, to take up opportunities to fund particular aspects of lessons learnt or sector-based social impact assessments.

⁴⁰ See for example the provision made within the fund for resourcing PNPM which has earmarked monies for M&E support.

Action points

- Use the revision of the portfolio results framework to: a) build ownership in partner and implementing agencies for tracking contributions to social sustainability; and, b) strengthen the social dimensions of project level monitoring. The process for this should be linked into the dissemination of lessons learnt and the multi-stakeholder process recommended above. It would be premature, therefore, to identify a full range of steps that the portfolio and partners would need to take in this regard. We would suggest, however, that the MDF, considers supporting (through external consultants and/or extra resources) collective development of indicators for new projects, or existing projects entering a second phase, working in the same sector on or similar issues (e.g. engaging with local government);
- Require new projects to identify and justify the amount of resources allocated to the social dimensions of their outputs and M&E systems and ask for a detailed elaboration in the PAD as to how projects intend to set social base lines appropriate to their level of intervention;
- For new projects and projects entering a second phase there should also be requirements, with budgetary support, to (re)structure the m/e system in order to embed social sustainability issues within monitoring and reporting. In order to link the process into the results framework, it may be appropriate to make this requirement part of a specific output within the project logframe with its own indicator. By doing so the MDF Secretariat has the basis of an aggregated indicator with concomitant data sets from which to track progress towards mainstreaming social sustainability within MDF projects. We recognise, however, that the scope of such an output would need to be broader than just social sustainability issues. The output would need to encompass the whole M&E system for a project. Whether or not this is appropriate is more properly a question for the Mid-Term Review.
- Regardless of the outcome of the MTR in relation to the results framework, we recommend that the MDF sets a requirement that projects have by the end of the inception phase (or within the PAD, whichever is appropriate), provided a budget or earmarked resources for social impact assessments promised in the PAD. Experience shows that without a budget line to back it up these types of claims made in the PAD are unlikely to be fulfilled;
- Require projects which have direct involvement with local communities (e.g. ILO/RRR phase 2) to plan and budget for carrying out consistent and regular client satisfaction surveys (or other measures aimed at eliciting the extent to which beneficiaries feel they have been involved in, and are happy with, project implementation). This would enable projects to be more responsive to the demands of beneficiaries and track systematically changes in levels of participation, access and inclusion during their lifetime. Moreover, results from customer satisfaction or similar type surveys can be aggregated and fed into the portfolio-wide results framework. For example, for monitoring trends in increasing the quality and level of participation in projects or trends towards greater levels of accountability.
- Use earmarked funds to support projects in collating and disseminating lessons learned in relation to social sustainability or, where appropriate, use resources to document and disseminate lessons learned across the projects. The lessons learned in this review are one set of possible topics and provide a baseline (of sorts) from which progress could be documented and reported in eighteen months to two years time. The issues developed through the proposed Aceh/Nias multi-stakeholder process (recommendation 1) offer a second set of topics from which lessons learned could be drawn.

5.3 Concluding remarks

Paramount to the social sustainability of the reconstruction efforts is that systems, processes and mechanisms have been embedded within local institutions so that:

- all people in communities, regardless of their age or gender or social status, have been able to adapt to the changed and changing conditions they now face;
- that they have been supported in building capacities to make positive use of the resources which have been made available;
- they have developed capacities within which to protect and maintain those resources; and,
- there is evidence that the dignity of individuals is upheld; there is justice in the way decisions are made; positive management of conflict and potential conflict and that there is understanding of equality in difference and increased equity for all.

The results from the review of social sustainability practices within the MDF would suggest that there is still some way to go before these conditions are met. The findings suggest that not all projects are working in ways which would support progress towards these conditions over time. On the positive side, there are some projects which are systematically addressing social sustainability throughout their project cycle. There are also positive trends, across the portfolio, in terms of a majority of projects increasing attention towards social sustainability issues such as gender equity, participation, inclusion and accountability.

Of concern, however, are the shortcomings, both at portfolio level and within individual projects, with regard to practices for ensuring social sustainability. Poor and vulnerable people are not being systematically targeted and included in project interventions; conflict sensitivity is not being adequately mainstreamed and processes of inclusive and accountable decision-making between community members and local governance structures have yet to be institutionalised. The resources, timeframe for socialisation and awareness within communities and government and capacities needed for mainstreaming social issues have been underestimated in many of the projects. The majority of projects also have inconsistent results frameworks which limit their own capacities to monitor the social impacts of their interventions and track progress towards social sustainability requirements under the MDF RAP.

There are structural reasons for these deficits. The review has identified aspects of the policy, procedures and operational guidelines of the MDF which constrain the optimal integration of social sustainability practices. These relate to the RAP, operational guidelines, the limited accountability mechanisms with regard to social sustainability, the organisational structure, funding and budgetary support to the mainstreaming of social issues. However, there is also a strong basis from which to address the concerns raised, such as the commitment of the Steering Committee to promoting social sustainability. The MDF Secretariat is also well positioned to call on the social development and conflict sensitivity networks and expertise available through the Steering Committee and its partner agencies. Moreover, there are policy frameworks: the social safe guards of partner agencies and the RAP guidelines which, if fully and effectively operationalised, are sufficiently robust to support projects in their efforts towards social sustainability. The challenge for the MDF over the final four years of its operation is to capitalise on these assets and forge workable actions for mainstreaming effective social sustainability practices throughout the portfolio.

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Annex A Terms of Reference

The original Terms of Reference are provided below. It should be noted, however, that the methodology used in the research differed significantly from that requested in the original TOR, particularly in terms of the replacement of the “qualitative survey” with the rapid participatory community assessment. The final methodology and other changes were agreed with the MDF Secretariat and are outlined in the inception report and fieldwork package.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Review of Social Sustainability Practices In the MDF Portfolio

Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias

I. Background

1. General background

Three years after the tsunami that hit Aceh in December 2004 and the following earthquake that devastated Nias Island in March 2005, the Government of Indonesia’s recovery program has entered its final year. Many physical achievements have been made, and while many programs, funded by the Government, donors and international agencies are still fully ongoing, the pace of activities has somewhat slowed down. This leaves room for taking a step back and assessing the progress made and the quality of results to date in order to investigate the strengths and weaknesses of approaches and to identify scope for improvement during the remainder of the recovery process. The mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues such as supporting gender equitable recovery, environmental sustainability, enhancement of good governance or conflict sensitivity has posed additional challenges to reconstruction actors in the very dynamic context of reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. The multitude of agencies has also resulted in a plethora of approaches, often in one community, which has been cause for confusion, and sometimes even for conflict.

The Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias, established in May 2005, will reach its mid-implementation point in 2008 and therefore prepares to conduct a mid-term review towards the end of this year. Therefore it is set to assess its own performance in terms of supporting a recovery that is sensitive to social and environmental sustainability.

