

REBUILDING AFTER COMMUNAL VIOLENCE: LESSONS FROM TOLIKARA, PAPUA

**13 June 2016
IPAC Report No.29**

CONTENTS

I.	Introduction.....	1
II.	The Fragmentation of Tolikara.....	2
III.	The 2012 Election.....	4
IV.	The GIDI Church	5
	A. Background to GIDI	5
	B. Interfaith Relations	7
V.	The “Incident”	8
	A. The Letter	8
	B. Prayers and Violence	10
VI.	The Response	11
	A. Reconstruction	12
	B. Financial Aid.....	14
	C. The Shooting Victims	14
	D. Reconciliation Efforts	15
	E. Flawed Prosecutions	16
VII.	After the Violence	17
	A. Muslim Concerns.....	17
	B. The Coming of Ja’far Umar Thalib	18
	C. Land, Elections and the Lippo Hospital.....	19
VIII.	Conclusions.....	20
	Appendix 1: Sketch of Bullet Casings Location	23

I. INTRODUCTION

The first anniversary of an outbreak of communal violence in Tolikara, Papua is approaching, with a fragile reconciliation in place and many issues left unresolved. The “Tolikara Incident” on 17 July 2015 has been variously portrayed as an issue of religious intolerance (Christians toward Muslims), the product of indigenous-migrant tensions, and miscommunication. But to reduce it to one or two causes is to miss the point of the complexity of violence in Papua. It is all of the above and much more: poor governance, poor policing, corruption, isolation, and the residue of previous conflicts that have accumulated under the surface into a toxic mix. A campaign is now beginning to heat up for the election of district head in 2017 that could ignite old grievances. Among Tolikara’s many urgent needs is for the best police chief the country can offer but the likelihood of turning a remote post in Papua into a prize for the best and brightest is slim.

Tolikara erupted after local leaders of the Evangelical Church of Indonesia (Gereja Injili di Indonesia, GIDI) issued a letter on 11 July 2015 forbidding Muslims to celebrate Idul Fitri at the end of Ramadan because of an international revival meeting that was taking place nearby. On 17 July, Muslims went ahead with Idul Fitri prayers, and GIDI youth threw rocks at the worshippers. Police at the mosque fired warning shots, but then the exact sequence of events becomes less clear. Other shots were fired from a different location, killing one youth and wounding eleven others. Several GIDI men set fire to kiosks that doubled as homes for the owners, destroying close to 60; most were owned by non-Papuan Muslim migrants from other parts of Indonesia, although a few belonged to indigenous Papuans. As the shops went up in flames, the local mosque caught fire and burned to the ground. More than 100 people were displaced. The Jokowi government moved at once to stop the “burned mosque” narrative from inflaming Muslim emotions elsewhere: one senior official after another arrived from Jakarta, bearing aid to assist the newly homeless and rebuild the mosque and kiosks. Two GIDI men were arrested for provocation, but the investigations raised more questions than they answered, and when the guilty verdict finally came down in February 2016, both men were sentenced to time served and released. Neither the arsonists nor the shooters were ever identified.

The two sides saw the government’s response very differently. The Christians, all indigenous Papuans, saw Jakarta bending over backwards to help non-Papuan migrants rebuild their shops and mosque and prosecute the provocateurs of the violence while showing less zeal for identifying and prosecuting the shooters. The Muslims who lost their homes and shops saw all the aid as a poor substitute for the only thing that would make them feel secure: acceptance by the local community. Muslims in other parts of Indonesia blamed the government for failing to take preventive measures that would have prevented violence in the first place and favouring the Papuans by failing to prosecute the arsonists. In the meantime, the accepted spin on events is that everyone has apologised to everyone else, and everything now is fine. In fact, much distrust remains, and some of the measures taken to respond to the violence may have inadvertently created new problems:

- Shophouses were rebuilt on contested land, and now a giant new Lippo hospital is being constructed on similarly disputed land.
- The prosecution of the two men has left lasting resentment, especially because neither was responsible for arson, but no one else was ever arrested.
- The failure to quickly establish the facts in a satisfactory manner has left open room for conspiracy theories that are likely to exacerbate intra-Papuan relations.
- The new mosque, said to be temporary but more likely to be permanent, is on the grounds of the subdistrict military command, giving the unfortunate impression of a Muslim-military link.

