

Beyond Narratives and Numbers:  
**A CLOSER LOOK INTO KALAH  
CIDSS PROGRAM**



A Case Study on the KALAH CIDSS Project

**Copyright © 2011 ODA Watch and MODE, Inc. All rights reserved**

The Official Development Assistance Watch - Philippines (ODA Watch - Philippines) and Management and Organizational Development for Empowerment, Inc. (MODE, Inc.) encourage the use of this monograph, with appropriate credit given to the publishers and author. The content of this monograph may be reproduced by civil society groups for non-commercial purposes. Any form of reproduction, storage, in retrieval system or transmission by any means for commercial purposes requires permission by MODE, Inc. and ODA Watch.

The research and publication of this briefing paper is funded by 11.11.11 (formerly NCOS Belgium) and MODE, Inc.

**Official Development Assistance Watch - Philippines**

c/o MODE, Inc.

99 Matimtiman Street, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City 1101

Telephone no.: (632) 426-1126 / 434-3576

Fax no.: (632) 426-1126

Email: [odawatch@mode.org](mailto:odawatch@mode.org)

Website: <http://www.odawatch.org>

**Patricia Fe Gonzales**

ODA Watch Lead Convenor

Email: [patfegonzales@yahoo.com](mailto:patfegonzales@yahoo.com)

**Arnel Ramos**

ODA Watch Coordinator

Email: [odawatchconvenor@yahoo.com](mailto:odawatchconvenor@yahoo.com)

**Editor**

Patricia Fe Gonzales

**Photo, Layout and Cover Design**

Rundell A. Ato

**Beyond Narratives and Numbers:  
A CLOSER LOOK INTO THE KAPIT  
BISIG LABAN SA KAHIRAPAN  
- Comprehensive and Integrated  
Delivery of Social Services  
(*KALAH* CIDSS) Program**

REDEN B. RECIO

December 2010



# Table of Contents

<b>I. Executive Summary</b>	<b>9</b>
A. Objectives of the Study and the Case Study Area	<b>9</b>
B. The KALAHI_CIDSS Program	<b>11</b>
C. Data Gathering Methods	<b>12</b>
D. Main Findings	<b>12</b>
<b>II. Introduction</b>	<b>19</b>
A. Context & Considerations	<b>19</b>
B. Project Description	<b>20</b>
C. Process and Activities Undertaken	<b>21</b>
<b>III. Revisiting <i>KALAHI</i>-CIDSS as the Government's Poverty Reduction Flagship Program</b>	<b>22</b>
A. Understanding the Basic Features of KALAHI CIDSS	<b>22</b>
B. KC in Region XII	<b>36</b>
C. KC in the Municipality of Malapatan and the Chosen Project	<b>42</b>
D. The Road Opening Project in Brgy. Poblacion, Malapatan	<b>47</b>
E. Summary of Comments/Feedback from Different Stakeholders	<b>55</b>
<b>IV. Insights and Analysis</b>	<b>64</b>
<b>V. Conclusions, Policy Implications and Recommendations</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>VI. Bibliography</b>	<b>80</b>

## **LIST OF TABLES**

Table 1 - KC Sub-Projects	<b>24</b>
Table 2 - KC Loan Utilization as of the End of September 2010 (in US\$M)	<b>25</b>
Table 3 - Performance Indicators based on Program Components	<b>29</b>
Table 4 - Performance and Impact Indicators Based on Goals and Objectives	<b>30</b>
Table 5 - Regional Distribution of KC Projects and Financial Assistance	<b>31</b>
Table 6 - KC Regional and Provincial Coverage in Mindanao	<b>34</b>
Table 7 - Municipalities in Region XII with Poverty Incidence Higher than the National Average of 33%	<b>38</b>
Table 8 - Poverty Incidence in Malapatan, Sarangani	<b>43</b>
Table 9 - KALAHI CIDSS Projects in 12 Barangays of Malapatan	<b>45</b>
Table 10 - Summary of Comments/Feedback from Different Stakeholders	<b>56</b>

## **LIST OF DIAGRAMS**

Diagram 1 - National Project Management Office (NPMO) Organizational Structure	<b>27</b>
Diagram 2 - Regional Project Management Office (RPMO) Organizational Structure	<b>28</b>

## **LIST OF GRAPHS**

Graph 1 - Geographical Distribution of KC Projects	<b>33</b>
Graph 2 - Geographical Distribution of KC Financial Assistance	<b>33</b>
Graph 3 - Poverty Incidence in Four Provinces of Region XII	<b>37</b>
Graph 4 - Distribution of KC Projects in Region XII	<b>39</b>
Graph 5 - Distribution of KC Funds in Region XII	<b>40</b>
Graph 6 - Distribution and Types of KC Projects in Region XII	<b>41</b>
Graph 7 - Distribution and Types of KC Sub-Projects in Malapatan	<b>46</b>

## Foreword

Poverty eradication and reduction remain one of the key challenges facing the Philippines for decades. As such, various Philippine administrations have put poverty reduction at the core of their development agenda. The Arroyo administration's official development agenda have focused on poverty and unemployment issues too. The *Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan* - Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI CIDSS) Program was one of the key initiatives that focused on addressing poverty during Arroyo's administration. The program's funding came from official development aid (ODA).


The previous government and the program's funders claimed that the implementation of the KALAHI CIDSS Program has been successful. This paper, *Beyond Narratives and Numbers: A Closer Look into Kapit Bisig Laban Sa Kahirapan - Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (KALAHI CIDSS) Program*, documents and analyzes the lessons from the implementation of the KALAHI CIDSS project in Mindanao.

The ODA Watch – Philippines and the Management and Organizational Development for Empowerment, Inc. (MODE) sincerely hope that this paper's findings and recommendations will help in improving future ODA-funded poverty reduction programs and projects in terms of design, mechanisms/ processes and outcomes.

  
Patricia Fe Gonzales

Convenor

ODA Watch - Philippines

  
Aurora A. Regalado

Managing Trustee

MODE, Inc.





## I. Executive Summary

### A. Objectives of the Study and the Case Study Area

This case study generally aimed at presenting the *KALAHI*/CIDSS (KC) Project as the flagship poverty reduction program of the government. More specifically, it documented and analyzed the lessons from the experience of a *KALAHI* CIDSS project in the municipality of Malapatan, Sarangani Province in Mindanao. Apart from documenting a specific KC project in one community, the paper also looked into the number of areas covered in Mindanao (2003 to June 2010 KC implementation) and compared the figures with the number of municipalities with more than 33% poverty incidence<sup>1</sup>. The paper also presented the views and experiences of some project beneficiaries, particularly in Sitio Lanao Mafnoh Poblacion, Malapatan, as well as the insights of *KALAHI* CIDSS implementers in Region XII, Sarangani province and Malapatan town.

The decision to choose Mindanao for the case study was guided by two major considerations. First, several national statistics have repeatedly pointed out that the island's poor people have not received enough support from the national government. In fact, in terms of human development index (HDI), seven of the bottom ten provinces are in Mindanao, with Sarangani ranking seventh from the bottom. Second, while some ODA donor countries like the United States believe that the age-old conflict in Mindanao has been fueled by the massive poverty in the area, ODA commitments in the area remain relatively low compared to the allocation for Luzon and the Visayas.

Indeed, it is important to take a look at how the government's anti-poverty flagship program addresses these realities.

---

<sup>1</sup> The paper used the NSCB 2003 Small Area Poverty Estimates to identify municipalities with more than 33% poverty incidence.

While poverty reduction served as the central theme of the study, the way governance-related concerns (e.g., community participation) were manifested in or achieved by the identified KALAHÍ -CIDSS project was also documented and scrutinized.

## **B. The KALAHÍ-CIDSS Program**

The *Kapít Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan* Comprehensive and Integrated delivery of Social Services or KALAHÍ CIDSS is the Philippine government's flagship poverty reduction project. Launched in 2003, the initiative aims to go beyond the minimum basic needs (MBN) approach of the earlier Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS) project, which was implemented as part of the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) during the Ramos administration. The government's Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) acts as the lead implementing agency of KALAHÍ CIDSS.

The program has three major project goals. These include: (a) *improved local governance*; (b) *reduced poverty* and (c) *improved quality of life of the poor*. In terms of specific objectives, the project particularly aims to strengthen the participation of local communities in “*barangay*” governance and develop their capacity to design, implement, and manage development activities that reduce poverty.

With regard to identifying the project areas, the project prioritized the forty (40) poorest provinces. The DSWD used the NSCB official poverty statistics at the provincial and municipal levels and the small area poverty estimates. For the implementation of the KALAHÍ CIDSS Phase 1 cycle, the program was able to cover the bottom 25% of all the eligible municipalities in 42 of the poorest provinces in the Philippines. When the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB) poverty figures were not yet available, the agency tapped Dr. Arsenio Balisacan to prepare a special study of poverty incidence among municipalities within the provinces covered by the project (Redaja 2010).

When the NSCB data was already available, the DSWD used the national poverty incidence as a reference mark. All municipalities with at least 33% poverty incidence (above the average national poverty incidence) were considered as eligible to be part of the KC program. Among the eligible municipalities, KC implementers identified/prioritized areas based on their project proposals and their ability to comply with KC requirements (e.g. local financial counterpart). Municipalities with at least 70% poverty incidence were automatically selected while the rest of the eligible municipalities were subjected to a randomized selection process (Redaja 2010).

According to Mr. Karlo De Asis, the National Monitoring and Evaluation Officer of KALAHI CIDSS, starting 2011, the DSWD will choose 50% of the new eligible KC areas (those that have not implemented KC before) using a random sampling design. Before the randomized selection activity, all eligible municipalities will be oriented about KC, and be allowed to decide if they want to participate in the randomized selection or not. The agency assumes that those in the 'pool of eligibles' have signified interest to participate in KC and have committed to comply with the conditions set by the project (e.g. willingness to put up a local counterpart, to mobilize and set up structures to support implementation, etc.) and demonstrate readiness to adopt community-driven development or CDD (De Asis 2010).

After more than seven years of implementation, the DSWD reported last March 2010 that the program has supported 5,326 community sub-projects, with a total estimated cost of PhP 5.34 billion. About 1,197,720 households in 5,543 *barangays*<sup>2</sup> are believed to have benefited from the subprojects.

---

<sup>2</sup> According to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), some *barangays* that were prioritized by their MIBFs are counted more than once.

### **C. Data Gathering Methods**

This is primarily a qualitative study employing the following research methods: review of relevant documents, interviews and discussions with project beneficiaries and mandated government agencies and assigned evaluators of the project, direct fieldwork and actual observation.

Among the documents reviewed were the national and regional project profile and accomplishment reports of KALAH I CIDSS, researches about the KC and studies about projects that have been initiated in other countries which are similar to the KC program.

Participants of the individual interviews included an anti-poverty expert and activist, project head of the World Bank-commissioned qualitative evaluation of KALAH I CIDSS, and staff of national, regional, provincial and municipal level agencies that are mandated to implement the KALAH I CIDSS projects. The purok leader of Sitio Lanao-Mafnoh, a leader of a peoples' organization in Brgy. Poblacion, and a barangay chairman from Brgy. Lun Masla, another barangay of Malapatan, were also individually interviewed.

Four group interviews were also undertaken. The first two were semi-structured group interviews with women residents of Sitio Lanao-Mafnoh in Brgy. Poblacion, Malapatan, Sarangani. Another group interview was with three regional specialists of KALAH I CIDSS Region XII. The last group interview was with residents of Sitio Aspang, Barangay Poblacion, Malapatan.

### **D. Main Findings**

#### **1. Some Encouraging Features of KALAH I CIDSS**

##### **a) An Effective Mechanism for the Delivery and Implementation of Community Projects**

As reflected in the qualitative impact evaluation and midterm reports, KC is an effective mechanism for the delivery and implementation of projects that have to do

with basic social services (e.g. water system, classrooms, and health centers). This was validated by the views of both the beneficiaries and the project implementers interviewed by the researcher.

