



INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN EASTERN BURMA

2006 SURVEY



Thailand Burma Border Consortium

November 2006

Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma

2006 Survey

With Field Research and Situation Updates by:

**Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
Karen Office of Relief and Development
Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
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Front cover photos: New arrivals at the Salween River, February 2006 (CIDKP)
Displaced and isolated woman and children in southern Shan State, 2005 (SRDC)

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COLLOQUIAL AND HISTORICAL NAMES

Burma
Irrawaddy Division
Karenni State
Karen State
Moulmein
Mergui
Pa-an
Pegu Division
Salween River
Sittaung River
Tavoy
Tenasserim Division
Taungoo
Rangoon


SPDC NAMES

Myanmar
Ayeyarwady Division
Kayah State
Kayin State
Mawlamyine
Myeik
Hpa-an
Bago Division
Thanlwin River
Sittoung River
Dawei
Tanintharyi Division
Toungoo
Yangon

ACRONYMS

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CIDKP	Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
FBR	Free Burma Rangers
IASC	(UN) Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IB	Infantry Battalion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
KNLP	Kayan New Lands Party
KNPLF	Karenni National People's Liberation Front
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KnSO	Karenni Solidarity Organisation
KNU	Karen National Union
KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army
KORD	Karen Office of Relief and Development
KPF	Karen Peace Front
KSWDC	Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
LIB	Light Infantry Battalion
MRDC	Mon Relief and Development Committee
NGO	non government organisation
NMSP	New Mon State Party
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNO	Pao National Organisation
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SSA-S	Shan State Army – South
SSA-N	Shan State Army - North
SSNA	Shan State National Army
SNPLO	Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation
SRDC	Shan Relief and Development Committee
TBBC	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
UN	United Nations
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UWSA	United Wa State Army

Family fleeing in northern Karen State, January 2006 (FBR)



Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Both tragedy and hope are reflected in this fifth annual survey of internal displacement in eastern Burma. The tragedy is that such systematic and widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law continue to occur with national impunity and a largely ineffective international response. Yet it is the ongoing commitment and courage of ethnic community-based organisations to support grassroots coping strategies and document the impacts of conflict, violence and abuse which inspires hope for the future of Burma.

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document the scale, distribution and characteristics of internal displacement since 2002. Collectively, these surveys have aimed to raise awareness about vulnerability in eastern Burma and inform the development of humanitarian protection strategies. Recognising that conditions for the internally displaced are always changing, this year's survey attempted to update population estimates and assess trends across different areas in more detail with higher resolution maps.

TBBC and the participating community-based organisations designed the surveys collaboratively by drawing from the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Although there were some changes for the sake of clarity, the questionnaire was similar to those used in previous years to facilitate trend analysis. Quantitative field surveys of the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarization and development have been based on interviews with key informants in 38 townships between June and August 2006. This has been complemented with qualitative field assessments about the causes and impacts of displacement which have been documented by community based organisations on an ongoing basis throughout the year.

TBBC has previously reported that the Burmese Army has approximately doubled the deployment of battalions across eastern Burma since 1995. This survey has identified 204 infantry and light infantry battalions currently in eastern Burma, which represents approximately 40% of the government's frontline troops nation-wide. Such militarisation has facilitated the State Peace and Development Council's (SPDC's) counter-insurgency strategy which targets civilians in contravention of international humanitarian law. Accounts of such crimes against humanity have been documented by community based organisations in this report as contributing to conflict-induced displacement.

State-sponsored development projects have done little to alleviate poverty in Burma, but have been significant causes of human rights abuses and displacement during the past year. The energy sector is Burma's largest recipient of foreign direct investment, but this report associates the gas pipeline in Mon State with forced labour, travel restrictions, and harassment. Similarly, proposed hydro-electric dams along the Salween River are linked with incidents of forced relocations, forced labour and the logging of community forests. Meanwhile commercial agriculture, and in particular the national development initiative to cultivate castor oil plants to produce bio-diesel, is reported to have induced widespread land confiscation, the imposition of procurement quotas and forced labour for the cultivation of seedlings.

During the past year alone, this survey estimates that 82,000 people were forced to leave their homes as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict and human rights abuses. These estimates are consistent with the annual average rate

of displacement in eastern Burma since 2002, and reflect the SPDC's disregard for their responsibility to protect Burmese citizens from harm. While the distribution of forced migration during the past year was widespread, the most significant concentration was in northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division. Counter-insurgency operations are reported to have killed at least 39 civilians and displaced over 27,000 others in this area during the past year.

While the majority of people displaced during the past year fled in small groups, 232 entire villages were destroyed, forcibly relocated or otherwise abandoned. When combined with the findings of previous field surveys, 3,077 separate incidents of village destruction, relocation or abandonment have been documented in eastern Burma since 1996. Over a million people are understood to have been displaced from their homes in eastern Burma during this time. This reflects the cumulative impact of the Burmese Army's expanded presence and forced relocation campaign targeting civilians in contested areas. Some of these villages may have since been re-established, and indeed this survey has identified 155 villages that were at least partly repopulated during the past year. However, the sustainability of return and resettlement is restricted not only by livelihood constraints but also by the lack of official authorisation. Indeed, attempts to re-establish over 100 villages in previous years have already been thwarted by harassment leading to further rounds of displacement.

The total number of internally displaced persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society as of November 2006 is estimated to be at least 500,000 people. This population is comprised of approximately 287,000 people currently in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities, while 95,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in areas most affected by military skirmishes and approximately 118,000 villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites. These are conservative estimates for eastern Burma as it has not been possible to survey urban areas nor mixed administration areas.


Overall this represents a decrease of approximately 40,000 internally displaced persons since October 2005. This is due to a decrease of 53,000 people in the estimates for ceasefire areas. Population movements have been recorded out of areas administered by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) due to lack of livelihood opportunities. Estimates in other ceasefire areas of Shan and Karenni states have also decreased, reflecting how the areas administered by non state actors have effectively been reduced by the expansion of SPDC control. While many of these villagers may remain internally displaced, it has not been possible to track their current status.

Conversely, the number of people in relocation sites has increased by approximately 10,000 people. This is partly a result of broader survey reach in Tenasserim Division and partly due to new incidents of forced relocation in Shan State. However, a significant decrease has been recorded in Mon state, where restrictions on resettlement away from relocation sites have eased. Rather than reflecting increased freedom, this illustrates that as villagers in surrounding areas become resigned to complying with Burmese Army orders, the government's perceived need for relocation sites becomes redundant.

While the overall estimates for people in hiding sites increased only slightly, there has been a significant increase in northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division where approximately 55,000 villagers are currently hiding from government forces. This represents an increase of approximately 14,000 people since last year, and suggests that half of those displaced in the past year were previously living with the tacit approval of local SPDC authorities in mixed administration areas. These local arrangements offered little protection when the Southern and South Eastern Military Commands coordinated patrols by over 40 battalions to search for civilian settlements and destroy their means of survival.

The wide reach of ethnic community based organisations has enabled these broad trend assessments, yet it is arguably the detailed descriptions and maps which best portray the dilemmas of everyday life for the internally displaced. The contexts and concerns vary across different geographical terrain and types of displaced persons. Yet there is widespread documentation from the sub-township level of specific accounts of abuse and atrocities having been committed by the SPDC against civilians during the past year. At the same time, the resilience of internally displaced communities to resist occupation is exemplified by instances of civil disobedience against the imposition of forced eviction and relocation orders.

This fifth annual survey of internal displacement in eastern Burma reports that the SPDC are the primary perpetrators of systematic and widespread human rights abuses and humanitarian atrocities. Through the deliberate targeting of civilians in military operations, the national authorities are violating their obligations under international humanitarian law. Given the Burmese government's actions, the challenge for the international community is to accept responsibility to protect existing and potential victims of abuses and atrocities.



Chapter I

Introduction

Returning to a burnt home
in northern Karen State, January 2006 (FBR)

1.1 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN ACTION

Internally displaced persons have been forced away from their homes but remain in their country of origin. The authoritative definition, as stated in standards derived from international human rights, humanitarian and refugee law, recognises internally displaced persons as:

“persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.”¹

In the context of conflict-induced displacement, it is significant that not only proximity to actual fighting but also the broader effects of war are recognised as potential causes of internal displacement. Similarly, it is accepted that internal displacement may not only be the result of violence and abuse that has already taken place but also due to the avoidance of threats which are yet to occur. Both of these conditions highlight the involuntary nature of internal displacement regardless of whether people are forced to flee conflict, violence or abuse, or alternatively obliged to leave by government orders or fear.

However, the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles’ framework describes a broader set of causes for internal displacement than the refugee-like criteria of fleeing conflict and human rights abuses. Apart from recognising forced migration caused by natural disasters, arbitrary displacement is also prohibited “in cases of large-scale development projects that are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests”.² Development-induced displacement is problematic even when part of genuine efforts at poverty alleviation. Yet in situations of protracted conflict, development projects are often closely related to militarisation and designed so that communities perceived as opposing the State bear a disproportionate share of the costs and are denied a fair share of the benefits. In such cases, “development-induced displacement constitutes a violation of human rights and humanitarian law and calls for a response from the international community”.³

While there is no specific cessation clause defining the end of internal displacement in international standards, potential solutions are identified as incorporating either return to former areas of residence or resettlement into another part of the country voluntarily, in safety and with dignity. National authorities are obliged to support reintegration by ensuring that internally displaced persons are protected against discrimination, able to participate fully in public affairs and enjoy access to public services. It is stipulated that national authorities’ responsibilities include facilitating the recovery or compensation of property which was dispossessed as a result of displacement. Further, international humanitarian agencies are to be granted unimpeded access to assist internally displaced persons during all phases of return or resettlement and reintegration.⁴ These principles have been expanded upon in

¹ Para 2, Introduction, *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 1998,

UN document E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2; November 11, 1998

² Principle 6.2 (c), *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 1998

³ Courtland Robinson, 2003, *Risks and Rights: The Causes, Consequences and Challenges of Development-Induced Displacement*, Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement

⁴ Principles 28-30, *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement*, 1998

2005 with the adoption of international standards specifically addressing the rights of displaced persons to recovery of their homes, lands and properties.⁵

While recognising the plight of internally displaced people is essential to advocating for appropriate protection and solutions, programmatic responses to protracted conflicts tend to broaden the focus to conflict-affected populations.⁶ At an international level, the institutional framework since the late 1990's for responding to the assistance, protection and recovery needs of internally displaced persons has been based on inter-agency collaboration rather than mandating one agency. However it has been acknowledged that this collaborative response has been largely ineffective in dealing with governments either unwilling or unable to deal with internally displaced persons.⁷

Recognising these concerns, in 2004 the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) revised and expanded its guidelines to UN Country Teams responding to situations of internal displacement. This revised policy package identifies the following as key sequences necessary for putting the collaborative response into practice⁸:

- cross-sectoral needs assessment and data collection
- common analysis of assistance and protection needs
- a UN system-wide strategic plan
- division of labour across agencies
- agency involvement derived from respective mandates
- regular review to adjust responses to the evolving environment

It is hoped that the preparedness and technical capacity of the international community to respond to humanitarian emergencies will be further strengthened by the introduction of a cluster leadership approach. "This is part of a wider reform process aimed at improving the effectiveness of humanitarian action by ensuring greater accountability, predictability and partnership amongst relevant agencies."⁹ Sectoral responsibilities have been clustered and delegated in relation to service provision (logistics and emergency telecommunications), relief and assistance (emergency shelter; health; nutrition; water, hygiene and sanitation), and cross-cutting concerns (early recovery, protection and camp management). Under this model, lead agencies at the country level are responsible for :

- identifying key partners
- coordinating programme implementation
- planning and strategy development
- application of standards
- monitoring and reporting
- advocacy and resource mobilisation
- training and capacity building of national authorities and civil society
- acting as a provider of last resort

⁵ UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons, 2005, UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17

⁶ ICRC, 2000, *Internally Displaced Persons : The Mandate and Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)*, Geneva, p2.

⁷ Simon Bagshaw and Diana Paul, 2004, *Protect or Neglect – Towards a More Effective United Nations Approach to the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons*, The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement, UN OCHA – Inter Agency Internal Displacement Division.

⁸ IASC, 2004, *Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations of Internal Displacement: Guidance to UN Humanitarian Coordinators and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams*, p10.

⁹ IASC, 2006, *Preliminary Guidance Note on the Implementation of the Cluster Leadership Approach*, p1

Although the international legal framework for humanitarian action was founded over half a century ago, the protection agenda has only gained prominence since the end of the Cold War and the genocide in Rwanda. The UN definition that has evolved for humanitarian protection is “all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law”.¹⁰ In practice, this purpose has been interpreted as “making states and individuals meet their humanitarian responsibilities to protect people in war and filling in for them as much as possible when they do not”.¹¹

So while humanitarian assistance helps people recover from harm already caused, a protective approach also strives to stop violence and abuse, or at least to mitigate the effects, to ensure survivors have access to judicial and social redress and to prevent emerging threats from causing further harm. This necessitates engaging national authorities who are primarily responsible for the protection of their citizens and empowering the coping strategies of those at risk. Protection and empowerment have thus been recognised as mutually reinforcing factors of human security. “People protected can exercise many choices. And people empowered can avoid some risks and demand improvements in the system of protection.”¹²

Humanitarian protection is understood as incorporating three general types of activities.¹³ Responsive actions are urgent attempts to stop, prevent and / or mitigate the immediate harm inflicted by a pattern of abuse. Remedial actions try to restore people's dignity subsequent to a pattern of abuse through longer-term recovery processes. Environment building involves promoting attitudinal and behavioral change as well as frameworks for governance which are conducive to respect for human rights. These three types of activities are not chronologically ordered but rather overlap, with timing related instead to the nature and gravity of the pattern of abuse. Similarly, given sufficient information sharing and resource coordination, the respective mandates and activities of different humanitarian agencies can complement each other to promote shared protection goals.