2. Introduction to the MDF

Following the Aceh tsunami and the Nias earthquake disasters in December 2005 and March 2006, the GOI Government of Indonesia (GOI) requested a trust fund to be set up for harmonization and coordination of reconstruction efforts. Fifteen donors joined the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF) with initial contributions of US\$ 550 million. As of February 2008, the contributions stand at around US\$ 670 million. The main government counterpart of the MDF is the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR), a special

agency of ministerial status that implements the government's reconstruction program (2005-2009).

The objective of the MDF is to efficiently and effectively contribute to the reconstruction of a better Aceh and Nias after the disasters of 2004/2005. The MDF is not involved in post-conflict reintegration activities. In accordance with the GOI's Master Plan for Reconstruction, the MDF does not only support reconstruction of lost private and public assets, but also strives to support the improvement of living conditions to ultimately contribute to poverty reduction.

In mid-2005 donors and the trustee specified the goals for the MDF in a Recovery Assistance Policy to guide programming and implementation of projects. At the end of its lifespan, the MDF according to this policy expects to have contributed to the following goals in Aceh and Nias: (1) communities/ community infrastructure regenerated; (2) poverty alleviated; (3) livelihoods restarted; (4) larger infrastructure repaired; (5) governance rebuilt; (6) environment sustained. MDF projects are being proposed by the BRR to ensure alignment of the MDF funding with the GOI reconstruction program (for further information on the MDF and this policy, please see www.multidonorfund.org).

The MDF is administered by the World Bank as Trustee who has instituted a Secretariat for the day-to-day management of the trust fund. The Secretariat reports to the MDF Steering Committee, the MDF decision-making body, on the progress of the MDF on a semi-annual basis. Progress is measured against a programmatic results framework which is largely built on project-level monitoring and evaluation and has been discussed and agreed with all projects. All projects report to the MDF Secretariat who, in turn, aggregates information at the portfolio level to report on progress and quality of implementation to the Steering Committee of the MDF.

3. Current portfolio

As of February 2008, the MDF has a portfolio of 17 active projects valued at US\$492 million to rebuild Aceh and Nias. Projects currently contribute to four reconstruction sectors that link to the goals of the Recovery Assistance Policy: recovery of communities (mostly basic infrastructure and housing), infrastructure, rebuilding governance and the environmental sector. Projects in the sector of economic recovery are under development, while several of the ongoing projects also contribute on a small scale to the recovery of livelihoods through training, pilot activities, small credits, small livelihood grants, small credit programs etc. The goal of poverty reduction is a cross-cutting theme for all reconstruction efforts.

In these four areas MDF projects strive to enhance sustainability by supporting the stakeholders in the identification of needs, resulting in informed decision-making on where investments should go (e.g. what kind of village infrastructure should be prioritized to best reflect community needs; what kind of district infrastructure needs to be prioritized to meet immediate needs of the population; how to enhance district planning by integration of bottom-up planning results). Social sustainability and equitability are supported at all levels by specific participation arrangements, targeting exercises, opportunities for engagement in implementation.

Projects are implemented by Implementing Agencies (government agencies, NGOs, UN agencies) under the supervision of Partner Agencies which are ultimately accountable for the appropriate use of funds. Partner Agencies are the World Bank, UNDP and WFP, and projects are implemented according to the rules and regulations of each respective agency (Annex 1: MDF Projects).

One important aspect of efficient reconstruction is ensuring sustainability of investments. In order to enhance the sustainability of the MDF portfolio, projects during the design phase include the relevant Partner Agency safeguard regulations and standards, take into consideration experience with good practices elsewhere and/or refer to governmental standards. On the portfolio level, the Recovery Assistance Policy summarizes expected standards: MDF projects should (a) enhance the quality of the recovery process; (b) use different capacities over time; (c) alleviate poverty; (d) support good governance; (e) pursue sustainable development policies; (f) gender sensitivity; (g) geographical balance and avoid regional disparity; (h) use a conflict sensitive approach. Projects have included these aspects in project design and have been assessed by the Secretariat and donors along the mentioned criteria.

In reporting on the status of the portfolio, the MDF also reports to the Steering Committee against the Recovery Assistance Policy implementation criteria. However, reporting needs to be further enhanced regarding the specific approaches and results achieved that enhance social sustainability regarding poverty alleviation, achievements in introducing good governance, environmental practices, gender and conflict sensitivity.

4. Background to the Social Sustainability Review

In May 2008, the MDF will have its third anniversary, and a Mid-Term Review (MTR) is planned for late 2008 to assess progress to date and issue recommendations for improvement to guide the second phase of the MDF. In order to prepare for that review, the Secretariat seeks to enhance its understanding how projects have supported environmental and social sustainability through two reviews conducted prior to the MTR. The review on environmental sustainability will be conducted during the first half of 2008 with similar objectives to this review (assessing performance of projects in the light of environmentally sustainable practices and providing recommendations).

In the context of reconstruction, the MDF projects pursue 'social sustainability' in terms of creating access, inclusion, and empowerment to ensure that all parts of society can benefit equitably from MDF reconstruction activities. For this review, special focus should be given to gender sensitivity, inclusion of the poor and other vulnerable groups, and conflict sensitivity; it should also be noted that the focus lies on groups rather than individuals – both in the Recovery Assistance Policy as well as in actual project design. Because of its reconstruction-based mandate, MDF projects largely focus on the coastal areas, while the hinterland/ inland have also been covered by some of the projects to support equitable development throughout Aceh province and the districts of Nias. Currently, the MDF operates in all districts and municipalities of Aceh and Nias. In striving to enhance social sustainability, all projects have to take into consideration the social texture of the Acehnese and Nias societies, the role of traditional leaders/ structures, and, especially in Aceh, the place and role of women in society.

Based on their approach, MDF projects can be sorted into three types of project: enhancing social sustainability (i) through community-based development; (ii) through improvement of public services with participatory approaches; and (iii) through rebuilding vital infrastructure based on demand, and including participatory approaches for identification. Two projects fall under two types, while one project is supporting the social sustainability of reconstruction from a very high level point of view by providing technical support to BRR – for which it will be difficult to assess the effectiveness on a beneficiary level. The 17 projects are at various stages of implementation: while some projects have spent the bulk of their funds, others are still starting up (Annex 1).

Project reporting to date has not enabled the Secretariat to achieve a comprehensive overview on how the MDF has helped to enhance social sustainability in reconstruction. Therefore, it seems appropriate to take an arms-length approach through an external review with the objective to inform the MDF Secretariat and the Steering Committee of the status of (i) compliance with project strategies and Partner Agency standards and the MDF quality criteria, (ii) on results achieved and the beneficiary perspective on the MDF approaches and results, and (iii) to provide recommendations for improvement in the second phase of the MDF (see Objectives of the Review below).