**b. An Important Mechanism for Raising Awareness about the Roles of Communities and Government Agencies and Officials in Project Development**

The paper recognizes that aside from delivering the much-needed social services projects to poor communities, KC had also helped raise the awareness, primarily of poor people who had long been excluded from meaningful governance processes, on the roles they could play in any community development project. An incident worth noting was that of a *purok* leader who wrote a letter to his *barangay* captain asking for assistance in maintaining the road opening which was constructed thru KC. However, the *purok* leader eventually got discouraged from engaging further with the *barangay* captain because he did not get any response from him.

**c. Employs Transparency**

The experience of the researcher and the research assistant of this paper attest to the fact that compared with other government projects and programs, KC practices more transparency. Documents are readily available via its official website, which contains updated reports and pertinent tools and guides. Even the details of the loan agreement of the program, which is normally difficult to obtain, are made available. National and Regional (Region XII) Program personnel/staff were very accommodating and open to the queries of the researchers.

However, it is suggested that the program staff (from the national, regional to municipal KC offices) should be more thorough and methodical in recording the quantitative

accomplishments of the project. As discussed in this paper, the case road opening in *Barangay* Poblacion Malapatan, which has inconsistent completion data, may erode public trust in the KC processes.

**d. KC Implementing Agencies Initiate Efforts to Modify Processes that Address Identified Gaps/Needs**

This paper also acknowledges the efforts initiated by the KC implementing agencies to make the program responsive to the conditions and needs of the local partners. For instance, in *KALAHI* Region XII some modifications in the implementation of KC processes have been done to address the concerns of the communities.

**2. Constraints and Challenges**

**a. Impact on Poverty Alleviation is Difficult to Measure**

KC started implementing community projects that aimed to reduce poverty in 2003. Yet, the national poverty incidence rose between 2003 and 2006<sup>3</sup>. These years were periods when *KALAHI*-CIDSS programs were being implemented. At the municipal level, the town of Malapatan (where a specific KC project was documented) registered a poverty incidence of 66.37% in 2003<sup>4</sup>. This figure became the basis for making the town a KC project area.

---

<sup>3</sup> Based on the official data of the government's National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), the poverty incidence in 2006 was 26.9%, a 2.5% increase from 24.4% in 2003.

<sup>4</sup> This is based on NSCB 2003 City and Municipal Level Small Area Poverty Estimates.

From 2003 until 2008, eighteen (18) KC poverty-reduction community projects were implemented in Malapatan covering all its 12 barangays. Despite the implementation of these anti-poverty projects, however, the 2008 community-based monitoring system (CBMS) survey indicated that Malapatan's poverty incidence rose to 78.91%<sup>5</sup> or a 12.54 percentage increase from the 2003 figure.

These numbers amplify the need to look into the nature of projects (and the quality and impact these projects would ultimately yield) that *KALAHI*-CIDSS has been initiating.

**b. Limited Coverage: KC Implementation (2003-2010) in Region 12 Has Only Covered Less Than 30% of Poor Areas**

The figures on KC project areas (at least in Region 12) show that the program has only covered 10 out of 35 municipalities with poverty incidence higher than the national average of 33%. This is only 28.47% of the total poor areas in the entire region. Moreover, there are some towns in the region with higher poverty incidence than the ten KC municipalities. Yet they have not received any KC projects so far. In fact, two municipalities with the highest poverty incidence in their respective provinces have not received any KC projects at all. These are the municipalities of Banisilan in North Cotabato registering 52.58% poverty incidence and Bagumbayan Sen. Ninoy Aquino in Sultan Kudarat with 63.63% poverty incidence.

---

<sup>5</sup> This is based on the 2008 community-based monitoring survey (CBMS)

**c. Some Highly Technical Requirements and Rigid Timelines May Lead to A Donor-Driven Approach**

These two issues have direct impact on the selection process of KC partner municipalities and beneficiaries. They define the selection process and limit/narrow down the prospective beneficiaries to those who have the technical capabilities and are more familiar with the KC programmatic framework. In this sense, the intervention may lead to a donor-driven selection process. Contrary to KC's pronounced demand-driven model, the highly technical requirements and rigid timeframe promote an elimination/exclusion process that is based on the capabilities and resources of certain localities and not based on their specific conditions and needs. KC should then answer the nagging question 'Should poverty-reduction programs such as *KALAH!* CIDSS favor those who have the means and capabilities to participate in the competition process and follow highly technical requirements?'

**d. Gender Concerns Have Not Been Integrated Into the Design of the Program and Projects**

As can be seen in KC's performance and outcome/impact indicators, gender concerns are not addressed and integrated into the program design, tools and instruments used for reporting, monitoring and evaluation. Thus, they are, at best, gender-blind. Since gender concerns (e.g. women's conditions, possible impacts of community projects on women, etc.) have not been integrated into its design and tools, it now becomes difficult to assess how *KALAH!* CIDSS has made contributions to Millennium Development Goal (MDG) number three, which is about addressing gender inequality.



It is worth mentioning though that the recent KC updates contain specific information about the participation and roles of women in community projects. According to Ms. Benilda Redaja, the Deputy National Program Manager, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), one of the funding partners, wants to include gender concerns in the scale-up phase of KC implementation (Redaja 2010).

### **3. Area-Specific Issues/Concerns**

#### **a. Reporting and Monitoring of Accomplished Projects Need Stricter Supervision**

As clearly narrated in this paper, the case of the road opening project in Poblacion Malapatan reveals a system of reporting, monitoring and evaluation that needs more stringent supervision. The inconsistent information – from local residents, KC engineers and the national database – as well as the failure of some responsible agencies to present a written report (that reflects the discrepancy between targets and actual accomplishments) generates questions as to how reporting, monitoring and evaluation are being done to ensure that actual project accomplishment is properly documented. If left unaddressed, the lenient practice may lead to a system of reporting that is vulnerable to distortion of facts. This administrative lapse reminds us of other bureaucratic practices that lead to suspicious practices and erode public trust.

### **b. Absence of Post-Project Monitoring and Maintenance Initiatives**

The deteriorating state of the road opening and its limited functionality indicates an absence of post-project monitoring and maintenance activities that should have been initiated by the concerned local government units to optimize the benefits of the community project. The regional KC staff claim that the project was already turned over to the municipality/*barangay* and thus the maintenance of the project became the responsibility of the local government units of Malapatan. However, one of the current KC community facilitators in Malapatan and residents/beneficiaries of the road opening said that neither the municipal government nor the *barangay* conducts any activities to properly maintain the KC project.

### **c. Failure to Implement Sustainability Plans**

The sentiments of both the beneficiaries of the project and the community facilitator also illustrate a failure to implement sustainability plans. Based on the reviewed KC documents and the statements of interviewed KC staff, sustainability plans are crafted before KC phases out from one community. In the required plans, the LGUs, especially the *barangay* government, have major roles to play. Unfortunately, the supposed sustainability plan (after the implementation of the road opening in Poblacion) has not been carried out. Even the formal letter of a *purok* leader to the *barangay* government mentioned earlier in this report also affirms that a sustainability plan has not been implemented.

## II. Introduction

### A. Context and Considerations

For several decades now, the Philippines has been one of the recipient countries of official development assistance (ODA) from several developed countries and international multilateral institutions. Aimed at helping developing countries address issues concerning human and social development, ODA comes in either a loan or a grant package. Regardless of the form, however, most of the ODA portfolios have policy conditionalities.

In the Philippines, while the more pressing issues surrounding human and social development have to do with provision of health and education services, the bulk of ODA loans go to infrastructure projects. In fact, infrastructure cornered US\$5.5 billion in 2006 or 57.5 percent of the total ODA commitment. This was even lower than the 69 percent ODA-funded infrastructure projects in 2001.

Among the ODA-funded programs that specifically focus on addressing poverty conditions in the country, the Philippine government has been boasting about the achievements of its flagship poverty reduction initiative dubbed as ***Kapit-Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Service or KALAHI CIDSS***. ***KALAHI*** CIDSS is expected to contribute to all the five pillars of the government's poverty reduction strategy: (1)asset reform, (2)human development, (3)employment generation and livelihood, (4)social protection, and (5)participation in governance. Of these pillars, the flagship project, as its proponents claim, specifically addresses participation in governance.

While the government and its funding partners were quick to cite self-commissioned short-term 'impact studies' commending the successful implementation of the program, civil society organizations remain passive, and at times,

critical observers of this much-lauded poverty alleviation program. It is in this context that the ODA Watch, a loose network of several non-governmental organizations, pursued a case study that looked into a specific KALAHI CIDSS project – a road opening project that was implemented in Brgy. Poblacion, Malapatan, Sarangani Province.

## **B. Project Description**

This research undertaking is an independent initiative by the Official Development Assistance Watch or ODA Watch, a network of development-oriented Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) who believe that ODA should serve genuine development. ODA Watch seeks to influence the realization of reforms in ODA institutions, policies and practices towards addressing inequitable relations between and among development stakeholders.

This case study generally aimed at presenting the KALAHI CIDSS Project as the flagship poverty reduction program of the government. More specifically, it documented and analyzed the lessons from the experience of a KALAHI CIDSS project in the municipality of Malapatan, Sarangani Province in Mindanao. Apart from documenting a specific KC project in one community, the paper also looked into the number of covered areas in Mindanao and compared the figure with the number of municipalities with more than 33% poverty incidence<sup>6</sup>. The paper also presented the views and experiences of some project beneficiaries, particularly in Sitio Lanao Mafnoh Poblacion, Malapatan, as well as the insights of KALAHI CIDSS implementers in Region XII, Sarangani province and Malapatan town.

While poverty reduction served as the central theme of the study, the way governance-related concerns (e.g. improved

---

<sup>6</sup> The paper used the NSCB 2003 Small Area Poverty Estimates to identify municipalities with more than 33% poverty incidence.

local governance, community participation) were manifested in or achieved by the identified *KALAH!* CIDSS project was also documented and scrutinized.

### **C. Process and Activities Undertaken**

This was primarily a qualitative study employing the following research methods: review of relevant documents, interviews (individual and semi-structured group interviews) and discussions with project beneficiaries and mandated government agencies and assigned evaluators of the project, direct fieldwork and actual observation.

Among the documents reviewed were the national and regional project profiles and accomplishment reports of *KALAH!* CIDSS, researches about the KC and studies on projects similar to the KC program that have been initiated in other countries.

Participants of the individual interviews included an anti-poverty expert and activist, project head of the World Bank-commissioned qualitative evaluation of *KALAH!* CIDSS, and staff of national, regional, provincial and municipal level agencies that are mandated to implement the *KALAH!* CIDSS projects. The purok leader of Sitio Lanao-Mafnoh, a leader of a peoples' organization in Brgy Poblacion, and a *barangay* chairman from another *barangay* (Brgy. Lun Masla) of Malapatan were also individually interviewed. Follow-up interviews (via emails) with some key staff of KC were also undertaken.

Four group interviews were also undertaken. The first two were semi-structured group interviews with women residents of Sitio Lanao-Mafnoh in Brgy. Poblacion, Malapatan, Sarangani. Another group interview was with three regional specialists of *KALAH!* CIDSS Region XII. The last group interview was with residents of Sitio Aspang, Barangay Poblacion, Malapatan.

### III. Revisiting **KALAHI-CIDSS** as the Government's Poverty Reduction Flagship Program

#### A. Understanding the Basic Features of **KALAHI** CIDSS

##### 1. Description & Goals

The *Kapit Bisig Laban sa Kahirapan* Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services or **KALAHI** CIDSS is the Philippine government's flagship poverty reduction project. Launched in 2003, the initiative aims to go beyond the minimum basic needs (MBN) approach of the earlier Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDSS) project, which was implemented as part of the Social Reform Agenda (SRA) during the Ramos administration. The government's Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) acts as the lead implementing agency of **KALAHI** CIDSS.

The program has three major project goals. These include: (a) *improved local governance*; (b) *reduced poverty* and (c) *improved quality of life of the poor*. In terms of specific objectives, the project particularly aims to strengthen local communities' participation in "*barangay*" governance, and develop their capacity to design, implement, and manage development activities that reduce poverty.

In terms of funding, the World Bank has provided a total of US\$ 100 million<sup>7</sup> for the implementation of community projects. Local government units are also

---

<sup>7</sup> Based on the fact sheet of Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) dated August 09, 2010, **KALAHI** will receive an additional funding of \$120 million from the MCC.

required to provide local financial counterpart, which is about 30% of the total project cost. Fifty percent (50%) of the total local counterpart should be in the form of cash.