Techniques for securing protection range from pressuring relevant authorities to comply with their obligations to protect civilians from violence and abuse, to providing assistance for those survivors recovering from abuses. Pressure can be applied on authorities via denunciation through public censure, persuasion through private negotiation, and / or the diplomatic mobilization of advisors and other influential stakeholders. The main techniques for providing protective assistance are to support and empower existing local structures and services and / or substituting for the authorities by directly providing aid to the survivors of abuse.

Despite this protective framework, recent evaluations of humanitarian action in ten countries identified that “where national government fail to protect internally displaced persons, there is evidence of a continuing and substantial deficit in the

¹⁰ IASC, 2000, *Protection of Internally Displaced Persons – Inter Agency Standing Committee Policy Paper Series*, No.2, UN, New York, p4

¹¹ Hugo Slim and Luis Enrique Eguen, 2001, *Humanitarian Protection: A Guidance Booklet*, ALNAP, p21

¹² Commission on Human Security, 2003, *Human Security Now*, UN, p12

¹³ IASC, 2002, *Growing the Sheltering Tree: Protecting Rights Through Humanitarian Action*, UN, p12

protection work done by the international community”.¹⁴ Practices contributing to this protection deficit were identified as the neglect of minorities; prioritisation of material assistance over protection needs; lack of protection capacities and will; lack of access into insecure areas; and a lack of human rights monitoring.

1.2 THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

The humanitarian community is not primarily responsible for failing to protect people from massive atrocities. National authorities have the primary obligation to respect, protect and promote the human rights of their citizens, yet the responsible authorities are often the primary perpetrators of violence and abuse. In such cases, the international diplomatic community has been reluctant to intervene in so-called “domestic affairs” due to the sacred cow of sovereignty amongst nation-states. These perceptions led to woefully inadequate international responses to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, ethnic cleansing in the Balkans in 1995 and crimes against humanity in Kosovo during 1999, amongst other humanitarian crises.

In the past five years, however, it has been recognised that the debate should not be about the right to intervene at all, but rather about the international community’s responsibility to protect people at grave risk. “The relevant perspective is not that of the powerful interveners but those needing support. Sovereignty, in the modern age, involves not just control but responsibility.”¹⁵ This conceptual change has been formally embraced by the heads of state and government meeting at the UN’s 60th Anniversary Summit in 2005 and reaffirmed by the UN Security Council in 2006. It is now accepted in principle that if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect potential or actual victims of massive atrocities, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and enforcement action. This is a landmark change which has the potential to bring our common humanity to the forefront of the global security agenda.

“The international community, through the United Nations... (is) prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”¹⁶

“The Security Council... notes that the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons, and the commission of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, reaffirms in this regard its readiness to consider such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps.”¹⁷

¹⁴ John Borton, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Ralph Otto, 2005, *Learning from Evaluations of Support to Internally Displaced Persons*, Channel Research, Belgium.

¹⁵ Gareth Evans, “The Responsibility to Protect: Unfinished Business”, G8 Summit 2006: Issues and Instruments, www.crisisgroup.org

¹⁶ UNGA, 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, UN doc. A/Res/60/1, 24 October 2005, para 138

¹⁷ UN Security Council, Resolution 1674, Adopted on 28 April 2006

1.3 PROTRACTED CONFLICT IN BURMA

Burma's post-independence history has been dominated by civil war between the central government and a plethora of armed opposition groups.¹⁸ Political instability has been rooted in ideological conflict between a socialist State and communist resistance, and more recently between military rule and democratic opposition. However, the most protracted armed conflict has been between the Burman controlled State and a loose alliance of non-Burman ethnic nationalities who are fighting for self determination.¹⁹

After decades of low-intensity conflict, the Burmese Army's negotiation of seventeen ceasefire agreements with various ethnic-nationalist forces reduced the scale of armed conflict in the 1990's. While these ceasefires have led to the establishment of special regions with some degree of administrative autonomy, broader political grievances are yet to be addressed and human rights abuses continue to be widespread. In the mid-1990's, Rangoon's ceasefire with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) lasted only a few months while Khun Sa's surrender of the Mong Tai Army in exchange for an amnesty against drug-related charges led to the Shan States Army (SSA) reforming around a more genuinely ethnic nationalist cause. The New Mon State Party's (NMSP's) ceasefire has been maintained, but its authority has been challenged by the deployment of Burma Army troops into areas previously controlled by the Mon. A split in the Karen National Union (KNU) in 1994 also resulted in an expansion of the Burmese Army's control.

The UN General Assembly has been calling annually for democratisation, the restoration of human rights, and tri-partite dialogue between the government, democratic opposition and ethnic representatives for over a decade. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) responded in 2003 with the announcement of a "road map" to democracy. However, the proposed seven step process remains stuck in the first stage of drafting a new constitution. Given the autocratic nature of the National Convention, the continued detention of democratic and ethnic opposition leaders, ongoing military operations targeting civilians, and the government's refusal to implement recommendations made by the UN Office of the Secretary General and the UN Human Rights Council, the prospects for national reconciliation remain bleak.



¹⁸ The Union of Burma was officially renamed the Union of Myanmar by military decree after a coup in 1988. A number of states and divisions were also renamed, including Karen state (now Kayah), Karenni state (now Kayah) and Pegu Division (now Bago). This report uses historical and colloquial titles.

¹⁹ The Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan and others are often described as ethnic minorities or indigenous people, but generally prefer the term "ethnic nationalities".

It was in this context that the Nobel Peace prize laureate, Bishop Desmond Tutu, and former President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, commissioned an assessment of the threat that the government of Burma poses both to its own people and to regional peace and security. To determine whether the situation in Burma warranted intervention from the UN Security Council, criteria that the Council had previously cited as causing a threat to peace in other situations of internal conflict were reviewed. The determining factors were identified as the overthrow of a democratically elected government; conflict among government bodies and armed opposition groups; widespread violations of humanitarian and human rights law; the substantial outflow of refugees; and other cross-border problems such as drug trafficking. While all the cases of internal conflict in which the Security Council has intervened have involved at least one of these factors, Burma is the only situation in which all five factors are present.

Assessment of Determining Factors Resulting in UN Security Council Intervention²⁰


Country	Resolution	Overthrow of Democratic Government	Conflict Among Factions	Humanitarian or Human Rights Violations	Refugee Outflows	Other (Drug traffic)	Other (HIV / AIDS)
Sierra Leone	S.C. 1132 (1997)	√	√	√	√		
Afghanistan	S.C. 1076 (1996)		√	√	√	√	
Yemen	S.C. 924 (1994)		√	√			
Haiti	S.C. 841 (1993)	√		√	√		
Rwanda	S.C. 812 (1993)		√	√	√		
Liberia	S.C. 788 (1992)		√	√			
Cambodia	S.C. 668 (1990)		√				
Burma		√	√	√	√	√	√

The UN Security Council received informal briefings on the situation in Burma from the UN Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs in December 2005 and May 2006. Member States subsequently voted to formally add Burma to the Security Council's agenda and officially considered the international implications in September 2006. Although there is yet to be consensus on a resolution, there is increasing recognition within the Council as well as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) that protracted conflict in Burma is a threat to regional peace and security.

²⁰ DLA Piper, 2005, "Threat to the Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to act in Burma", p3

1.4 2006 SURVEY RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document the characteristics of internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2002.²¹ This has included population surveys as well as assessments of food security, vulnerability and protection, for which the findings have been summarised in Appendix 1. However, as the environment is constantly evolving, situation assessments also need to be regularly revised. More communities have been displaced during the past year while others have attempted to return to former villages, resettle elsewhere in Burma or flee to Thailand. The aim of this year's research was thus to update assessments of the causes, scale and distribution of internal displacement in eastern Burma.



TBBC and the participating community-based organizations designed the surveys collaboratively, by drawing from the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. Although there were some changes for the sake of clarity, the questionnaire was similar to those used in previous years to facilitate trend analysis. Quantitative surveys of the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarization and development have been based on interviews with key

²¹ Previous surveys can be accessed from www.tbbsc.org/resources

informants in 38 townships between June and August 2006.²² This has been complemented with qualitative field assessments about the causes and impacts of displacement which have been documented by community based organizations on an ongoing basis throughout the year.

Much of eastern Burma remains inaccessible to international observers and there are significant risks associated with collecting information from conflict-affected areas. Without the participating ethnic community-based organizations' commitment and courage, this report would not have been written.

Population estimates were compiled for people who:

- have fled from SPDC patrols and hide in areas of ongoing fighting
- were forcibly evicted and obliged to move into SPDC relocation sites
- reside in ethnic administered ceasefire areas after having been forcibly relocated by non-state actors, or having fled from human rights abuses and the effects of war, or having returned from refugee camps in Thailand.

To guide the demarcation of population estimates, the following definitions of hiding sites, relocation sites, ceasefire areas and mixed administration areas were used :

- Hiding sites are the most contested areas where people are actively seeking to conceal themselves from detection by SPDC patrols.
- Relocation sites are consolidated villages where people have been ordered to move by SPDC after having been forcibly evicted.
- Ceasefire areas are special regions with some autonomy for ethnic nationality authorities and provisional guarantees against SPDC attack.
- Mixed administration areas are rural areas nominally under SPDC control, but within the sphere of influence of the armed opposition.

As in previous years, it has not been possible to estimate the number of people obliged to leave their homes but remaining in a state of internal displacement in mixed administration areas or on the fringes of urban settlements. Further, given the complexities in distinguishing between different location types as well as between displaced and resident populations these are best estimates only. Approximations derived from the sub-township level have been triangulated against last year's estimates and situation updates from the field staff of ethnic community based organisations.

It is recognised that the demarcation of distinct areas is largely a theoretical exercise, and that in practice the distinction between different location types is imprecise. For example, it is difficult to distinguish between civilians in the most militarily contested areas who do not expose themselves to SPDC and villagers in mixed administration areas who leave home if SPDC patrols approach. Similarly, people who have previously been forcibly evicted and relocated but now have a relative (although still restricted) degree of choice about their place of dwelling, could justifiably be classified as living in either SPDC relocation sites or mixed administration areas.

²² The questionnaire is reproduced in the Appendix 2.



Chapter 2

Displacement Trends in Eastern Burma

Rebuilding on the Salween River, May 2006 (TBBC)

2.1 CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

The impacts of war, and specifically counter-insurgency strategies, on human rights and displacement in eastern Burma have been widely documented.²³ Through decades of low-intensity conflict, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and its predecessors have based their counter insurgency strategy on targeting the civilian population. The “Four Cuts” policy aims to undermine the armed opposition’s access to recruits, information, supplies and finances by forcibly relocating villagers from contested areas into government controlled areas. The policy has aimed to turn “black” opposition controlled areas into “brown” contested areas and ultimately into “white” areas controlled by Rangoon.

Villagers who do not comply with forced relocation orders are considered sympathetic to the armed opposition. The subsequent targeting of these civilians by military patrols is a violation of international humanitarian laws which the State of Burma has formally ratified.²⁴ Conflict-induced displacement can thus be considered a manifestation of not only systematic human rights abuses but also of crimes against humanity committed by the Burmese Army.

Threats to lives are the most severe manifestations of this counter-insurgency policy and include military attacks, summary execution, landmines and inhumane punishment. However threats to livelihoods in the form of the destruction of agricultural fields and housing as well as the confiscation of land and food supplies are a more common method of undermining the capacity of villagers to remain in militarily contested areas. Either way the risks for civilians generally increase after military skirmishes, when the SPDC retaliates against villagers for supposedly enabling the armed opposition forces to strike.

Armed opposition forces and independent security analysts have reported that the Burmese Army has approximately doubled the deployment of battalions across eastern Burma since 1995.²⁵ This survey has identified 204 infantry and light infantry battalions, which represents approximately 40% of SPDC’s frontline troops nation-wide. Yet it is not only the scale of militarisation, but also the systematic nature of the Burmese Army’s order of battle that has occupied the customary lands of the non-Burman ethnic nationalities. The military hierarchy from Regional Command to Operational Control to the Battalion level demands rigorous compliance, with insubordination resulting in brutal collective punishment. Regional Commanders are more powerful than cabinet members in Burma, yet during the past year the junta’s supreme commanders have been able to coordinate a military offensive in northern Karen state with battalions from two Regional Commands. This culture of authoritarian discipline reflects the ultra-nationalist values which underlie the “paranoid orientation of the military leaders, their strong emphasis on self-reliance and fundamentally ethnocentric outlook.”²⁶

²³ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 10 May 2006, *Myanmar (Burma) : Worst Army Attacks in Years Displace Thousands*, www.internal-displacement.org

UN Commission on Human Rights, 7 February 2006, *Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 62nd session, E/CN.4/2006/34

Refugees International, June 2006, *Ending the Waiting Game : Strategies for Responding to Internally Displaced People in Burma*, www.refugeesinternational.org


Human Rights Watch, 2005, *They Came and Destroyed our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State*, Vol.17, No. 4(C).