II. Objectives of the Review

The objective of this review is (i) to assess the inclusion and application of practices that contribute to enhanced social sustainability through MDF projects and the quality of implementation; (ii) to verify results in the fields and analyze the beneficiaries' perspective on the creation of social sustainability through MDF activities and the benefits/ intermediate results thereof; (iii) based on the above analysis, to issue recommendations for improvement of ongoing projects, where appropriate, and regarding the mainstreaming of social sustainability in the MDF portfolio during its remaining period of implementation.

Specifically, the review will:

1. on the project level: assess the approaches chosen during design that support social sustainability within MDF projects, and review the quality of consistent application of these practices within projects and the stated results of this (through project reporting- see Annex 6); and also determine how well approaches took into consideration local conditions/ existing traditional structures;
2. on the beneficiary level through a qualitative field survey: (a) verify the effectiveness of the approaches chosen and (b) identify the intermediate results and benefits – as well as negative effects – of the approaches used to enhance social sustainability in reconstruction; (c) at the same time, also identify possible areas of neglect in project implementation that have (the potential of) detrimental impacts on social sustainability;
3. on the portfolio level: based on the above analysis, assess the overall performance of the portfolio regarding enhancement of social sustainability;
4. provide recommendations: (a) to improve the performance of projects and the portfolio as a whole regarding social sustainability, where appropriate; (b) to enhance monitoring and evaluation on project level where appropriate and on portfolio level (possible adjustments of results framework); and (c) regarding suitable methods for follow-up to this evaluation on the portfolio-level;
5. on the portfolio level: based on the results of this review and experiences gained by other main reconstruction stakeholders, identify lessons learned and challenges of mainstreaming cross-cutting themes in a reconstruction context, and more specifically in the social and cultural context of Aceh and Nias.

Results of this review will also feed into the MDF mid-term review in late 2008.

III. Scope of the Review

During the review of MDF projects and performance as a portfolio, the consultants will take into consideration, with a focus on women, the poor and especially the very poor community members, as well as other relevant disadvantaged groups, the aspects of:

- access (participation, information, targeting),
- opportunities for active engagement,
- empowerment,
- protection of vulnerable groups, and
- conflict sensitivity.

Through document review and field verification this will also lead to an assessment of immediate benefits and lessons learned. The consultants are not expected to conduct a thorough impact assessment, which is the task of individual projects, but to assess positive and possibly negative effects of the MDF projects' practices regarding social sustainability. For guiding questions that will further help frame the scope of the review, please see Annex 5.

Both the societies of Aceh and Nias are based on strong traditional cultures and traditional social institutions. Therefore it will be important for the reviewers to gain a comprehensive understanding of the social context, the institutional landscape on community level as well as the effects of this context on women and/ or vulnerable groups of society. It will also be important to assess which vulnerable groups need to be taken into consideration within the varying contexts (e.g. coast vs. hinterland) to be able to assess whether they have been adequately considered as beneficiaries of MDF projects.

It will also be important to take into consideration the findings of the environmental sustainability review which will be implemented during the first half of 2008. The objectives of that review are similar to this review, and there is an opportunity for cross-fertilization.

IV. Methodology

1) Document Review and Data Analysis

- Review of project appraisal documents, Partner Agency standards/ guidelines, Government standards issued for reconstruction in Aceh, project progress reports, relevant project MIS data, results from independent project evaluations, MDF Secretariat reports, other available documentation on reconstruction in Aceh relevant to this review, where appropriate, studies related to other disaster reconstruction efforts for comparative input, etc

2) Key informant interviews

- Interviews with key informants: project stakeholders, BRR and local government, MDF donors, field staff, other reconstruction stakeholders with similar activities in Aceh and Nias, local NGOs/ CSOs, etc

3) Qualitative survey

- In order to provide deeper insight into the results of MDF projects a qualitative survey will be conducted with a sampling size of a few hundred persons:
 - Semi-structured interviews with (a) beneficiaries (randomly selected households) and (b) key village stakeholders (village heads, local leaders/religious leaders, head of women's group, youth group leader, former combatant if there);
 - Focus group discussions.

It is expected that around 40 villages in Aceh and Nias should be covered (possibly clustered in up to 8 sub-districts) to ensure a good coverage of the various types of MDF projects/ project locations/ beneficiary groups. For sampling criteria and site selection information, see Annex 3. Sampling will be done by the consultants and signed off by the Secretariat before field work commences.

V Description of Main Tasks

The responsibilities of the contracted research firm during the implementation of the review include the following main tasks:

- 1) Preparation and discussion of an Inception Report**, based on initial desk review and initial key informant interviews
- 2) Preparation and conducting of field research** (see Annex 3 for detailed tasks)
- 3) Presentation of interim findings to the Secretariat of field data analysis** approximately halfway through the analysis period
- 4) Final report writing and submission**, based on presentation of a draft report and receipt of further inputs from MDF stakeholders

V. Outputs

The main outputs and contract lump-sum payment triggers based on deliverable signoff by the MDF Secretariat for this review will be:

1. an inception report,
 2. a comprehensive field guide package,
 3. a draft report and discussion of results with MDF stakeholders for further input
 4. a final report that covers the detailed objectives in the section II Objectives of the Review.
-
1. The inception report shall cover:
 - understanding of the TOR;
 - Critical issues and questions (referring to and expanding on the guiding questions in this TOR);
 - Evaluation approach, methods and instruments used;
 - Projects selected for evaluation and draft site selection for field mission;
 - Reporting and timing
 - Draft detailed outline of the Final Report
 2. Comprehensive Field Package shall include:
 - Methodology of the field survey;
 - question guides (village format, questionnaire for individual interview, FGD);
 - field research manual;
 - and sampling information/ justification)
 3. Draft report

The draft report shall be submitted to discuss with the Secretariat and other MDF stakeholders the findings of the review and to provide further inputs for the finalization of the report.

4. Final report

The contracted firm is responsible for producing one high quality final report in English by September 29, 2008. It shall be organized as follows:

1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction (description of purpose of review and background – MDF/ reconstruction/ local setting etc)
3. Description of review methodology and possible difficulties encountered
4. Findings from research (analysis should answer the overall research questions by examining the key issues and questions of the review)
5. Lessons Learned and Recommendations
6. Conclusions

The final report shall include comprehensive matrices relating to the performance of the individual projects that have been reviewed that provide a detailed picture and could serve as a baseline for follow-up reviews.

All reports shall be submitted in English language (five hard copies and as softcopy).