## **2. Beneficiaries and Sub-Projects**

With regard to identifying the project areas, the project prioritized the forty (40) poorest provinces. The DSWD used the NSCB official poverty statistics at the provincial and municipal levels and the small area poverty estimates. For the implementation of the KALAHI CIDSS Phase 1 cycle, the program was able to cover the bottom 25% of all the eligible municipalities. When the NSCB poverty figures were not yet available, the agency tapped Dr. Arsenio Balisacan to prepare a special study of poverty incidence among municipalities within covered provinces.

When the NSCB data was already available, the DSWD used the national poverty incidence as a reference mark. All municipalities with at least 33% poverty incidence (above the average national poverty incidence) were considered as eligible to be part of the KC program. Municipalities with at least 70% poverty incidence were automatically selected while the rest of the eligible municipalities were subjected to a randomized selection process (Redaja 2010).

After more than seven years of implementation, the DSWD reported last March 2010 that the program had supported 5,326 community sub-projects, with a total estimated cost of PhP 5.34 billion. About 1,197,720 households in 5,543 barangays<sup>8</sup> are believed to have benefited from the subprojects.

---

<sup>8</sup> According to the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), some *barangays* that were prioritized by their MIBFs are counted more than once.

The matrix below shows the five (5) major *KALAHI* CIDSS sub-project types, the specific projects under each type and the percentages<sup>9</sup> of the total *KALAHI*-CIDSS grant spent on each type.

**Table 1. KC Sub-Projects**

<b>Type of Project</b>	<b>Specific Projects</b>	<b>Percentage (%) of Budget Spent</b>
<b>1. Basic social services sub-projects</b>	Community water systems, school buildings, day care centers, barangay health stations, electrification, and tribal housing/shelter	44.14%
<b>2. Basic access infrastructure</b>	Access roads, small bridges/footbridges and access trails	36.50%
<b>3. Community production, economic support and common services facilities</b>	Community economic enterprise training, equipment and materials support sub-projects, pre- and post-harvest and multi-purpose facilities, small scale irrigation and community transport	9.37%
<b>4. Environmental protection and conservation</b>	Drainage, river/flood control, sea wall, soil protection (rip rap), artificial coral reef sanctuary and sanitation facilities	9.57%
<b>5. Skills training and capability building sub-projects and others like light house/eco-tourism sub-projects</b>	Skills training and capability building sub-projects and others like light house/eco-tourism sub-projects	0.42%

*Source: KC Project Accomplishment Report, First Quarter 2010*

<sup>9</sup> The percentage share of budget spent on each project type is based on DSWD's First Quarter 2010 Update on the *KALAHI* CIDSS Implementation



*In terms of loan utilization for the program's different components, the table below demonstrates the fund allocation per component and the status of utilization.*

**Table 2. KC Loan Utilization as of the End of September 2010 (in US\$M)**

Project Category	Allocation (US\$ M)	Utilized as of September 2010	Unutilized
<i>Barangay Grants</i>	90.60	78.24	12.36
Goods	1.00	0.95	0.05
Consultants' Services	4.84	4.50	0.34
Incremental Operating Cost	2.56	2.35	0.21
Front End Fee	1.00	1.00	0.00
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>87.04</b>	<b>12.96</b>

*Source: KC 2010 Third Quarter Report*

### **3. Processes and Activities**

When it comes to procedures and activities, the project has sixteen (16) procedural stages that are divided into four major project cycles: *social preparation, project development, project selection, and project implementation*. The entire process and specific activities are reflected below.

Project Cycles and Stages	Specific Activities
<b>Social Preparation</b>	
Stage 1	Municipal Orientation
Stage 2	<i>Barangay</i> Orientation (First <i>Barangay</i> Assembly)
Stage 3	Conduct of Participatory Situation Analysis (PSA)
Stage 4	Validation of Participatory Situation Analysis (Second <i>Barangay</i> Assembly)

<b>Project Development</b>	
Stage 5	Project Development Workshop
Stage 6	Community Decision on Project Concept (Third <i>Barangay</i> Assembly)
Stage 7	Finalization of Project Concept Paper for Submission to the MIBF
Stage 8	MIBF Ranking of <i>Barangay</i> Project Concept Paper
Stage 9	<i>Barangay</i> Feedback on MIBF Meeting (Fourth <i>Barangay</i> Assembly)
Stage 10	Formulation of Detailed Project Proposal
Stage 11	Community Approval of Detailed Proposal (Fifth <i>Barangay</i> Assembly)
Stage 12	Final MIBF Decision on Detailed Proposals
<b>Project Implementation</b>	
Stage 13	Submission of Project Proposal for Funding
Stage 14	Project Implementation
Stage 15	Project Monitoring and Evaluation
Stage 16	Project Operation and Maintenance

Through this process, the project hopes to be able to reduce poverty incidence in the selected areas and develop/enhance the capability of project beneficiaries and local stakeholders in defining and implementing poverty-alleviation interventions.

#### **4. Project Structure**

Based on the Loan Agreement between the World Bank and the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the program would be implemented through the following committees and offices: National Steering Committee, Technical Working Committee, National Project Management Office (NPMO) and the Regional Project Management Office (RPMO). The National Steering Committee was tasked to come up with the Project

Implementation Manual. The Manual should contain the following: (a) criteria for the selection of *Barangay* Sub-projects and Grantees; (b) procurement procedures and standard documentation (included in the loan agreement document); (c) reporting requirements and financial management procedures (including audit procedures); (d) Project Performance Indicators (included in the loan agreement document).

The structures of the NPMO and RPMO are presented below.

**Diagram 1. National Project Management Office (NPMO) Organizational Structure**





Diagram 2. Regional Project Management Office (RPMO) Organizational Structure



## 5. KC Performance Indicators

Below are two matrices that contain the performance and impact indicators of KC program objectives and components. These indicators are reflected in the loan agreement document. However, based on the 2010 Third Quarter Accomplishment Report of the Program, some indicators in the loan agreement have been modified.

**Table 3. Performance Indicators based on Program Components**

Components	Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
<b>1.Community Grants</b>	<b>Community Grants Provided:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of completed sub-projects implemented in compliance with technical plans and within budget</li> <li>• % of completed sub-projects that meet basic financial reporting standards based on approved Finance and Administration Manual</li> </ul>
<b>2.Capability Building &amp; Implementation Support</b>	<b>Capability Building and Implementation Support Provided:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of Area Coordination Teams with satisfactory annual performance appraisal based on their work plan</li> <li>• # of <i>barangays</i> that have completed the core trainings for KC volunteers</li> </ul>
<b>3.Monitoring and Evaluation</b>	<b>Monitoring and Evaluation Conducted:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• % of registered grievances resolved in accordance with the GRS manual</li> </ul>

*Source: 2010 Third Quarter Accomplishment Report of the KC Program (KALAH-CIDSS Logframe and Accomplishments)*

**Table 4. Performance and Impact Indicators Based on Goals and Objectives**

Objectives	Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)
<b>Goals:</b>  <b>Improving Local Governance</b>	<b>Indicators:</b>  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved governance as evidenced by % of participating LGUs that have implemented the participatory strategies and technical assistance introduced by the project to assist community organizations/<i>barangays</i> to reduce poverty</li> </ul>
<b>Reducing Poverty</b> <b>Improved quality of life of the poor</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved poverty situation in the beneficiary <i>barangays</i></li> <li>Improved human development indicators in the beneficiary <i>barangays</i></li> </ul>
<b>Project Dev't Objectives:</b>  <b>Empowerment of local communities through improved participation in local governance and involvement in the design and implementation of poverty reduction projects</b>	<b>Outcome/Impact Indicators:</b>  <b>Empowerment Indicators:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>% of <i>barangays</i> that have committed to sustain the participatory process as part of the <i>Barangay Sustainability Plan</i></li> <li>% of completed community sub-projects that passed the sustainability evaluation</li> <li>% of non-prioritized <i>barangays</i> that have secured funding per annual cycle of operations</li> <li>% of municipal LGUs that meet with <i>barangay</i> representatives with inputs for the Municipal Development Plan</li> </ul> <b>Governance Indicators:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li># of MLGUs that provide technical assistance in SP preparation, implementation &amp; monitoring based on the MOA with MLGUs</li> <li># of MLGUs that provide at least 80% of the counterpart based on the MOA</li> <li># of MLGUs that substantially comply with transparency requirements per MOA</li> <li># of MLGUs with turnover MOA</li> </ul> <b>Poverty Reduction:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Improved poverty indicators in-project <i>barangays</i> compared to without-project <i>barangays</i></li> <li>Improved quality of life indicators in-project <i>barangays</i> compared to without-project <i>barangays</i></li> </ul>

Source: 2010 Third Quarter Accomplishment Report of the KC Program (KALAH-I-CIDSS Logframe and Accomplishments)

## 6. KC Geographical Distribution of Projects and Financial Support

The table below summarizes the distribution of KC projects and the corresponding financial assistance to eligible areas. It provides regional level distribution of projects and funding support.

**Table 5. Regional Distribution of KC Projects and Financial Assistance**

Regions	Number of KC Projects	% Share in the Total KC Projects	Financial Assistance Provided by KC (in PhP)	% Share in the Total KC Financial Assistance
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5326</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3, 754, 804, 724.94</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>LUZON</b>	<b>1245</b>	<b>23.37%</b>	<b>932, 703, 723.60</b>	<b>25%</b>
CAR	242	4.5%	121, 243, 433.61	3.22%
Region IV-A	189	3.55%	152, 113, 916. 79	4.05%
Region IV-B	148	2.78%	136, 577, 152.72	3.64%
Region V	666	12.5%	522, 769, 220.48	13.92%
<b>VISAYAS</b>	<b>2509</b>	<b>47.11%</b>	<b>1, 611, 068, 857.14</b>	<b>43%</b>
Region VI	882	16.56%	680, 871, 620.17	18.13%
Region VII	454	8.52%	344, 791, 859.32	9.18%
Region VIII	1173	22.02%	585, 405, 377.52	15.59%
<b>MINDANAO</b>	<b>1572</b>	<b>29.51%</b>	<b>1, 211, 032, 144.00</b>	<b>32%</b>
Region IX	570	10.70%	424, 992, 833.49	11.32%
Region X	244	4.58%	187, 753, 934.50	5.00%
Region XI	190	3.56%	133, 749, 490.72	3.56%
Region XII	285	5.35%	212, 445, 529.00	5.66%
CARAGA	283	5.31%	252, 090, 356.00	6.71%

**Note:** Breakdown of totals may not sum up due to rounding of digits -

*Source of Basic Data: List of KC Accomplished Projects*

As can be seen in the matrix, the Visayas emerges as the number one recipient of KC projects and financial assistance. The combined projects of its three regions compose 47% of all KC interventions. The islands' corresponding financial assistance has reached 43% of the total allocated funds. Two of its three regions have even surpassed the combined share of the five regions in Mindanao. Regions VI and VIII have cornered almost 39% of all the projects and almost 34% of the funding assistance.

Meanwhile, the consolidated share of Mindanao's five regions<sup>10</sup> in KC projects and funding assistance totaled 29.51% and 32%, respectively. Mindanao is second only to the Visayas in terms of KC projects and financial support. Of its five eligible regions, Region IX has the highest share in both KC projects (10.7%) and funding assistance (11.32%). Region XI registered the lowest allocation with 3.56% share in both areas.



For Luzon, only four of its eight regions have been included as KC beneficiaries. These include regions IV-A, IV-B, V and the Cordillera Autonomous Region or CAR. Among these four regions, Region V registered the highest share cornering 12.5% of all the KC projects and a financial support reaching 13.92% of KC funds. Luzon's total share in projects and financial support reached 23.37% and 25% respectively.

The pie charts illustrate the geographical distribution of KC projects and financial support.

---

<sup>10</sup> The Autonomous Region for Muslim in Mindanao (ARMM) is not part of any KC Interventions.





*Source of Basic Data: List of KC Accomplished Projects*

Since this paper focuses on Mindanao, it is important to show how KC has reached out to eligible provinces and municipalities in the island. The matrix below provides figures on the number of eligible municipalities at the regional and provincial levels. It also shows regional and provincial KC coverage in Mindanao.