- One well-known radical Muslim, Ja'far Umar Thalib, is still talking of plans to build a school in Papua so that his students will be ready to come to the aid of any Muslims under attack. His plans have been roundly rejected by all local Muslim organisations and government officials.
- Discontent with some of the solutions is already being exploited by candidates in the upcoming 2017 district election in a way guaranteed to rekindle rivalries that led to major intra-Papuan violence in the 2012 campaign.

It is tempting to see Tolikara as the inevitable result of indigenous Papuan resentment over the influx of migrants who have the networks, the capital and the education to take advantage of economic opportunities thrown up by unprecedented levels of government funding. But it is too facile an explanation: it does not explain why Tolikara erupted when it did or why many of the migrants had lived in Karubaga, the capital, for years without incident. It also lets too many others off the hook.

This report is a first attempt to put the violence in context, but it will be important to continue to monitor political and social dynamics as the 2017 election approaches. It is based on two visits to Tolikara by IPAC consultants and additional interviews with some of the key players in Jayapura and Jakarta. IPAC also had access to several primary sources, including provincial and *kabupaten* government documents and the trial dossier in the case of one of the two men arrested.

II. THE FRAGMENTATION OF TOLIKARA

Some of Tolikara's woes are a direct result of its being carved up into smaller and smaller units through a process called *pemekaran*, a byproduct of decentralisation. Tolikara itself was carved out of Jayawijaya district (*kabupaten*) in the central highlands in 2002.¹ At the time it had four subdistricts.² In 2005, when John Tabo was elected *bupati* or district head, it had ten. In 2015 it had 46, second only to another poor highland *kabupaten*, Yahukimo, which had 51. Tolikara also had more registered villages than any other district in Papua: 549.

Tabo proudly acknowledges himself as the pioneer of *pemekaran* and says the main goal was to get more money into remote areas.³ Tolikara's budget, like that of many other highland districts, has mushroomed from about Rp.150 billion in 2005 (then about US\$15 million) to Rp.1.5 trillion (about \$115 million) in 2016, yet it has no revenue to speak of other than fiscal transfers from the central government. It has no mining, plantation crops, investment, or industry. According to the provincial statistical yearbook for 2015, it had 5.7 km of paved road, about 60 micro-enterprises and two cooperatives. Its electricity is all from generators. Consistent with a subsistence economy, the main occupation of most Tolikarans is sweet potato cultivation and pig husbandry.

The cash coming in through transfers and the need to spend it offer economic opportunities for traders from outside Papua who have the wherewithal to bring supplies in through the airport in Wamena and then truck them into Tolikara. The losses noted by some of the arson victims after the July 2015 violence were instructive: they were supplying Tolikara with rice, bottled water, cooking oil, clothes, generators, solar batteries, gasoline and other basic needs.

1 See IPAC, "Carving Up Papua: More Districts, More Trouble," Report No.3, 9 October 2013. Tolikara was created through Law No. 26 of 2002.

2 In Papua these are known as *distrik*; in the rest of Indonesia they are known as *kecamatan*. The original four were Kembu, Bokondini, Karubaga and Kanggime.

3 Telephone interview, John Tabo, 21 May 2016.

Some doubled as civil servants, working in the government or teaching in the local schools.⁴ While one of the victims had lived in Tolikara for 25 years, most had come over the last decade as Tolikara's budget increased.

Non-Papuans coming into Tolikara were both Muslim and Christian. John Tabo, the first elected *bupati*, was part Torajan from South Sulawesi, and he was seen in some quarters as having favoured the in-migration of (Christian) Torajan migrants, especially for civil service posts.⁵ The number of Muslims also rose steadily, from 311 in 2010 to 566 in 2014, although no population statistics in the Papuan highlands are reliable, and it is probably safer to accept these figures as rough approximations rather than accurate head counts.⁶

In fact, it is impossible to know from government data exactly how many people live in Tolikara. Throughout Papua, the proliferation of subdistricts and villages, driven by the prospect of increased funds, has meant a general inflation of population statistics, and the central highlands are the worst affected.

- According to 2010 census data collected by the National Statistics Center (Badant Pusat Statistik, BPS), Tolikara district had a population of 114,427 that had risen by 2014 to 127,526. BPS acknowledges a shortage of trained enumerators for the highlands, but at least it tries to count, and these figures are almost certainly more accurate than any others.
- According to the home ministry, Tolikara's population in 2010 was 244,824, more than twice the BPS figure.⁷ These figures form the basis of voter rolls and the number of seats in local legislatures, so there is a strong incentive for inflation.
- According to the Tolikara BPS office, the population reached 262,000 in 2010 (see Figure 1, below) with an increase two years later to 292,000.⁸
- According to the provincial office of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the total population in 2014 was 232,980 (231,748 Protestants, 657 Catholics, 566 Muslims and 9 Buddhists).

