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Torture Survivors: Their Experiences
of Violation, Truth and Justice

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Executive Summary

This report provides an overview of the extent and nature of torture during the internal conflict and the occupation of Timor-Leste. It details that torture was widely experienced and that it was undertaken and supported by various groups. The report shows that the Indonesian military and police committed most torture however the direct involvement and support of East Timorese (including local political party members as well as intelligence and militia members) was vital to its continuation. This local participation in torture has created a legacy of mistrust, suspicion and anger among the Timorese population.

The report shows that the methods of torture were wide-ranging and focused on breaking the victim's physical and psychological spirit. It illustrates that torture was used for specific purposes such as to gather confessions, to punish perceived opponents or to terrify the population. The report also details that certain groups such as women and children differentially experienced torture. Although torture was a specific practice, it was, for survivors, often just one violation among many others. Nevertheless, victims engaged in numerous strategies of resistance to counter their ill-treatment.

This report provides a short evaluation of each of the various transitional justice mechanisms established to deal with past repression in Timor-Leste. It then provides an overview of survivor's thoughts on each of the bodies. Few survivors knew about the judicial processes established in Jakarta (the Ad Hoc Court) and Dili (the serious crimes process). Survivors take a uniformly negative view with regard to the Dili process. They report that the prosecution of Timorese individuals is unfair and upsetting, and that the process has ultimately created further conflict in communities.

Survivors were much more aware of the CAVR (the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation). The report indicates that survivors warmly welcomed the CAVR's attempts to expose truth and encourage reconciliation within communities. Survivors emphasised that the CAVR report should be widely disseminated and taught within schools. However, survivors also note problems with the CAVR; these revolve around issues of participation (of both perpetrators and victims), CAVR personnel and justice. This latter issue was intensified when survivors discussed the CTF (the Commission on Truth and Friendship). The CTF's ability to recommend amnesty was widely denigrated.

The report notes that survivors of torture continue to have significant medical, psychological and social needs. Survivors discussed the difficulties of living in a country that lacks basic resources to deal with these issues. Concerns were raised about employment, education as well as personal security, and the continuation of torture by the Timorese police was raised as a particular worry. Justice for past torture was seen to be central to the construction of a democratic Timor-Leste. Criminal justice for torture, and other serious violations, was regarded as vital to dignify victims, strengthen the rule of law, and provide a solid framework for reconciliation and development. All survivors viewed the campaign for justice as an ongoing necessity.

A. Introduction and Methodology

From 1975 to 1999, torture was a common feature of policing and security provisions in Timor-Leste. Many people died as a result however a significant number of people survived this serious violation. These individuals often face many problems – for example, they can have psychological and physical difficulties and they may find themselves unable to work, or less able to cope with family life. The repercussions of torture are wide-ranging and are faced by survivors in Timor-Leste on a daily basis.

This short report provides a snapshot of how torture was employed during the conflict and occupation of Timor-Leste. It examines who was involved in torture and why this violation was undertaken. While providing an indication of the specific suffering experienced by torture survivors, and how survivors resisted their treatment, the report also shows that torture was just one part of widespread gross human rights violations and abuses that affected vast swathes of the population – that is, torture survivors have suffered numerous harms against them over many years.

This report also provides an indication of torture survivor's perceptions of the transitional justice mechanisms established for Timor-Leste. It shows what survivors think about the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta, the serious crimes process in Dili, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation as well as the Commission of Truth and Friendship. Overall, torture survivors remain dissatisfied with these bodies and continue to demand further provisions for justice.

This report was written by an academic associate of JSMP. It is based on analyses of documentation from the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) as well as from academic and NGO sources. In addition, between November 2005 and February 2006, JSMP outreach staff undertook 15 in-depth interviews with survivors of torture across the districts of Timor-Leste. These interviews, further details of which can be found in the Appendix, have formed the backbone to this report.

B. General Overview of Torture

Arbitrary detention and torture were integral features of the Indonesian occupation. The recent report from the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) identified 17,169 victims of arbitrary detention, 8,508 victims of torture and 6,872 victims of ill-treatment (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 7.4.28). Given issues around data collation (for example, that the CAVR struggled to access testimonies in particular regions or from particular groups), it seems reasonable to suggest that these figures minimise the true extent of such violence.

In 2000, the International Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims undertook a national psychosocial needs assessment in Timor-Leste (Modvig et al, 2000). Having interviewed members of 1033 households, they show that, despite under-reporting, 587 respondents said that they had been exposed to torture. As they (2000:1763) further detail:

Psychological torture (411 [40%]), physical beating or mauling (336 [33%]), and beating the head with or without a helmet (267 [26%]) were

the most common forms reported, and other forms of torture included submersion in water (126 [12%]), electric shock (124 [12%]), crushing of hands (102 [10%]), and rape or sexual abuse (54 [5%])...207 (20%) respondents believed that they would never recover from their experiences, and a further 424 (41%) believed they would only recover with some help.

In short, torture has been widely experienced in Timor-Leste. The CAVR illustrates three peaks of torture – in 1975, during the internal armed conflict and the Indonesian occupation; between 1976 and 1984, when large-scale Indonesian military operations were used to crush the resistance; and, in 1999, at the time of the vote and the subsequent departure of the Indonesian military and supportive militias (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.23-27). Between 1985 and 1998, torture was low-level and mainly used on specific, targeted individuals. All regions were affected by torture however during the initial and final periods of occupation, torture was used more extensively in the districts that bordered West Timor while, between 1980-1985, torture occurred more often in the eastern districts where resistance activity was seen to be strong (ibid). The CAVR report found that that ‘there was clearly no limit on what police and military officers could do to obtain information’ (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 7.4.569-570, 805).

C. Who was Involved in Torture?

In terms of responsibility, the CAVR (2005:Chapter 7.4.33) notes that the principal perpetrators of torture were the Indonesian military, the police and their auxiliaries (such as East Timorese militia members). These groups were identified as being directly involved in 82.4% of torture and ill-treatment cases. Fretilin or resistance fighters were named as perpetrators in 11.5% of cases and UDT members were named in 3.8% of cases. This local participation in human rights violations has created a legacy of mistrust and anger between the Timorese population; an issue that has underpinned recent violence and unrest.