²⁴ Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949, Common Article 3.

²⁵ TBBC, 2005, *Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma*, www.tbtc.org/resources

²⁶ International Crisis Group, 2001, “Myanmar: The Military Regime’s View of the World”, p4

Militarization in Eastern Burma, 2006



2.2 DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT

Burma lags behind most of its neighbours in terms of poverty alleviation, with UN agencies and the Asian Development Bank recently reporting that Burma is falling further behind with respect to the Millenium Development Goals.²⁷ This partly reflects the government's priorities as an estimated 40% of the budget is allocated to the military²⁸ whereas annual public expenditure on health and education is less than US\$1 per person.²⁹ A global survey of transparent governance in 145 countries also found only three nations where systematic corruption was more prevalent than in Burma.³⁰

While poverty is a nation-wide phenomenon, many of the most deprived areas are in border areas where protracted conflict has further undermined human, social, economic and natural capital. By focusing on infrastructure construction and commercial agriculture, the government's Border Areas Development programme has done little to alleviate poverty in conflict-affected areas.³¹ In contrast, state-sponsored development initiatives have often undermined livelihoods and "primarily served to consolidate military control over the rural population"³²

Burma's energy sector is its largest recipient of foreign direct investment, however gas pipelines and the proposed hydro-electric dams along the Salween river have also been significant causes of human rights abuses during the past year. While approximately 35,000 people were previously displaced from areas surrounding the proposed Tasang dam site in Shan State, the livelihoods of those remaining continue to be undermined by forced labour for the construction of roads and deforestation caused by large scale logging. Similarly, villagers along the perimeter of the Yadana gas pipeline in Tenasserim Division and the Kanbawk-Myaingkalay gas pipeline in Mon state have been forced to provide security guards without payment by the local authorities. When there was an explosion in the latter pipeline during February, villagers were punished with fines, restrictions on movements and the arrest of leaders for allegedly cooperating with the armed opposition.

Commercial agriculture has intensified during the past year with the promotion of a national development initiative to cultivate castor oil plantations to produce bio-diesel as a potential fuel substitute. Thousands of acres across eastern Burma have been confiscated by local authorities without the payment of compensation to landowners and primarily to the benefit of privately financed joint-ventures with SPDC. Livelihoods have been further undermined by the imposition of procurement quotas and forced labour for the cultivation of seedlings. There have been no indications that former landowners and labourers will share any of the harvests, which in any case are years away. As with other monocultures, the environmental consequences of deforestation and a loss of biodiversity will also undermine local livelihoods and natural resource management in the longer term.

²⁷ *Millenium Development Goals : Progress in Asia and the Pacific*, UNESCAP, UNDP and ADB, 2006, p7

²⁸ International Crisis Group, 2004, *Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas*, Yangon / Brussles, p14.


²⁹ Center for Public Health and Human Rights, March 2006, *Responding to AIDS, TB, Malaria and Emerging Infectious Diseases in Burma*, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, p7

³⁰ Transparency International, 2005, "Corruption Perceptions Index", www.transparency.org

³¹ International Crisis Group, 2004, *Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas*, Yangon / Brussels, p4

³² Human Rights Watch, 2005, *They Came and Destroyed our Village Again: The Plight of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State*, Vol. 17, No. 4(c), p43

Development Projects Related to Human Rights Abuses 2005-2006



2.3 DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN 1996 AND 2006

Field surveys conducted by indigenous humanitarian and human rights groups and collated by TBBC have previously indicated that more than 2,800 villages were destroyed, forcibly relocated or otherwise abandoned in eastern Burma between 1996 and 2005.³³ Based on the refugee exodus into camps and migrant communities in Thailand and estimations of the internally displaced population, over a million people are understood to have been forcibly displaced from their homes in eastern Burma during that period.

This survey estimates that during the past year alone, 82,000 people were forced to leave their homes as a result of, or in order to avoid, the effects of armed conflict and human rights abuses. This includes people from at least 232 villages that have been documented as having been completely displaced in the past 12 months. While the distribution of forced migration was widespread, the most significant concentration was in four townships of northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division where counter-insurgency operations displaced over 27,000 civilians. The overall rate of displacement in eastern Burma remains critical and is consistent with previous field surveys which have indicated that on average over 81,000 civilians have been forced to leave their homes each year since 2002.

RATE OF DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN 2002 AND 2006

States and Divisions	Civilians displaced by armed conflict or human rights abuses				
	2002-3 ³⁴	2003-4 ³⁵	2004-5 ³⁶	2005-6	annual average
Southern Shan	15,500	15,500	23,100	16,200	17,600
Karenni	6,100	6,100	12,500	7,400	8,000
Eastern Pegu	3,050	3,050	5,900	13,400	6,400
Karen	30,500	30,500	29,500	30,100	30,200
Mon	8,150	8,200	10,000	1,100	6,800
Tenasserim	15,200	15,150	6,000	13,800	12,500
Overall	78,500	78,500	87,000	82,000	81,500

The cumulative impact of SPDC's forced relocation campaigns between 1996 and 2002 reflects the extent of the Burma Army's expanded presence. This period followed the fall of KNU's headquarters, Khun Sa's surrender of the Mong Tai Army and ceasefire agreements in Mon and Karenni states. The Burma Army substantially expanded its control over contested areas in the late 1990's by establishing new bases in strategic locations and forcing rural villages to relocate into towns or consolidated villages. By 2002 few rural villages had not already been subjected to forced relocation orders, although in many cases civilians had resisted these attempts to subjugate customary land ownership. The main form of civil disobedience against the imposition of forced eviction and relocation has been to hide in surrounding fields and forests as close as possible to former villages and ancestral lands.


³³ TBBC, 2005, "Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma", www.tbtc.org

³⁴ TBBC, 2004, "Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma", www.tbtc.org

³⁵ Ibid. (Estimates were originally for a 2 year period between 2002 and 2004)

³⁶ TBBC, 2005, "Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma", www.tbtc.org

Displaced Villages in Eastern Burma, 1996-2006



While 3,077 villages have been documented as forcibly displaced since 1996, some of these villages have been at least partly repopulated. This survey has identified 155 locations where civilians have attempted to re-establish a village during the past year. The vast majority of these attempts have been in Shan state where villagers have quietly been allowed to leave relocation sites in some areas. However, the sustainability of such return and resettlement is restricted not only by livelihood constraints but also by the lack of official authorisation. Indeed, documented attempts to re-establish over 100 villages during 2003 and 2004 have already been thwarted by harassment leading to further rounds of forced displacement.

2.4 INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION ESTIMATES IN 2006


The total number of internally displaced persons who have been forced or obliged to leave their homes and have not been able to return or resettle and reintegrate into society as of October 2006 is estimated to be at least 500,000 people. The population is comprised of 287,000 people currently in the temporary settlements of ceasefire areas administered by ethnic nationalities, while 95,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in areas most affected by military skirmishes and approximately 118,000 villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites.

DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN 2005 AND 2006

States and Divisions	IDPs in Hiding		IDPs in Relocation Sites		IDPs in Ceasefire Areas		Total IDPs	
	2005	2006	2005	2006	2005	2006	2005	2006
South Shan	20,800	13,300	23,700	31,300	174,500	131,000	219,000	175,600
Karenni	9,500	9,300	7,500	6,400	75,500	63,600	92,500	79,300
East Pegu	13,400	17,400	7,900	6,400	0	0	21,300	23,800
Karen	38,800	49,100	6,100	4,300	45,000	45,900	89,900	99,300
Mon	2,500	300	6,200	500	40,000	41,000	48,700	41,800
Tenasserim	7000	5,600	56,600	69,100	5,000	5,500	68,600	80,200
Overall	92,000	95,000	108,000	118,000	340,000	287,000	540,000	500,000

Overall, this represents a decrease of approximately 40,000 internally displaced persons since October 2005. This reflects a substantial decrease in the population estimates for ceasefire areas. Population movements have been recorded out of areas administered by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) due to lack of livelihood opportunities. Estimates in other ceasefire areas of Shan and Karenni states have also decreased, reflecting how the areas administered by non state actors have effectively been reduced by the expansion of SPDC control. While many of these villagers may remain internally displaced, it has not been possible to track their current status. Conversely, estimates for relocation sites have increased significantly, partly as a result of a broader survey reach in Tenasserim Division and partly due to new incidents of forced relocation in Shan State. Population estimates for hiding sites increased slightly overall, due to a major Burmese Army counter-insurgency operation which targeted civilians in northern Karen state.

Relocation Sites, Hiding Areas and Ceasefire Areas in Eastern Burma, 2006



From a longer term perspective, the internally displaced population estimates for 2006 represent a decrease of over 130,000 people compared to the first border wide reports that TBBC documented in 2002.³⁷ This decrease is explained by a mix of sustainable return or resettlement, flight into refugee and migrant populations in Thailand, and forced migration into Burma's urban communities beyond the reach of these field surveys.

As hinted above, these population figures are considered conservative due to constraints in the methodology. While estimates have been derived from the rural areas of 38 townships most affected by internal displacement, it has not been possible to include approximations from urban areas and from other townships. Similarly, there remain difficulties distinguishing between formerly displaced persons who have successfully returned or resettled into mixed administration areas compared to those who still dare not expose themselves if SPDC patrols approach. This survey has generally discounted such populations in mixed administration areas, as it was not possible to verify how many have reintegrated into society and how many remain in a state of internal displacement.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN ETHNIC CEASEFIRE AREAS

People in ethnic administered ceasefire areas represent the largest category of internally displaced persons in eastern Burma. 287,000 displaced people are residing throughout areas administered by ceasefire groups in eastern Burma who have each been granted a relative degree of autonomy by the Burma Army. This authority is generally formalised by the demarcation of special regions, with the main exception being in the areas of southern Shan State which are claimed by the United Wa State Army (UWSA). Authorities in ceasefire areas can generally be divided into three types. There are former members or allies of the Communist Party of Burma,³⁸ militias who split from the main political party representing their ethnic group³⁹ and former members of the armed opposition's National Democratic Front.⁴⁰

77,000 people are estimated to remain in areas nominally governed by the UWSA along the Thailand border. This population primarily consists of villagers who were evicted from their homes in northern Shan state between 1999 and 2001 and forcibly relocated for strategic and supposedly drug eradication purposes. Autocratic rule and the ongoing suppression of rights by the UWSA has obstructed opportunities for people to re-establish their livelihoods, while at the same time inducing further displacement amongst former land owners whose property has been seized to accommodate the new arrivals. Over 40,000 people have felt obliged by these restrictions to move away from UWSA's southern areas during the past couple of years. These villagers have migrated to search for work in Thailand, attempted to resettle elsewhere in Shan State or returned to their former homes along the China border.

³⁷ BBC, 2002, "Internally Displaced Persons and Relocation Sites in Eastern Burma", www.tbtc.org

³⁸ United Wa State Army (UWSA), Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), and Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation (SNPLO)

³⁹ Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Karen Peace Force (KPF), and the Karenni Solidarity Organisation (KNSO)

⁴⁰ New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State Army North (SSA-N) and Pao National Organisation (PNO)

In contrast, ceasefire areas where the legitimacy of ethnic nationality authorities is less disputed provide a relative degree of protection for displaced communities. Over 60,000 people are currently residing in the New Mon State Party's (NMSP's) 12 designated ceasefire areas. This includes former refugees who were repatriated from Thailand back into a situation in flux over ten years ago as well as villagers from SPDC controlled areas who have fled from systematic human rights abuses. Approximately 2,000 new arrivals have been reported seeking refuge in the NMSP ceasefire areas during the past year alone. However these areas can not provide a sustainable solution for the internally displaced due to population density with limited access to suitable agricultural land, SPDC restrictions on travel outside of ceasefire areas, and the inability of ethnic nationality authorities to support resettlement or compensate for livelihood assets lost. The Rangoon-based international community's attempts to access and assist displaced communities in the NMSP ceasefire areas continue to be frustrated.

Other ceasefire parties include the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) which administers around 60,000 people, the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) which governs over 30,000 civilians, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) which claims authority over approximately 25,000 villagers, and the Shan Nationalities' Peoples Liberation Organisation (SNPLO) which administers over 15,000 people. However, the boundary between areas primarily influenced by non state actors and those under the administration of Burmese authorities is porous. SPDC's expansion into ceasefire areas during the past year has effectively reduced the displaced population under the administration of KNPLF, SSA-N and SNPLO in particular. This expansion has manifested in various ways including orders for villages to be relocated, confiscation of land and property, imposition of forced labour, and restrictions on trade and travel. As long as the human rights dividends accruing from ceasefire agreements remain negligible, their sustainability continues to be undermined.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN HIDING SITES

An estimated 95,000 civilians are hiding in the most militarily contested areas, which are generally located in remote and mountainous forests and fields. This type of geography strengthens the ability of the armed opposition forces to move undetected and weakens the logistical advantage of the government forces. Forest growth also provides shelter under which internally displaced populations can hide their temporary settlements.

