



Country Studies on Mainstreaming Drug Control

Myanmar

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Executive summary

Key Findings

1. *Trends.* There are credible reports that poppy cultivation, and production, has rapidly declined over the last 8 years. From 2006 – 2007 there has been an increase in poppy production. South and East Shan State are the main producers.
2. *Policy coherence.* Drug Control (DC) policy is largely incoherent in Myanmar. This has had dire humanitarian consequences on its population.
3. *Controversies.* There are many examples of controversies surrounding DC in Myanmar. There are considerable tensions between DC targets achieved through compressed and time-bound poppy bans and development objectives.
4. *Experiences with mainstreaming.* The Kokang and Wa Initiative (KOWI) represents an effort to bring coherence and coordination to multi-sectoral integrated programming in a poppy-growing area. It is evolving into an organisation that could support mainstreaming in a strategic manner. Mainstreaming is happening in a promising, albeit embryonic fashion, from the demand-side. There has been an encouraging expansion of Harm Reduction (HR) programs in the last few years. Mainstreaming is perhaps best exemplified by a contemporary shift from HR to a 'Drugs and Society' approach.
5. *'Mainstreaming without a stream'.* Government of the Union of Myanmar (GOUM) expenditure on social sector spending is amongst the lowest in the world. Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in Myanmar is very limited. It is problematic, perhaps impossible, to mainstream in a meaningful fashion without social sectors to mainstream through.
6. *Dedicated funding.* Allocations of funding to supply-side initiatives are miniscule. Allocations to HR and Drug Demand Reduction (DDR) are more generous but radically inadequate to deal with the scale and magnitude of needs.

Key Recommendations

1. *ODA.* Increase ODA for social development sectors with great urgency. This will avert a humanitarian crisis. In addition, increased financing for social development sectors provides programs through which drugs mainstreaming can be achieved.
2. *ODA allocated to DC and development.* Allocate ODA to DC measures. In contemporary Myanmar DC, from the supply-side, is receiving radically inadequate funding allocations.
3. A multi-sectoral, multi-institutional partnership should be established in South and East Shan State where there are upward poppy cultivation/production trends. Its goal would be similar to KOWI's in Wa and Kokang.
4. There should be a move away from the politicisation of DC. Efforts should be made to ensure that DC is more humane, evidence based and depoliticised.
5. The 'Drugs and Society' approach should be supported and funded.

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Burnet Institute – Myanmar kindly hosted a workshop with partners to discuss mainstreaming.

Caveat

The majority of Key Informants and respondents referred to in this document are not mentioned by name to maintain anonymity. Typically they are referred to by the category of institution they belong to in order to provide some context.

Disclaimer

This paper does not represent the views of FAO Myanmar, UNODC Myanmar, FAO, UNODC, EC, BMZ or GTZ. The author has tried to represent the views of all respondents and positions in as balanced a way as possible. Analysis, conclusions and recommendations reflect the author's interpretation of respondent's opinions. Errors, mistakes and omissions are the responsibility of the author.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

<i>3D</i>	Three Diseases Fund
<i>AD</i>	Alternative Development
<i>AHRN</i>	Asia Harm Reduction Network
<i>AL</i>	Alternative Livelihoods
<i>AMI</i>	Aide Medicale Internationale
<i>ARHP</i>	Asia Regional HIV Project
<i>ATS</i>	Amphetamine Type Substances
<i>AusAID</i>	Government of Australia's Donor Agency
<i>BI-MM</i>	Burnet Institute – Myanmar
<i>CB</i>	Capacity Building
<i>CBO</i>	Community-based organisation
<i>CCDAC</i>	Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control
<i>CHR</i>	Centre for Harm Reduction
<i>DDR</i>	Drug Demand Reduction
<i>DFID</i>	Department for International Development. Government of United Kingdom.
<i>DC</i>	Drug Control
<i>EC</i>	European Commission
<i>ECHO</i>	European Commission Humanitarian Organisation
<i>FHAM</i>	Fund for HIV/AIDS Myanmar
<i>GOUN</i>	Government of the Union of Myanmar
<i>HR</i>	Harm Reduction
<i>IDPs</i>	Internally Displaced Persons
<i>INGO</i>	International Non Governmental Organisation
<i>JICA</i>	Japan International Cooperation Agency
<i>KIO</i>	Kachin Independence Organisation
<i>KOWI</i>	Kokang-Wa Initiative
<i>LNDO</i>	Lahu National Development Organisation
<i>MANA</i>	Myanmar Anti-Narcotics Association
<i>MAS</i>	Myanmar Agricultural Service
<i>MdM</i>	Medecins Du Monde
<i>MOAI</i>	Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation
<i>MoH</i>	Ministry of Health
<i>NAP</i>	National HIV/AIDS Program
<i>PRC</i>	People's Republic of China
<i>PWO</i>	The Palaung Women's Organisation
<i>SC-MM</i>	Save the Children – Myanmar
<i>S.H.A.N.</i>	Shan Herald Agency for News
<i>TA</i>	Technical Assistance
<i>TNI</i>	Transnational Institute
<i>ToR</i>	Terms of Reference
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNDP</i>	United Nations Development Program
<i>UNODC</i>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<i>UWSA</i>	United Wa State Army
<i>UWSP</i>	United Wa State Party
<i>WADP</i>	Wa Alternative Development Project
<i>WCC</i>	Wa Central Committee
<i>WHO</i>	World Health Organisation

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<i>Ceasefire group</i>	A term given for insurgent groups that have come to an accord with the Burmese regime. The ceasefires are not formal political settlements. Generally ceasefire groups keep their armies, retain some administrative control in their areas and engage in some independent economic activities.
<i>Political entrepreneur</i>	Individual who uses political and economic resources to achieve objectives.

1. Introduction

The objectives of this paper are outlined in *Section 10.1. Annex 1. Terms of Reference*. The structure and key questions addressed in this paper appear in *Section 10.2. Annex 2. Guiding Questions*.

1.1. Methodology

The information appearing in this paper was generated through a rapid process of data collection and analysis. The review was based on a two-stage process. Initially, a literature review was conducted by the consultant. Subsequently the consultant deployed a flexible semi-structured interview schedule in discussions with key informants.

1.2. Process of Enquiry

The opinions of approximately 50 individuals were elicited with regard to the key questions outlined in the Terms of Reference (ToR) (Section 10.1. Annex 1. Terms of Reference). Around 40 individuals were interviewed in face-to-face interview contexts (or in small groups). The remaining 10 individuals provided their opinions/perspectives in a participatory workshop¹. Sampling was purposive, aiming to access a cross-section of actors, perspectives and positions vis-à-vis Drug Control (DC) policy.

Interviews were conducted with the following categories of actors: GOUM, UN Agencies, donors, a representative of the Embassy of People's Republic of China (PRC), INGOs, NGOs (both based in Myanmar and working cross-border from Thailand) and independent experts/academics. In total the views of 50 individuals from 30 organisations were solicited.

2. Illegal Drug Economy: Introduction and Context

A number of caveats should be articulated prior to this analysis. Robust, and credible data, does exist with regard to poppy cultivation (hectares, yield, production etc) (UNODC/CCDAC, 2006). However, robust and credible data does not exist for: (i) the illicit Amphetamine Type Substance (ATS) trade²; (ii) the illicit opiate processing and trafficking arena (Shan Herald Agency for News (S.H.A.N), 2007); (iii) the licit economy (Save the Children - Myanmar (SC-MM), 2006); Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007; European Commission (EC), 2007). Given the disputed nature of data concerning both key dimensions of the licit and illicit economy any description of the situation for drugs will remain incomplete.

¹ Kindly organised and coordinated by Burnet Institute (Myanmar)

² Based on a conversation with UNODC's Regional Illicit Crop Monitoring Expert about the closed, opaque and criminalised nature of the ATS market.

2.1. Size, Impact and Trends

2.1.1. Size of illegal drugs economy (2006)³⁴

2.1.1.1. Opium

Cultivation (ha.). Opium poppy cultivation decreased from 130,300 ha in 1998 to 81,400 in 2002 and 21,500 ha in 2006. This is a reduction of 83% (from 1998-2006) and a 34% reduction in 1 year (2005-2006). This represents an enormous reduction within a radically compressed time-frame. There has been a 29% increase in cultivation from 2006 (21,500 ha) – 2007 (27,700 ha) (UNODC, 2007). In Shan State alone there has been a 23% increase in cultivation (20,500 – 25,300 ha). 65% of the total area under poppy cultivation is situated in South Shan State. 25% of the total area under poppy cultivation is situated in East Shan State. The increase in South Shan State is significant.

Production (MT). There was an aggregate reduction of production from 1,300 MT (in 1996) to 315 MT (in 2006). This represents a substantial reduction of 76%. From 2005 to 2006 there was a reported increase of 1% (312 to 315 MT). The increase resulted from improved yields. From 2006 (315 MT) – 2007 (460MT) there has been a 46% increase in production (UNODC, 2007).

Total revenue. The total potential value of opium production in Myanmar for the year 2006 is calculated at USD\$ 72 million. In 2007, the figure is \$USD 120 million (UNODC, 2007).

Households involved in Poppy. In 2005 193,000 households were involved in opium cultivation. In 2006 the figure reduced by 34% to 126,500 households. This equates to a reduction of 965,000 to 632,500 people being involved in opium cultivation. In the historical centre of poppy cultivation (Shan State) the number of households involved in poppy cultivation plummeted from 181,000 to 120,000 households. The number of households involved in cultivation increased substantially from 2006 – 2007. In 2006 126,500 households were involved in poppy cultivation. In 2007 (UNODC, 2007), the figure is 163,000 (an increase of 29%). An estimated 815,000 people are therefore involved in poppy cultivation. Most of them are living in South, and to a lesser extent, East Shan (UNODC, 2007).