**Table 6. KC Regional and Provincial Coverage in Mindanao<sup>11</sup>**

Regions/Provinces	No. of Municipalities with Poverty Incidence Higher than 33%	Number of Municipalities with Projects* of KC	Percentage of KC Coverage
<b>Total</b>	<b>289</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>21%</b>
<b>Region IX</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>25%</b>
Zamboanga Del Norte	26	6	23%
Zamboanga Del Sur	26	7	27%
Zamboanga Sibugay	14	4	29%
Isabela City, Basilan	1	0	0
<b>Region X</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12%</b>
Bukidnon	20	0	0
Camiguin	2	1	50%
Lanao Del Norte	22	7	32%
Misamis Occidental	17	3	18%
Misamis Oriental	23	0	0
<b>Region XI</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>22%</b>
Davao Del Norte	6	2	33%
Davao del Sur	8	0	0
Davao Oriental	10	3	30%
Compostela Valley	8	2	25%
<b>Region XII</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>29%</b>
North Cotabato	13	4	31%
South Cotabato	4	2	50%
Sarangani	7	2	29%
Sultan Kudarat	11	2	18%
<b>CARAGA</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>24%</b>
Agusan Del Norte	10	3	30%
Agusan del Sur	14	4	29%
Surigao Del Norte**	28	6	21%
Surigao Del Sur	19	4	21%

\*Areas that are still undertaking social preparation activities are excluded

\*\*The Dinagat Island was still part of Surigao Del Norte when the Small Area Poverty Estimates was conducted in 2003; thus, Dinagat is regarded in this matrix as part of Surigao Del Norte

*Source of Basic Data: City and Municipal-Level Small Area Poverty Estimates (2003), KC 2010 First Quarter Report), List of KC Accomplished Projects*

<sup>11</sup> The Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao is not included in these Mindanao Areas since KC did not target ARMM areas.

The poverty incidence serves as the main criterion of eligibility for KC projects. Municipalities that register more than 33% poverty incidence are considered as eligible for KC projects. Based on this reference figure, the table indicates that there are at least 289 eligible municipalities in five regions of Mindanao. Of this number, only 61 have managed to be included as KC areas. In other words, KC coverage in Mindanao (excluding ARMM area) is 21%. If the ARMM areas<sup>1</sup> are included in the municipalities with more than 33% poverty incidence, the total number of eligible areas in Mindanao would be 378. The KC coverage would then be around 16%.

Further, the table shows that no region in Mindanao has gone beyond 29% KC coverage. There are even provinces with eligible municipalities but have no KC projects. These are Bukidnon (with 20 eligible municipalities), Misamis Oriental (with 23 eligible municipalities) and Davao Del Sur (with eight eligible municipalities).

---

<sup>12</sup> Based on the 2003 NSCB Small Area Poverty Estimates, there are 89 ARMM municipalities with more than 33% poverty incidence. The provincial breakdown is as follows:

Basilan – 5 municipalities;

Lanao Del Sur – 35 municipalities;

Maguindanao – 21 municipalities;

Sulu – 18 municipalities;


Tawi-Tawi – 10 municipalities.

## B. KC in Region XII

Known as the SOCCSKSARGEN Region, Region XII covers four provinces and one component city: South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani and General Santos City. Based on the 2007 Population Census conducted by the National Statistics Office (NSO), Region XII had a population of 3, 830, 500 in 2007. With the annual population growth rate of 2.41%, this is expected to reach 4, 080, 400 in 2010.



Meanwhile, the 2006 NSCB data reveals that the region has 40.8% poverty incidence. In terms of provincial level poverty incidence, Sarangani's 52% poverty incidence is the highest in the region. This is followed by Sultan Kudarat with 47.7%. South Cotabato and North Cotabato have registered 37.3% and 34.6% poverty incidence, respectively.

**Graph 3. Poverty Incidence in Four Provinces of Region XII**

*Source of Basic Data: NSCB 2006 Poverty Incidence Statistics*

When it comes to the human development index (HDI)<sup>13</sup>, the Philippine Human Development Report 2008/2009 says that the 2006 figures indicate that the four provinces fared differently as well. Of the more than seventy provinces in the Philippines, the province of South Cotabato has landed on the top 20, placing 17<sup>th</sup>. After South Cotabato, North Cotabato ranked 47<sup>th</sup> while Sultan Kudarat settled at 62<sup>nd</sup>. Sarangani, which placed 71<sup>st</sup>, was among the ten provinces with lowest HDI.

With regard to KC implementation, the Region has implemented a total of 285 projects. This is 5.35% of the total 5326 KC projects nationwide. The 285 KC projects in the region were initiated in ten (10)

<sup>13</sup> HDI is a summary measure of human development that seeks to gauge the average achievement in a country in three basic HD dimensions: a long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living (UNDP 2007)

municipalities that included: Malapatan and Malungon in Sarangani, Lutayan and Columbio in Sultan Kudarat, T'boli and Lake Sebu in South Cotabato, Libungan, Pres. Roxas, Magpet, and Arakan in North Cotabato. These KC covered municipalities represent 21% of the total 48 municipalities in the region.

**Table 7. Municipalities in Region XII with Poverty Incidence Higher than the National Average of 33%<sup>14</sup>**


Provinces/Municipalities	Poverty Incidence	Municipalities	Poverty Incidence
<b>North Cotabato Province</b>		<b>Sultan Kudarat</b>	
Alamada	40.78	Bagumbayan	56.95
Carmen	39.99	<b>Cumbio*</b>	55.19
<b>Libungan*</b>	36.22	Esperanza	53.78
<b>Magpet*</b>	48.41	Isulan	33.45
Matalam	41.21	Kalamansig	54.19
Pigkawayan	39.46	Lebak	46.30
Pikit	47.64	<b>Lutayan*</b>	49.21
<b>President Roxas*</b>	48.84	Lambayog	49.92
Tulunán	37.59	Palimbang	61.13
Antipas	44.14	President Quirino	46.23
Banisan	52.58	Sen. Ninoy Aquino	63.63
Aleosan	43.99		
<b>Arakan*</b>	50.67		
<b>South Cotabato Province</b>		<b>Sarangani</b>	
Banga	39.0	Alabel	36.98
Norala	36.66	Glan	45.81
<b>T'boli*</b>	66.5	Kiamba	46.41
Tupi	30.78	Maasim	62.18
<b>Lake Sebu*</b>	65.31	Maitum	48.66
		<b>Malapatan*</b>	66.37
		<b>Malungon*</b>	50.63

\*Names in bold and marked with \* are municipalities with KC community projects - *Source of Basic Data: City and Municipal-Level Small Area Poverty Estimates, 2003; List of KC Projects*


<sup>14</sup> According to KC Deputy National Program Manager, municipalities with poverty incidence higher than the national average of 33% are eligible for KC community projects

The matrix shows that KC has only covered 10 out of 35 municipalities with poverty incidence higher than the national average of 33%. This is only 28.57% of the total poor areas in the entire region. Moreover, there are some towns in the region with poverty incidence higher than the ten KC municipalities but have not received any KC projects. In fact, two municipalities with the highest poverty incidence in their respective provinces have not received any KC projects at all. These are the municipalities of Banisilan in North Cotabato, registering 52.58% poverty incidence, and Sen. Ninoy Aquino in Sultan Kudarat, with 63.63% incidence. The municipality of Libungan in North Cotabato, a town that registered the lowest poverty incidence in the province, was able to implement twenty three (23) community projects with KC financial assistance of PhP 13, 708, 560.00.

Meanwhile, the provincial distribution of KC projects and the corresponding financial assistance are reflected in the pie charts below.



*Source of Basic Data: List of KALAHI CIDSS-Funded Community Projects*

**Graph 5. Distribution of KC Funds in Region XII**


*Source of Basic Data: List of KALAHI CIDSS-Funded Community Projects*

As reflected in the charts, the province of North Cotabato has cornered more than half (149 out of 285) of the community projects in Region 12. This translates to allocating half of the KC financial assistance to the same province. According to Ms. Arapoc (2010), this trend can be attributed to the criteria for selecting municipalities where projects are to be implemented. While the provincial and municipal poverty incidence guides the KC implementers in identifying eligible areas or covered municipalities, the number of *barangays* per municipality determines the volume of projects and the amount of financial assistance an area (province or municipality) could obtain (Arapoc 2010). For instance, during the KC Phase 1 cycle, the financial grant per municipality was computed by multiplying PhP 300,000 by the number of *barangays* (Redaja 2010). Thus, a province/municipality with more *barangays* (like North Cotabato) is able to get more projects and higher funding assistance.



Meanwhile, the pie graph below illustrates the distribution of 285 community projects according to project type.

**Graph 6. Distribution and Types of KC Projects in Region XII**



*Source of Basic Data: List of KALAHI CIDSS-Funded Community Projects*

The top three community projects in the Region are construction of school buildings (24%), road opening/construction (23%) and construction of water systems/spring development (23%). Other projects include post-harvest facilities like a solar dryer, construction of health centers and other social services facilities. Consistent with the processes of KC, these projects were identified at the *barangay* level through a series of *barangay* assemblies. The deliberation and approval was carried

out in the Municipal Inter-*Barangay* Forum. Ranking of *barangay* proposals was done through the MIBF. It was also during the MIBF when discussions about the details of the adopted proposals were carried out. The approved proposals were then submitted for financial KC assistance (Arapoc 2010).

### C. KC in the Municipality of Malapatan and the Chosen Project

#### 1. Brief Profile of Malapatan Sarangani

Malapatan is one of the seven towns of the Sarangani province. Its name was derived from the B'laan word *malah* ("pepper") and *fatan* ("place"). Formerly part of Glan municipality, Malapatan became a separate town in 1969 by virtue of Republic Act No. 5328. Malapatan has a total land area of 62,456 hectares and a population of 65,605. Of this number, the majority are of Muslim or Maguindanaon origin.



The town is subdivided into twelve barangays, namely: Daan Suyan, Kihan, Kinam, Libi, Lun Masla, Lun Padidu, Patag, Poblacion, Sapu Masla, Sapu Padidu, Tuyan, Upper Suyan

The economy of Malapatan is highly based on agriculture with more than 73% of the employed people relying on farming, fishing and forestry work (CBMS 2008 Survey). The place is also ideal for coco-based estates and eco-villages because of its expansive coconut farms and scenic shoreline (according to the provincial website). The town is considered as a first class municipality.

Of the seven municipalities in Sarangani, Malapatan has the highest number of households living below the poverty threshold (Bascomte 2010). Based on the 2008 community-based monitoring (CBMS) survey, the income of 10, 225 households or 79% of the total 12, 958 households is below the poverty threshold. The table below shows the municipal and *barangay* level distribution of poverty incidence.

**Table 8. Poverty Incidence in Malapatan, Sarangani**

Municipality/Barangay	Number of Households	Households with Income Below Poverty Line	
		Magnitude	Proportion
<b>MALAPATAN</b>	<b>12,958</b>	<b>10, 225</b>	<b>78.91</b>
Daan Suyan	817	683	83.6
Kihan	829	729	87.94
Kinam	1,302	1,197	91.94
Libi	497	431	86.72
Lun Masla	742	522	70.35
Lun Padidu	1,892	1,100	58.14
Patag	376	313	83.24
<b>Poblacion</b>	<b>2,903</b>	<b>2,371</b>	<b>81.67</b>
Sapu Masla	1,279	1,081	84.52
Sapu Padidu	689	424	61.54
Tuyan	770	544	70.65
Upper Suyan	862	830	96.29

Source: CBMS Survey 2008

As can be seen in the matrix above, the highest poverty incidence has been registered in the mountainous *Barangay* Upper Suyan with 96.26% of households earning incomes below the poverty threshold. The lowest is in *Barangay* Lun Padidu at 58.14 %, which is still high. It is also worth mentioning that in the Poblacion area, the location of the chosen KC project, the poverty incidence is at 81.67%.

## **2. KC Projects in Malapatan**

The statistics reflected in the table above explain why Malapatan is among the 10 municipalities in the entire Region XII where *KALAH!* CIDSS projects have been implemented. In fact, it is the only town in the entire region where the *KALAH!* Phase 1 projects were carried out. All the 12 *barangays* were chosen as project areas of the *KALAH!* sub-projects.