VI. Management

The review will be conducted independently by the contracted firm and in coordination with the MDF Secretariat. The consultant will be in charge of making all logistical arrangements pertaining to the assignment such as travel or interview appointments. The consultants will coordinate with the relevant project officers/ task team leaders of the Partner Agencies, and through them with the Implementing Agencies of MDF projects.

The Secretariat of the MDF will provide the mission with necessary documentation, contact details, relevant field information, and logistical arrangements for the presentation of findings to the MDF stakeholders. Further, the Secretariat will provide feedback on:

- the Inception Report,
- the draft field research package,
- the draft Final Report.

Team Composition

Upon submission of the proposal, the consultant shall provide a proposal on the composition of the team, including profiles of persons that would be available to fill the team leader position as well as those of other researchers/ analysts.

1) Team Leader: overall responsibility

The team leader is in charge of directing and managing the preparation, implementation, analysis and report writing of the review and liaising with the MDF Secretariat.

Specific duties:

- Develop detailed work plan and timetable for the review;

- Closely monitor the progress of the team in preparing the various mandatory products;
- Provide direct technical support to supervisors and field researchers;
- Present the review findings to the MDF;
- After receiving comments and inputs from the MDF and its donors, prepare the final report for distribution.

Qualifications and Professional Experience:

The team leader should have 15 years of relevant experience, including with portfolio level, cross-cutting reviews. S/He should also have technical expertise in at least two of the relevant areas for this review (e.g. community-driven development, gender, pro-poor development, conflict, transparency mechanisms) and be familiar with social safeguards standards of the World Bank and the UN. S/He should also be well versed in methods of quantitative and qualitative social research and M&E (unless this would be covered strongly through another expert). Previous experience in Indonesia is mandatory, in Aceh/Nias would be preferable, while experience regarding post-disaster/ post-conflict reconstruction settings would be valued.

2) Team members: desk review/ data analysis/ report writing team

To support the team leader during the review further person(s) would be required to:

- support the desk review,
- conduct stakeholder interviews,
- develop and refine field survey tools,
- support management and oversight of field survey,
- analyze field data,
- support report writing.

Qualifications and Professional Experience:

The team members should each have a minimum of 10 years of relevant experience and between them and the task leader an appropriate mix of technical expertise to conduct the review activities (quantitative and qualitative social research/ data analysis; impact analysis of development activities, M&E expertise, community-driven development/ participatory development approaches, poverty reduction, gender and vulnerable group sensitive development, conflict sensitive development, etc). Previous experience in post-disaster/ post-conflict reconstruction settings is mandatory, also previous Indonesia experience, while there is also a strong preference for additional experience in the Aceh/Nias setting.

3) Field survey team

To conduct the field survey in around 40 villages in Aceh and Nias a field research team is required. Based on extensive World Bank experience with field research in Indonesia the suggested composition is:

- 24 field researchers: around 8 teams of 3 local researchers (at least one, preferably two of whom has to be Acehnese/ from Nias; with at least one woman), each of which would cover 5 villages (or 2 sub-districts);
- 4 supervisors to support two teams each during implementation of the survey and to thoroughly check on the quality of data generated/ questionnaires filled in (in order to fill information gaps on the spot);
- Persons as required to conduct data entry for further analysis through the analysis/ report writing team.

It will be important to ensure that surveyors and field researchers have previous field work experience and will be adequately prepared for the field work (see Annex 4 for details) to ensure quality of the data (given that the sample is rather small, data loss must be minimized).

VII. Time Frame

The mission is expected to commence during May 2008 and to be conducted during a five month period.

Key deliverables are:

- submission of Inception Report 2 weeks after kick-off (tranche 1 payment trigger)
- submission of field review package (draft) 4 weeks after kick-off
- submission of final field review package (tranche 2 payment trigger)
- submission of draft final report in early September (tranche 3 payment trigger)
- submission of final report on September 29, 2008 (tranche 4 payment trigger)

Annex 1 – List of Projects

Project	Type of project	Partner/ Implementing Agency	Duration	Project funds (million \$)	Funds disbursed (Sept. 2007)	Geographic Coverage
<i>RALAS (Rehabilitation of Aceh Land Administration System)</i>	Community recovery/ Public service	WB/ National Land Agency (BPN)	May 2005- Dec 2008	28.5	11.7	Selected districts – currently 9
<i>KDP (Kecamatan Development Project)</i>	Community recovery	WB/ Min. of Home Affairs	May 2005- Dec 2008	64.7	64.7	All districts in Aceh and Nias
<i>UPP (Urban Poverty project)</i>	Community recovery	WB/ Min. of Public Works	May 2005- Dec 2009	18.0	17.9	402 urban wards
<i>REKOMPAK (Community-based Rehab and Recon of Settlements – Aceh)</i>	Community recovery	WB/ Min. of Public Works	May 2005- Feb 2009	85.0	78.2	130 communities in 10 districts
<i>KRRP (Kecamatan-based Reconstruction Project for Nias)</i>	Community recovery	WB/ Min. of Home Affairs	May 2007- Dec 2009	25.75	11.0	246 villages in 2 districts
<i>Resource-based Rural Road Rehabilitation</i>	Infrastructure	UNDP/ILO	Jun 2006- Dec 2008	6.42	4.42	5 districts
<i>TRPRP Ports Redevelopment Programme</i>	Infrastructure	UNDP/UNDP	Jan 2006- Dec 2007	3.8	3.58	4 districts
<i>Sea Delivery and Logistics Project</i>	Infrastructure	WFP/WFP	Nov 2005- Feb 2010	24.7	24.7	Aceh west coast/ Nias
<i>IREF Infrastructure Recon. Enabling Project</i>	Infrastructure	WB/BRR	Feb 2007- Oct 2009	42.0	2.91	All of Aceh and Nias
<i>IRFF Infrastructure Recon. Financing Facility</i>	Infrastructure	WB/BRR	Jun 2010	100.0	10	All of Aceh and Nias
<i>Lamno-Calang Road Maintenance Project</i>	Infrastructure	UNDP/UNDP	Oct 2007	1.3	1.3	One district in Aceh
<i>Banda Aceh Flood Mitigation Project</i>	Infrastructure	WB/ Muslim Aid	Jun 2008	4.5	0.8	Banda Aceh City
<i>SPADA Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas</i>	Governance Public service	WB/ Min. of Disadvantaged Areas	Jun 2010	25.0		19 districts in Aceh/ 2 in Nias