This population has fled from their homes to avoid contact with SPDC military patrols due to fear of harassment under the pretext of counter insurgency activities. People in hiding may not move far from their homes, which is a key motivating factor for remaining despite the risks of being detected by SPDC or paramilitary patrols. However, while there may be opportunities for people to return periodically to nearby villages and fields, the risks prohibit the possibility of a more sustainable return or resettlement.

The categorisation of these people as members of the armed opposition for disobeying relocation orders contravenes the government's obligations under international humanitarian law to distinguish between civilians and combatants. Threats to the lives include heavy artillery shelling of civilian settlements, landmines, summary execution and inhumane punishment if captured. If settlements are discovered

uninhabited, livelihoods are commonly undermined by the burning of civilian dwellings and the destruction or theft of crops and food stocks. Offences documented in this report constitute not merely more examples of human rights abuses which are widespread in Burma, but rather are indicative of the crimes against humanity that are committed against people hiding in conflict-affected areas.

Counter-insurgency military operations during the past year have particularly targeted civilians in northern Karen and eastern Pegu Division. At least 39 civilians have been killed by Burmese Army patrols in this area during the past year, while approximately 55,000 villagers are currently hiding from government forces. This represents an increase of approximately 14,000 people since 2005, which suggests that half of those displaced during the past year were previously living with the tacit approval of local SPDC authorities in mixed administration areas. However, local arrangements became null and void when the Southern and South Eastern Military Commands coordinated patrols by over 40 battalions to search for civilian settlements and destroy their means of survival. This level of coordination is illustrative of the systematic nature of the Burmese Army's crimes against humanity.

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN SPDC RELOCATION SITES

The third category of internal displaced persons in eastern Burma consists of approximately 118,000 villagers who currently reside in designated relocation sites after having been evicted from their homes. Government relocation sites are generally situated on barren land near a town or village and in close proximity to roads and SPDC army bases. Relocation sites can result from either the forced transfer of villages to a newly constructed center, or the forced consolidation of dispersed villages into a more densely populated pre-existing settlement.


Population estimates for internally displaced persons in relocation sites have increased by 10,000 people since 2005. This partly reflects a broader survey reach in Tenasserim Division resulting in more comprehensive data collection in 2006. However, new incidents of forced evictions and the relocation of entire villages have also been reported in Shan state. Part of the migration out of the Wa ceasefire areas in southern Shan state has been induced by the expansion of SPDC authority, which has manifested through forced relocations of villages previously administered by UWSA. Similarly, SPDC counter-insurgency operations have attempted to divide upland and lowland Karen communities by ordering another round of forced village relocations just south of Kyaukgyi town.

Residents of relocation sites were generally obliged to dismantle their houses and carry whatever property and food stocks were transportable to the designated area within a few days notice. There is commonly no assistance provided for the reconstruction of shelters and tenancy is usually not officially registered. Restrictions on movement outside of relocation sites vary, with travel passes for between a day to a week generally available for purchase from SPDC military commanders. These passes guarantee passage through checkpoints and into markets but single day passes are often not long enough to enable people to return to their homes and fields.

Apart from the fundamentally coercive nature of population movements into SPDC relocation sites and the loss of property as a result of displacement, possibilities for resettlement and reintegration are also restricted by limited livelihood options. Limited access to suitable agricultural land results either from relocation sites being located close to towns, adjacent to SPDC army bases where lands have been confiscated to support the livelihoods of soldiers, or due to population density and barren soil. Proximity to SPDC bases results in orders to work without compensation, taking time away from earning an income, as well as demands for payment of arbitrary taxes at irregular and short notice.

As a result, with the exception of Shan State and Tenasserim Division, population estimates for relocation sites have slightly decreased in the past year. The most significant decrease has been recorded in Mon state, where restrictions on resettlement away from relocation sites have eased even if villagers remain in the same location. Rather than reflecting increased freedom, this is illustrative of expanded SPDC control over surrounding mixed administration areas. As villagers in surrounding areas become resigned to complying with Burmese Army orders, the SPDC's perceived need for relocation sites becomes redundant.

Hiding in northern Karenni State, June 2006 (KSWDC)



Chapter 3

Situation Updates from Community Based Organisations

3.1 CENTRAL SHAN STATE

Over 58,000 internally displaced people are estimated to currently be in ceasefire areas, relocation sites or hiding sites across Namzarng, Loilem, Laikha, Mongkung, Kehsi and Kunhing townships of central Shan state. This represents a decrease of approximately 18,000 people compared to the results of last year's survey. The main reason for this apparent decrease is the expansion of SPDC influence into the Shan State Army-North (SSA-N) ceasefire areas. This does not mean that these villagers are no longer displaced, but rather that it was no longer safe to assess displacement in areas which are now partly administered by SPDC. Indeed, following the arrest of Shan political opposition leaders and increased pressure on ceasefire groups to surrender their arms in 2005, SPDC control has strengthened and human security weakened during 2006.


In Laikha township, the surrender of a battalion commander from the armed opposition of the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) in June was a key destabilizing factor. In the past couple of years, people in relocation sites had been allowed to return to their former villages and armed conflict had subsided. However after the surrender, the deployment of Burmese Army troops into contested areas resulted in an increase in skirmishes with SSA-S and the resumption of human rights abuses committed by SPDC in retaliation against local villagers. The former SSA-S battalion commander's subsequent disappearance and apparent return to the armed opposition has further complicated local politics.

The national development initiative to cultivate castor-oil plants to produce bio-diesel as a fuel substitute has also been a widespread cause of instability. In Kunhing township alone, 8 village tracts on either side of the Paang river have had about 8 square miles of agricultural land confiscated for the cultivation of castor-oil plantations in March 2006. More than 100 acres were also confiscated in May closer to Kunhing town. The villagers could not find sufficient seedlings themselves, and so were obliged to buy the remainder from local SPDC authorities at a cost of 150 kyat per seedling. On top of losing their means of subsistence, farmers were also ordered to cultivate these plantations for at least 3 years when it is expected that the local authorities will reap the harvest.

The expansion of SPDC control has also resulted in the increased imposition of forced labour without payment upon civilians. For example, since March 2006 at least 9 village tracts have been forced by SPDC authorities to upgrade a 40 kilometer road from Laikha north towards Mongsu township. The local authorities provided a roller but villagers were ordered to pave the roads with rocks and stones and then apply the tar. Villagers in Mongsu and Kehsi have also been ordered to work on extending this road further north and the practice is widespread in other townships. Similarly, the conscription of civilians to run errands or serve as porters and guides is routine practice. Villages north of Mongkung-based Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 514 and south-east of the Kehsi-based Infantry Battalion (IB) 286 report having to provide labourers on a daily basis for errands and for half of each month to carry military supplies or guide troops on patrol. When labourers tried to escape the harsh conditions, the entire village was collectively punished with fines equivalent to 200,000 kyat per day, which is more than 100 times a daily labourers wage.⁴¹

⁴¹ Shan Human Rights Foundation, Monthly Report, September 2006.

Central Shan State



3.2 SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

Approximately 118,000 people are internally displaced in the townships of Monghsat, Mongton, Mongpan, Langkher, Mawkmai and Mongnai in southern Shan State. The vast majority of these villagers are located in ceasefire areas administered by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and Shan Nationalities Peoples' Liberation Organisation (SNPLO). The forced and unsustainable relocation of villagers from northern Shan State into the UWSA areas prior to 2002, pressure from SPDC on UWSA and SNPLO to actively fight the SSA-S since 2005, and a leadership split in the SNPLO in 2006 have all contributed to insecurity and displacement during the past year.

In Monghsat and Mongton townships there has continued to be a steady rate of migration out of the UWSA ceasefire areas due to the lack of livelihood opportunities. Independent assessments estimate that 125,000 people were forcibly relocated into these areas prior to 2002⁴², however it is estimated that over 40,000 have since migrated into Thailand or attempted to resettle elsewhere in Shan State to find work. The Burmese Army have also increased their harassment of villagers in the ceasefire areas, with 9 settlements having been forcibly relocated during the past year. The UWSA has not been able or willing to provide villagers protection either from these forced relocations or from the SPDC's counter-insurgency operations against SSA-S intruding into the ceasefire areas.

The SNPLO leadership split was triggered by ideological differences about alliances after SPDC increased pressure on them to fight against the SSA-S last year. In effect, the SNPLO leaders west of the Prawn river are now aligned with the PaO National Organisation and have stronger ties with SPDC. The SNPLO leaders east of the Prawn River in Mawkmai township have been perceived as more sympathetic with the armed opposition of SSA-S, which has led to an increase in Burmese Army surveillance. 10 villages have been forcibly relocated to Nam Lot and Kan Du Long during the past year, and in January 2006 a curfew was imposed there prohibiting villagers from staying in their fields overnight. Not only were people prohibited from returning to their villages, but land beside the road to Mawkmai was confiscated and each household ordered to plant 1,000 castor-oil palms for bio-diesel.

Plans for the proposed Tasang hydro-electric dam and power station on the Salween River are developing. A Memorandum of Agreement was signed between MDX, a Thailand-based infrastructure development firm, and the Myanmar Electric Power Enterprise in April 2006, while state-owned Sinohydro Corporation of China expressed interest in June about investing in dams along the Salween River. In practice, as more Burmese Army troops are deployed to secure the surrounding areas and roads are upgraded, the rate of logging and deforestation is increasingly threatening the local villagers' natural resource base.⁴³

Opium cultivation and the production of methamphetamines is another key cause of instability. Despite reporting a national decline in opium cultivation, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime acknowledges that production in southern Shan state has doubled since 2004.⁴⁴ The drug trade is politically expedient for the Burmese Army due to the "self reliance" policy for frontline troops' rations and the need to offer ceasefire and militia groups something in return for their submission.⁴⁵

⁴² Lahu National Development Organisation, 2002, *Unsettling Moves: The Wa Forced Resettlement Program in Eastern Shan State*

⁴³ Shan Sapawa Environmental Organisation, 2006, *Warning Signs*

⁴⁴ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2005, Myanmar Opium Survey.

⁴⁵ Shan Herald Agency for News, 2006, *Hand in Glove: The Burma Army and Drug Trade in Shan State*

3.3 KARENNI STATE AND TAUNGOO

Karenni (or Kayah) State is ruled by the SPDC's Eastern Military Command, who delegated authority in 2006 to the Regional Control Headquarter (RCH) based in Loikaw and Operational Control Headquarter (OCH) based in neighbouring Pekon. There are currently 16 SPDC battalions spread throughout Karenni state, while another 7 battalions are also patrolling the area though they are based in Shan state. These battalions generally conduct joint patrols with the ceasefire groups of Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF) and the Karenni National Solidarity Organisation (KNSO).


When there are skirmishes with the armed opposition of the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), the SPDC forces commonly retaliate against local villagers. For example, after a clash on July 29 near the Loikaw road and Pawn River in which a high ranking SPDC official was killed, civilians from 6 nearby villages were threatened with summary execution if they went to their rice fields. Similarly, each household in Shadaw relocation site was fined 3,000 kyat after a SPDC private surrendered with some weapons to KNPP. The KNPLF have also retaliated against civilians, such as the execution of a village secretary and his associate in Pruso township at the beginning of September 2006 for allegedly having contact with KNPP forces.

Restrictions on access to agricultural land continues to cause food shortages for residents of government controlled relocation sites. For example, villagers from Nwalaboe, north of Loikaw, walked for eight hours towards the Pawn river to try and cultivate rice, but SPDC patrols subsequently destroyed the fields when they passed by. Residents of Shadaw relocation site have also been restricted to fields within a 3 mile radius. There have also been reports from Demawso township's relocation sites at Hteepokloe and Dawtamagyi of curfews prohibiting farmers from sleeping at their farm huts.

One of the results of this has been that over 1,000 people from Shadaw relocation site attempted to return to their former villages during the past year. Although this was not officially permitted, local SPDC authorities allowed this movement as the villages were close to military outposts or the car road. This provided the SPDC with a more widespread source of labourers for road repairs and portering military supplies. Villagers were warned that communication with KNPP would result in forced return to the relocation site again.

Political tensions between SNPLO, SPDC and the SSA-S in southern Shan state have resulted in villagers fleeing into Shadaw township during the past year. These people reported fleeing from the conscription of soldiers, arbitrary taxation and travel restrictions imposed by several armed groups. Nearly 3,000 villagers are now hiding along the Karenni – Shan state border. When SPDC or KNPLF troops see these villagers from Shan state, they order them to stay in the unofficial villages that have recently been re-established. However, given that many former land owners have yet to return, the local villagers are reluctant to accept new arrivals.

Karenni State and Taungoo



The SPDC's national development project promoting castor-oil plantations is also affecting livelihoods in Loikaw, Demawso and Pruso townships. Villagers have been forced to work on these plantations to the extent that they do not have time to support their own families. In some cases, villages have been forced to buy seeds at higher than market rates and cultivate on their own lands while in other places lands have been confiscated by the State. For example, in August 2006 the local SPDC authorities confiscated a cemetery and other fields surrounding Loikaw town for castor-oil plantations.