Whatever figures one uses, the population was growing, the economic pie was growing faster and everyone should have benefited. Instead, much of the funding disappeared, and only a few weeks before the July violence, activists were calling for an audit of the *kabupaten* budget and the resignation of the *bupati*, Usman Wanimbo.⁹

4 The number of civil service posts throughout Tolikara has risen from 535 in 2006 to 1,154 in 2009 to 2,379 in 2014, the last year for which data is available. Many of these are almost certainly fictive. For the first two years, see Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Papua, "Jumlah Pegawai Negeri Sipil Daerah di Lingkungan Pemerintah Provinsi Papua 2006-2011", <http://papua.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatistik/view/id/31>. For the 2014 see Badan Pusat Statistik Propinsi Papua, *Papua Dalam Angka* 2015, p.73

5 Indeed, one local play on words was that "Tolikara" was actually an acronym for "Toraja Lingkar Karubaga" (Torajans Surrounding Karubaga, the district capital).

6 These figures are from *Papua Dalam Angka* 2010 and *Papua Dalam Angka* 2015, both available online from the provincial statistical office, www.papua.bps.go.id.

7 That Home Affairs data comes from "Kode dan Data Wilayah Administrasi Pemerintahan: Provinsi Papua," 29 January 2010. The official figures then in use were still based on data from 2007. See https://papuaprov.kpu.go.id/files/kode_wilayah/papuaprov.pdf.

8 One provincial BPS official explained the discrepancy between its figures and the national data in terms of the different interests involved. The data from BPS Central, she said, was needed to determine the general allocation from the central government to the *kabupaten*, while the data from the province was needed to determine gross domestic product. She said both offices based their figures on projections from the last census, but said that the provincial office was more likely to be more accurate because the local office would have a better grasp of who had moved, who had died, what areas had been affected by natural disasters. (In fact, there is little cross-checking of identity cards, and there is no reason to believe that the provincial statistics are more accurate than the national ones.) Interview, BPS official, Jayapura, 20 May 2016.

9 "APMPPKT Tolikara Bantah Demo Mahasiswa Diboncengi Elit Politik", Pasificpos.com, 14 July 2015.

III. THE 2012 ELECTION

Usman Wanimbo was elected *bupati* in 2012 on the heels of an even worse outbreak of violence than in 2015. Papuan versus Papuan, it left eleven dead, more than 200 wounded and 122 homes, shops and government buildings burned. The proximate cause was the contested result in the election that even by Papuan standards was poorly administered and deeply flawed.¹⁰

Tolikara, as a new *kabupaten*, had had two caretaker *bupati* or district heads appointed by Jakarta before it held its first, much-delayed direct local election in late 2005. The winner was John Tabo, former head of the Jayawijaya district council (1999-2004). He was by many accounts a dynamic and popular leader and developed a reputation for educational reform. In 2008, he was declared a suspect in a corruption case dating back to his days on the district council, but when the police came to arrest him in June 2009, thousands of Papuans surrounded his house to protect him, and the police could not get through. He always claimed he had returned the money, and the case was eventually dropped.

In 2012, Tabo ran for a second term supported by the Golkar party, against Usman Wanimbo and Amos Jigwa, running for Partai Demokrat, the party of both then President Yudhoyono and Lukas Enembe, the strongest candidate to be Papua's next governor. When the votes were being counted, the winner kept changing. John Tabo was initially declared the victor and after a minor scuffle with Wanimbo supporters, everything was quiet for two days. Then two days later, a huge pro-Wanimbo mob returned to Karubaga, the district capital, and a full-fledged war erupted between the two sides that lasted for four days. The non-Papuan migrant population was not targeted, though one of the victims was a Torajan married to a local woman; the local clan head made it clear that this was between two Karubaga groups. Tabo eventually lost the war and the election. Victims from both sides were promised compensation for their losses, but until the 2015 violence took place, those promises remained unfulfilled – which made the rush to help the Muslim migrant victims in July all the more striking.

Of the hundreds displaced, some were resettled and tried to rebuild their lives on land, only to find it later claimed by different owners. A few opened kiosks next to migrant-owned shops and had their lives uprooted a second time when the 2015 violence took place. The problems were complicated by the fact that Tolikara lacks a local office of the National Land Agency, and proof of land ownership, difficult to obtain even in Jakarta, is that much harder in the Papua highlands. When Tolikara split off from Jayawijaya, the land needed for construction of government offices in Karubaga was hastily acquired, often with scant attention to multiple claimants or bureaucratic procedure. The consequences emerged in 2012, when post-violence reconstruction began and the old claimants surfaced, and again in 2015, when the government wanted to build new kiosks on the contested land.