Review of Social Sustainability with the MDF for Aceh and Nias: Final Report

Project	Type of project	Partner/ Implementing Agency	Duration	Project funds (million \$)	Funds disbursed (Sept. 2007)	Geographic Coverage
<i>CSO Strengthening Project</i>	Governance Community recovery	UNDP/UNDP	Feb 2010	6.0	3.0	10 [?] districts in Aceh and Nias
<i>Aceh Forest and Environment Project</i>	Environment Public service/ Community recovery (?)	WB/ Leuser Int'l Found-ation and Fauna and Flora Int'l	Jun 2010	17.5	4.0	12 districts in Aceh
<i>TRWMP (Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Programme)</i>	Environment Public service	UNDP/UNDP	Jan 2010	24.4	14.4	Currently 8 districts, expansion to 13 (Aceh/Nias)
<i>Technical Assistance to BRR</i>	Cross-cutting support Public Service (?)	UNDP/UNDP	Dec 2007	14.7	14.7	All of Aceh and Nias

Annex B Notes from stakeholder discussion group meeting/workshop – 2nd July 2008

Present:

M. Syathin	Bappenas
Khairullah	Bappenas
Gerard Howe	Deputy Head Programmes / Senior Social Development Advisor, DFID
Leya Cattleya	Gender Advisor, CIDA
Festina Lavidia	Coordinator, KRRP – Nias, World Bank
David Fournier	First Secretary, Development – Aceh, Canadian Embassy
Alesandra Roccasalvo	Programme Officer, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP
Thamrin Hanafi	Programme Assistant, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP
David Jackson	Decentralisation Advisor, Governance Unit, UNDP
Hagar Ligtoet	Second Secretary, Political Affairs, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Francesca Spadola	Programme Officer, Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction, EC
Angela Ramirez	EC
Muamar Vebry	EC

Agenda:

1. Introductions
2. Background to the MDF review of social sustainability practices
3. What social sustainability means in the context of the MDF and Aceh
4. Vulnerability and vulnerable groups – How has this been addressed

Notes from the Stakeholder Discussion

Background:

In advance of the MDF mid-term review planned for late 2008, the MDF Secretariat is conducting a review of how MDF projects have supported social sustainability (SS) in terms of creating access, inclusion and empowerment to that all social groups benefit equitably from the projects. Oxford Policy Management (OPM), UK has been contracted to carry out the SS review. It will be conducted in two phases: inception and assessment. The review will include: document review; in-depth interviews with key informants; qualitative fieldwork with project constituents at community level and rapid assessments of portfolio and project approaches to social sustainability. As part of the inception visit, OPM met with MDF stakeholders through a small multi-stakeholder meeting in Jakarta.

The stakeholder meeting was an opportunity for OPM, to gain a better understanding of how issues relating to social sustainability had been understood and addressed in the MDF, through focused discussion with a range of MDF stakeholders. The stakeholder group comprised donor representatives from the MDF Steering Committee and team leaders plus colleagues from individual projects.

After brief introductions and a general discussion about how social sustainability was understood by the MDF, the group was divided into two interest groups:

- Donor group; and,
- Project implementers group.

Each group carried out a participatory analysis activity – **SPOKES** – which had two components:

1. A discussion centred around what constitutes “social sustainability” from their perspective; and,
2. A mapping of how far these aspects / elements of social sustainability identified during the earlier discussion had been addressed in the context of MDF support to reconstruction and recovery in Aceh and Nias.

The SPOKES activity was used to elicit opinions and perceptions in relation to items 2 – 4 on the agenda. The consultants agreed to share the results of the interest group discussions with the all the meeting’s participants. We present below the summary of discussions and the SPOKES diagram developed by each group.

General Points:

Prior to, and after, the SPOKES exercise there were a number of general points made:

- There were key social issues that were cross-cutting which all donors believed need to be addressed – conflict sensitivity, poverty reduction, gender, social inclusion and the environment.
- In the initial project documents (i.e. the first four put before the Steering Committee at the first meeting), all these issues were addressed. However there was a general concern that there was no consensus or overarching strategy which could guide the MDF in project selection. The Recovery Assistance Policy (RAP) was the response to this concern and represents the guidelines which projects and the portfolio as a whole need to follow. OPM were reminded that the RAP should form starting point of the review.
- The push to systematically address issues relating to social sustainability did not come from BRR – much more from the Donors, and MDF Secretariat.
- The issue was raised about the MDF being seen as a conduit for funds with no real power to enforce adherence to the RAP guidelines by projects. It was left as an open question as to whether the MDF Secretariat had been empowered by the Steering Committee with the resources, capacities and systems of accountability by which it could fully address social sustainability (gender equity, inclusion, access. etc.).
- General concern was raised over baselines and whether MDF or partner projects had the data to monitor and track impacts relating to social sustainability issues.
- It was agreed that greater clarity was needed over terminology: specifically, what is meant by social sustainability in the context of Aceh and the MDF.
- The timeframe over review – three years – is short. The review team needs to be realistic about can be achieved in such a relatively short time.

SPOKES 1 – The donor group

Headings refer to each of the different aspects (spokes) of social sustainability identified by the group.

Empowerment

Generally good, but with disparities between districts; overall people do feel that they have more control over their lives. This is especially true in rural areas. MDF has a real impact on individual and community empowerment. Still need to work on local government empowerment – very weak with little power or control.

Human Rights

There is not a conscious rights based approach but MDF has contributed to increased voice and citizen-state engagement. Good on raising awareness much less effective on changing the way things are done – implementation. Supporting RALAS (joint land titling for women and men) has been an important contribution to addressing rights especially women's rights.

Creating long-lasting opportunities and benefits

None of the employment opportunities are sustainable – once donors withdrew many of the jobs will go. It is a very fragile environment and we need to be realistic about what can be achieved in a relatively short time. For some, there were signs of sustained benefits – particularly through the waste management project.

Ownership

Need to differentiate between different levels of ownership. There is a high degree of ownership within BRR and also amongst target communities. But, there is very little ownership within the provincial government.

Community Resilience

Understood as the ability to face other disasters in a prepared state and to withstand shocks and conflict. Quite high through MDF support. We are beginning to instil appropriate community preparation through DRR. Also increasing resilience and capacities in communities to adapt and respond to changing circumstances through projects like KDP, UPP and RECOMPAK.

Conflict Sensitivity

Score low on this aspect. It was a donor mistake in not addressing conflict separately and systematically. We have contributed to aid-related conflict, although it is probably less true for MDF. This is because we were able to come to a compromise agreement whereby MDF projects could work all over Aceh as long as do not mention the word conflict.

Differences of opinion emerged over the role of MDF. On the one hand, realising MDF as a co-ordinating body with a large fund missed an opportunity to really influence the government over policies in Aceh, especially given the conscious decision by MDF to work across Aceh. On the other hand, taking that approach risked the Fund becoming politicised in the reconstruction effort. MDF was linked to BRR which deliberately avoided becoming politicised. In this sense it was a very different animal to BRA. MDF needed to stand back from that kind of direct involvement with conflict in order to be effective.

Also important to note that conflict refers to inter-community conflict and social inclusion on this there are distinct disparities between projects. KDP is good at identifying and including different social groups and dealing with conflict. AFEP, for example, has no disaggregation of social data and as a result has less understanding of what is going on in communities.

