

LEARNING FORUM ON DRR AND CSO RELIEF OPERATION



Contents

Foreword 4

By Benedict O. Balderrama
PHILSSA

Executive Summary 7

By Ana Teresa Yuson
PHILSSA

People Power and Disaster Relief Operations Sectors NGO Sector 12

By Luz Malibiran, and co-authored by
Franz Clavecillas of the CO-Multiversity

The School Sector's Response to the Post- Ondoy Disaster 22

By Boots Tirol of OSCL, Ateneo de Manila

Church-Based Caritas Relief Operations during Typhoon Ondoy 30

By Milet Mendoza,
humanitarian volunteer and disaster risk reduction of Caritas Manila

Disaster Response and the Private Sector 40

By Mr. Aberto Lim,
president of the Corporate Network for
Disaster Relief Response (CNDR)

GMA-7 Network's Disaster Relief Response 46

By Ms. Kara David,
field reporter of the GMA 7 News and Public Affairs in consultation with the
Kapuso Foundation

Post-Ondoy Disaster Relief Operations in Marikina City 54

By Alex Lumban

Foreword

By **Benedict O. Balderrama**
PHILSSA

Last September 26, 2009, Typhoon Ondoy and the devastation it has caused had been an eye-opener to all of us. It showed us the need for disaster preparedness and community resilience.

However, it also showcased Filipino compassion and solidarity. People giving and distributing relief goods. People involved in search and rescue work. People putting up soup kitchens and providing food for others. People helping in evacuation centers. People working together in cleaning up and rebuilding. The outpouring of assistance and the spirit of volunteerism had helped in addressing the needs and suffering of the evacuees and other victims of disaster.

But there were also challenges and problems encountered. There is the need to coordinate the various efforts and initiatives among people and agencies, both public and private. So that we can ensure the timely and orderly delivery of the goods and services as needed by those affected.

So there is a need to go back to our experience and draw lessons in terms of disaster response, as well as disaster risk reduction and community resilience.

Thus, Partnership of Philippine Support service Agencies (PHILSSA), with support from the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom government (UKAid) and the Peace and Equity Foundation (PEF) had worked together for a *Learning Forum on Disaster Relief response of Civil Society Organizations*, focusing on the experience of Typhoon Ondoy.

The objectives of the project are:

1. To learn from the experiences of key sectors of civil society in their recent disaster relief response to Ondoy's typhoon-flood victims,
2. To come up with a general picture of how various sectors respond to disaster situations towards enhancing the basis for potential cooperation,
3. To open windows for possible multi-sectoral coordination, complementation and cooperation on disaster responses among the various sectors of civil society to generate more positive impact in working together, and
4. To catalyze efforts in developing capacities for effective disaster relief response among the

participating organizations and their respective sectoral networks in the hope of developing better approaches to disaster relief management and operations.

The activities are:

- Discussion and consultation among key CSO groups involved in Typhoon Ondoy disaster relief response
- Sectoral sub-fora among key sectors
- Conduct of the cross-sectoral Learning Forum
- Preparation of forum documentation

The *Learning Forum on Disaster Relief response of Civil Society Organizations* was held last December 16, 2009 in the ISO Conference Center in Ateneo de Manila University campus, attended more than 120 participants from NGOs/ POs, schools, private sector, faith-based groups and government agencies. There were sectoral presentations from the NGOs, Students/ Schools, Church Social Action groups, Business sector and Media.

The activity was held back-to-back with a *Capacity-Building Activity for Local Initiatives in Disaster Risk Reduction* held last December 15, 2009 also in the ISO Conference Center.

Executive Summary

By Ana Teresa Yuson
PHILSSA

On December 16, 2009 some 120 representatives from the community-based NGOs, Urban Poor community leaders, student-school sector, church social action centers, media representatives from the GMA news and Kapuso Foundation and the business private sector attended the Learning Forum on Disaster Relief Response. Roused by the need to learn and improve one's disaster response after the unexpected havoc caused by the September 26, 2009 Typhoon Ondoy, the various sectors from Civil Society shared and listened to one another's relief operations response to Ondoy. The Learning Forum was organized by the Peace and Equity Foundation in cooperation with PHILSSA.

Prior to the Forum, sectoral sharings and consultations were

conducted by the lead organizations per sector: for the NGOs, it was CO-Multiversity; for the Church sector it was Caritas Manila thru Milet Mendoza; for the School sector, it was the PHILSSA's school cluster led by the Ateneo's Office for Social Concern and Involvement; for the private sector, it was the Corporate Network for Disaster Response; for media, it was just GMA news and Public Affairs thru its news field reporter Ms. Kara David; and the sixth presenter was a personal testimony of a private volunteer, Engr. Alex Lumban. Sectoral Consultations were undertaken to cull out the lessons and recommendations within the members of the participating sectoral network so that by December 16 Learning Forum, the discussions would be enriched further as they learn from the other

sectors. Hence, sectoral discussions enabled the various organizations to share their animated stories and interesting reflections, with various topics ranging from mobilizing resources, identifying and reaching the targeted flood beneficiaries and doing the relief operations



from planning to monitoring. The pre-Dec 16 consultations provided the avenues to understand their sectoral organizations' capacities and possible role contribution in disaster relief operations, exposing both the potential and strengths, the gaps and the limitations of the civil society organizations. The sectoral sessions made the participants realize that disaster compels them to respond best in areas where they are strong, and to seek each other's help when there are limitations and difficulties. That's why the December 16 multi-stakeholder Learning Forum became a timely culminating avenue to network and complement each other's role contributions during disaster.

If there is one silver lining that Ondoy showed the civil society participants, it was the realization that voluntarism, people power, and compassion continue to live in the hearts of the Filipinos. Disaster has a way of bringing out the best in Filipinos, as they strive to help one another survive the storm. Yes, disaster with all the socio-economic damages and loss to lives and properties, also showed its flipside: the unsung heroes, the thousands of volunteers, and the outpour of donations coming in to respond to the disaster. Though Typhoon Ondoy showed our vulnerabilities and unpreparedness in dealing with calamities, it was also a blessing in disguise as it was a warning to prepare for the coming calamities with the common experience that Filipinos were more than ready to

volunteer, donate and reach out, as long as there would be clear and organized venues and parameters for responding to disasters. This was the realization of the organized civil society that enthusiastically participated in the Learning Forum.

While the Lessons from the Learning Forum forewarned the participants to take climate change seriously considering the Philippine's archipelagic formation and location in the ring of fire, the Forum inspired them to take up the cudgels in disaster risk reduction, mitigation and preparation among their respective constituency and sectoral networks. Developing one's lens and capacity in disaster reduction toward mainstreaming this into one's existing organizational mandate and concern became an imperative that the participants strongly resolved to do. Inspired by the lessons of Typhoon Ondoy and roused to prepare now for the coming disasters, the following were some of the key lessons and DRR role contribution shared by the sectoral case presenters (culled from their respective sectoral consultation workshops prior to the December 16 Learning Forum):

From the NGO sector

(presented by Luz Malibiran, and co-authored by Franz Clavecillas of the CO-Multiversity.

1. "Relief response should be viewed from a holistic perspective—that even though it is Welfare Work, it can be located in the continuum of an

empowering process, where survivors of disasters are not be viewed as a burden, but as a human resource to be mobilized”;

2. Role of the NGO/Civil society in DRR: Developer of alternatives to the prevailing DRR models that may not be very responsive to the present context (i.e., Develop the concept of a community-run evacuation Center)

From the Students /School sector

(presented by Boots Tirol of OSCI, Ateneo de Manila):

1. In the conduct of implementing, managing and coordinating Emergency and Disaster Relief Response, empowerment of students, school employees and people in the affected communities must be the foremost aim. Volunteers must know the whole process and see the big picture, as beneficiaries must also take part in the process;
2. Role of the School Sector: First and foremost, the role of the school is to educate. Education should be integral to the conduct of relief operations, to inculcate in the students the values of bayanihan, selflessness and preparedness. Also, there must be an analysis of the

cause and effects of disasters, as well as in the conduct of the relief operations.