Since 2003, *KALAH!* has initiated twenty seven (27) community sub-projects in Malapatan, which is about 9.41% of the total 285 *KALAH!* Projects in the entire Region XII. In Sarangani, 65 *KALAH!* projects have been implemented. Of this, 38 projects (or 58.5%) were initiated in the municipality of Malungon.


Among the twelve (12) *barangays*, Lun Padidu had four projects, while Kihan and Tuyan had three projects each. Eight *barangays* (Libi, Lun Masla, Sapu Masla, Patag, Upper Suyan, Daan Suyan and Poblacion) were able to implement two projects each. Only *Barangay* Sapu Padidu got one project.

**Table 9. KALAH! CIDSS Projects in 12 *Barangays* of Malapatan**

<b>Barangays</b>	<b>Projects Initiated</b>
Libi	Road Construction Road Opening
Lun Masla - C2	Spring Development W.S. Level I (Hand Pumps)
Lun Padidu	Day Care Center Construction of 3-Classroom School Building Livelihood & Technical Center Development Center
Sapu Masla	3-Classroom School Building with Comfort Rooms Water System
Sapu Padidu	Water System
Kihan	Spring Development 2-Classroom School Building (HS) 9.68 km Road Opening
Patag	Road Opening Construction of Day Care Center
Tuyan	Road Opening Development Center 2-Classroom School Building
Upper Suyan	Road Opening 2-Classroom School Building (Elem.)
Daan Suyan	90 m. Hanging Bridge W.S. Level II (Spring Source)
Kinam	2-Classroom School Building 2-Classroom School Building (HS)
Poblacion	2.15 km Road Opening Construction of Health Station

*Source of Basic Data: List of KALAH! CIDSS-Funded Community Projects*

The pie chart below illustrates the project distribution according to types.



Source of Basic Data: List of KALAH! CIDSS-Funded Community Projects

In terms of types of projects, nine of the 27 projects were construction of school buildings. This constituted 33% of all the projects in Malapatan. There were eight projects allocated to road opening/construction and construction of hanging bridges, which comprised 30% of the total community projects. There were also six projects for water system/spring development and three projects were the construction of day care and health centers. The last four projects were construction of development and livelihood centers, health centers and training centers.

## **D. The Road Opening Project in Brgy. Poblacion, Malapatan**

### **1. Rationale for Choosing the Project**

The researcher decided to choose the 2.15 kilometer road opening project in *Barangay Poblacion* for a number of reasons. One, it was implemented in 2006-2007 or around three years ago. This means that perceived and felt impacts of the project on the intended beneficiaries could now be qualitatively observed and/or shared by those who had supposedly benefited from the project. At the same time, the beneficiaries and agencies involved in the project could already share their insights regarding post-KC implementation operations and maintenance.

Second, since it was an infrastructure project; the documentation and examination of this road opening could provide a narrative on how a KALAHI-CIDSS infrastructure initiative significantly resembles or differs from other ODA-funded infrastructure projects that have been riddled with corruption.

Lastly, the presence of a member of a people's organization in the area, Sarangani Community Development Foundation Incorporated (SARCO DFI), provided the researcher with some preliminary information on the project.

## 2. Basic Features of the Project

Based on the KC national database, the project was a 2.15 kilometer road opening located at *Sitio 9-B to Sitio Lanao Mafnoh* in *Barangay Poblacion, Malapatan*. It was funded and implemented by *KALAHICIDSS* in 2006 as part of the KC Phase 1 cycle. Around 700 households were expected to benefit from this project.



Based on the list of *KALAHICIDSS*-funded community projects from 2003 until June 2010, the total project cost of the road opening was PhP 810, 880.00. Of this amount, PhP 430,000.00 was financed by *KALAHICIDSS* and the remaining 380, 880.00 came from community and local government unit (LGU) contributions. However, based on the contractor's accomplishment report dated March 21 2007<sup>15</sup>, the total cost reached

<sup>15</sup> The contractor's statement of work accomplished was obtained by the researcher from the municipal engineer of Malapatan.



PhP 870, 000.00. This was more than PhP 50, 000.00 higher than the cost reflected in the *KALAHI* database. Even the project's total cost reflected in the billboard - PhP 1, 038 795.00 - was different from the cost indicated in the *KALAHI* CIDSS database and the contractor's report.

According to a project description stated in a recovered project billboard which was originally placed near the project site, the road opening covered the *Sitio* 9-B - *Sitio* Lanao Mafnoh to *Sitio* Aspang (*please refer to photos below*). This information generated high hopes among the residents of *Barangay* Poblacion, particularly among the B'laan people who live in *Sitio* Aspang. According to the *purok* leader of a B'laan community *Sitio* Lanao Mafnoh, their fellow B'laan residents in *Sitio* Aspang were really expecting that the road opening would reach their area. Some women of *Sitio* Lanao Mafnoh shared that residents of *Sitio* Aspang expressed frustration over the unfinished road opening. Some people even expressed their jealous sentiments towards residents of Lanao Mafnoh, who now primarily benefit from the project.



### 3. Current Status

As of this writing, the 2.15km road opening project is reported in the KC national and regional database as 100% complete. However, for the residents of *Sitio* Lanao Mafnoh and *Sitio* Aspang the project is not yet finished. They believe that it should have reached *Sitio* Aspang. Also, for the people who were interviewed, the completed road opening is less than one kilometer. They claimed that based on the marker put by the project engineer, the construction only finished around 700 meters.

When the researcher verified this claim of the community members with the municipal engineer he admitted that the original target of 2.15 kilometers was not met since there had been expenses incurred due to unforeseen physical considerations (e.g. pipe culvert with headwall). When asked about the distance of the actual completed road opening, the engineer was not able to present any written documents about the project completion. What he provided was a copy of the contractor's accomplishment report. Unfortunately, the actual distance/size of the project was not indicated in the document. The municipal engineer and his assistant simply gave an estimate that about 1.2 to 1.3 kilometers of road opening was finished by the contractor.

In the contractor's report, there was no explanation as to why the project was not able to reach its 2.15 km target.

During the group interview with the regional staff of KALAHl, this same concern was brought up with the regional engineer. At first, he claimed that they had indeed finished the 2.15 kilometer road opening. However, when the researcher narrated the story from the community and cited the estimate of the municipal engineer, he suddenly retracted his statement and admitted that the project's actual accomplishment was about 1.5 to 1.6 kilometers. This estimate was again inconsistent with the figure reflected in the KALAHl CIDSS official database. Likewise, it was different compared to the estimates of the municipal engineer and the residents of Lanao Mafnoh.

At the time of the interview, the residents of Lanao Mafnoh expressed their complaint that the road opening had already deteriorated over time. They claimed that there had been no maintenance activities carried out since it was completed. They said that previously, some male members of the community volunteered to clear the growing wild grass and bushes from the sides of the road. However, when they felt that the *barangay* and the municipal government were not initiating any maintenance activities, the enthusiasm among the volunteers slowly faded away. Since no one assumed responsibility for maintaining it, the road opening could not be used during the rainy season, when the road gets flooded with water and covered with mud. Thus, vehicles which normally are able to access the area are not able to make use of the poorly maintained road project.

In 2008, Mr. Manuel San (the *purok* leader of *Sitio* Lanao Mafnoh) decided to write a letter to the *barangay* chairman of *Barangay* Poblacion. In his letter, he



*The road opening project in  
Sitio Lanao Mafnoh, Barangay  
Poblacion, Malapatan*

explained the current state of the road opening and asked the *barangay* chairman if the latter could do some maintenance work to optimize the benefits of the project. Up until this writing, however, there has been no response from the *barangay*. After this attempt to report the project status and seek assistance, Mr. San said that eventually he got discouraged from further engaging with the *barangay* government. No one mentioned any initiative to use the KC grievance mechanism to report the deteriorating status of the project.

*An ill-maintained  
portion of the road  
opening project*



#### **4. Views/Feedback from the Stakeholders (Beneficiaries and Implementers)**

During the fieldwork, the beneficiaries and project implementers who were interviewed shared their views on the KC project. The feedback can be grouped into two major clusters: (a) views on the process and (b) views on the impacts on poverty and living conditions.

##### *a. On the Process (From Conceptualization to Evaluation and Maintenance)*

According to the people interviewed in the community, they were part of the consultation process for the project conceptualization and implementation. Since they were part of the process, they knew that the project should have reached *Sitio* Aspang as it was the agreement in the assemblies. Some men in the *Sitio* even volunteered their services as laborers during the project implementation. However, months after the project had been completed, the community volunteers lost the enthusiasm to help maintain the road opening. The beneficiaries also noted that even the *barangay* government, which was supposed to monitor and maintain the project after KC had exited from the community, did not do anything for the upkeep of the project.

The problem of maintenance was also raised by the current KC community facilitator in Malapatan. He even cited

another KC project (a water system) in *Barangay* Lun Masla that cost about two million pesos but was only used by the beneficiaries for almost two months. This water system project was not maintained by the *barangay*. What is worse was that residents even disassembled the equipment and facilities of the water system and used them for their own purposes (Santiago 2010). The community facilitator then suggested that the municipal government should assign one person to monitor and assess the status of all the completed *KALAHI* projects in Malapatan.

*b. On the Impacts (on Poverty and Living Conditions)*

The intended beneficiaries recognized the positive effects of the road opening on their living conditions. All of the interviewed residents admitted that it was now easier for them to bring their harvested goods to the market. Before, they needed to hire some horses to bring down the products from their mountainous farms, so it took them a long time before the goods were brought to the downtown area. Now, some motorcycles and vehicles are able to reach their area and pick up their products. However, when asked whether the project had helped reduce the number of poor people in their area, both B'laan and Visayan respondents had no definite answer.

### **E. Summary of Comments/Feedback from Different Stakeholders**

The matrix in Page 56 to 59 contains the summary views<sup>16</sup> of different stakeholders on the KC processes and on the impacts of the implemented community sub-projects from 2003 until 2010.

---

<sup>16</sup> The insights are based on the interviews conducted by the researcher with beneficiaries and implementers of the KC program and sub-projects.

Table 10. Summary of Comments/Feedback from Different Stakeholders

STAKEHOLDERS	PROCESS		IMPACTS	
	Conceptualization & Implementation	Monitoring & Evaluation	Impacts (Poverty Alleviation/ Living Conditions)	Governance & Empowerment
<b>People in the Community</b> <b>Direct Beneficiaries</b> <b>(Residents of</b> <b>Purok 9-B and Sitio</b> <b>Lanao Matnroh</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People were part of the consultation; they attended assemblies (San 2010; Claha et. Al 2010)</li> <li>- Some community members served as volunteers for the road opening project (San 2010)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- No monitoring has been done (De La Peña 2010)</li> <li>- One common question from the residents: "Why was the project not completed?" (De La Peña 2010)</li> <li>- Based on the marking made by the engineers who helped in the road construction, the completed project is only 700 meters (San 2010).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Because of the road opening, it is now easier to transport farm products; it has helped in bringing farm products to the market (San 2010; Palaryon and Montibon 2010)</li> <li>- If not continued/finished, the impact would be limited; the project was helpful only for those residents reached by the road (De La Peña 2010)</li> <li>- The project would be more helpful if it was properly maintained and if the road opening would reach <i>Sitio Aspang</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- In 2008, a <i>purok</i> leader sent a letter to the <i>barangay</i> chairman to update the latter on the limited functionality of the project and to ask help for maintenance of the road opening. The <i>barangay chairman</i> however, did not respond to the letter (San 2010).</li> </ul>
<b>Residents of Sitio Aspang</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Residents were part of the consultation process. (Pagi et. al. 2010)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People were not aware of the reasons why the project did not reach their area. (Pagi et al 2010)</li> </ul>		
<b>Project Implementers/Evaluators</b> <b>National KC Implementer &amp; Evaluator</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Those who were not able to get assistance got disappointed (Redaja 2010)</li> <li>- Some LGUs feel that KC violates the local autonomy of the local governments since they should be the one implementing projects similar to the KC community projects at the local level (Rodriguez 2010)</li> <li>- Some LGUs disengaged from the program because they were not able to produce the local counterpart (Redaja 2010)</li> </ul>	<p>There was no specific quantitative target level/percentage of poverty reduction that should be met. (Redaja 2010)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Lives have slightly improved. (Rodriguez 2010)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Active participation of community volunteers in <i>barangay</i> assemblies</li> <li>- When it comes to initiating development projects, communities still rely on government (Rodriguez 2010).</li> <li>- LGUs realize the logic of community-driven development and how they can contribute to community projects (Redaja 2010)</li> </ul>



