







การประชุมวิชาการ  
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คุณภาพสังคมกับ  
คุณภาพประชาธิปไตยไทย

SOCIAL QUALITY  
AND QUALITY OF  
THAI DEMOCRACY

# KPI Congress 12

**Conflict, Legitimacy and Government Reform:**

**Equitable Allocation of Resources in Thai Society**

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KPI Congress 12  
“Social Quality and Quality of Thai Democracy”  
4-6 November 2010

## Principle and rationale







## Principle and rationale

The crisis and conflicts that have occurred in Thai society during the past year have caused enormous economic and social losses. This is an unfortunate consequence of the imbalance and instability of economic and social development, regardless of the inevitable and necessary changes to the national and social landscape. For example, the development of liberal economic ideas, such as capitalism, is aimed at creating wealth and income. Growth of per capita income and increase in gross domestic product (GDP) are now indicators of the standard of life. The expected increase of goods and services means an increase in employment. Benefits that arise from economic growth will then be distributed to the public and to the majority of the country. Subsequently, social problems will be solved and poverty will eventually disappear. The approach will be successful in expanding the growth rate, but the fact is that there is a problem with quantitative growth because of the fundamental weakness of the economy. We rely on the knowledge of technology and investments and too much on external markets. For these reasons, the Thai economy suffers risks from domestic and international fluctuations. The result is events such as the economic

crisis of 1997, which aggravated problems in the economy and social structure. The effect is inequality in the distribution of funds. The benefits of development are unevenly spread and income is distributed unevenly between groups of people in different regions of the country.

In addition, the political crisis in the year 2005 - 2010 which has caused extreme conflict and division in politics, has led to violence and loss in Thai society at large. Conflict and discord are forefronts of extreme political parties, which in turn, provoke violence, and ultimately, loss in the Thai society. *A Foreign Policy* Magazine publishes an annual report called “**Failed States Index**,” and in the year 2010, Thailand was classified as No. 79 of 177, that is, in the warning zone (the higher the rank, the more risk factors and thus more failure). This is consistent with the Peace Index, on which in 2010, once more, Thailand ranked 124th of 149 countries (ranked very low among peaceful countries).

As mentioned above, this is an unfortunate consequence of the imbalance and instability of economic and social development, regardless of the inevitable and necessary changes to the national and social landscape. By looking at each aspect of problem solving the cause of conflict does not originate from economic or political problems. Therefore, it is necessary to create a balance by improving the quality of social and political development in a democratic regime.

**Several factors contribute to the development of stable democracy:**

- 1) Institutions such as Parliament, political parties, the bureaucracy, interest groups, and organizations for freedom of the press, etc.-these institutions must have clearly defined roles in our society.
- 2) Clear demonstrations of the process for monitoring elections and the removal of any proposed law. This includes the responsibility of both horizontal (response to government officials) and vertical (response to the public) awareness, both of which are often subjects of regulation.
- 3) Respect for the freedom of citizens, equality, justice, brotherhood, privacy, and human dignity. These principles must be part of the people’s values, and people must also be able to accept differences.

A well correlated relationship of those factors requires the development of all branches of government simultaneously to stably function. If any defect happens to occur under any branch, the democratic process will become more difficult and may cause a variety of problems.

The quality of society, concepts of integration, and the sensitivity to human quality must be addressed. Both the national and community scope must be involved in improving the social and economic environment, promoting the well-being of the nation, and promoting the potential of each person. The goal is to achieve integration between development in social policy, economic policy, and environmental policy, all of which reflect the following four aspects of our society.

1. Social and economic stability as a basis for people to survive in society. This includes financial resources, housing, a healthy environment, the work environment and good education.
2. Social inclusion means public access to social services, such as equal opportunity for employment and equal understanding of the rights and obligations as citizens to partake in social activities. Citizens are to be included as part of the institutions with respect to law. The values and culture of the community are to be integrated into social processes that are a matter of daily life, such as voting in elections, and the rights of children and women to receive fair wages.

3. Social cohesion that promotes helpfulness and reconciliation in society. The unique expression of values and relationships will lead to a unified society built on trust.
4. Social empowerment, which refers to the ability of people to participate in social, economic, political and cultural activities. This means enhancement of the people's ability to build prosperous communities.

Therefore, social reconciliation and sustainable peace will be achieved and people will be able to live amongst other civilized countries. People will treat others with respect and collaborate in managing the public sector to ensure a virtuous and exemplary government. Since the critical issue is the development of democracy, the 12th Annual KPI Congress will focus on the topic of "Quality of Society and Quality of Thai Democracy." The congress will provide a public platform to exchange and share knowledge and comments in order to find ways to develop a stable democratic society.

## Objectives

1. To serve as a public forum for presentation of academic papers concerning development of social quality that could affect the promotion of quality of Thai democracy.
2. To exchange knowledge and comparative perspectives about relevant issues and share experiences of local and foreign academics and interested parties.
3. To provide suggestions and collectively formulate a suitable structure for development of social quality that could create sustainable peace in Thailand.

## Expected outcome

1. Administrators, academics, government officials, non-governmental organizations, and the general public have opportunities to review and comment on development of democracy, which would create social quality.
2. Obtain recommendations and approaches for social and democratic quality for future presentation to Thai society.

## Main activities

There will be three main activities at KPI Congress 12 under the theme "Social Quality and Quality of Thai Democracy."

### 1. Keynote speeches

Keynote speeches present opportunities for local and foreign experts with a breadth of experiences and knowledge about political and administrative structures to share their experiences, insights, and perspectives on government system reform to facilitate fair distribution of benefits and promote social harmony. At this symposium, two keynote speeches will be arranged:

**1.1 Opening keynote speech** delivered by a foreign academic expert in the field of democratic development, social quality development, and indicators of social quality.

**1.2 Closing keynote speech** delivered by a Thai expert on policy formulation on democratic development to create social quality.

## 2. Academic seminar

The academic seminar will serve as a forum for sharing ideas and brainstorming among participants on the issue of democratic development, social quality development, and indicators of social quality. Participants will include administrators from both public and private sectors, academics, and competent individuals as well as representatives from the government, independent organizations, public agencies, local administrative organizations, academic institutions, non-governmental organizations, media, civil society organizations, and the general public. The academic seminar comprises panel discussions and group discussions as follows:

**2.1 Panel discussions** present opportunities for local and foreign academics and experts to share their insights and experiences on the issue of social quality and quality of Thai democracy.

- 1) Panel discussion with foreign experts who share their insights and experiences on the issue of democratic development, social quality development, and indicators of social quality.
- 2) Panel discussion with Thai academics and experts who share their insights and experiences on policy issues pertinent to the promotion and development of social quality and quality of Thai democracy.
- 3) Group discussions present academic research, article paper including best practice from communities, local, provincial and national levels and a presentation on the summary of group discussions which consisted of 5 groups.

## 3. Exhibition

The purpose of the exhibition is to disseminate information and knowledge about social quality development, quality of democracy development, and best practice in Thai society at community, local, provincial, and national levels. The compilation represents research conducted jointly conducted by King Prajadhipok's Institute and partner network organizations and undertaken by other sectors.

## Target groups

1. Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate
2. Executives and members of political parties
3. National and local politicians
4. State officials as well as officials or personnel in public agencies, independent organizations, state enterprises, and local administrative organizations
5. Officials or personnel in international agencies dealing with promotion and development of democratic governance

6. Academics involved in promotion and development of democratic government
7. Community development organizations, community leaders, local leaders, civil society groups or networks
8. NGO representatives
9. All branches of mass media
10. Secondary school and university students
11. Interested persons

**Number of participants:**

500

**KPI Congress XII will be held on**

4 November 2010 12.00 - 18.00

5 November 2010 08.00 - 17.00

6 November 2010 08.00 - 12.00

at the United Nations Conference Center

# Summary and main idea of group discussions for 12<sup>th</sup> Annual KPI Congress 2010

## Group 1.

### Reform of Political Institutions and Social Empowerment

#### Description

The structure of political institutions such as parliament, government, political parties, and the election system, and the relationships among these institutions is important. Problems in the quality of the Thai democratic system originate in the system of checks and balances between institutions. The results are imbalances of power, such as excessive strength of the executive branch of government. Political institutions of the legislature are weak or inefficient in monitoring the executive. Participation of the people is weak and the people have no direction.

To resolve the structural imbalance in political institutions, there should be structural reform of those institutions to achieve social empowerment. This means empowering people with a feeling or sense of personal ability and efficacy by being involved in determining the direction and details of public policy concerning the economy, politics, and culture. This would promote the development of “people” into “citizens” who have potential and would create virtue, making society sustainable.

#### Main ideas

1. Structural reform of political institutions aims to make the structure of political institutions work effectively and efficiently and to organize a system of checks and balances to create fairness in society.
2. Structural reform of political institutions includes elections for the House of Representatives and/ or the executive that reflect the demands and true spirit of the people.
3. Structural reform of political institutions aims to create supplementary mechanisms, and power for society and citizens to allocate and distribute resources fairly.

## **Group 2.**

### **Procedures of Democracy and Social Cohesion**

#### **Description**

The problem of conflicting ideas and differing opinions can occur in a democratic society because of differences in race, religion, culture, customs, or beliefs. If the society has a good quality democracy, however, such conflicts and differences could not bring members of society to use force and violence against each other, and everyone would be able to live together with their differences. One of the main goals of a democratic society is to live in peaceful coexistence. The democratic process has several critical components: rule of law (legislation and law enforcement with fairness to achieve equality, equal recognition and confidence in the legal system); promoting genuine participation in socio-economic and political affairs; fair and transparent political competition; enhancing checks and balances on state power from both legally-empowered organizations and from civil society organizations.

#### **Main ideas**

1. Improving the processes of initiating legislation, amending existing laws and enforcing the law to respond to problems, creating acceptance and fairness for everyone in society.
2. Improving mechanisms and political processes at both national and local level to build reconciliation in society.
3. Enhancing genuine political participation through democratic processes for reconciliation at the national and local level.

## **Group 3.**

### **Democratic Values and Social Quality**

#### **Description**

One of the most important things in a high-quality democracy is civil society with citizens who have good democratic values, which means faith in democracy as a valuable and important thing, and who act within the framework of democratic rules by taking into account rights and responsibilities so as not to deprive others of their rights. Citizens accept that all people are members of the society and do not treat each other unfairly.

The approach for promoting democratic values must focus on at least two values: freedom and equality. Three types of freedom must be promoted. Political liberty is the right to express opinions, including ideologies, and undertake political activities in public without threat or intimidation. Social freedom means the right to express one's identity and community freely as long as the rights of other people or other communities are not affected. Economic freedom means

allowing people to work professionally and honestly with fair compensation. Equality means people in the society have equal rights and protection under the law. They have fraternity and equal access to justice and authority with no discrimination.

### **Main ideas**

1. To promote the exercise of rights and duties of citizens, respect for regulations, the rules and laws of society, and the practice of a democratic way of life.
2. To seek cooperation concerning the equality, freedom and responsibility, including respect for diversity in society.
3. To encourage people to strive for freedom and equality with various processes and mechanisms to lead to the building of democratic values and morals.

### **Group 4.**

## **Effectiveness of Democracy: Socio-Economic Security and Legal Empowerment of the Poor**

### **Description**

One important factor affecting the effectiveness of democracy and economic and social stability is the existence of a stable government that has the ability to set public policy, legislate and enforce laws in order to meet the needs and demands of most people in society. This must be done without abusing or neglecting the rights of minorities and individuals in society. The state should ensure that everyone's basic needs are met. There should be a basic level of care and benefits to facilitate economic stability and social development of basic economic security. Examples include employment, stability in work environment, adequacy of household income, stability in the residential environment, health insurance, health care treatment, stability in education and quality of education. This will lead to stability in the economy and enable society to create citizens of strength and quality.

### **Main ideas**

1. Reduce differences and income inequality, and to solve the problem of persistent poverty, legal empowerment and other means.
2. Effectiveness of the state in the process of ensuring fair allocation and access to natural resources, creating benefits for most people in the country.
3. To create economic and social security through effective democratic development.



## Group 5.

### Democracy Innovations for Thai Social Quality

#### Description

In a civilized and developing society, the goal is to bring about changes that improve present conditions. Therefore, the word “**innovation**” is used widely, and pertains to various areas of society. “**Innovation**” can be used to refer to new processes and new methods, such as changes in manufacturing, ideas, and organization, which have meaningful results for improvement.

In the dimension of democracy, innovation may mean that new institutions, processes, methods, experiences, and values are essential for the support and integration of new knowledge related to politics and management.

#### Main ideas

1. Innovations in democracy for creating social reconciliation
2. Innovations in democracy for creating economic and social security
3. Innovations in democracy for promoting civil society
4. Innovations in democracy for creating justice in society
5. Innovations in democracy for promoting civil rights and liberty







## KPI Congress 12

### Social Quality and Quality of Thai Democracy

4 - 6 November 2010

United Nations Conference Centre, Rajdamnoen Avenue, Bangkok

#### Thursday 4 November 2010

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| 1100-1300 | Registration   |
| 1330-1430 | His Royal Highness Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn and Her Royal Highness Princess Srirasm, Royal Consort to His Royal Highness Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn preside over opening of the KPI Congress & Exhibition  |
| 1430-1440 | Video presentation "Social Quality and Quality of Thai Democracy"  |
| 1440-1530 | <p><b>Opening keynote address on "Gross National Happiness and Social Quality"</b><br/>         by <i>Lyonpo Dago Tshering</i><br/> <i>(Special Envoy of the Prime Minister of Bhutan and Former Minister of Home and Cultural Affairs, The Kingdom of Bhutan)</i></p>   |
| 1530-1730 | <p>International panel discussion on "Social Quality: Quality of Democracy"<br/>         by <i>Prof. Alan Walker</i><br/> <i>University of Sheffield, United Kingdom</i><br/> <i>Prof. Jaeyeol Yee</i><br/> <i>Seoul National University, Republic of Korea</i><br/> <i>Prof. Lih-rong Wang</i><br/> <i>Nation Taiwan University, Taiwan</i><br/> <i>Ms. Laura Edgar</i><br/> <i>Vice President – Partnerships and International Programming Institute On Governance, Canada</i></p> <p>Moderator:<br/> <i>Dr. Jingjai Hanchanlash</i><br/> <i>Chairman, 12<sup>th</sup> KPI Congress Organizing Committee</i></p> |

## Friday 5 November 2010

- 0800-0900 Registration
- 0900-1000 Special keynote address “Social Quality and Quality of Thai Democracy”  
by *Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva*
- 1000-1030 Coffee break
- 1030-1200 Thai panel discussion “Thai Social Quality: Current Situation and Future Trends”  
by *Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nipon Poapongsakorn*  
*Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI)*  
*Mr. Kiaticchai Pongpanich*  
*the National Press Council of Thailand*  
*Dr. Silaporn Buasai*  
*the Thailand Research Fund*  
*Dr. Thawilwadee Bureekul*  
*King Prajadhipok’s Institute Moderator: Prof. Surichai Wun’ Gaeo*
- 1230-1330 Lunch
- 1330-1700 Registration and group discussions

### Group 1 Reform of Political Institutions and Social Empowerment

#### *Speakers:*

*Prof. Dr. Sombat Thomrongthanyawong*  
*Prof. Dr. Thirapat Serirangsan*  
*Asst. Prof. Dr. Parinya Thevanaruemidkul*  
*Mr. Suranand Vejjajiva*  
*Dr. Weerachart Kilenthong*

#### *Moderator:*

*Prof. Dr. Chaiwat Khamchoo*

#### *Summarized by*

*Dr. Preedee Shouteshoung*

### Group 2 Procedures of Democracy and Social Cohesion

#### *Speakers:*

*Prof. Dr. Wanchai Watanasapt*  
*Assoc. Prof. Dr. Surasith Wachitrakkachon*  
*Dr. Pusadee Tamthai*  
*Mr. Buntoon Srethasirote*

#### *Moderator:*

*Mr. Thienchai Na Nakorn*

#### *Summarized by:*

*General Ekkachai Srivilas*

### Group 3 Democratic Values and Social Quality

#### *Speakers:*

*Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gothom Arya*  
*Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pichai Ratanadilok Na Phuket*

*Senator Rosana Tositrakul*  
*Mr. Sonthiyan Chuenreutainaidhamma*

*Moderator:*  
*Assoc. Prof. Thapanat Prom-in*

*Summarized by:*  
*Mr. Supanat Permpoonwiwat*

#### **Group 4 Effectiveness of Democracy: Socio-Economic Security and Legal Empowerment of the Poor**

*Speakers:*  
*Prof. Dr. Nattapong Thongpakde*  
*Dr. Somkiat Tangkitwanich*  
*Mr. Chupinit Kesmanee*

*Moderator*  
*Miss Pattama Subkhampang*

*Summarized by:*  
*Dr. Thawilwadee Bureekul*

#### **Group 5 Innovation In Democracy for Thai Social Quality**

*Speakers:*  
*Dr. Som Nasaarn*  
*Mr. Chatchawal Thongdeelert*  
*Mr. Choosin Sararattana*  
*Miss Penpak Rattanakumpu*  
*Mr. Somkiat Juntursima*

*Moderator:*  
*Asst. Prof. Tossapol Sompong*

*Summarized by:*  
*Asst. Prof. Dr. Orathai Kokpol*

### **Saturday 6 November 2010**

0800-0830 Registration

0830-1030 Presentation and discussion of group discussion results

**Group 1 Reform of Political Institutions and Social Empowerment**  
*by Dr. Preedee Shouteshoung*

**Group 2 Procedures of Democracy and Social Cohesion**  
*by General Ekkachai Srivilas*

**Group 3 Democratic Values and Social Quality**  
*by Mr. Supanat Permpoonwiwat*

**Group 4 Effectiveness of Democracy: Socio-Economic Security, and Legal Empowerment of the Poor**  
*by Dr. Thawilwadee Bureekul*

**Group 5 Innovation In Democracy for Thai Social Quality***by Asst. Prof. Dr. Orathai Kokpol**Moderator:**Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai**Deputy Secretary General, King Prajadhipok's Institute*

- 1030-1045 KPI Award video presentation and 2010 KPI Award presentation  
(to local government organizations for excellence in transparency and public participation)
- 1045-1100 Video presentation: KPI Congress 13
- 1100-1200 Closing address

*By Prof. Dr. Borwornsak Uwanno**Secretary General, King Prajadhipok's Institute*







# Social Quality and Quality of Korean Democracy

Prof. Jaeyeol Yee

Seoul National University

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- 1. From hungry to angry society: the importance of social conflict in explaining social development**
- 2. Social Quality model and its application in Asian context**
- 3. Measure of social conflict**
  - Inequality
  - Quality of democracy
  - Quality of institutions
  - *Noblesse Oblige*
- 4. Symptoms of transitional society**
  - Social transition
- 5. Policy response to social conflict in Korea**
  - Integrative liberalism and centrist policy
  - Social quality and fair society

## 1. From hungry to angry society:

**the importance of social conflict in explaining social development**


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### Is Korea a developed country?

- 13th largest trading country
- IMF: Per Capita GNP US\$ 20,000
  - 29 Advanced Countries, emerging markets, developing countries
  - Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong
- OECD membership
  - 30 countries (Korea and Japan in Asian region)
  - Countries Per Capita GNP less than US\$ 10,000 are included.
- UNDP: HDI (Human Development Index) > 0.9
  - Korea's HDI= 0.912 26<sup>th</sup> out of 177 countries
  - Expected life expectancy 77.3 yrs (33<sup>rd</sup>)
  - Adult Literacy 98% (22<sup>nd</sup>)
  - Enrollment for Higher School 95% (12<sup>th</sup>)
- **But majority of Koreans do not believe that Korea is a developed country.**


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## Economic Growth Rate (GDP)



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## Suicide rates per 100,000 persons: 1980- 2007



주1): 국가별 연령구조의 차이에서 비롯된 사망 수준의 차이를 보정하기 위해 OECD 표준인구를 사용한 연령표준화 값임.

출처: OECD, OECD Health Data, 2009.

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### Conflicts and disintegration:

- In 2008 spring there was massive demonstration against the import of US beef, which had many implications: opposition against the US, against conservative government, against neo-liberalism, expression of the people's rights to health, etc.



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### Conflicts and disintegration:

- In January 2009 there was a demonstration by persons who rented rooms of the building which was being destroyed for re-development in Yongsan, Seoul. Several people died in the process of confrontation with the police.



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## From *hungry* society to *angry* society

- Symptoms of hungry society
  - Increasing income inequality
  - Growing civil grievance after democratization
  - Clash between domestic culture with global environment
- Need for alternative concept other than **GDP growth**.
- **Sustainable society with high legitimacy**
  - = Violence is avoided by conflict resolution
  - = social conflicts are dissolved into dynamic harmony through political system
  - = society where both quality of life and social quality are high
  - = fair society

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## Social integration as a basis for sustainable development

$$\text{Social integration} = \frac{\text{Conflict Potential}}{\text{Conflict resolving system} + \text{societal moral capacity}}$$

- **Conflict potential** = inequality + distrust
  - **Conflict resolving system** = social welfare + democracy
  - **Societal moral capacity** = trust and social capital
- In Korean case, inequality is smaller than other countries.
  - Yet conflict resolving system and societal moral resources are fragile.
  - As a result, conflict is high, and integration is difficult.

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## Theoretical resources for the conflict resolving capacity

- Societal moral resources and social facts (Durkheim)
  - From repressive to restitutive law
  - From mechanical to organic solidarity
- Sources of political legitimacy (Weber)
  - From traditional authoritarianism to rational-legal authority
- Institutional carrying capacity (Huntington)
  - Political violence as mismatch between social and political modernization
- Institutions of conflict management as determinant of economic growth (Rodrik, North, Acemoglu)

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## Samuel Huntington: Institutional carrying capacity

- Political instability or violence =** **(social modernization)**  
**(political and institutional modernization)**
- **Social modernization =** urbanization, increased literacy, social mobilization, economic growth
  - **Political and institutional modernization =** order itself is an important goal of developing countries, independent of the question of whether that order is democratic, authoritarian, or free-market.
  - As societies modernize, they become more complex and disordered.  
 If the process of social modernization that produces this disorder is not matched by a process of political and institutional modernization—a process which produces political institutions capable of managing the stress of modernization—the result may be violence.

Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 1968

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### Dani Rodrik: social conflict managing capacity

$$\Delta \text{growth} = - \text{external shocks} * \frac{(\text{Latent social conflict})}{(\text{institutions of conflict management})}$$

- Latent social conflict =
  - inequality**
  - + ethnic and linguistic fragmentation**
  - + social distrust**
- Institutions of conflict management =
  - democracy**
  - + quality of governmental institutions**
  - + public spending on social insurance**

Dani Rodrik, "Globalization, Social Conflict and Economic Growth," *The World Economy* 21 (2), 143-158  
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### Douglass North: "Institutions" matter

- Douglass North (1990, p.3):  
"Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction."
- Economic institutions (e.g., property rights, entry barriers) shape economic incentives, contracting possibilities, distribution
- Political institutions (e.g., form of government, constraints on politicians) shape political incentives and distribution of political power.

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### Daron Acemoglu: Social conflict as determinant of institutional effectiveness

- Economic institutions essential for the prosperity of nations
  - But also benefit different groups and individuals -> social conflict
- Formal vs informal institutions
  - How rules are codified vs. how rules are applied
  - e.g., *Constitutions of U.S. and many Latin American* countries are similar, but the practice of politics is different.
  - Why? Because the distribution of political power is different
- *De jure* vs. *de facto* political power
  - *De jure* political power: power allocated by political institutions
    - e.g., power allocated to a party by an election
  - *De facto* political power: determined by economic, military or extra-legal means
    - e.g., power of rebel groups in a Civil War, or the threat of such groups in peace.
    - *de facto* power typically relies on solving the “collective action problem”



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## 2. Social Quality model and its application in Asian context


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## Social Quality?

- the extent to which people are able to participate in the social, economic and cultural life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential. (Beck, et al, 1997)
- Comprehensive conception of the quality of people's daily lives


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## Constitutional factors of social quality




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## Areas and factors of Social Quality



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## Summary of the Trend of Social Quality in Korea



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## Critical Evaluation of Social Quality

- Western European bias
  - Established Social Quality Regime (Nordic vs. Anglo-American Model)
  - Declining importance of Social Quality and depressing atmosphere among researchers.
  - It takes mature industrial structure and high level of per capita GDP, consolidated democracy, transparency and rule-by-law as granted.
  - Mainly concerned about the recovery of social policy vis-à-vis economic policy
  - Highly theory-laden, and deductive method.
  - Indicators with 95 variables, but it is difficult to assign them to domains
- Critical Input from Asian experience
  - The beginning of SQ regime and invigorating atmosphere among researchers.
  - Growing importance of social quality in addition to economic growth, democracy, and transparency
  - Social Quality as a measure of **social progress**.
  - Indicators with parsimony and empirical evidence are needed. (inductive method)

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## Alternative approach to Social Quality

- The importance of 'system' vs. 'life-world' (Habermas & Lockwood)
- The importance of *de jure* vs. *de facto* power (Acemoglu)
- **System Quality = risk resilient capacity = source of *de jure* power**
  - Socio-economic risks and resilience depending on risk governance mechanism.
  - Risk governance system is closely related with the institutional arrangement by the government as well as market and informal networks, to provide people enough resilience to social and economic risks created by the working of the economy and by other causes.
- **Life-world Quality = societal moral resources = source of *de facto* power**
  - Societal moral resources as socially constructed element of social quality.
  - It is composed of social capital and perceived democratic process that empowers people and thus harbours active participation.