1. UDT and Fretilin

The internal civil war in Timor-Leste was rooted in the actions of the União Democrática Timorense (UDT) who, on 11 August 1975, launched an armed movement to purge ‘Fretilin communists’. This movement lasted until 20 August 1975, when Fretilin commenced an armed insurrection. However, during this short period, UDT members attacked and burnt villages where there was strong Fretilin support. Many people – mostly military aged men with a real or suspected association with Fretilin, were arbitrarily detained in improvised, overcrowded detention centres. Here, they suffered forced labour, unsanitary conditions as well as limited water and food. Inhuman treatment and torture were common albeit not systematically applied (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.798-799).

In response, Fretilin’s own armed action targeted hundreds of UDT leaders and supporters, as well as Apodeti members, Portuguese administrators, civilians and even its own members. Over the following four years, Fretilin engaged in killings and wide-scale detentions against suspected enemies, collaborators and those who criticized Fretilin leadership. Those detained were held in an array of improvised

spaces and detainees faced overcrowded, unsanitary conditions and suffered from limited food and hard labour (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 7.4.266-268). Torture - including heavy beatings, whippings, burnings, strippings, stabbings and humiliation techniques - was widely undertaken during interrogation and punishment (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.800-801). In addition, Fretilin leaders would encourage locals to commit violence against each other (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.44). Although aware of these activities, Fretilin leaders failed to intervene (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.800-801) and this issue, of Timorese turning against Timorese, intensified old community divisions and created new ones – a reality that was undoubtedly manipulated by the Indonesian military (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 4.75).

2. Indonesian Officials

Torture pervaded the criminal justice system of Indonesia and the torture in Timor-Leste was a continuation of similar treatment (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1993). In areas like Timor-Leste, which were thought to be ‘dangerous’ in terms of security, torture was routinised and extensive. Part of the reason for this was that all aspects of life in East Timor were militarised, policed or controlled. There was the East Timor Regional Defence and Security Command (Kodahankam Timor Timur), Sub-Regional Command (Korem), District Military Commands (Kodim), Sub-district Military Commands (Koramil), Combat Team Regiments, Intelligence Task Forces (Intel), Elite Counter-Insurgency Forces (Kopassus), Military police, riot control Mobile Brigade (Brimob) as well as provincial, district and sub-district police units (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 4.39). Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the CAVR report shows that in 82.4% of torture and ill-treatment cases, statement-givers named the Indonesian military and police as being directly involved (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 7.4.33).

While victims tended to be male, of between 20-40 years of age, with a real or suspected association with Fretilin or Falintil, they came from a wide range of backgrounds. Victims also included women, children, elderly people, students, teachers, local government officials, educated Timorese, whole families, those suspected of witchcraft or anyone deemed to be ‘political’ (Amnesty, 1991). The reported victims of Indonesian-led torture ‘have come from virtually the whole spectrum of East Timorese society’ (Amnesty, 1985:11).

3. Timorese Auxiliaries

Over a third (37.1%) of torture and ill-treatment cases recorded by the CAVR detail the participation of East Timorese auxiliaries (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.33). East Timorese worked within the Indonesian Army itself¹ but they also participated in ‘ninja’ gangs, militias, intelligence units and civil defence forces. In these roles, they provided a means by which Indonesian officials could present the idea that they were a neutral force in a volatile, conflictual country (Human Rights Watch, 1995; Robinson, 2001).

¹ By July 1998, 6097 East Timorese were serving in the Armed Forces (ABRI), mostly in the army but with over 500 in the police. They tended to occupy the lower ranks (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 4).

Paramilitary groups have a long history in Timor-Leste and their use can be tracked back to Portuguese administrators as well as to the Australian forces during World War Two (Robinson, 2001). In the early 1990's, the Indonesian military established local 'ninja' gangs that engaged in 'death squad operations'. Dressed in black, and working at night, hooded ninjas would undertake raids on suspected independence supporters – their victims would be 'disappeared' or their executed bodies would be left in public view as a means to terrify the local population (Robinson, 2001).

The Indonesian military was also central to the formation, training and instruction of militia groups (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 4.126). Militia commanders, given recruitment targets for each village, were paid a salary for the mobilization, co-ordination and retention of local members (Dunn, 2003). Robinson (2001:277) notes that a considerable number of individuals joined militias 'under duress', for example some 'refusers' were detained for up to four months, tortured and threatened with being burnt and raped (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.563; Cribb, 2001). However, a fair number of East Timorese chose to join the militias to enact revenge for Fretilin-led violence in the 1970's, to gain power through the carrying of arms or to show support to the regime in which their family had done well. Some militia members had been previously part of criminal gangs, or were also enlisted as Army soldiers, and were just continuing their work under different auspices (ibid; CAVR, 2005:Chapter 4.129). During 1998 and 1999, militia members asserted their power through random, often opportunistic, acts of violence including torture.

The Indonesian military was also assisted by a developed network of intelligence gatherers and informers. For instance, many East Timorese joined Civil Defence Forces or were employed as 'village guidance officers' ('Babinsa's), providing vital information to the local military and some worked as spies or informants (known as Intel), monitoring and informing on fellow villagers. Many interviewed torture survivors have remarked that their initial arrest was a result of being reported by another Timorese.

Overall, East Timorese communities were militarized and controlled through expansive intelligence networks (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 4.95). This situation destroyed trust within communities and underpinned an atmosphere of suspicion and fear as villagers would not always know who could or could not be trusted (Sherlock, 1996).

D. Why were People Tortured?

In line with common perceptions, torture was employed as a means to gather confessions from suspects and intelligence about the 'enemy'. Violent interrogation was used to obtain information about oppositional members, the location of weapons or political strategies. However, detention and torture was also used to coerce compliance and deference.

Fretilin, for instance, used Renals (Campo de Reabilitação Nacional) to discipline 'wayward' Fretilin or Falintil members and civilians in need of 're-education'. Many people were detained for criticizing Fretilin leadership, breaching party rules or for suspected collaboration. Branded as 'traitors', prisoners were often subject to ill-

treatment and severe torture. They would be detained indefinitely, until they were deemed suitably compliant (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 7.4.228).