From the Church Social Action sector

(presented by Milet Mendoza, humanitarian volunteer and disaster risk reduction of Caritas Manila)

1. Reinforce personal and institutional commitment for efficient disaster response and risk reduction anchored on the Christian virtues of human compassion and respect for human dignity. Adhering to the basic principles and promotion of Christian values consistent with the principles of the conduct in humanitarian response calls for:
 - Accountability and Transparency
 - Volunteerism and the efficient management of volunteers
 - Standardization of relief assistance;
 - Do No Harm;
 - Community Empowerment and Self-Help/Self-Reliance
 - Partnership and Multi-sectoral Coordination
2. The Envisioned Role of the Social Action Centers of the Church (Diocesan Caritas), in the parishes and communities, can thus provide support to Civil

Society Organizations (CSO) engaged in disaster response. Given its primary comparative institutional advantage with existing social development, community-based programs and linkages, the church could relatively ensure delivery and receipt of assistance to the most needy and severely-affected households.

From the Private Sector

presented by Mr. Aberto Lim, president of the Corporate Network for Disaster Relief Response (CNDR):

Having the mandate and experience of Disaster Risk Reduction/Management for the past 18 years, the CNDR guiding principles in development-oriented Emergency Response are:

1. Respect and recognize people's rights and ensures that the response does not create an attitude of dependence;
2. Ensure participation of the affected community in the whole process: gathering of data, planning, implementation and assessment;
3. Contribute in increasing capacities of affected communities;
4. Lead to preparedness

activities and community development; and

5. Be accountable and transparent to beneficiaries primarily, then to donors.

Role /Mandate of CNDR. Composed of 35 organizations (corporations and foundations) with a mandate to do disaster response, CNDR conducts activities in the field of emergency response, community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation, business sector preparedness, influenza pandemic preparedness, and rehabilitation. Having DRR as its core expertise and mandate, CNDR has graciously donated to the participating organizations of the December 16 Learning Forum a kit of trainer's training manuals in Community - based Disaster Risk Reduction. In response, the receiving organizations resolved to conduct training first among their respective staff then to their partner communities.

From the Media: GMA 7 Disaster Relief Response

(presented by Ms. Kara David, field reporter of the GMA 7 News and Public Affairs in consultation with the Kapuso Foundation):

1. Develop more strategies to tap the Filipino compassion manifested during Ondoy's relief operations. Encourage donors and volunteers in disaster response but in a systematic and coordinated effort.



2. Role of Media: the power of television enabled GMA 7 to easily/effectively do the following disaster relief response:
 - a. Strategy: Not only to report the news accurately to the public but to inspire compassion among viewers. Consequently, media can easily mobilize donations and volunteers.
 - b. Access of accurate data as evidence of needs in the affected communities can trigger immediate and relevant emergency response from donors and key government agencies like DSWD, NDCC, etc. Visual evidence of the affected areas dictates what kind of relief should be delivered and how it should be delivered.
 - c. Being independent, credible and transparent, media can easily generate donations as they are immediately able to report (and show) and regularly update where their money went ... and that it went to the most deserving communities.
 - d. Provide facilities needed to get to the affected area (where the action is) and store donations and even house relief repacking operations.

The December 16 Learning Forum ended quietly with a youtube video of Typhoon Ondoy while the participants in the silence of their hearts prayed solemnly for the survival of the Philippines in the disasters yet to come, with the urgency and resolve to prepare and help each other to reduce the risks of the coming disasters.

People Power and Disaster Relief Operations Sectors

NGO Sector

By Luz Malibiran, and co-authored by
Franz Clavecillas of the CO-Multiversity

Background


The Philippines is not a stranger to super typhoons. An average of 25 typhoons visit the country every year. Among the strongest was Typhoon Reming with a maximum wind of 230 kilometers per hour. Typhoon Ondoy (International Code Name: Ketsana) at its peak had 110 kilometers per hour wind, which was way below Reming's but the volume of rain it brought made it the most destructive ever in the history of typhoons that hit the Philippines, particularly Metro Manila.

Everyone blames forest denudation, particularly the Sierra Madre Mountain Range, and the destructive lifestyles reinforced by a political culture that generally puts Mother Earth within harm's way. The larger picture of climate change makes humankind, in general, accountable for the environmental disasters of this age.

On September 26, 2009, Typhoon Ondoy left 86 dead and 32 missing, displaced more than 430,000 people, and forced 115,898 others to take temporary shelter in various evacuation centers, according to government figures. The said data showed that the country was not prepared for a large-scale disaster response.

As of January 6, 2010, the floodwaters in many Laguna and Rizal towns have yet to recede as normally expected. There are still people in a number of Laguna and Rizal evacuation centers.

The floods not only submerged towns and devastated many lives, but also gave timeless lessons for everyone to ponder.



Totally wrecked homes



Aftermath of Typhoon

As soon as the roads were accessible to transportation, the NGOs visited the communities and did a rapid assessment of the impact of the typhoon on the urban poor communities. The NGOs in this case study did not include the evacuation centers in their relief operations as relief goods were regularly being brought into these centers. Instead, they looked for the survivors that stayed in their improvised abode and were not included in the masterlists of the evacuation

centers. After the assessment was done, the networks put up fair criteria for communities that would be receiving relief goods. Flood survivors whose houses and belongings were destroyed by the flood and were just staying with friends or relatives or in makeshift dwellings were given top priority.

Many houses most of which made of light materials (*i.e.*, wood and *sawali*) were wiped out by the floodwaters.

Preparing the Relief Goods



Resource Mobilization

On 27 September 2009 many roads to the partner communities of NGOs were not yet accessible and the remaining lines of communication were television and the radio. The said communities were submerged in flood, and people depended on the mass media. Text messages from communities came in only when they were able to access generators [and recharged their cellphones]. It was through text messages that networks got in touch with one another.

The following non-government organizations participated in the immediate relief operations: PHILSSA (Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies, Inc.) – NCR (National Capital Region); PMP (PHILIPPINE-MISEREOR PARTNERSHIP); UP-ALL (URBAN POOR ALLIANCE–NCR); COM (Community Organizers Multiversity); COPE Foundation

(Community Organization of the Philippines Enterprises Foundation); COSE (Coalition of Services for the Elderly); UPA (Urban Poor Associates); FDUP (Foundation for the Development of the Urban Poor); FDA (Foundation for Development Alternatives); KASAGANA KA; PILIPINA; DAMPA; TAO-PILIPINAS; ULRTF (Urban Land Reform Task Force); and AKAP Bata (Akap sa Bata ng mga Guro Kalinga Philippines).

Right after the typhoon, NGOs went to their partner communities to do a rapid assessment and come up with criteria on which to base the needed emergency response. The set of criteria was important given the limited resources. One overall criterion was that the networks would not do relief operations at the evacuation centers given the fact that both government and private sectors' assistance have steadily poured into the centers.

The NGOs agreed to assist families that were not at the evacuation centers.

Though the NGOs did not have resources for relief assistance, their networking and mobilizing capacity enabled them to respond to emergencies quickly and effectively. Relief goods, services, medical services, money, clothing and other basic needs were given to the communities through networking efforts and with the help of private and donor agencies. Among the first to respond right after the typhoon was the PHILSSA network that had a link with the Ateneo Task Force Ondoy. Ready-to-eat packs were distributed to flood survivors who were within the criteria set. A week

after the typhoon, the Philippine-Misereor Partnership, Christian Aid, Oxfam and other groups joined hands with the networks. Though there were network efforts in relief response, this did not prevent individual NGOs that had a capacity to respond to do a parallel relief operation.

The spirit behind the network effort alongside individual NGO effort was to spread the emergency response in a timely manner. The more volunteers to reach out to flood survivors, the better it was for communities to cope and recover quickly.

Mobilization of resources went side by side with transparency and



accountability. This was done through a validated master list and reporting with documentation to inform the donors where their donations went.