Page • 22

## Definition of variables and Sources

1. Male Employment Rate: OECD Statistics
2. Female Employment Rate: OECD Statistics
3. Public educational expenditure
4. Upper secondary education Gross enrolment ratio: UNESCO Institute for Statistics
5. Relative poverty: OECD "Income Distribution-Poverty" OECD.Statextracts(2009)
6. Public social expenditure: Public social expenditure as percentage of Gross National Product (OECD Statistics)
7. Trade union density: Unionization rate (OECD Statistics)
8. Gross pension replacement rate (OECD pension models)
9. Press freedom: scale by Freedom house (2009)
10. Government effectiveness: Public opinion on the government effectiveness as percentage in normal distribution (World Governance Indicators 2008, World Bank)
11. Percent Internet users: number of internet users (World Bank and International Telecommunication Union)
12. Corruption perception index: perceived corruption collected by Transparency International, 2007
13. Average rights: Combined measure of political rights and civil liberties, or the opportunity for individuals to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centres of potential domination. As such, the survey is primarily concerned with freedom from restrictions or impositions on individuals' life pursuits. (Freedom House, 2009)
14. Gender empowerment: Composed of four variables such as 1) seats in parliament held by women, 2) female legislators, senior officials and managers 3) female professional and technical workers 4) ratio of estimated female to male earned income. (UNDP 2008)
15. General trust: percentage of respondents who answered yes to the question that 'most people can be trusted' (World Value Survey 2005, Eurobarometer, 2004)
16. Institutional confidence: Average trust level on the military, press, labor union, government, big business, and philanthropic organizations (World Value Survey 2005, Eurobarometer 2005)
17. Voter turnout: Voter turnout at the most recent parliamentary election. (IDEA database)
18. Total organizational participation: Total number of voluntary organizations membership, chosen from five types of organizations such as 1) sports & recreation, 2) art, music, and educational 3) labor union 4) political party 5) professional association. (World Value Survey 2005, Eurobarometer 2006)
19. Democracy: Estimated Democraticness in own country WVS 2005 and Euro Barometer 2007

## Eigenvalues, percent of variance explained, and factor loadings

System 1 (Eigen value=3.487, variance=43.588)	Factor loadings
Female employment rate	.887
Male employment rate	.816
Public educational expenditure	.644
Upper secondary education gross enrolment rate	.616
System 2 (Eigen value=1.568, variance=19.605)	Factor loadings
Relative poverty	.826
Public social expenditure	.794
Trade union density	.658
Gross pension replacement rate (public)	.621
Life-world 1 (Eigen value=6.230, variance=56.640)	Factor loadings
Press freedom	.929
Government effectiveness	.922
Percent Internet users	.906
Corruption perception index	.885
Average rights	.871
Gender empowerment	.853
General trust	.799
Life-world 2 (Eigen value=1.736, variance=15.783)	Factor loadings
Institutional confidence	.891
Voter turnout	.640
Total organizational participation	.573
Democracy	.528



### Clarifying the Definition of Social Quality

- **Original Definition:**
  - The extent to which people are able to participate in the social, economic and cultural life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential (Beck 1997)
- **Clarification:**
  - Participation occurs primarily in Life-world 2 (political empowerment). But it is possible only when communities flourish in Life-world 1 (social empowerment), which in turn requires conditions which enhance well-being in System 2 (welfare and safety-net) and individual potential in System 1 (human capital investment and resilience).
- **Social integration:**
  - Societal development and further economic growth is induced as long as the conflict potential (such as economic inequality and ethnic clash) is dissolved by welfare protection and smooth working of democratic governance.

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## Scores and Ranks in Terms of Social Quality Dimensions

	Total SQ	Rank	GDP	Rank	System Total	Rank	System 1	Rank	System 2	Rank	Life-world Total	Rank	Life-world 1	Rank	Life-world 2	Rank
Denmark	85.62	1	53.89	6	83.67	1	78.03	2	89.3	1	87.05	1	97.84	1	68.16	2
Sweden	77.16	2	46.62	7	74.13	3	66.53	6	81.74	2	79.96	2	95.73	3	50.7	7
Finland	70.98	3	43.82	8	64.91	5	57.33	9	72.5	4	75.4	4	93.42	4	43.87	8
Austria	68.98	4	41.86	12	63.3	6	54.36	11	72.24	6	73.12	5	78.22	13	64.18	3
Luxembourg	66.06	5	100	1	52.44	11	32.56	24	72.33	5	75.97	3	80.31	10	69.36	1
Netherlands	65.88	6	43.76	9	61.1	7	58.93	8	63.28	8	69.35	7	88.97	5	35.01	14
Australia	64.28	7	40.22	14	53.5	10	73.48	4	33.51	25	72.12	6	84.03	8	51.28	6
Switzerland	62.97	8	55.38	5	55.31	8	60.47	7	50.14	14	68.54	8	88.41	6	33.76	17
Belgium	61.51	9	40.06	15	52.03	12	44.73	18	59.32	10	68.41	9	76.42	15	54.39	4
Germany	55.04	10	37.45	17	46.13	16	46.41	16	45.84	18	61.52	10	80.11	11	28.99	22
United Kingdom	54.72	11	43.04	10	45.77	17	48.5	12	43.05	19	61.24	12	78.8	12	30.49	19
Ireland	53.76	12	57.06	4	43.47	21	56.04	10	30.91	26	61.25	11	73.65	16	39.55	10
Portugal	53.4	13	18.36	24	45.02	18	48.14	13	41.91	20	59.49	13	63.42	20	52.62	5
France	51.34	14	38.92	16	49.58	13	43.76	19	55.39	12	52.63	17	67.76	18	26.15	23
Spain	51.14	15	29.23	20	47.75	14	45.96	17	49.55	15	53.61	16	64.87	19	33.89	16
United States	47.85	16	42.78	11	33.54	25	46.79	14	20.29	28	58.26	14	77.63	14	24.36	25
Japan	47.48	17	31.43	19	36.84	24	46.7	15	26.98	27	55.22	15	69.12	17	30.9	18
Czech Republic	46.62	18	14.15	25	44.76	19	41.17	20	48.35	16	47.98	18	58.56	22	29.46	20
Italy	46.19	19	33.06	18	44.29	20	34.07	23	54.5	13	47.57	19	55.28	25	34.08	15
Greece	44.14	20	25.24	22	42.56	22	27.23	28	57.88	11	45.28	21	48.4	27	39.84	9
Hungary	44.14	21	11.08	27	46.17	15	32.06	25	60.29	9	42.67	23	55.85	24	19.59	28
Slovak Republic	41.32	22	11.22	26	38.39	23	30.92	27	45.85	17	43.45	22	56.2	23	21.13	27
Korea	37.42	23	18.9	23	25.52	27	35.7	22	15.35	29	46.07	20	60.2	21	21.33	26
Poland	34.92	24	8.5	28	32.89	26	31.17	26	34.61	23	36.4	24	48.95	26	14.43	29
Mexico	27	25	7.11	29	22.46	28	38.42	21	6.49	30	30.3	26	30.84	28	29.37	21
Turkey	24.57	26	6.79	30	21.32	29	8.74	29	33.91	24	26.93	27	21.91	30	35.73	13
Norway	.	.	78.85	2	68.08	4	71.71	5	64.45	7	.	.	96.33	2	.	.
Iceland	.	.	61.76	3	81.41	2	81.29	1	81.54	3	.	.	.	.	.	.
Canada	.	.	40.69	13	.	.	.	.	38.76	21	.	.	83.81	9	.	.
New Zealand	.	.	27.59	21	54.8	9	73.5	3	36.09	22	.	.	86.47	7	.	.
Brazil	.	.	4.44	31	.	.	.	.	.	.	33.79	25	30.69	29	39.23	11
Argentina	.	.	4.01	32	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	25.96	24
Thailand	.	.	1.17	33	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	36.09	12
China	.	.	0	34	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	18.5	31	.	.

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
## The Three Worlds of Social Quality (K-means cluster)

		Life-world	
		Low	High
System	High		Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland <b>[Type I]</b>
	Low	Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Turkey <b>[Type III]</b>	France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States <b>[Type II]</b>


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### Three Worlds of Social Quality and Their Locations



### Comparison of SQ profiles among Korea and other SQ regimes



### 3. Measures of social conflict


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### Income Inequality in Developing Countries (Gini Index)

Selected South and Middles Americas	Selected African	Developed Countries	Selected East Asian Countries
Argentina—urban 2001 (0.51)	Botswana 1993 (0.63)	Australia 1994 (0.32)	Malaysia 1997 (0.49)
Bolivia 2002 (0.58)	Central African Rep. 1993 (0.61)	Belgium 2000 (0.26)	Taiwan, China 2000 (0.32)
Brazil 2001 (0.59)	Lesotho 1995 (0.63)	Canada 2000 (0.33)	<b>Republic of Korea 2005 (0.32)</b>
Chile 2000 (0.51)	Malawi 1997/1998 (0.50)	Denmark 1997 (0.27)	<b>Thailand 2005 (0.44)</b>
Colombia 1999 (0.54)	South Africa 2000 (0.58)	France 1994 (0.31)	<b>Selected Fast Growing Countries</b>
Ecuador 1998 (0.54)	Uganda 1991 (0.59)	Germany 2000 (0.28)	India 1999/2000 (0.33)
El Salvador 2002 (0.50)	Zambia 1998 (0.53)	Ireland 2000 (0.31)	China 2001 (0.45)
Guatemala 2000 (0.58)	Zimbabwe 1995 (0.57)	Italy 2000 (0.31)	
Honduras 1999 (0.52)		Luxembourg 2000 (0.29)	
Panama 2000 (0.55)		Norway 2000 (0.27)	
Paraguay 2001 (0.55)		Spain 2000 (0.35)	
Haiti 2001 (0.68)		Sweden 2000 (0.25)	
		Russian Federation 2002 (0.32)	

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### Declining trust on institutions: 1981-2004



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### Quality of Democracy:



Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008



#### ■ Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008

- spectrum of governing authority that spans from *fully institutionalized autocracies* through *mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes* (termed "anocracies") to *fully institutionalized democracies*.
- The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted to regime categories:
  - three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -77, and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10)

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<http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>





### Quality of Institutions:

Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2008


- The indicators are constructed using an unobserved components methodology
- The six governance indicators are measured in units ranging from about -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes.
  1. Voice and Accountability
  2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence
  3. Government Effectiveness
  4. Regulatory Quality
  5. Rule of Law
  6. Control of Corruption

<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>

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### Quality of Institutions: Rule of Law


Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2004-2008



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### Quality of Institutions: Control of Corruption

Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2004-2008



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### Noblesse Oblige Index = 26.48


Trust Deficit for Social Leaders

Oblige score



How much they  
perform their  
moral  
obligations?


Noblesse Oblige Index  
=  $\sum \text{Noble Score} * \text{Oblige Score}$   
= 26.48



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
### Noblesse Oblige Index:

Reversed relationship between Nobleness and Obligation







### Conflict Index 1


$(\text{Gini} + \text{Distrust}) / (\text{Welfare} + \text{Democracy} + \text{Governance})$












#### 4. Symptoms of transitional society


## Symptoms of Transitional Society: circa 2001



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
출처: World Values Survey (circa 2002)

## Symptoms of Transitional Society: circa 2006



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### Transitional of Korean Social Regime since 1982-2007



### Symptoms of Transitional Society:

declining trust and stagnating transparency

- Korean society suffering from declining trust.
  - After comparing more than 70 countries, we find that general trust in Korea is much lower than China and Vietnam as well as than European countries.
- Two groups of countries in the world.
  - European OECD countries showing both high trust and high transparency.
  - Some of the non-western countries showing high trust coupled with lower transparency.
- Opening of information and democratization has made it more difficult to maintain authoritarian system based on traditional social system. Korea is in a sense in the transition.

## Symptoms of Transitional Society:

declining trust and stagnating transparency

- Democratization destroyed **authoritarianism**, but it also undermined the **authority** of major institutions which have claimed to be a source of political legitimacy.
  - As a result, there is a vacancy of governance which must be filled with more rational and legal authority.
- Korea is now facing the transition zone where the system based on traditional personal ties should be replaced by more transparent rule-based domination.
  - Trust on social rule is a moral resource which has many positive effects in transforming social relations and upgrading political and economic governance.
- In this context, we want to emphasize that for the time being, establishing transparency is the most important task in Korea for upgrading social quality and sustaining development.

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## 역사적 맥락

- 한국은 1950~1960년대에 가난하지만 매우 평등한 사회에서 출발
  - 외환위기 이전까지는 높은 평등성과 고도성장을 잘 결합할 수 있는 성공적인 모델이었음.
  - 외환위기 이후 강력해지는 글로벌화의 압력 속에서 성장과 고용의 비동조나 불일치현상이 심해지고 있으며, 고용없는 성장 및 일자리의 양극화현상이 심화되고 있음.
- 급속한 불평등의 심화와 고착화는 사회 전반에서 규칙의 정당성과 경쟁의 공정성에 대한 민감성을 높임.
  - 지위추구경쟁에서 탈락하는 층을 중심으로 하여 형평성에 대한 회의와 미래 전망에 대한 좌절감이 퍼지고 있음.
  - ‘능력있는 승자에 대한 인정’의 문화가 적고, 경쟁의 정당성에 대하여 민감하며, 결과의 불평등이 쉽게 질투로 바뀔 수 있는 특성
- 정부가 정당성을 갖추고 사회갈등을 조정하며, 미래 비전을 제시할 수 있기 위해서는 매우 강력하게 도덕적 정당성을 주장할 수 있도록 인적 구성에서 청렴성과 공정성, 그리고 수월성을 갖추어야 하며, 이를 보장할 수 있는 제도적 기반을 갖추어야 함.

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## 5. Policy response by Korean government

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### New Paradigm for Socio-economic Progress

- Harmony among economic growth, social integration, and environmental sustainability

**Growth  
Engine**



**Social  
Integration**


**Fair  
Society**



**Environmental  
Sustainability**

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## New Paradigm for Socio-economic Progress



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## Domains and definition of Socio-economic Progress

Domain	Sub-Domain	Detailed definition
Growth Engine	Stable growth	Income
		Macroeconomic stability
		Financing
		Economic Openness
	Industrial competitiveness	Information
		Science and Technology
Social Integration	Free and safe life	Human capital
		Freedom
		Safety
		Empowerment
		Welfare/distribution
	Trust and Governance	Fertility/Aging
		Social capital
		Tolerance
Environment	Sustainability	Governance
		Natural Resources
		Environmental risk

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
Ranking and Trends of Growth Engine, OECD countries	국가	1990	1995	2000	2005	2007
<b>Growth Engine</b>  • Korea's ranking of growth engine is 14 <sup>th</sup> in 2007, and it jumped from 20 <sup>th</sup> in 1990	Australia	14	10	13	12	12
	Austria	15	16	15	17	16
	Belgium	16	17	16	14	15
	Canada	7	6	9	8	9
	Czech Republic	22	20	23	23	23
	Denmark	10	12	7	3	3
	Finland	8	13	14	11	11
	France	12	14	19	19	19
	Germany	11	8	12	15	13
	Greece	25	25	25	26	27
	Hungary	26	27	26	25	25
	Iceland	-	-	-	-	-
	Ireland	19	19	11	10	7
	Italy	24	23	22	21	21
	Japan	3	3	4	16	18
	Korea	20	18	17	13	14
	Luxembourg	1	2	2	1	1
	Mexico	27	26	27	28	28
	Netherlands	9	7	5	5	4
	New Zealand	17	15	18	18	17
	Norway	5	5	6	4	5
	Poland	29	29	29	27	26
	Portugal	23	22	20	22	22
	Slovak Republic	21	24	24	24	24
	Spain	18	21	21	20	20
	Sweden	6	9	8	7	8
	Switzerland	4	4	3	6	6
	Turkey	28	28	28	29	29
	United Kingdom	13	11	10	9	10
	United States	2	1	1	2	2

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Ranking and Trends of Social Integration, OECD countries	국가	1990	1995	2000	2005	2007
<b>Social Integration</b>  • Korea's ranking of Social Quality is 26 <sup>th</sup> in 2007, and no significant difference since 1990.	Australia	7	6	6	7	5
	Austria	17	15	15	15	14
	Belgium	15	16	18	17	17
	Canada	10	10	11	12	13
	Czech Republic	20	20	22	22	21
	Denmark	6	4	4	4	4
	Finland	8	8	9	5	7
	France	13	14	14	14	15
	Germany	11	11	12	13	11
	Greece	26	27	26	25	25
	Hungary	27	26	24	21	23
	Iceland	-	-	-	-	-
	Ireland	18	18	19	18	18
	Italy	22	24	20	20	20
	Japan	16	17	17	19	19
	Korea	24	23	25	27	26
	Luxembourg	14	13	10	10	10
	Mexico	28	28	28	28	27
	Netherlands	9	9	8	9	9
	New Zealand	4	5	7	6	6
	Norway	3	3	3	3	3
	Poland	21	21	23	26	28
	Portugal	23	22	21	23	22
	Slovak Republic	25	25	27	24	24
	Spain	19	19	16	16	16
	Sweden	1	1	1	1	2
	Switzerland	2	2	2	2	1
	Turkey	-	-	-	-	-
	United Kingdom	12	12	13	11	12
	United States	5	7	5	8	8

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
## Ideological Orientation of Policies Decided in the Cabinet Meeting (%)



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Source: Kookminilbo, Institute for Contemporary Politics, Sogang University

## Centrist Policies Increased Approval Rate on MB government



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Source: Kookminilbo, Institute for Contemporary Politics, Sogang University

## Social Inclusion in Taiwan : A subjective survey

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### Abstract

**T**his paper intends to provide a preliminary effort to measure subjective feelings about social inclusion in Taiwan and the social policy from this evidence –based data will be addressed.

The research works on social inclusion variables by factor analysis and tests the correlation between dependent and independent variables in seven multivariate regression models from a comprehensive social quality survey. Across all models, this research suggests that the subjective feelings of social inclusion are weak in Taiwan. In addition, education, democratic satisfaction, and the level of group participation are the most important variables affecting an individual's subjective feelings about social inclusion in Taiwan. Several equation models provide concrete factor analysis of affecting factors on different domains of social inclusion, such as social network, and social service, and citizenship.

Although it is the study about social inclusion, this paper provides a supplemental effort to link subjective and objective studied on social quality. The aim of this research is to find out what is the missing link in social quality research.

**Keywords:** Social quality, social inclusion, social exclusion

## Social Inclusion in Taiwan : A Subjective Survey

### Introduction

In Taiwan, the term of social inclusion is still under under-developing in academic arena. No matter what effort, we can see there were some academic research focus on social exclusion rather than social inclusion and earned preliminary accomplishments. Ku and Chan (1998) are the pioneers to discuss social exclusion in Taiwan. In the research, they recommended the idea of social exclusion should be an integrative framework for social policies and economic development in Taiwan. This literature is a kind of touchstone about social exclusion for academic in Taiwan. Like the concept used in Europe, there are strong links between social exclusion and poverty in many researches based on the previous research in Taiwan. Wang (2001, 2003) focused on poverty by discussing the social exclusion in Taiwanese society; Huang, Lin and Lin (2003) also discussed the poverty issues and suggested the government should care about social problems that are imputed to economic development by taking social inclusion perspective. However, the early studies which seldom used social inclusion as a framework to test the social reality in Taiwan yet, not only poverty.

### Literature review and alternative explanation of social inclusion

#### Social inclusion in social quality

Between 2001 and 2006, European Foundation on Social Quality (EFSQ) constructed a framework about social quality based on four key empirical domains: social-economic security, social cohesion, social inclusion, and social empowerment. Social inclusion is one of domains. By contrast to the social exclusion which is used before, social inclusion is a positive term (Walker & Wigfield, 2004: 2).

Beck, Maesen, Thomese, and Walker (2001: 7) defined social quality is the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential. In this context, Steffens and de Neubourg (2005:192) defined social inclusion is “the degree to which people are integrated in (or have access to) different social relations that constitute everyday life”. In many political and social policy branches, social exclusion is also defined as a lack of social rights (Bouget, 2001: 50). Oppositely, social inclusion is linked explicitly to the ideas about basic civil rights, equal opportunities, and other social services or institutions that can diminish the poverty, inequalities and discriminations (Beck, Maesen, Thomese, and Walker, 2001). The paper will start from the brief examination of social quality which construct social inclusion as part of its concept. Beck et al.(1997) defines that the social quality as ‘the extent to which citizens are able to participate in the social and economic life of their communities under conditions which enhance their well-being and individual potential’ (Beck et al., 1997, p. 3). Social quality is intended to be comprehensive and to encompass both objective and subjective interpretations (Berman and Phillips, 2000, p.331). Four elements of social quality have been identified, each of which is conceptualized as a continuum:

- ☐ social-economic security/ insecurity
- ☐ social cohesion/anomie
- ☐ empowerment/disempowerment
- ☐ social inclusion/exclusion.

Regarding social inclusion, according to Berman and Phillips (Berman and Phillips, 2000) it is “connected with the principles of equality and equity and the structural causes of their existence. The goal to build inclusion is to give the help of supportive infrastructures, labor conditions and collective goods in such a way that those mechanisms causing exclusion will be prevented or minimized (Berman & Phillips, 2000, 332). Since the collaborative efforts of scholars, the concepts of social quality and the indicator approaches start to develop in Asia now<sup>1</sup>. There are four domains, twelve sub-domains, and twenty indicators about social inclusion taken as the indicators of social quality in Taiwan (Wang, 2008). But these indicators in Taiwan are objective rather than subjective because the data are almost based on the secondary statistics rather than subjective concern of the people. Those indicators from secondary data cannot measure and present subjective well-being and feeling. The government statistics cannot measure the senses of national identity, for example. In addition, we might not be able to know the social factors or individual variables which might affect social inclusion. From academic research perspective, there is a need to generate another mechanism to test the social inclusion consequently and to provide a supplemental effort to the objective indicators measured by governments through social quality researches.

For opportunity perspective, on the basis of our review of the evidence, we suggest that any proposed social inclusion index should focus on the availability of opportunity to access material and other resources, and the subjective view of this availability. It should address the extent to which the person participates in these life activities, and also the person’s subjective perception of the value or benefit of these activities for themselves. It should also assess the degree to which the person wishes to have more or less or the same level or type of participation in each life domain, otherwise it is not possible to encompass the feelings of those who are satisfied with what might be a low level (personally and normatively) of activity through choice. Making this last assessment is also helpful in quantifying the extent of resignation and aspiration, enabling response shift to be detected (Evans and Huxley, 2005).

Therefore, social inclusion can also be defined as the ability to participate in the social, political, cultural activities of the society. The solidarity and integration are the main factors of social inclusion. Putnam (1993: 167) considered the trust, norms and network can improve the efficiency of society. In the de Tocqueville famous book, “Democracy in America”, voluntary organizations is the basis of social integration and effective democracy. Some of scholars consider the de Tocqueville model is the origin of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993). From *social network perspective*, Evans and Huxley(2005) summarize that the social inclusion and social capital share the same social phenomena and social capital basically exists across social networks (Jordana, 1999: 552; Whiteley, 1999: 349). For this reason, they hypothesize if individual who often trust another people and enjoy in the voluntary organizations should be influence on his/her social inclusion.

From political right –based thought, as Giddens (1984: 64) remarked the routine of day-to-day life are fundamental to even the most elaborate forms of society. Some of the most powerful political attitudes involve identification with imaginary communities such as the nation state,

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<sup>1</sup> The first meeting about social quality was held in Chiba University in Japan. And the

political party or an ethnic group. There are imaginary communities because there are no chances to interaction between members in large geographies and the distances (Whiteley, 1999: 523). Therefore, the individuals living in different area may share the different political ideologies and form different political attitudes and cultures through political socialization may influence on the feeling of social inclusion.

From social participation perspective, social inclusion is defined as the ability to participate in the normal social, cultural and activities of a society. The solidarity and integration are the main factors of social inclusion. Putnam (1993: 167) considered the trust, norms and network can improve the efficiency of society. In the de Tocqueville famous book, "Democracy in America", voluntary organizations is the basis of social integration and effective democracy. Some of scholars consider the de Tocqueville model is the origin of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993).