Throughout the occupation, Indonesian officials tortured individuals for being unwilling to take part in military operations such as the ‘Fence of Legs’ Operation, because they refused to join militia groups, for falling asleep during night patrols, or for failing to attend welcome demonstrations when international delegations or dignitaries visited. Torture was used because prisoners were thought to be disrespectful to the regime. Alternatively, torture was employed as a preventive means to ‘silence’ perceived dissenters when internationals visited (Amnesty, 1985:74-5, 1991).

Torture was also applied by Indonesian officials to stop perceived associations with Fretilin. Long-term prisoners would be tortured every six months and classified according to their supposed attachment to the party (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4). Similarly, detentions and torture were used to undermine political opposition and communication between Fretilin members. During the 1990s, for instance, many young students were arrested and tortured on the basis that they were seen to be involved in the new wave of resistance.

Families deemed to be ‘political’ were also subject to regular intimidation techniques and family members could face ‘proxy punishments’ in which they were violated on account of their association with another individual (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.803-804). The punishment of family members had a number of different objectives – to intimidate specific families, to stop any assistance (such as food, medical help or information) going from families to Fretilin, to weaken the resolve of fighters and to warn others of the consequences of resistance (Pinto, 1997). Women, who took a central cultural and community role in the independence movement, were often the initial targets of such punishments (Franks, 1996).

Torture was also used to spread terror. In 1998-1999, for example, militia members tortured to intimidate the population, to assert the authority of pro-autonomy forces over communities, and to punish those who supported the move to independence (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.664-675). During this period, torture was often a public spectacle and those killed would have their bodies publicly displayed in villages. This strategy served to humiliate victims and terrorise others (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.808).

At an individual level, torture sought to undermine a victim’s psychological and political integrity. From the outset, captors often regarded torture victims as ‘less than human’, as animals. This was combined with popular techniques (such as stripping, sexually abusing and photographing detainees) that were employed to shame and humiliate victims. Other activities to dis-empower victims included using fellow detainees to ‘confess’ and testify against each other or making detainees torture each other. This strategy, to implicate victims in the torture of others, worked to disturb collective cohesion within resistance groups; an issue that was also related to the creation of informers or the attempts to ‘turn’ individuals into regime ‘supporters’, to get ‘clandestine members and former Falintil guerrillas to work for the Intelligence Task Force’ (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 4.110).

Finally, alongside these strategic reasons, torture was also undertaken for the personal gains or wants of individual torturers. Torture was sometimes applied to extort money from the prisoner or their family or because the torturer wanted revenge for some previous action or had particular sadistic or sexual motives (Amnesty, 1985).

E. Torture as One Violation among Many

Notwithstanding these specific brutalities, torture was just one violation among many. The very nature of detention itself was particularly horrifying for many individuals. For example, prisoners were regularly passed from one site to another. This technique disoriented victims, isolated them and placed them far from their family, friends and support networks, while allowing different units to continue torture (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.569-570). Consequently, individuals were tortured across multiple locations including: military sites; large civilian buildings such as warehouses, shops and hotels; requisitioned private homes; police buildings; local government buildings such as village offices and meeting halls; local prisons, particularly Comarca and Becora prisons in Dili, and Buruma prison in Baucau; prisons in Indonesia; victim's homes; transit camps that were used for mass surrenders and arrests; improvised structures such as holes in ground; as well as public spaces (Amnesty, 1985; CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4).

Aside from these practices, prisoners would also suffer various degradations during detention. They were given inedible food (that was mixed with glass or faeces), made to strip, placed in solitary confinement for extensive periods, put in dark cells (small cells with no light and limited ventilation), held in poor sanitary conditions (with prisoners toileting on the floor) or subject to severe overcrowding (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.4.806). Between 1980 and 1986, thousands of people were transferred to the island of Ataúro where they suffered, and often died from, malnutrition and starvation. Those transferred were forced into hard labour and were subject to ill-treatment and violence. Such conditions made detention particularly traumatic, regardless of whether or not prisoners were also tortured.

However, beyond these specific detentions, victims faced a multitude of other victimisations. For example, victims witnessed or suffered the killing of their family members and friends, they had their houses destroyed and their possessions and money stolen, they were displaced, they experienced malnutrition and starvation, they lost all communication with their families and, for numerous women, they were forced into sexual slavery.

F. Survivor's Experiences of Torture

The specific forms of violence inflicted during torture were wide-ranging. During interviews, victims described numerous painful experiences, including: beatings (with fists, wood, iron bars, lengths of cable and bamboo); burnings with lit cigarettes (all over the body but, specifically, on sensitive areas such as genitalia, eyelids and mouth); cuttings (with knives and razor blades); being hit on the head (particularly when victims wore a steel helmet); kickings; whippings; electric shock (again, all over the body but used particularly on the head, thumbs, genitalia and breasts); submersion in icy or fetid water and urine; being placed in small spaces and having animals (such as lizards or snakes) attack; sexual abuse (including being stripped

naked and paraded); rape; having teeth or nails forcibly extracted; having feet crushed under table legs (the table being sat on by interrogators); having salt or lemon juice rubbed into open wounds; standing for long periods in the sun; being made to drink urine or blood, or made to eat body parts; food deprivation; and, death threats of the victim and their family members. Techniques of humiliation, such as enforced nakedness, were also readily applied.

Alongside these methods, torture often involved symbolic denigrations. Detainees were often forced to sing songs, to make public statements that rejected Fretilin or to perform rituals involving the Indonesian flag. For example, some survivors were forced to take an oath in front of the community and kiss the Indonesian flag. Alerico detailed his own experiences of being detained by Indonesian military officials,

I was interviewed with five others. We were held in an iron cell that was marked as Fretilin. After interrogation, we were beaten. We were then asked to sing Foho Ramelau [a Fretilin song]. In the middle of the song, we were hit with an iron bar. Then, we were all required to cut our hair...We were there for about twelve hours.

Those who were tortured were often forced to adhere to the cultural symbols of the Indonesian regime.

1. Describing Brutal Torture

During this research, survivors related their individual experiences of torture. These testimonies were often harrowing. Here, we present a few examples of survivors' experiences.