Process of Relief Distribution

Preparing the relief goods. Relief goods were repackaged as fast as possible because the NGOs did not



have a storeroom. Because repackaging had to be done in a day or two days, work would often last until evening. The NGO staff together with volunteers from the communities did the job. The repackaging system used was the “factory production line” concept, *i.e.*, in one corner three people would repackage the soaps; in another corner, rice or other

noodles; in another corner, a group would count and tie each bag. The last group in line would maintain “quality control” by making sure that each pack had the complete number of items for each package.

Transporting and distributing relief goods. The community organizing process was very valuable in preparing the distribution of relief goods after being repackaged by the community volunteers and the NGO staffers.

People from the community help in validating the masterlist as well as distributing claim stubs for crowd control. Some NGOs distributed the relief goods directly to where those in the list were staying. This distribution at night spared the volunteers and the people from the sweltering heat of day and from the likely discomfort of the people from being at the receiving end of the relief response. The distribution of goods at night was also a way for people from the community to avoid the hassle of having to pass through very narrow alleys while bringing their goods.

Communication line. There was one point person from the NGO staff responsible for the flow of communication from the network members to the staff of a particular NGO. This was important within the NGO to maintain the line of communication and avoid miscommunication or misunderstanding during the operation.

Before the distribution of relief goods, an orientation on how volunteers should view relief work was conducted. This process helped volunteers carry out the distribution phase with respect and compassion for the people. One NGO shared its policy for the staff never to respond to an irritating argument or complaint from the side of flood survivors as a way to deal with the frustrations and trauma of people who have just survived a calamity.

Feedback from the community. The residents from the communities recommended that the most helpful relief goods would be those that are ready-to-eat, especially during the first three days after the typhoon. Food, water, and stove were also requested. Supply of potable water was cut off so the people were requesting bottled water. Stove and burner were to be used to boil water and cooking utensils. Rice could not be cooked immediately after a disaster.

Schedule of distribution. The primary things that people would need for a week after the typhoon are mats, blankets, a number of dry clean clothes and medicine, *i.e.* medicine for athlete's foot, cough, and fever; and, alcohol, antibiotics, mertiolate, boots, if there are available resources, and medicine to contain the deadly leptospirosis. From Day 8 onward, rice as well as soap and milk can be distributed. From Day 9 onward, the children's clothes and notebooks can be distributed since the evacuees might have settled down at the temporary centers.

Timeframe for Disaster Relief Response

For most NGOs, relief response ended when there were no more goods to distribute but everybody agreed that the indicator to end relief operations and move to the rehabilitation phase is more than just a matter of producing relief goods.

For a number of NGOs, relief operations in Laguna and Rizal were targeted to end in December 2009 so that the intervention could be converted to the rehabilitation phase of Disaster Risk Reduction work.

The guiding principle of relief assistance is to help people cope with an emergency situation in a swift manner so that they could return to the normal grind of things immediately.

Assessment of the NGOs and POs

Among the tasks or interventions the NGOs were able to do in relief response were the following:

- The capacity to link up with groups with financial resources, services and programs since they were used to organize communities;
- The capacity to mobilize people's organizations and allies for relief response activities;
- Communities, especially the organized ones, proved that they had the capacity to respond to emergencies even with the obvious lack

of government preparedness in terms of rescue operations.

A number of factors that were both inherent and external to the people's organizations also made the disaster response manageable instead of becoming an ordeal.

1. Responding to an emergency or crisis is a natural part of community organizing work, for instance, eviction of informal settlers as an emergency situation is a major work of NGOs.
2. NGOs are credible to the stakeholders in the community, including among others, donor agencies, local government units, and allies developed in the course of the community organizing process.

Lessons from Post-Ondoy Disaster Response

1. Relief work should be viewed from a holistic perspective. Though it is welfare work, it can be located in the continuum of an empowering process. Attitudes consistent with emergency work should be enhanced.
2. Relief work should be done within and across an NGOs' area of responsibility.
3. Typhoon Ondoy brought sorrow and untold sufferings but it also taught people to look beyond themselves.

3. The people's organizations as NGO partners played a key role in the relief operations. They did not act as victims who stayed at the receiving end but were volunteers themselves in carrying out the Relief Operation.

The difficult part in doing the relief operation

1. Occasional problems concerning delay, namely, difficulty in coming up with the vehicle on time to get the goods; and delay on the part of those in the masterlist to be in the queue. The delay caused tension when those in the list came after the the relief goods had already been distributed. There were times when those who were very late had to wait for another time for distribution.
2. When partner communities from flooded communities were being pressured to move out from the church or school because these evacuation centers were to be used by the school and by the church.
3. Validation of the masterlist. Some beneficiaries listed by the community volunteers were not those agreed upon by the network. Processing this caused tensions.

Recommendations

1. A multi-stakeholders' approach in carrying out relief work is very important *i.e.*, NGOs, the Church, private organizations and all other stakeholders in the community should participate in the formulation of a master plan on Disaster Preparedness.
2. Relief work should be a well-planned strategic response to Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation. Vigilance and involvement in terms of policy development and formulation regarding Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation are everyone's concern.
3. Disaster Preparedness should be built into the overall Development Framework of NGOs whereby the following concerns are addressed:
 - a. Environmental consciousness of the communities should include taking responsibility for the environment, housing rights, disaster relief response, and the concept of stakeholdership.
 - b. The National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC) as a government structure, from the national level to the

Do's and Don'ts in Disaster Response

What to do during disaster relief

- Always think multi-stakeholder in doing relief work. The task is awesome and cannot be done by just one group. Develop a multi-stakeholders' guidelines on how to carry out a DRR program in the city or municipality
- A show of arrogance or irritability during relief distribution should never be a part of an NGO or Volunteers' behavior.
- To keep the inner drive to be able "to walk the talk" in relation to the NGO communities' vision of society, a periodic reflection whether in a group or on an individual level needs to be a part of a volunteer's values and habits.

local level, must become reliable and effective vehicle in developing programs in the area of disaster preparedness and mitigation;

- c. There should be continuing advocacy for a holistic view of DRR located in the larger landscape of Climate Change and Good Governance.
- d. An orientation program for volunteers should be part of Relief Operations to prepare the volunteers to view flood survivors from the standpoint of human

dignity and human rights. Community-based Disaster Preparedness Training should be part of all Barangay LGU Programs.

- e. There should be continuing advocacy work toward effective NDCC, City or Municipal Disaster Coordinating Council, and Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council.
- f. Disaster relief and response should be included as a core agenda of Civil Society.
- g. The possibility of a community-based evacuation as an alternative to the

prevailing evacuation model as a disaster response should be studied further.

Recommended Role of Civil Society in DRR

1. Civil society may develop alternatives to prevailing disaster relief response models that may not be very apt to the present context. For example, it can develop the concept of a community-run evacuation Center and pilot the concept.
2. Continue Advocacy Work. Integrate the disaster relief response in the community organizing process.



3. Disaster relief response should not be viewed as a separate arena from community organizing.
4. Organizing communities around disaster relief response issues is a role Civil Society does very well and therefore should continue doing.
5. Civil Society's role in mobilizing people for social transformation should be the same in the field of DRR.

What to avoid during relief operation

- Those who want to do volunteer work in a relief operation should develop the attitudes and values demanded of an emergency situation. A volunteer must

not behave like a victim who shows an air of being so burdened when problems arise in the course of the relief operation.

- A volunteer distributing relief goods may be perceived by people in the community as someone who has power. A serious reminder to everyone who will work in relief operation never to think like a “patron” or “dispenser of graces”. Behaving so will put Volunteers’ credibility on the line.
- NGOs’ in charge of resources for relief operation should be transparent and accountable for the entrusted resources – in thought, in word and in deed.

Note: This Case Study is the result of a shared experience and lessons of NGOs who participated in the DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction) response immediately after the flash flood brought about by Typhoon Ondoy.

The final form of this Case Study was assigned to CO Multiversity (COM) PHILSSA. Francia C. Claveillas, a member of the COM Staff wrote the final form of this Case Study.