Consumption. In 2006 UNODC (2006) estimated that opium consumption, and addiction, remained high in areas of production. Figures furnished by UNODC indicate a range from 0.60% of the total adult population in Shan State to 0.72% in Kachin State and up to 0.83% in the Wa region⁵. Baldwin (2006) estimates that there were between 250,000 – 400,000 drug users in Myanmar in 2004.

2.1.1.2. ATS

About 700 million tablets are thought to be transported from Myanmar (2005) across the border into Thailand, corresponding to about 20 tons of methamphetamine or 7.5% of global manufacture⁶ (TNI, Triangle). The total revenue derived from the sale of 700 million tablets has not been assessed within the parameters of this consultancy. The UNODC's press release statement placed in the public domain with the 2007 'Opium poppy cultivation in South East Asia' Report emphasises that '...a reduction in opium cultivation has been offset by more lucrative methamphetamine

³ All data concerning the size of the illicit drugs economy regarding opium is based on UNODC (2006 & 2007) data.

⁵ It should be emphasised that many actors within GOUM are uncomfortable with these statistics and dispute them.

⁶ These figures may no longer be accurate (in contemporary Myanmar).

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production'. This suggests that ATS production should be of increasing concern to the international community and GOUM.

2.1.1.3. Licit economy

In the fiscal year (2006-07) Myanmar's licit export revenue reached US\$5.01 billions (Htet Aung, 2007).

The total potential value of opium production in Myanmar was \$US 72 million in 2006. Opium would have constituted 1.4% of the value of total licit revenue in 2006. In 2007, production was valued at \$US 120 million. Opium would constitute 2.8% of the value of total licit revenue in 2007. This is a doubling in one year.

2.2. Descriptive Account of Illicit Drugs Economy & Actors

Cultivation. The main illicit narcotic drug derived through cultivation is opium poppy (UNODC, 2007). Principle areas of cultivation, in 2007, included: Shan State and to a much lesser extent Kachin State (UNODC, 2007). Most land cultivated in poppy was in South Shan State and East Shan State (UNODC, 2007). Poppy cultivation bans were implemented in SR1 (Kokang) in 2003 and in SR2 (Wa) in 2005 (UNODC, 2006.)

Processing. Opium is processed into heroin and ATS is produced in Myanmar. ATS and heroin processing and trafficking operate within the arena of opaque and tightly controlled criminal networks. They are processed/trafficked in border zones, areas of multiple or local *de facto* autonomous political control and in areas associated with chronic and acute violent conflict. Processing/trafficking happens in areas controlled by insurgents, militias and zones of military occupation. Trafficking is dispersed across many economic agents (Yawnghwe, 2005; Fabre, 2005; Pathan, 2005).

Consumption. Opium, heroin and amphetamines are consumed in Myanmar. (Baldwin, 2006). Opium was traditionally the illicit drug of choice. Opium has, over recent years, been overshadowed by heroin and to a lesser extent ATS is becoming popular (Baldwin, 2006; TNI, 2006).

Heroin is the dominant drug in Kachin State, Northern Shan State and in the large cities. Opium is mostly used in Eastern and Southern Shan State and in Kayah state. (TNI, 2006). ATS is consumed in urban areas and is a pervasive and growing trend in areas of intense economic activity (mines, transit areas, casino towns, logging areas). Heroin is similarly being consumed in areas of intense economic activity (Schuele, 2007; Schuele and Theuss, 2007). Opium use is correlated with areas of cultivation and is associated with inaccessibility, remoteness and marginalisation (Schuele, 2007; Schuele and Theuss, 2007).

Profiles of drug-use are informed by diverse demographic, socio-economic and socio-professional factors. Drug use is more prevalent amongst the 'youth' (Schuele, 2007; Schuele and Theuss, 2007). It is associated with certain socio-professional groups (miners, truckers, fishermen, sex-workers, construction workers and migrants) (Baldwin, 2006; TNI, 2006; Schuele and Theuss, 2007). Drug use is more prevalent among ethnic minority groups (Kachin, Shan, Lahu, Paluang) (The Palaung Women's Organisation (PWO), 2006). Poor, vulnerable and marginalised communities living in remote, inaccessible, rural areas and in peri-urban/urban zones are significantly more likely to consume illicit drugs (TNI, 2006).

At an aggregate level the number of drug users in Myanmar has increased dramatically (TNI, 2006).

2.3. Causes and Consequences of the Drug Economy

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A deep analysis of the causes and consequence of the drug economy is not possible within the space constraints of this paper. The principle factor driving the drug economy is institutionalised conflict situated within a broader political ‘complex’ and system of governance (South, 2007; Smith, 1991).

3. Policy Framework: Policies and Institutions

3.1. Drug-control Agencies, Institutions and Actors

3.1.1. National

Central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC). CCDAC's principle responsibility relates to drug control. CCDAC is a coordinating secretariat. CCDAC was structured to work with relevant Ministries to ensure a coordinated approach to the elimination of narcotic drugs (UNODC/WA Project, 2004). Under the leadership of CCDAC a 15 year narcotics elimination plan started its first phase in 1999 to be completed in 2014 (UNODC/WA Project, 2004).

In 1989, the GOUM initiated various drug control measures for a nation wide ‘New Destiny’ program. The program attracted 200 million Kyat (about \$US 146,000 at the market rate and \$US 28.5 million at the ‘formal’ rate) to provide alternatives for opium farmers (UNODC/WA Project, 2004).

Ministry for Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs. Progress of Border Areas and National Races Department (PBANRDA/NaTaLa). On the national level NaTaLa⁷ has the first responsibility for the coordination of development activities within the country's remote (predominantly ethnic minority) areas. One of NaTaLa's key objectives is: ‘Eradicate totally the cultivation of poppy plants by establishing economic enterprises’ (Progress of Border Areas and National Races Department (PBANRDA/NaTaLa), 2007).

NaTaLa finances and implements most projects independently. However, a key function of NaTaLa is to provide coordination to multi-ministerial programming in border areas⁸. Up until end of August 2007 NaTaLa had implemented/overseen programs valued at 109.432.000.000 Kyats (which is \$USD 84 USD Million at the market rate or \$USD 15.6 Billion at the formal/legal rate) (NaTaLa, 2007). Approximately 60% comes from NaTaLa budget and the remaining from other ministries (NaTaLa, 2007).

Ministry of Health (MoH). MoH houses the National HIV/AIDs Program (NAP) which is a key player in the Public Health policy/strategy response to risky drug-use (Government of Union of Myanmar (GOUM) (2006)).

Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MOAI). Myanmar Agriculture Service (MAS). Crop Substitution Sector. A major focus of MAS as a Department within the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation (MOAI) is the “crops substitution sector” (Myanmar Agriculture Service Crop Substitution Sector, 2006). A key mechanism for achieving its objectives is agricultural extension⁹.

⁷ This document refers to the ministry as ‘NaTaLa’ which is the more catchy Myanmar acronym (in comparison to PBANRDA).

⁸ Based on an interview with U Aye Lwin (Director, Ministry of Progress of Border Areas and National Races and Development Affairs).

⁹ Based on an interview with U San Nyunt (General Manager, Seed Division, Myanmar Agricultural Services (MAS). Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation) and U Maung Muang Yi (General Manager, Planning Division, MAS).

3.1.2. International

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). UNODC is limited by its mandate to drug demand issues and decreasing opium cultivation through development means, and does not have the remit to intervene in wider law enforcement context (TNI, 2003). UNODC took the lead role in a long-term Alternative Development project in Wa (Mong Pawk district). The project started in 1999 and terminated in 2005 (Renard *et al.*, 2003). In light of its mandate and experience UNODC served as coordinating body in a Wa and Kokang multi-sectoral approach (Kokang and Wa Initiative (KOWI)) described further in the text (KOWI/UNODC, 2005).

In recent years UNODC has suffered from declining funding. The decline in funding started in 2005 when a federal district court in New York indicated 8 Wa leaders (for alleged drug-related crimes). When the Wa allegedly issued death threats against three DEA officials in Myanmar, (according to the State Department), the State Department cut off funding to UNODC without providing a comprehensive explanation for the cessation of funding.

Given this context of declining funding, UNODC has reoriented itself strategically. In Wa, UNODC is changing its role to coordinating KOWI and facilitating the exchange of information and data collection among the many agencies there. DDR has ceased being implemented. However AD is continuing. UNODC is partnering with WFP's PRRO. This will involve the organisation of village work and training for which WFP will give 1,600 Metric Tons of rice.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). UNDP does not have a drug related mandate, experience or expertise (UNDP: Myanmar, 2007). However, it is envisaged that UNDP will play a lead role in coordinating integrated development in Wa. At this point in time UNDP has no presence in Wa¹⁰.

World Food Program (WFP). WFP is a key player in the project post-eradication food assistance to poor ex-poppy growing households in Shan. WFP has, since August 2003, targeted significant resources to Shan State.

Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA). One of JICA's key national foci is counter-narcotics (JICA, 2007a). JICA has established a 'Project for the Eradication of Opium Poppy Cultivation and Poverty Reduction in Kokang Special Region No 1'. JICA has played a key coordinating role in the KOWI framework in Kokang SR1. Japan is Myanmar's largest bilateral donor (UNIDO, 2006; JICA, 2007b; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007).

Kokang and Wa Initiative (KOWI). In 2002 UNODC/JICA agreed to take a lead in supporting the entry of aid agencies to poppy growing regions (Kokang Special Region 1 (SR1) and Wa Special Region 2 (SR2)). The KOWI programme developed as a single coordinating framework. Its goals were to meet the basic humanitarian needs of former opium farmers and their families. KOWI consists of nine substantive sectoral interventions.

The Three Diseases Fund (3D). In response to the public health crisis in Burma, a number of mostly European donors decided to create a new mechanism: the Three Diseases Fund (known widely as the 'The 3D Fund' is meant solely to combat malaria, TB and HIV/AIDS in Burma) (Three Diseases Fund, 2006). One of its aims at purpose-level is: 'to reduce transmission and enhance provision of treatment and care for HIV/AIDS affected persons'. The duration of fund is 60 months and its indicative budget is \$US 99.5 million (TNI, 2006)

¹⁰ Based on discussions with two senior managers within UNDP.