From social network perspective, I could summarize that the social inclusion and social capital share the same social phenomena and social capital basically exists across social networks (Jordana, 1999: 552; Whiteley, 1999: 349). For this reason, I hypothesize if individual who often trust another people and enjoy in the voluntary organizations should be influence on his/her social inclusion.

The fact that gender, education, age and other demographic characteristics can be correlated to differentiation/integration is a common observation. For sociologists, the relations of cultural values, social institutions, and the social actors has always been a controversial matter (Effinger, 2004: 14). Stratification is main issue in sociology. Wilson (2006: 341) argues patterns of domination arising from the manipulation of emotional solidarity can be mapped as various forms of community stratification. The control for socio-demographic factors such as gender and living area derive from the hypothesis that the individual who is at different stratification have markedly different cultures, behaviors, and beliefs during their early socialization. Thus, I hypothesize different stratifications including gender, age, education, and other psychological and demographic factors might influence their level of social inclusion.

All the discussion above pays the way of our measurement of independent variable and dependent variables. The suggested measurement of social inclusion and its relevant factors will be addressed in the following section.

## Method

There is no single, tested and robust measure of social inclusion of this sort that is an accepted standard measure. Measures of the component parts of a possible measure, such as access to material goods etc, and social and community participation, are available, but usually do not have adequate psychometrics and there are some reservations about its use.

Following Asia comparison study purpose<sup>2</sup>, in order to obtain the subjective and primary data of social quality in Taiwan, the Social Policy Research Center in National Taiwan University (NTUSPRC) obtain the permission to use a modified the Social Quality Survey (Originally named as Citizen Consciousness National Survey) originally designed by the Institute of Social Development in Seoul National University in Korea) which include the measurement of social

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<sup>2</sup> Here is Asian Social Quality network existing since 2006, which is composed the scholars from Taiwan, Thailand, Korea, Japan, Hong Kong. The purpose is to do research related to social quality and social policy. The seminar, conference, and publications are all under development. Up to know, here are more than 6 seminar held, and now it move to fourth Asia Social Quality Conference.

inclusion. These modifications were based on the Taiwanese cultural context, including the political situation and the issues of minorities.

Because the planned sample size was large and the sampling distribution was randomly designed to cover every administration region in Taiwan<sup>3</sup>, the Social Policy Research Center has sub-contracted the work of data collection to Gallup Corp. in Taiwan. Of the individual contacted, 1682 individual cooperated through the screening section of the survey, 75 of which were ineligible after checking and data cleaning and 1607 of the rest were valid. All the data collection was done from September 21<sup>st</sup> to October 9<sup>th</sup>, 2008.

In order to make our data more representative, we used a quota sampling according to the demography of each administration region in Taiwan. Accordingly, the sex ratio and the age makeup in our sampling were determined by the demographic compositions in each city. In addition, every administration region was divided into two to three sampling areas: one or two metropolitan and one rural area<sup>4</sup>. For instance, Shinyi District and Zhongzheng District represent urban areas while Beitou District represents the rural area in Taipei City. Thus, there are at least two sampling locations in every administrative division in Taiwan. In total, there are 46 sampling locations. .

This social quality survey is a 40 to 50 minute- interview survey used to measure citizens' social quality concerns in Taiwan<sup>5</sup>. The sixty-one questions collected information on the views about nation aims in the future, national identity, social acceptance, social trust, consumption behaviors, job experiences, democratic satisfactory and other socio-demographic characters. There are several ordinal and nominal scales to measure citizens' opinions in these questionnaires.

Table 1 shows the result of goodness-of-fit test between samples and population in gender and age variables in this survey. The population data is from government statistics. The Chi-square is .980 while p value is .322 in gender section and Chi-square is .997 while p value is .607 in age section. The test does not achieve the statistic significant level in both variables. Therefore, the result shows we should accept null hypothesis, in other words, there are no differences between samples and population. Thus the data is representative.

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<sup>3</sup> The survey excluded Kinman and Matsu which are surrounding islands because of its few population percentages.

<sup>4</sup> How many divided areas in one administration region are decided by ratio of population in the region. If there are high ratios of population, the administration region is divided into three or more interview locations to represent metropolitan- rural and if there are low ratios of population, the administration region is divided into two interview locations to represent metropolitan- rural.

<sup>5</sup> Because the survey focuses on citizens' social quality in Taiwan, the survey excluded the juveniles under the 20-year old from samples.



**Table 1 Goodness-of-fit test between sample and population**

Variables		Sample		Population		Goodness-of-Fit Test	
		Frequency	%	Frequency	%	$\chi^2$	P
Gender						.980	.322
	Male	785	48.8%	8,663,031	50%		
	Female	822	51.2%	8,644,358	50%		
Age						.997	.607
	20-34	517	32.2%	1,675,596	32.2%		
	35-49	523	32.5%	1,845,404	35.5%		
	Over 50	567	35.3%	1,674,991	32.2%		


Source: sample data is from this research and population is from Dept. of Household Registration.

This research comes with three hypotheses that that socio-demographic condition can influence the social inclusion status in Taiwan. In addition, political and social variables also have impact on social inclusion. Since the data can represent the population in statistical level well, this research wants to measure these questions:

1. Does socio-demographics can affect people's social inclusion in Taiwan?
2. Does political preference of residents can influence the social inclusion in Taiwan?
3. How does other social contextual variables affect the social inclusion in Taiwan?
4. How are the determinants of individual and other social-political-cultural variables affect the feelings of social inclusion of Taiwanese?

Therefore, the independent variables include social-demographic, political and social variables; the dependent variables are social inclusion variables.

The research framework of our study shows on Figure 1.



**Figure 1 Research framework**

According to the research framework above, the multivariate regression equation of this research is like this:

$$SI = \alpha + \beta_1 Demo_i + \beta_2 Polit_i + \beta_3 Socio_i + \varepsilon_i$$

SI is social inclusion variables, Demo is demographic variables, and Socio is Social variables.  $i$  is every case in this survey from 1 to 1607.  $\beta_1$  to  $\beta_3$  are regression coefficients,  $\alpha$  is intercept, and  $\varepsilon$  is error function, where  $E(\varepsilon) = \sigma_i^2$  in our regression model.

## Variable Definition

According to our research framework and regression equation above, this study selects several questions relevant to the social quality indicators constructed by EFSQ. These relevant questions are used as operational questions to measure Taiwanese people's subjective feelings about social inclusion.

The independent variables in this research are demographic, political, and social variables. Our demographic variables include gender, religious belief, marital status, residential area, education, age and monthly income after tax. Among these demographic variables, four are measured by nominal scale (gender, religious belief, marital status, residential area), one is measured by interval scale (monthly income after tax) and two are measured by ordinal scale (education, age).

Although education and age in this survey categorizes respondents into separate age cohort and educational attainment, education and age are seen as interval data in this research.

Political variables include political attitude and democratic satisfaction<sup>6</sup>, which are measured by the interval scale. Social variables include trust, subjective class identification and the level of group participation<sup>7</sup>. Among these variables, one is nominal data (trust) and two is interval data (subjective class identification and the level of group participation).

Coding values of all the independent variable and type of scales are displayed in the Table 2.

**Table 2 Independent variables**

Independent variables	Sub-variables	Code	Type of data
Demographic	Gender	Female	Discrete
		Male	Discrete
	Age	20 to 87 years old	Continuous
	Education	Elementary to Ph.D.	Continuous
	Religion	Non	Discrete
		yes	Discrete
	Marital status	Single and others	Discrete
		Married	Discrete
	Metro-rural	Rural	Discrete
		Metropolitan	Discrete
	Living Area	North	Discrete
		Central	Discrete
		South	Discrete
		East	Discrete
	Income	NT\$0 to 30,000	Continuous
Political and Democratic	Political Attitudes	Neutral	Discrete
		Pan-blue (KMT)	Discrete
		Pan-green (DPP)	Discrete
	Democratic Satisfaction	0 to 10 scale	Continuous
Social –Cultural participation and involvement	Subjective Class	0 to 10 scale	
	Identification		Continuous
	Group Participation	0 to 11 scale	Continuous
	Specific Trust	Lack of trust	Discrete
		Trust	Discrete

Source: this research.

<sup>6</sup> Democratic satisfaction is a 0 to 10 ordinal scale. Zero score is dissatisfied and ten score is satisfied.

<sup>7</sup> Individual who take pare in one social group gain one score, two social groups gain two scores, and so on. Thus, the social participation index is a 0 to 11 scale. Zero represent the individual does not participate in any social groups, vice versa.

The dependent variable in this research is social inclusion, which is measured by a set of operational questions drawn from our survey. These operational questions correspond to the social quality indicators designed by EFSQ. The operational questions about social inclusion are shown in Table 3.

**Table 3 Standardization of questions about social inclusion (independent variable)**

Domains	Sub-domains	Operational questions
Citizenship rights	Political right	Do you agree with the following statement in Taiwan? Political system reflects the public demand well Court treats everyone equally Electoral law guarantees a fair competition for every candidate Police enforce the law fairly.
	Civil right	Do you agree with the following statement in Taiwan? 1) If an foreign worker wants to stay in Taiwan after the termination of their contract, the government would allow them to stay 2) There are discrimination against the children of foreign brides 3) How do you think the following situations have been changed since 1997? Gap between the rich and the poor Income gap between the rich and the poor Conflicts between workers and capitalists Discrimination on educational attainment Sex discrimination Discrimination on foreign workers Illegality and corruption
	Social right	Do you think that the welfare pension system have been secured? Aging pension Housing Educational allowance Better treatment for foreign worker Benefits for temporary workers Welfare for the poor

Domains	Sub-domains	Operational questions
		Do you agree with the following statement in Taiwan? The need for social welfare was met while pursuing economic growth
Social Services	Social care	Do you think that the social care system is well-settled in Taiwan? Aging pension Housing Educational allowance Better treatment for foreign worker Benefits for temporary workers Welfare for the poor
Social networks	Networks	How democratic relationship have been experienced in Taiwan? Parents and children Manager and labor Teacher and students Civil servants and citizen Higher official and his staff Between generations Doctor and patient

Source: his research.

As stated above, there are several operational questions aiming to measure the subjective feelings of social inclusion. Therefore, we integrate these relative questions into one index and each of them can represent one particular sub-domain of social inclusion, and thus enables us to do further statistics.

The domain of social services and the domain of social networks only have one corresponding question in our current survey. And since this corresponding question was ordinal in nature (used as interval in this research), in order to obtain a score, multiple choices in each questions represent a gradient score from 0 to 5. For example, the score of subjective feelings for social services is from 0 to 24 score; the score of subject feelings of social networks is from 0 to 28. Represented in this way, higher score suggests a high degree of satisfaction with social services and social networks.

In order to guarantee the fitness between the operational questions and those indicators in the domain of social inclusion, I use the correlation and reliability test to measure the inter-consistency between the indices with each question. If there are any questions showing a negative correlation, it should be deleted and add all questions' scores again. The correlation and reliability test of "services" and "social networks" indices are shown in Table 4.

**Table 4** The process of index-establishment in social services and networks

Variables	Operational questions	Correlation with index		Reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha$ )
		r	Sig.	
Social services	Do you think that the welfare pension system is well-settled?	---	---	.742
	Aging pension	.688**	.000	
	Housing	.688**	.000	
	Educational allowance	.683**	.000	
	Better treatment for foreign workers	.539**	.000	
	Benefits for temporary workers	.669**	.000	
	Welfare for the poor	.711**	.000	
networks	How democratic -based relationship have been experienced?	---	---	
	Parents and children	.627**	.000	
	Employers and employees	.701**	.000	
	Teachers and students	.698**	.000	
	Civil servants and citizen	.690**	.000	
	Superiors and subordinates	.708**	.000	
	Older and younger generations	.655**	.000	
	Doctors and patients	.634**	.000	

\*\*p<.001

Source: this research.

Second, in the citizenship rights index, I use factor analysis to extract different factors about citizenship rights and test its reliability to build up the indices, because there are diversified questions and fit to factor analysis. Table 5 shows the result.

**Table 5 Factor analysis on citizenship rights index**

Rename variables	Operational Questions	Factor loading	% of variance	Reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha$ )
The level of satisfaction on social rights	Do you think that the welfare pension system should be expanded or reduced?	---	13.912	.707
	Old-age pension	.715		
	House	.725		
	Education support	.690		
	Unfixed worker	.615		
	Welfare for people in poverty	.729		
	Do you think that the welfare pension system is well-settled?	---		
	Welfare should come first than economic growth	.380		
The level of satisfaction with political rights	Do you agree or disagree to the followings?	---	13.245	.821
	Political system reflects public demand well	.761		
	Courthouse judges everyone equally	.846		
	Electoral law guarantees a fair competition for every candidate	.805		
	Police carries out the enforcement fairly	.786		
The level of inequality feeling	How do you think the following categories have been changed since 1997?	---	10.294	.608
	Difference between the capital and others	.612		
	Gap between rich and poor	.780		
	Conflict between labor and capital	.744		
	Illegality and corruption	.467		
The level of discrimination feeling	How do you think the following social reality have been changed since 1997?	---	8.983	.657
	Distinction on academic clique	.539		
	Sex discrimination	.842		
	Discrimination on alien workers	.819		

Rename variables	Operational Questions	Factor loading	% of variance	Reliability (Cronbach's $\alpha$ )
	Do you agree or disagree to the following	---		
The level of satisfaction with foreign worker's right	If an alien worker wants to stay in Taiwan	.772		
	after training, the Government should let him stay		6.329	.316
	Do you think that the welfare pension system	---		
	should be expanded or reduced?			
	Better treatment for alien worker	.655		
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy=.772				
Cumulative % of squared loadings=52.672%				

Source: this research.

Therefore seven indices about social inclusion were constructed in this study. Five indices which are extracted by factor analysis from citizenship rights domains; two indices are from original domains. Total indices about social inclusion built up in this study are the level of satisfaction on social rights, political rights, dissatisfaction on social inequality, and dissatisfaction on discrimination, satisfaction of foreign worker's rights, social services and social networks.

Since our dependent variable, social inclusion is separated into seven dependent variables as stated above after factor analysis. Here are original regression equations written precisely:

$$\text{SI Model I} = \text{Social rights} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Demo}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polit}_i + \beta_3 \text{Socio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{SI Model II} = \text{Political rights} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Demo}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polit}_i + \beta_3 \text{Socio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{SI Model III} = \text{Inequality} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Demo}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polit}_i + \beta_3 \text{Socio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{SI Model IV} = \text{Discrimination} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Demo}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polit}_i + \beta_3 \text{Socio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{SI Model V} = \text{Foreign worker's rights} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Demo}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polit}_i + \beta_3 \text{Socio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{SI Model VI} = \text{Social services} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Demo}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polit}_i + \beta_3 \text{Socio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$\text{SI Model VII} = \text{Social networks} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Demo}_i + \beta_2 \text{Polit}_i + \beta_3 \text{Socio}_i + \varepsilon_i$$

## Data Analysis

As stated above, this study finally build up all the indices needed to measure social inclusion in Taiwan . Univariate descriptive statistics are first conducted to evaluate the distributions and frequencies of each variable (Table 6).

Possible multicollinearity of independent variables is diagnosed by Pearson's correlation coefficients and variance inflation factor (VIF) in regression models. All the analyses are conducted using the SPSS 16.0. I chose the simultaneous method not stepwise in SPSS 16.0 on purpose to express the explanations of all independent variables in our regression models.



**Table 6 The scores of social inclusion in Taiwan<sup>8</sup>**

Citizenship right				Services	Networks	
Social rights	Political rights	Inequality	Discrimination	Foreign rights	Social services	Social networks
.125	.003	-.001	.003	-.032	8.667	0.643

Source: this research.

The multivariate regression model summaries display on Table 7. The ANOVA tests show all the models reach statistic significant level and Durbin-watson values are between 1.590 to 1.897, it means there are no autocorrelation on error function and the residual analyze prove that the regression models are fit to statistic hypotheses although the coefficient of determination (R<sup>2</sup>) show the goodness-of-fit in each model is not very suitable.

**Table 7 Multivariate regression model summaries**

Social Inclusion model	F	R <sup>2</sup>	Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	Durbin-watson
Social right (model I)	2.420**	.049	.029	1.590
Political right (model II)	7.102**	.131	.112	1.853
Inequality (model III)	5.294**	.101	.082	1.897
Discrimination (model IV)	2.210**	.045	.024	1.792
Foreigner's right (model V)	6.064***	.114	.095	1.823
Social Services (model VI)	1.723*	.035	.015	1.591
Social Networks (model VII)	4.317***	.084	.064	1.725

Source: this research.

Results of ordinary least-squares regression modeling on demographic, political, and social variables are displayed in Table 8.

<sup>8</sup> The scores of category of citizenship rights are medians which are standardization scores from factor analysis. The scores of categories of services and networks are average scores from adding the relative questions directly. The higher score the better feeling on each category.

Table 8 Ordinary least-squares regression results

Variables	Citizenship right					Social Services	Social Networks
	Social right	Political right	Inequality	Discrimination	Foreigner right	Social services	Social networks
<b>Demographic variables</b>							
1. Gender							
Female	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Male	-.100	.121	-.022	.033	<b>.232**</b>	-.074	-.525
2. Age	-.002	-.003	<b>.016***</b>	.002	<b>-.015***</b>	-.012	<b>.041**</b>
3. Education	-.011	<b>-.107**</b>	<b>-.072*</b>	<b>.072*</b>	.05	-.023	<b>.397**</b>
4. Religious							
Non	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Belief	<b>.178*</b>	-.028	<b>-.154*</b>	-.011	-.124	.269	.055
5. Marriage							
Single	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Married	-.092	.137	-.012	.094	.011	-.213	.350
6. Metro-rural							
Rural	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Metropolitan	.057	-.022	<b>-.224**</b>	-.087	<b>-.189**</b>	.039	.104
7. Area							
North	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Central	-.089	.035	-.096	-.111	.062	-.115	-.321
South	<b>-.343***</b>	.082	.033	<b>-.197**</b>	.093	<b>-.584**</b>	-.268
East	-.081	.071	-.007	-.135	-.061	-.174	.519
8. Income	-.004	<b>-.018*</b>	-.005	-.014	.005	-.007	.017
<b>Political variables</b>							
1. Political attitude							
Neutral	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Pan-blue (KMT)	-.041	<b>.151*</b>	<b>-.191*</b>	.115	-.018	-.127	.037
Pan-green (DPP)	<b>.218*</b>	-.036	.028	.102	-.098	.345	.022
2. Democratic satisfaction	.011	<b>.132***</b>	<b>.040*</b>	<b>.058**</b>	.013	.044	<b>.190*</b>
<b>Social variables</b>							
1. Class	-.048	<b>.055*</b>	<b>.039*</b>	.021	-.025	-.111	.187
2. Group participation	-.015	<b>.050**</b>	<b>.044**</b>	-.005	<b>.057**</b>	-.002	-.017
3. Trust							
Don't trust	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Trust	-.049	<b>.160**</b>	.095	.048	<b>.146*</b>	-.025	.395

\*p&lt;.05, \*\*p&lt;.01, \*\*\*p&lt;.001

Source: this research.

**Table 9 The significant factors influence social inclusion in Taiwan**

Variables	Most significant	Significant
Demographic variables	Education	Age Residential area
Political variables	Democratic satisfaction	Political attitudes
Social variables		Group participation level Subjective class identification

Source: this research.

## Findings and discussions

Table 5 displays the overall of social inclusion in Taiwan. Across all categories of social inclusion, the scores are not very high. Of all of categories, “inequality” and “foreign workers’ rights” are reported negative while all of categories are reported positive. Therefore, people are not satisfied with inequality and alien workers’ conditions. Although there are no ideal statistics in Table 5, there are big improvements in social inclusion in Taiwan.

As Table 8, I enter three main variables compulsorily into our models. In our first model about the level of concern on social rights, there are two demographic variables, religious and area, reach the significant level and political attitude also reach the statistic standard in political variables. The individual who do not live in southern Taiwan, have beliefs, and support pan-green camp are more support and concern with the social welfare systems than others. The model II shows the people who are at low education and low income level often satisfied with the political rights while the political and social variables have positive impacts on political right satisfaction in Taiwan.

Regarding the part of social equality concern, the order people with higher class and enjoy in the social activities feel society in Taiwan is more equal, while people who is atheism with lower education and live in rural area feel society is more unequal.

With respect to the discrimination modle, there are only variables such as education, living area, and democratic satisfaction achieve statistic significant level on discrimination regression model. The higher education and higher democratic satisfaction might tend to feel that there is less discrimination in Taiwanese society. At the same time, the individual who do not live in southern Taiwan also feel less discrimination.

In addition to those citizenship rights, our model displays the gender, age, and metro-rural demographic variables achieve the significant level while there are no significant in political variables in foreign worker’s rights. Male as well as youths are much concern with alien workers than female and elders. Urban residents seem to have less care about foreign workers than rural residents. People who often trust others and engage in social activities have directly influence on foreign workers’ rights variables.

In social services model, there is only one variable achieve statistic significant level which means individual who is not southern residents may support the welfare systems than others in Taiwan. In addition, people in higher educational and elder categories report the better social network relations than younger and lower education. Moreover, there are positive correlations

between democratic satisfaction and social networks variables while there are no social variables show statistic significant marks.

Across all models, education which significantly associated with four of seventh independent variables is the most important variables to social inclusion in Taiwan. The poor education categories report much better social inclusion experiences than higher education in political rights, and inequality categories. Discrimination and networks are exceptions. Meanwhile, democratic satisfaction also reports four of seventh significant associations with social inclusion in political dependent variables. The results show that the more satisfied with democratic situations the more social inclusion experiences. The education and democratic satisfaction is the most important variables can impact social inclusion in Taiwan.

Age, living area in demographic variables, and the group participation in social variables are the subordinate variables to the social inclusion in Taiwan since they all have three significant associations at least. The elders report they content with equal society and feel comfortable in social spaces while the younger care about the social rights toward foreign workers. In addition, the southern residents seem do not content with social rights, discriminations, and social services than those who do not live in southern Taiwan. Of course, the more enjoy in the social activities the more satisfied with political right, social justice, and care about foreigners' human rights according to our regression model.

Finally, there are subtle connections between some independent variables and social inclusion including gender, income, class, urban-rural, and trust. However, marriage variables do not show any significant associations in our seven social inclusion models.

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## Efforts to Improve Citizen Participation in the Democratic Process in Canada

Ms. Laura Edgar

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Institute On Governance

- Institute On Governance
  - A Canadian, independent, not-for-profit institution
  - Mission: '*Advancing better governance in the public interest,*'
  - What We Do: explore, develop and promote the principles, standards and practices which underlie good governance in the public sphere, both in Canada and abroad
  - Practice Areas: Modernizing Government; Organizational Governance; Aboriginal Governance, Health, Innovation, International Programming; Governance Laboratory



Institute On Governance

- Today's Presentation:
  - IOG's approach to governance
  - Social quality and quality of democracy: Examples of efforts to better engage citizens in democracy
    - The Ontario Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform
    - Debate 2.0: Engaging Youth in the Democratic Process (City of Ottawa)
  - Opportunities for the use of the web to engage citizens

2



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Governance is the process whereby societies or organizations make their important decisions, determine whom they involve and how they render account.

3





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## IOG's Principles of Good Governance

- Legitimacy & voice
- Direction & purpose
- Effective performance
- Accountability & transparency
- Fairness & ethical behaviour

4



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## The Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform

- Held in province of Ontario (2006-2007)
- Current system: Single Member Plurality ("first past the post")
- Citizens' Assembly created to assess and recommend whether to retain Ontario's current electoral system or adopt a different one. Any recommended change was to be put to the Ontario electorate in a referendum during the next provincial election.
- Assembly consisted of 103 randomly selected citizens from each of the electoral ridings in Ontario, plus the Chair
- Secretariat support
- Institute On Governance was contracted to monitor and evaluate the Assembly process

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### Three phases for the Assembly:

- Learning
- Consultation
- Deliberation

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### Phase 1 - Learning

- Goal:
  - to improve the knowledge and confidence of Assembly members regarding electoral systems
- Methods: plenary lectures by staff and guest visitors; small group sessions; personal study; plenary discussions by the whole assembly; informal conversations with staff and other members

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## Phase 2 – Consultation

- Goals:
  - to raise awareness among the Ontario public about the Citizens' Assembly and opportunities to participate
  - Participation by a broad range of Ontarians in the Citizens' Assembly process
- Methods: website; news reports; advertisements in newspapers; distribution of consultation guides and brochures; public meetings, written submissions.