Poverty Reduction

The poverty assessment in Aceh shows there is a downward trend and real reduction. Poverty is being addressed.

Gender Equity

Low. Gender was addressed in project design but not necessarily followed through in implementation. There has been some impact and we have to be realistic – discrimination is deep and structural; within the timeframe we have to support positive change for women.

Community Participation

Good – above average

Geographical Equity

Whilst MDF made a conscious decision to support the whole government, over 75% of the projects are coastal. This does contribute to geographical disparities. Should remember that MDF puts more money in Nias than any other donor.

Accountability and Transparency

There are different layers of accountability. Overall, now in Aceh there is a greater awareness that the government is there for the people and that demands can be made openly, this is a reversal of previous ways of thinking.

In projects: most have been very tough on accountability, as has the MDF in terms of financial management. Also, facilitation for, and lines of, complaint and redress by community members has been set up.

There are also stronger relationships of accountability than before between different actors including government. Although, it is not clear to what extent this can be attributed to MDF.


Inclusion

People who have been historically disadvantaged in Aceh are not being involved – GAM combatants, women, particularly widows and some ethnic groups. However, MDF doesn't trace inclusion issues systematically and there is enormous variability between projects. KDP has data but others do not. May have instilled the principles of inclusion within the MDF but the data is not available to score along this spoke.

Cohesion

There is an improvement in social cohesiveness especially in projects like KDP and Reompak. The majority of projects supported by MDF are contributing to social cohesiveness through acting on findings from social safeguard analysis and consciously bringing together different social groups for joint planning and decision-making.

However, there is a flip side, greater engagement between the different groups in bringing out into the open tensions and conflicts. Maybe this is not such a bad thing as opens up space for debate and more voices to be heard.



Spokes 2 – project implementing agencies

This group addressed the initial question about social sustainability slightly differently to the first group and the notes reflect that difference. It decided on several key aspects of social sustainability. Other elements or issues were grouped under or with each of these main headings, as follows:

Recognising differences between Aceh and Nias

- Transition issues in Nias

Opening up avenues

- New rules of the game

- Less equal access
- Increasing inequality?

Measuring

- Measured against what – indicators? Baseline available?
- Whose measure?
- Regulatory framework
- Monitoring does not capture gender properly

Post conflict / post tsunami / social transformation

- Slow to pick up on these issues
- Now more inclusive
- BRA – BRR
- Now more realistic

Social aspects of post tsunami programmes / interventions

- Social sustainability is “social aspect of post tsunami interventions”
- Appraisal focuses on written document, not on actual impact / operation
- Not appraised on this
- Tries to include in all programmes
- Suffers from lack of data
- Got better as time went on
- Sometimes appraisal process more focussed on structure of project design and not on social aspects

The group produced the following Spokes diagram. Two areas – social aspects of tsunami programmes and post-conflict, post-tsunami transformation – were felt to have improved over time, and this is shown by the arrows indicating movement away from the centre.

During discussion about where to mark along each spoke, the following points were made.

Recognising differences between Aceh and Nias.

When looking at the response, people look at Aceh and Nias as an appendix or afterthought. There are transition issues in Nias, but now there are more projects starting. Donors have adapted to the Nias context. Nias has less social empathy than Aceh, and the local government of north Sumatra is less engaged than the local government in Aceh.

Opening up avenues

This is seen as being about opening up options for people. Projects have opened up access to the outside world, even to the rest of Indonesia, just by being implemented. However, this has also made the situation less equal as those who have benefited most are the educated and English speaking and this has led to increasing social tension. The response itself has led to new “rules of the game” – how do people adapt to this? There are comparisons to be made with Eastern Europe, which had a long period of being closed to outside influences before being opened up suddenly – this opening up had positive impacts, but also longer term negative impacts in terms of inequality.

Measured against what?

In terms of gender equality, the mechanics are put in at the proposal stage, but these go missing when the project becomes operational. The monitoring tools used are not able to

capture this. Whilst some project implementers do qualitative monitoring, the monitoring systems of the MDF always want quantitative data.

Post tsunami / post conflict social transformation

The MDF was slow to pick up on conflict issues, but this has improved over time. An example was given of when a road construction project had to stop because the road passed through a Kabupaten that was “conflict affected”. Even in proposals, the word conflict needed to be removed. The MDF was felt to be hiding behind the donors on this issue. There are challenges that arise when introducing social sustainability in a fragmented way. While targeting is easier for the tsunami, it is very important to take into account conflict to reduce or avoid creating tensions.

Social aspects of MDF projects


These are less important in infrastructure projects when asked to act quickly, although the idea was that they should take all information into account. KDP was seen as a good example because it involved the community from the start. It was felt the MDF had tried to address these issues but there was a lack of social analysis to base a strategy on, and therefore no baseline. The statistics often look normative and some (targets?) are ambitious, which leads to resistance. There may also be a lack of capacity within the MDF (perhaps this is too strong) regarding this area.

The independent technical reviewers look more at the structure of the proposal/ design (rather than potential impacts). Social aspects (e.g. gender / conflict) are not commented on with sufficient clarity.

During the appraisal process, when a reviewer comments are not clear, the proposer just reacts by adding or taking out words – e.g. adding “gender” and taking out “conflict”. This is a mechanistic response aimed at getting the proposal approved rather than really changing the substance of the project design / proposal.

Project proposers sometimes feel strong ownership of the project so disagreements can arise. There was also a feeling that they did not have enough time to put into re-writing a proposal several times, and in terms of efficiency there are always things that can be worked out along the way.

The MDF portfolio, however, can't be discussed without looking into the context of the BRR and their direction. BRR is the first filter, and is a very strong filter. Sometimes there is 6-12 months discussion with the BRR before some projects even reach the MDF. BRR has used their gate-keeping role very effectively. The MDF was a useful 10% (of total response funding) for the BRR because it was not on government budget so they could control it very effectively.