The School Sector's Response to the Post-Onjoy Disaster

By Boots Tirol of OSCI, Ateneo de Manila

Introduction

Two focus group discussions were held for the school sector in order to thresh out experiences from the relief efforts. Representatives from Adamson University (AdU), Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU),

Typhoon Ondoy Relief Operation,” where the group in which she belongs distributed relief goods, held clean up drive, feeding, and medical assistance for relocation community in Marilao, Bulacan, and communities in Sucat, Paco, Rizal



Catholic Education Association of the Philippines (CEAP), De La Salle University (DLSU), Miriam College (MC), University of the Philippines Diliman (UP) met and shared their Ondoy Disaster Response stories.

Perlie B. Alano, Program Officer from the Integrated Community Extension Services of Adamson University, discussed “Bigay-Lakas:

and communities of affected students and faculty.

Mary Ann P. Manapat, the Director of the Office for Social Concern and Involvement, talked about Ateneo de Manila University’s “Task Force Ondoy” with Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan and GK Ateneo. ADMU had relief goods distribution, medical assistance, clean-up and rehabilitation activities for various

communities in Quezon City, Marikina, Pasig, Malabon, Navotas, Caloocan, Rizal, Bulacan, and Laguna.

Ines M. Basaen informed the group of CEAP National Office's funds and donation-raising efforts. Donations in kind were forwarded to Quezon City Red Cross. CEAP also identified from its 1,500 members and matched schools that needed assistance with schools that can help.

Nelca B. Villarin of the La Sallian Justice and Peace Commission shared about "Tugon Lasalyano," in which 10 De La Salle and De La Salle-assisted schools participated in relief goods distribution, feeding, medical assistance, psycho-social intervention (counseling) to communities in Quezon City, Marikina, Malabon, Pasay, Laguna, Rizal, and Pangasinan.

Prof. Mel Luna of the UP College of Social Work and Community Development (UP CSWCD) discussed about their college's two-phase endeavors. In Phase 1 (first two weeks), UP CSWCD distributed goods in neighboring communities around UP Diliman and in Banaba, a partner community. For Phase 2, UP CSWCD partnered with OXFAM and distributed hygiene kits to various pre-selected communities and evacuation centers around Metro Manila and neighboring towns.

Miriam College, which was present in the first meeting, provided priority relief response to the affected student, faculty and school

employee population. MC had to hold post trauma counseling sessions among the students affected. MC also mobilized relief goods and clean-up volunteers to provide that much needed support to the affected school population. Second priority areas that were assisted were the depressed communities of Loyola Heights (e.g. Marytown, Daang Tubo, Park 7).

Resource Mobilization

Father Nonong Fajardo, the Director of AdU's ICES, called for a meeting a few days after Ondoy struck to get support from the community. After the general assembly, the AdU slashed its budget allocation for Christmas party, and the AdU



community donated funds [intended for the typhoon victims]. From nothing, they came up with half a million pesos that day. Donations, be it monetary and in kind, came in from the alumni after AdU released newsletters regarding Ondoy and their relief operations. SMIIC and the developer of the relocation site also gave assistance.

ADMU has a Disaster Response Emergency Management Team (DREaM Team) in place and maintains a stand-by calamity fund. Donations both in kind and monetary from alumni, ADMU community, partner institutions, and private individuals poured amounting to more than 10 million pesos. Monetary donations were coursed through Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan's bank accounts.

Tugon Lasalyano got more than 3 million pesos worth of donations from its school network, school community, individuals, corporate donors.

UP got donations from students, faculty, alumni, and friends. UP had a partnership with OXFAM which provided hygiene kits for the survivors.

CEAP has an institutionalized calamity fund. Donations in kind from the school network were forwarded to Quezon City Red Cross. Donors, especially from regional schools, donated to the CEAP calamity fund.

In general, the schools were able to raise funds by getting a portion from their internal funds, besides soliciting donations from their alumni and partner institutions and



networks. The influx of donations came from the networks of partner organizations, friends, family, and other individuals.

Sponsorship and fund raising were the easiest parts of the sector's DRR. Donations from all over came by millions. Once announcements were made and the structures were in place (i.e., location where to drop the donated goods; the bank account in which funds can be transferred or deposited), the resources flowed. The mobilization of volunteers was easy, however volunteer management was challenging.

Beneficiaries

AdU prioritized a relocation site in Marilao, Bulacan. It also catered to nearby communities of the school, existing partner communities of SMIIC, and communities of affected employees and students.

ADMU meanwhile prioritized communities of employees and students, existing partner areas like OSCI Immersion areas, GK communities, and neighboring communities around the school. ADMU accepted walk-in request as long as there is a contact person in the community.

DLSU prioritized neighboring communities of the schools, communities of affected employees and students, existing partner communities and institutions, and supervised/member schools. Its principle was help those who are most affected by the disaster and

those who were least served.

UP gave assistance to partner communities in Banaba, as well as nearby communities around UP, and those pre-identified evacuation centers as identified by OXFAM. CEAP identified member schools that were affected [by the flood]. Quezon City Red Cross redistributed the forwarded goods to its own areas.

In general, the schools immediately responded to their neighbor communities that were affected by the disaster. Communities of affected students and employees were also prioritized. Existing partner communities of the schools were also helped.

CEAP and DLSU used the criteria "most affected, least served" to identify its beneficiaries. ADMU catered to walk-in requests as long as there was a known contact person in the area.

Process of Relief Operations

The AdU formed committees according to [one's] expertise/department. The Hospitality department led the feeding, the Engineering and Architecture departments led in the clean up, while its Pharmacy and Nursing departments led in the medical mission. The services were based on each department's expertise. The AdU organized volunteers, systematized giving assistance in each area, monitored the activities, and released newsletter to get donations from both public and private and donors.



The ADMU formed committees among students (lead by the Student Council), OSCI, SLB, OSA and had a shifting schedule. Volunteers worked around Purchasing, Receiving and Documentation; Sorting and Repackaging of Goods; Volunteer Orientation and Management; Transportation and Deployment committees from 6 am to 12 mn. Teams and guidelines were put in place. Networking helped raise funds and donations. Monitoring of the activities was established to make the services more effective.

The DLSU on the other hand rendered the following services:

1. Sponsorship and fund raising as well as internal mobilization of funds;
2. Receiving and documenting donations (monetary or in kind, or services);

3. Sorting and repackaging of goods;
4. Organizing volunteers and identifying point persons from the affected communities;
5. Gathering data from partner communities and organizations;
6. Coordinating the distribution of goods and services;
7. Sponsorship and fund-sourcing;
8. Cooking and feeding of children;
9. Distributing relief goods to communities/areas;
10. Giving medical assistance as well as counseling to the affected people.

DLSU also considered student formation; district mandate and coordination; partnership with

communities and organizations; and the accessibility of schools during the entire operation. UP CSWCD used its existing committee on climate change. Its experience in community organizing and mass mobilizations made a difference in the distribution of goods. Both students and faculty repackaged and distributed goods. During the second phase of its operation, staffers were hired to distribute the goods to the centers. Strict monitoring and verifications were observed.

CEAP contacted member schools, and encouraged members to help those affected. It also forwarded donations in kind to QC Red Cross.

In general, the school sector provided basic needs of the affected communities, including among others, food, water, medicines, and clothes. With the exception of UP and CEAP, the schools provided other services like clean-up, feeding, and medical and psychological assistance to the said communities.

Students and employees of the schools played key roles during the entire relief operations. Structures, like committees, and schedules were set to better manage the operations. The schools operated from 10 to 14 days for DRR, and shifted to community rehabilitation after this.

Assessment of Relief Efforts

AdMU made sure that the supervision of students for deployment should be in order. For instance, an adult must accompany the students when they are in the community. AdMU's personnel were not spared by the typhoon, and so AdMU must extend assistance to the affected persons. AdMU also checked the expiry dates of goods donated by some corporate donors to avoid unfortunate incidents like food poisoning.

The easiest part was getting donations and organizing volunteers. The hardest part was distributing the goods and materials because there was disorder in the communities. AdMU also had a hard time supervising the students, while avoiding compromising their security.

DLSU lacked general guidelines though there were influx of volunteers. Some implementers were also affected by the disaster. DLSU had to share resources with network groups.