The most contested part of Karenni state is along the Karen state border in Pasaung and Pruso townships where the SPDC, KNPLF and KNSO are jointly struggling for control of the Mawchi – Taungoo road. Despite the risks of detection by joint patrols searching for settlements in the surrounding forests, over 5,000 civilians remain in hiding close to their former villages on Karenni side of the border. Villagers who had fled into Karen state during 2004 and 2005 returned to hide in Karenni state during the past year. However, given KNSO's knowledge of the local terrain, people are attempting to move and stay with relatives in other areas. Some are keen to come to refugee camps in Thailand, even though it is a dangerous journey of over 100 kilometers to the border.

Across the Karen state border, over 5,000 people have been displaced in Thandaung township during the past year and over 13,000 villagers continue hiding in the forests surrounding their abandoned villages. The recent displacement resulted from the patrols coordinated amongst 13 SPDC battalions under the command of Division #66 from the Southern Command based in Taungoo. Artillery shelling and the burning of dwellings in Ho Kee village tract (near the Karenni border and south of the road to Mawchi) on 26 November 2005 marked the beginning of this latest round of military operations targeting civilians.

The SPDC patrols continued in Thanduang township during the wet season, and had killed 22 civilians by August. This military operation has primarily been targeting food stocks and crops, but also burning houses and confiscating property that villagers had abandoned. Landmines were laid along travel routes and in cultivation areas in order to prevent villagers who had fled from returning. At least 160 paddy fields, 10,000 baskets of husked paddy, 1,000 baskets of milled rice, 420 cardamom gardens, 30 betel gardens, and 150 coffee gardens have been destroyed or abandoned.

21 villages in Thandaung township were displaced during the year and more than 2,000 people have fled to the Thailand border. However, the majority of villagers remain in hiding in the forests close to their former villages. They depend on the sale of betel and cardamom to access rice supplies, but this is also becoming more difficult. Travel restrictions along the main trade route to Taungoo, as well as nation-wide inflation, have resulted in a 100% increase in the cost of rice for upland villagers hiding in Thandaung during the past year.

3.4 EASTERN PEGU DIVISION AND PAPUN

While SPDC patrols to search for civilians and destroy settlements in the Taungoo hills intensified at the end of 2005, it was not until February 2006 that the focus shifted south to Kyaukgyi, Papun and Shwegyin townships. Patrols by over 30 battalions targeted civilians and were jointly coordinated by Operation Controls #16 and 21 under SPDC's Southern Command and Operation Controls #10 and 15 under the South Eastern Command. By August, SPDC patrols had resulted in the abandonment of over 100 villages in these 3 townships. More than 22,000 civilians were either relocated to SPDC controlled areas or fled the approaching SPDC troops to hide in mountainous forests.

This was the largest military operation in this area since 1997-1999. In northern Papun township, many civilians who previously lived in Ler Mu Plaw and Saw Mu Plaw village tracts were displaced to more remote areas of Kay Pu and Na Yo Hta where they remain today. Similarly, many villagers from Phla Kho fled to the mountainous Na Yo Hta and Yeh Mu Plaw village tracts and have been depending on shifting cultivation for subsistence there ever since. Although the Burmese Army withdrew some forces from northern Papun in the late 1990's, patrols continued sporadically targeting civilian settlements and food supplies until 2003. By the beginning of 2006, villagers were confident enough to resume preparing for rice cultivation near SPDC outposts along the Kyaukgyi - SawHta road and closer to their former villages.

However, the optimism was betrayed and livelihoods again undermined when SPDC began deploying troops into northern Papun township in March 2006. During these patrols, troops repeatedly fired heavy artillery mortars into areas under cultivation where they suspected villagers were in the fields. By August, approximately 10,000 people had abandoned their rice fields and fled away from the approaching patrols to hide deeper in the forests and remote villages. Approximately 69,000 baskets of paddy were burnt or confiscated by SPDC troops or otherwise abandoned by villagers fleeing the approaching patrols. This is equivalent to the loss of a year's supply of rice for almost 4,000 people.

The vast majority of those displaced in northern Karen State and eastern Pegu Division during the past year have remained as close as possible to their ancestral lands. However, a minority have joined villagers from Thanduang township who fled to the Thailand border. Approximately 3,000 people have sought protection in Mae Ra Ma Luang refugee camp and more than 1,400 villagers are residing in temporary shelters at EeThuHta on the Burmese side of the border. However, security remains a concern for these villagers as SPDC continues to deploy troops to secure areas around proposed hydro-electric dam projects at Wegyi, Dagwin and Hatgyi along the Salween river.

Kyaukgyi township includes highlands to the east and lowlands adjacent to the Sittaung River. The highlands are contested areas where KNU's influence is strongest and civilians remain in hiding from the Burmese Army. SPDC control most of the lowland areas and in between the villagers deal with both the SPDC and KNU. An increase in the frequency of SPDC patrols searching for villagers and destroying settlements in

the highlands and the forced relocation of villages in the lowlands have been the main recent trends in this township. As a result, almost 10,000 people are estimated to have been displaced in Kyaukgyi township the past year.


SPDC patrols in Kyaukgyi's highland areas have been particularly brutal north of the Kyaukgyi - Saw Hta road and east of Mone. Between March and May, villages in lower lying mixed administration areas were prohibited from leaving their villages to prepare fields for the wet season rice crop or any other reason. These restrictions and the forced recruitment of porters were followed by the advance of SPDC patrols into the highlands. These patrols did not distinguish between the armed KNLA opposition and ordinary civilians, but rather were ordered to shoot on sight. 9 villagers were killed in separate incidents by these patrols, bringing the total number of extra-judicial killings in this area between January and May 2006 to 17 deaths.

More than 6,000 people are estimated to currently be residing in SPDC controlled relocation sites in Kyaukgyi township. Between May and June 2006 SPDC troops consolidated a further 9 villages in close proximity to military camps just south of Kyaukgyi town and west of the Sittaung river. The relocation presumably aimed to disrupt communications between the highland and lowland areas as well as to provide more security for the SPDC military camps. Villagers were not given the time nor means to transport belongings, and were prohibited from returning to their homes and fields for one month. During this time, SPDC troops stole the remaining property and destroyed the former homes. In July, SPDC began issuing day passes for travel back to former villages and fields. However without permission to sleep overnight, villagers were unable to walk to the uplands to collect forest products for sale. The relocation has thus not only uprooted households but also livelihoods, and villagers have been reduced to eating rice porridge to sustain themselves.

Over 6,000 civilians survive while hiding in the forests of Shwegyin township, despite being regularly targeted by SPDC patrols over the past few years. Families in Loe Khi and Ler Wah village tracts, north-east of Shwegyin town, abandoned over 8,000 baskets of paddy in September 2005 due to constant SPDC patrols over a 6 week period. Food security problems were exacerbated when the Burmese Army returned in February 2006 to set up two bases from which they coordinated regular patrols over the next 3 months. On this occasion a further 8,000 baskets of paddy hidden in 120 paddy barns were abandoned by villagers. The combined result was not only that a year's supply of rice was lost for over 1,000 people, but also villagers were not able to properly prepare plots to cultivate rice for the year ahead.

The resilience of villagers in hiding despite the cumulative effects of SPDC patrols over the past few years is also demonstrated by the example of communities south-east of Shwegyin town and west of the Bilin river. The village tracts of MaeYeKhee, Mae K'Tee and Plaw Kho lost over 8,000 baskets of paddy in October 2004 when they fled to the hills to avoid Burmese Army patrols. However, they regrouped and committed to continue defying the authorities' orders to relocate away from their land. However, throughout April and May 2006 over 500 SPDC troops returned to patrol the area again. For the sake of their physical security, the villagers had to flee and sacrifice over 10,000 baskets of paddy while 100 families abandoned rice fields that had been prepared for this year's wet season rice crop.

Eastern Pegu Division and Papun



3.5 NORTHERN MON AND KAREN STATES


The northern townships of Mon state and the central townships of Karen state are, politically, relatively stable. As the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the Burmese Army have expanded their control across the area in recent years, armed conflict has significantly reduced. This has resulted in a decrease of 7,000 people in the internally displaced population estimates for these townships during the past year, with approximately 18,000 people remaining primarily in DKBA administered ceasefire areas in August 2006. However, the prevalence of human rights abuses committed by both SPDC and DKBA forces continues to undermine human security.

6,000 villagers are estimated to remain hiding in the foothills on either side of the Dawna Range near the Thailand border. However, the military operations which most adversely affected civilians during the past year were conducted on either side of the Donthemi River in northern Paan and Bilin townships. During November and December 2005, DKBA's Brigade #333 ordered a curfew in the 15 villages of Ha Ta Reh village tract, supposedly to enable patrols to search for KNU soldiers in the surrounding fields and foothills. This curfew prevented villagers from harvesting their annual rice crop and resulted in the ruin of 90 paddy fields and over 150 upland rice farms. The same DKBA brigade conducted a similar operation in coordination with SPDC's Infantry Battalion #254 in Htee Maw Khi and Noh Ber Baw village tracts in May and June of 2006. Sewing the annual rice crop was disrupted by the curfew this time, while the subsequent military patrols destroyed more than 400 paddy barns storing the equivalent of a year's rice supply for 1,300 people.

In Hlaingbwe township, livelihoods continue to be undermined by forced labour, arbitrary taxes and land confiscation committed by SPDC troops. This has intensified during the past year due to the proposed development of Pyaing Kyone as a sub-township centre. Land has been confiscated by local SPDC authorities without compensation being offered to the former owners for the construction of administrative buildings. Similarly, villagers have been forced to upgrade a road linking Pyaing Kyone to Kawkareik without payment for their labour. This is on top of regular demands from SPDC army camps for nearby villagers to provide manual labour for chores. Cleaning the camp compound, carrying water from streams and wells, cutting bamboo and trees to build huts for the soldiers, constructing fences around the camp compound, guarding the gate and acting as messengers are everyday forms of forced labour that villagers are subjected to.

In Myawaddy township, the DKBA Special Battalion #999 has used the informal ceasefire period to build up military strength and consolidate control. A forced conscription campaign has comprised of each village being ordered to provide three civilians to become soldiers. Villages that do not provide any soldiers are subject to a fine of 90,000 kyat for non-compliance. Since May, 8 villages have also been ordered to provide 6 labourers each in rotation to construct a road linking Myawaddy with villages in DKBA controlled areas to the north. Civilians have also been forced to routinely carry supplies to the more remote DKBA checkpoints throughout the township.

Northern Mon and Karen States



3.6 SOUTHERN MON AND KAREN STATES

There is relatively little armed conflict in the south of Mon and Karen States, due to the New Mon State Party (NMSP) ceasefire agreement and the expansion of SPDC control respectively. Villagers are still punished by SPDC's counter insurgency operations supposedly against the KNU in Kyain Seikkgyi township and the Mon splinter groups in Ye township. However, it is the systematic abuse of human rights in government controlled and mixed administration areas that is the primary cause of vulnerability and displacement.

The Burmese Army has controlled most of southern Karen state since a major offensive in 1997 against the KNU was followed by a campaign of confiscating lands and forcibly relocating remote villages. While over 10,000 villagers fled to refuge in Thailand, the lowland agricultural terrain made it difficult for those who remained to hide from the SPDC for long.

People are no longer allowed to live in scattered villages or remote houses, but rather villages must be compact and centralized for easy control. Most of the farms are still far from settlements, but villagers are not allowed to go there for more than a few days at a time, for which they must obtain an SPDC pass. Villagers traditionally live in farm-side huts while crops are cultivated, but these travel passes are not sufficient for farmers to protect crops from wild animals and stray livestock.


During the past year, local human rights activists have conducted over 100 interviews with villagers and obtained more than 100 written orders from local SPDC authorities in Kyain Seikkgyi to document the effects of expanded militarization. The findings include forced membership of SPDC-affiliated groups; land confiscation without compensation; forced labour without payment on army farms, roads and other infrastructure; forced portering of military supplies; arbitrary taxation, outright extortion and theft; as well as direct personal violence including rape and execution.⁴⁶

In southern Mon state, the majority of internally displaced persons are dispersed across the ceasefire areas under the administration of NMSP. These are the safest place for people, with a greater degree of protection from human rights abuses. However when Burmese Army troops patrol nearby, villagers are still subject to abuses such as the forced conscription of porters and extortion of food. There has been a small population increase in the Mon ceasefire areas during the past year. New arrivals have mostly reported forced labour in mixed administration areas or restrictions on movement in conflict affected areas as the causes of displacement.

Conflict-induced displacement is primarily related to the deployment of 10 SPDC battalions in Ye Township for counter-insurgency operations against a Mon splinter group. In order to cut off support to the splinter group, the Burmese Army has applied its 'four-cuts' strategy against local civilians. Entire villages have not been forcibly relocated in this area, but the houses of alleged rebel supporters have been burnt.