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## Phase 3 – Deliberation

- Goals:
  - The Assembly facilitates group cohesion, dialogue and deliberation
  - The Assembly members have ownership of the Assembly's decisions (The final decision of the Assembly is supported by more than 90% of the members)
- Methods: Agreed upon values and procedures; Chair; facilitators

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- **Additional Goals:**

- Support – the Assembly is well-supported by the Secretariat team
- Transparency – the Assembly process is transparent and well documented for the historical record and for the benefit of future exercises

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### Key Evaluation Results

- **Learning:**

- Members' assessment of the degree to which they felt informed about electoral systems increased substantially over the course of the learning phase.
- All of the members' ratings related to the learning objective – educational support, preparation, balance, organization, understanding, usefulness, individual plenary sessions and small group sessions – were either 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied'

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## Key Evaluation Results

- Consultation
  - The Citizens' Assembly website was visited by 58,002 Ontario visitors between July 2006 and May 2007.
  - 501 people made presentations at the 41 public consultation meetings held throughout the province. This exceeded the target of 350 people. Online registration system considered simple and effective.
  - Of the presenters, 77% were male and 23% were female.
  - 986 written submissions received. Lower than target of 1,500 submissions.
  - 87% of members found the written submissions to be very or somewhat informative.
  - Over 95% of members found the public meetings to be very or somewhat informative.

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## Key Evaluation Results

- Deliberation
  - Members' rating related to the deliberation objective (the Assembly facilitates group cohesion, dialogue and deliberation) was 'very satisfied'
  - The average members' rating on their ability to raise questions and express their views was 'very satisfied'
  - Assembly took a number of decisions throughout the process. Key decision was whether to recommend a different electoral system to the people of Ontario. 92.16% of members supported the final decision (goal was more than 90% support).

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- The Recommendation:
  - That Ontario adopt a form of mixed member proportional representation (MMP)
  - Key Characteristics:
    - 2 votes per citizen of Ontario – one vote for a local candidate and one for a political party.
    - Election results are proportional - the party vote determines the share of seats a party wins in the legislature.

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- Referendum
  - Referendum results binding if passed by 60% of the vote overall, and by 50% of the vote in each of at least 64 of the 107 electoral districts (i.e. 60% of them). This threshold was set by the Ontario cabinet.
  - Referendum held October 10, 2007 (same day as the provincial election)
  - Actual Result: The proposal was rejected by 63% of voters. Status quo remains in Ontario.

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- **Lessons Learned**

- Importance of access to expertise, and having information presented in a helpful way and pitched at a level that the members could easily understand
- Importance of a variety of methods to promote learning among participants
- Do not overlap the learning and consultation phases
- Allocate more resources to communications and networking, and better monitoring results of communications efforts
- Key role of the Chair of the Assembly in facilitating discussion and deliberations
- Create a plan that provides enough structure to manage deliberations in 'manageable pieces'
- More communications / outreach to citizens in advance of the referendum

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- **Debate 2.0: Engaging Youth in the Democratic Process through Social Media**

- Disengagement of youth in the democratic process an increasing concern in many jurisdictions
- Debate, organized by the Institute On Governance, held to encourage participation by Ottawa youth leading up to municipal elections on October 25, 2010
- live, bilingual, interactive debate with four mayoral candidates

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### Social media played a key role in the debate:

- Goal was to organize a live debate and enable youth to participate live not only from the debate venue but also from a distance
- The IOG partnered with organizations with expertise in social media
- The IOG also brought in social media moderators that use these forms of media every day and are respected in their field

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- The results:
  - Over 200 questions received for candidates through Twitter and a live blog
  - The live stream and live blog were syndicated to a number of other websites throughout the city
  - Over 500 people watched the online portion of the debate

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### Lessons Learned

- Social Media allows for ongoing engagement. Technology has allowed citizens and candidates to continue the conversation after the debate.
- An inexpensive way to engage citizens; the tools are already available.
- Government needs to keep up with technology – and consider its use in an engagement strategy – as the technology is already widely in use among its citizens.
- Conversations using social media do need to be managed

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### • Broader Lessons on the Power of the Web

- The 1990s:
  - 1<sup>st</sup> application of web technology to government services in Canada focused on transactions (e.g. finding information; changing addresses, requesting a permit etc.)
  - Challenge: e-government applications built in the image of existing organizational structures. Little attention to real drivers of cost savings and improvements to service delivery, such as re-designing existing work.

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– The 2000s:

- Recognition that e-government was just one component of a broader shift in the role of government
- Citizens demanded more accountability and transparency in service delivery
- Move to a new model of service delivery that is not a mass production machine but a more holistic approach with service directly connected to outcomes.

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- The Web and Service Delivery to Citizen: Getting Started on the Journey
  - Collaboration is the key. Re-evaluate what is possible and look at problems differently
  - Leverage new channels for feedback
  - Enable genuine customization with MyGovernment page for every citizen

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For further information:

- Visit the Institute On Governance website:  
[www.iog.ca](http://www.iog.ca)
- Email Laura Edgar, Vice President –  
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Thai panel discussion

## Thai Social Quality: Current Situation and Future Trends





## Social Quality in Thailand

**Dr. Thawilwadee Bureekul**

Director of Research and Development Office,  
King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI)

### Abstract

“**S**ocial Quality” is the measure of quality in society. It looks at quality at both the individual and societal level. There are four dimensions of social quality: Socio-Economic Security, Social Inclusion, Social Cohesion and Social Empowerment. These dimensions are used to measure, evaluate and improve social quality. This report explored the condition of social quality in Thailand based on survey data collected by KPI from 2000 to 2010 and survey data collected as part of the Asian Social Quality Network Project and the Thailand Social Quality Network in 2009.

The results of the study show that Thailand has attempted to strengthen its economy and society with several social and economic policies. Regarding Social Inclusion, findings uncovered that many Thai people feel discriminated against due to their status. This status discrimination can be economic (financial and job related) or social. The findings of the Social Cohesion dimension of the study show that Thailand is still very

fragile. People's trust in their fellow citizens, institutions and political parties has declined over the study period. However, the strength of Thai identity and pride in Thai citizenship has allowed Thai society to maintain some cohesion. The study concludes that enhancing social empowerment through "**policy making**" is the best way to rebuild trust and reduce the status gap, ensuring that all those who live in a community can take part in the way that community is governed. It is not only about the opportunity to be involved, but also the accessibility of rights. The study concludes that there are still imbalances in access to rights that need to be addressed.



# Social Quality in Thailand<sup>1</sup>

## Thailand Team<sup>2</sup>

Working paper on Social Quality in Thailand

Many countries have developed the indicators to measure national social quality. Many of them use GNP as the indicator and it cannot explain the real situation of the quality of life, society, environment and mentality of the people. Therefore, many countries try to develop the effective indicators to measure social quality.

Thailand, the country with 61.5 million populations, is one of those countries that develop the indicators to measure social quality to help evaluate the performance of the government agencies at both national and community levels. At the national level, the Office of National Economic and Social Development Board have this responsibility and at the community level, the Department of Social Development and the Social Welfare Department have developed the indicators at community level. The social quality index that has been

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<sup>1</sup> Data on which this paper is based are funded by King Prajadhipok's Institute

<sup>2</sup> Thailand team is the Network of the researchers on Social Quality in Thailand consists of Dr. Thawilwadee Bureekul (King Prajadhipok's Institute-KPI), Prof. Surasit Vajirakajorn (National Institute of Development Administration), Prof. Surichai Wankaew (Chulalongkorn University), and Walaiporn Losussachan (KPI)

developed in Thailand concentrates on family relationship, self support on economy, information, health, social capital, adaptability, and risk avoidance.

However, the social quality index cannot explain clear condition of the society. Therefore, the new approach to measure social quality is developed.

King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI), as the academic institute concerned with the democratic development of Thailand, realizes that studying and measuring current levels of social quality will be valuable for general societies as a whole. KPI, working in collaboration with National Institute of Development Administration and Chulalongkorn University, intends to studies the social quality of Thailand based on the conceptual framework developed by the European Foundation on Social Quality (Beck, Van der Maeson, and et.al. 2001) and the Asian Social Quality Network . The 4 dimensions of social quality, socio-economic security, social inclusion, social cohesion and social empowerment are employed. However, with the limitation of data, the researchers, therefore, use some important indicators to explain social quality situation in Thailand.

The objectives of the research are to study the overall level of quality in Thailand and to be the reference site for measuring and tracking social quality in Thailand as well as to build up the knowledge base of applied-research into social and democratic development

## **What is Social Quality?**

According to the European Foundation on Social Quality, social quality is a comprehensive conception of the quality of people's daily lives. It is a function of the constant tension between individual self-realization and participation in the various collective identities that constitute everyday life. Van der Maeson and Walker (2005: 11-12) identified social quality as the extent to which people are able to participate in the social and economic life and development of their communities under conditions which enhance their wellbeing and individual potential.

Social quality is proposed as a goal not only of social policy but of economic, environmental and other relevant policies.

## **Four Dimensions of Social Quality**

### **Socio-economic security**

Socio-economic security refers to the extent to which people have resources over time. In this study, we focus on financial resources, housing and environment, health care, and employment.

### **Social inclusion**

Social inclusion is the extent to which people have access to and are integrated into, the various institutions and social relations that constitute everyday life. Access to social services is particularly crucial for those who lack resources. Such additional resources can help to them to return to mainstream society. (Chan, Raymond K.H., 2007: 50) Here we define social inclusion in the form of citizenship rights, labor market (such as access to paid employment and civic/cultural services), and social network.

## **Social cohesion**

Social cohesion is the extent that social relations, values and norms are shared and accepted collectively. Social cohesion includes trust which comprises generalized trust and specific trust, social network and identities.

## **Social empowerment**

Social empowerment is the ability to act and interact in the content of social relations in various domains. It is the extent to which the personal capabilities of individual people and their ability to act are enhanced by social relations. Social empowerment includes knowledge based, and labor market on control over employment contract, prospects of job mobility, and reconciliation of work and family life.

## **State of Social Quality in Thailand**

This paper looks at how social quality can be measured empirically in Thailand. The authors use data from King Prajadhipok's Institute surveys to help explain social quality in Thailand. The data for this analysis were obtained from probability samples of communities in Thailand. The latest survey was conducted during October 20 – November 10, 2009. The procedure used was multi – stage sampling. The samples are eligible voters or those with 18 years of age and above. A four-stage probability sample based upon legislative provinces, then districts, then sub-districts, villages, communities and then the samples. The total number of samples is 1,200.

This process produced a true probability sampling. It represents one of the few (if not the only) probability-based samples of the Thai population for social attitudes. Here, we present the data that characterize the Thai population across the kingdom in attitudes toward social quality, indicating the level of attitudinal social quality values among the Thai people in which socio-economic security, social cohesion, social inclusion and social empowerment are included.

## **Demographics**

Approximately 49.9 percent of the respondents are males and 51.1 percent are females, 28.2 percent are those with the age between 18-29 years old and 24.7 percent are those with 30-39 and 22 percent are 40-49 years old, 13.8 percent are 50-59 years old the rest are those with over 60 years old.

For the religion of the respondents, 90 percent are Buddhist, 9.3 percent are Muslims. For the marital status, 61.2 percent are married, 26.3 percent are single, 8.8 percent are divorced and widow. 1.4 percent are separated and 2 percent are living together without being married.

For education level, the majority of the respondents are those with primary education level (37.5 percent), 13.5 percent finished secondary school, 18 percent finished high school and 17.4 percent got BA degree.

Approximately 30 percent of the respondents have no children. For those who have children, one forth have 2 children (26.3 percent) and 19.3 percent have one child.

For occupation, three forth are those employed with salary (78.4 percent).

Table 1 Occupation

occupation	percent
<b>total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
1. Managers, senior officials and legislators	7.0
2. Professionals	5.6
3. Technicians and associate%o professionals	3.7
4. Clerks	6.3
5. Service and sales workers	11.9
6. Skilled agricultural, fishery,%o%o and forestry workers	35.1
7. Craft and related trades%oworkers	12.3
8. Plant and machine%o%ooperators, and assemblers	4.9
9. Elementary occupations	12.6
10. Armed forces occupations	0.6

### Socio-economic Security

From the study, during the past year, half of the respondents said that their family 'Just get by' (51.9 percent), one forth (24.8 percent) said that they can save money, 15.6 percent have 'Spent savings and borrowed money', 7.2 percent have 'Spent some savings', the rest (0.5 percent) don't know.

When asking the respondents about various events and conditions that happen to people during the last 12 months, 15.3 and 12.4 percent of the respondents had wounded at work and paid for medical expense respectively.

Table 2 Events and conditions that happen to people during the last 12 months

Experienced any of the following?	percent			
	total	1 Yes	2 No	3 Don't know
1) Family disbanding (such as separation with your partner, divorce, etc.)	100.0	5.4	93.0	1.6
2) Medical expenses that cost you a lot (such as hospitalization, operation, nursing home etc.)	100.0	12.4	86.3	1.3
3) Job loss or business bankruptcy	100.0	7.5	90.7	1.8
4) Job insecurity (such as getting switched from a regular to non-regular position)	100.0	4.5	94.0	1.5
5) Wounded at work	100.0	15.3	83.3	1.4
6) Becoming a victim of crime (such as fraud, burglary, robbery, personal assault, murder, etc.)	100.0	3.7	94.9	1.4

Three forth of the respondents are very unlikely to leave the accommodation within 6 months.

**Table 3 Need to leave your accommodation within the next six months because the respondents can no longer afford it**

need to leave your accommodation within the next six months	percent
<b>total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
1) Very likely	2.2
2) Quite likely	4.7
3) Quite unlikely	18.2
4) Very unlikely	72.2
5) Don't know	2.7

#### Satisfaction with any problems

When asking about the satisfaction with where the respondents live now - the immediate neighborhood. How satisfied or unsatisfied are you with each of the following problems, 21.7, 20.9 and 20.2 percent of the respondents are not satisfied with solid waste, water quality and crime respectively.


**Table 4 Satisfaction level with where the respondents live now.**

issues	Level of satisfaction					
	total	(1) Very unsatisfied	(2) Somewhat unsatisfied	(3) Somewhat satisfied	(4) Very satisfied	(5) Don't know
1) Noise	100.0	2.1	16.6	45.8	35.3	0.2
2) Air pollution	100.0	3.1	15.2	44.3	37.2	0.2
3) Lack of access to recreational or green areas	100.0	1.2	11.6	44.8	42.1	0.3
4) Water quality	100.0	4.2	16.7	44.9	34.0	0.2
5) Crime, violence or vandalism	100.0	2.3	17.9	46.5	32.0	1.3
6) Noise	100.0	3.7	18	47.6	30.3	0.4

When ask about the last occasion that the respondents needed to see a doctor or medical specialist, to what extent each of the following factors make it difficult for the respondents to do so, 37.9 percent of the respondents said that they found the delay in getting appointment, 33.9 percent said that they have difficulties in the waiting time to see doctor on day of appointment and almost 30 percent said that the difficulty is the distance to the hospital.

**Table 5** percentage of the respondents that find difficulties to see the doctors

issues	Level of difficulties					
	total	(1) Very difficult	(2) A little difficult	(3) Not difficult at all	(4) Not applicable / never needed to see doctor	(5) Don't know
1) Distance to doctor's office / hospital / medical center	100.0	3.4	26.1	66.7	3.3	0.5
2) Delay in getting appointment	100.0	6.7	31.2	57.0	4.1	1.0
3) Waiting time to see doctor on day of appointment	100.0	9.7	34.2	50.2	4.6	1.3
4) Cost of seeing the doctor	100.0	2.5	19.6	72.5	4.5	0.9

**Figure 1** the difficulties to see the doctors

Moreover, for the providing of the various programs at work, when asking about how easy or how difficult is it to actually use those programs, the majority of the respondents said that they did not provide that program (75-94 percent). The program they receive mostly is the maternity leave.

**Table 6 Providing with the following program at work**

	I am provided with the following program at work			
	total	Yes	No	No answer
1) Maternity leave for women who are pregnant or recently gave a birth	100.0	20.0	75.4	4.6
2) Childcare leave for women with a baby less than 12 months old	100.0	6.4	88.7	4.9
3) Childcare leave for men with a baby less than 12 months old	100.0	2.2	92.8	5.0
4) Day care center at work	100.0	1.1	94.0	4.9

For the respondents' health condition, the majority said that they have good and very good health. Only 4.3 percent said that they have bad and very bad health.

**Table 7 health condition**

Health condition	percent
<b>total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
1) Very good	15.0
2) Good	51.2
3) Fair	29.3
4) Bad	3.9
5) Very bad	0.4
6) Don't know	0.2

## Social Cohesion

### Trust

Is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms? (Fukuyama, 1995:25).

In this study, one forth or 24.5 percent said that most people can be trusted and three forth said that we need to be very careful in dealing with people. When compare with the previous survey conducted by King Prajadhipok's Institute, the degree of trust on other people increased gradually every year and dropped after the year 2006. The reason for this is that the coupdetat in September 19, 2006 create the strong political conflict in Thai society (Burekul, 2008).

Table 8 Trust on people

trust	percent
total	100.0
<input type="checkbox"/> Most people can be trusted	24.5
<input type="checkbox"/> Can't be too careful	72.5
<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	3.0

Figure 2 Trust on people





Figure 3 Trust on people from 2002-2009 (percent)



Source: King Prajadhipok's Institute survey on democratization in Thailand

For various groups of people, most respondents trust the people in the same family (91 percent) and 90 percent trust the neighbors and Personal acquaintances. The least trust goes to the strangers (10.3 percent).



**Table 9: trust various groups of people**

groups of people	Degree of trust on people					
	total	(1) Trust them completely	(2) Trust them a little bit	(3) Do not trust them very much	(4) Do not trust them at all	(5) Don't know
1) Family	100.0	94.9	4.2	0.7	-	0.2
2) Neighbors	100.0	38.8	53.4	6.8	0.8	0.2
3) Personal acquaintances	100.0	36.9	55.4	6.4	1.2	0.1
4) Strangers	100.0	0.5	9.8	45.4	44	0.3
5) People with different religion from you	100.0	0.8	22.2	50.4	23.8	2.8
6) Foreigners	100.0	1.2	19.2	49.1	27.7	2.8
7) Your doctor	100.0	56.4	31	5.9	4.8	1.9
8) National political leader (such as governor, president, party leader etc)	100.0	21.4	48.3	18.8	9.2	2.3

**Table 10 Trust on various Organizations (Oct-Nov, 2009)**

Organizations/ Institutions	percent <sup>3</sup>
1) Religious organizations	88.3
2) Army	86.1
3) Newspapers	74.7
4) TVs	79.0
5) Labor unions	61.3
6) Police	74.5
7) Judiciary	86.5
8) Administration	81.6
9) Political parties	55.7
10) Parliament (or equivalent, depending on your country's system)	65.4
11) NGOs	58.0
12) Major Companies	57.0
13) Scientists	76.3

<sup>3</sup> Trust completely and trust a little bit

Organizations/ Institutions	percent <sup>3</sup>
14) University	85.9
15) Charitable or humanitarian organizations	75.4
16) Banks	88.2

For the groups that would not like to be the neighbors, most respondents mentioned the drug addicts (90.8 percent), and 86.4 and 80.2 percent mentioned the people with a criminal record and someone with a mental health problem respectively.

**Figure 4 : Trust in various independent organizations**  
(survey conducted by KPI and National statistical Office in June –August, 2009)




Table 10.1 Trust in Institutions (percentage) (2001-2008) (Bureekul, 2009)

<b>Institutions</b>	<b>December, 2001 (2)</b>	<b>July, 2002 (1)</b>	<b>April, 2006 (3)</b>	<b>25 June -12 August, 2007 (4)</b>	<b>Ocobert 1- November 30, 2008 (5)</b>
Prime Minister		88.5	70.6		37.6 ( Mr.Samak)
Member of Parliament (MPS) (Representatives)		79.7			36.5
Senate		79.4			39.8
Political Parties	51.7	71.2	66.8	26.1	33.2
Opposition Parties		75.4			
Cabinet	69.1	84.7	65.9	45.2	34.4
Parliament	60.6	81.8	65.1		
Civil Services	69.3	75.1	75.1	52.1	59.9
Police		63.7	66.7	55.4	57
Military	80	94	80	61.8	70.1
Local Government			76.2	49.4	53.4
Administrative Court		79.7	84		62.6
Court of Justices		75	78.9	72.4	68.2
Constitutional Court	81.8	74.3		64.6	60.4
Ombudsman		80	78.2		48
Auditor General		73.1	75	48.5	48
National Economic and Social Advisory Council		73.1	75	36.9	35.3
National Counter Corruption	79.8	72.5	71.1	53.9	48.1
National Human Right Commission		85.3	78.2	38.2	38.2
Election Commission	70	72.4	64.1	47.7	49.6
Anti-Money Laundering Office - AMLO		66.8	70		
NGOs		57.4	57.3	25	22.9
TV	79.5	92.3	70.1	72.6	57.8
Newspaper		59.2	66.1	53.8	44.3
Radio				48.4	
Community Radio				46.6	
<a href="#">The Council for National Security (CNS)[1]</a>				41.8	
<a href="#">National Legislative Assembly[2]</a>				35.6	
<a href="#">The Asset Examination Committee (AEC)[3]</a>				42.8	
Provincial governors				66.5	
Medical doctors in public hospitals				71.4	74.4
Medical doctors in private hospitals				66.7	71.7
Customs				37.7	
Officers at Department of Lands				41.1	48.5

Sources: (1) and (2) Albritton and Bureekul, 2002 a and 2002  
 (3) survey on measuring the democratization in Thailand by King Prajadhipok's Institute  
 (4) National Statistical Office and King Prajadhipok's Institute , 2008, Report on the Survey on the public Satisfaction on Public Services Delivery and Various Organizations' Performance , n = 34, 776 ( samples are the Thais at the age of 18 and over in all regions)  
 (5) King Prajadhipok's Institute , 2009, Report on the Survey on the public Satisfaction on Public Services Delivery and Various Organizations' Performance , n = 30,600 ( samples are the Thais at the age of 18 and over in all regions)

For the groups that would not like to be the neighbors, most respondents mentioned the drug addicts (90.8 percent), and 86.4 and 80.2 percent mentioned the people with a criminal record and someone with a mental health problem respectively.

**Table 11: On this list are various groups of people.  
 Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?**

	would not like to have as neighbors			
	total	Mentioned	Not Mentioned	Don't know
1) Drug addicts	100.0	90.8	8.7	0.5
2) People of a different race	100.0	21.9	76.4	1.7
3) People who have AIDS	100.0	55.9	41.4	2.7
4) Immigrants/foreign workers	100.0	55.4	41.8	2.8
5) Homosexuals	100.0	23.2	74.6	2.2
6) People of a different religion	100.0	18.0	80.2	1.8
7) Heavy drinkers	100.0	73.2	24.7	2.1
8) Unmarried couples living together	100.0	12.4	86.2	1.4
9) People who speak a different language	100.0	20.7	77.2	2.1
10) People with a criminal record	100.0	86.4	11.7	1.9
11) Someone with a mental health problem	100.0	80.2	15.8	4.0

For the pride of being Thai, 99.4 percent said that they are proud to be Thais.

**Table 12 How proud are you to be a Thai Nationality?**

How proud are you to be a Thai Nationality	percent
<b>total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
1) <input type="checkbox"/> Very proud	92.4
2) <input type="checkbox"/> Quite proud	7.0
3) <input type="checkbox"/> Not very proud	0.1
4) <input type="checkbox"/> Not at all proud	0.1
5) <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	0.4

About 95.4 percent said that they feel closed to the neighbors and 71.6 percent feel closed to the residents in the same city.

**Table 13 How close to or distant from do you feel about the following identities you might have?**

	How close to or distant from do you feel					
	Very close	Close	Distant	Very distant	Don't Know	Very close
1) Resident of my neighborhood	100.0	50.1	45.3	4.1	0.3	0.2
2) Resident of my city	100.0	13.0	58.6	26.3	1.3	0.8
3) Resident of a metropolis or province	100.0	3.8	40.3	47.5	7.4	1.0
4) A Thai	100.0	10.3	43.2	34.0	11.7	0.8
5) Member of a Thai ethnicity	100.0	9.5	46.6	30.6	12.2	1.1
6) An Asian	100.0	2.6	13.8	48.0	32.8	2.8
7) A World Citizen	100.0	3.3	12.5	36.1	44.4	3.7

For the direct contact, 83 percent said that they have contact with their family more than once or everyday.