CEAP had difficulty monitoring the flow of donations, and accounting them.

In general, the school sector's most valuable strength was its network and its capacity to mobilize resources, facilities, and volunteers. Having students who were ready to help made the

schools a valuable reservoir of volunteers for DRR.

The accessibility of schools, and its capacity to have specialization in their operations are also the sector's strengths.

Experience in working with communities, and having existing partner communities made the school's DRR effective and efficient.

The schools had no shortage of student volunteers but the difficulty was on the supervision of students. Since schools have legal responsibility over their students, adult supervision must be exercised. There was not enough personnel who can supervise the students during relief operations.

Having separate operations and lacking in coordination is also one of



the sector's gaps in its DRR. Resources could have been shared, and duplication of efforts in some communities could have been avoided if the schools coordinated with one another.

The schools lacked of general guidelines for DRR. Implementers and volunteers had to evaluate, and change some strategies and structures along the way while doing relief operations.

Recommendations

1. In the conduct of Emergency and Disaster Relief Response, empowerment of students and employees, and of the people in affected communities must be the foremost aim. Volunteers must know the whole process and see the big picture, as beneficiaries must also take part in the operations.
2. Operations in the communities must be coordinated with

community leaders/HOA/PO/ Baranggay officials to ensure an orderly and empowering conduct of the distribution of goods and services.

3. Education should be integral to the conduct of relief operations in order to inculcate among the students the values of *bayanihan*, selflessness, preparedness. Disaster preparedness must be included in the curricula.
4. Students and employees should have disaster preparedness training. Students and employees must know what to do during emergencies, to help themselves and others as well.
5. Each school should have Emergency Response Teams.
6. Schools must have better evacuation facilities and equipment.

Church-Based Caritas Relief Operations during Typhoon Ondoy

By Milet Mendoza,
humanitarian volunteer and disaster risk
reduction of Caritas Manila

Objectives and Principles in doing Disaster Relief Response

The Church has a clear vision to respond to the needs of the people particularly the poorest of the poor, and a mission “to build and develop basic ecclesial communities towards total human development and social transformation”. It is, therefore, a given commitment of and responsibility for the Church sector to help out in times of need in the spirit of human compassion and love. Every Church’s mission is to reach out in love and charity to every human being particularly the poor and the marginalized. Every disaster is a call to every person and institution to respond in good faith.

Background of the CARITAS (Social Action) Network


In 2003, the Archdiocese of Manila was divided into six dioceses headed by its own Bishop, namely:

- Archdiocese of Manila (covering Manila, San Juan, Pasay, Mandaluyong)
- Diocese of Cubao (part of Quezon City with six vicariates and 45 parishes)
- Kalookan (part of Kalookan City, whole of Malabon and Navotas)
- Novaliches (part of Quezon City and Kalookan City)

- Paranaque (Las Pinas, Paranaque and Muntinlupa with six Vicariates and 52 parishes)
- Pasig (whole of Taguig, Pateros and Pasig)

The six arch/dioceses generally cover the entirety of Metro Manila. The ecclesiastical boundaries cover specific political boundaries with a total of seven cities and five municipalities within a land area of 315.26 square kms. The Archdiocese of Manila and the suffragan dioceses are bounded by the Diocese of Malolos (Bulacan) in the north; Diocese of Antipolo (Rizal) in the East; Diocese of Imus (Cavite) and San Pablo (Laguna) in the south; and the Manila Bay in the west.

Each diocese is further clustered into vicariates covering a specific number of parishes under a parish priest who is either a diocesan priest or religious. Each diocese has its regular program ministries one of



which is the Social Services and Development Ministry or SSDM where usually the Caritas Program is anchored. It is the Social Action Desk of the diocese. The BEC, composed of volunteers in every parish, is the frontline mechanism for Church outreach programs.

Organizationally, the Dioceses, as is also replicated in the parishes, have the following committees:

- Liturgy
- Education/ Evangelization
- Family Life
- Youth
- Temporality

Areas Provided with Disaster Relief

There is a wide coverage of areas assisted in the aftermath of Typhoons Ondoy (Sept. 26, 2009) and Pepeng (a week after). The outreach of assistance included Northern Luzon provinces.

At the parish-level, affected communities are automatically assisted with whatever relief goods are made available by parishioners at the given moment usually food items and used clothes. Due to limited resources, priority parishes or communities more severely affected are identified mainly based on the reports of the SSDM coordinators and volunteers and the community-based Basic Ecclesial Community (BEC) leaders. Other dioceses and parishes not as badly affected extend assistance to more severely-affected dioceses/ parishes; they no longer seek further assistance for their own

needs to give way to addressing the needs of others.

Resource Mobilization

The Caritas networks within Metro Manila and nearby provinces operate independently but traditionally share resources in times of need including every time a disaster strikes. Caritas Manila, for instance, took the lead in the mobilization of resources (in cash and in kind as well as technical support) to assist other dioceses within and outside the National Capital Region (NCR).

Basically, resource mobilization is done thru second collection during masses. Appeals for donation in cash and in kind are made by the Bishop and the priests to their parishioners. Its various media arm and schools network are also tapped for contribution of goods and cash not to mention foreign-based contacts.

Core Competence

Disaster program management is rarely a core expertise of the diocesan-based social action networks although it is something that the sector is oftentimes seemingly involved in. Except perhaps for areas in the Philippines that are constantly prone to natural and human-made hazards, these social action center found in these areas, by virtue of their exposure, have improved on this field over time. Nonetheless, the primary competence of the social action lies not only in resource mobilization, advocacy and community organizing

but also in the implementation of basic social development projects in the areas of:

- Education and Leadership Formation
- Primary and Preventive Health Care
- Livelihood Assistance, Microfinance and Cooperative Development

For its Social Action, a typical set of programs may or may not include:

- Social Services and Development Ministry (i.e., Livelihood, Education, Health and Nutrition, Relief and Rehabilitation, etc.)
- Pastoral Care for Migrants
- Pastoral Care for Women and Children
- Restorative Justice
- Pastoral Care for the Sick and the Elderly
- Ecological Concerns
- Land and Housing
- Labor
- Advocacy for Social Concerns

Institutional Strengths

- As frontline mechanism, the diocese thru its parishes and BECs has primary access to communities
- Given its existing/ongoing social development programs in the communities thru parish network, there is some basic community organization and stable outreach.
- Availability of a pool of volunteers (both skilled and unskilled)

- A personal and collective calling and response to service for others: values of cooperation and commitment reinforced by the Bishop's call to action to the clergy and the laity.
- Institutional and community support with networks and linkages to parochial schools and religious congregations and multi-sectors
- Quick response and immediate involvement of Vicariate program coordinators, religious and lay leaders
- Resource mobilization from various sources at all levels.
- Effective advocacy channels
- Credibility and first preference of private donor individuals and institutions.

Difficulties in Disaster Relief Work

There is a general state of unpreparedness due to the lack of technical capacity in humanitarian program management particularly when confronted with major disasters. Specifically,

- There is a need for stronger diocese/parish-based support beginning with the religious leaders themselves.
- Inequitable distribution of relief assistance due to gaps in technical assessment and relief aid management skills.
- Lack of internal coordination among diocesan programs and various church institutions.
- Lack of motivation to reach out to other stakeholders in disaster response specifically with

government units due to credibility issues.

- Lack of communication and technical facilities.
- Challenge for better accountability and transparency to set good example.
- Gaps in documentation of relief distribution process and management.
- Challenge to shift paradigm from reactive relief response to disaster preparedness and risk reduction framework.

Recommendations

1. Reinforce personal and institutional commitment for efficient disaster response and risk reduction anchored on the Christian virtues of human compassion and respect for human dignity.
2. Deepen awareness and knowledge on disaster management and its principles.
3. Strengthen disaster management and risk reduction program and streamline the program across all other programs.
4. Deepen awareness on sustainable environment programs.
5. Formation of more efficient and effective community-based disaster relief teams
6. Improve volunteer management: Map out volunteers according to skills

and expertise, and conduct training needs' assessment, and enhance existing capacities.