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People's Republic of China (PRC). PRC and CCDAC have cooperated in implementing an annual poppy survey¹¹. PRC cooperates with GOUM in cross-border law enforcement activities. China has donated 10,000 MT of wheat to Wa and Kokang to reduce food insecurity during the post-ban/eradication phase (UNODC/Wa Project, 2004). PRC Government has facilitated the entry of macro-level private initiatives in Wa and Kokang (UNODC/Wa Project, 2004). These interventions are situated within a broader AD framework (Renard *et al.*, 2004).

Burnet Institute (BI-MM). BI-MM has for several years been providing Technical Assistance (TA) and Capacity Building (CB) for Implementing Partners involved in Harm Reduction programming. Its HR focus is now expanding to focus on a 'Drugs and Society' approach (Theuss, 2007).

INGOs working in HR. There are several INGOs programming in the field of HR. They include: CARE (Australia), Asia Harm Reduction Network (AHRN), Asia Regional Harm Reduction Project (HARP) and Medecins du Monde (MdM) (Theuss, 2007).

3.1.3. Civil Society¹²

Myanmar Anti-Narcotics Association (MANA). MANA's goal is a 'drugs free society'. MANA has a very focused DC mandate with a varied, and complex, programme architecture (Harm Reduction, Demand Reduction, Advocacy, Behavior Change etc)¹³.

Myanmar Business Coalition on AIDS (MBCA). MBCA support continuing expansion of private sector workplace interventions that focus on drug related harm in workplace settings (BI-MM, 2005).

Metta Foundation. Metta is engaged in participatory rural development programs throughout Myanmar. Metta is inserting HR initiatives into its rural development programs to deal with articulated demands from communities affected by drug-abuse¹⁴.

3.1.4. Local Authorities

United Wa State Party (UWSP) – Wa Authority. In 1990 the UWSP Central Authority (henceforth referred to as Wa Authority (WA)) formulated a 15 year strategic plan to eliminate narcotics (Milsom, 2005). In 2003, Wa SR2, was responsible for 40% of opium production in Myanmar (TNI, 2005). In 2005 WA enforced a total ban on poppy cultivation. Wa SR2 is now poppy free (UNODC, 2006).

According to the cease-fire agreement negotiated between the Wa and the GOUM in 1989, the WA directly control the region operating through its Central Authority with branches including Agriculture, Treasury, Health, Politics (including education) and external relations (Renard *et al.*, 2003).

It is difficult to assess the resources/financing of the WA. The Wa Authority is run as a quasi-feudal entity underpinned by asymmetrical client-patron relations¹⁵.

¹¹ Based on discussions with Police Colonel Hkam Awng (Joint Secretary, Central Committee for Drugs Abuse Control (CCDAC)) and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe (Deputy Director, International Relations Department (CCDAC)).

¹² For a stimulating discussion and empirical investigation into Civil Society in Myanmar see Heidel (2006).

¹³ Based on discussions with former Country Director of BI-MM acting as a long-term consultant to MANA.

¹⁴ Based on a presentation by METTA at workshop concerning drugs mainstreaming.

¹⁵ Based on a discussion with a former UNODC employee who worked in Wa.

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Kokang Authorities. Kokang's Authorities implemented a radical poppy ban in 2003 (South, 2006). The ban was monitored and enforced in collaboration with the GOUM.

Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). KIO have implemented poppy bans (in 1991) in combination with limited crop-substitution projects (TNI, 2005).

Other local administrations. The New Democratic Army-Kachin (NDK-A) in Kachin State, Shan State Army South (SSA-South) among many others have engaged in drug bans, eradication and mass detoxification schemes. These efforts have largely been ignored by the international community (TNI, 2005).

3.2. Policy: Coherence, Coordination and Capacities

Drug policy is largely incoherent and uncoordinated in Myanmar. This assertion can be applied to both supply and demand components of drug policy.

3.2.1. Policy incoherence

From the supply perspective compressed poppy bans and time-bound eradication are not coherent with development and humanitarian objectives (TNI, 2005, South, 2006; South, 2006; SC-MM, 2006; UNODC, 2005).

A poppy ban in Kokang SR 1, in 2003, represented a radical shock to the livelihoods of ex poppy farmers in Kokang (TNI, 2005, South, 2006; South, 2006; SC-MM, 2006; UNODC, 2005). The social and economic consequences of a complete ban in Wa SR 2 have not yet been satisfactorily researched¹⁶. However, micro-studies suggest that the impact of the ban has been 'serious' (FAO, 2007).

In Kokang, household incomes have reduced drastically as a result of the ban (South, 2006). Food insecurity has reduced as a result (SC-MM, 2006). There has been mass out-migration from Kokang to cope with livelihood shocks (South, 2006; South, 2007). Children have been taken out of school for lack of means to pay private educational services. Chinese service providers have left Kokang with an assortment of negative effects on the socio-economic status of local residents (South, 2006). The ban was described by one senior UN official respondent as a 'man-made humanitarian crisis'¹⁷. The ban was therefore incoherent with regard to humanitarian and development policies and objectives. The ban was punitive and inhumane.

In Kokang and Wa, the ban was implemented by local authorities to assure credibility with, and in the light of pressure from: neighbouring countries (PRC, Thailand), the United States and to some very limited extent GOUM (Milsom, 2006). Local authorities additionally championed opium bans to be 'modern' and attract humanitarian and development assistance from the international community (Renard *et al.*, 2003). For the WA the ban was also associated with a nascent, probably misguided, experience of modern state-building¹⁸. It should be emphasised that the WA decided to enact the poppy ban largely on their own initiative. GOUM was encouraging a phased reduction (with a final poppy-free status to be reached in 2014). UNODC did not propose the idea to the Wa Authorities although the initiation of UNODC programs may have emboldened the Wa Authorities to enact the ban in compressed time-windows.

Poppy bans have, from a policy-perspective, been comprehensively incoherent. This policy incoherence has had troubling and radical impacts on ex-poppy farmers and their communities.

¹⁶ Based on an interview with a frustrated donor representative in Yangon.

¹⁷ Based on an interview with an experienced, knowledgeable and senior UN staff member.

¹⁸ Based on an interview with Ashley South (academic and freelance consultant).

There are several other examples of policy incoherence which cannot be explored in much depth because of space constraints. They include: (i) the forced migration of more than 100,000 Wa poppy-growing farmers by WA in the name of Alternative Development (S.H.A.N./LNDO, 2002; South, 2006; South, 2007). The forced migration resulted in the deaths of several thousand migrants and the infringements of their basic rights¹⁹; (ii) the legality, or otherwise, of Harm Reduction programs (TNI, 2006)²⁰.

At a macro-policy level, China and Thailand's drug policy largely revolves around ensuring border security, internal stability and law-enforcement. The US politicises drugs policy (TNI, 2006; Milsom, 2005). Despite a radical reduction in poppy cultivation in Myanmar over the last 8 years and the cooperation of GOUM with the US Government in poppy surveys, the GOUM has still not been 'certified' (TNI, 2005)²¹. The GOUM's strategic focus on supply reduction through punitive bans and eradication results from international pressures (particularly the US) to demonstrate willingness and determination to fight the 'evil of drugs'²². The GOUM's emphasis on supply-level policies/strategies is probably therefore best understood as being politically inspired, rather than focused on the development concerns of its citizens²³.

Drugs Policy is therefore a tragic victim of international political machinations and incoherence. Policy-makers and members of the elite, (international, GOUM and Local Authorities), do not suffer from these machinations or incoherence. Many hundreds of ex-poppy farmers, drug users (and their families) and rural citizens living in former poppy growing areas bear the brunt of this policy incoherence.

3.2.2. Policy Coherence

Whilst drugs policy is largely incoherent there have been national, regional and local-level initiatives to encourage coherence. These should be understood as islands of coherence in an ocean of drug policy incoherence.

The UN's Strategic Framework aims to "create conditions for the sustainable reduction of illicit drugs" through an integrated strategic architecture underpinned by a thematic and 'mainstreamed' approach (UN Agencies Myanmar, 2005). KOWI represents a key effort to bring coherence to counter-narcotics programming through a multi-sectoral, multi-institutional coordination mechanism (KOWI/UNODC, 2005). 3D is a multi-donor, pooled fund, designed to develop a comprehensive strategic policy position on the three most serious communicable diseases in Myanmar, including HIV (Three Diseases Fund, 2006). The National Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDs provides a comprehensive framework for strategy and policy (GOUM, 2006).

¹⁹ It is important to point out that Mae Fah Luang Foundation (Thai Organisation) established a project to help those that were forced to migrate through the 'Doi Tung 2 Project'. The project was initiated on the basis of the personal invitation of the GOUM. The project was active for 1-2 years and then ceased.

²⁰ Based on an interview with Police Colonel Hkam Awng and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe.

²¹ It should be noted that the Consultant does not have the 'full' picture with regard to certification. The Consultant and representatives of the DEA in Yangon attempted to meet on multiple occasions. Various factors intervened to make the meetings unfeasible. Therefore this report is somewhat incomplete and has **not** integrated a full understanding of the DEA's perspective or the US Government more generally. This is a **limitation** of the report.

²² Based on several interviews with representatives from UN, donor, INGO and academic community.

²³ Interpretation/analysis of the Consultant.

3.3. Controversies

In Myanmar, controversies are evident not only in all dimensions of DC policy but are manifest at the much more profound level of development discourses and International Relations more generally. Both the politicisation of ODA and the polarisation of IR ensure that drug-policy unfolds within a problematic and controversial policy-landscape.

Eradication and poppy-bans are controversial. Whilst they achieve DC cultivation/production objectives they do so with disastrous humanitarian impacts and at the cost of poor rural inhabitants and ex-poppy farmers (SC-MM, 2006).