⁴⁶ Karen Human Rights Group, Report 2006#4, "Setting up the Systems of Repression : The Progressive Regimentation of Civilian Life in Dooطلا District", 7 September 2006, www.khrg.org

Southern Mon and Karen States



Travel outside of villages to work on farms, plantations or fishing boats has also been restricted. Villagers who violate these orders and pursue their livelihoods are subject to summary execution, arbitrary arrest and detention, or inhumane treatment.

However, villagers also continue to be punished for unsubstantiated support to the armed opposition in areas controlled by the SPDC as well. On February 1, the Kanbauk-Myaingkalay gas pipeline exploded in a village called Kwan-hlar, in Mudon Township. Although no one claimed responsibility, and it may have simply been an electrical accident due to faulty construction, the authorities accused armed opposition groups of plotting the explosion. Village leaders accused of cooperating with the “rebels” were detained without trial for three months at the Southeast Command headquarters in Moulmein. The 4 surrounding villages were also blamed, and have since been ordered to build a fence and provide nearly 100 security guards along the pipeline night and day. Local households were also ordered to pay up to 300,000 kyat each in compensation to the local authorities. Troops of the Burmese Army also restricted the movement of farmers who were working near and along gas pipeline. This climate of intimidation has led many villagers to fear for their safety, and some to flee.⁴⁷

Like in many areas of Burma, the local SPDC authorities have forced the people in most townships of Mon state to grow castor oil plants with the objective of producing bio-diesel as an alternative source of fuel. Individual households have been ordered to plant at least 10 of these palms in their home gardens. Some farmers have had lands confiscated, only to then be ordered to begin cultivating new plantations of castor oil plants on their former lands.

Insufficient food rations for SPDC soldiers are another reason that land continues to be confiscated by the Burmese Army in Mon state. For example, around 200 acres was recently confiscated from Mon farmers in order to support a Burmese Army Training School near the Thanbyuzayat-Ye junction with the road to Three Pagodas Pass. Similarly, SPDC battalions in Ye Township continued to confiscate land from the civilians for the “self reliance” of their own soldiers.

In order to control the southern part of Ye Township, the Burmese Army has established a sub-township administration center in a Mon village called Khaw-zar. This has resulted in SPDC authorities forcing villagers in the area to build, without payment, administrative offices and a 20 kilometer long road to Ye. The authorities and army commanders also pressured teachers in the area to cease teaching Mon language in Mon National Schools. In effect, the sub-township is another form of Burmanisation.

⁴⁷ Human Rights Foundation of Monland, *The Mon Forum*, Issue No. 2, 2006.

3.7 NORTHERN TENASSERIM DIVISION


The current situation in Yebyu, Tavoy and Thayetchaung townships in northern Tenasserim Division is symptomatic of the flux caused in the mid 1990's. That was when investment interests in the Yadana gas pipeline pressured the NMSP into a ceasefire agreement, but the lack of a political settlement has subsequently led to various frustrated groups splintering away from NMSP. Then in 1997, the Burmese Army launched a major offensive to occupy areas previously controlled by the KNU. The civilian population was targeted for eviction from their homes and forcibly relocated to areas under Burmese Army control. Tens of thousands of villagers either fled for refuge in Thailand or to hide in the forests surrounding their land. In August 2006, approximately 32,000 internally displaced people were located in these townships, representing a slight increase compared to last year. The vast majority of these villagers are residing in government controlled relocation sites and consolidated villages, although over 5,000 people are in the NMSP ceasefire area and more than 1,000 villagers are hiding from the Burmese Army.

The Mon splinter group has less than a hundred members, but they continue threatening and ambushing both military and civilian transportation along the Ye-Tavoy road in northern Yebyu township. Although the splinter group does not appear to have a political agenda, and can not claim much grassroots support, its activities provide a pretext for the Burmese Army to conduct counter-insurgency patrols in this area. Two villages were forcibly relocated by the Burmese Army due to suspicions that the villagers had assisted the splinter group. A number of village leaders have fled to the ceasefire areas out of fear that they would be accused of supporting the splinter group, arbitrarily arrested or cruelly punished. Other villagers have had travel restrictions imposed to supposedly isolate the splinter group for SPDC patrols to capture.


Even civilians who have obeyed orders to relocate or consolidate into larger villages under SPDC control are subject to restrictions on movement. For example, PataukGyi relocation site was established on the Tavoy – Mergui road south of Thayetchaung in 1998 and currently has over 1,000 residents. While movement was initially tightly restricted, in 2002 the Burmese Army introduced short term travel permits allowing villagers to return to farm their betel nut gardens and rice fields. However in October 2005, the township chairman issued an order prohibiting villagers in PataukGyi from leaving the relocation site for 3 months. This was presumably in retaliation against KNU for skirmishes in August and September, however by targeting civilians the order resulted in the inability to harvest the annual rice and betel crops before they were ruined by pests.

These townships have also been affected by development-induced displacement and land confiscation in particular. Under the orders of SPDC's Coastal Military Command, thousands of acres in Tenasserim Division have been confiscated without providing any compensation to the landowners. This has primarily been to the benefit of joint ventures with private investors in palm oil and rubber tree plantations. The consequences of these projects are not only detrimental for local livelihoods in the short term, but also in regards to deforestation and biodiversity in the longer term. The expansion of Tavoy's domestic airport has also resulted in the confiscation of agricultural land during the past year.

Northern Tenasserim Division



Southern Tenasserim Division



3.8 SOUTHERN TENASSERIM DIVISION

The combined scale of displacement remains greater in the southern townships of Palaw, Mergui, Tenasserim and Bokpyin than in northern Tenasserim Division. Over 57,000 villagers are estimated to be internally displaced, primarily in government controlled relocation sites primarily along the main roads north of Tenasserim town and on the banks of the Tenasserim river. However, there also remain over 4,000 villagers hiding in remote areas who are constantly subject to counter insurgency operations attempting to isolate the KNU from its constituents.

The proximity of villagers in relocation sites to SPDC authorities constantly subjects them to the imposition of human rights abuses, and in particular forced labour, arbitrary taxes and travel restrictions. Forced labour is most commonly associated with road construction, the transport of military supplies and for general maintenance tasks in SPDC military camps. However, even the promotion of education in relocation sites is conditional upon villagers providing the labour free of charge. The SPDC has either not provided funds for the construction of schools, or those funds have diverted for personal profit by local authorities.

Villagers in both relocation sites and hiding sites are subject to summary execution if they are suspected of having contact with the KNU. 3 residents of Kamawla relocation site, which is located east of Palaw town, were executed in October 2005 due merely to the suspicions of soldiers from SPDC's LIB #409. Just a couple of months earlier in a nearby hiding site, troops from LIB #410 had deliberately killed 11 other civilians.

The vulnerability of civilians in hiding deteriorated in June 2006 when the new Coastal Regional Commander instructed his troops in Palaw, Tenasserim and Bokpyin townships to intensify "search and destroy" operations against the KNU and its supporters. After almost a decade of survival in hiding, the increased frequency of SPDC attacks and the lack of distinction made between soldiers and civilians is beginning to exhaust the coping strategies of villagers.

For example, east of Bokpyin in the Narkapraw area, over 300 villagers are scattered in forests surrounding a KNLA battalion headquarters. In November 2005, the Burmese Army's LIB 342 was deployed into Narkapraw and destroyed the houses and food supplies that were found. Villagers fled prior the arrival of SPDC troops, but had to abandon their rice fields at precisely the time when crops were ready for harvesting. By the time villagers had returned, a large proportion of the crops were destroyed by wild animals or otherwise ruined. Again in April 2006, joint patrols of soldiers from LIB 555, 560, 559, and 342 deployed into the area frightened farmers away from preparing their hill-side plots for the wet season rice crop. This was followed in August when the Burmese Army patrols laid approximately 1,000 landmines near rice fields to intimidate villagers against returning again. Although the KNLA battalion was never seriously attacked, the villagers were targeted three times and some have since fled to the Thailand border for refuge. The situation is similar in MaNoeRoe area, just south of Tenasserim town.


Shelter in Mon ceasefire areas, April 2006 (TBBC)

Appendices

APPENDIX 1 : SUMMARY OF VULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION SURVEYS

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document the characteristics of internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2002. This has included a vulnerability assessment in 2004⁴⁸ and a protection survey in 2005.⁴⁹ Both surveys were conducted with over 1,000 households spread between hiding sites, ethnic ceasefire areas, SPDC relocation sites and mixed administration areas, as well as key informants in at least 36 townships. The protection survey also consulted non-state actors and humanitarian agencies based in Rangoon. Selected indicators are reproduced below and reflect a critical state of vulnerability to livelihood shocks and stresses as well as violence, abuse and conflict.


Livelihoods in hiding areas are demonstrated as largely dependent on subsistence-oriented slash and burn agriculture, yet still they are undermined by government patrols searching for and destroying crops. Conversely, less households were documented in relocation sites than elsewhere as being involved in any type of rice farming, indicating a lack of access to land and greater restrictions on movement. Yet the highest rates of hunting and gathering were documented in densely populated ceasefire areas, which is indicative of the livelihood constraints of resettlement into these areas.




⁴⁸ TBBC, 2004, Internal Displacement and Vulnerability in Eastern Burma, www.tbtc.org/resources


⁴⁹ TBBC, 2005, Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern Burma, www.tbtc.org/resources

The indicators suggest there is a public health emergency amongst internally displaced persons in eastern Burma. A third of households surveyed had not been able to access any health services during the past year, contributing to high mortality rates from infectious diseases which can be prevented and treated, such as malaria. Child mortality and malnutrition rates are more than double the national baseline rate and comparable to those recorded amongst internally displaced populations in Africa.




In terms of abuse and insecurity, despite the severity of threats to lives, the prevalence of threats to livelihoods is on a much greater scale. Arbitrary taxation and forced labour were the most pervasive human rights abuses recorded, with a third of households directly affected during the past year. The proportion of households affected by arbitrary taxes and forced labour was highest in government relocation sites. In contrast, the destruction of food supplies and housing was more prevalent amongst people hiding in the most militarily contested areas. These indicators reflect how soldiers from the Burma Army are the primary perpetrators of abuse and violence directed at civilians.






Although unable to stop or prevent violence and abuse, internally displaced and conflict-affected villagers have developed a range of coping strategies to resist threats and mitigate the worst consequences. The surveys found that other civilians are the main source of early warning signals about approaching troop movements. This represents the protective value of social capital within and between local communities. However, villagers also reported being ten times more likely to receive warnings of troop movements from opposition forces than government authorities. This indicates that the government is generally unable or unwilling to support local coping strategies nor protect civilians from harm.



In terms of engaging the humanitarian responsibility to protect civilians, non-state actors acknowledged that the use of landmines was their main transgression and that their protective capacities are limited. In areas of ongoing armed conflict, the short term protection objectives of non-state actors are limited to deterring and delaying SPDC patrols, using radio communication to provide warnings to villagers, and securing access for local humanitarian agencies to provide relief aid. In ceasefire areas, non state actors may be able to offer more protection but there is a trade off with sustainable livelihoods as access to fertile land is limited.



Humanitarian agencies based in Rangoon have managed to expand their access significantly during the past decade. However, United Nations agencies reported that since the purge of the former Prime Minister and his allies in October 2004, humanitarian agencies in Burma have either been disregarded or viewed with suspicion by the government. Experience in northern Rakhine state also suggests that increased access does not necessarily lead to an expansion of humanitarian space unless national authorities are willing to engage in policy level dialogue about protection issues.

APPENDIX 2 : 2006 QUESTIONNAIRE

Township name :

Key informants :

.....
.....
.....
.....