The election also resulted in a complete cleaning out of all local officials who had supported Tabo, including, in January 2014, the replacement by decree of 546 of the 549 village heads. This purge was later one of the bases for a corruption complaint filed in February 2015 against Usman Wanimbo by a group calling itself the Alliance of People's Movements Concerned with Tolikara's Development (Aliansi Pergerakan Masyarakat Peduli Pembangunan Tolikara). The complaint alleged that because the village heads had been illegally appointed, all the village funds subsequently channeled through them were also improperly used.¹¹

10 See Constitutional Court Decision Number 34/PHPU.D-X/2012, www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id, 16 May 2012.

11 These included funds for honoraria for village heads, village development funds (*dana bangdes*), PNPM-Mandiri and RESPEK funds.

The case was not pursued, but after the July violence, the Alliance gave copies of the documentation to a Muslim fact-finding team, and it became major news on all the hardline websites, used to vilify the *bupati* as head of the organising committee of the revival.¹²

IV. THE GIDI CHURCH

One of the narratives that emerged from Tolikara was the intolerance of the GIDI church, the Protestant domination to which most Christians in Tolikara belong. The letter on 11 July banning celebration of Idul Fitri was the incontrovertible proof, in the eyes of many activists, some of whom welcomed the chance to show their neutrality by finally being able to focus on a Christian group after most reported cases of actions against religious minorities have involved hardline Muslims. Muslims were the minority in Tolikara and the GIDI letter violated their right to worship. But it was less because GIDI leaders were anti-Islam than because they were convinced that since theirs was the first mission in Tolikara, they had a privileged position that all other faiths, not just Islam, had to respect.

A. Background to GIDI

The church that became GIDI was established on 12 February 1963 by three missions working together: the United Fellowship Mission (UFM) from the U.S; Association of the Pacific Commission Mission (APCM) from Australia; and Regions Beyond Missionary Union (RBMU), a London-based missionary society.¹³ The church was originally called the Evangelical Church of West Irian, became the Evangelical Church of Irian Jaya in 1971 and finally GIDI in 1988.¹⁴ While it now claims to have a presence across Indonesia, its stronghold continues to be in the Papuan highlands, and it has a particularly close association with the current governor, Lukas Enembe. Enembe's father was the first indigenous GIDI evangelist in the highlands. The family came from Mamit in *distrik* Kembu, Tolikara which to this day is still considered the birthplace of the movement.

In the course of investigating why violence erupted, one NGO team learned of a regulation (*peraturan daerah, perda*) passed by the Tolikara district council in 2013 that declared GIDI to have a privileged position in Tolikara and that other faiths, including other Christian denominations, would have to accept this. Muslims would not be allowed to use loudspeakers for the call to prayer and women would only be allowed to wear headscarves inside mushollas or small prayer houses. *Bupati* Usman Wanimbo, when interviewed about the regulation, readily acknowledged that it had been passed but said he had never implemented it, on the advice of the Ministry of Home Affairs. He then explained:

But this wasn't the opinion of the government, or the opinion of the legislature, no, this was a recommendation from the annual GIDI congress to the district council (DPRD) that a decision to ban headscarves in public, loudspeakers in mosques, and the construction of other houses of worship be turned into a government regulation (*perda*). Why did the GIDI decide to recommend this? Because GIDI occupies a special place here. I'm not defending it but I'm telling you the truth so you can understand how it is. So why does

12 "Dosa-dosa Politik Bupati Tolikara: Dari Serangan Idul Fitri Hingga Kasus Korupsi," *kiblat.net*, 9 August 2015. See also "Bupati Tolikara: Pemecatan 546 Kepala Kampung Sesuai Aturan," *Tabloid Jubi*, 24 January 2014 and "APMPPKT Tolikara Bantah Demo Mahasiswa Diboncengi Elit Politik", *op.cit.*

13 Three missionaries from UFM and APCM, Hans Veldhuis, Fred Dawson and Russell Bond, had already established an outpost in Senggi, Kerom in 1951 and subsequently built an airstrip there.