7. Sensitivity to needs of human resource pool: Caring for caregivers /humanitarian workers.
8. Provide for emergency fund for disasters.
9. Initiate contingency plans in coordination with other sectors including government agencies and local government units.
10. Actively collaborate with LGUs and government mandated service institutions [during disaster response].
11. Envisioned Role Contribution of the Sector

The Caritas as an organization can extend support for other CSOs engaged in disaster response in the following manner:

- Provide institutional support and existing social development programs with established partners and linkages.
- Mobilize resources through parishioners, private individuals and organizations who/which have preference to course donations thru church groups.
- Ensure delivery and receipt of assistance to the most needy and severely-affected households.
- Identify beneficiaries, distribute relief goods and materials, and document activities in certain


organized communities under its wing.

- Guide and draw strategies on how to manage relief assistance in urban poor communities.
- Pool of highly-committed volunteers in the frontlines (parish/community) as well as at the Vicariate and Diocesan levels.
- Provide infrastructure facilities, i.e., schools, chapels and

churches, etc., and logistical support.

- Advocate policy reforms and media facilities for general public information and awareness building.

Case Presentation: DIOCESE OF NOVALICHES - CARITAS NOVALICHES EMERGENCY DISASTER RESPONSE OPERATIONS AND COORDINATION SYSTEM DURING TYPHOON ONDOY




Community-based Support Organizational Mechanism

- The Diocese of Novaliches is situated in the northern part of Metro Manila covering one (1) barangay (Brgy. Old Balara) in District 1 and 24 barangays in District 2 of Quezon City, and 24 barangays in District 1 of Kalookan City.
- It is organized according to 10 Vicariates and 59 Parishes.
- The Novaliches Clergy is composed of 37 diocesan priests, 23 Religious Priests assigned as parish priests and 14 guest priests. It has 10 parochial schools and 16 congregational schools. It has a pool of catechists deployed in the entire diocese.
- It has 3.4 Million population (2008 census data), 70% of which are urban poor.

Adherence to Christian values in Humanitarian Response

The principle of compassion lies at the heart of all religious, ethical and spiritual traditions, calling us always to treat all others as we wish to be treated ourselves. (From the Charter for Compassion)

- Accountability and Transparency
- Volunteerism and the efficient management of volunteers
- Standardization of relief assistance
- Do no Harm
- Community empowerment and Self help/Self reliance
- Partnership and Multi-Sectoral Coordination



Selecting Priority Areas for Relief Assistance

- Targeting of areas and families as assessed by SSDM and BEC Coordinators in coordination with the parish priests (severely affected poorest of the poor based on concrete objective indicators)
- Identification of vulnerable groups: female-headed household, single-parent household, child-headed household, no external support from OFW relatives, children, pregnant/lactating mothers, physically/ mentally incapacitated, the elderly, and the sick (families with serious illness)
- Identification of homeless families (severely-damaged homes) Formulation of database of affected communities and families thru the conduct of house to house area surveys by volunteers using standard format. (Preliminary listing existed in some urban poor areas where you have homeowners associations and BECs in place)

Support and Coordination Systems

- Provision of full time technical assistance provided by experienced and trained humanitarians and disaster management volunteers
- The Ondoy emergency situation has also provided an entry point for institution-building for disaster management and better contingencies.

- Disaster response coordination systems are being enhanced in the process of the conduct of emergency relief assistance. Capacity building is carried out simultaneous with the conduct of relief operations.


Organizational Steps undertaken immediately after Typhoon Ondoy

Simultaneous with immediate relief response, a series of emergency coordination meetings of ten (10) Vicariate Coordinators, all parish priests and SSDM coordinators with the presence of the Bishop were held. The purpose was to set up better systems and agree on priority actions and targets for assistance and interventions.

The meeting threshed out WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE, which includes the following:

1. Prioritize areas to be assisted (at the vicariate and parish levels)
Nine Parishes (with at least 29,551 affected families)
Out of the 59 parishes in the Diocese, 40 are affected. Nine out of 40 have been assessed to be severely affected.
2. Conduct rapid needs assessment through SSDM and BECs.
3. Work on database of affected families.
4. Agree on standard relief package for both food and non-food assistance.

5. Standardize report formats (rapid needs assessment, baseline data gathering, etc)
6. Formulate the GAP Chart : WHO is DOING WHAT WHERE HOW AND FOR HOW LONG?
7. Determine which parish or vicariate needs technical / organizational support, and to provide assistance.
 - Setting up of Vicariate / Parish Level Disaster Operations Center
 - Organizing for centralized information dissemination and utilization of standard report formats
 - Identification of safer relocation areas (chapels, schools, barangay centers)
 - Volunteer Management / Skills Identification
8. Affirm coalitions and alliances among parish members and networks including linking up with religious congregations and consolidate resources. This refers to agreement towards better coordination to avoid duplication and wastage of resources.
9. Communications' Networking: setting up Diocese/Parish hotline/emergency numbers.
10. Organize for program clustering through regular program realignment and/or expansion and determining short, immediate and long term relief response and rehabilitation in agreed priority areas:
 - Food and Non-Food Relief Assistance (SSDM)



- Nutritional Feeding (Hapag-Asa Program Desk)
- Psychosocial Support (Pastoral Care for Women and Childrens)
- Medical Assistance (Health Program)
- Relocation and Housing (Land and Housing Program)

10.1 Food Relief Cluster

- Continuing provision of food aid and non-food aid package (subject to availability of resources)
- Moving towards adherence to standardization of package of food and non-food relief assistance (as resources permit)

Public campaign on the improved standard of relief package adhering to standard nutritional requirement and standard non-food items kit.

10.2 Nutritional Feeding Cluster

Organization of the **Health and Sanitation Cluster** and training of volunteers on medical first aid and basic sanitation and hygiene.

10.3 Psychosocial Support Program for Women and Children

- Basic orientation/ training to the Diocesan Women and Children Protection Program Unit and Caritas relief workers on child-focused assessment of protection and psychosocial needs of children and families in the typhoon-affected communities.
- Development of child-focused assessment tools: Guide questions for adults, guide questions for children
- Key Informant Community Assessment form on the Situation of Children
- Conduct of psychosocial assessment of children and communities in pre-selected priority areas (planning stage)
- Implementation of a three-month parish based psychosocial recovery programme from November 2009 –January 2010

10.4 Safe Relocation and Housing

- Preparation and validation of homeless families due to Typhoon Ondoy
- Advocacy with national and local government for safe relocation sites and support livelihood programs
- Fund raising for housing and livelihood assistance
- Resource mobilization thru linkage with NGOs and donor institutions, foundations, parishioners' support, etc.

10.5 Formalize and professionalize emergency response and disaster management through capacity enhancement and program development

- Conduct of Basic Emergency Management Training
- Basic Orientation on Climate Change and Adaptation
- Setting up Diocesan level Disaster Management Unit and support frontline disaster response teams
- Collaborative engagement with government mechanisms and adopt program cluster approach in disaster response and management.

Disaster Response and the Private Sector

By Mr. Aberto Lim,
president of the Corporate Network for
Disaster Relief Response (CNDR)

Introduction

The Corporate Network for Disaster Response (CNDR) is composed of 35 organizations belonging from various corporations and foundations. For 18 years, it has conducted activities related to emergency response, community-based disaster preparedness and mitigation, business sector

atmosphere of dependency of the beneficiaries to the donors; and encourage the participation of the affected community in the whole process of data gathering, planning, implementation, and assessment. The said principles seek to contribute in increasing the capacities of the affected communities; initiate preparedness



preparedness, influence pandemic preparedness, and rehabilitation. CNDR's guiding principles revolve around "a development-oriented emergency response." The said principles respect and recognize the people's rights and ensure that the response will not create an

activities and community development; and maintain accountability and transparency to both beneficiaries and donors alike. CNDR's recent projects include the Resettlement Assistance Project in Arayat, Pampanga, and the ACCORD-2 Project which is a community-

based disaster preparedness project in in Calabanga in Camarines Sur, Dingalan in Aurora Province, and St. Bernerd in Southern Leyte. When typhoons struck the Philippines in 2009, CNDR immediately responded to calls for help and put its machinery into work. CNDR's relief operation focused on coordinating the various efforts on disaster response and directing and giving relief assistance to certain places that were isolated by the flood. In partnership with CARE and Redemptorist Church, CNDR reached out to the affected families in Metro Manila and the provinces of Laguna, Pampanga, and Rizal.