**Table 14 Thinking of people living outside of your household how often do you have direct (face to face)/indirect(by phone, e-mail, by post) contact with**

	how often do you have direct(face to face)/indirect(by phone, e-mail, by post) contact with								
	Total	(1) More than once a day	(2) Every day or almost every day	(3) At least once a week	(4) Once or twice a month	(5) Several times a year	(6) Less often	(7) Don't have such relatives	(8) Don't know
1) Family	100.0	40.8	42.2	9.7	4.6	1.0	0.8	0.8	0.1
2) Friends	100.0	24.9	46.4	18.8	5.2	1.7	1.6	1.2	0.2
3) Colleagues	100.0	27.7	44.6	7.8	2.1	1.3	4.1	7.4	5.0
4) Neighbors	100.0	32.1	47.7	13.4	2.6	0.5	1.7	1.2	0.8

When asking about the tension between each of the following groups in this country, half of the respondents think that there are tension between poor and rich groups as well as management and workers. Only one forth thinks that there is tension between different racial and ethnic groups as same as the tension between the religious groups

**Table 15: how much tension is there between each of various groups in this country?**

groups	How much tension is there between each of various groups in this country					
	total	(1) Very serious	(2) Somewhat serious	(3) Not very serious	(4) Not serious at all	(5) Don't know
1) poor and rich people	100.0	15.8	34.2	29.3	18.9	1.8
2) management and workers	100.0	10.7	38.3	29.7	18.1	3.2
3) men and women	100.0	2.9	21.5	41.7	31.6	2.3
4) old people and young people	100.0	1.8	20.5	42.9	32.7	2.1
5) different racial and ethnic groups	100.0	2.1	22.6	43.9	28.6	2.8
6) different religious groups	100.0	4.2	23.7	42.0	27.4	2.7

**Table 16** For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life.  
Would you say it is?

	how important it is					
	total	(1) Very serious	(2) Somewhat serious	(3) Not very serious	(4) Not serious at all	(5) Don't know
1) Family	100.0	94.2	5.1	0.2	0.1	0.4
2) Friends	100.0	46.3	44.4	8.9	0.1	0.3
3) Respect for parents	100.0	92.2	7.2	0.2	-	0.4
4) Duty to children	100.0	67.3	29.2	3.0	-	0.5
5) Leisure time	100.0	48.2	35.9	14.6	0.7	0.6
6) Politics	100.0	43.6	34.6	18.4	2.7	0.7
7) Work	100.0	86.6	11.6	1.2	0.1	0.5
8) Religion	100.0	67.1	28.2	4.0	0.4	0.3

### Social Inclusion

**Table 17** did you vote in the last general election (December 23, 2007)?

vote in the last general election	percent
total	100.0
yes	84.2
no	10.6
Not Eligible	4.2
Don't know	1.0

**Table 18: During the past 12 months, have you ever experienced discrimination against you due to any of the following reasons?**

reason	have you ever experienced discrimination			
	total	yes	no	Don't know
Social status such as non-regular employment	100.0	8.3	90.1	1.6
Physically handicapped and/or medical history	100.0	2.1	96.3	1.6
Age	100.0	4.6	94.0	1.4
Sexual harassment	100.0	0.7	97.9	1.4
Gender	100.0	3.9	94.8	1.3
Nationality	100.0	2.1	96.2	1.7
Physical look	100.0	3.8	94.3	1.9
Region of origin	100.0	3.9	94.9	1.2
Educational degree	100.0	9.3	89.4	1.3
Criminal record	100.0	0.9	97.4	1.7
Religion	100.0	2.1	96.4	1.5
Other (Specify: _____)	100.0	8.3	90.1	1.6

**Table 19 How much do you agree or disagree with the following opinions about immigrants living in Thailand?**

items	How much do you agree or disagree with the following options						
	Total	(1) Strongly Agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly Disagree	(6) Can't choose
1) An immigrant can become a political leader if so qualified.	100.0	2.3	9.1	10.2	40.1	37.2	1.1
2) Korean [Your Country] students should be given priority to immigrant students in college admissions if they are equally qualified.	100.0	34.2	35.2	11.7	13.7	4.5	0.7
3) An immigrant can become CEO of a Korean company if so qualified.	100.0	2.7	19.8	16.0	34.6	25.6	1.3



**Table 20: How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about men and women?**

items	How much do you agree or disagree						
	Total	(1) Strongly Agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly Disagree	(6) Can't choose
1) On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do.	100.0	21.6	34.1	16.1	24.5	3.4	0.3
2) A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.	100.0	3.9	11.8	19.1	47.6	16.9	0.7
3) On the whole, men make better business executives than women do.	100.0	12.3	25.8	17.9	35.1	8.3	0.6

**Table 21 Do you ever experience difficulty in using public transportation?  
(Such as bus, subway, and train; not including taxi)**

21 Do you ever experience difficulty in using public transportation	total
total	100.0
yes	23.0
no	76.5
Don't know	0.5
Why did you experience difficulty in using public transportation?	
total	100.0
1) <input type="checkbox"/> Fare is too expensive for me.	18.8
2) <input type="checkbox"/> Bus stops or train stations are too far away.	16.7
3) <input type="checkbox"/> Inconvenience due to frequency of service	51.5
4) <input type="checkbox"/> Inconvenience due to accessibility (such as elevators and escalators)	5.1
5) <input type="checkbox"/> Other: Specify _____	4.3
6) <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	3.6

### Social Empowerment

**Table 22 How likely or unlikely do you think that one can achieve higher social or economic status by his/her own effort?**

(Such as studying hard to go to better schools; accumulating professional/technical knowledge etc.)

one can achieve higher social or economic status by his/her own effort	percent
<b>total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
1) <input type="checkbox"/> Very likely	46.7
2) <input type="checkbox"/> A little likely	20.1
3) <input type="checkbox"/> Neither likely nor unlikely	20.2
4) <input type="checkbox"/> A little unlikely	7.0
5) <input type="checkbox"/> Very unlikely	2.2
6) <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	3.8

**Table 23 Suppose you happen to be in a trouble such as layoffs, sexual harassments, or physical handicap. How much help (such as free information and counseling) do you expect you would be able to receive from either government or non-government organizations?**

How much help do you expect you would be able to receive from either government or non-government organization	percent
<b>total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
1) <input type="checkbox"/> Very much	14.3
2) <input type="checkbox"/> A little	26.3
3) <input type="checkbox"/> Neither much nor little	25.9
4) <input type="checkbox"/> Little	15.0
5) <input type="checkbox"/> Very little	12.6
6) <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	5.9

**Table 24 Have you ever participated in any of the political actions listed below?  
If so, please tell us your experiences**

activities	total	participation			
		(1) Have done	(2) Might do	(3) Would never do	(4) Don't know
1) Signing a petition	100.0	6.1	3.1	88.5	2.3
2) Joining in boycotts	100.0	2.8	2.5	92.9	1.8
3) Joining demonstrations	100.0	8.5	3.0	86.7	1.8
4) Joining strikes	100.0	6.2	2.8	89.0	2.0
5) Online political actions	100.0	1.3	2.7	93.7	2.3

**Table 25 How often do you do each of the following activities in your free time?**

activities	How often do you do each of the following activities in your free time						
	total	(1) Daily	(2) Several times a week	(3) Several times a month	(4) Several times a year or less often	(5) Never	(6) Don't know
1) Watch TV, DVD, videos	100.0	85.4	11.1	1.4	1.0	0.8	0.3
2) Go to live theater	100.0	0.5	2.4	9.3	26.5	60.9	0.4
3) Go to classical music performance (including opera and chorus)	100.0	0.9	1.0	1.4	6.9	88.9	0.9
4) Go to popular music concerts	100.0	-	0.9	3.9	31.0	63.5	0.7
5) Go to art exhibitions	100.0	-	0.7	2.7	23.5	72.7	0.4
6) ไปดูพิพิธภัณฑ์หรือสถานที่มรดกทางวัฒนธรรม	100.0	0.1	0.7	5.7	42.7	50.4	0.4

**Table 26 Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, disagree or strongly disagree with each statement.**

items	percent						
	total	(1) Strongly Agree	(2) Agree	(3) Neither agree nor disagree	(4) Disagree	(5) Strongly Disagree	(6) Can't choose
1) I am optimistic about the future	100.0	19.3	52.3	20.5	6.0	1.2	0.7
2) On the whole my life is close to how I would like it to be	100.0	10.4	51.8	20.2	15.3	1.6	0.7
3) In order to get ahead nowadays you are forced to do things that are not correct	100.0	1.6	5.9	17.1	44.0	30.6	0.8
4) I feel left out of society	100.0	0.8	4.5	19.8	40.7	33.7	0.5
5) Life has become so complicated today that I almost can't find my way	100.0	1.5	10.4	21.2	39.3	26.8	0.8
6) I don't feel the value of what I do is recognized by others	100.0	2.7	19.9	27.7	31.1	17.7	0.9
7) Some people look down on me	100.0	4.2	30.1	26.6	24.6	13.7	0.8

**Table 27 Have you ever doubted information from the following individuals?**

individuals	total	Have you ever doubted information from the following individuals?			
		Yes	No	Have not received information from this individual	Don't know
1) Doctor	100.0	29.2	66.4	3.0	1.4
2) Lawyer	100.0	33.3	55.9	8.8	2.0
3) Local politician	100.0	60.2	33.8	4.9	1.1
4) National leader	100.0	50.0	41.2	7.1	1.7
5) Employer	100.0	25.3	56.0	14.9	3.8
6) Bank employee	100.0	22.2	57.8	17.2	2.8
7) Person who reads the news on television or radio	100.0	31.1	57.4	9.4	2.1
8) Family member	100.0	9.3	86.4	3.0	1.3

**Table 28 Have you ever doubted information from the following organizations/ institutions?**

organizations/institutions	total	you ever doubted information from the following organizations/inst			
		Yes	No	Have not received information from this individual	Don't know
1) The legal system	100.0	34.8	57.1	6.2	1.9
2) Your local government	100.0	65.3	30.3	3.2	1.2
3) Your national government	100.0	44.0	43.0	10.8	2.2
4) Credit card companies	100.0	27.8	46.1	23.2	2.9
5) The media	100.0	40.7	48.0	9.7	1.6
6) Banks	100.0	24.0	59.6	13.9	2.5
7) Big business	100.0	26.0	49.7	20.3	4.0

**Table 29 Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they had the chance?**

Do you think that most people would take advantage of you if they had the chance?	percent
<b>total</b>	<b>100.0</b>
1) <input type="checkbox"/> Yes	49.1
2) <input type="checkbox"/> No	17.8
3) <input type="checkbox"/> Have not thought about it	29.5
4) <input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	3.6

**Table 30 When visiting your doctor (or a doctor that you see most often), to what extent do the following factors influence your decision to trust them?**

Factors	total	to what extent do the following factors			
		(1) A lot	(2) Somewhat	(3) Not at all	(4) Don't know
1) They are wearing a white coat	100.0	25.4	37.4	34.5	2.7
2) They are friendly	100.0	58.3	34.9	5.5	1.3
3) They seem to be caring	100.0	61.7	32.7	4.3	1.3
4) They listen to you	100.0	58.3	34.7	5.7	1.3
5) They appear to be looking out for your best interest	100.0	38.9	43.8	15.2	2.1
6) They appear to be competent in their ability as a doctor	100.0	66.4	23.3	8.9	1.4
7) They appear to be older than 40	100.0	33.5	30.9	33.8	1.8
8) They appear to be younger than 40	100.0	12.1	50.1	35.7	2.1
9) They are female	100.0	16.5	37.4	44.1	2.0
10) They are male	100.0	20.7	31.8	45.4	2.1

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## The Quality of Democracy in Thailand

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Most scholars agree that consolidation of democracy requires mass approval in order to sustain this form of government. Even overwhelming support for democracy among peoples of developing nations, however, cannot guarantee democracy in the face of determined elites who have access to instruments of military power (Linz and Stepan, 2001). The military, after fifteen years of democracy, overturned a democratically-elected government in Thailand on September 19, 2006, as in 1991, on the pretext of “**corruption in government.**” Whether “**corruption**” warranted such a drastic remedy has yet to be determined,<sup>1</sup> but what is clear is that Thai elites are still willing to sacrifice democracy when it finds control of government slipping from their grasp.

Elites were willing to tolerate a ban on all political activities, including meetings of political parties, assemblies of more than five people, and restrictions on the news media – specifically bans on criticism of the

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<sup>1</sup> Much is always made of the distribution of money during elections. There is, however, no hard evidence that such practices change election outcomes.

regime and reporting on activities of Thaksin Shinawatra, deposed Prime Minister - all measures that far exceeded actions for which the Thaksin regime was severely criticized. The bankroller for the so-called People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD), Sondhi Limthongkul, argued that suppression of individual rights should be acceptable in order to rid the government of all remaining vestiges of the Thaksin regime. Although a semblance of democracy was restored after elections in 2007, the new regime is governed by a constitution drafted, essentially, by a junta-appointed drafting committee, adopted in a popular referendum.<sup>2</sup>

Although a small majority endorsed the new constitutional draft, it passed with less than 60 percent support, furthered by army coercion outside Bangkok plus the threat that, if it did not pass, the junta-appointed government would continue to govern. The latter threat was a compelling reason for many voters who wearied of constraints on media communication and the imposition of martial law in much of the countryside outside Bangkok. Even so, the Northeastern Region, the largest rural population area in Thailand, rejected this Constitution of 2007.

Explanations of sources of the coup are controversial and complex. Our analysis, however, argues that support for the coup is rooted in historical and cultural factors dating to the overthrow of the absolute Thai monarchy in 1932 (Albritton and Bureekul, 2008). Consequently, this paper approaches the evaluation of Thai democracy in two ways. First, it offers an evaluation of the “quality” of Thai democracy at the time of the coup, as defined by Diamond and Molino (2008). This discursion helps to ascertain the status of democracy at the time of the coup and allows inferences as to the justification of such an extreme remedy for whatever problems might have plagued the Thai polity. Next, the paper addresses long-standing cleavages in Thai society and culture that play themselves out in conflicts between the traditional Thai aristocracy and Thai mass publics, offering insights into the sudden turn away from democracy after a fifteen-year period of consolidation, as well as prospects for the future of democracy in Thailand.

What did the furor in the streets portend for Thai democracy? Diamond and Molino suggest that in order for a nation to be considered a “**democracy**,” there must be: “1) universal adult suffrage; 2) recurring free, competitive, and fair elections; 3) more than one serious political party; 4) alternative sources of information;” and 5) formal, democratic institutions unconstrained by powers that are not directly accountable to the people (Diamond and Molino, x-xi).<sup>3</sup> Any reasonable and fair assessment of Thai polity and politics indicates that Thailand more than met all of these requirements, except during the period of dominance by the military regime from the time of the junta, beginning in September 2006. This means that for at least fifteen years, Thailand met all Diamond and Molino’s minimum requirements for democracy.

There are, of course, many ways of defining a “quality” democracy, but Diamond and Molino appear to define it as rooted primarily in the “**degree of customer satisfaction with it, regardless of how it is produced or its actual content (xi).**” This is a reasonable measure of democracy; government “**by the people**” should result in satisfaction of the people above all else. Diamond and Molino then identify eight dimensions on which democracies vary, five of which are procedural (rule of law, participation, competition, and both vertical and horizontal accountability). There are two additional dimensions that are primarily substantive: respect for civil and political freedoms, and progressive implementation of greater political, social, and economic equality. (5)

<sup>2</sup> Once again, the anti-government movements took to the streets against constitutional revision. Although initial draft revisions were defeated in the Parliament, the anti-government movements demanded resignation of the government itself. The conflict is clearer, now, after anti-government speeches alluding to “the defence of the monarchy, alleging that the constitutional amendments would subvert and overthrow the traditional pillars of the Thai state.” (Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Bangkok Post, 5/30/2008)

<sup>3</sup> During the abortive parliamentary elections of 2006, our poll showed that 77.9 percent of respondents considered the elections essentially free and fair.

No single poll addresses all the indicators of these dimensions, but two nationwide polls of Thai attitudes toward democracy (Asian Barometer, 2002 and 2006) occurred approximately one year after the first government under the Constitution of 1997 began to govern and in April-May 2006, just four months prior to the coup, shed light on the status of progress toward democracy and public opinion at the time of the coup. Although we compare data across the two polls, it is important to be aware that the 2006 poll was taken in the midst of ongoing social tensions leading to the military takeover of government. Keeping this context in mind, we are in a position to ask about political conditions that may have led to, or even justified a coup. In essence, we are asking about public perceptions of the quality of democracy just prior to the coup and, whatever the conditions, attempting to understand the overthrow of a democratically elected government in a society overwhelmingly committed to belief in democratic government.

## Commitment to Democracy

The constitutional drafting committee of 2007 began with a confounding premise that Thailand **“has been under the rule of democratic government with the King as head of state for more than 75 years.”** Considering the number of years Thailand operated under absolute military dictatorships during this period, this is truly a fatuous claim. From the very beginning, the government could not be described even as an electoral democracy; Government was exercised by elites in a one-party state (the People’s Party) and full electoral democracy was not even contemplated until half the population had completed primary education or ten years had passed, whichever came first.

The first direct elections occurred in November 1937, when 26 percent of the electorate chose half of the National Assembly. Subsequent elections, in November 1938, continued the half-elected, half-appointed National Assembly, and the period of war extended the government until after the surrender of Japan. During this period, the Prime Minister, Phibunsongkram, undertook a program of economic and social nation-building that was pursued in a highly authoritarian manner. Following the end of WWII, the National Assembly ousted Phibun and elections were held in 1946. Up to this point, at least, Thailand had little tradition of electoral democracy or democratic government.

During the post-war period, prospects for democracy brightened with the creation of four political parties (at least in name), elections in January 1946 for the un-appointed seats in the Parliament, and a new constitution that provided for a fully elected House of Representatives and a Senate chosen by the House. By August, however, the Prime Minister, Pridi Banomyong, had lost support in the legislature as a result of by-elections, resigned, and went abroad. In November 1947, the military seized the government. At first, it allowed the civilian regime to continue, but when the 1948 elections resulted in a major defeat for the military, it moved to re-install Phibun as Prime Minister. At most, the period of electoral democracy extended for only slightly over 3 years.

Throughout the post-WWII era, however, the ideology of democracy persisted, reinforced, in part, by a growing consciousness, largely in the rural population, of oppression by the military, the police, and the bureaucracy. This disaffection from the authoritarian regimes served to support an equally anti-authoritarian sentiment among the educated middle-classes. By 1973, a coalition of workers, farmers, students and others in the middle class clashed with police. In order to prevent mass bloodshed, the King intervened to end the authoritarian regime.

The ensuing period was one of political and economic instability. Parties of the left, that had benefited from the revolution initially, not only lost power in the 1976 parliamentary elections, there followed a period of organized atrocities by anti-government operatives against figures advocating radical democracy. This oppression culminated in an infamous event when protesting students at Thammasat University were shot, lynched, burned alive, or imprisoned, and the military re-asserted itself – with the support of the ruling establishment, including much of the middle class, bringing this experiment in democracy to an end.

By 1978, however, an underlying democratic ethos revived in the form of dissatisfaction with excesses of the authoritarian right. There followed a period of political stability and, arguably, a steady progression toward democratic governance under the leadership of Prem Tinsulanonda. In fact, modern Thai democracy can be dated to the parliamentary elections of 1983, consolidating Prem's power. In 1986, when economic conditions created considerable social unrest, the military urged an internal coup – not unknown in Thai history. Prem, however, not only refused to be associated with a military putsch, but stepped aside, holding new elections. By 1988, fully democratic elections were held and a full-fledged coalition government formed under Chatichai Choonhavan.

Contrary to these truncated experiences with democracy, the claim to a democratic government noted above appears to be shared among ordinary Thai citizens, that is, the ideology of democracy in Thailand is very high. The data on virtually all measures of support for democracy in repeated polls shows considerably higher levels of approval than in countries with longer experiences of democratic government, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

The data in Table 1 indicate clear commitments of Thai respondents to democracy. Both in 2002 and 2006, satisfaction with democracy is very high. Even under conditions of social and political tension leading to the coup, 83.8 percent expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works in Thailand. Even more remarkable, however, is the fact that just four months prior to the coup, 81.8 percent expressed satisfaction with the Thaksin government.

**Table 1: Satisfactions with and Commitments to Democracy, 2002 and 2006, N=1546**

	2002	2006
Percent satisfied or very satisfied with the way democracy works in Thailand	90.5	83.8
Percent satisfied or very satisfied with the Thaksin regime	89.5	81.8
Mean rating of democracy under the present government (1-10 scale)	8.22	7.48
Mean score on desire for democracy (1-10 scale)	9.33	8.75
Mean score on "suitability" of democracy for Thailand (1-10 scale)	8.31	8.75

Even by April-June of 2006, the data indicate high levels of "consumer satisfaction" with the status of democracy in Thailand. These levels of commitment to democracy are based on indicators of the quality of democracy as Diamond and Molino suggest. Furthermore, it is important to note that the relevant data come from the later poll, 2006, taken just a few months before democratic government was suppressed by a military and bureaucratic coup.

## Quality of Democracy

A poll, taken in 2005, at the time of parliamentary elections, shows high evaluations of the government in a variety of policy areas. Table 2 shows that over 70 percent of respondents rated government performance as “good” or “very good” in every category. The highest ratings are found in the health care sector. This is probably a consequence of the very popular program creating access to health care for 30 Baht (approximately \$.90), a very low cost to the consumer. The program is so popular that virtually all politicians applaud it, and the major opposition party actually urged that the cost be reduced to zero, as a strategy to trump the popularity of the leading political party, the People’s Power Party. The junta-led government then adopted the zero-cost proposal.

Table 2: Ratings of Government Policy Performance (by percent), 2005, N=2000

Very bad	Bad	Good	Very good	Economy
	0.6	12.6	63.7	23.2
Education	1.3	13.5	67.8	17.5
Employment	2.0	22.8	62.0	13.2
Poverty	3.3	24.3	55.8	16.7
Health care	1.1	9.6	62.4	26.9
Crime	3.6	16.0	59.6	20.9
Traffic safety	2.1	17.7	67.7	12.5
Environment	2.6	19.3	66.9	11.2

Returning to the 2006 poll, the data show other positive evaluations of government performance. Table 3 offers general evaluations of the quality of democracy in areas of equality and, most importantly, civil liberties, an area in which freedoms were later sharply curtailed during the junta government. The data also present a series of questions concerning the treatment of minorities in Thailand. There appears to be a very high level of support for fairness and equality for these peoples, including basic needs and political rights.

**Table 3: Evaluations of Equality and Civil Liberties, 2006, (in percent) N=1546**

Agree or Strongly Agree Everyone is treated equally by the government	58.6
Our courts punish the guilty even if they are high-ranking officials	77.7
People have basic necessities like food, clothing, and shelter	90.7
People are free to speak what they think without fear	75.9
People can join any organization they like without fear	74.8
Minority groups should have equal rights to do whatever other citizens do	94.8
Minorities should be able to vote	94.0
Minority interests should be protected like those of other citizens	93.7

Even more important, given ostensible grounds for the coup, is the perception of corruption only a few months away from the overthrow of a democratically elected government. Table 4 shows not only a low degree of perceptions of government corruption, but also a very low level of personal experience of corruption, even compared to the 2002 poll. Ironically, by 2006, the proportion of respondents believing that “hardly anyone is involved in corruption” doubled, while those expressing a belief that government officials are corrupt declined. In addition, respondents with personal experiences of corruption declined by half (32.4 percent to 16.2 percent). The ostensible reason for the overthrow of a democratically-elected regime was not perceived by the general public, and, in fact, perceptions of government had actually improved, a far different picture from public discourse in the news media.

**Table 4: Perceptions of Corruption in the Government of Thailand, N=1546**

	2002	2006
How much corruption and bribery is there in the national government? Hardly anyone is involved	7.4	15.0
Not a lot of officials are corrupt	58.3	55.5
Have you personally witnessed an act of corruption or bribe-taking by a politician or government official during the past year	32.4	16.2

In terms of “consumer satisfaction,” then, the indicators point to relatively high levels of satisfaction with the quality of democracy in Thailand as late as four months before the coup swept aside fifteen years of democratic progress and a highly popular constitution, returning Thailand to a previous system of elite rule. How was it possible to revoke democracy in the face of widespread popular approval of the state of democratic government in Thailand? The answers lie embedded in deeply rooted cultural factors seldom addressed in discussions of Thai democracy. It is to this cultural context that we now turn for evaluating the status of democracy in Thailand today.



## Does Culture Matter?: Foundations of an Inegalitarian Society

Most analyses of democracy as it exists in Thailand use traditional templates applied to evaluate democratic systems throughout the world. These include free and fair elections, active political competition, and even basic civil liberties. Questions of equality are generally considered as economic dimensions and are relegated to criteria associated with “**substantive democracy**.” Underlying pictures painted by indicators of these variables, at least in the Thai case, however, is a centuries-old culture based on support for fundamental inequalities, not explicitly of wealth, but of status derived from proximity to the monarchy.

The intricacies of what is called the “**sakdhina**” system are too complex to be addressed here fully. Its crude translation refers to a place of honor derived from control of land, essentially land bestowed by the king. More recently, it has come to mean honor as a function of “**place**” or status. Thai society is organized around a hierarchical system of “**place**” in which everyone knows to pay proper respect to “**superiors**” as a function of age, education, occupation, and other cues, such as respect for monastics, and persons associated, however remotely, with the historic monarchy, who constitute a significant portion of leadership in government, the media, and universities, particularly in Bangkok. The key concept for Thais, as formulated by M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, who was largely responsible for restoring the sakdhina system during the 1950s, after its undermining in the overthrow of the absolute monarchy, is “**Know thy place**,” meaning that citizens should accept the status to which they are born and to be content with it.