AD has often been subject to controversies. AD is seen as essential in averting a humanitarian crisis by development actors (UN, INGOs etc), local authorities and GOUM. However, the local understandings and variants of AD as practiced by local authorities has often been practiced in a punitive fashion and with dire socio-economic outcomes (S.H.A.N./LNDO, 2002).

Poppy cultivation and production trends are a hotly disputed and controversial area in Myanmar. CCDAC and UNODC provide robust data indicating that there have been substantial reductions in poppy cultivation in Myanmar over the last 8 years (UNODC, 2006). Critics claim that this data is flawed (S.H.A.N., 2007)²⁴. They believe that the data for 1999 (provided by USG) was over-inflated for political reasons (S.H.A.N., 2007). Technical experts (who wish to remain anonymous) are willing to concede that the data for 1999 was not derived through 'proper surveys'. Thus the radical downward trend could be understood to be a function of an over-inflated starting-point rather than a radical downward trend (S.H.A.N., 2007). It is important to emphasise that even if the 1999 data was over-inflated there has still been a decreasing trend in poppy cultivation. The decreasing trend was considered to be significant amongst most respondents.

There is considerable controversy surrounding different readings and interpretations of the UNODC/CCDAC 2006 poppy report (UNODC/CCDAC, 2006). A careful reading of the report indicates that UNODC/CCDAC do not make the claim that GOUM controlled areas were poppy free and areas of poppy cultivation were in the hands of ethnic ceasefire groups (UNODC, 2006). However critics, (predominantly political groups working cross-border from Thailand who access these insecure areas and in some cases conduct alternative surveys), read and interpret the report in a highly critical manner. These critics assert that UNODC/CCDAC does make the claim that GOUM controlled areas were poppy free and areas of poppy cultivation were in the hands of ethnic ceasefire groups. Critics claim, based on their own reading/interpretation of the text, that this assessment is flawed (S.H.A.N., 2007; Palaung Women's Organisation, 2006)²⁵. They assert that many areas controlled by so-called ethnic ceasefire groups are actually under the control of militia who are GOUM proxies (Macan-Markar, 2007).

There are controversies over what are the driving factors behind poppy cultivation/production reductions. Some (CCDAC and UNODC) stress that it results from GOUM and Local Authorities DC measures. Others believe that global market factors are responsible (Jelsma, 2005).

²⁴ Based on discussions with NGOs and political groups working from Chiang Mai (Thailand) along the Thai/Myanmar border.

²⁵ Based on discussions with NGOs/political groups based in Chiang Mai.

HR is controversial. On the one hand it reduces risk and harm for the individual drug user (TNI, 2006). On the other hand it is understood to be illegal and contradictory to the norms and social mores of Myanmar²⁶.

3.4. Drug-control: PRSP, CAS and International Loans

GOUM and international community have neither implemented a PRSP nor formulated a CAS (European Commission, 2007). The World Bank and ADB have not provided any new loans since 1989. This was because GOUM was in arrears. Neither the World Bank nor ADB have a presence in the country (European Commission, 2007). IMF comes to assess the economic situation on a yearly basis. Its assessments have been hampered by the absence of 'reliable official economic data' (Department for International Development (DFID), 2004).

4. Mainstreaming: Experiences, Potentials & Constraints

4.1. Experiences of Mainstreaming

4.1.1. GOUM

NaTaLa's coordinating role and structure is conducive to mainstreaming. It coordinates multi-sectoral and programmatic inputs/programmes through a multi-ministerial architecture. A key objective is poppy-eradication within that broad multi-sectoral framework. From a policy architecture perspective this constitutes mainstreaming from a functional and logical perspective.

CCDAC has a coordinating secretariat function overseeing DC through a multi-ministerial architecture. Similarly to NaTaLa this coordinating function and multi-sectoral architecture is conducive to mainstreaming in formal/functional terms.

A range of GOUM ministries, (MAS, MoH, MoE, MoHA, Ministry of Labour, Ministry of Religious Affairs etc), include objectives and programmes relating to DC. Through coordination meetings with CCDAC and NaTaLa their budget prioritisation is available, in formal terms, to mainstreaming agendas.

Moving from a formal analysis of structures, roles and architectures to an empirical analysis of concrete reality provides a different perspective²⁷.

There are few robust examples of mainstreaming within the GOUM. CCDAC's approach to HR is inspired by a broader development-focused approach to DC policy. With the exception of this notable example DC policy is not mainstreamed in practice. CCDAC is clear that the GOUM emphasis is on "supply-elimination", rather than DDR, HR, AL, AD or a developmentally-framed approach to drug policy²⁸.

NaTaLa's key preoccupation is state-penetration in remote ethnic minority controlled areas through winning hearts-and-minds via 'hard' development interventions (bridges, roads etc)²⁹. This is not a comprehensive or integrated approach to development nor development-oriented drug-policy.

MAS's approach is focused on crop-substitution, seed security and food security. Whilst a helpful approach, the complex household decision-making associated with cropping trends and managing risk is not integrated into this somewhat simplistic seed-centric intervention.

²⁶ Based on a reading of Theuss (2007).

²⁷ Assessment of the Consultant.

²⁸ Based on an interview with Police Colonel Hkam Awng and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe.

²⁹ Based on discussions with several I-NGO representatives working in border areas.

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From a pragmatic perspective it should be pointed out that none of the above ministries have the financial wherewithal to translate formal objectives into meaningful drug mainstreamed programs (let alone to deal with basic development priorities or even humanitarian basics)³⁰. The international community is largely unwilling to provide financial assistance to support in this endeavour for political reasons.

4.1.2. KOWI

KOWI is an effective partnership incorporating elements of mainstreamed DC programming. The partnership model provides a framework for multi-sectoral, integrated and long-term development strategies to be implemented. Whilst the majority of partners had no interest in DC *per se*³¹ their work contributes to improved socio-economic conditions and provides increased access to services (UNODC/Wa Project, 2005). These contributions have provided the ex-poppy farmers of Wa/Kokang with important, albeit inadequate³² (given the magnitude of need) support in the light of livelihood shocks induced by the ban.

4.1.3. UNODC

The UNODC/Wa project deployed an integrated Alternative Development model associated with multi-sectoral interventions situated within a formally community-based, participatory approach (UNODC/Wa Project, 2005). In terms of programme design it therefore had elements of 'mainstreaming'.

Whilst programmes were multi-sectoral and integrated in design, UNODC found it difficult to establish a community-based, participatory planning and monitoring process at first (Renard *et al.*, 2003). This was largely because the Wa Authorities were hierarchical and centralised in their development approach and partly a result of UNODC's somewhat fragmented approach to programming from the village-perspective in initial phases of programming. Interventions at village level were initially largely "one-off" uni-sectoral initiatives (Renard *et al.*, 2003).

Since this initial phase of intervention both the programmatic approach and sustainability of initiatives have improved substantially. There was a recognition within UNODC that AD interventions 'were not likely to greatly benefit the poor, ex-poppy growers...[because]... the Wa Authorities (WA)...do not seem to believe in, and/or do not practice in the field, the principles of self-help, self-sustainable, village-based participatory development.'³³ Moreover, it was acknowledged that large-scale programs were neither likely to be successful in Wa nor sustainable because of high and chronic levels of rent-seeking within the WA. UNODC have therefore promoted small-scale village level initiatives (notably the promotion of increased village/household rice production and small-scale irrigation scheme development). Small-scale interventions have been promoted by UNODC because they do not require support from WA, and are therefore at a significantly lesser risk of being controlled by WA. This reduces the possibility for WA rent-seeking and substantially increases the sustainability of village-level development interventions. The outcomes of this approach have been encouraging (Eberhardt, 2005). This approach is clearly coherent with mainstreaming because it aims to achieve DC measures through sustainable, community-level, development interventions.

³⁰ This statement is not based on hard data or evidence. Ministerial/agency budgets are not available in the public domain. However, both UN representatives and INGO respondents converged in emphasising the resource-strapped nature of these Ministries.

³¹ Based on an interview with an I-NGO Head of Mission (based in Wa).

³² Based on an interview with an experienced and senior UN manager.

³³ Unpublished note written by Trevor Gibson, former UNODC Wa Project Operations Manager.

4.1.4. GAA

GAA's Rural Development projects aim to promote sustainable livelihoods in ex-poppy growing areas. GAA is encouraging collaborative development planning processes with the Wa Authorities with the objective of encouraging a more integrated and participatory approach to decision-making among local leadership³⁴. This is a helpful step in encouraging mainstreaming.

4.1.5. Donors

There is no evidence of mainstreaming being evident in the country strategies of key donors.

4.1.6. Partnerships between INGOs and LNGOs: from Harm Reduction to the 'Drugs and Society' approach

A broad coalition of INGOs and NGOs have partnered in the last few years to initiate HR programs (BI-MM, MANA, AHRN, HARP, MDM, CARE etc). BI-MM has recently broadened its Harm Reduction approach to a more integrated non-individualistic approach to 'Society and Development' (BI-MM, 2005). The 'Drugs and Society' approach converges with a mainstreamed approach.

4.2. Potential Areas for Mainstreaming

The UN Country Strategy aims to "*create conditions for the sustainable reduction of illicit drugs*" through a multi UN Agency architecture. The programmes of FAO, WFP, UNFPA, WHO, UNDP and UNODC are entry points for achieving mainstreaming objectives (UN Agencies in Myanmar, 2005).

Whilst KOWI is still evolving, it is rapidly formulating its strategic objectives around the support of mainstreaming. UNDP could play a lead role in coordinating integrated development programmes in Wa SR2³⁵. Whilst Wa is a poppy-free zone it has the potential to return to large-scale poppy cultivation³⁶.