Continuation of Table 10

STAKEHOLDERS	PROCESS Conceptualization & Implementation	Monitoring & Evaluation	IMPACTS Impacts (Poverty Alleviation/ Living Conditions)	Governance & Empowerment
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Some NGOs (e.g. Plan International) and other government officials (Congress persons) shouldered the funding of other KC projects that have not been prioritized (Redaja 2010)</li> </ul>			
<b>Regional Provincial Implementers</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Problem with the schedule of KC (timing) and local budget cycle. There is a need to look into the possibility of aligning the KC timeframe with the schedule of the local planning process (Camarinas 2010).</li> <li>- Some communities whose projects were not included in the priority list got discouraged. The implementers constantly communicated with them, and explained the process. The KC regional staff even submitted some of their proposals to other funding organizations (Camarinas 2010, Bascomte 2010).</li> <li>- Some LGUs are having difficulty producing their local counterpart while those that are already familiar with KC processes take the initiative to realign their local budget for KC implementation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Monitoring should be done by the partner municipal governments (Camarinas 2010).</li> <li>- The Region conducts Community-Based Evaluation (CBE). There is a Mid-CBE that is being done in the middle of project implementation. Results of the Mid-CBE usually revolve around concerns related to processes. There is also a Post-CBE that is conducted after the project completion. Results of the Post-CBE have to do with insights of the people on the effects of infrastructure projects (Arapoc 2010).</li> <li>- There are sustainability plans at the municipal and <i>barangay</i> level (Arapoc 2010).</li> <li>- The actual project completion of the road opening in Poblacion Malapatan was about 1.5 to 1.6 kilometers. The original target was not finished because there</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Aside from capacity building activities, one of KC's strengths is its ability to produce tangible results - physical outputs. This creates an impression among communities that KC is not just about assemblies and meetings (Camarinas 2010).</li> <li>- KC projects really help address the needs of the people (Bascomte 2010).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People learned a lot from being involved in the project implementation. They learned bookkeeping, carpentry, and other things.</li> <li>- KC projects made people realize that it is important for them to get involved in government projects; people became aware of their role in implementing community projects (Arapoc 2010, Bascomte 2010).</li> <li>- The people had a say in the decisions and they learned about planning processes (Bascomte 2010).</li> <li>- The communities began to have a sense of ownership of the projects (Bascomte 2010).</li> </ul>

Continuation of Table 10

STAKEHOLDERS	PROCESS Conceptualization & Implementation	Monitoring & Evaluation	IMPACTS Impacts (Poverty Alleviation/ Living Conditions)	Governance & Empowerment
	<p>(Camariñas 2010, Arapoc 2010).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- While some <i>barangays</i> have the capability to follow the KC requirements, some <i>barangays</i> are having difficulty in terms of accomplishing the required documents (Bascomte 2010).</li> <li>- Based on the identified gaps of previous KC projects, there have been modifications in the implementation of KC processes to address the concerns of the communities. For instance, since the people complained that the 16 steps of KC were time-consuming and too many activities had to be done, some adjustments were made: now there's the 5-stage KC cycle and back-to-back orientation/activities are conducted to maximize the time (Camariñas 2010).</li> <li>- One concern that should be addressed is the lack of linkages among agencies, organizations (NGOs and GOs) and ODA-funded poverty-related interventions at the community level. There is a lack of collaborative efforts (Camariñas 2010).</li> </ul>	<p>were revisions/changes in the source of the gravel materials. Also, additional drainage structures (box culvert) and slope protection were also constructed. These increased the total project cost resulting in the reduction in the length of the actual completed project (Teofilo 2010).</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Of the 285 KC projects in the region, eighty nine percent (89%) or 225 sub-projects were fully functional. Twenty three (23) sub-projects (around 8% of the total projects) were found to be lacking in functionality. These projects with limited functionality include roads and bridges (11), water systems (8) and classrooms (4). Seven projects are non-functional due to disasters that occurred (Arapoc 2010, KC Region XII Project Completion Report, undated).</li> <li>- Many road projects have limited functionality. It is suggested to remove road construction from the KC list of allowed projects (Teofilo 2010).</li> </ul>		

Continuation of Table 10

STAKEHOLDERS	PROCESS	IMPACTS	Governance & Empowerment
Municipal Implementers and Partner LGUs	Conceptualization & Implementation	Monitoring & Evaluation	Impacts (Poverty Alleviation/ Living Conditions)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- There is a problem with the timing of the KC call for project proposals; the local funds are already depleted when the partners are invited to apply (Suib 2010).</li> <li>- The road opening project was not able to reach Sifio Aspang, which was originally identified as part of the target beneficiary sites; due to the lack of funds. Of the proposed seven (7) kilometer road opening project, only about one (1) kilometer has been completed (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- The community is really helpful in implementing KC projects and there is accountability since the people feel that they are part of the project (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- Community volunteers helped in the construction of the road opening.</li> <li>- They (KC) come at the middle of the year when LGUs do not have funding for the local counterpart (Tita Suib 2010, Vinzon 2010).</li> <li>- Those who were not able to get assistance got disappointed; it is suggested to simply divide the resources among the <i>barangays</i> (Esparagosa 2010).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The project was able to help the community but the <i>barangay</i> and municipal governments have not properly maintained the road opening project (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- For the road project in Poblacion Malapatan, the maintenance was turned over to the <i>barangay</i>. However, the latter did not have the resources to maintain the project (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- There should be one or two staff from the municipal government to monitor all the KC projects in Malapatan. Since 2003, no one has monitored the KC projects (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- Those who did not get financial assistance were said to have jealous sentiments against those who received help (Esparagosa 2010).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- It is difficult to determine the program's quantitative impact on poverty reduction since there was no identified target level/percentage of poverty reduction at the start of the project's conceptualization (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- For beneficiaries of school buildings, KC has helped them reduce expenses, specifically the travel costs (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- "We cannot really say that because of KALAH! the poverty incidence has been reduced" (Tita Suib 2010).</li> </ul>
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The local government units are partners in KC projects (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- People were really participating actively in KC activities (Santiago 2010).</li> <li>- People did not attend assemblies/meetings once they learned that their proposed projects were not included in the priority list (Esparagoza 2010).</li> <li>- Processes enshrined in the local government code are practiced – people participation and consultation with communities, among others (Tita Suib 2010).</li> </ul>

### **1. Common Concerns On the Process**

Based on the interviews, it was learned that KC projects really went through a series of consultations with the target communities. This was confirmed by the implementers and the residents who were able to attend some of the assemblies. Aside from attending meetings and assemblies, some residents also served as volunteers for the project.

With regard to communities that were not able to get financial assistance, both implementers and beneficiaries noted that people from the said communities got disappointed and discouraged. The implementers explained the process to the non-prioritized communities and helped them submit their proposals to other funding organizations.

Tensions between KC implementers and some LGUs was also observed. Some LGUs felt that KC violated the local autonomy of the local governments since they should be the ones implementing projects like the KC community projects at the local level (Rodriguez 2010). Redaja (2010) says it is normal especially for local governments that are not familiar with the community-driven development approach.

Another recurring concern was the schedule of the KC implementation. KC implementers admitted that LGUs had been complaining that the KC timeline was not consistent with the schedule of the local development process and budgeting cycle. For instance, some LGUs had difficulty producing their local counterpart since KC informed them of the next cycle of implementation at a time when local

resources had already been allocated to other projects. LGUs that were already familiar with KC processes took the initiative to realign their local budgets for KC implementation (Camariñas 2010, Arapoc 2010).

Aside from the timeframe, it was also observed that while some barangays had the capability to follow the KC requirements, others were having difficulty in terms of accomplishing the required documents (Bascomte 2010). These capabilities of LGUs to accomplish requirements (documents, financial counterpart) affected the process and results of KC implementation. As repeatedly pointed out by some KC staff, LGUs that were not able to produce the local counterpart did not get KC financial assistance.

Moreover, the monitoring and maintenance of KC projects were identified by implementers and beneficiaries as major concerns. The KC staff and the beneficiaries both claim that it is the responsibility of partner LGUs (municipal and *barangay* levels) to monitor KC sub-projects and initiate the necessary maintenance activities/operations. Some LGUs also fail to do their post-implementation duties. The road opening project in Poblacion Malapatan is a case in point. The regional KC staff claimed that the project had already been turned over to the municipal/*barangay officials*, and thus the maintenance of the project had become the responsibility of the local government units of Malapatan. Yet, local KC staff and residents/beneficiaries of the road opening said that neither the municipal government nor the

*barangay* conducts any activities to properly maintain the KC project. This has then resulted in a road opening that has limited functionality.

Lastly, aside from LGUs and communities, the role of non-government entities such as foundations, funding agencies, civil society organizations etc., has also been recognized by the *KALAH!* implementers. In some areas, they shoulder a certain percentage of the project cost. However, as Camariñas (2010) observes, - one concern that should be addressed is the lack of linkages among agencies, organizations (NGOs and GOs) and ODA-funded poverty-related interventions at the community level.

## **2. Common Concerns On Impacts**

When it comes to impacts on addressing poverty and improving the living conditions of the poor, it was noted that KC projects have helped in addressing the needs of the communities, especially the need for basic social services such as classrooms, water systems, and road networks, among others. Some beneficiaries and implementers also claim that these interventions have allowed some residents to save on everyday expenses. Others claim that projects have led to a slight increase in income of some residents. However, the KC staff also admitted that they still could not determine whether KC projects had reduced the poverty incidence in the covered areas. In fact, the Municipal and Planning Development Coordinator (MPDC) of Malapatan, Sarangani even

claimed that it was difficult to say whether poverty reduction in an area could be attributed to KC since they had other poverty-related interventions.

In terms of impact on governance, the views of the respondents can be clustered into two important points. First, the LGUs have been a crucial partner in KC implementation. As already stated, the capabilities of LGUs also have an impact on the KC implementation. Second, the communities were really involved in the project conceptualization and implementation that were facilitated by the KC staff. Further, it is noteworthy that in some communities that implemented the construction of school buildings, the Parents and Teachers Association (PTA) were an active partner in initiating maintenance interventions (e.g. repainting of classrooms). However, other views also reveal that other communities still rely on government agencies when it comes to post-implementation activities. This has been affirmed by Rodriguez (2010) when he shared his observation on the reliance of communities on municipal government when it comes to coming up with other projects. Likewise, the initiative of a *Sitio* Mafnoh Purok leader to write a letter to the *barangay* chairman signifies a dependence on the local government.

## **IV. Analysis & Insights**

### **A. Some Encouraging Features of KC**

#### **1. An Effective Mechanism for Delivery/ Implementation of Community Projects**

As reflected in the qualitative impact evaluation and midterm reports, KC is an effective mechanism for the delivery and implementation of projects that have to do with basic social services (e.g. water system, classrooms, and health centers). This has been validated by the views of both the beneficiaries and the project implementers interviewed by the researcher. For instance, some B'laan people mentioned that they were really thankful for the road project as it had afforded them easier access to other services. The same people look forward to other social services projects that the KC can implement in their community.

#### **2. An Important Mechanism for Raising Awareness about the Roles of Communities and Government Agencies/Officials in Project Development**

Aside from delivering the much-needed social services projects to poor communities, KC has also been a mechanism to raise awareness, primarily of poor people who have long been excluded from meaningful governance processes, on the roles they can play in any community development project. It is also worth noting that a *purok* leader wrote a letter to their *barangay* captain asking for assistance in maintaining the road opening which was constructed



thru KC. However, the leader eventually got discouraged to communicate further as he still has not received any response from the *barangay* leader up to this writing.