The ideology of “**place**” was elevated as a characteristic of national identity by Kukrit, intellectual leader in the revival of the monarchy under the authoritarian national leader Field Marshall Sarit Thanarat. Contrary to the liberal ideology of the 1932 overthrow of the monarchy that the nation and its sovereignty belong to the people, the concept of “**sakdhina**” promotes an ideology based upon the notion that all beneficence flows from the monarchy, all liberties – and even democracy – are granted to the people by the king, and the social structure rightly divides people into hierarchical classes according to their birthright (Sattayanurak, 2007).<sup>4</sup>

This understanding of fundamental Thai identity as “**sakdhina**” has been established by government-supported intellectuals and propagated through the media and the governmentally controlled school system. Virtually all Thais are socialized into this view of identity in which their status or “**place**” is given to them by birth. Reinforcement of this ideology comes by means of several rituals, including the traditional form of greeting, the “**wai**,” in which the “**inferior**” initiates the traditional greeting to which the “**superior**” may or may not respond. Sattayanurak suggests that this internalization of inequality prevails because the Thai media and education system have not been reformed to express an ideology characterized by equality, in which there would be a social space for all groups of people to attain justice and freedom to live a dignified life. (p.1) What is important for political analysis, however, is the realization that the course of democracy in Thailand cannot properly be understood apart from how the “**sakdhina system**” qualifies almost every aspect of democratic discourse.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> The description of “sakdhina” in this paper comes from the doctoral dissertation of Saichol Sattayanurak, which is in press. The chapter, “The Construction of Mainstream Thought on ‘Thainess’ and the ‘Truth’ Constructed by ‘Thainess’” was translated by Sarinee Achavanuntakul.

<sup>5</sup> When one of the authors asked two educated Thai adults whether Thais believed that “we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all people are created equal,” the response was, essentially, “absolutely not.”

The overall ideology of sakdhina has several implications that profoundly structure Thai attitudes towards politics and government:

1. Absolute monarchy as the source of enlightened rule. This premise creates a dichotomy between **“government”** and **“administration.”** The former may be democratically elected; however, elected governments come and go, but the bureaucracy is the one constant in the Thai polity. A corollary is that because the king is the moral compass of the nation, there is no need for democratic political structures, such as parliaments or checks and balances mechanisms to supervise the government’s use of power, as long as there is a king. In this view, democratic institutions are of secondary consequence, as the king will insure that the government does not abuse its authority. In fact, it is appropriate for the king to obstruct any activity seen as governmental abuse of power. (Sattayanurak, 22)
2. Sattayanurak argues that part of the propaganda restoring the sanctity of the royal institution was a belief in the correctness of an unequal social structure, in which **“people have no political right or freedom to participate in any decision-making process about the use of resources and checks-and-balance mechanisms.....there is no need for democratic institutions (such as the parliament or independent organizations) to supervise the government’s use of power, because Thailand has the king to supervise the government, to ensure that it will not abuse or misuse its authority.”** (21) A good democracy is an elite guided society, defined as a society **“without politics.”**

Only when a ruler can be free from politics, defined as struggles over power and interests,<sup>6</sup> can there be a **“good”** society. Ills that afflict the Thai nation are due to **“politics;”** therefore, **“non-political”** institutions, such as the bureaucracy, the military, and, most explicitly, the monarchy, are, in principle, above politics. Part of the socialization process is perpetuation of a belief that **“Thais do not want political freedom to demand rights relating to natural resources, and they also feel that such freedom will cause chaos. Therefore, what they demand is a decisive and strong (ruler), not a strong civil society.”** (Sattayanurak, 25)

3. Order is preferable to freedom. Whenever someone disrupts order (defined as disrupting the **“know thy place”** principle), the ruler is entitled to use violent means to suppress that disruption. This principle, perhaps more than the others, helps to interpret the process of coups and counter-coups that, until 2006, seemed to be a thing of the past.

The ideology of sakdhina has thus corrupted traditional understandings of political democracy in Thailand. The concept of sakdhina clearly elevates the position of social (rather than economic) hierarchy at the expense of traditional instruments of democracy, such as prime ministers and parliaments. In this understanding, the importance is not in having democratic institutions, but in having **“good people”** to administer the government. Because the masses are not regarded as having the competence to criticize government policies, critics of the government must focus on moral deficiencies. This means that a strong leader, even a dictatorship, is not **“bad”** government, as long as the leader is **“moral”** and can be seen as working for the best interests of the people. One consequence of this view is that most political parties conduct campaigns that are not presentations of policy alternatives, but highly personalized in terms of the **“worthiness”** of party leaders.

Guardians of the **“sakdhina”** system work assiduously to ensure that government in Thailand is weak. One problem for the aristocracy with the 1997 constitution was that it encouraged strong

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<sup>6</sup> Most scholars of democracy regard democratic politics as a means of resolving conflicts without violence.



party government. Truly strong government threatens the autonomy of the bulwarks of the aristocracy – the monarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy. Thaksin Shinawatra also began to assert authority over military promotions and interfered with this bastion guarding a system dominated by historic elites, whereas previously these matters were left to military insiders. Finally, he began to assert political authority over the bureaucracy, particularly the Ministry of Interior, and the bureaucratic polity, the most stable instrument of Thai governance, would not go quietly.

Contrary to many nations in which the middle class is the engine of democracy, the middle class of Thailand represents two fundamentally divergent interests: 1) an emerging class of entrepreneurs who have difficulty responding to rapid social and economic change in Thai society inconsistent with a hierarchical social order, and 2) an aristocracy associated with the traditional social hierarchy from which they benefit. The latter find themselves at odds with rural masses, unless the latter are compliant enough to become politically quiescent, allowing the right of place to guide them through politics. As one representative of sakdhina-guided intellectuals put it, **“The problem with Thaksin is that he mobilized the poor and got them involved in politics; and the problem with that is that the poor vote differently from the middle class.”** (Italics ours)

The struggle between elites and democrats also takes shape as conflicts between Bangkok and the hinterland. Political dimensions of this cleavage represent a resurrection of the **“two democracies”** thesis that essentially pits the politics of Bangkok against politics of the rural populations. Polls, taken in 2005 and 2006, indicated growing divisions between urban and rural populations on some of the most fundamental social and political dimensions and post-coup reports on the financial situations faced by farmers in the Northeast underline growing tensions between rural areas and the Bangkok metropole, since the current regime returned government to traditional dominance by Bangkok interests less concerned for adversities in the hinterland.

In the Thai context, scholars have noted disparities in approaches to democracy based upon class or status, as well as urban-rural cleavages within society, but Anek Laothamatas (1996) suggests that the most fundamental cleavage operating in Thai democracy is the sharp differences in political cultures between Bangkok and the essentially rural hinterland. Thailand is a **“tale of two democracies”**: one, of sophisticated urban elites (with origins or current residency in Bangkok), the other rural, often isolated, parochial interests that view political activity, especially elections, as opportunities for personal gain in a Downsian sense (Downs, 1997). Among other differences between urban and rural constituencies is that (according to the **“Bangkok”** view):

*Voting in farming areas is not guided by political principles, policy issues, or what is perceived to be in the national interest, all of which is (regarded as) the only legitimate rationale for citizens casting their ballots in a democratic election. The ideal candidates for rural voters are those who visit them often, address their immediate grievances effectively, and bring numerous public works to their communities (202).*

The ability of rural constituencies to acquire substantial political power in the parliament under conditions of electoral democracy often leads to doubts among members of the middle class who view the traditional order as threatened, the upper class, the mass media, and even academics – many, if not most of whom are deeply committed philosophically and otherwise to sakdhina – as to the efficacy of the democratic process. For these groups, **“democracy turns out to be the rule of the corrupt and incompetent”** (Laothamatas, 2008). This puts them in a dilemma: although they oppose authoritarian rule in principle, they hold representatives from rural constituencies in contempt, regarding them as **“parochial in outlook, boorish in manner, and too uneducated to be competent lawmakers or cabinet members”** (Laothamatas, 2008).

<sup>7</sup> Thirayuth Boonmi, quoted in the Bangkok Post, 3/12/2006.

The problem is that urban, educated, cosmopolitan candidates, who are skilled policy experts, are often held in equal contempt by villagers. They are often regarded as being alien to rural electorates in terms of taste, culture, and outlook, who **“fail to stay close to the voters in both a physical and cultural sense”** (Laothamatas, 208). Veiled contempt for rural-dwellers by sophisticated Bangkok elites posed no problem under authoritarian regimes. Once democratic elections tipped the balance in favor of rural areas, however, significant gaps in perceptions of and commitments to democracy have developed.

These cleavages have, over the past decade, produced considerable political conflict that until recently seemed to be abating. Laothamatas argues that this fundamental conflict cannot be resolved until the Bangkok middle class accepts alternative versions of democracy that make room for understandings and aspirations of rural voters, especially the need for the rural poor to draw benefits away from the center and distribute them toward rural areas. **“Ideally, patron-client ties might be replaced by a more responsive and effective system of local government. On top of that, voters are to be convinced that principle or policy-oriented voting brings them greater benefits than what they may get from local patrons”** (Laothamatas, 223).

There is growing evidence, also, that, while the Bangkok middle class opposes authoritarian forms of government that restrict individual freedoms and exercise a heavy hand over commerce, the uncertainty of changes in government, even by democratic processes, is often viewed as destabilizing the economic environment on which entrepreneurs depend. The possibility that government may be seized by politicians with **“populist”** agendas poses an even greater threat to the interests of a class that stands significantly above the average voter in Thai elections.

The traditional emphasis on the **“middle class”** (that characterizes Bangkok **“culture”**), as an engine of democracy appears to be declining in favor of a view that middle-class support for democracy exists primarily when it coincides with class interests in curbing the power of government. This means that one cannot expect middle-class enthusiasm for democracy when it poses conflicts with private interests of the middle class. This latter view is expressed both by Laothamatas (1996), who argues that the 1991 coup could not have been sustained except for support from the middle class, and Samudavanija (1998), who notes that the role of the middle class in Thailand, vis- a-vis democracy, has been **“reactive rather than proactive”** (156) and that its primary interest in democracy has been **“to safeguard their own freedom and the freedom of the market”** (158). Similarly, the coup of 2006 is often conceived as a revolt of the Bangkok-middle-class against dominance of the government by populist politicians who gain their support from rural masses.

The recent political conflict in Thailand thus represents a resurrection of the **“two democracies”** identified by Anek Laothamatas (1996) that essentially pits the politics of Bangkok against the rural North, Northeast, and Central regions from which the majority party, Thai Rak Thai, drew its strength. Underlying this cleavage is a division rooted in the history of Thai politics, but only now becoming critical to social stability as a result of advancing democracy in the Thai nation. Until the development of democracy, Thai politics was dominated by the Bangkok aristocracy, even though Bangkok comprises only about 15 percent of the population of Thailand. As democracy began to take hold (with each voter in the rural areas counting as much as each voter in Bangkok), it was only a matter of time before political power would shift to the politics and priorities of rural Thailand. The conflict between Bangkok and the hinterland was long in building, but, once the structures of democracy were in place, it was not long before the rural 80 percent asserted their political strength to the alarm of Bangkok elites.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> In some respects, “Bangkok” is a marker for the core city including the suburbs. In fact, suburban Bangkok (or the Central Region) is even more linked to aristocratic views than the city, itself.

The ethos of “**sakdhina**” spills over into the ability to establish the rule of law in Thailand. Hierarchy of status produces quite different outcomes in civil and criminal law. Persons of high status, even when convicted of serious crimes, rarely serve prison sentences. In addition, no serious efforts to bring justice to perpetrators of high level assassination, such as the killing by police of a lawyer who attempted to defend Muslims accused of terrorist activities in southern Thailand. Much of the lack of serious law enforcement or judicial justice relates directly to the system of deference required under “**sakdhina**.”<sup>9</sup>

But it would be a mistake to view this threat primarily in terms of class or even regional struggle. It is more fundamentally a struggle between aristocrats seeking to defend the sakdhina system and emerging impacts of new ways of thinking about fundamental social structures.

## Empirical Evidence of the “Sakdhina” System

Because the sakdhina system is virtually unique to Thailand, few public opinion polls include questions that measure adherence to a highly structured class system not directly related to economic structures. The national poll conducted in 2005 at the time of parliamentary elections, however, offers a clue to the role of sakdhina in supporting military coups against elected governments, as well as the role of Bangkok as the guardian of the sakdhina system.

Examining responses on a 1 to 10 point scale of differences between Bangkok and the rest of Thailand on the question “**Even if a government is democratically elected, if it is corrupt, the military should intervene to improve the situation,**” an ANOVA reveals no differences in means. When the distributions in each category are examined, however, the non-Bangkok portion of the sample exhibits a relatively normal distribution, but Bangkok respondents are highly polarized with 44.6 percent responding “**Strongly Agree**” and 34.8 percent responding “**Strongly Disagree**.” In other words, nearly 80 percent of respondents locate themselves at the most extreme ends of the scale.

A question that measures adherence to norms of an elite-guided society evokes a similar response. When respondents are asked whether they agree or disagree (10 pt. scale) with the statement “**People with high education should have more influence in politics than low or non-educated people,**” 63.8 percent of Bangkok residents fall into category 10, “**Strongly Agree**,” while only 29.9 percent of non-Bangkok residents identify with this category. Table 5 helps to put in perspective the complex relationships among attitudes and opinions that are involved in the continuing conflict between elites and masses in Thailand:

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<sup>9</sup> See article by Jonathan Head, BBC News, 4/7/08. Head relates the “untouchability” of Thai elites to their wealth, but this connection is more associated with sakdhina status. (Of course, sakdhina status and wealth are not uncorrelated.)

**Table 5: Regression of Support for Military Action Against Democratically Elected Governments: “Even if a government is democratically elected, if it is corrupt, the military should intervene to set things right.” (2005)**

Variable	Reg. Coeff.	Beta	Sig. of t
Education	-.170	-.090	.000
People with high education should have more influence in politics than low or non-educated people	.198	.170	.000
People who have bad reputations cannot do well in politics	.060	.061	.007
Constant	4.638	.000	
R-square = .046			

It is important to note that people with higher levels of education are significantly opposed to military intervention. In fact, there is no association between level of education and the belief that more highly educated people should have more influence in politics, so issues of collinearity can be ruled out. On the other hand, a second attitudinal variable, attitudes of respondents who draw a moralistic connection between reputation and political leadership, tend to support the resort to a coup. This variable is consistent with a sakdhina view of Thai politics and society in which the issue is always, primarily, the “**morality**” of those who govern rather than the policies they follow.

Because the level of education defining an interest group or class is independent of the attitude that more highly educated persons are more fit to govern, there is a reasonable inference that this view arises from a different form of socialization than one based in traditional class or status dimensions. It is, however, consistent with the ideology of sakdhina, and one that largely supports an aggressive role for the military to bring down even democratically elected governments when necessary to restore “**order**” in the sense of adherence to an inequalitarian ideology now being contested, while the ideology of democracy as a “**countervailing power**” (Galbraith, 1993) has expanded among the rural populations of Thailand. Whether democracy can survive against a deeply rooted culture of inequality remains to be seen, but this conflict will be the decisive factor in the future of Thai democracy.

## Role of Education in Support of Democratic Values

A considerable body of scholarship argues that education and other indicators of modernization contribute to support for democratic values (Dalton and Shinn, 2007; Rohrschneider, 1999; Rose, Haerpfer, and Mishler, 1998), even in East Asian nations (Shin, 1999; Chu and Chang, 2001). Table 6 presents regressions estimating effects of education in promoting the values identified in Table 1. The results, however, show that education either has no significant impact on promotion of democracy or, in one dimension, significant negative impacts; more highly educated people are less likely to support political equality for minorities than persons of lower educational levels. The data thus indicate that education does not necessarily promote democratic values and, in some respects, works against development of democratic values of political equality.

Table 6: Effects of Education on Democratic Values Identified in Table 1, OLS Models

Dependent Variables	<u>Regression Coefficients</u>	<u>t-test</u>	<u>Sig. of t*</u>	<u>r-square</u>
Citizen rights and duties	-.0352	-2.398	.017	.080
Authoritarian Alternatives	.0090	.610	.542	.020
Support for Democracy	.0095	.647	.518	.022

\* Two-tail test

Why is education not associated with democratic values in Thailand as scholars have found in other areas of the world? One answer is that these studies tend to equate education with growth in liberal democratic values as a result, presumably, of learned awareness of benefits of civic virtue to societies. There is, however, another interpretation. Education (in Thailand, at least) is, primarily, an indicator of social status. Previous studies show that income, education, and occupational status tend to load on a single natural factor indicating socioeconomic status, rather than civic values (Albritton and Bureekul, 2005). In Thailand (as in most countries), educational status is almost solely a function of family income status. This interpretation implies that when examining the role of education in contributing to democratic values, scholars in Thailand are often observing values based upon social class, rather than civic values acquired through education. Furthermore, upper-status attitudes clearly provide a context for opposition to populist regimes, such as the one overturned in the 2006 coup.

Table 7 makes these attitudes more explicit in an analysis of how education and populist values contribute to support for Prime Minister Thaksin, the leader of the government overturned in the 2006 coup. First, the data indicate that education appears to have no significance for valuing the political roles to be played in politics of people with lower levels of education. The data also show, conversely however, that people who supported Thaksin tend to support the involvement of persons in politics with little or no education. The populist orientations of Thaksin supporters begin to emerge in this additional perspective on the data.

**Table 7: Roles of Education and Support for Thaksin Shinawatra on Attitudes Toward Rights of Less Educated Citizens: OLS Analysis** **N = 1300**

*“People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly educated people.”*

**Equation 1**

Variable	Regression Coefficient	t-test	Sig. of t	R-square
Education	.0040	.386	.699	.097
Satisfaction with the Thaksin government	.0991	3.490	.000	

**Equation 2: (Dependent Variable is Satisfaction with the Thaksin Government)**

Variable	Regression Coefficient	t-test	Sig. of t	R-square
Education	-.0661	-6.600	.000	.203
People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly educated people	.0938	3.490	.000	

The data also reveal that the role of education has what might be a significant indirect effect on attitudes toward persons of lower socioeconomic status. Table 3 shows a substantial negative relationship between levels of education and support for the Thaksin regime. By contrast, supporters of the role of less educated people in politics are significantly positive toward the Thaksin government. The question then becomes a choice of interpretations. Either education has no impact on populist attitudes toward participation of less-educated people in politics, or there is an indirect link in which opposition to the Thaksin regime has indirect effects on attitudes toward participation of less-educated citizens in politics and government. In the Thai case, at least, education remains primarily a measure of socioeconomic status, and popular support for Thaksin in most of the areas outside Bangkok challenges the existing dominance of socioeconomic status elites represented by higher educational levels.

Dalton and Shin (2007: 93-4) offer a context for understanding this phenomenon: **“People seek freedom and rights, but it is more difficult to openly extend these rights to one’s opponents. Elections and a fair judiciary are positive values until one’s party loses an election or an electoral appeal.”** The decline in ability of elites, specifically including intellectual elites, to influence government behavior engendered a sense of threat to the place of Bangkok as the core society and culture defining the Thai nation, as well as to their role in guiding the nation.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> These elite attitudes come from historical orientations of Thailand as a “kingdom” rather than as a “nation.” Threats to the preeminence of Bangkok, through elections or otherwise, represent a threat to the kingdom, itself.



The most recent manifestation of the conflict is over the issue of *les majeste* laws that in Thailand have been the basis for banning thousands of websites and leading to the arrest and possible prosecution of scholars, both foreign and domestic. Although the king, in 2005, expressly welcomed critical comments about him in his birthday address, this has not deterred the “royalists” from initiating criminal actions in the name of defending the monarchy. Vitriolic condemnations of Thais associated with a movement to reform these laws demonstrate the deep roots of traditionalists who bask in the aura of monarchy that they fear to lose.<sup>11</sup>

## Conclusion

This analysis brings in “**culture**” as the way of understanding the state of democracy in Thailand. In effect, it posits a culture war as the key to the struggle for democracy. In conventional analyses of democracy in Thailand, the data, even as the coup bringing fifteen years of democracy to an end was imminent, indicate a very high level of support for democracy, support for civil liberties, and a high level of satisfaction with the democratically elected government. Lurking beneath this confident picture, however, was an aristocratic ideology, in place at least since the 1950s, fundamentally at odds with the development of democracy or its continued consolidation.

This ideology, commonly called “**sakdhina**,” is based upon the premise that Thais are by no means born to citizenship as equals. To the contrary, it holds that citizens are born to a specific status in life and that the key to the good society is that everyone “**knows their place**.”<sup>12</sup> Sakdhina, however, is not really similar to a caste system. It is not based upon ethnic, religious, or specifically cultural characteristics. Furthermore, it represents a constructed identity of “**Thainess**” in which all rank and status is related to proximity to the monarchy and, unlike the Indian caste system, does not privilege persons of lesser rank. It is, nevertheless, an identity to which Thais are socialized from early years, specifically in the educational system, but also in public rituals. The power of this socialization process, now extending over 50 years, cannot be underestimated.

Sakdhina is also designed to limit political space, especially to ordinary people in two ways: first, by defining the political arena as immoral in nature because it represents an area of contention and conflict of interests; second, by reducing the space of political participation, so that government is left to the appropriate instruments of the monarchy – the military and the bureaucracy. This allows concentrations of political power in the central government, specifically in Bangkok. One example of the growing struggle between the Bangkok aristocracy which defends sakdhina and the rural populations in the hinterland is the opposition by the central government to decentralization, especially when it includes devolutions of authority to the local level. Efforts to decentralize authority have been systematically thwarted by the Ministry of the Interior, whose administrative structure makes it virtually impervious to political control.

As democracy has flourished, political power has begun to transfer to rural populations who constitute an overwhelming majority in Thailand. When rural citizens count as much as urban elites (as they inevitably do in a democratic system) elites feel threatened by prospects of rapid social changes, most specifically in the privileges afforded them in a hierarchical society. One compelling

<sup>11</sup> Note that it is the “aura of monarchy,” not the monarchy itself that they fear to lose. Tongchai Winichikul, a spokesman for this movement has been called a “traitor” for suggesting reconsideration of the effects of these laws. (See Attachment)

<sup>12</sup> Prawas Wasi, noted national moralist, in a public speech attended by one of the authors stated that “The problem with Thais is that they aspire too much. They should go back to plant their rice fields and be happy.”

bit of evidence in support of this view is the fact that education which, presumably, defines an elite class of one dimension, is not associated with support for a military coup even if corruption is evident. Respondents who believe that more highly educated people should have more say in government, however, strongly support military intervention if they are persuaded that the government is “**immoral**” on some dimension. In this context, charges of “**corruption**” become highly politicized in the context of the sakdhina system. For a substantial portion of the Thai middle class aristocracy, especially royalist sympathizers, academics, the media and other intellectuals who benefit from this hierarchical system, the question is whether they will accept the choice of governors by the masses, if the result is government by people of whom they disapprove. In 2006, these groups manipulated the instruments of power and authority to say that the masses should not be free to choose those who would govern them.

Now, the stirrings of anti-democratic sentiments against popularly elected governments have begun again. Loyalists of the PAD movement have even urged a “**new politics**” in which only 30 percent of the parliament would be elected by the people. The most recent government of the Democratic Party has seriously eroded many of the liberties enjoyed under the Thaksin regime by intimidating what has become a pusillanimous press and suppressing internet sites, as many as roughly 4500 by some estimates. The erosion of civil liberties under the royalist onslaught has been a hallmark in the decline of democracy in Thailand.

Popular democracy or even “**liberal democracy**” is difficult to sustain when confronted with a highly mobilized aristocracy controlling the instruments of force. Sustaining democracy confronts even more difficulties when it struggles against a culture that promotes inequality as the foundation of the society. When the cultural basis of a nation is inherently undemocratic, can democracy be possible? According to a recent columnist in the Bangkok Post, the “**racist**” and “**authoritarian**” ideology of sakdhina “**has run its course.**” (Sanitsuda Ekachai, Bangkok Post, 31/1/ 2008) As another analyst framed the issue in an even more recent column, “**This fight has always been about the heart and soul of Thailand, but now it is in the open.**” (Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Bangkok Post, 30/5/2008) The state of democracy in Thailand hinges on how this struggle between the aristocrats and the masses plays out. For the time being, unfortunately, the “**quality of democracy**” in Thailand is not very high. Once again, the nation embarks on a hopeful path toward democratic government.



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# Checking Bureaucracy system by empowerment approach

Nipapan Jentsantikul

## Abstract

Bureaucracy is focused on delivering public goods and service to citizen. In systems of delivering should manage and Thai government officers have a virtue and moral, in both virtue and moral have an intangible and trouble to evaluate because everybody has the difference treating, socialization and confiscate Thai social context. The mechanic important in checking bureaucracy system that the citizen in the position person choose an agent enters to administrate the country to evaluate and involve with participation democracy.

In this article has two objectives that a) explain the meaning and problem of Thai government officer. b) explain the way in which checking bureaucracy system by empowerment approach.