1. How many villages have been completely destroyed, relocated or abandoned since last year's dry season? Where were these villages?
(Please indicate for each area on the table and map provided)
2. How many households have fled or been forced to leave their homes and moved elsewhere due to war or human rights abuses since last year's dry season?
(Please indicate for each area on the table provided)
3. How many previously displaced villages have been re-established to at least half of the population size since last year's dry season? Where are these villages?
(Please indicate for each area on the table and map provided)
4. How many households which were previously displaced have been able to return or resettle in this area since the end of last year's dry season?
(Please indicate for each area on the table provided)
5. How many SPDC "relocation sites" (including consolidated villages) currently remain populated by force? Where are these relocation sites?
(Please indicate for each area on the table and map provided)
6. How many households are currently obliged to live in SPDC relocation sites (including consolidated villages)?
(Please indicate for each area on the table provided)
7. Where are any "hiding areas" in which people conceal themselves from SPDC patrols, including opposition controlled areas?
(Please indicate on the map provided)
8. How many households currently hide from, or do not show themselves to, SPDC patrols?
(Please indicate for each area on the table provided)
9. Where are any special regions or "ceasefire areas" in which the ethnic nationality authorities have limited autonomy and guarantees against SPDC attack?
(Please indicate on the map provided)
10. How many households currently live in ethnic "ceasefire areas"?
(Please indicate for each area on the table provided)
11. Where are development projects (eg road construction, agricultural plantations, mining, logging, dam construction, gas pipelines) which have caused human rights abuses during the past year?
(Please indicate the location, project type and human rights abuse on the map)
12. Where are current locations of SPDC outposts, battalion headquarters, Light Infantry Divisions (LID), Operational Control Headquarters (OCH) and Regional Commands?
(Please indicate the location and type of army camp on the map provided)

APPENDIX 3 : INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION SURVEY BY TOWNSHIP

States, Divisions and Townships	Newly Displaced civilians (2005-06)	IDPs in hiding sites (2006)	IDPs in Relocation Sites (2006)	IDPs in Ceasefire Areas (2006)	Total IDPs (2006)
SHAN STATE	16,200	13,300	31,300	131,000	175,600
Mawkami	2,000	1,300	2,000	2,500	5,800
Mong Kurng	1,200	1,300	3,000	300	4,600
Laikha	200	1,200	2,000	3,100	6,300
Loilem	1,500	1,200	1,500	800	3,500
Nam Zarng	1,500	1,500	3,000	2,500	7,000
Kun Hing	2,800	2,000	3,600	13,000	18,600
Mong Hsat	900	1,000	2,000	42,000	45,000
Mong Ton	3,000	1,300	6,600	35,000	42,900
Mong Pan	1,100	1,000	2,000	1,800	4,800
Kehsi	n/a	n/a	n/a	18,500	18,500
Langkher	n/a	n/a	n/a	7,500	7,500
Mong Nai	2,000	1,500	5,600	4,000	11,100
KARENNI STATE	7,400	9,300	6,400	63,600	79,300
Shadaw	2,100	2,900	1,500	0	4,400
Loikaw	0	0	1,900	9,000	10,900
Demawso	0	0	1,300	36,600	37,900
Pruso	800	1,400	0	7,200	8,600
Bawlake	0	0	1,000	0	1,000
Pasaung	4,500	5,000	700	1,500	7,200
Mehset	0	0	0	9,300	9,300
PEGU DIVISION	13,400	17,400	6,400	0	23,800
Tantabin	1,200	1,200	0	0	1,200
Kyaukgyi	9,900	10,200	6,400	0	16,600
Shwegyin	2,300	6,000	0	0	6,000
KAREN STATE	30,100	49,100	4,300	45,900	99,300
Thandaung	5,200	14,500	0	0	14,500
Papun	10,000	24,000	0	0	24,000
Hlaing Bwe	2,100	2,100	0	5,300	7,400
Myawaddy	3,800	3,800	0	6,700	10,500
Kawkareik	600	600	0	0	1,500
Kyain Seikgyi	8,400	4,100	4,300	33,000	41,400
MON STATE	1,100	300	500	41,000	41,800
Thaton	0	0	0	0	0
Bilin	0	0	0	0	0
Ye	1,100	300	500	41,000	41,800
TENASSERIM DIV.	13,800	5,600	69,100	5,500	80,200
Yebyu	500	500	5,400	5,500	11,400
Tavoy	4,800	800	13,600	0	14,400
Thayetchaung	100	0	6,200	0	6,200
Palaw	1,000	1,400	14,800	0	16,200
Mergui	0	0	5,900	0	5,900
Tenasserim	7,000	2,100	18,800	0	20,900
Bokpyin	400	800	4,400	0	5,200
TOTALS	82,000	95,000	118,000	287,000	500,000

APPENDIX 4 : DESTROYED, RELOCATED OR ABANDONED VILLAGES (2005-2006)

Shan State		ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်	
Kunhing Township	ကွန်ဟိန်းမြို့နယ်	Mawmai Township	မောက်မယ်မြို့နယ်
Kunhing Township	ကွန်ဂေါဝီး	Kan Du Long	ကန်တူးလုံ
Bang Wat	ဘန်းဝပ်	Daw Sar Lar	ဒေါ်စာလား
Wan Khai	ဝန်ခိုင်	Daw TaLay	ဒေါ်တလေး
Hwe Aw	ဟွေအော	Daw Keelay	ဒေါ်ခီးလေး
Wan Bartep	ဝန်ဘာတက်	Wan Lok vay	ဝမ်လူဝေး
Wan Mai	ဝန်မိုင်	Nong Yasai	နောင်ယာစိုင်း
Nam Mein	နမ်မိန်း	Hwe Kit	ဟွေခီ
Mai Selee	မိုင်စလီး	Bang Mark Mu	ဘန်မာ့မူ
Bar Mo	ဘားမူ	Wan Par Lom	ဝန်ပါလွန်း(မ်)
Nar Nong	နားနောင်	Nar Mark Keng	နမ်မာ့ကင်
Wan Jong	ဝမ်ကျော		
Mong Hsat Township	မိုင်းဆတ်မြို့နယ်	Mong Ton Township	မိုင်းတုံမြို့နယ်
Pa To	ပါတူး		
Sib Lak	စိ(ပ်)လာ	Wan Loi Nawk	ဝမ်လွိုင်နော့
Sang Kang	စင်ခန်း	Wan Bar Nim	ဝမ်ဘာန့်မ်
Yao Ba Luang	ယောင်းဘလွန်	Sar Hanar	ဆာဟာနား
Mae Ko Nue	မဲ့ကိုနူး	Wan Bar Voo	ဝမ်ဘာဂူး
Mong Pan Township	မိုင်းပွန်မြို့နယ်		
Bong Jan	ဘောကျန်		
Tong Ju	တုံးကျူ		
Nong Yong	နောင်ယော(င)		
Karenni State		ကရင်နီပြည်နယ်	
Pruso Township	ဖရူဆိုမြို့နယ်		
Wewa	ဝီဝေါ		
Hpahpo	ဖါးဖိုး		

Pegu Division

ပဲခူးတိုင်း

Shwegyin Township

Ta Kay Der	ရွှေကျင်မြို့နယ်
Hsaw Oh Hta	တာကေးဒဲ
Khaw Khee	ဆောအိုထာ
Hsaw Aw Khee	ခေါစီး
Htee Blah	ဆောအော့ခီး
Mae Ye Khee	ထီးဘလား
Kho Poe Khee	မယ်ရယ်ခီး
To Khee	ဟိုဖိုးခီး
Baw Pau Khee	တိုခီး
	ဘောပေါခီး

Plawh Hta

Mae Teh

Ler Ka

Mae K'Tee

ဖလော့ထာ

မယ်တဲ

လယ်ကု

မယ်ကတီ

Tantabin Township

Wah Khee	ထန်းတပင်မြို့နယ်
Nwa Lo	ဝါးခီး
Htee Lo	နှားလို
Pae Taw Day	ထီးလို
K' Ser Doh	ပယ်တောဒေး
	ကစယ်ဒို

Kyaukgyi Township

Tha Pyi Nyo	ကျောက်ကြီးမြို့နယ်
Maw Keh Tha Per Kho	သပြေညွန့်
Ter Kweh Lay Kho	မောက်သာဘာခို
Saw Tay Der	တယ်ကွယ်လေးခို
Thet Baw Der	စော်တေးဒဲ
Yu Lo	သက်ဘောဒဲ
K' Mu Lo	ယူလို
Plah Khee	ကမူလို
Kheh Pho Der	ဘလားခီး
To Poe Khee	ခဲပို့ဒဲ
Kyauk Pya	ထိုဖိုးခီး
Nyah Mu Khee	ကျောက်ဖျာ
Saw Kher	ညာမူခီး
K' Pa Hta	စော်ခယ်
K' Waw Kho	ကပါထာ
Play Khee	ကဝေါခို
Yaw Khee	ဖလေးခီး
Tae Na Hta	ယော်ခီး
Play Pa	တယ်နာထာ
Ler Wah Lu	ဖလေးပါ
Gay Blay Hta	လယ်ဝါးလူ
Htee Htaw Khee	ဂေပလေးထာ
Ta Mu Khee	ထီးထောခီး
Nyegh Hta	တာမူခီး
Ler Htaw Der	နှယ်ထာ
Saw Khee	လယ်ထောဒဲ
Ler Klah	စော်ခီး
Ler Wah	လယ်ကလား
	လယ်ဝါး

Per Poe Khee

Mae Kho

Wa Kay Der

Ler Hsu Kho

Maw Lu Kho

Mi Y' Hta

Htee Kho

Ta Kaw Pu

Htaw Aw Pay Der

Klaw Khee

Thay Nyeh Khee

Saw Kah Der

Ma Taw Ku

Htaw Lu Kho

Thu K' Bee

Noh Poe

P' Na Ner

Hi Poe Der

Hteh Htu

Ma Ma Ya Uper

Taw Kho

Pa T' La

Wae La Daw Uper

P' Aw Taw

Ma Ma Ya Lower

Wae La Daw Lower

P' Ya Hser Der

K' Dee Mu Der

ပယ်ဖိုးခီး

မယ်ခို

ဝါကေးဒဲ

လယ်ဆူခို

မောလူခို

မီးရထား

ထီးဟို

တကော်ပူ

ထော်အော့ဖေးဒဲ

ကလောခီး

သေ့နှယ်ခီး

စော်ခဲ

မာတောခူ

ထောလူခို

သူးကဘီး

နို့ဖိုး

ပနာနယ်

ဟိုဖိုးဒဲ

ထိုက်ထူ

အထက်မမရ

တောခို

ပတ္တလား

အထက်ဝယ်လာဒေါ

ပအောတော

အောက်မမရ

အောက်ဝယ်လာဒေါ

ပယာဆဲဒဲ

ကဒီးမူဒဲ

Karen State

ကရင်ပြည်နယ်

Myawaddy Township

Mehkane'pokee
keh law Ma kee
Mehkane'pota
Kaw kau klo
Kaw Kau kee
Thay Ko kyí Kee
Nya Htee Kee
Maw Wa Mae'
Belér Do Kee
Megalapooklo
Paw Naw Pu
Klerlawsei
Paw Bu La Hta
Kalawgaw
Nyaplakee
Ta Ler Si

မြဝတီမြို့နယ်

မယ့်ကန့်ဖိုးချောင်းဖျား
ခယ်လော်မာဒီး
မယ့်ကန့်ဖိုးချောင်း
ကော်ခေါ်ချောင်း
ကော်ခေါ်ချောင်းဖျား
သေကုံးကျီးဒီး
ညာထီးဒီး
မော်ဝမေး
ဘယ်လယ်ဒိုဒီး
မယ်ကလဖိုးချောင်း
ဖေါနောပ
ခလယ်လော်ဆယ
ဖေါဘုလထ
ကလော်ဝေါ
ညာပလာဒီး
တလယ်စီ

Papun Township

Hso Per Kho
T' May Khee
Thay thu Khee
Kay Pu
Bo Na Der
Htaw Khu Mu Der
HteeHsih Baw
Htee Bway Khee
Thaw Tu Khee
Hser Hti
Thet Hsa Khee
Htee Kheh Khee
Pu Kler Der
T' Yu Plaw
T' Yu Khee
Na Yo Hta
Per Kho
Kaw Raw Baw Hta
Paw Khaw Plaw
Ma Nyeg
Bler Gaw
Htee Baw Khee
Htee Mu Khee

ပါးပွန်မြို့နယ်

ရှိုးပယ်ခို
တမိဒီး
သေသူးဒီး
ခေးပူ
ဘိုနာဒဲ
တောခူမူဒဲ
ထီးဆီဘော
ထီးဘွေးဒီး
သောတူဒီး
ဆဲထီ
သယ်ဆာဒီး
ထီးခယ်ဒီး
ပူကလယ်ဒဲ
တယူပလော
တယူဒီး
နာယိုတာ
ပါခို
ကလောဘောဒီး
ဘောခေါပလော
မာညေး
ဘလယ်ဝေါ
ထီးဘောဒီး
ထီးမူဒီး

Kyain Seikgyi Township

Maw
Mawtaku
Thay Kau Pau Po kee
Noe Maw Pu
Yaw Tarae
Noe Klo Tic
Na Thee Kloe
Htiponwe
Htipomaw
Paretkhi
Mawtara
Laywakha
Htilawbler
Tarickee
Htikapa
Htikapakee
Htithablu
Htodonet

ကာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးမြို့နယ်

မော်
မော်တက
သေကျော်ပေါ်ဖိုးဒီး
နိုမောပ
ယောတရဲ
နိုခလိုတ
နားထီးကလိုး
ထီးဖိုးနွယ်
ထီးဖိုးမော်
ပရယ်ဒီး
မော်တရာ
လျိုင်ဝခ
ထီးလော ဘလဲ
တရီထီဒီး
ထီးကာပါး
ထီးကာပါးဒီး
ထီးသဘလ
ထိုဒိုန

Ta Baw Kaw Der

Saw Ker Der
Taw Baw Der
Saw Mu Lay Der
Plah Kho Doh
Paw Mu Der
Maw Law
Ta Meh Der
Ta Paw Der
Hti Thu Der
Ku Day
Thay Baw
Saw Ai Der
Plah Kho
Baw Lo Der
Kaw Wae Der
Ber Khaw
Thay Kho Mu Der
Lay Gaw
Ku Khaw Mu Der
T' Gay Gaw Der
Lay Poe Khaw Hti
Hu Khee Der
Ler Wah Kho Der