Further, while some KC reports claim that some community volunteers have become active players in *barangay* decision-making during and, to some extent, after the completion of KC projects in their areas, the experience of the interviewed residents in Malapatan indicates that the involvement of ordinary members of the community has not gone beyond attending assemblies and being informed of the future plans and decisions made by the *barangay* leaders. More evident though is the awareness of the people about the roles and responsibilities of the government (*barangay* and municipal) in responding to their needs. In fact, people were quick to share that the failure to maintain their road opening could be attributed to the inability of their *barangay* leaders to do their duties.

### 3. Employs Transparency

The experience of the researcher and the research assistant of this paper could attest to the fact that compared to other government projects/programs, KC practices transparency. Documents are readily available via its official website that contains updated reports and pertinent tools and guides. Even the loan agreement of the program, which is normally difficult to obtain, is made available online. National and Regional (Region XII) Program personnel/staff were accommodating and open to queries of the researchers.

However, the program staff (from national office, regional to municipal KC offices) should be more thorough and methodical in recording quantitative accomplishments of the project. As discussed in this paper, the road opening in *Barangay* Poblacion Malapatan has been recorded in the national data as a 2.15km project. However, the fieldwork information says that it was not completed. The beneficiaries claimed that only about 700 meters was finished. Even the engineers involved in the project were sharing different data. The municipal engineer claimed that they were able to complete about 1.2 to 1.3m of road opening while the regional engineer estimated that actual completion would reach about 1.5 to 1.6km. They were not able to present any document that could show the actual project completion. Nor were they able to provide any report that could explain the disparity between the actual and planned project implementation (which was explicitly stated in the loan agreement).

#### **4. KC Implementing Agencies Initiate Efforts to Modify Processes that Address Identified Gaps/Needs**

This paper also acknowledges the efforts initiated by the KC implementing agencies to make the program responsive to the conditions and needs of the local partners. For instance, the community development specialist of *KALAHI* Region XII mentioned that based on the identified gaps of previous KC projects, the region had already introduced some modifications in the implementation of KC processes to address the concerns of the communities. As Camariñas (2010)

noted, since the people complained that the 16 steps of KC was time-consuming and too many activities had to be done, they have made some adjustments in the implementation process. They now conduct back-to-back orientation/activities to maximize the time and presence of the people.

## **B. Constraints and Challenges**

### **1. Impact on Poverty Alleviation is Difficult to Measure**

KC started implementing community projects that aimed to reduce poverty in 2003. Yet, the national poverty incidence rose between 2003 and 2006<sup>17</sup>. These years were periods when *KALAHI-CIDSS* programs were being implemented. At the municipal level, the town of Malapatan (where a specific KC project was documented) registered a poverty incidence of 66.37% in 2003<sup>18</sup>. This figure became the basis for making the town a KC project area. From 2003 until 2008, eighteen (18) KC poverty-reduction community projects were implemented in Malapatan covering all its 12 barangays. Despite the implementation of these anti-poverty projects, however, the 2008 community-based monitoring system (CBMS) survey indicated that Malapatan's poverty incidence rose to 78.91%<sup>19</sup> or a 12.54 percentage increase from the 2003 figure.

---

<sup>17</sup> Based on the official data of the government's National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB), the poverty incidence in 2006 was 26.9%, a 2.5% increase from 24.4% in 2003

<sup>18</sup> This is based on NSCB 2003 City and Municipal Level Small Area Poverty Estimates.

<sup>19</sup> This is based on the 2008 community-based monitoring survey (CBMS)

These numbers amplify the need to look into the nature of projects (and the quality and impact these projects would ultimately yield) that KALAH-CIDSS has been initiating. For while the program's most recent qualitative impact evaluation cited some positive impacts – KALAH-CIDSS as an effective project delivery mechanism, increased awareness of members of the community on local governance processes, empowerment of community volunteers and revitalization of barangay assembly as a mechanism for barangay level consultation (Rodriguez 2010, KC 2010 3rd Quarter Accomplishment Report) - the program's significant impact on the national poverty incidence still remains to be seen.

The Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC) of Malapatan, Sarangani also claimed that it is very difficult to measure the impact of KC projects on poverty reduction, since the LGUs and other government agencies also implement interventions that intend to reduce the number of poor people in the area. This becomes more difficult since KC did not set the target level/percentage of poverty reduction that the program wishes to achieve.

Even the interviewed beneficiaries in Sitio Lanao Mafnoh had no definite answer when asked whether the project has helped reduce the number of poor people in their area.

These concerns call for a thorough investigation of the impact of KC on the poverty incidence in the covered municipalities. At the same time, it is also necessary to measure how this impact reduces the national

poverty incidence. Since the World Bank has already commissioned a quantitative study similar to the one being suggested here, there is now a need to look into the findings of the study and check out the processes and instruments used by the World Bank-commissioned study. If there has been a positive impact, there is a need to examine how significant it is and relate it with the debts incurred because of the program.

**2. Limited Coverage: KC Implementation (2003-2010) in Region 12 Only Covered Less Than 30% of Poor Areas**

The figures on KC project areas (at least in Region 12) show that the program has only covered 10 out of 35 municipalities with poverty incidence higher than the national average of 33%. This is only 28.47% of the total poor areas in the entire region. Moreover, there are some towns in the region with poverty incidence higher than the ten KC municipalities; yet they have not received any KC projects. In fact, two municipalities with the highest poverty incidence in their respective provinces have not received any KC projects. These are the municipalities of Baniisan in North Cotabato, with 52.58% poverty incidence, and Sen. Ninoy Aquino in Sultan Kudarat with 63.63% incidence. Ironically, Libungan in North Cotabato, a town that registered the lowest poverty incidence in the province, was able to implement twenty three (23) community projects with KC financial assistance of PhP 13, 708, 560.00.

With this project allocation trend, the public should ask whether the targeting design used by the program has really reached the intended beneficiaries. Also, this makes one wonder if targeting (as a framework) should be used in implementing an anti-poverty program in a country where poverty is so prevalent.

In Mindanao (excluding the ARMM area), KC coverage is only 21%. If the ARMM areas are included in the municipalities with more than 33% poverty incidence, the total number of eligible areas in Mindanao would be 378. The KC coverage would then be around 16% only. As already stated, there are also Mindanao provinces with eligible municipalities but have no KC projects. These are Bukidnon (with 20 eligible municipalities), Misamis Oriental (with 23 eligible municipalities) and Davao Del Sur (with eight eligible municipalities).

### **3. Some Highly Technical Requirements and Rigid Timelines May Lead to A Donor-Driven Approach**

KC staff and partner LGUs shared their concerns over some requirements that are too technical and complex for some local governments to accomplish. In fact, the interviewed KC staff mentioned that other eligible LGUs have not been included in KC program cycles because they could not meet some of the needed requirements. This concern has also been highlighted in the KC mid-term report.

Aside from this issue, KC's rigid timeframe has also prevented other eligible municipalities from participating in the program. One concrete example related to this concern is the needed allocation of the

local budget (as the local counterpart) for KC projects. Sometimes KC's call for proposal/application is announced at a time when local governments have already finalized their respective annual investment plans and resources have been allocated to different projects. When KC asks for a local financial counterpart the LGUs are not able to commit local resources and this prevents them from participating in the KC process. Thus, the local governments appeal for an LGU-friendly framing of the KC program schedule.

These two issues have direct impact on the selection process of KC partner municipalities and beneficiaries. They define the selection process and limit the prospective beneficiaries to those who have the technical capabilities and are more familiar with the KC programmatic framework. In this sense, the intervention may lead to a donor-driven selection process. Contrary to KC's pronounced demand-driven model, the highly technical requirements and rigid timeframe promote an elimination/exclusion process that is based on the capabilities/resources of certain localities and not based on their specific conditions and needs. KC should then answer the nagging question 'Should poverty-reduction programs such as *KALAHI*/CIDSS favor those who have the means and capabilities to participate in the competition process and follow highly technical requirements?'

#### **4. Gender Concerns Have Not Been Integrated Into the Design of the Program and Projects**

As can be seen in KC's performance and outcome/impact indicators, gender concerns are not addressed and integrated into the program design, and tools/

instruments used for reporting, monitoring and evaluation are, at best, gender-blind. Since gender concerns (e.g. women's conditions, possible impacts of community projects on women, etc.) have not been integrated into the program's design and tools, it now becomes difficult to assess how *KALAHI*/CIDSS has made contributions to millennium development goal (MDG) number three, which is about attaining gender equality. The lack of a clear gender policy was also raised in the Final Report submitted by the Center for Policy and Executive Development (CPED) of the U.P. National College of Public Administration and Governance (UP NCPAG) to the DSWD. The CPED NCPAG acted as the Consultant for External NGO Monitoring in 2004.

In the KC reports, only the more recent updates contain specific information about the participation and roles of women in community projects. The Deputy National Program Manager also shared that the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), one of the funding partners, wants to include gender concerns in the scale-up phase.

### **C. Some Concerns on Performance and Impact Indicators**

When it comes to performance and impact indicators, the following can be said:

- On Community Grants – Indicators deal mainly with highly technical and administrative concerns.
- On Implementation Support - While the emphasis on personnel capability building is laudable, there are no specific indicators for the desired capacities of the beneficiaries.



- On Monitoring and Evaluation - Indicators are mainly focused on grievance mechanisms and how to respond to reported issues. These are not enough for they do not address other important dimensions of the program (how to monitor and evaluate limited functionality of projects, capabilities of partner LGUs and communities, etc.)
- On Empowerment – Indicators are highly quantitative and focused on LGUs (municipal and *barangay*) and their adoption of KC processes. There are no qualitative indicators on how empowerment should manifest in the people's/beneficiaries' engagement with LGUs. Also, since gender concerns are not consciously addressed in the program, KC has also missed out on coming up with indicators on women's empowerment.
- On Governance – Indicators are highly quantitative and focused on the number of LGUs that have complied with the requirements. There are no qualitative indicators of good/improved governance as experienced by the people involved.
- On Poverty Reduction – There is no specific target level/percentage of poverty reduction.

#### **D. Area-Specific Issues/Concerns**

Finally, the story of the chosen road project raises three major issues. These include: *a) a system of reporting and monitoring that needs stricter supervision; b) absence of post-project monitoring and maintenance activities; and c) failure to implement KC sustainability plans.*

## **1. Reporting and Monitoring of Accomplished Projects Needs Stricter Supervision**

As clearly narrated in this paper, the case of the road opening project in *Poblacion* Malapatan reveals a system of reporting, monitoring and evaluation that needs more stringent supervision. The inconsistent information – from local residents, KC engineers and the national database – as well as the failure of some responsible agencies to present written reports (that reflect the discrepancy between target accomplishments and actual accomplishments) generate questions as to how reporting, monitoring and evaluation are being done to ensure that actual project accomplishment is properly documented. If left unaddressed, the lenient practice may lead to a system of reporting that is vulnerable to distortion of facts. This administrative lapse reminds us of other bureaucratic practices that lead to suspicious practices and erode public trust.

## **2. Absence of Post-Project Monitoring and Maintenance Initiatives**

The deteriorating state of the road opening and its limited functionality indicates an absence of post-project monitoring and maintenance activities that should have been initiated by the concerned local government units to optimize the benefits of the community project. The regional KC staff claim that the project was already turned over to municipal/*barangay* officials and thus the maintenance of the project became the responsibility of the local government units of Malapatan. However, one of the

current KC community facilitators in Malapatan and residents/beneficiaries of the road opening said that neither the municipal government nor the *barangay* officials conducted any activities to properly maintain the KC project.

### **3. Failure to Implement Sustainability Plans**

Lastly, the sentiments of both the beneficiaries of the project and the community facilitator also illustrate a failure to implement sustainability plans. Based on the reviewed KC documents and the statements of interviewed KC staff, sustainability plans should be crafted before KC phases out from one community. In the required plans, the LGUs, especially the *barangay* government, have major roles to play. Unfortunately, the supposed sustainability plan (after the implementation of the road opening in Poblacion) has not been carried out. Even the unanswered letter of a *purok* leader to the *barangay* government also affirms that the plans have not been implemented.

The inability of the residents/beneficiaries to utilize the KC grievance mechanism to report the needed maintenance operations may also indicate a low awareness of the post-project grievance system.