**Keyword:** *Virtue, Moral, Empowerment Approach*









## Community Rights : Local Value Creating Social Quality

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### Abstract

This article presents the issue of community rights with local value creating social quality. Such issue was studied under three perspectives: community rights under the perspective of complex right, community rights under the perspective on legal right, and community rights under the perspective on entity right considered as concept base which indicates local identity and was connected, creating social quality with progress.

However, after studying such issue, the author found that there is limitation on people's knowledge and understanding of community rights. People misunderstand lawful possession, management, use of local resources, which affects balance of community relation based on mutual receipt of benefits for development as the social quality in the future..

As for ways to resolve such limitation, the community should instill ideal to bring about awareness of legal rights which all people naturally have. This will make the community mutually have conscience and

stimulate understanding of the concept base on community rights on basis of correct knowledge, indicating entity, identity of the locality, which is progress reflecting social value such as local heritage, local wisdom. Moreover, all sectors should be seriously interested in community rights for strong base, really creating social quality.

**Keywords :** *Community Rights / Local Value / Social Quality*



## Group 4

### Effectiveness of Democracy: Socio-Economic Security and Legal Empowerment of the Poor





## Background documents for the legal empowerment of the poor and for minority ethnic people in Thailand

Mr. Chupinit Kesmanee

### Executive Summary

In the history of development in Thailand, except for the “hill tribes”, one can say that government after government there was no intention to formulate a plan to sustain the livelihood of indigenous peoples. With special condition, the “hill tribes” had attracted the interests of the national government as well as governments overseas and international organizations. The spread of Communist movement in border areas was one of the major forces driving the government to step in. Opium production and shifting cultivation were combining factors added up to convince the government’s decision to intervene by setting up the Hill Tribes Welfare Committee in 1959 in charge of the ethnic highlanders’ affair. Large and small projects on highland development were initiated mostly in the areas of opium production in the Upper North of Thailand with their aims to introduce other opium replacement crops. As a result, a great number of highland communities have adopted a variety of cash-crops at the expense of traditional farming. Most of these development projects were launched in a top-

down manner with limited participation. It was the time when development paradigm considered the ethnic highlanders simply as the passive recipients.

With all these development efforts, however, the problem at its root has not been tackled in real term. The fact that these ethnic highlanders have been denied the right over their ancestral lands is the effect of all the forestry bills. Despite the existence of the Constitution of 2007 together with being the State party to the Convention on Biological Diversity both of which allow local communities with their indigenous knowledge and practices to participate in natural resource management, there was no sign of interest from any authority to revise the existing forestry laws.

Lack of citizenship among unknown number of ethnic highlanders is an equally important problem that constrains the exercise of their rights and fundamental freedom. In principle, the “**hill tribes**” are recognized as Thai citizens, but the registration process lacks sincerity that even after over forty years of highland development many people are still suffering from the non-legal status position.

Moreover, the term, “**Indigenous Peoples**” which has been developed in the UN system is denied by the Thai Government that such peoples do not exist in Thailand. However, the four criteria accepted by various UN agencies to distinguish indigenous peoples are:

- ☐ Indigenous peoples usually live within (or maintain attachments to) geographically distinct ancestral territories.
- ☐ They tend to maintain distinct social, economic, and political institutions within their territories.
- ☐ They typically aspire to remain distinct culturally, geographically and institutionally rather than assimilate fully into national society.
- ☐ They self-identify as indigenous or tribal.

Indeed, the description above has already covered many ethnic minority groups in Thailand. However, the official rejection of the term has become an obstacle for indigenous peoples in Thailand to benefit from the international celebrations and promotion of indigenous peoples all over the world.

Thus, it is inevitable to conclude that the reason the indigenous peoples in Thailand have become more and more marginalized is largely the result of government measures and operations. However, on the positive aspect, this bombardment of government policies and their implementations has motivated the indigenous movement in the North more progressive than other parts of the country. At present, there are more indigenous organizations and networks at the local, national, regional, and international levels to promote and protect the rights of indigenous peoples in Thailand. To end the poverty among indigenous peoples, it requires a number of structural changes, more support from the government, and close collaboration between the government and civil society.

Currently, the problems the indigenous peoples in Thailand are confronting can be summarized as:

1. Access to justice and the rule of law:
  - 1.1. The problem related to non-legal status or non-citizenship.
  - 1.2. The problem of indigenous peoples when entering the justice system.
  - 1.3. The problem of summary execution in early 2003.

## 2. Property rights:

- 2.1. Involuntary relocation of highland communities as a result of protected area expansion.
- 2.2. The threatening, arrest, fine, detention, and confiscation of farm tools from the charge of protected area encroachment.
- 2.3. The prohibition of development activities in protected areas.
- 2.4. Raising fine on forest encroachment that contributes to the climate change.
- 2.5. The prohibition of traditional rotational farming.

## 3. Labour rights:

- 3.1. The indigenous peoples with non-legal status are the most vulnerable labour group.
- 3.2. Migrant labourers' rights are usually violated in one way or another.
- 3.3. Labour migration to town contributes to the expansion of slum areas and the aggravation of drug abuse, prostitution, and crime.

## 4. Business rights:

- 4.1. Lack of business support from financial institution among indigenous peoples.
- 4.2. Lack of information and source of information and promotion for business enterprise among indigenous peoples.
- 4.3. Lack of understanding about the property rights on cultural products.

In order to fight against poverty, the government is entrusted with responsibility to achieve the goal of legal empowerment of the poor. In this light, it is important that the government has its mandate to make changes systematically in order to make sure that the indigenous peoples have their equal access to justice, property, labour market, and business opportunity.

## Recommendations

### 1. Law and Policies:

- ☐ As it is indicated in the present Constitution and the CBD to support people's participation in natural resource management, it is imperative to revise all the forestry bills and adjust them accordingly.
- ☐ The new law recognizing "communal land title" is needed.
- ☐ "Community forest bill" is also required to ensure full participation of indigenous and local communities in natural resource management.
- ☐ Amendment should be made to "Citizenship Act" to provide opportunity for the non-citizens who have lived in Thailand for at least 15 years to apply for Thai citizenship.
- ☐ National law on the protection of cultural heritage must be formulated and enforced.

The Ministry of Justice should explore the concept of "Legal Pluralism" in conjunction with academic institution. This is based on the complimentary aspect between the state law and customary law.

- ☐ The policy of multicultural society should be spelt out as part of the national agenda.
- ☐ Concerned agencies must be assigned to discuss the applicability of the term, “Indigenous Peoples” defined by the United Nations in the Thai context.
- ☐ The government should support the establishment of “The National Council of Indigenous Peoples”.

## 2. Implementation:

### 2.1 Access to justice and the rule of law

- ☐ Public hearing should be held for law enactment by inviting all the stakeholders to participate.
- ☐ There must be an agency in charge of public relations and dissemination of new law and regulations to the public and particularly to the people who could be affected by such law and regulations.
- ☐ A well-trained interpreter must be provided for the verbal Thai language handicapped at all levels of the justice system.
- ☐ An agency must be assigned to provide explanation of judicial process for the people in need.
- ☐ The judge should pay more serious attention to the appropriateness of arrest made of all charges.
- ☐ In case the accused claims that the arrest is made to the wrong person bearing the same name and family name, his/her identity must be checked before sending the case to court.
- ☐ In case a person has launched an application with evidences to secure the citizenship, the officer who receives that application has to process it within the timeframe indicated by law, but ignoring this must be punishable.
- ☐ The prohibition to leave the province for the non-legal status people must be canceled, if it is enforced without legal reference.
- ☐ It is important to provide Human Rights training for all government officials, particularly those who have to serve the public.
- ☐ The Department of Special Investigation should be assigned to follow-up the murdered cases taken place from 1 February – 30 April 2003 as there was a rumor pointing to the government’s secret mission.

### 2.2 Access to property rights

- ☐ Recognition must be made for traditional land holding and land use even in the protected areas.
- ☐ In case it is necessary to relocate the indigenous settlement, consultation with target communities must be organized at all stages through free, prior, and informed consent. Compensation is required appropriately.
- ☐ Promotion and support must be provided for community networks to be able to participate in the co-management of natural resources with government sector.



- ☐ The government must realize that civil and land rights are two major factors for indigenous peoples to have equal access to property.
- ☐ The cases of farmers who were arrested with the charge of encroaching the protected forest and causing of global warming, it is important to apply scientific method for proofing the accusation before the judgment is made.
- ☐ In case the law on the protection of cultural heritage is passed, an agency must be assigned with its mandate to enforce the law and to be responsible for setting up the data-base system.

### 2.3 Access to labour market

- ☐ The cancelation of the prohibition to travel outside the province among non-legal status people will provide opportunity for them to enter the labour market on equal footing with other people.
- ☐ Labour investigators should pay more attention to many employers who do not observe the labour law.
- ☐ Training should be provided at the local level for the villagers who prepare to migrate to town in search of off-farm work.

### 2.4 Access to business

- ☐ The state should promote traditional livelihood as part of self-sufficient lifestyle and also to slow down the labour migration from the community.
- ☐ As Chinese-type hemp has been used traditionally for clothing, it should be taken out of the drug bill.
- ☐ An agency in charge of vocational training should develop a complete training course for business enterprise at the local level.
- ☐ The state should secure the financial arrangement for the poor to invest in business.
- ☐ Government should set up local mechanism to promote cultural activities as well as exchange between cultural groups.
- ☐ An agency responsible for property rights should be assigned the task to disseminate information about the procedure to register the cultural product.



# Do Citizens' Voices Get Heard?

## Practices of Participatory Budgeting in Tambon Administrative Organization

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### Abstract

This study investigates the use and effects of citizen participation in the budget making process of Thai local governments. Budget document analyses, interviews, and non-participatory observations were conducted for four Tambon Administrative Organizations. The cases showed that civic forums and civic committees were primary tools for citizen involvement in planning, resource allocation, and performance audits. Notwithstanding, the existing participatory mechanisms were not very effective in influencing budget allocations and hardly spurred meaningful discussions on local taxes and development priorities. This research suggests there is substantial room for the development of participatory processes and rules-in-use in order to help enhance the actual effect citizens could have on public budgeting.

**Keywords:** *Participatory budgeting, local budgeting in Thailand, Tambon Administrative Organization*



# Welfare State and Possibility in Thailand

: Comparative Studies in Saridi – Taksin Democracy

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## Abstract

An article entitled Welfare State and Possibility in Thailand: Comparative Studies in Saridi – Taksin Democracy is a study about possibility of building welfare state in Thailand. This article demonstrates that general definition of welfare state and do not insist which is real or not. But, this article will classifies and deliberates form of welfare state which appropriates in Thai society by studying in Saridi and Taksin democracy welfare state in the past.

The finding shows the fact that Thai state has ability enough to build welfare state because studies of Saridi and Taksin democracy also built welfare state, only different formation (Saridi welfare state is Keynesian and Social Welfare; Taksin welfare state is The Third Way). Under present context of Thailand democracy, Thai state capability appropriates to be Social Democrat Welfare for assured Thais people fundamental rights and improved quality of life. If people lives have quality, they will have

raise understanding and intelligence. Then, this is supplementary for democratization that wants consciousness and intelligence people.

**Keywords:** *Welfare State, Keynesian, Social Security, Social Democrat, Social Welfare, New Right Welfare, the Third Way Welfare.*



## Group 5

### Innovation In Democracy for Thai Social Quality







## **“Blog, Facebook, and Twitter : Alternative Media for Democratic Society”**

Jakranat Naktong

Suwida Thammanee Wong

### **Abstract**

The article, “**Blog, Facebook , and Twitter : Alternative Media for Democratic Society**”, aims to present the mass gathering for an initiation of communicating innovations to achieve social and self improvement. Weblogs, social networking sites, and Twitter can be used as an effective learning process. While Facebook emphasizes the networking and Twitter focuses on speed, weblogs are so concerned about privacy. However, if the qualifications of each are carefully intertwined, they will assuredly turn out to be a great innovation that engenders the power of communication in both a wider and deeper scopes, and ideally responds to the new sophisticated ways of life. Specifically, it is a way to elevate the communication between “**individuals**” to the communication of shared interesting “**issues**”, making a “**message**” become a magnet which attract diverse people to give a hand to interweave the social networking and together continue to stimulate activities on the real space. It is a potential learning space of the modern world, designed to keep up with consumerism and to raise awareness of the cultural diversity within the democratic society.



# Social Empowerment of Democratic Society through the Internet

Thossaphol Noratus

## Abstract

This paper examines the role of the Internet as an effective tool for social empowerment in democratic society. It aims to find ways to raise the citizen's awareness of their civil and personal rights, liberties and freedoms that they want to become truly and actively involved in politics to the extent that they finally realize the potentials and powers to influence and direct the public policies on social, economic, political and cultural development, and to conduct audit to ensure that the administration of the country is in accordance with the principles of good governance. IT applications such as website, social networking sites,

e-Mail, Web board, Blog, Vote systems are excellent venues and channels for expression and exchange of political views. However, they can be successfully utilized for the benefits of individuals and all members of the society only when freedom of expression is fully recognized under the Constitution. The state should therefore expand the ICT infrastructure to make available the low-cost high-speed and wireless Internet services in

all areas, and at the same time encourage people from all walks of life to acquire ICT literacy and use the Internet in an ethical and considerate manner. This leads to benefits for themselves and society as a whole and lead to democracy innovations as an important tool to change Thai society to high social qualities, peace and prosperity.

**KEY WORDS:** *Democracy Innovations; Social Empowerment; Democratic Society; Good governance; Internet; Thai Social Quality*



## Biographical Information





## Lyonpo Dago Tshering

### BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Lyonpo Dago Tshering is the Special Envoy of the Hon'ble Lyonchhen Jigmi Y. Thinley, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Bhutan.

Former Home Minister, and former Ambassador of Bhutan to several countries, Lyonpo Dago Tshering has had a lifelong association with the Royal Government of Bhutan, directly engaged with the Kingdom's efforts in nation building since the launch of planned development in 1961.

He attended Elphinstone College of the University of Bombay in India (1959-1961) and obtained a Masters Degree in Public Administration from the University of Manchester in the UK (1966-1967.) He completed the Indian Administrative Service Training in 1964, and the Indian Audit Account Service in 1965. In 1970 he attended the National Administration Course in Tokyo.

He joined the Royal Civil Service in 1961 in the Ministry of Development. He has served twice as a member of the National Assembly (1968-1970, and 1985-1989) as well as the Royal Advisory Council (1968-1971.) Having served as Secretary in the Home Ministry (1985) and Deputy Minister (1985-1991) he was awarded Orange Scarf by His Majesty King Jigme Singye Wangchuck on 16<sup>th</sup> July 1991 and elevated to the Cabinet rank of Minister for Home Affairs, a position held upto July 1998. During this period, he served as Chairman of the Special Commission for Cultural Affairs (1995-1998), President of the Bhutan Olympic Committee (1996-1998), and Chairman of the National Commission for UNESCO (1995-1998.)

One of the pioneers of modern Bhutan's foreign policy, Lyonpo established Bhutan's first resident diplomatic missions in India, Geneva and Bangladesh. Lyonpo served in various capacities at the Royal Bhutanese Embassy in New Delhi (1971-1973) and in New York at Bhutan's Permanent Mission to the United Nations (1971 to 1974.) In 1974 he was appointed Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bhutan to the United Nations in New York (1974-1980) a post which he returned to in 1984. In 1980 he served as Bhutan's first Ambassador to the People's Republic of Bangladesh (1980-1984.) More recently, he served as Ambassador of Bhutan to India, concurrently accredited to Japan, and Nepal (1998-2008) and Dean of the Diplomatic Corp in New Delhi (2005-2008.)

Lyonpo has participated in numerous international and regional conferences, including sessions of the UN General Assembly (1971-1985), ECAFE and ESCAP, UNESCO, Non Aligned Movement Summits, SAARC conferences and Summits, and meetings of the Colombo Plan. He led Bhutan's delegations to the Law of the Sea Conferences, and the World Food Summit.

His publications include *Himalayan Kingdom* (1979), *Law of the Sea Past and Present* (1983), *Buddhist Art and Culture* (1983), and *The Buddha's Descent from the Trayastrimsas to Samkasya Village* (1994.)

He retired from Government Service in December 2008 as Ambassador to India.

Lyonpo Dago Tshering was born on 17<sup>th</sup> July 1941. He is married and has one son and two daughters.

# Abhisit Vejjajiva

Prime Minister

## Education

- Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (PPE), First Class honours, Oxford University, UK
- Master of Philosophy (M.Phil.) in Economics, Oxford University, UK
- Bachelor of Law, Ramkhamhaeng University - Honorary Doctorate in Law, Ramkhamhaeng University Schools
- Eton College, UK
- Chulalongkorn Demonstration School, Thailand

## Professional Experience

### Prior to 1992:

- Special lecturer in Economics at Oxford University
- Lecturer at Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy (rank second lieutenant)
- Lecturer at Thammasart University's Faculty of Economics

### After 1992: Member of Parliament, Democrat Party

- 1992 Bangkok District 6
- 1995 Bangkok District 5
- 2001 Democrat Party List
- 2005 Democrat Party List, until February 2006
- 2007 (23 dec 07) Democrat Party List Zone 6

### 1992 – 1994: Government Spokesperson

1994: Deputy Secretary to the Prime Minister (for political affairs)

1995: Chair, House Committee on Education Affairs

1998: Chair, Committee to Consider the National Education Bill of 1999

1999: Deputy Leader, Democrat Party

2001: Minister to the Prime Minister's Office, in charge of

- Board of Investment (BOI)
- Counter Corruption Commission
- Office of the Education Council
- Office of the Decentralization to Local Government Organization Committee

2005 – Present: Leader of the Democrat Party

2005 – February 2006: Leader of the Opposition, House of Representatives

February 2008 - December 2008: Leader of the Opposition, House of Representatives

17 December 2008 - Present: Prime Minister



## **Decorations**

1998: Knight Grand Cordon of the Most Noble Order of the Crown of Thailand

1999: Knight Grand Cordon (Special Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant

## **International recognition**

- One of 100 Global Leaders for Tomorrow, by World Economic Forum 1992
- One of 20 Leaders for the Millennium Politics & Power, by Asiaweek magazine 5 November 1999
- One of 6%oup and coming%oleaders for Asia, Time magazine 6 October 1997, New Voices for New Asia

## Prof. Dr.Borwornsak Uwanno

### Current Positions

- Secretary-General, King Prajadhipok's Institute
- Chief Executive Officer, Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre (SAC)
- Chairman, Audit Committee for the Ministry of Justice
- State Councilor
- Member, Law Commission, Office of the Council of State of Thailand
- Honorary Member, Office of the Public Sector Development Commission
- Member, National Health Systems Reform Committee
- Member, Chulalongkorn University Council
- Member, Board of Directors, Thai Asset Management Corporation

### Education Background

- Doctoral Degree Ph.D in Public Law (With High Honors), University of Paris 10, France
- Master Degree Master of Advanced Studies in Administrative Law, University of Paris 2, France  
Master of Advanced Studies in Public Law (With Honors), University of Paris 10, France
- Bachelor Degree Bachelor of Laws (First Class Honor), Chulalongkorn University
- Others Certified Thai Barrister, Institute of Legal Education of the Thai Bar  
National Defence College Class 4111

### Work Experiences

- Cabinet Secretary-General
- Dean, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University
- Policy Adviser to then Prime Minister General Chatichai Choonhavan
- Deputy Secretary-General to the Prime Minister (Political Affairs)
- Senator
- Former Member, Constitution Drafting Assembly
- Advisor, Senate Standing Committee on Interior Administration
- Advisor, Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Thai Parliament
- Chairman, Advisory Board to the Senate Standing Committee on Environment
- Chairman, Advisory Board on Legal Affairs to President of the Senate
- Member, Commission on the Bureaucratic and Public Administration Reform
- Member, Committee to decide on Information Disclosure on Social Sector, Public Administration and Law Enforcement
- Chairman, Advisory Board to then Deputy Transport Minister Pinij Jarusombat
- Member, Sub-Committee scrutinising Amendments of the National Constitution's Section 211

### Academic Works

- Bovornsak Uwanno, Public Law, Volume III: Origin and Juristic Methods. Bangkok: Nititham Publishing House, 1995. 423 pages.

- Bovornsak Uwanno, Public Law, Volume II: The Separation of Public Law and Private Law and History of Public Law in Thailand. Bangkok: Nititham Publishing House, 1994. 334 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno, The system to control the administrative power in United Kingdom). Bangkok: Nititham Publishing House, 1994. 192 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno, Law and Alternatives for Thai society. Bangkok: Nititham Publishing House, 1994. 467 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno, Public Law, Volume I: Development of Philosophies and Features of Public Law in Various Ages. Bangkok: Nititham Publishing House, 1994. 467 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno and Wissanu Krea-ngam, Explanatory Book of the Interim Constitution B.E.2520 (1977), First Edition. Bangkok: Nam Aksorn Publishing House, 1977. 195 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno, Lecture on Constitution of Courts of Justice, 713335. 1977. 92 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno, Lecture on Introduction to Law, 1977. 60 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno and Wissanu Krea-ngam, The Status of the King according to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand), Chulalongkorn Law Journal. No. 3 (May – August 1977), Page148-183
- Bovornsak Uwanno, Civil and Commercial Code of Law, Book 6 on Heritage Law. Bangkok: Nititham Publishing House, 1994, 701 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno, Khemchai Chutiwongse, and Thitipan Chuerboonchai. Handbook on Negotiation for Thai-Foreign Joint Investment Contracts, Bangkok: The Board of Investment of Thailand, Chulalongkorn University Academic Service Center, Law Development and Research Centre at the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University, 1992. 239 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno, Text on Thai and Foreign legal systems Unit 2: Romano-Germanic Law Family. Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University's School of Law. Bangkok: Victory Power Point Corp Ltd, 1985. Page 57- 140 (83 pages). Paper for practice on Thai and foreign legal systems Unit 2. Page 18-28. 10 pages.
- Bovornsak Uwanno and Khemchai Chutiwongse, Lecture on Contracts. Bangkok: Copy duplicated and bonded by Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University. 1977. 360 pages.

## Professor Alan Walker

Professor of Social Policy and Social Gerontology

(BA, DLitt, Hon. D.Soc.Sc. (HKBU), FRSA, AcSS)

Director of the New Dynamics of Ageing Programme

Email: a.c.walker@shef.ac.uk

Room: Elmfield, G41 | Telephone: 0114 222 6466 (external), 26466 (internal)

### Academic Profile

Alan Walker joined the Department in 1977 and was a Lecturer, Senior Lecturer and Reader in Social Policy. He was appointed Professor of Social Policy in 1985 and was Head of Department from 1988 to 1996. He directed the £3.5 million ESRC Growing Older Programme, 1999-2004, and the UK National Collaboration on Ageing Research, 2001-2004. He is currently Director of the £22 million ESRC, EPSRC, BBSRC, MRC and AHRC New Dynamics of Ageing Programme and is also Director of the European Research Area in Ageing and the FUTURAGE Project. He supervises a large number of postgraduate students and was until recently the Research Director for the Social Sciences Division in the University.

### Research

His research interests span a wide range in social analysis, social policy and social planning. He is a specialist in social gerontology and, with two colleagues in the Netherlands, is responsible for developing the concept of social quality and he Chairs the European Foundation on Social Quality, which is based in Amsterdam. Currently he directs the New Dynamics of Ageing Research Programme funded by five Research Councils. He has published more than 30 books, over 200 reports and more than 300 papers in scholarly journals and edited volumes. His work has been published in more than 20 languages. He is a founding Academician of the Academy for Learned Societies in the Social Sciences, and, in 2007, was given lifetime achievement awards by both the British Society of Gerontology and the Social Policy Association. He has been active in the UK voluntary sector for many years and co-founded the Disability Alliance in 1974. He is currently Patron of the National Pensioner's Convention.

### Research Topics

#### *QUALITY OF LATER LIFE*

Director of the ESRC Growing Older Research Programme on Extending Quality Life (1999-2004).

The twin objectives of the programme were to establish a broad-based multidisciplinary and co-ordinated research programme designed to generate new knowledge on the extension of quality life; and to contribute to the development of policies and practices in the field and, thereby, help to extend quality life. The research topics covered by the programme were defining and measuring quality of life; inequalities in quality of life, the role of technology and the built environment, healthy and productive ageing, family and support networks and participation and activity in later life.

## Dr. Jaeyeol Yee

Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University, Republic of Korea.

His research areas include social quality, organizations, social networks, risk and disaster. He obtained Ph D in Sociology from Harvard University, and has served as Director of the Institute for Social Development and Policy Research, Seoul National University, and now serving as an editor of *Development and Society*. He is also a current member of the Presidential Council for Future and Vision of the Republic of Korea. His recent publications include co-edited trilogy on social networks: *Social Networks and Social Structure* (2004), *The Transformation of Korean Society and Social Networks* (2006), and *The Structure and Problems of Network Society* (2007); and two co-authored books on social quality: Reading Korean Social Trend: *Change of Social Quality after Economic Crisis +10* (2009), and *Risk Society, Risk Politics* (2010), all published in Korean by SNU Press. Other frequently cited articles include 'The Structure of Disasters in Double Risk Society' (Korean Journal of Sociology, 38 (3)) and 'The Social Capital of Koreans' (Korean Journal of Sociology, 42 (7)).