We've all suffered. I was detained in a room with 48 others. We were fed once a day and beaten constantly. We had weeks of interrogation [by the Indonesian military]. Many people were beaten to death, some vomited blood and some bled from their teeth...It was never the same people who beat us, every two or three days it changed to someone else. They used boots and there was a tool similar to a telephone that was used for electro-shock. They would use pliers to cut off the penis...One of my friends was made to eat another man and a soldier tried to poo in his mouth...I was badly beaten. I now have bleeding from my bottom and nose. I have lost teeth and I cannot stand properly...I'm lucky to have survived (Manuel).

I was detained by military intelligence and was tortured four times over three consecutive nights. They used a shark tail to hit me and I was very skinny when I got home. As a result of the torture, my bones came out of my body and were broken. I was only cured much later...At the time, they insulted us like animals, they treated and hit us like animals (Gil).

When I didn't report, they sent two Hansip to arrest me. I was taken to Koramil where they kicked and punched me, and hit me with wood. I was injured very badly. After that, I was made to sit in the sun for hours (Bosco).

The Indonesian military found out about our taking letters and food to the jungle. We were arrested and detained in Kodim for a month....they tortured us with electric shock, they hit us and put chairs on our toes. In 1996, the Indonesian military arrested me again. They used a gillette to cut by forehead and I collapsed (Jacinta).

I was arrested and tortured six times [by Indonesian officials]. They tortured me with electricity. They took off our toenails and they sat on our feet using a chair. They also committed a very specific torture as they burnt cigarettes on my penis, my bottom and my ear...I was also tortured so that I lost most of my teeth and my back bones were all fractured (Felimeno).

I was arrested by UDT in 1975. They destroyed my Fretilin emblems. They punched my ears and strangled me. I was unconscious for a long time. I was so angry but I couldn't do anything as I did not have enough force...We suffered a lot, they held about 70 of us in a cell. I saw them stab others in the mouth; they would bleed to death (Clementino).

These statements express the reality of the pain and suffering during torture. They downplay, however, the despair and fear experienced in those particular moments and in the aftermath of attacks.

2. Sexual Torture

The majority of torture victims recorded by the CAVR were male – a point that fits with the fact that men were at the forefront of fighting and resistance networks. Female victims comprised 12.3% torture, 13.9% detention and 7.7% ill-treatment cases recorded by the CAVR. Given the problems in collating this gendered data, these numbers will be lower than the reality. Other data shows that women may have been affected by violence more widely – for example, in Hynes et al's (2004) study of 288 women, one in four East Timorese women reported being exposed to violence during 1999. Regardless of the recorded numbers however, the CAVR clearly detailed how the torture of women was invariably sexualised. Some men were sexually assaulted and raped during torture yet the sexual violation of women was a 'widely accepted practice' that was 'covered by almost total impunity' (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.7.11)².

During sexual torture, women would face rape, genital mutilation, the insertion of objects (bottles, wood or snakes) into vaginas, burning with cigarettes or electro-shock on genitalia, they would be forced to conduct sexual acts and were tied to men in simulated sex poses. Pregnant women were often beaten until they miscarried. Women also suffered gang rape and prolonged periods of individual rapes (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.7.12). Isabel, who took a prominent role in organizing women and fighting for independence, stated

I was arrested on 10 February 1996. About ten people came to arrest us, all of them were Indonesian military. We were forced to sleep with many

² The CAVR (2005: Chapter 7.7.7) recorded 853 incidents of sexual violation such as rape, sexual harassment, sexual slavery and other acts of sexual violence.

Indonesian military. I can say that this was rape. They made us naked and they tortured us with electric shock on our breasts and eyelids. I was very sad...I was held for a week then I was released and made to report three times a week. In April, when I went to report, I was arrested again and held for five nights. I was tortured again. In 1998, I was arrested again, held for a week and raped again.

Women were often targeted as ‘proxy victims’ when male family members were wanted by the Indonesian military. Consequently, females were targeted during major military operations as well as when they were displaced (CAVR, 2005: Chapter 7.7.363). For example, Agustinha was tortured after the military discovered that her husband and brother were in the jungle. She commented

I was asked to go and find them. As I didn’t find them, they hit me and poured hot water over me. They took me to Ermera. There, they hit and shocked me with electricity and burnt me with cigarettes. I was raped until my child died...My mother was also hit until her teeth were broken and her hand fractured...I am now in a bad situation as I am all crooked.

The sexual torture of women in the presence of others was seen to intensify humiliation – this was particularly so when women were assaulted in public or were made to walk naked through the village. Added to this, like men, women were also subject to being photographed during torture. These photographs would be passed around the Indonesian military, much like ‘cigarette cards’ they became tokens of service within perpetrating units.

3. The Torture of Children

Such violation was also directed towards children during torture and young girls could be victim to rape. Generally, children (those 17 and under) account for 5.2% of torture cases (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.8.198). While civilian children were often targeted, by all sides, as a means to punish or inflict harm on their older family members, children were also targeted in their own right. Children, aged 14 or 15 years, were regular contributors to the clandestine networks and, as a result, ‘children were detained and sometimes tortured as a consequence of their own activities, rather than their family ties’ (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.8.220). During the 1990’s, students were also fiercely targeted – some children were repeatedly detained, particularly during the visits of foreigners, and torture was used as a regular form of recruitment, to ‘encourage’ children to become informants or militia members (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 7.8.224).

G. Resisting Torture

So far, this report has shown how individuals either perpetrated or were victimised by torture. Yet, it is also apparent that many people engaged in strategies to cope with and resist torture. This section illustrates that East Timorese took a variety of approaches to avoid torture in the first instance, and to cope with their treatment during and after the violence.

Perhaps one of the clearest points to emerge out of this research is that torture did not stop political activity. For those who were the principal targets of torture (the individuals who supported independence), the use of torture by Indonesian officials intensified their commitment to continue resistance. In addition, as Flisberto detailed, without such violations, the resistance movement would not have gained the momentum it needed to attain independence.

They continued killing and hurting us but we continued fighting for our independence. The most important thing is, and I don't deny it, what else could we do? I can enjoy the independence of Timor-Leste and give thanks to those who did bad things to us, because if they hadn't created turmoil, we wouldn't have gained our independence.