There are fertile opportunities for more sustained mainstreaming through UNODC in Wa. UNODC intends to coordinate KOWI and facilitate exchange of information and data collection among the many agencies there. UNODC has political clout with the Wa Authority to initiate change. It will be actively involved in establishing guidelines for income generation projects. It remains focused on building on its existing relationship with the Wa Authority to catalyse good governance. These are just some of the operational mechanisms through which programming could promote mainstreaming.

UNODC could initiate KOWI II in South Shan State. Poppy cultivation has increased in South Shan State in 2006 – 2007³⁷. SSS is still associated with instability and violent conflict. This is conducive to increased opium cultivation³⁸. Given that KOWI was a test-concept which has been successful the same approach could be attempted in SSS³⁹. KOWI II would need to be coordinated by a UNODC that provides sustained leadership in mainstreaming DC strategies and policies. Providing support to access the area, coordination and political support with local authorities for

³⁴ Based on a conversation with GAA Myanmar Head of Mission.

³⁵ Based on discussions with UNDP management.

³⁶ Based on the assessments of UN representatives and independent analysts.

³⁷ The poppy survey will be released by UNODC/CCDAC on October 15. This assertion is based on informal discussion with CCDAC, MAS and UNODC.

³⁸ Based on a discussion with a UNODC Crop Monitoring Expert.

³⁹ Based on discussions with representatives of I-NGOs programming in Wa, independent analysts, KOWI members, and UN Agencies.

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INGOs will not suffice. It needs to provide strategic and policy-level leadership particularly with regard to DC policy and mainstreaming.

Mainstreaming agendas could be realised through Metta Foundation and World Concern. Both organisations have a Rural Development focus and programme in areas associated with poppy cultivation and drug-abuse. Both organisations have initiated partnerships with BI-MM in the area of HR within the framework of a ‘Drugs and Society’ approach⁴⁰.

BI-MM, MANA and MBCA have initiated a partnership inspired by a ‘Drugs and Society’ approach (BI-MM, 2005). This provides a very concrete entry point for more active mainstreaming.

MANA will be initiating a training programme with law-enforcement agencies in the future⁴¹. Given the trust that MANA commands with GOUM this provides concrete opportunities to bring a humane, evidence-based and HR emphasis to a key state actor in Myanmar.

INGOs such as MDM, CARE, AHRN, AHRP etc could be available to integrating elements of mainstreaming into a risk framework that is largely focused on the individual as a locus of intervention. Pragmatically speaking this probably largely depends on the extent of funding being made available to promote a mainstreamed DC agenda.

Key, institutional potentials for mainstreaming are local authorities among ceasefire groups.

UN Agencies such as FAO⁴² could initiate a three-pronged initiative to: (i) strengthen the GOUM MAS bureau in autonomous areas; (ii) strengthen the Agricultural bureaus of local authorities; (iii) promote confidence building between Myanmar state actors and local authority actors in the arena of technical agricultural cooperation and dual-extension services. This would be the springboard for a later process of concerted mainstreaming.

INGOs such as GAA have already engaged in intensive collaborative development planning exercises with the Wa Authority, GOUM (in Wa SR2), community representatives and other INGOs engaged in livelihoods projects in GAA project areas. Mainstreaming could be promoted through organisations such as GAA who have demonstrated a desire for meaningful collaborative development planning with state and local authorities.

4.3. ‘Mainstreaming Without a Stream’? Constraints to Mainstreaming

One insightful respondent posed the question ‘*can you mainstream without a stream?*’. This section deals with this question.

4.3.1. Economic and financial governance

The Management of GOUM’s economic affairs is weak (European Commission, 2007). Weak state financial governance, high defence spending and a lack of fiscal discipline have been compounded by weak tax administration (SC-MM, 2006). The fiscal deficit remains amongst the highest in the region. The GOUM therefore does not have the financial resources to invest in social development and services. These are the sectors through which DC objectives are typically ‘mainstreamed’. This represents a first formidable obstacle to meaningful mainstreaming.

⁴⁰ Based on discussions with World Concern management.

⁴¹ The Consultant did not have sufficient time to explore this initiative in-depth with MANA. This information is probably therefore partial and incomplete.

⁴² Based on an interview with FAO-MM Representative Mr Tang Zhengping.

4.3.2. Strategic priorities

GOUM's priorities are 'security', 'stability', and 'integrity of the Union'. In budgetary terms this translates into 25-40% of public expenditure being allocated to the military (SC-MM, 2006). Social development is considered to be less of a priority by GOUM than defence, security and internal stability.

4.3.3. Sectoral priorities

The state of the health sector is particularly alarming. Government expenditure on health per person is the second lowest in the world (SC-MM, 2006). ARI and diarrhoea kill large numbers of children. This is a clear indication of a health system in crisis. This stems from consistently low government expenditure on health which is less than \$USD 0.5 per person per year. This is a fraction of \$USD 40 - 60 per person that WHO estimates is required to fund a minimally functional health system in developing countries (SC-MM, 2006).

In the period from 1988 to 2001/2, total public expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP fell to 1% from an already low level (2.5% of GDP in 1988) (CSO, 2002). Today less than US\$0.60 per capita is spent annually on education (UN Agencies Myanmar, 2005).

GOUM's social development ministries are therefore radically under-resourced to deal with the acute humanitarian and development needs of the population.

4.3.4. ODA

As of 2002, Myanmar was receiving about US\$121 million per year in ODA, approximately US\$2.5 per capita annually, far less than any other country in the region (International Crisis Group, 2002). For example, Laos and Cambodia, which rank near Myanmar on UNDP's Human Development Index both receive about 20 times the per capita assistance given to Myanmar (SC-MM, 2006; UNDP, 2006). In 2002, Myanmar received 10 times less than Zimbabwe (DFID, 2004). In absolute, and relative terms, Myanmar loses out in the ODA arena.

Whilst Myanmar citizens live in poverty and its social development sector is poorly financed the international community are only willing to finance social sector programming in a very limited and constrained fashion (DFID, 2004).

4.3.5. Mainstreaming without a stream?

DC mainstreaming typically is understood to operate through state, and non-state, planning mechanisms and instruments (e.g. budgets). Mainstreaming operates by promoting DC measures through transformed budget prioritisation (typically in social development sectors (health, education), agriculture etc).

Myanmar is a country with massive development needs, poor economic management, a preoccupation with military and internal security objectives and inadequate prioritisation of social sector objectives, few financial means for social sector spending and limited ODA. It is difficult to imagine how this combination of factors could translate into a meaningful context for mainstreaming through the state⁴³.

One route out of this conundrum is increased ODA being allocated directly to the state for the social development sector. This is unlikely to be appealing to most donors for political reasons.

⁴³ Based on a conversation with a senior UN Official.

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A second route out of this conundrum is to mainstream through UN Agencies, INGOs and civil society. Overall levels of ODA to Myanmar are small. A substantial portion of this ODA is allocated to Health, Education, HIV, Harm Reduction and Drugs and Society programs. Mainstreaming through these sectors is therefore possible from the consumption side of DC programming. However, a tiny fraction of ODA is allocated to rural livelihoods, AD and AL⁴⁴. Therefore, mainstreaming from the supply-side appears to be considerably more difficult and less probable.

Drugs mainstreaming is therefore dependent on higher-order International Relations and Development Assistance fundamentals.

5. Drug-control Objectives & Development: Experiences & Capacities, Strengths and Weaknesses

5.1. National-level

GOUM's drug control objectives have been supply-elimination focused⁴⁵. The GOUM have been largely successful in achieving these supply-level objectives (UNODC, 2006).

The GOUM's key capacities in the arena of drug control are: monitoring, enforcement and sanction. GOUM has collaborated with PRC, USA's DEA and the UNODC to establish rigorous systems to monitor illicit crop cultivation⁴⁶. GOUM has the coercive capacities, (through the military, police and intelligence services), to enforce bans etc. In the event that bans are not enforced or respected GOUM is willing and able to discipline and sanction.

CCDAC has effective leadership⁴⁷. Key actors within CCDAC are open to outside perspectives and new ideas that originate from the international community. Its leadership is willing to champion 'new' concepts, practices and approaches which are perceived as being relevant within a Myanmar context. CCDAC leadership is adept at working as an interlocutor between different hierarchical levels of the GOUM and the international community.

CCDAC, NaTaLa, MAS and other ministries/bodies which could promote mainstreaming are under-resourced⁴⁸. CCDAC's focus is supply-elimination. NaTaLa's development activities are situated within a more broadly political state-building endeavour. Funding of social development is not a priority⁴⁹. MAS institutional systems appear weak in incentivising extension agents to distribute seed in an effective fashion.

GOUM is associated with a range of weaknesses in integrating DC objectives into development activities. These include: (i) a focus on targets rather than process; (ii) punitive approaches to DC; (iii) a top-down, paternalistic, approach to social development and DC.

GOUM is committed to drug-control particularly supply elimination (for political reasons). It is less concerned with integration of DC objectives into development.

5.2. Local Authorities

⁴⁴ One UN respondent described budget allocations as 'peanuts'.

⁴⁵ Based on an interview with Police Colonel Hkam Awng and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe.

⁴⁶ Based on an interview with Police Colonel Hkam Awng and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe.

⁴⁷ Based on discussions with several I-NGO and UN interlocutors.

⁴⁸ This assertion is not based on hard evidence given that budgets are not made available in the public domain. This is based on multiple conversations with UN and I-NGO interlocutors.

⁴⁹ Based on discussions with I-NGO interlocutors and academics.

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Local authorities have successfully implemented bans in Kokang, and Wa. Less successful bans have been implemented by local authorities in Kachin and certain areas of Shan (TNI, 2005). There are many documented examples of DDR measures being implemented by local authorities (detoxification camps etc) (TNI, 2006). Most appear to have been implemented with inadequate resources, in a punitive fashion and with no follow-up.