Annex C Key Informant interview report format

Name	
Details: Job title length of time with MDF	
General Background	
Date, time started, finished	
Impressions	
Key issues	
Further actions – e.g. for in-depth in phase 2	
Broad discussion areas	
A. Understanding of Social Sustainability	
B. Understanding of Vulnerability	
C. Good practice/bad practice at project level <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ What projects and what approach ▪ What judgements/ criteria are being used to make this assessment 	
D. Criteria for village level selection	
E. Any other issues?	
Further comments	

Annex D Key Informants consulted

Name	Position	Organisation	Location
Bowen Uhlenkamp	M&E Consultant – Aceh	MDF	Based in Banda Aceh; interviewed in Jakarta
Christian Rey	Manager	MDF	Jakarta
Rully Amrullah	Independent Consultant	Independent	Based in Aceh; interviewed in Jakarta
Sinta Dewi	Independent Gender Consultant	Independent	Jakarta (formerly in Aceh/Nias)
Scott Guggenheim	Task Team Leader (KDP / SPADA / KRRP-Nias)	World Bank	Jakarta
George Soroya	Task Team Leader (UPP / Housing)	World Bank	Jakarta
Ida Ayu Indra Dharmapatni	Senior Operations Officer (UPP / housing)	World Bank	Jakarta
Heru Prasetyo	Director, Jakarta Representative Office	BRR	Jakarta
T. Sofyan	Cooperation Division	Government of NAD	Banda Aceh
Pak Muhammad	Head, Economic Bureau	Government of NAD	Banda Aceh
Azwari		Government of NAD	Banda Aceh
Usman		Government of NAD	Banda Aceh
Zul Azhar		Government of NAD	Banda Aceh
Humam Hamid	Civil Society Representative on Steering Committee	MDF Technical Review Group	Banda Aceh
John Penny	Head of EC for Aceh and Nias	European Commission	Banda Aceh
Eddy Purwanto	Chief Operating Officer	BRR	Banda Aceh
Baiq Dian	Independent researcher		Banda Aceh
Rosnida Sari	Lecturer / researcher	State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN) Ar-Raniry, Syriah Kuala University	Banda Aceh
Safriza Sofyan	Deputy Manager – Aceh	MDF	Banda Aceh
Geumala Yatim	Consultant – Outreach	MDF	Banda Aceh
M. Syathin		Bappenas	Jakarta
Khairullah		Bappenas	Jakarta

Gerard Howe	Deputy Head Programmes / Senior Social Development Advisor	DFID	Jakarta
Leya Cattleya	Gender Advisor	CIDA	Jakarta
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Thamrin Hanfi	Programme Assistant, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit	UNDP	Jakarta
David Jackson	Decentralisation Advisor, Governance Unit	UNDP	Jakarta
Hagar Ligtvoet	Second Secretary, Political Affairs	Royal Netherlands Embassy	Jakarta
Francesca Spadola	Programme Officer, Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction	EC	Jakarta
Angela Ramirez		EC	Jakarta
Muamar Vebry		EC	Jakarta
Patrick Barron	TTL	World Bank	Jakarta
Georgia Wimhofer	Monitoring and Evaluation Officer	MDF	Jakarta
Joe Leitmann	TTL	World Bank	Jakarta
Bernadette Whitelum	Deputy Senior Representative (Aceh Reconstruction and Health)	AusAID	Jakarta
Stephen Almsteier	Security Adviser	BRR / ADB	Banda Aceh
Renate Korber	Adviser to Governor's Office	GTZ ALGAP project	Banda Aceh
Bernhard May	Advisor to the Governor of Aceh and Team Leader	GTZ ALGAP project	Banda Aceh
Nuli (by phone)		BRR International Liaison Department	
Jesse Grayman	Researcher for Aceh Stakeholder Peace Analysis	IOM	Banda Aceh
Philip Visser	Consultant, peace and social development	CRS, Red Cross, others	Banda Aceh
Paul Greening	Project Manager, IOM peace programmes	IOM	Banda Aceh
Harold Crouch	Emeritus Professor, Head of ARTI	Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh	Banda Aceh

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Rob Wrobel	Specialist	World Bank Aceh Conflict Unit	Banda Aceh
Simon Field	Aceh Programme / Office Manager	UNDP	Banda Aceh
Maurice Knight	SPADA Aceh coordinator	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Muslahadin Daud	Conflict Team, Social Development	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Izziah Hasan	Social Safeguards Team	ADB	Banda Aceh
Parissara Liewkeat	Project Officer	ILO	Banda Aceh
Vanda Day	National Programme Officer	ILO	Banda Aceh
Eav Kong	Labour-based Expert	ILO	Banda Aceh
Bruno Dercon (by phone)	Housing Policy Adviser	UN Habitat	Formerly based in Aceh
Paul Adams (by phone)	Consultant / former field manager	CARE	Formerly based in Aceh
Jamal Gawi	Aceh representative	CIDA	Banda Aceh
Cameron Noble	Manager, Stakeholder Peace Analysis	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Rusli	KDP Coordinator, Aceh	World Bank	Banda Aceh
M Saleh Siregar	Coordinator, REKOMPAK, Aceh	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Mikko Antti Ollikainen	Program Specialist – Environment, AFEP	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Robert Silevis	Director, Aceh Programme	Flora & Fauna International	Banda Aceh
Helene Barnes	CBC and Operation Manager	Flora & Fauna International	Banda Aceh
Tisna Nando	Communication, Deputy Manager	Flora & Fauna International	Banda Aceh
Saliza Mohamadar	Project Manager	Muslim Aid	Banda Aceh
Fahmi M Nasir	Compliance Manager	Muslim Aid	Banda Aceh
Ujang Suparman	CSO Programme Coordinator	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Lyndal Meehan	Ex-Coordinator, Livelihoods Recovery	Formerly UNDP (Also formerly Aceh NGO Forum immediately post-tsunami and Oxfam)	Banda Aceh
Muqhsin	Deputy Planning and Development Programming	Katahati (Local NGO)	Banda Aceh
Ms Reihar	Program Officer	Katahati (Local NGO)	Banda Aceh
Mohammad Aulia	Project Officer	IMPACT (Local NGO)	Banda Aceh
Mr Udin	Chair	GERAK (Local anti-corruption CSO)	Banda Aceh

Mr Mumus	Staff Representative	GERAK (Local anti-corruption CSO)	Banda Aceh
Lixin Gu	TTL Banda Aceh Flood Mitigation Project	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Andre Bald	Coordinator – Banda Aceh Flood Mitigation Project	World Bank	Banda Aceh
M. S. Shivakumar	Project Management Specialist and RALAS Coordinator	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Lilik Hidayat	National Consultant for RALAS Coordination	World Bank	Banda Aceh
Jane Dunlop	Land Rights Policy Coordinator	Oxfam	Banda Aceh
Hermann Soesangobeng	Land Specialist, ADB Adviser	ADB	Banda Aceh
Chris Clark	Shipping Coordinator	WFP	Banda Aceh
Nigel Landon	Waste Management Adviser	UNDP	Banda Aceh
Aida Novita	Programme Assistant	Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Project	Banda Aceh
Tom Alcedo	Senior Field Representative	American Red Cross	Banda Aceh
Rod Volway	Aceh Director	Mercy Corps International	Banda Aceh
Daniel Hunt	Representative, Aceh	AusAid	Banda Aceh
Claude St. Pierre	Senior Programme Manager (2005-06), Aceh and Nias	Oxfam	Interviewed in Recife, Brazil (formerly based in Banda Aceh)
Tony McDonald	Team Leader	Environmental Sustainability Review for the MDF	Banda Aceh (plus email contact to Melbourne)
Antun Hidayat	Programme Coordinator	Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Project	Banda Aceh
Ferhad Alsadad	Programme Associate – Head of Waste, West Coast	Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Project	Banda Aceh
Pepen	Programme Associate – Head of Livelihood	Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Project	Banda Aceh
Lilianne Fan (by email)	SE Asia Land Specialist	Oxfam	Bangkok (formerly based in Aceh)
Martin Bjerregard (by email)	Disaster Waste Specialist Consultant	Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Project	Stockholm
Scott Campbell (by phone)	Director, Aceh Programme	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)	Aceh