## V. Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper recognizes *KALAHI*-CIDSS as an important mechanism for the delivery of social services and a tool for building and deepening the awareness of communities about the roles they play in governance. It likewise commends the efforts of DSWD personnel – on the national, regional and municipal levels – to make the whole process of implementing the program as transparent as possible. This practice encourages public participation and creates the impression that KC is open to public scrutiny. Indeed KC (as an ordinary government program) has encouraging features that may have surpassed the achievements of past government interventions (including ODA-funded projects).

However, there are some issues concerning the design, mechanisms and effects of the program. Some of these have been documented in KC reports and evaluation reports. Others have already been pointed out in the last section of this paper.

First, it is difficult to measure the impact of *KALAHI*-CIDSS projects on poverty reduction. What is even worse is that figures show that projects under KC seem to have little impact on poverty reduction. It is therefore necessary to look into the nature of the projects (and the kind of impact these projects would ultimately have) that KC has been initiating. At the same time, there is a need to conduct a thorough investigation on the impact of KC on the poverty incidence of the covered municipalities.

These steps are necessary particularly because the country is just borrowing the funds that sustain KC operations. Thus, it is crucial to make sure that debts incurred are effectively and efficiently used for programs that have clear positive impacts on poverty alleviation. It is also important to our Millennium Development Goals or MDG-related initiatives. At a time when development programs are measured in terms of their contribution to achieving MDG targets, it is really necessary to know how KC projects have contributed (or failed to contribute) to our efforts to lessen the number of poor people in the country.

At the same time, the government should also explore other broad-based anti-poverty interventions. These measures should promote asset-based reforms and create opportunities that generate decent jobs for the poor.

Moreover, targeting, as a framework, has also been a controversial issue when it comes to poverty-reduction programs. It is high time for KC implementers, poverty experts and policy-makers to take a hard look at targeting as the guiding framework of anti-poverty measures in the country. Some countries have already explored the 'universalist' policy as an approach to poverty-reduction. There is a need to have a serious cost-benefit analysis and comparison of these two models (targeting and universalism) vis-à-vis the current national socio-economic realities and policy directions of the government. Beyond the concern for the efficient use of resources, the equity and social justice issues should be the central theme of all poverty reduction programs.

This is of particular policy concern since KC has been framed as part of two other targeting-oriented poverty-related government programs – the conditional cash transfer program (for the poorest of the poor) and the self-enhancement assistance-kaunlaran program or SEA-K (for the entrepreneurial poor). Inevitably, the success or failure of KC will affect the other two interventions. For instance, if the targeting design/tool of KC is found to be missing its supposed ‘target’, or the impact of the program on poverty is highly insignificant; this will jeopardize the government’s claims of having a comprehensive, multi-pronged poverty-reduction model.

Aside from reviewing targeting, there is also a need to revisit other tools/instruments that are being used by the program. For instance, it was already mentioned that some performance and outcome indicators deal mainly with administrative and quantitative concerns. More importantly, gender concerns and other MDG-related issues have to be consciously addressed and integrated into every step of the project cycle.

It has also been repeatedly noted that the KC program in Mindanao (from 2003 to 2010) has only covered about 21% of the poor municipalities in the area. This partly explains why the program has not made a significant impact on the poverty reduction efforts of the government. The convenient excuse for limited coverage is the lack of funds that support the program implementation - KC’s US\$ 100million fund from the World Bank merely represents 1.04% of the entire ODA portfolio in 2009. The government should seriously study its financial resources/options that could support an anti-poverty program that has broader coverage and goes beyond ‘micro-ized’ and ‘project-ized’ interventions.

Finally, there is a need to have comprehensive inventory and field-based inspections of the significant number of KC accomplished projects. As presented in the case of the road opening in Malapatan, there could be other cases of over-reporting of actual finished projects. If left unaddressed, this may tarnish other transparent aspects/practices of the program.

## VI. Bibliography

### Books and Articles

Bailey, D. (1992). *Using Participatory Research in Community Consortia Development and Evaluation Lessons from the Beginning of a Story*. American Sociologist, 23 (4), 71-82.

Cornia G.A. (2001) *Social Funds in Stabilization and Adjustment Programmes: A Critique*. Development and Change 32: 1-32.

Cornia, G.A. and Reddy S. (2001). *The Impact of Adjustment-Related Social Funds on Income Distribution and Poverty*. WIDER Institute: Helsinki.

Cornia G.A. (2001). *Globalization and Social Inequalities*. WIDER: Helsinki.

van Domelen, J. (2002). *Social Funds: Evidence on Targeting, Impacts and Sustainability*. Journal of International Development 14:627-642.

Diokno B. (2008). *Understanding Poverty*. In *Business World*, Opinion, March 12, 2008

Ellerman, D. (2001). *What's wrong with social funds?*. In *Working on Administrative and Civil Service Reform*, 1(2). Retrieved from <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/civilservice/acrex/vol1page7.pdf>

Ellerman, D. (2001). *Helping people help themselves: toward a theory of autonomy-compatible help*. Washington DC: World Bank.

Johnson, T. (1999). *Social funds: examining women's reproductive health and women's empowerment*.

Labonne J. and Chase R. (2007). *Who's at the wheel when communities drive development?: The Case of KALAHI-CIDSS in the Philippines*. In Social Development Papers, Community Driven Development, Paper No. 107/ September 2007

Mkandawire, T. (2005). *Targeting and universalism in poverty reduction*. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development: Geneva.



- Page, N. & Czuba, C. (1999). *Empowerment: what is it?*. Journal of Extension, 37(5), 1-6.
- Philippine Institute for Development Studies or PIDS . *How do Philippine Provinces Fare in terms of Human Development?* (Policy Notes by Philippine Institute for Development Studies or PIDS)
- Raquiza M. (2010). *On poverty, hunger and employment: Off-track but not without hope*. In Leonor Magtolis Briones, Isagani Serrano, Jessica Cantos, Marivic Raquiza and Rene Raya et al (eds), *Winning the Numbers, Losing the War: The Other MDG Report 2010*, Social Watch Philippines and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
- Schady, Norbert R. 1999. *“Seeking Votes: The Political Economy of Expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund (FONCODES), 1991–1995.”* Policy Research Working Paper 2166. The World Bank. August. (Page references in the chapter are to a 1998 draft.)
- Schuftan, C. (1996). *The community development dilemma: what’s really empowering?*. Community Development Journal, 31(3), 260-264.
- Sen, A. (1995). *The political economy of targeting*. In *Public Spending and the Poor: Theory and Evidence*, ed. D. Van de Walle and K. Nead. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Tendler, Judith (2000). *“Why are Social Funds So Popular?”* Chapter 14 in: *Local Dynamics in the Era of Globalization*, edited by Shahid Yusuf, Weiping Wu, and Simon Everett, Companion Volume of the World Development Report 1999/2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the World Bank).
- Tendler, Judith (2004) *“Why social policy is condemned to a residual category of safety nets and what to do about it”*, in Mkandawire, T. ed. *Social Policy in a Development Context*, UNRISD, November 2004
- World Bank Operations Evaluation Department. (2002). *Social funds: assessing effectiveness*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.

## Documents

Center for Policy and Executive Development (CPED), U.P. National College of Public Administration and Governance (UP NCPAG). *KALAHI CIDSS Consultant for External NGO Monitoring Final Report*, 2004

Community-Based Monitoring System (CBMS) *Survey in Malapatan Sarangani*, 2008

Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) KALAHI-CIDSS: KKB Project, *THIRD QUARTER 2010 PROJECT ACCOMPLISHMENT REPORT*

DSWD Region XII. KALAHI CIDSS Regional Project Completion, ‘*Our Voices, Our Stories.*’ *Undated*. Bumanaag, Barangay Zone III, Koronadal City, South Cotabato

KALAHI CIDSS KKB Project. *List of Community Projects Funded by KALAHI CIDSS (KC)*, 2003 to June 2010

KALAHI CIDSS *Loan Agreement Between Republic of the Philippines and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)*. October 07, 2002.

Landrock Construction. *Contractor’s Statement of Work Accomplished – Construction of Road Opening from Purok 9-B to Sito Mafnoh and Sito Aspang, Poblacion Malapatan*. March 21, 2007.

Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) *Fact Sheet*, August 9, 2010

ODA Watch. *Aiding Foreign Aid Regime*, *ODA Watch Presentation*, UP Balay Kalinaw, December 14, 2010

## Interviews

### *Individual Interviews*

1. Ms. Ma. Victoria Raquiza, Co-convenor of Social Watch Philippines and Faculty Member of UP – National College of Public Administration and Governance (NCPAG), Oct. 29, 2010, UP NCPAG
2. Dr. Agustin Martin Rodriguez, Chairperson of the Department of Philosophy of Ateneo De Manila University, Project Head of World Bank-Commissioned Qualitative Impact Study of KALAH I – CIDSS, November 08, 2010, Dela Costa Building, ADMU Campus
3. Ms. Benilda Redaja, Deputy National Project Manager of KALAH I-CIDSS, November 17, 2010, KALAH I-CIDSS National Office, DSWD National Office
4. Mr. Sulayman De La Peña, Trustee of Sarangani Community Development Foundation Incorporated (SARCO DFI) and resident of *Sitio* 9B, *Brgy.* Poblacion, Malapatan Sarangani, November 22, 2010
5. Mr. Manuel San, *Purok* Leader of *Sitio* Lanao-Mafnoh, November 22, 2010, *Sitio* Lanao-Mafnoh, *Brgy.* Poblacion, Malapatan Sarangani
6. Mr. Beljohn Santiago, Community Facilitator of KALAH I-CIDSS in Malapatan, Sarangani, November 22, 2010
7. Mr. Edres Suib, former Vice Mayor of Malapatan, Sarangani, November 22, 2010
8. Engr. Tita Suib, Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (MPDC), Malapatan, Sarangani, November 22, 2010
9. Mrs. Marilyn Vinzon, Head of Municipal Social Welfare and development (MSWD), Malapatan, Sarangani, November 22, 2010
10. Mr. Miller Esparagoza, *Barangay* Chairman of *Brgy.* Luan Masla, Malapatan, Sarangani, November 22, 2010
11. Engr. Dioslindo T. Pulanco, Municipal Engineer, Malapatan, Sarangani, November 22, 2010
12. Mrs. Evelyn Bascomte, Staff of Sarangani Provincial Social Welfare and Development Office and former Community Facilitator of KALAH I-CIDSS in Malapatan, Sarangani, November 23, 2010

*Group Interviews*

- a) Interview with B'laan women residents of *Sitio* Lanao-Mafnoh, *Brgy.* Poblacion, Malapatan Sarangani, November 22, 2010. Participants included:
- Mrs. Jingle Claha
  - Mrs. Leonida San
  - Mrs. Bibi Laha
  - Mrs. Aliway Lantingan
- b) Interview with Visayan women residents of *Sitio* Lanao-Mafnoh, *Brgy.* Poblacion, Malapatan Sarangani, November 22, 2010. Participants included:
- Mrs. Gandiosa Palaryon
  - Mrs. Percy Montibon
- c) Interview with KALAHI-CIDSS Regional Staff (KALAHI CIDSS Region XII Office, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, November 23, 2010). Participants included
- Mr. John Kevin Camariòas, Community Development Specialist
  - Mrs. Christine June D. Arapoc, Senior Research, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer
  - Engr. Rolly A. Teofilo, Regional Infrastructure Engineer
- d) Interview with residents of *Sitio* Aspeng, *Brgy.* Poblacion, Malapatan Sarangani, November 22, 2010. Participants included:
- - Mr. Mario Pagi – *Purok* Chairman
  - Mr. Pilliano Baran – *Purok* Vice-Chairman
  - Mr. Bayen Baran
  - Ms. Julina Salinda
  - Ms. Luisa Dot
  - Mr. Roly Cian
  - Ms. Arcilita Baran
  - Mr. Julito Kingkong





*c/o Management and Organizational  
Development for Empowerment, Inc, (MODE, Inc.)  
99 Matimtiman Street, Sikatuna Village,  
Quezon City, Philippines 1101*

*Tel. #: (632) 434-3576*

*Fax #: (632) 426-1126*

*Email: [odawatchconvenor@yahoo.com](mailto:odawatchconvenor@yahoo.com)*

*Website: <http://www.odawatch.org>*