Resource Mobilization

CNDR got cash donations worth 6 million pesos, 48 percent of which came from the CNDR members (i.e., BPI Foundation, BPI Ayala Paseo, Calenergy, Dole Asia, Johnson & Johnson, and SGV), while the 52 percent came from non-members





700,000 pesos and provided a warehouse where the goods could be repackaged.

Volunteers

The volunteers for the relief operations came from the corporate sector, church, and other organizations. Volunteers also came from affected areas, and who were also survivors of the disaster. Some beneficiaries of the Ondoy Relief Operations also volunteered in giving out relief goods.

Damage Assessment

CNDR prepared situation reports that would be disseminated to member-corporations. Said reports contained information on the status of the disaster as well as relief efforts of CNDR and the private sector. CNDR also sustained its

(i.e., Malampaya Foundation, Compassionate Sisters, Global City, Poyre Energy, Rotary Club East Makati, and various individuals).

The in-kind donations were estimated to have reached 4 million pesos, that came from Shell, Philam Foundation, SGV, Municipality of St Bernard and Calabanga and Redemptorist Church.

Redemptorist Church, one of the implementing partners of CNDR, gave



coordination with National Disaster Coordinating Council during the entire period of disaster assistance. Damages, Needs, and Capacities Assessment (DNCA) was conducted in 27 areas in Malabon, Taguig, Manila, Marikina, and Muntinlupa as well as Pampanga Province. The assessment was detailed and presented information on the impacts of Typhoon Ondoy in the livelihood of communities.

Process of Relief Operation

In order to reach out the most affected families and individuals, a set of criteria was established, which included the following: one, the gravely affected by the disaster; two, the most vulnerable; and three, the least served by either by the government or private sector groups.

The masterlist of the names of the beneficiaries were prepared prior to the actual relief delivery operations.

Contacts from the ground informed the beneficiaries beforehand about the items that they would be receiving. Relief packages usually had the following: 8 kilos of rice, ½ kilo of sugar, ½ kilo of monggo, ¼ kilo of salt, 3 cans of sardines, ½ kilo of dried fish, 400 ml of cooking oil, and 1 detergent bar. Other items included were jerry can, blanket, sleeping mat, 10 yards of plastic sheet, candles, and bottled water.

CNDR was able to served approximately 9,149 families (or approximately 45,745 individuals). It conducted relief goods distribution in Malabon, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Quezon City, and Taguig, including the provinces of Laguna, Pampanga, and Rizal.





Emergency Operations Center

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) ran from September 30 to October 31, 2009, with a staff from

CNDR and some representatives from Redemptorist and CARE.

The EOC warehouse was immediately set-up at the Newman house and Baclaran Church. By the



second week of its operation, EOC was transferred to St. Clement Seminary in Mariposa Drive in Cubao, Quezon City to accommodate the increasing amount of goods.

Some of the facilitating factors for the success of the center would include the following. First, the resources were provided by the corporate sector. Second, the staffers were well-trained and highly-skilled in terms of actual relief delivery. Third, the center has enough knowledge and experience in Disaster Risk Reduction and Management. And fourth, the center has links with other other sectors.

Problems and Lessons

1. Capacity building program for the CNDR Secretariat to address the gaps in coordination and monitoring work should be provided.
2. CNDR Committees should also be consolidated and maximized in future emergency response operations to ensure a more effective participation of members.
3. A system for volunteer registry and vendor listing is important to facilitate volunteer mobilization and purchasing of good in future emergency operations.



GMA-7 Network's Disaster Relief Response

By Ms. Kara David,
field reporter of the GMA 7 News and Public Affairs in
consultation with the Kapuso Foundation

Introduction

Typhoon Ondoy took everyone by surprise. In one day, a six-hour of rain brought one month's total average rainfall, bringing unprecedented floods, particularly in Metro Manila. Cainta, where I happen to live in one of its subdivision, was not spared. What was more alarming was Ondoy

Everyone wanted to help during the onset of Ondoy though roads were blocked by debris, mud, and waste materials. The demand for rescue and relief was just too massive.


Resource Mobilization

GMA-7 Network's relief operations started as early as September 26,



highlighted how unprepared our country in facing calamities. More than 20 typhoons visit the Philippines every year. But our disaster rescue and relief operations remain very uncoordinated and disorganized.

the day of the typhoon. As soon as images of devastation were shown on television, the phones never stopped ringing. People wanted to help; people wanted to donate. In a few hours, the said station was overflowing with donations of blankets, clothes, canned goods, ready to eat food, rice, water, cash



etc. Several trucking services also offered free services and there was a steady flow of volunteers to pack relief goods.

The network's strategy was not only to report the news accurately but to inspire compassion among viewers. Everyday, a segment is devoted for GMA Kapuso Foundation, the station's public service arm. Mel Tiangco hosts the segment titled *Kapusong Totoo*. During [and after the typhoon], there was a concrete call to action. Repackaging of relief goods was aired live; celebrities manned the telephone lines; reporters distributed relief goods though it's not their line of work. It helped that the network enjoyed very high credibility among the people. Media organizations became the people's last bastion of hope since the government was widely viewed with distrust and cynism. It helped that our organization did not have any politicians who may have vested interests. This gave us more independence and credibility.

Transparency is another key to credibility. People want to know where their money is spent. People want to make sure their donations go to the most deserving communities. Because of this, GMA-7 not only showed actual relief distribution, it also showed actual relief repackaging as well as weekly accounting of donations it has received and how many beneficiaries were reached.





Process of Relief Distribution

Data gathering. Access to accurate information is key to any successful relief operation. Being a TV station, GMA-7 was fortunate to have easy access to the data of Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) and National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). [These data were relayed to the public immediately.]

GMA 7 reporters likewise provided visual evidence of the devastation. This is important because the visual evidence of the place dictates what kind of relief should be delivered and how it should be delivered. How high are the floods? Are the roads accessible? Do people have access to clean water? Do they have access to toilet facilities? Can they cook meals? What is the profile of the population?

Having access to accurate information is essential because of the following:

1. To make sure goods go to the most deserving area;
2. To avoid duplication of work;
3. To assess and be able to customize the relief goods to be sent based on the community's real needs. For example, why give uncooked rice and instant noodles to a community that neither has access to clean water nor kitchen facilities? Better to give them ready to eat meals.

4. To assess crowd control requirements. A lot of relief efforts by private individuals were wasted because they were mobbed by the crowd even before they could ask them to form a line.
5. To assess distribution/ vehicle requirements.

Distribution. For more reliable distribution of relief goods, GMA Kapuso Foundation tapped the help of the Philippine Army and the Philippine Air Force. The soldiers not only provided manpower and crowd control measures, but also equipment such as trucks and helicopters to reach those people in isolated areas.

It was very important to be in close coordination with local government agencies. GMA Kapuso foundation partnered with the local barangay

officials and the local DSWD. This was essential because local officials knew the terrain and their community and had access to accurate information.

Before any relief distribution takes place, there is a need to verify and validate the number of beneficiaries to be served. This can be done by our local DSWD and barangay partners. It is also important to identify in detail the community's needs to be able to customize the relief goods to be given. If the community has no access to water and kitchen facilities, it is best to give them ready to eat foods instead of the traditional pack of rice, canned goods and noodles.

It is also important to distribute claim stubs to the beneficiaries to avoid duplication. GMA-7 gave family packs— one pack per family—instead of individual packs. It usually has a buffer of 300-500





Ondoy, reporters also became relief distributors.

The rationale behind this novel strategy was that reporters were always first on site. It was hitting two birds with one stone. After the reporters did their job of reporting the news, they would assist in giving relief goods to people in need. News crews are composed of three people, a very lean and flexible team, that is perfect for relief operations.