တာဘောခေါဒဲ

စော်ကယ်ဒဲ
တောဘောဒဲ
စော်မူလေးဒဲ
ဖလာခိုဒို
ပေါမူဒဲ
မောလော
တာမဲဒဲ
တာဖေါဒဲ
တီသူဒဲ
ကူဒေး
သေဘော
စော်ဒီဒဲ
ဖလာခို
ဘောလို့ဒဲ
ကော်ဝဲဒဲ
ဘယ်ခေါ
သေခိုမူဒဲ
လေးဝေါ
ကုခေါမူဒဲ
တလေဝေါ
လေးဖိုးခေါထီ ဒဲ
ဟိုဒီးဒဲ
လယ်ဝါးခိုဒဲ

Thandaung Township	သံတောင့်မြို့နယ်
Pa Wae	ဖာဝဲ
Pa Der Kha	ဖာဒဲခါ
Kaw Mi Kho	ခေါမိခို
Thay Ya Yu	သေယာယူ
Dee Dah Kho	ဒီဒါခို
Klay Soe Khee	ကလေးစိုးခီး
Kaw Thay Der	ကော်သေးဒဲ
Hi Daw Khaw	ဟီဒေါ်ခေါ်
Klay Khee	ကလေးခီး
Bu Khee	ဘူခီး
Klaw Mi Der	ကလောမိဒဲ
Ler Klah Der	လယ်ကလားဒဲ
Kheh Der	ခဲဒဲ
Hu Mu Der	ဟူးမူးဒဲ
Khaw Poe Lo	ခေါဖိုးလို
Mwee Lo	မ္မိလို
Ta Pa Khee	တပါခီး
Plaw Baw Der	ပလောဘောဒဲ
Yer Lo	ယယ်လို
Paw Pa	ဖေါပါ
Lay Ho Lo	လေးဟိုလို

Kawkareik Township	ကော့ကရိတ်မြို့နယ်
Mepalankee	မယ့်ပလက်ချောင်းဖျား
Lamphakee	လမ်းဖန်းချောင်းဖျား
Kawkareikke	ကော့ကရိတ်ချောင်းဖျား

Hlaingbwe Township	လှိုင်းဘွဲ့နယ်
Hto thukhi	ထိုသူးခီး
Mepakwakhi	မဲ့ပလယ်ဝါးခီး
Thaybawsu	သေဘော်စူး
Daylawpya	ဒေးလောဖျာ
Htiwakale	ထီးဝါကလေ
Waklupu	ဝါကလူပ
Hpaklu	ဖါးကလူး
Thaynyaeh	သေညာအူ
Methaponhta	မဲ့သဖိုးထာ
Hteebawday	ထီးဘော့ဒေး
Kwithawkheh	ကွီးသောခယ
Thaygawpoekhi	သေဝေါဖိုးကွီး
Kwilawplaw	ကွီးလောပလော
Talarhta	တလာထာ

Tenasserim Division

တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း

Yebyu Township	ရေဖြူမြို့နယ်
Ma-round-jound	မဲရောင်ကျောင်
Kapole	ကင်မွန်း

Palaw Township	ပုလောမြို့နယ်
Themeinke	သမိန်ခီး

Tenasserim Township	တနင်္သာရီမြို့နယ်
Hteepoelay	ထီးဖိုးလေး

APPENDIX 5 : RELOCATION SITES (2006)

Shan State		ရှမ်းပြည်နယ်	
Mong Ton Township MaeKen Nakawngmu Poongpakham	မိုင်းတုံမြို့နယ် မဲ့ကယ်(န်) နားကော(င)ပူ ပူး(င)ပါခမ်း	Mong Hsat Township Mae Nim Pa Wo Luang Wo Chin	မိုင်းဆတ်မြို့နယ် မဲ့နင်း(မ်) ပါဝူးလွန်(င) ဝူချင်း
Mong Pan Township Nong Bar Mon Nar Low Ho Phay Mork Sam	မိုင်းပန်မြို့နယ် နောင်ဘားမွန်း နားလိုး ဟိုဖေးမော့(က်)စမ်	Nam Zarng Township Wan Nong Hai Park Hai Neng	နမ့်ဆန်မြို့နယ် ဝန်နော်(င) ဟိုင်းပါ ဟိုင်းနယ်(င)
Laikha Township Wan Sarng Sa Lai Kum Wan Kart	လင်းခေးမြို့နယ် ဝမ်ဆန်း ဆာလှိုင်းခွမ်း မ်ကတ်	Loilem Township Nong Leng	လွိုင်လင်မြို့နယ် နော်(င)လင်
Mong Kurng Township Bang Kae Tu Ham Ngai	မိုင်းကွန်မြို့နယ် ဘန်ကေးတူ ဟမ်ငိုင်း	Kunhing Township Kar Lee Nam Mor Ngern Keng Lom	ကွန်ဟိန်းမြို့နယ် ကာလီး နမ်းမိုင်း ကင်လုံ
Mong Nai Township Nar Kharm Ton Hoong	မိုးနဲမြို့နယ် နမ့်ခမ်း တော်ဟုံး	Mawkmai Township Kan Du Long Nam Lot	မောက်မယ်မြို့နယ် ကန်တူးလုံ နမ်းလော့
Karenni State		ကရင်နီပြည်နယ်	
Loikaw Township Daw Htar Hay Wan Khing Nwalaboe Par Loung	လွိုင်ကော်မြို့နယ် ဒေါ်တဟေး ဝမ်ခိုင်း နွားလာဘိုး ပါလောင်း	Bawlake Township Nam Phe Bawlake Ywathit	ဘောလခဲမြို့နယ် နန်းဖ ဘောလာ ရွာသစ်
Shadaw Township Dawledu Shadaw	ရှားတောမြို့နယ် ဒေါ်လဲဒ ရှားတော	Pasaung Township Kahmapyu Mawchi	ပါဆောင်းမြို့နယ် ခဲမဖြူ မော်ချီး
Demawso Township Hteepokloe Dawtamagyi	ဒီမောဆိုမြို့နယ် ထီးဖိုးကလိုး ဒေါ်တမကြီး		

Pegu Division

ပဲခူးတိုင်း

Kyaukgyi Township ကျောက်ကြီးမြို့နယ်
Tha Pyi Nyu သပြေနု
Htah Htu ထာထူး

Karen State

ကရင်ပြည်နယ်

Kyain Seikgyi Township ကာအင်းဆိပ်ကြီးမြို့နယ်
Shwedo ရွှေတို
Tihuthan တိဟုထံ

Mon State

မွန်ပြည်နယ်

Ye Township ရေးမြို့နယ်
Khaw-za ကောဇာ

Tenasserim Division

တနင်္သာရီတိုင်း

Tavoy Township ထားဝယ် မြို့နယ်
Seinpyon ဆိတ်ဖြိုး
Myekhanbaw မြင်းခံဘော်
Nyaungdon သောင်တုန်း
Nantayok နန်းပရုပ်
Thebyuchaungpya သပြေချောင်းဖျား
Pyinthadaw ပျဉ်းသားတော
Myitta မေတ္တာ
Train Station (B) ဘူဒါရုံ
Heinda ဟိန္ဒဝေး

Kyaikpelaung
Paungdaw
Kazwinchaung
Pyathachaung
Sinswenchaungwa
Maungmatu
Thebyuchaung
Kataungni
Kyaukton
Taungthonlone

ကျက်ဖီးလောင်း
ဖေါင်းတော
ဟင်းကပင်
ပျားသားချောင်း
ဆင်စွယ်ချောင်းဝ
မောင်မထူး
သပြေချောင်း
ကထောင်းနီ
ကျောက်ထုံး
တောင်သုံးလုံး

Yebyu Township ရေဖြူမြို့နယ်
61 Mile ၆၁ မိုင်
62 Mile ၆၂ မိုင်
Lotsine လော့ဆိုင်
Laukthein လောက်သိုင်း
Yabu ယားပူး
60 mile ၆၀ မိုင်
Eindayaza အိန္ဒရာဇာ
Zinba ဇင်းဘာ
Yebyu ရေဖြူ
Shintabi ရှင်တမီ
Migyaunglaung မိကျောင်းလောင်း

Thayetchaung Township
Shitchaung
Thinbonchaung
Patauk Gyi
Padaukngae
Pe
Malagachaung
Aingma
Lenpyingyi
Kyauktakwa

သရက်ချောင်း မြို့နယ်
ဆိပ်ချောင်း
သင်ပုန်းချောင်း
ပိတောက်ကြီး
ပိတောက်ငယ်
ပဲဒက်
မာလကာချောင်း
အင်းမ
လယ်ပြင်ကြီး
ကျောက်တခွက

Palaw Township

Aingmakyi
Bayektaung
Madaung
Wazwinoak
Kyauklonkyi
Kataungni
Pyicha
Myitchinsut
Taminmasan
Sarpyi
Paw
Pettaut
Bankadaw

ပုလောမြို့နယ်
အင်းမကြီး
ဘရင့်တောင်
မဒေါ
ဝါးစွမ်းအုပ်
ကျောက်လုံးကြီး
ကထောင်းနီ
ပြည်ခြား
မြစ်ချည်စု
ထမင်းမစား
စန်ပြင်
ဖေါ
ပွဲထောင်း
ဘန်းကတို

Shandot
Minwin
Kyauklake
Migyaungthaik
Yinshan
Kamawla
Duyinbinshaung
Gyini
Zadiwin
Kabya
Pawut
Kawblen
Letpanbyin
Tapo

ရှန်းဒွတ်
မင်းဝင်း
ကျောက်လိပ်
မိကျောင်းသိုက်
ရေရှား
ခမောင်းလှ
ဦးရင်းပင်ရှောင်
ဂျင်းနီ
ဇာဒီဝင်း
ကပလာ
ပဝတ်
ခေါ်ပလယ်
လက်ပံပြင်
တပို

Mergui Township

Papyin
Bok
Yazapa
Banmade
Kaungki
Winnetchaungpya
Kyetmaoh
Wunehchaung
Alechaung
Pathwi
Tanyat
Mazaw
Thagan

မြိတ်မြို့နယ်
ပပြင်
ဘုတ်
ယာတပါ
ဘော်မသီ
ကော်ခီး
ဝါးနက်ချောင်းဖျား
ကြက်မအုပ်
ဝါးနက်ချောင်း
အလယ်ချောင်း
ပသွီး
တညုတ်
မဇော
သကန်

Bokpyin Township

HteenyaU
Sanyingon
Kenchauung
Kyachauung
Lanphonnga
Nattaung
Kanbaut
Heinlai
Yo Daung
Chaungmon
Sadein
Taunggne
Kawkanin

ဘုတ်ပြင်း မြို့နယ်
ထီးညါအူ
စံရင်ကုန်း
ခဲချင်း
ကျားချောင်း
လားဖူးဝန်
နန်းတောင်
ကော့ဘော့
ဟဲလဲ
ရုံးတော်
ချောင်းမွန်
စတန်
တောင်ငယ်
ကောကနင်း

Tennassarim Township

Nathamee
ThebawU
Sarawa
Sinmagyon
Pagwin
Shautgon
Kyauklongyi
Sanpe
Kinnigyon
Tamu
Konthaya
Pawut
Kawet
Tharabwechaungpy
Pyindaung
Peinchaung
Kyauktaung
Talainda
Tharabwe
Yinkanchaung

တနင်္သာရီမြို့နယ်
နတ်သမီး
သဘောဦး
စရပ်
ပထူးကျွန်း
ဖါးကွင်း
ရှောက်ကုန်း
ကျောက်လုံးကြီး
စံပဲ
ကင်းနီကုန်း
တပ်မှူး
ကုန်းသာယာ
ပဝတ်
ကဲ
သရဘွင်ချောင်းဖျား
ပျဉ်းတော
ပိန်းချောင်း
ကျောက်တောင်
တလိုင်းဒတ်
သရဘွင်
ရေခမ်းချောင်း

Tonbyawkyi
Ngayanin
Ananchaung
Dogyo
Thagyettaungbein
Thagyetkaleak
Kanankwin
Taungma
Aingwai
Theinkun
Laeseit
Thebyu
Minlaungkwin
Pawatchaungwa
Wayit
Yodaw
Tamokchon
Thamilhla
Lentaungya
Anen
Shanaintaung

တုံးပြော
ဝါးရုံအင်း
အနန်းချောင်း
ဦးကုန်း
သကျက်တောင်ပိုင်း
သကျက်ကုလားအိပ်
ဂါးနွင်းကွင်း
ထောမ
အင်းပိုင်း
သိန်ခွန်း
လှည်းဆိပ်
သဲဖြူ
မီးလောင်ကွင်း
ပဝချောင်းဝ
ဝါရင့်
ဂျိုးတောင်
တမုခြုံ
ပတ္တမြား
လယ်တောင်ယာ
အနိုင်း
ရှမ်းအင်းတော်

Thailand Burma Border Consortium

Mission

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, a non profit, non-governmental humanitarian relief and development agency, is an alliance of NGOs, working together with displaced people of Burma, to respond to humanitarian needs, strengthen self reliance and promote appropriate and lasting solutions in pursuit of their dignity, justice and peace.

Goal

To support displaced people of Burma to be independent and self-reliant in a peaceful society where there is full respect for human rights.

Aim

To work in partnership with displaced communities to build capacity, strengthen self-reliance and food security, ensure an adequate standard of living and human rights are respected.

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