From the late 1980's, political activism against occupation grew in the towns and cities. Survivors detailed that they would be careful in their movements, to ensure that they did not raise suspicions that they were connected to clandestine networks; they took on the insignia of the Indonesian officials – they would wave Indonesian flags at demonstrations and give the impression that they supported the occupation; they would pledge allegiance to UDT or Apodeti on registration cards; and, they would work directly for Indonesian officials, as interpreters or informants, despite their commitment to work against their employers.

Notwithstanding these attempts, many people were imprisoned. East Timorese experienced little protection from the criminal justice system. Trials, to convict East Timorese who were suspected of supporting Fretilin, were often closed and relied on 'evidence' from suspect sources (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1993). Presiding Judges would commence trials by speaking, at length, about their support for Indonesian progress in the region (ibid). Those who came before the courts were highly likely to be convicted and imprisoned. While detained, any complaints against torture were met with unsatisfactory responses – there was no clear complaints procedure, no judicial independence and any investigations were undertaken by the Indonesian police (ibid).

During the subsequent periods of imprisonment, which could last days or years, East Timorese took action to secure their release or to assist themselves and others. For example, clandestine members used tactics to control what was said or not said during torture. Many survivors told lies to secure their release. Similarly, those held together tried to build a group effort in the control of information. Flisberto discussed his own torture as

The room was as big as a coffee table. We were all just standing, there was no room to sit. One man took his pants off because it was so hot inside. I took off my shirt. We just stood there for the night. In the morning I thought we had better die than live in this condition. At least we would have done something. One man was crying and I told him not to mention the names of anyone. I knew that we could not reveal anything to them. We stayed in the same room from the 18th to 25th December 1991.

Other survivors used their detention to get Indonesian officials 'on side' by explaining what the resistance fight was about. In response to Indonesian officials who claimed that he was communist, Alerico replied

We are Fretilin not communist. Fretilin defend independence like you fought in 1945 against the Dutch. We want the same thing.

During detentions, victims would also take solace from the news and support that they obtained from outside. It is evident that religious leaders played a vital role in supporting and encouraging prisoners to be courageous in their situation. Manuel detailed one such visit

I wasn't frightened. Although, we were visited by Bishop Martinho from Dili and, when he arrived, we all cried. He asked if we had eaten, and we all said 'yes'. If we had said 'no', we would have been beaten when he left. He said, 'Endure with pride, Timor is yours'. He encouraged us. So, from then on, we were not afraid to die even though they beat us.

Similarly, the news that the Timorese cause had gained international recognition assisted people to deal with their situation. As Isabel clarifies

I heard about the Nobel Prize and I was very happy. It gave me hope and helped me to endure the pain.

At times, however, survivors faced acute hopelessness. Many survivors said that they had to prepare themselves for death during detention, as many people were killed, or threatened with death, during torture. Manuel commented

One of my brothers died due to torture, he was beaten to death...the Indonesian soldiers did not treat us like human beings...There was never any respect, and they beat people until they died. The majority of my friends were killed. Indonesian soldiers said that we were like dogs and that we would die like dogs.

While Felimeno reflected

At the time, there was no choice except death for the independence because many people were killed so we could not retreat. To reach our objective, people had to die.

Prisoners would, however, resist death and try to secure their early release from imprisonment by different means. Prisoners could sometimes buy their way out of imprisonment, and related torture, with money, antique coins or other valuable items. Alternatively, if a trusted individual would vouch responsibility for the prisoner, then a release might also occur.

Prisoners could also 'give themselves over' to become workers for Indonesian authorities. If victims agreed to this, they would be placed on report (during which, they would have to report to local military installations a number of times a week) and would undertake maintenance work, cleaning or cooking for Indonesian staff. Failing

that, prisoners could also agree to become interpreters, intelligence workers or informants. Of course, as survivors also noted, if this happened, you could give Indonesian officials the wrong information. In response to the idea that he might serve for the Indonesian military, Alerico was told by a Fretilin commander

You can take it if they offer you a job and please always collaborate with them and you can inform us if you hear something. However, you have to be aware of three principles: first, don't deny our country; second, don't report on each other; and, third, don't disclose your secrets.

In summary, East Timorese victims engaged in various strategies to deal with or resist their detention, torture and ill-treatment. In this sense, victims were never 'complete victims'. While free, many of these individuals engaged in 'subversive' actions or supported the independence movement. During detention, these active struggles continued, often in the most dire of circumstances.

H. Survivor's Thoughts on Justice Mechanisms

During 1999, the UN established an 'International Commission of Inquiry' to ascertain the situation in Timor-Leste. In their report of January 2000, the Commissioners argued that Timorese victims 'must not be forgotten in the rush of events to redefine relations in the region, and [that] their basic human rights to justice, compensation and the truth must be fully respected' (UN, 2000:146). The responsibility for addressing such issues fell, the Commission argued, on the UN and they recommended an international tribunal for Timor-Leste. Notwithstanding these instructions, the UN supported the Indonesian government to prosecute those responsible for violations within Indonesia (see Hirst and Varney, 2005). The Secretary General, Kofi Annan, stated that these efforts would be 'monitored closely' to ensure that they were both credible and reflected human rights standards (Burgess, 2004:135).

1. The Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta

In 2000, the Indonesian government established the 'Ad Hoc Human Rights Court' in Jakarta. Starting work on 14 March 2002, the Court's mandate was extremely limited as it examined just three [Liquiça, Suai and Dili] of Timor-Leste's 13 districts, for events that occurred during April and September 1999. Of the 18 defendants brought to trial, 12 were initially acquitted and six convicted. Following appeals, five had their convictions overturned. In the end, only one (Eurico Guterres, the Timorese leader of the Aitarak or 'thorn' militia) was convicted and punished – he was handed down a ten-year sentence at his March 2006 Supreme Court hearing.

Aside from the problems of the limited jurisdiction, the UN Commission on Human Rights (2003:s52) notes a range of flaws in this process, including: a failure of prosecution staff to undertake thorough investigations; weak indictments that failed to sustain arguments regarding crimes against humanity; limited numbers of experienced court personnel; consistent intimidation of and hostility to witnesses by judges, court staff and defendants; and, the failure of judges to punish individuals in a way that reflected the seriousness of the violations. Indonesia managed to protect its own officers through a legal process that was 'intended to fail' from the start (Cohen,

2003). At the same time, the few Timorese victims and witnesses were continually threatened and intimidated by the Indonesian military through the process. Thus, Dominggos details

It has been an unfair process. The trial must be held in a neutral country so that victims can give their testimony freely.