Local authorities have diverse and differential capacities. The UWSP (WA) have very limited 'modern' development planning and technical capacities (Renard *et al.*, 2003)⁵⁰. They have strong military and security enforcement capacities (Renard *et al.*, 2005). Its coercive enforcement and sanction capacities ensured a successful and comprehensive poppy ban in 2005 despite the ban lacking local legitimacy. The KIO has sufficient capacities to develop an embryonic, albeit dysfunctional, administrative mechanism with somewhat regularised fiscal institutions and systems. Most local authorities are somewhere between UWSP and KIO. No local authority has modern DC related capacities.

The Wa Authority is aware of its own weaknesses⁵¹. It therefore welcomes development actors from outside and encourages the transfer of technical expertise from external sources (PRC and the 'West'). The Wa Authority has effective coercive capacities with which to enforce a poppy ban. The Wa Authority has developed a keen awareness of its potential relationship with the external world (Milsom, 2005). The Wa Authority's decision to ban poppy was based on a desire to achieve international recognition and avoid opprobrium (Milsom, 2005). It has an ambitious approach to achieving policy-objectives⁵². It has territorial control of SR2, power and a monopoly over the means of violence in its territory. It is committed to tackling the issue of drugs⁵³.

The strengths of other local authorities, with regard to DC, has not documented in as much depth as the Wa Authorities. In summary the KIO has a patchy record of drug-control. In 1991 it enforced poppy bans without providing meaningful alternative (largely because of resource limitations) (TNI, 2005). The Kokang authorities have successfully implemented a ban in 2003 with disastrous development outcomes (South, 2006).

Local authorities manifest a range of weaknesses with regard to DC. DC is often implemented in a punitive fashion. For example, the Wa Authorities enforced a ban at great development cost to the Wa (South, 2006). DC is executed in an often inhumane fashion. The Wa Authorities had no compunction in forcing hundreds of thousands of people to mass-migrate in the name of poppy bans (S.H.A.N., 2002). Local authorities implement DC in an autocratic and top-down manner. Local Authorities rarely consulted communities about their development priorities (Renard *et al.*, 2002; Joint Kokang/Wa – Humanitarian Needs Assessment Team (2003)). Finally, local authorities are supply-elimination obsessed. DC is associated with supply-elimination rather than balancing DC with development (TNI, 2005).

5.3. International-level

KOWI mobilised development actors operating in a 'drugs environment'. UNODC lead this partnership together with JICA. From the demand perspective a range of INGOs and LNGOs have started to initiate DC programming that has a development

⁵⁰ Based on discussions with a former UNODC employee and a representative of a key donor.

⁵¹ Based on an interview with the Head of Mission of an I-NGO based in Wa.

⁵² GOUM describe UWSP as perhaps 'over-ambitious' in DC measures! Based on an interview with Police Colonel Hkam Awng and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe.

⁵³ Based on an interview with Police Colonel Hkam Awng and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe.

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focus. This is evident in a 'Drugs and Society' approach adopted by BI-MM, MANA and MBCA.

KOWI had a diverse assortment of capacities in line with its multi-institutional, multi-sectoral partnership approach. Institutions programming around the 'Drugs and Society' approach have a similarly diverse set of capacities. BI-MM has technical expertise and is situated at the cutting edge with regard to formulation of methodologies, instruments, concepts and approaches. MANA and MBCA are local organisations, operating at scale with the trust of communities and state actors and are credible to beneficiaries.

KOWI has the following strengths⁵⁴: (i) robust logistical support for partner NGOs and UN Agencies; (ii) effective in providing access to partners in SR1 and SR2; (iii) effective in developing strong relationships with counterpart ministries and local authorities; (iv) takes an integrated approach to programming in a drugs environment. The BI-MM, MANA, MBCA partnership is robust because it links international expertise with local knowledge and practices.

KOWI's partners were occasionally too diverse and eclectic to be able to partner meaningfully⁵⁵. Some INGOs felt that very diverse nature of partnerships (at different stages of entry to Wa) meant that their efforts at coordination were constrained. Moreover, many INGOs talked of programming in territorial isolation aiming to avoid other KOWI partners.

KOWI has merely provided 'pain-relief'⁵⁶ to ex-poppy farmers in SR1 and SR2. It does not have the resources to provide a long-term solution to the suffering of ex-poppy farmers who are suffering as a consequence of a 'man-made' humanitarian crisis resulting from deadline-centric drug-enforcement policies (TNI, 2005). This is not a criticism of KOWI and is merely an acknowledgement of the enormous needs and inadequate resources being made available for KOWI to deal with these needs.

There is enormous commitment to support integration of DC objectives into development among a whole host of institutions (particularly KOWI partners). However, this will not happen without greater levels of funding.

5.4. Civil Society

The projects of MANA and MBCA are example of embryonic efforts to integrate CN objectives into development.

MANA⁵⁷ and MBCA have the following strengths: (i) they are legitimate locally; (ii) they fill gaps of the state in a sustainable fashion; (iii) they are efficient and sustainable because they are local organisations. In MANA's case Human Resources often consist of volunteer workers; (iv) they understand the priorities and demands of community members more fully than International NGOs; (v) they operate at scale across a wide geographical area; (vi) they have robust links with GOUM providing them with space and greater probability of longevity.

MANA's management systems need to mature. Both MANA and MBCA have funding for elements of their programmes, but not others. Therefore, their programmes are somewhat unbalanced.

Both at a central and local level MANA and MBCA have shown an impressive enthusiasm to embrace new approaches.

⁵⁴ Based on conversations with KOWI partners.

⁵⁵ Based on discussions with the the Head of Mission of an INGO based in Wa.

⁵⁶ Verbatim quote of a senior UN Official.

⁵⁷ Comments are based on a reading of Theuss (2007) (CHR/FHAM Final Evaluation, 2007) and discussions with anonymous interlocutors.

5.5. Strategic Alliances

Up until 2005 KOWI represented an important and robust strategic alliance around which integrated development in a drugs-environment could operate. In Kokang the Consultant had the impression that JICA had made concerted efforts to coordinate KOWI. Nonetheless, there appeared to be a somewhat fragmented landscape of intervention across all players in Kokang. NaTaLa and WFP appear to have a fruitful alliance. NaTaLa requires resources to project the state outwards and penetrate into border areas. WFP provides the 'hard' resources to do this in a concrete and visible fashion. CCDAC has provided operating space for HR and other DC initiatives for many INGOs and NGOs. UNODC and CCDAC have formed a strategic alliance which is mutually beneficial in overseeing crop monitoring trends.

BI-MM, MANA, MBCA and a range of other INGO and NGO partners have configured themselves in an impressive strategic alliance focusing on a HR and 'Drugs and Society' approaches.

In general, the relationship between donors and national state actors is very far from what could be described as an alliance. This largely results from the unfortunate power-locked political impasse between GOUM and many 'Western' donors.

6. Understanding of Mainstreaming

6.1. GOUM

Individuals within GOUM understand that the drug economy is complex and driven by multi-dimensional causes. However, GOUM understands DC in relation to supply-elimination⁵⁸. DC is equated with supply-elimination most probably to satisfy the demands and pressures of the governments of PRC, Thailand and US. Mainstreaming is, for GOUM, neither a meaningful, appropriate nor applicable concept within this context.

6.2. International Actors

JICA was politely critical of the mainstreaming concept. Representatives felt that it was unlikely to be a successful concept given that the GOUM are not generally keen on 'accepting blueprints imposed from outside'. The PRC found the concept of mainstreaming somewhat mystifying. A representative of a key donor, who wishes to remain anonymous, described multiple constraints to mainstreaming. This representative described mainstreaming as a 'nice dream'. The main constraints to mainstreaming are according to this donor representative: (i) the non-existent capacities of Local Authorities; (ii) the absolute dearth of macro-level socio-economic data in former, and contemporary, poppy-cultivating areas.

6.3. UN

UNODC raises the concern that there is a crowded 'mainstreaming' landscape. UNODC poses the important question: 'are other issues not more important in Myanmar which deserve priority concern for mainstreaming?' UNODC provided at least two themes which are considered more important in Myanmar: (i) protection⁵⁹ and; (ii) the 'environment'⁶⁰. Other UN Agencies did not have a coherent conceptual

⁵⁸ Based on an interview with Police Colonel Hkam Awng and Police Lt. Colonel Than Soe.

⁵⁹ See House of Commons Select Committee (2007) for a relevant analysis.

⁶⁰ See Global Witness (2003) for a relevant analysis.

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understanding of what drugs mainstreaming was. Some agencies liked the concept if it attracted greater funding for programmes.

6.4. I-NGOs

I-NGOs felt that mainstreaming was a helpful concept. Several I-NGO's questioned its efficacy in a context of limited funding and without dedicated funding being allocated towards the promotion of this concept. Several respondents felt that rather than exposing development actors to a stream of baffling new methodologies and frameworks it would be more useful to promote good development and DC in a practical fashion. A large number of I-NGOs found it difficult to differentiate the concept 'mainstreamed' from 'integrated'. Some I-NGOs felt that it might be helpful for the HR concept to be fully internalised and consolidated before launching into a new fashionable 'paradigm-shift'.

6.5. Local Authorities

Local authorities were not consulted in this brief consultancy engagement because of time-constraints. This is a limitation of the paper.

6.6. Civil Society

Ultimately organisations like MANA are not particularly bothered with what 'mainstreaming' means. It wishes to serve the demands of its beneficiaries. If it can do this by buying into a mainstreaming agenda it is happy to do so.

6.7. Civil Society based in Thailand

The consultant interviewed representatives of several NGOs that are operating in Thailand, working cross-border into conflict areas where ethnic minority people are based. These groups are highly critical of mainstreaming because: (i) it does not endeavour to achieve political reform and simply accepts the political status quo. The political system in Myanmar is seen as the fundamental, perhaps sole, driver of the drugs economy; (ii) it involves financing development activities in Myanmar which are viewed as sustaining the GOUM and strengthening its 'grip' on power.