These strategies worked wonders for our relief operations. Our beneficiaries total 747,347 individuals in 78 municipalities. These communities were the communities covered by our news teams, some were referrals from local governments. The GMA-7 News hotline: Text Balita (4627) was also utilized.

family packs just to make sure everybody gets a pack. Another innovation introduced by GMA-7 in relief distribution was to use the 200-strong GMA7 news teams/reporters. Traditionally, reporters were just tasked to report the news. But during Typhoon





Difficulties. There were many difficulties that we encountered in relief operation. First, access roads were cut. Many areas were isolated not only by floods but also by heavy traffic. Partnering with the military was a big advantage for GMA-7. The soldiers were a big help in reaching unreachable communities.

Second, the demand for relief was just too large. There was a never ending request for relief. In spite of this, GMA-7 decided it needed to phase out if not adjust its relief operations at some point to avoid over dependence of victims. Third, most institutions involved in relief distribution had to face violent, and oftentimes, uncontrollable crowd. GMA-7 news

teams were always mobbed by people who wanted to get the relief first. Again, partnering with the military for crowd control was a big help in organizing queues.

From Relief to Rehabilitation

GMA Kapuso Foundation's relief operations ran for more than one month from September 26 till November 11. It was still receiving a lot of calls even after November 11 but the foundation felt there was a need to phase-out or adjust relief operations to prevent over dependence of victims. All relief operations should graduate to rehabilitation efforts. Thus, from giving relief goods, efforts were

channeled to medical missions, repair of schools, and giving out school supplies.

Conclusion

If there's one thing that Ondoy highlighted, its the fact that our country is so unprepared when it comes to disasters. Rescue and relief efforts were uncoordinated, and disaster preparedness was almost non-existent. Everyone was caught by surprise.

But there is always a silver lining to every dark rain cloud. Yes, Typhoon Ondoy highlighted our unpreparedness, but it also highlighted the Filipinos' deep sense of compassion. Corporations, private individuals, families, migrant workers, students – just about everyone wanted to donate or volunteer to help.

Filipinos are naturally compassionate; they just need a credible, transparent vehicle to



channel their *malasakit*. In a country worn down by distrust and cynicism, evoking compassion and unity is still possible. We need to develop more strategies to tap this compassion that we all have, to encourage more donors and volunteers. But any effort towards compassion will be useless if we don't start getting our act together. Compassion is not enough. It has to go hand in hand with proper coordination and a credible working system. Institutions whether government or non-government need to have more coordination with each other. If we

want to help, we have to help each other. *Hindi na puwede ang kaniya-kaniya. Kaniya-kaniyang pabida, kaniya-kaniyang diskarte.*

Grandstanding and limelight grabbing have no place in public service.

Giving relief should not stop. Relief is just a relief, which is something temporary. All relief operations should graduate to rehabilitation. Helping others means helping them help themselves to recover from any catastrophe.

Post-Ondoy Disaster Relief Operations in Marikina City

by Alex Lumban

Marikina City was hardest hit when typhoon Ondoy struck Metro Manila last year. Heavy rains inundated the communities near the riverbanks, and two of these were Balubad and Camacho areas within Barangay Nangka.

settlers were poor. Two or more families lived in one house, and you could imagine the magnitude of the victims if all persons were accounted for.

Marikina River serves as a catch



Balubad has an elevation of 2-3 meters above the water level of Marikina River, while Camacho has 6 meters above the water level. Both Balubad and Camacho became the relocation sites of families who were displaced when the road projects of the local government were implemented. The said areas also became the nesting ground of the informal settlers who were booted out from the private lands and subdivisions they were illegally occupying. Majority of the the

basin of the rainfall coming from Quezon City and San Mateo and Montalban Rizal. The silts on the riverbed have accumulated through the years when riverbanks started to erode due to lack of ripraps.

Relief and Rescue Network

For the first three days after Ondoy passed through Metro Manila, private groups, religious organizations, and individuals coming from nearby barangays

provided the needs of the survivors. Friends and relatives also helped the victims in whatever way they could.

The said private groups and individuals assessed the situation on the ground, then sought help from friends, colleagues and business associates. Regan Industrial Steel, Ricky Reyes and team, Gawad Kalinga Volunteers, Couples for Christ, EEI, Phoenix Petroleum, Marikina City Engineering Contractors, and Tsuchi Foundation were among those that immediately provided goods and services to the communities. Some groups provided earth-moving equipment to clear the roads from mud and debris. Others supplied relief goods; and some extended their manpower for the distribution of goods, clothing, and medical supplies.

The military UN Peace keeping contingent, the PNPA cadets, and Army and Navy units arrived to help in the clearing of debris [and rescue those who were trapped in their homes.] Filipino-Chinese Fire Volunteers also helped by coordinating with the government agencies and international organizations with regard to humanitarian missions. All shipments of medicines and medical equipment were delivered within two weeks after the request had been made.

The Filipino-Chinese Fire Brigade worked closely with the Office of Civil Defense and the Department of Health using the “clusterised approach system.” The said brigade coordinated its relief and rescue assistance with those of The RP United Nations White Helmets, Philippine Coast Guard, and the AFP





Reserve Command. It also identified possible areas [of coordination] and got authority from the OCD-NDCC/ AFPRESCOM.

Resource Mobilization

Most of the private groups and individuals were mobilized through SMS (short message service) by using cellphones. Before the actual relief operations, the extent of the damage in the area was assessed with the help of Barangay Nangka. List of priorities were done.

The Filipino-Chinese Fire Volunteers coordinated with the local officials and international and local partners. The FCFV gave relief goods through their “Operation Braveheart” from September 27 to October 15. Then medical missions came afterwards when GOs and NGOs and international agencies gave assistance. The volunteers used the UN Geneva UN-ISDR and

UN-OCHA as their guiding principle. They used the standard incident command system form. Relief operations lasted depending upon the number of donors.



Information and updates on the ground were relayed through texting. Ready to eat foods, noodles, canned goods, bottled water, and used clothing were given to the victims.

Volunteers who had vans and light trucks shared their vehicles to get the residents who were stranded in flooded areas. Heavy equipment

were used in clearing major roads and staging areas (i.e., covered gym, school building grounds,) of two feet thick mud, stalled vehicleless, and other debris.

After a few days of clearing operation, religious, business and non-government groups came to provide medical assistance, food, water, and clothing supplies to the needy.

Problems encountered

The Filipino-Chinese Fire Volunteers faced the problems related to funding, manpower, and donors.

On the part of private groups, they had limited resources and they could not immediately address the scope of widespread destruction caused by the typhoon. The response was slow in some areas because of inaccessibility of the survivors and victims.

Some private groups doubted the

integrity of some government representatives that led to the distribution of supply and services directly to those who could be accessed easily. Those victims and survivors who were isolated due to floods were not immediately addressed.

Learnings

1. Disasters should be anticipated. Lessons from the past should be gathered so that everybody can learn from them.
2. Cooperation with local and international organizations should be done in a systematic way.
3. Every group should be ready and prepared physically, emotionally, and spiritually in dealing with disaster response.
 - a. Every group must know its strength and weaknesses,





- capabilities and limitations;
 - b. Every person must use protective gear and equipment to minimize collateral damage;
 - c. Patience and determination must be ingrained to every volunteer;
 - d. Every volunteer must have a proactive attitude in disaster response.
4. Standard protocols applicable to all sectors must be established as guidelines of immediate and effective response.
- Recommendations**
1. Identify all available resources be it from local, national, or foreign organizations that can support disaster response;
 2. Establish protocols and guidelines that can be disseminated to all sectors.
 3. Use schools, media, and other avenues to disseminate the guidelines nationwide.
 4. Local government units, with the technical support from government agencies and professionals, should identify potential risks and hazards in their area of jurisdiction.
 5. Homeowners associations, barangays, and municipalities should establish teams intended for disaster response. Members should identify their capabilities and assign tasks that can best fit their expertise.
 6. All volunteers should be provided with protective gear, tools, and equipment while responding to disasters.
 7. Learn from the experiences of other cities and countries in providing solutions related to health, safety, and environment.