It is, perhaps, not surprising that most torture survivors interviewed for this project did not know that this justice provision existed. As shown below, this issue was also apparent with regard to the serious crimes process.

2. The Special Panels for Serious Crimes

The UN established the serious crimes process in 2000. This process - incorporating the 'Special Panels for Serious Crimes' (SPSC, the courts), the 'Serious Crimes Unit' (SCU, the prosecution unit) and the Defence Lawyers Unit - was funded by and predominantly staffed by UN personnel however the courts operated as Panels of the Dili District Court. The Panels took universal jurisdiction over charges of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. On paper, the process appears to have been relatively successful - for example, 440 defendants were indicted and 84 were convicted; these are strong figures compared to other international judicial processes.

It is not the intention of this report to evaluate the serious crimes process, as this has already been undertaken by JSMP and others (Cohen, 2006; Reiger and Wierda, 2006). However, four points are worth noting. First, the serious crimes process concentrated on cases from 1999. This has meant that any crimes from the previous 24 years of Indonesian occupation were not investigated or prosecuted. Second, concerns have been raised about the nature of due process. It is clear, for example, that the UN failed to provide adequate numbers of trained staff and resources. The repercussions of this were extensive - the number of investigators was impossibly small; few legal personnel had previous experience in international law; workers often struggled to access legal documentation, electricity, telephone or computer services and they did not have assistants or interpreters. These issues have led to concerns regarding the rule of law. Third, the serious crimes process failed to reach and prosecute Indonesian officials. The challenge of addressing Indonesia's reticence to pursue prosecutions was not planned from the outset. Those who have been processed through the courts have been low-ranking Timorese militia members and high-ranking perpetrators remain in Indonesia. Fourth, the serious crimes process failed to address torture in any substantive way. Torture was repeatedly sidelined as the SCU focused on counts of murder and rape in the drafting of indictments. In addition, when torture charges were presented to the Special Panels, cases were not always prepared to an international level and convictions were not often secured.

Many interviewed survivors did not know about the serious crimes process at all. The mechanism did not have a developed outreach programme, particularly for the population outside Dili. In the districts, serious crimes bodies did not connect with local people. As Isabel summed up

I live in a rural area and I don't have a radio or TV so I don't know about this. The bridges that link to Dili are also broken.

Moreover, where survivors did have some knowledge about the serious crimes process it was uniformly negative. Investigations and prosecutions were seen to be misplaced in their concentration on Timorese people. Thus, Bosco argued

We should not just think about the militia we should also think about from where the war started. We should think about who initiated revolt...We should know whose fault it was.

The limited convictions of Indonesian officials have led to significant upset among survivors. Basco commented

We were like rats...but those who created this situation have not been investigated, this makes me very sad...If I think about justice, I will cry.

While Gil noted that the serious crimes process has served to create further conflict among the local population

We thought it would be a good process but it has not worked. This has caused people to get mad at each other.

It is clear that the lack of prosecutions for those most responsible for previous suffering has not been accepted. Continued campaigns for justice were seen to be important because prosecutions would dignify victims by acknowledging their pain, strengthen the rule of law and create a positive framework for reconciliation and development. Thus, José states

Independence was costly, it wasn't a gift. We can't just leave things behind because so many of our Timorese people have died. We need to have justice so that we can work together to develop this country.

The responsibility for providing justice was seen to lie with various actors. Many survivors viewed that international actors, particularly the UN, had not done enough to secure justice in Timor-Leste. Dominggos argued that the government of Timor-Leste had to be more supportive of these international attempts while others proposed that Timorese people, themselves, had to be more vocal in their aspirations. As Antonio argued

We all need an international tribunal but it needs a contribution from everyone. If you are a human being, you need to show yourself. We are always talking about it, but it never happens. We should stand and show to the world that we want an international tribunal....it's not enough to just keep talking.

What seems clear to these respondents is that justice provisions have been inadequate. Consequently, all survivors requested either the return of the serious crimes process in Dili or an international criminal tribunal. The campaign for justice has not, then, dissipated; rather, as Felimeno notes, it is a matter that will build over time.

I. Survivor's Thoughts on Truth-Seeking Bodies

1. *The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR)*

The Comissão de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliação de Timor-Leste (CAVR, The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation) emerged in 2000. From the start, the proposal had wide public approval and was supported by Timorese political leaders and the UN. Starting work in January 2002, the Commission employed hundreds of people to facilitate its programmes.

The final report of the CAVR, entitled '*Chega!*' (meaning 'no more, stop or enough'), was released onto the internet in December 2005³. Stretching over 2,500 pages, it details the range of activities undertaken by the Commission: 7,669 victim statements, reporting 85,164 human rights violations, were recorded; 1,541 perpetrator statements were taken and 1,371 perpetrators engaged in hearings of community reconciliation; public victims hearings were held in each of the 65 sub-districts; eight national public hearings were held in Dili to publicise key themes; over 1,000 interviews to strengthen information were conducted; six healing workshops were held; death-toll research that incorporated a graveyard census and a survey of 1,322 households across the territory was undertaken; and, large-scale 'community mapping' exercises to produce local profiles of violations were carried out.

Given these operations, survivors were much more aware of the CAVR. Many survivors spoke warmly about the ability of the CAVR to expose the truth of events, and to illustrate repression and torture. The CAVR report detailed that the responsibility for violence in Timor-Leste lies with individual states (particularly Indonesia), international organizations as well as local militias and gangs. A number of survivors argued that the exposure of such facts was important to ensure that brutality will not be forgotten. For example, Isabel said

It is good that the report will show what Indonesia did. It is also good for the East Timorese because they are also accusing each other about who was and who was not involved in the struggle. It's good too that people are aware of women's suffering.

However, numerous survivors remarked that the CAVR report should be widely disseminated across villages and that young people, the next generation, should learn its content within schools. The effective distribution of this official truth was seen as vital to the success of the CAVR.