7. Recommendations

7.1. Sectors

The following sectors represent promising entry points for mainstreaming:

Health. The Health sector is perhaps the most generously funded sector in Myanmar vis-à-vis ODA. HIV/AIDs is one of the three main communicable diseases that has been focused upon as a priority 'humanitarian concern'. The Ministry of Health's National Aids Program is relatively dynamic and open to external initiatives.

Education. A large portion of ODA is allocated to education. There are numerous examples of life-skill educational projects being initiated and implemented in Myanmar (both in formal and informal educational spheres). Behaviour and Concept Change processes could be operationalised through informal, formal and faith-based educational institutions.

Law enforcement. The law enforcement agencies demonstrated the most pragmatic approach to HR. Law enforcement leadership (CCDAC) have provided sustained support to international organisations involved in integrating development priorities into DC.

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Agriculture and Natural Resource Management (NRM) The MOAI and MAS have been cooperating with FAO and UNODC for many years and support to crop substitution is therefore a practical proposition.

Environment. There are numerous LNGOs active in the area of environmental protection and management. Moreover, they appear to be able to operate more flexibly than organisations working in other sectors. It is evident that poppy bans have disturbed the environmental balance of many areas. Given that mainstreaming includes a 'Do No Harm' component it would be possible to operationalise this element of mainstreaming through the environment sector.

Rural infrastructure. NaTaLa is very fond of hard development projects (roads, bridges etc). Given that poppy farmers like the fact that the opium market 'comes to their farm gate' this suggests that access to markets is a key variable in making crop decisions. It therefore makes sense to improve access of farmers to markets, through rural infrastructure, thus transforming their crop decision-making processes.

7.2. Institutions

Mainstreaming could be promoted through a wide assortment of institutions.

Supply-side. From a supply elimination perspective mainstreaming could be operationalised through AD, AL and crop-monitoring projects. Promising institutions to operationalise mainstreaming through include: JICA, UNODC, UNDP, UNODC, FAO, CCDAC, NaTaLa, MOAI, MAS, Metta Foundation, World Concern, GAA, local authorities (UWSP, KIO, NDA-K, SSA-S etc).

Demand-side. From a demand, and HR perspective, the following institutions are relevant: 3D; donors of 3D: UK, Sweden, AusAID⁶¹ etc; MANA; MBCA; organisations involved in HR (Care, MDM, AHRN, HARP etc); institutions programming in rural areas where poppy is cultivated and addiction is an issue (Metta Foundation, World Concern). BI-MM is clearly a key organisation promoting a 'Drugs and Society' approach through partnerships.

Integrated development. Given that mainstreaming requires an integrated approach to development, mainstreaming should be operationalised through an assortment of INGOs and UN Agencies working in rural areas which are former or contemporary poppy-growing areas. These include: AMI, Malteser, Health Unlimited, AMDA, WFP, FAO, UNODC, UNFPA etc. Integrated development should operate through institutions willing to work in SSS in the future.

The consultancy has not had sufficient time to investigate the huge number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) (particularly faith-based organisations) that operate at scale. There are fertile opportunities for mainstreaming through these organisations.

7.3. Actors

In addition to the above institutions a range of actors should be prioritised in the course of promoting mainstreaming.

PRC & neighbouring nation-states. The PRC facilitates businesses to enter border areas (SR1, SR2, Kachin etc). China does prioritise DC objectives. Whilst PRC's vision of development and AD is different from western actors there is room for dialogue and focused mainstreaming efforts to be initiated in partnership between PRC and 'western' development partners. It would be valuable to investigate the role of the Yunnan Provincial Authorities in AD programs in the present and projected

⁶¹ (AusAID, 2007).

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future. The Governments of India and Thailand are also important to engage in wider regional discussion about DC in border zones.

Technicians and middle-ranking policy-makers in GOUM. GOUM's ministries do have capable, technically trained, interested individuals working at a technical and middle-high ranking policy-level. There should be more awareness of the difficult role they are playing in acting as interlocutors between the international community and high-level policy-makers. Mainstreaming will need to operate with the support of these actors.

7.4. People

Leaders/patrons. Myanmar's political structures are hierarchical and structured around patron-client relations. It is therefore important to promote new policy initiatives with the support of powerful patrons. HR was an example where the international community was able to promote a new, and controversial approach, through the support of key patron-individuals in the state machinery with political clout, power, influence and vision. Mainstreaming will need to operate through similar structures of patronage.

7.5. Processes and Initiatives

KOWI II. UNODC should begin planning to initiate KOWI II in Shan State South. There has been a substantial increase in poppy cultivation and production in the year 2006 – 2007. Sustained, integrated, development interventions are required now to provide alternatives when the GOUM/Local Authorities implement what will probably be another punitive ban. UNODC should therefore, with great urgency, deploy the KOWI concept to attract donor funding for multi-sectoral interventions in SSS. This should involve intense dialogue, in the immediate future, with potential INGO, UN Agency, GOUM and Local Authority partners.

Survey. Whilst poppy may have been eliminated in Wa SR1 the consequences of the ban are immense and poorly understood. Micro data-sets are available to assess socio-economic and political-economic outcomes of the ban. No macro, or comprehensive, data-set exists. Key donors in Myanmar are calling for a comprehensive survey to understand impact.

A crowded mainstreaming landscape. The policy landscape in Myanmar is crowded with efforts to mainstream. Key stakeholders should come together to have a rational discussion about which issues are of key concern in Myanmar and should be mainstreamed.

Feasibility study. There should be a much longer feasibility study conducted to understand possibilities, and potentials, for mainstreaming through the state (GOUM). This would operate in parallel with 'confidence-building' output-based projects with key ministries.

Development rather than politics. Groups working cross-border in the arena of political transformation and humanitarian relief should consider the possibility of initiating DC projects (DDR and HR) in their place of origin. This would complement ongoing advocacy and humanitarian relief activities.

Research. Research should be financed and implemented around: (i) ATS and alcohol consumption trends; (ii) potentials for DC programming in LNGOs and CBOs. In light of UNODC's 2007 poppy cultivation report it is vital that more is understood about the opaque ATS market. The structures and workings of the ATS market should be subjected to empirical investigation.

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Case-study based learning. GTZ should formulate a case-study based learning instrument/pedagogic tool for development actors in Myanmar. The tool would encourage critical thinking and decision-making for programme and management-level staff who are operating in a 'drugs-environment'.

7.6. Concepts and Policies

Harm Reduction to 'Drugs and Society'. Demand-side aspects of programming should incorporate dimensions of BI-MM's 'Drugs and Society' approach into HR in order to ensure that HR is more inclusive and focused on the wider social and economic dimensions of drug-use.

Licit vs illicit. The concept of licit vs illicit is not helpful in overcoming harm and risk in relation to drugs. Alcohol is probably more harmful, (in Myanmar), than illicit drugs, but receives scant attention from a policy or strategic perspective.

Opiates and ATS. There should be a greater focus on amphetamines and a lesser emphasis on opiates in HR and CN.

Elimination targets. Elimination targets, compressed bans and political pressures bought to bear by GOUM and Local Administrations are neither humane nor do they deliver development results. There should be a greater policy focus on development rather than drug elimination targets.

7.7. 'Lead'-role & Networks

7.7.1. 'Lead'-role

In the demand, and HR, arena the following donors could play a lead role: 3D; the donors to 3D (particularly Australia (AusAid)). Australia might be the donor most willing to play a lead-role given that large quantities of Burmese heroin is consumed in Australia.

From the supply-side the only funds being made available are via JICA (which funds its own implementation). Unless ODA changes radically JICA will be the only donor/implementer able to take this leadership role. JICA has also played a key role as a KOWI coordinator in Kokang. UNODC has the clear mandate, technical expertise and experience to play a role (through the KOWI concept) from a UN Agency perspective.

7.7.2. Networks

From a demand side strong networks of practice already exists that are already implementing DC activities in a manner that is close to 'mainstreamed'. The network is comprised of the following actors: CCDAC; MoH; 3D; the donors to 3D; UNODC; BI-MM; MANA; MBCA; Care; MDM; AHRN; HARP.

From the supply-side networks exist, primarily through the KOWI framework. They include: GOUM, Local Authorities, JICA, UNODC, WFP, FAO, KOWI, AMI, Malteser, GAA, World Concern, AMDA etc.

Limitless numbers of networks could, and should, be established with LNGOs and CBOs. The creative and inspiring approach of HIV/AIDS Alliance Myanmar could be replicated in the area of drug mainstreaming through Civil Society. Alliance partners with 30 plus CBOs including groups that focus on: (i) men who have sex with men (MSM); (ii) Self-help groups that provide support and care for People Living with HIV&AIDS (PLWHA); (iii) sex-workers. Alliance provides small grants, Capacity Building and Technical Assistance to partners. This approach to networking could be prototyped in the arena of HR.

7.8. Coordination

In Kokang JICA should play a coordination role through KOWI. In Wa, UNDP should coordinate KOWI. KOWI II should be established in South Shan State under the coordination of UNODC. HR and the consumption/demand side of programming appears to be effectively coordinated at this point. There should be accelerated efforts to provide capacity building for local GOUM state actors and local authorities (Wa Authorities etc) in the arenas of coordination and development planning. This could be funded through organisations like GAA and FAO who already show an interest and willingness to play this role.

7.9. Harnessing Capacities

One of the greatest skills of state, and non-state, actors in Myanmar is their ability to implement development activities in the grey-zones of institutional and legal control. Civil Society is, within the prevailing context, rich and robust. KOWI represents a test-case of an integrated approach to CN programming. It should be reinvigorated and reapplied in South Shan State and possibly Kachin State as KOWI II. UWSA, KIO etc may not have strong technical or development management capacities but they are enthusiastic, open and committed to DC. There is much capacity within CCDAC, MoH and MAS that could be harnessed with the right financial support.