14 It has been registered with the Ministry of Religious Affairs since 1976. See GIDI website, <http://www.gidi.church/>

it occupy a special place? There are many churches in Tanah Papua, including many that have come from outside: from the West, from Europe, from Australia, from America and so on. But GIDI was born here, in Kangime. It was established by old people who did not have schooling, who learned to read the Bible. They were urged to join the Baptists, but they didn't want to -- they wanted to be independent. They met in Kangime, in Mamit and then decided to form the Evangelical Church of what was then Irian Barat. To maintain this identity, the people of Tolikara don't want to accept other denominations. If you're in another area, you might be a Baptist, but here, if you're in Tolikara, you're GIDI. GIDI was born here, it's to safeguard that symbol of specialness. It used to be the Evangelical Church of Irian Barat, then Irian Jaya, now it's the Evangelical Church of Indonesia. We have a presence from Sabang to Merauke. Because it was founded here, the people want to protect it, it can't be disturbed. In a few more years, that history will be gone. There will be no trace. Because of that we've put up a monument, maybe you've seen it. We've built the GIDI Convention Center. So to preserve history and ensure it's not lost, the people have adopted this stance. [...] The biggest concentration of GIDI members in Papua is here. I'm not speaking to you as *bupati*. I'm speaking as someone who was born here and is explaining it as it is. The people here don't want others coming in. They want only GIDI. So it doesn't matter if you're Baptist, or GKI, if you're here, you join GIDI, you adjust.¹⁵

The GIDI church is now the most powerful in the central highlands, thanks to government patronage. Just months into his governorship, in August 2013, Enembe visited Mulia, Puncak Jaya, and formally inaugurated 26 GIDI churches there. In a sermon on the occasion, Rev. Lipius Biniluk, head of the GIDI Synod, stated that GIDI's expansion was aimed at ending the conflict there, and indeed, the then provincial chief of police, Tito Karnavian, saw GIDI as an important partner in keeping the peace.¹⁶ In September 2014, the first GIDI branch in Port Numbay (Jayapura) was established.

All of this was accompanied by a sharp increase in government funding for religious activities in general and for GIDI in particular.¹⁷ In 2014, the provincial government allocated almost Rp.20 billion (about \$1.5 million) to religious institutions, of which GIDI and GKI received about \$150,000 each, twice as much as any other denomination or faith. In 2015, the Catholic church joined GIDI and GKI as the top recipients. Most other organisations stayed the same; the Baptist share of the pie declined from 2014 but it was still more than it had received before Enembe took office.¹⁸

By and large, then, there were few complaints about GIDI's dominance from other Christian deonominations, especially in the highlands where Enembe's pro-highlander policies were generally seen in a positive light. There were enough perks for everyone. The 11 July letter banning Muslims from celebrating Idul Fitri noted that GIDI had also closed a Seventh Day Adventist church in Paido subdistrict, but a senior Adventist official in Jayapura played down

15 Recorded interview with Usman Wanimbo, July 2015, made available to IPAC.

16 <https://www.puncakjayakab.go.id/gubernur-papua-lukas-enembe-resmikan-26-gereja/>, 31 August 2013.

17 In FY2014, 47 religious institutions received a total of Rp.19.7 billion rupiah of which GIDI and GKI, Papua's largest denomination, each received Rp.2 billion. Other denominations -- Kingmi, Bethel Pentecostal, Baptist Association, Catholic Bishopric, and Religious Harmony Forum (a government forum) each received Rp.1 billion and other groups received half that. See "Keputusan Gubernur Papua Nomor:466/51/Tahun 2014 tentang Persetujuan Pemberian Bantuan Dana Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Kepada Lembaga Keagamaan di Provinsi Papua tahun Anggaran 2014" and "Keputusan Gubernur Papua Nomor 188.4/145/Tahun 2015 tentang Persetujuan Pemberian Bantuan Dana Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Kepada Lembaga Keagamaan di Provinsi Papua tahun Anggaran 2015".

18 "Keputusan Gubernur Papua Nomor 188.4/145/Tahun 2015", op.cit. Grants to Papuan religious institutions were also channeled via the Institute for Empowering Religion in Papua (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Keagamaan Papua, LPKP), an organisation focused on turning Papuans from consumers into producers.. "Lembaga Pemberdayaan Keagamaan Papua (LPKP) Ajak Masyarakat Ubah Sikap Konsumtif," www.komunitas.papua.us, 5 November 2014.

the problem, suggesting that any denomination that set up the first mission in a remote area was bound to try and prevent others from encroaching on its turf, and that the Kingmi denomination had done the same in its strongholds.¹⁹

This is not to say that there were not tensions, and the official recalled a 2006 incident where a church had been burned in Panaga subdistrict by a GIDI group, angered by the conversion of a senior GIDI member – although the former *bupati* when asked had no recollection of the incident.²⁰

After the violence, the four major Protestant denominations in the highlands – GKI, Kingmi, Baptists and GIDI – closed ranks: the government's response was seen as unfairly favouring non-Papuan in a way that demanded solidarity across church lines.