2. *Participation in CAVR Processes*

The CAVR's Community Reconciliation Process (CRP) - which brought victims, low-level offenders and local residents together to re-integrate individuals, allow discussions and admissions of guilt as well as to agree on a 'punishment' for 'less serious crimes' - was also positively regarded. This process encouraged wide community participation and the CAVR estimates that 40,000 people attended these

³ It can be found at: <http://etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm> and <http://www.ictj.org/en/news/features/846.html>.

events (CAVR, 2005:Chapter 1.5.126). The CRP was deemed to be an opportunity to clarify events, as Gil noted

People who lived in the village could accept each other. Those who were involved were encouraged to explain what they did. So it was advantageous for us.

Flisberto detailed

Indonesia created the problems for us, so it has been important for Timorese to sit together and solve our problems, and hug each other again.

The CRP could, then, operate in very positive ways. However, survivors raised a number of points regarding the failings of CAVR processes. For instance, survivors noted that the CRP process was undermined by the fact that key perpetrators were not present. Thus, Joao stated

I did not participate because the people who made me suffer were not there. They are in Indonesia.

While Felimeno commented

In my mind, there has been no peace with the enemy. Peace has only been made by friends.

Survivors were also concerned that some low-level perpetrators had not come forward while other perpetrators were not honest in their testimony. José argued

From what I have seen, victims usually tell the truth but as for the suspects, they don't acknowledge or admit that they have committed a crime. From what I have seen, they try to avoid telling the truth. We do know what they are hiding, but we can't intervene as that is CAVR's duty.

The avoidance of truth by perpetrators was possible, he argues, because the CAVR did not investigate cases or accumulate evidence and tended to accept perpetrator accounts at face-value.

Added to this, the political and personal attributes of CAVR staff were also seen to undermine truth-telling. In some circumstances, CAVR staff were blamed for dealing inappropriately with perpetrators because they were family members. As José outlines, in one situation

...the family of the militia, who are also members of the CAVR, just closed the case. So, this is the weakness of the CAVR.

This issue, which led to some truths being obscured or excluded, created a barrier to reconciliation. Other barriers also emerged as a result of the problems that survivors faced in participating in CAVR activities. Some survivors stated that the CAVR did not reach their villages so they had no opportunity to contribute. Others said that they were too sick to attend. It is also evident that certain groups, particularly women,

often struggled to participate in hearings due to their home duties and childcare. Similarly, other groups – such as poorer individuals or older people - could not often take time to leave their work to participate. A number of survivors commented that the CRP was dominated by young people.

Participation with CAVR practices was, however, also determined by individual decision-making. This was particularly clear with certain ex-militia members who did not want to be identified as perpetrators however it was also apparent with victims. Some women, for example, chose not to represent themselves as they did not want to be publicly identified as having been raped or sexually assaulted. Others did not want to be viewed as a ‘victim’. As Agostinha noted

I was asked by the CAVR to give a statement but I refused...I said that God will know my suffering. I don't want to be presented like a doll.

3. Reparations and Prosecutions

Survivors also raised concerns about the limited ability of the CAVR to provide reparations, such as victim compensation or community assistance. Some survivors participated in the CAVR because they required medical assistance. However, the truth-seeking body did not have such a reparatory role and subsequently they felt disappointed.

In addition, survivors spoke negatively about the ability of the Commission to provide adequate punishment, particularly for serious crimes. For example, José commented

I saw a case in which people had had their mother killed and it was reconciled by the perpetrator giving a goat. That is not the right process.

Survivors were dissatisfied with the fact that the CAVR was not adequately connected to justice provisions. As Bosco states

In my opinion, the victims are not happy because the CAVR came and took everything but, in fact, it ends with no justice and no facilities have been provided for them.

In the light of limited prosecutions, detailed above, there is a considerable amount of ‘unfinished business’ and the status of the CAVR as a facilitator of justice has been downgraded.

In their report, CAVR commissioners recommended that prosecutions must be pursued for violations committed throughout the 25-year period of the Commission's mandate. This was challenged by President Gusmão who argues that a strategy of further prosecutions would ‘sow’ ‘political anarchy’ and ‘a culture of political persecution’ in Timor-Leste (Patria and Assegaf, 2006). The distancing of such key Timorese political leaders from further provisions of criminal justice has connected with a turn to friendship initiatives.

4. The Truth and Friendship Commission

In March 2005, the governments of Indonesia and Timor-Leste established a 'Commission of Truth and Friendship' (CTF). The main objective of the CTF is to 'establish the conclusive truth in regard to the events prior to and immediately after the popular consultation in 1999, with a view to further promoting reconciliation and friendship, and ensuring the non-recurrence of similar events' (CTF, 2005:s12). Hence, the CTF follows the well-worn route of the CAVR, the serious crimes process and the Ad Hoc Court and will base its report on a review of the materials documented by these bodies. According to Ramos-Horta, the work of the Commission 'would finally close this chapter...would resolve once and for all the events of 1999' (Sarmiento, 2005:5).

The most controversial aspect of the CTF lies in its proposed 'measures to heal the wounds of the past, to rehabilitate and restore human dignity' through the recommendation of 'amnesty for those involved in human rights violations who cooperate fully in revealing the truth' (CTF, 2005:s14c.i). While, the CTF can only 'recommend' amnesty, survivors of torture argue that this approach amounts to an official immunity for the prosecutions for which they continue to struggle. Thus, Domingos details

This Commission was established without consultation with the victims. This is not good, victims have not participated in this at all...We have done a lot of reconciliation but the Indonesian military must be brought to court.

While Isabel states

How can we have friendship, when they won't even admit what they've done? This was established without consultation and they think that we should embrace it?

The political leaders in Timor-Leste have begun the process of sacrificing justice for friendship ties with its larger economically-stronger neighbour, Indonesia. Economic development, trade and bi-lateral reconciliation have become the main concerns.

J. In the Wake of Truth and Justice

The repercussions of the trauma from repression have already begun to be recorded. Silove et al's (2002) study of East Timorese asylum seekers in Australia found that the group, of whom almost half had experienced torture, had high levels of trauma. Survivors experienced feelings of humiliation and powerlessness; they mistrusted authority and many had difficulties in coping with feelings of anger. This latter point is of particular note in Timor-Leste as interpersonal violence has remained a consistent issue. For instance, Hynes et al's (2004) study shows a continuation of very high levels of reported intimidation and control, verbal abuse, physical assault and sexual coercion of women by their partners and others known to them.