7.10. Additional Support

ODA to Myanmar is radically inadequate in relative and absolute terms. ODA allocated to DC is a fraction of this overall ODA position. ODA earmarked for supply-side interventions can politely be described as inadequate. It was in more candid terms described by an experienced UNODC respondent as “*peanuts*”. The question therefore should not be ‘what additional support is required?’. The questions to be addressed, in the first instance, is how some basic level of meaningful ODA can be attracted to address Myanmar’s social development needs and avert a humanitarian crisis? Once this question has been addressed in substance focused allocations should be made available to DC initiatives.

If neither is possible, a common-sense, ‘Do No Harm Approach’ is probably the best way forward from the supply-perspective. This would include the following dimensions: (i) evidence based drugs policy; (ii) non-politicised drug-policy; (iii) the end to punitive drug bans in compressed time-windows; (iv) US certification of the GOUM for demonstrating willingness in eliminating drugs; (v) humane drugs policy that is focused on development and people rather than achieving unsustainable elimination targets. From the demand-side, there would still be possibilities to continue positive work in combining HR with a ‘Drugs and Society’ approach.

Conclusion. In the light of UNODC’s 2007 ‘Opium Poppy Cultivation in South East Asia’ report there is hard evidence that poppy cultivation is being grown intensely in South and East Shan State. These are areas of intense violent conflict. This suggests that poppy cultivation increases could be more than a one-year one-off increase. This increase could emerge into a trend unless proactive action is taken soon.

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10. Annex

10.1. Annex 1: Terms of Reference

I. Background

a) The context

Extensive research has highlighted the complexity of social, economic and political factors contributing to the emergence and existence of regional drug economies. Farmers involved in small-scale illicit drug crop production are frequently not reached by national and multilateral development programmes because they are criminalized or live in remote areas. Despite their involvement in the drug economy, however, they often show low development indicators in terms of income, health, education, access to infrastructure, and political participation. In many countries, opium poppy and coca are cultivated in isolated areas, where government presence in the form of civic administration, social services and economic development initiatives is largely nominal or non-existent. Because of their illegal source of income, drug crop producers are frequently denied basic political and legal rights. The insecurity and lack of rights associated with drug crop production thus often counterbalances the higher incomes earned from opium poppy and coca growing households..

No single project or programme can address the complexity of the many factors involved. There is a growing consensus that effective drug control requires a more concerted and comprehensive effort. In countries with a significant drug economy, drugs control needs to be included in national development agendas in order to improve understanding of the interrelation between exclusion, deprivation, profit seeking and drug production, address their complexity and foster sustainable development.

Conventional drug control policies have largely relied on direct measures such as drug crop eradication, interdiction and alternative development. Less attention has been paid so far to the indirect impact on the drug economy of other sectors such as education, health, infrastructure or small-business development. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the positive (or negative) impact of these sectors can be significant. A mainstreaming approach to drug control would entail that relevant sector programmes integrate drug control objectives in strongly affected countries to allow for a more comprehensive effort to combat drug crop production.

b) Mainstreaming drug control

Mainstreaming counter narcotics in development is a process through which development actors effectively and sustainably address the causes and consequences of the illicit drug economy as they relate to their area of work. From an institutional perspective, mainstreaming is the process of integrating drug control objectives into national development and sectoral policies from the macro down to the local- and household level. This generally requires the guidance of a lead agency, capable of supporting the relevant sector agencies when devising and applying sectoral the sectoral drug control policies required. Capacity building is an essential part of this process. A co-ordinated and coherent approach between the many different institutions is essential, as well as the inclusion of a broad range of stakeholders, including civil society.

International experience with mainstreaming gender and HIV/AIDS point to the importance of understanding the institutional issues for successful mainstreaming. Mainstreaming strategies require a good knowledge of the national institutional landscape and their potential relevance to the issue. Further, effective mainstreaming relies on the leadership provided for the issue, the relevance and cost-effectiveness of mainstreaming for the respective organisation, and the provision of sufficient financial resources and appropriate technical support.

c) The project

The European Community, FAO and BMZ/GTZ are implementing the co-funded project *“Development in a drugs environment: Mainstreaming- a strategic approach to Alternative Development”*. The project aims at providing conceptual contributions and lessons learned on mainstreaming processes in countries and regions affected by illicit drug economies. This involves processes for considering development programmes through a counter narcotics prism: what has come to be called *“mainstreaming” counter narcotics into development*

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programmes is also referred to as “*undertaking development in a drugs environment.*” An essential part of the project will be the organization of two regional Workshops focused upon countries in Asia (Afghanistan, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand) and Latin America (Bolivia, Colombia, Peru.).

d) The country paper

A key input to the workshops will be the respective papers that will be commissioned for each country. The paper will provide an overview of the current state of drugs control policy and practice within the country and provide an assessment of existing experience with potential entry points for mainstreaming drug control. Particular attention will be given to the institutions that are already working on drug control or those identified to be targeted for mainstreaming. Reference will be made to relevant government institutions, international organisations and civil society groups. If there are national controversies on drug control issues, they will be presented in a balanced manner. The country papers will provide the basis for discussion amongst workshop participants on possible future strategies and co-operation with the country.

II. The country paper

Objectives of the consultancy

The objective of the consultancy is to prepare a country paper which describes and assesses the experience of mainstreaming drug control in the country (*name of country*). The paper will provide a basis for reflection and discussion of possible mainstreaming strategies for the regional workshop scheduled for (*date*) in (*name of the city/ country*)

Tasks

A paper will be prepared that will address the following issues:

- Brief description of the drug economy (e.g. size, regional distribution, key actors, causes, dynamics, consequences) in (*name of country*).
- Description and assessment of current drug control policies and institutions (e.g. national drug plans/strategies, national drug control agencies, international drug control agendas and structures, civil society organisations; policy coherence, co-ordination mechanisms and similar); where there are major controversies regarding drug control in the country, briefly describe the different positions that prevail
- Map the relevant sectors and institutions involved with mainstreaming drug control, including a description of relevant experiences of integrating specific drug control measures in these sectors
- Assess the national capacities and experience with integrating drug control objectives into development programmes
- Make recommendations for mainstreaming drug control in the country (e.g. potential lead agency, co-ordination mechanisms, government and civil society capacities, role of international actors, sectoral entry points, support required for mainstreaming)

A guideline document containing some additional key questions, the format required as well as a checklist to assist with the drafting of the paper is provided.

Output

The paper will be of approximately 8.000- 10.000 words length (12-15 pages), with an additional executive summary of circa 1 page.

Timeframe

The draft paper will be delivered in electronic version by September 30th at the latest.

10.2. Annex 2: Guiding Questions

Guiding questions and report format

Contents required

Executive Summary

Contents

List of abbreviations

List of tables, figures and graphs (if any)

Development in an Drugs Environment: Mainstreaming – A Strategic Approach to Alternative Development

I. Introduction

- Provide information on the interviews, methodology, working process and information included as well as some background information on mainstreaming process within the context of the project.

II. Brief summary description of the illegal drug economy

- Size of the illegal drug economy in the country, i.e., its impact on the overall economy and trends in its development (recent 5-10 years)
- Brief description of illicit drug crops cultivation, processing, trafficking and consumption in the country, key actors involved
- Causes and consequences of the illegal drug economy in the country

III. Policy framework - description and candid assessment of current drug control policies and institutions

- Identification and description of dedicated drug control agencies in the country: national institutions, international agencies, specialized civil society organisations; other immediately relevant actors (e.g. security- and police forces)
- For each organisation, provide a brief description and assessment of its role, responsibilities, structure, policies, capacity/resources, programmes.
- Provide an overall assessment of the coherence, coordination and capacities of drug control policies in the country
- Where major controversies regarding drug control policy in the country exist, briefly describe the different positions (e.g. consensus/ congruence or not between development- and poverty- alleviation objectives, targets and indicators)
- Identify the level of inclusion of drug control objectives in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) and information on the level of commitment to use loans from Internat. Financial Institutions to fund relevant AD if available

IV. Mapping of sectors and institutions with a potential for mainstreaming drug control objectives into development programmes

- List and describe national policies, sectors and institutions with a potential for mainstreaming (*This potential may be based on presence in drug producing areas, on addressing driving factors of the drug economy, being able to reach out to actors involved in the drug economy, having significant negative impact on the drug economy*)
- Identify and assess existing experiences of integrating specific drug control measures in national policies, sectors and institutions

This section of the report will include a review of the potential for mainstreaming for the following stakeholders:

- Relevant government institutions (*line ministries and departments*)
- Relevant international organisations
- Donors, international partners, private sector organizations
- Non-governmental organizations and other local organizations

V. Candid assessment of the national capacities and experiences with integrating drug control- objectives into development

- Provide a critical yet candid assessment of national capacities and experiences with drug control, highlight strengths and weaknesses found
- Consider national, civil society and international capacities (i.e. explore leadership/ commitment of government, support from donors and international partners) to integrate DC objectives into development
- Identify existing/ lacking strategic alliances between appropriate stakeholders (i.e. among donors and national agencies).

The following questions could be used:

- Has CN mainstreaming become an instrument of joint drug control- and development agendas?
- Has CN mainstreaming become a policy-information tool with which development and poverty reduction objectives and targets can be included?

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VI. Recommendations for mainstreaming drug control in the country

- Based on findings and conclusions, describe the understanding of the main stakeholders for mainstreaming drug control objectives
- Identify major constraints and provide recommendations to address factors hindering effective mainstreaming of drug control objectives into broader development plans, programmes and projects in the country.

The following questions could be used to guide:

- What should be the priorities for mainstreaming drug control (e.g. what sectors, institutions, people)?
- Who should take the lead role? Should there be a lead agency? What network opportunities exist?
- What sectoral entry points can be considered?
- What existing capacities (e.g. national, civil society, international, etc.) can be harnessed to promote mainstreaming?
- What kinds of additional support may be required for mainstreaming drug control?
- What kinds of co-ordination would be required for mainstreaming? What coordination mechanisms could be used or should be developed?

VII References

VIII Contact

Name of the author/ contact person

Address

Date