Review of Social Sustainability with the MDF for Aceh and Nias: Final Report

William Sabandar (informal meeting)	Director BRR – Nias	BRR	Nias
David W Brown (by email)	Former Researcher and Forestry Consultant	The Multi Stakeholder Forestry Programme	Sudan

Annex E Rapid Participatory Community Assessment – communities selected

E.1 Summary of site selection criteria and communities in Aceh

Kabupaten	Kecamatan	Desa	Selection Criteria																		
Aceh													Project presence								
			Better off	Poorer	High Tsunami	Low Tsunami	Urban	Peri-urban	Rural	High conflict	Medium conflict	Low conflict	ILO	CSO	REKOMPAK	AFEP	KDP	WFPSS	UPP	BFAM	TWRMP
Kota Banda Aceh	Meuraksa	Annas		X	X		X					X						X	X		X
	Baiturrahman	Mangga	X			X	X					X			X				X	X	
Aceh Besar	Seulimeum	Salak		X		X			X	X			X				X				
Aceh Barat	Johan Pahlawan	Pisang	X		X		X					X			X				X		X
Aceh Jaya	Krueng Sabee	Rambutan		X		X			X	X				X		X	X				X
Pidie	Delima	Jeruk		X		X			X			X	X				X				

NB At Desa level the communities have been given a fictional name to maintain anonymity and confidentiality of respondents.

E.2 Summary of site selection criteria and communities in Nias

Kabupaten	Kecamatan	Desa	Selection Criteria																
Nias											Project presence								
			Better off	Poorer	High damage	Low damage	Urban	Peri-urban	Rural	North	South	ILO	CSO	KDP	WFPSS	KRRP	TWRMP	BRR Hosing	
Nias	Gunung Sitoli Idanoi	Manggis		X		X			X	X		X	X			X			
Nias Selatan	Teluk Dalam	Belimbing	X		X			X			X			X	X	X	X	X	

NB At Desa level the communities have been given a fictional name to maintain anonymity and confidentiality of respondents.

Annex F Rapid Participatory Community Research tools and questions

F.1 Vulnerability mapping

A key issue of the review is: “to what extent have the activities of MDF supported projects in a specific location reduced people’s vulnerability to poverty and social exclusion”. Whilst no one tool will provide the answer, taking time to look at vulnerability: what it means to different interests groups; who they think are the most vulnerable in their area; how this has changed over time and, what they think are the causes of vulnerability goes some way in helping build up a picture of whether or not project activities have helped reduce people’s vulnerability. A vulnerability map is a visual tool used to initiate these types of discussions with selected and specific groups of people chosen for example by age or gender or livelihood group or well-being status. Capturing responses from a range of interest groups enables an analysis of commonalities and differences and to pick up on trends in social inclusion.

At the start of building a vulnerability map, participants are asked to identify particular types of people as particularly marginalised and/ or vulnerable and a picture is drawn, or a symbol chosen, to represent each of these types of people. This is placed in the middle of a chosen space. Participants then, through discussion, identify the characteristics and circumstances which make the people particularly vulnerable. Symbols are chosen to represent these and they are placed in a circle round the symbol or drawing. In discussion, the symbols can be moved closer or further away from the symbol or drawing to represent visually which are the most important. Sticks can then be used to show how the different characteristics and circumstances relate to each other.

Discussion is pushed to analyse the consequences of the various characteristics of vulnerability, and the “web” of symbols, and relations between them, extended. Once this has been established it is then possible to ask people what has changed over time – are people more or less vulnerable? What or who is helping to maintain well-being and security and what or who is threatening their security.

F.2 Community Score Card guide questions

The objectives of this tool are to explore and understand people’s ideas about the following:

- Do targeting / participation approaches result in better representation in decision-making processes of the needs of especially women, the poor and other relevant vulnerable groups?
- Are these methods to provide access to information on the projects to the public / beneficiaries suitable to the local setting(s) and to the needs of the beneficiaries / public?
- Are complaints systems being used by beneficiaries? If not, why not? Have they been adjusted to meet local conditions? Are they being maintained (follow-up through projects, feedback to complainant)?
- How do the beneficiaries / stakeholders perceive the approach of the MDF projects to preventing / solving conflict? What has been the stakeholder involvement in these solutions? Are local project implementers perceived as neutral and independent by community members?
- What results do beneficiaries perceive stemming from the social sustainability practices in MDF projects?

The following guide notes explain the steps to go through once the vulnerability mapping and Spokes exercises have been completed.

Explain you will read out a set of statements and that for each statement, the participants should discuss it as a group and come to an agreement on a score. The statements have generally been worded as strong positive statements and the score will show how much they agree or disagree with the statement.

These numbers, or scores, will show whether and how much people agree or disagree with each statement, as follows:

1= strongly disagree

2= partly disagree

3= neither agree or disagree

4= partly agree

5= strongly agree

9= don't know/not sure

If people are not sure what they think, then they can put a 9. However, encourage them to try and express their view if they can, and only put 9 if they really can't decide or don't know.

Make sure that everyone understands this and ask if you can start with the first question.

Start by reading the first number and statement, and then continue down the list until all have been scored.

As you read out each question, provide any clarification or help requested but without directing the group in their choice of score.

The community scorecard questions are:

6. Our most important needs have been fully addressed

7. Everyone in the community has benefited from projects equally

8. Only the powerful people in the community benefited

9. Some people benefited who didn't need assistance

10. We were asked our opinions on the projects in our community

11. We were able to say what we wanted

12. We were very able to complain about the projects in the community

- 13. The projects changed what they were doing because of what we said
- 14. The projects created disagreements between different people and groups in the community
- 15. The projects have improved the way other people in the community behave towards us
- 16. Everyone in the community could influence all decisions that affect them
- 17. We were given lots of information about the projects

Keep probing participants' comments by asking open ended questions, such as "**why do you say that?**", "**why is that happening?**", or "**what causes that?**"

Asking these open ended questions will help you get the important explanations and reasons for the scores given. It is very important not to focus just on getting the scores or numbers.