Rees' (2003) study of East Timorese female asylum seekers in Australia found high levels of trauma including mental illness as well as feelings of isolation. In a further study of 48 case notes from PRADET (Psychosocial Recovery and Development in

East Timor), Silove et al (2004) highlighted that almost all met criteria for having an extreme social need with regard to severe mental health disorders, meeting at least one of five indicators – self harm and danger to others; incapable of self-care; bizarre, extreme or culturally inappropriate behaviour; incapacitating distress and agitation; and unmanageability, that is, that mental incapacity was so severe that family or care givers could not provide adequate care or protection.

Thus, Felimeno states

Torture has brought many consequences for people. For instance, many people continue to suffer because their backbones were fractured, so they are disabled. Those who were tortured with electricity were mentally affected. Consequently, they are not normal.

While Basco details

My life is hurt...I cannot study and I don't sleep well.

Many survivors require specific medical care together with community-oriented psychosocial and rehabilitation programmes. Those survivors who have connected with PRADET represent the 'tip of the iceberg' in terms of the number of the people with psychiatric disturbances or an inability to cope with everyday social life. This rare organization has faced overwhelming workloads with limited staff and budgets; given the lack of appropriate services, most survivors have had to draw on church and traditional community measures for support (Silove et al, 2002).

These medical and psycho-social issues have been linked with others concerning social and economic well-being. Timor-Leste, as José describes, 'lacks everything' and all individuals struggle to access basic housing, education, health care and other vital needs. People also generally lack secure employment, an issue that is made worse for some survivors of torture who depend on others for income. As Manuel notes

The majority of us can't work, we are disabled, we have poor eyesight, and some people can't walk, all because of the invasion...They made us disabled, many of us go through pain, and we can't work so they should take responsibility. Those who created this war must take responsibility, especially those people that allied with Indonesia to destroy Timor-Leste. Now we have independence, they have to accept their responsibility for our future. We didn't use guns to fight but we sacrificed our physical bodies to be beaten dreadfully, even to vomit blood.

While Manuel argues that internationals should take responsibility for the social and economic well-being of Timor-Leste, others determine that it is the government's role. As Flisberto states

It is necessary for the government to sit together and solve the problems, to create jobs for the youth and community as a whole. We would like to stay peaceful and don't want violence. Therefore, I would ask the government to pay attention to those who suffered. They need to create more schools and

give a chance to all children to access education. It's important that they don't only give priority to the rich.

The people of Timor-Leste continue to face numerous social, economic and political challenges. A further concerning issue, raised by a number of survivors, is that the national police (PNTL) have continued to torture. The inability of the PNTL to maintain law and order in a democratic way can be identified in various events – in the inappropriate treatment of women, children and other vulnerable groups; in situations where police have fired live rounds into crowds in an attempt to quell protests; and in the marked increase in alleged cases of professional misconduct, arbitrary detention, mistreatment, rapes and torture (HRW, 2006; UN, 2005). With a low priority given to bodies of oversight or accountability, the police have often been identified as a continuation of the old regime, albeit with different uniforms and badges. With the recent violence and continued unrest, this force has collapsed and is being rebuilt with international assistance. It is hoped that any new provisions will bring democratic policing to Timor-Leste.

K. Conclusion

This report has illustrated the ways in which torture was extensively applied throughout the internal war and occupation of Timor-Leste. Torture, often led by Indonesian officials and their auxiliaries, was used to break down the physical, psychological and social capacities of victims. Torture was just one aspect of a wide-range of human rights violations that faced continued resistance from victims.

The involvement of Timorese in torturing other Timorese has created a legacy of suspicion and anger within communities that continues to require attention. The CAVR has made a useful start to processes of reconciliation and further work is required to rebuild trust between local groups. Alongside this, it is evident that more attention needs to be paid to the significant medical, psychological and social needs of survivors. International organizations could do more to extend medical care or rehabilitation programmes for torture survivors, to embed positive development practices, and to assist in the re-formation of state services that will operate in democratic ways. A failure to provide these structures may well exacerbate the long-term suffering experienced by survivors.

Alongside these issues, survivors continue to stress the need for truth and justice responses to their specific violations and to the wider repression in Timor-Leste. Overall, the CAVR has been shown to have been a positive experience for many survivors. While there have been problems regarding implementation of CAVR programmes, the overall aims of the project were warmly regarded. It is now imperative that the results of this truth-telling are widely disseminated, and learnt by the next generation.

Unfortunately, the other transitional justice provisions for Timor-Leste have not received an equally positive response. Survivors knew relatively little about the Ad Hoc Court in Jakarta and the serious crimes process in Dili. However, survivors had serious reservations about the nature of justice provided by these bodies. The judicial focus on the convictions of Timorese was seen to have created upset and conflict

within local communities. Survivors also scorned the ability of the Commission for Truth and Friendship to recommend amnesty.

Overall, this report highlights that torture survivors remain dissatisfied with provisions for criminal justice. The fact that perpetrators of torture have not faced prosecution remains a distressing issue. Survivors view that this lack of justice exemplifies a disregard for their suffering; in addition, it is seen to undermine the rule of law and it will make reconciliation less likely to occur. For these reasons, many survivors are committed to a continued campaign for justice.

Appendix: JSMP Interviews with Torture Survivors

<i>Name</i>	<i>Place of Interview</i>	<i>Date</i>
Agustinha	Ermera	23-24 Feb 2006
Alerico	Liquica	18 Feb 2006
Antonio	Los Palos	08 Feb 2006
Basco	Bobonaro	20 Feb 2006
Bosco	Bobonaro	21 Feb 2006
Clementino	Bobonaro	20 Feb 2006
Dominggos	Liquica	18 Feb 2006
Felimeno	Liquica	18 Feb 2006
Flisberto	Bobonaro	19 Feb 2006
Gil	Los Palos	08 Feb 2006
Jacinta	Bobonaro	19 Feb 2006
José	Oecusse	22 Nov 2005
Manuel	Oecusse	22 Nov 2005
Isabel	Bobonaro	21 Feb 2006
Simplisio	Bobonaro	21 Feb 2006

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