## Dr. Prof. Lih-Rong Wang

Former head of Department of Social Work Director, Social Policy Research Center ,  
National Taiwan University

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886+2+33661253/ 886+93905746

Lih-Rong (Lillian) Wang, Dr./Prof. is the former head of Department of Social Work National Taiwan University, and currently serving as the Director of Social Policy Center, National Taiwan University (Since 2006).

Lih-Rong (Lillian) Wang was graduated from School of Social Welfare, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), USA and earned master and bachelor degree from Department of Sociology with the major of social work in National Taiwan University. Her recent research area is related to a more macro policy level, social quality and social policy, with the focus on the development of social quality indicator in Asia and social quality. Her previous major research includes gender-based violence, gender and health, as well as gender and work. She has published a book "Women and Social Policy" and a series of papers in the relevant topics such as sexual assault, intimate relationship, and women's employment. Recently, with social work experience in 921 Taiwan Earthquake, she has been now involved in research projects such as Sichuan earthquake and 88 flood disaster in Taiwan as well.

She has been appointed as chief editor for NTU Journal of Social Work Review since 2006, and the co-editor of International Journal of Social Quality, Asia Journal of Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence, and Asia Women (SSCI journal) for several years. She has also invited as readers and reviewers for several international journals including International Journal of Social Welfare, Asia Women, China Social Work Journal etc.

In addition to academic work and services, she is active in some NGOs and in different levels of governmental agencies in Taiwan, advocating for gender equality and women's right. For instance, being one of the founders of Modern Women's Foundation, she has been helping this organization to build up the direct service and advocacy network for the female victims of domestic violence and sexual offenders since 1990s. Now, she is acting as board members in several consultative committees in different levels of governments of Taiwan nationally and locally for promoting gender equality issues and social welfare policy as well.

## Laura Edgar

Vice President – Partnerships and International Programming, Institute On Governance

Laura Edgar leads the Institute's international work, including building and managing modernizing government, organizational governance, indigenous governance, health and innovation and partnership initiatives and projects. Laura also leads the Institute's work on the governance of partnerships, including public-private partnerships and civil society – government relations.

In addition to her international experience, Laura has over ten years experience working with governing bodies of public purpose organizations and is an active contributor to the Crown & Organizational Governance practice area.

Prior to joining the Institute, Ms. Edgar was the Programs Manager at the Institute for Leadership Development, where she led several programs for young professionals and young entrepreneurs. Her responsibilities included program management, liaising with Canadian and international partner organizations, and organizing training programs.

Ms. Edgar has completed an M.A. in Economics at the University of Guelph, and also holds a Bachelor of Business Administration from Wilfrid Laurier University. In addition, she lived and worked for two years in Guinea-Bissau, West Africa and two years in Japan, and has managed projects in South-East Asia and Lesotho.

## Jingjai Hanchanlash

### Education

- Doctorat d'Université de Caen (mention droit), France
- Certificate in Project Analysis, University of Connecticut, U.S.A.
- Certificate in Mid-Career Management Training, University of Western Ontario, Canada.

### Current Positions

- Chairman of the Board, Office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment
- Director, Executive Board, Loxley Public Company Limited
- Chairman, Thai-EU Business Council
- Chairman, Rutnin-Gimbel Excimer Laser Eye Centre
- Chairman, Loxley Pacific Company Limited
- Chairman, Executive Board, Rutnin Eye Hospital
- Co-Chairman, Greater Mekong Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation Business Forum (GMS-BF)
- Secretary General, Development Cooperation Foundation
- Member of the Executive Board, Mekong Region Law Centre
- Honorary Consul of Jamaica in Thailand
- Council member, King Prajadhipok Institute
- Member, National Education Council

### Past positions

- Part-time lecturer, Faculty of Political Sciences, Thammasart University.
- Advisor on Asian Affairs, International Development Research Centre of Canada (IDRC).
- Regional Director for Asia and the Pacific, IDRC (17 years)
- Director, Vietnam Sustainable Economic Development Programme, a CAD 4 Million joint IDRC-CIDA aid programme for Vietnam.
- Advisor to the Thai Prime Minister (General Chatichai)
- Advisor to the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs.



## **Sombat Thamrongthanyawong, Ph.D.**

President of the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA)

### **Education**

- Ph.D. in Development Administration, School of Public Administration, the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), Thailand
- M.A. in Government Studies, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

### **Current Position**

- President of the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA)
- Chair, The committee on constitutional amendment plans
- Chair, Muban Chom Bueng Rajaphat University Council
- Director and Chair of risk management ,National Housing Authority
- Director and Chair of risk management ,The Government Pharmaceutical Organization
- Director, Student Loan Fund

### **Professional Experience**

- Chair, The Committee for Development of Assessment Systems, The Office for National Education Standards and Quality Assessment (Public Organization) ,Thailand
- Chair, Software Industry Promotion Agency (Public Organization), Thailand
- Dean, School of Public Administration, NIDA
- Director, The Higher Education Commission, Ministry of Education, Thailand
- Chair, Sub-Committee of Governmental Work Evaluation and Auditing, Thailand
- Member , the National Parliament (MP), Thailand
- Chair, Phetchabun Rajaphat University Council
- Chair, Thai Maritime Navigation Company Limited, Ministry of Finance, Thailand
- Director, Forest Industry Organization, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand

### **Award**

- The Scholastic Achievement Award of Kasetsart University 2007
- Alumnus of the year 2008 by the National Institute of Development Administration

## Professor Dr.Thirapat Serirangsan

Former Minister to the Prime Minister's Office

The Lecturer of Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University (STOU)

### Education Background

- 1991 Ph.D. in Political Science Chulalongkorn University,Thailand%
- 1981 M.A. in Political Science Thammasat University ,Thailand
- 1977 B.A.in Political Science (The second% honor) Chulalongkorn University , Thailand

### Working Experiences

- 1984 - 2006 Full-Time Lecture, School of Political Science Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University
- 1981 - 1983 Board of Executive, Social Science Association of Thailand
- 1985 - 1991 Board of Executive, Social Science Association of Thailand
- 1990 - 1991 Assistant, to the President Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University
- 1991 - 1995 Director, Office of Continuing Education Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University
- 1995 - 1996 Board of Political Reform Committee
- 1995 - current% Board of Academic Committee, King Prajadhipok's Institute
- 1999 - current% Political Science and Public Administration Committee, the National Research Council%of%Thailand
- 2000 - 2004 Dean of the School of %Political Science Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University
- 2002 - current% Secretary-General, The Thai Enlightenment Institute Foundation (TEIF)
- 2004 - 2008% Senate Research and Development Committee
- 2003 - 2006 The President of the Political Science Association of Thailand

### Political Appointment

- 1995 - 1996 Board of Political Reform Committee
- 2001 - 2005 Specialist attached to Political Development Committee, House of Representatives
- 2005 - 2005 Adviser to Political Development Committee, House of Representatives
- 2006 - 2008% Minister to the Prime Minister's Office

## Suranand Vejjajiva

### Education

- SASIN Graduate Institute of Business Administration Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand Master of Management (1995)
- School of International and Public Affairs Columbia University, New York, U.S.A. Master of International Affairs (1985)
- Williams College Williamstown, Massachusetts, U.S.A. B.A. in Political Economy (1983)

### Training

- King Prachatipok's Institute Public Law and Management Certificate (2002)
- Institute of Applied Psychology National Defense Studies Institute Bangkok, Thailand Certificate (May 1995)

### Present

- Columnist, Bangkok Post "Let It Be" (Fridays)
- Columnist, Siam Rath "Soi Swasdee" (Monday-Friday)
- Host, "Saturday Talk," a variety show on TNN24 (Saturdays 7-8pm)
- "The Commentator" on Voice TV (Saturday-Sunday 8-8.30pm)
- CEO, Future PR Co., Ltd.

### Political Experiences

- Minister Attached to the Prime Minister's Office (2005-2006)
- Member of Parliament (2001-2004, 2005)
- Executive Director, Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2004)
- Executive Director and Party Spokesman, Thai Rak Thai Party (2001-2004)
- Secretary to the Committee on Parliamentary Affairs Member Committee on Consumer Protection Deputy Secretary General to the Prime Minister for Political Affairs (2001 – 2002)
- Secretary to the Prime Minister (2001)
- Deputy Party Spokesman, Thai Rak Thai Party (1998-2000)
- Private Sector Dharmniti Public Co., Ltd. (1996-1998)

### Experiences

- Managing Director
  - Dharmniti Training and Seminar Co., Ltd.
  - Dharmniti Publishing Co., Ltd.
- Managing Editor, Dharmniti Tax and Accounting Journal
- Ban Chang Group Public Co., Ltd. (1991-1995)
  - Executive Director
  - Executive Vice President and General Manager
  - Office of the President
  - Regional Projects Development

- Managing Director  
Phuket Century Country Club and Rayong Century Country Club  
Century Park Condominium, Bangkok
- Director
- Marketing & Sales Department
- Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Bangkok (1987).
- Credit Analyst

### **Government Experiences**

- Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board
- Office of the Prime Minister (1985-1990)
- Policy and Planning Analyst

### **Others**

- Royal Bangkok Sports Club
- Sathit Patumwan Alumni Association
- Sathit Prasarnmitr Alumni Association

## Weerachart Tee Kilenthong

### Research Interests

- Macroeconomics, Contract Theory, Growth and Development, Financial Economics

### Employment

- Assistant Professor, University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce

### Education

- Ph.D. Economics, University of Chicago
- M.A. Economics, University of Chicago
- M.Sc. Physics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand
- B.Eng. Civil Engineering, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand

### Published Papers

1. Collateral Premia and Risk Sharing under Limited Commitment, forthcoming in Economic Theory.
2. Information-Constrained Optima with Retrading: An Externality and Its Market-Based Solution (joint with Robert M. Townsend), forthcoming in Journal of Economic Theory

### Working Papers

1. Market Based, Segregated Exchanges in Securities with Default Risk (joint with Robert M. Townsend).
2. Trade through Endogenous Intermediaries (joint with Cheng-Zhong Qin).

### Work in Progress

1. Dynamic Valuation of Collateral (joint with Robert M. Townsend).
2. Children of Fortune: Chance, Choice, and the Quantity and Quality of Children (joint with Javier Birchenall).
3. Skill Bundling and Earnings Inequality ( joint with Javier Birchenall).
4. Walrasian pricing in matching models ( joint with Javier Birchenall).
5. In-kind Pay and Minimum Wages: Evidence from Thailand (joint with Mario Macis).
6. Observability and Endogenous Organizations (joint with Gabriel Madeira).
7. A Walrasian Equilibrium Model with Asset-Backed Securities.
8. Long-Term Labor Contracts and Business Cycles (joint with Marek Kapicka).

### Ongoing Projects

1. Roles of Industrial Policies in Development: Lessons from Automotive and Electronics Industries in Thailand (funded by the World Bank)
2. Credit, Saving and Insurance Invention in Villages of Thailand (funded by a private donor)

**Presentations:**

- 2009: Bewley Conference, LAFE conference, Far Eastern and Southern Econometric Society Meeting, FED Richmond
- 2008: Econometric Society Summer Meeting, SED meeting
- 2007: University of Southern California, MIT (Theory Lunch)
- 2006: University of California Santa Barbara, University of Virginia, Simon Fraser University, University of British Columbia, University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
- 2005: University of Chicago, New York University, University of Thai Chamber of Commerce

**Fellowships**

- David Marshall-Merrill Lynch Faculty Fellowship 2006-present
- John M. Olin Foundation Dissertation Fellowship, University of Chicago 2005-2006
- First Class Honor with Gold Medal (Rank 1st), Chulalongkorn University 1998

## Nattapong Thongpakde

### Present Position:

- Professor School of Development Economics,  
National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA)  
E-mail: nattapon@nida.ac.th

### Education

- Boston University
- Boston, Massachusetts, USA.
- Ph.D. (Economics)
- MAPE
- Thammasat University Bangkok, Thailand
- BA (Economics)

### Professional experience

- Vice President for Planning and Development, NIDA 2004-2007
- Director, Center for Sufficiency Economy Study, NIDA 2004-2008, 2010-present
- Dean, School of Development Economics 2002 - 2004
- Professor 2009 - present
- Associate Professor 2001 –2008
- Senior Consultant, TDRI, 2001 - 2005
- Research Director for International Trade and Investment, TDRI 1997 - 2001
- Associate Dean, School of Development Economics, NIDA, 1993-1994, 1996 (Dec.) – 1997 (July)
- Director of Evening Program, School of Development Economics, NIDA, 1991-1993
- Assistant Professor 1990-2001
- Lecturer 1987-1990
- Economist, Department of International Trade, Ministry of Commerce 1979-1980

### Academic Awards

- The Royal Thai Government Scholarship 1980-86
- Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, Boston University 1982-1983
- Research Assistant, Department of Economics, Boston University 1983

## Mr. Chupinit Kesmanee

### Career Position:

- Senior Lecturer

### Education:

- B.A. (Sociology and Anthropology), Thammasat University, Thailand, 1970
- Diploma (Social Planning in Developing Countries), London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom, 1980-81
- B.A. Honours (Anthropology), Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1989
- M.A. (Geography), Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand, 1991

### Other Training:

- Training for Executive Administrators, Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, 1996

### Work Experience:

1971-77	Team Leader, Hill Tribes Development and Welfare Mobile Team, Hill Tribes Development and Welfare Centre of Nan Province, Hill Tribes Division, Department of public Welfare, Ministry of Interior
1977-97	Social Sciences Researcher, Tribal Research Institute, Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare
1981-86	Participant, Working Group for Curriculum Development, Hill Areas Education Project (HAE), Department of Non-Formal Education, Ministry of Education
1982	Advisor, Textbook Production for Hill Areas Education Project, Department of Non-Formal Education, Ministry of Education
1982-84	Committee Member, Thai Language Textbook Production Committee, Hill Areas Education Project, Department of Non-Formal Education, Ministry of Education
1983	Committee Member, Research Committee, Hill Areas Education Project, Department of Non-Formal Education, Ministry of Education
1985	Team Leader, Community Problem Census, Thai-German Highland Development Programme (TG-HDP), Chiang Mai
1986-2008	Foundation Committee Member, Hill Area Development Foundation (NGO), Chiang Rai Province
1987-97	Sub-Committee Member, Northern Sub-Committee on Cultural Research, Office of the National Culture Commission (ONCC), Ministry of Education
1989-to date	Foundation Committee Member, Mountain Peoples Culture, Development and Education Foundation (MPCDE – NGO), Chiang Mai
1990-to date	Advisor, Center for the Coordination of Non-Governmental Tribal Development Organization (NGO), Chiang Mai
1991	Team Leader, Survey of Problems and Needs of Hill Tribes Communities in Doi Yao – Pha Mon Highland Development Project (DP-HDP), Chiang Rai
1992	Project Leader, The Study of Village Profiles and Recommendations for Drug Abuse Control, Tribal Research Institute and UNDCP



1992	Short-term Consultant, Heroin Addiction: Situation and Intervention, UNDCP
1992	Short-term Consultant, Public Health and Education Sector, Pae Per Highland Development Project (PP-HDP), UNDCP
1993-96 and 2000-2002	Chairperson, Inter-Mountain Peoples Education and Culture in Thailand Association (IMPECT – NGO), Chiang Mai
1994	Project Leader, Seminar on the Impact of Trekking Tourism on Hill Tribal Culture, Tribal Research Institute, (TRI) and Office of National Culture Commission (ONCC)
1994-97	Project Administration Committee Member, The Promotion for Community Participation in HIV/AIDs Prevention, Hill Tribes Division, Department of Public Welfare, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, funded by UNICEF
1995	Advisory Board Member, Seminar on Thai Social Crises, Office of National Culture Commission (ONCC), Ministry of Education
1996	Student Advisor, College Year in Thailand Program of 1995-1996, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiang Mai University and University of Wisconsin-Madison
1997-to date	Senior Lecturer, Department of Foundations of Education, Faculty of Education, Srinakharinwirot University
1999-2000	Local Researcher, “Addressing Health and Education Needs among the Ethnic Minorities in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region”, Research Triangle Institute (RTI), North Carolina, USA, funded by ADB
2001-2003	Project Leader, “Research on Local History in the Central Region”, funded by Office of Thailand Research Fund (TRF)
2002-to date	Chairperson, Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact Foundation (AIPP).
2004	Work with UNDP on the background paper for UNDP Regional Initiative on Strengthening Policy Dialogue on Indigenous, Highland and Tribal Peoples’ Right and Development (RIPP).
2005-to date	Committee Member, Indigenous Peoples’ Foundation for Education and Environment (IPF).
2007-to date	Sub-Committee Member, Sub-Committee on the Rights of Ethnic Minority Peoples, National Human Rights Commission.

### Papers And Articles:

1. “Hmong Healing”, Tribal Research Institute, vol.1-3, 1979, mimeographed (in Thai).
2. “Report on the Inthanon National Park: A Case Study of Khun Klang Village”, Tribal Research Institute, 1984, mimeographed (in Thai).
3. “Hmong House”, Tribal Research Institute, 1984, mimeographed (in Thai).
4. “Primary Education of the Hill Tribes in Mae Hong Son Province: Feasibility Study”, co-author, Samart Srijunong, Thai-German Highland Development Programme (TG-HDP), 1985, mimeographed.
5. “Hilltribe Relocation Policy, Ways Out of the Labyrinth: A Case Study of Kamphaeng Phet Province”, Tribal Research Institute, 1987, mimeographed.
6. “Hmong and Karen Health and Family Planning: Cultural and Other Factors Affecting Use of Modern Health and Planning Service by Hilltribe in Northern Thailand”, co-authors, Peter Kunstadter and Prawit Pothisart, 1987, mimeographed.
7. “The Poisoning Effect of a Lovers Triangle: Highlanders, Opium and Extension Crops, a Policy Overdue for Review”, in Hill Tribes Today, ed. by John McKinnon And Bernard Vienne, TRI-ORSTOM and White Lotus, 1989.
8. “The Impact of Modernization on the Cultures of Ethnic Groups in Northern Thailand: A Case Study of the Hmong”, Tribal Research Institute, 1990, mimeographed.

9. "Hill Tribe Education for Hill Tribes", Tribal Research Institute, 1990, mimeographed.
10. "Opium Addiction: Detoxification Alone is not Enough", Tribal Research Institute, 1990, mimeographed.
11. "The New Phase of Highland and Its Dwellers Problems", Tribal Research Institute, 1991, mimeographed.
12. "Highlanders, Intervention and Adaptation: A Case Study of a Mong N'jua (Moob Ntsuab) Village of Pattana", M.A. thesis, Department of Geography, Victoria University of Wellington, 1991.
13. "Indigenous Knowledge and Highland Economy", Tribal Research Institute, 1991, mimeographed.
14. "The Problems of Highland Resource Management", Tribal Research Institute, 1992, mimeographed.
15. "The Masque of Progress: Notes from a Hmong Village", in "Marginalization in Thailand, Disparities, Democracy, and Development Intervention", Special Issue of Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 33, No. 2, October 1992, pp. 170-177.
16. "Drug Abuse in Pang Ma Pha Sub-District: Genesis and Situation", co-author, Rita Gebert, Internal Paper No. 169, TG-HDP, 1993.
17. "Dubious Development Concepts in the Thai Highlands: The Chao Khao in Transition", in Law and Society Review, Special Issue: Law and Society in Southeast Asia, Law and Society Association, Vol. 28, No. 3, 1994, pp. 673-686.
18. "The Impact of Tourism on Culture and Environment: A Case Study of the Mae Taeng Trekking Route in Chiang Mai", co-author, Kulawadee Charoensri, Office of the National Culture Commission, Ministry of Education, 1994, mimeographed.
19. "Impact Assessment in Nam Lang Project Area", co-author, TG-HDP, 1994, mimeographed.
20. "Moving Hilltribe People to the Lowlands: The Resettlement Experience in Thailand", in Development, Displacement and Resettlement, Focus on Asian Experiences, ed. by Hari Mohan Mathur, Vikas Publishing House PVT LTD., 1995, pp. 244-254.
21. "Drug Addiction and Treatment in Hilltribal Villages", Tribal Research Institute, 1995, mimeographed.
22. "From Land Rights to HIV/AIDs", Tribal Research Institute, 1996, mimeographed.
23. "Addressing Health and Education Needs Among the Ethnic Minorities in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region", co-author, Research Triangle Institute, North Carolina, USA, 2000.
24. "Addressing Health and Education Needs Among the Ethnic Minorities in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region", co-author, Research Triangle Institute, North Carolina, USA, 2000, (in Thai).
25. "The Integration of Indigenous Knowledge into Education", Office of National Education Commission, Prime Minister Bureau, 2002, (in Thai).
26. "Cultural Diversity in Pluralistic Society", Office of National Culture Commission, Ministry of Culture, 2004, (in Thai).
27. "An Assessment of the Implementation of International Commitments on Traditional Forest-Related Knowledge in Thailand", co-author, Prasert Trakansuphakorn, in Helen Newing (ed.), Our Knowledge for Our Survival, The International Alliance of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forests, pp. 341-363, 2005.
28. "Evaluation Report on Program to Promote Educational Opportunities for Thai Highland Students", Submitted to Terre des Homme Netherlands, 2008, mimeographed.

## Penpuk Rattanakumfu

### Position

- Mayor of Kohkha Municipality

### Background of Education

- Bachelor degree : Faculty of Agriculture, Agriculture Economics Branch, Chiang Mai University : 1991
- Master degree : Faculty of Political Science, Politics and Government Branch Thammasat University : 1998
- Master degree : Graduate school of Public Administration, Master of Public Administration, National institute of development Administration : 2004

### Background of career

- Deputy Mayor of Kohkha Municipality : 14 January,2000 - 5 February,2002
- Member of the Municipal Council : 6 February,2002 – 8 January,2004
- Mayor of Kohkha Municipality : 15 February,2004 – 14 January,2008
- Mayor of Kohkha Municipality : 27 March,2008 – present

## Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai

Deputy Secretary General

Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai is Deputy Secretary General of King Prajadhipok's Institute and Associate Professor at Department of Community Development, Faculty of Social Administration, Thammasat University.

King Prajadhipok's Institute, best known for promoting democracy through research, education and training in the areas of politics, governance and democracy for the achievement of sustainable peace.

Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai was served as Director of College of Local Government Development at King Prajadhipok's Institute in 2002, and in 2007, he became Deputy Secretary General. Prior to his work with the King Prajadhipok's Institute, Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai served as Head of Department of Community Development in the Thammasat University.

From 1987 to 1995, Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn Tanchai was a lecturer at Thammasat University, where he also served as Vice Dean for Student Affairs from 1986 to 1995, and for Planning and Development from 1995 to 1996. Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn received his Bachelor of Science (B.Sc) degree in 1980 at Khon-Kaen University and later received his Master of Public Administration (M.P.A.) degree in 1982 at National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok in 1986 and Master of Policy Science (M.P.S.) degree in 1986 at Saitama University Japan. In addition, Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn received Certificate in Public Law in 2005 at Thammasat University and Certificate in Public Director Program (Class 1) in 2010.

Assoc. Prof. Woothisarn serves on National Decentralization Committee, Social Welfare Committee, House of Representative, Bangkok Metropolitan Administration Committee (BMA), Education Council Committee, Rajapat Nakorn Rajasima University Council Committee, Constitutional Drafting Committee, Thammasat University, Sanya Thammasak Democracy Institute Committee. He also serves as sub-committee of National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC), Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC). In 2007, he serves as a committee and a secretary of the Constitution Drafting Commission. Now, he serves as a Committee and Secretary of The Committee to Consider Amending the Constitution under the Unity Committee's Framework in order to Reform Politics and Study Constitution Amendment.

He has received numerous awards, including Japanese Government Scholarship, Honorary Certificate of the Research from National Research Council of Thailand on "Social Development Evaluation Project According to the Government Policy: Case Study on Regional and Local Development Concerning Strengthening Local Communities and Increasing the Management Role of Local Authorities." (February 2, 2003), research award in 2003 from National Research Council of Thailand in the field of Political Science and Public Administration on "Status and Role of Regional Administration in the Future" and The Certificate in consolation prize from The National Research Council of Thailand titled "The Status and Role of Regional Administration in the Future" February 2, 2004.

He has written extensively on such subjects as decentralization, public policy, social policy, local government, and community development. His academic publications in 2003 to 2009 include 7 volumes of books on local administrations and decentralization in Thailand, 50 articles on politics, local administrations and decentralization, 23 volumes of research papers on local administrations and decentralization and other 7 volumes of researches papers.