B. Interfaith Relations

If the disputes within the Christian community were over who brought the gospel to a particular area first, it was slightly different with the Muslims, in part because of the obvious factor that they were almost all non-Papuan. From the beginning, GIDI members made it clear that while a local teacher, Ali Mukhtar, could hold prayers in his house for other members of the community and could even construct a separate building, it had to be understood as a small prayer room (*musholla*) not big enough to constitute a mosque. (The usual designation of a mosque is that it be big enough to hold at least 40 people for Friday prayers.) In their view, other churches had more or less accepted GIDI's refusal to allow other houses of worship; Muslims would, too. The *bupati* explained:

So this gets to the question of why the mosque is still a *musholla* and not a mosque. It was like that from the beginning. Other churches couldn't come into Tolikara, so we couldn't allow a mosque. You could have a *musholla* but not a mosque. Those were the ground rules, everyone understood them. There was good cooperation between the *ustadz* and the ministers. There weren't any problems, no discrimination. But it was kept as a *musholla*.²¹

The restrictions chafed, because it was important to the Muslims to have their building seen as a full-fledged house of worship. "This place can hold more than 40 people and we use it for Friday prayers and other activities, so the term 'mosque' is appropriate," the imam said.²² In 2007, tensions arose when mosque officials wanted to put up a permanent signboard saying "Masjid Baitul Mutaqqin" using *masjid*, the word for mosque. Not only did GIDI officials reject the name but they insisted that the signboard be placed in a less visible location. From 2010 onwards, the mosque's use of loudspeakers was banned. In 2013, someone attempted to set fire to the building, but the incident was handled quietly and no police report was ever filed.²³

According to the imam, whenever the Muslim community was planning an activity, they informed not only local officials such as the police and military commanders but the Tolikara GIDI leaders as well. On some occasions, GIDI leaders would invite Muslims to a traditional pig roast but out of consideration for the Muslim ban on pork, they would set up a separate area

19 Interview, Rev. Stefanus Dike, Jayapura, 17 May 2016. Nevertheless, because of the way different ethnic, political and religious faultlines come together in Papua, the potential for differences in one area spilling over into another are high. If an Adventist majority village has a dispute with a GIDI-majority village over the distribution of village funds, it can easily be the church of one side that gets targeted.

20 Interview with Rev. Stefanus Dike, Jayapura, 17 May 2016.

21 Recorded interview with Usman Wanimbo, July 2015, made available to IPAC.

22 Interview with Tolikara resident, 6 December 2015.

23 Interview with Ustadz Ali Mukhtar, 4 December 2015.

where chicken was cooked on the hot stones.²⁴ Moreover, since 2012, Muslims had held Idul Fitri prayers outside in the field of the subdistrict military command (Koramil) without issue. The only difference in 2015 was that the number of Muslims would be somewhat larger, given their steady if not spectacular growth – and GIDI was planning the international revival meeting.

V. THE “INCIDENT”

Originally GIDI had scheduled a seminar and international youth revival meeting (*kebaktian kebangunan rohani*) for 22-27 July 2015. Some 2,000 young people from Nias, North Sumatra, West Papua, Kalimantan, Yogyakarta, and East and Central Java were planning to attend but because of campus commitments and the fact that it would be easier to attend during the long Idul Fitri holiday, they asked that the dates be moved forward by a week. On 4 June, the organising committee sent out a letter addressed to GIDI members in 21 congregations in Tolikara district, offering them a chance to take part, with each one allowed to send 50 people between the ages of 15 and 35. Each participant would have to pay Rp.200,000 per person.²⁵ In addition GIDI leaders had informed the Tolikara police that five foreigners would be taking part; they were GIDI leaders who had previously been to Tolikara. One of the U.S. participants, Benjamin Berger, caused particular controversy when it was discovered that he was a Messianic Jew from Jerusalem, although it was clear that none of those making a fuss had any idea what Messianic Judaism was.²⁶

A. The Letter

On 11 July 2015, as preparations were well underway, the GIDI leadership in Tolikara issued an open letter to all Muslims in the district. It had three main points:

- Ceremonies to celebrate the end of the fasting month on 17 July would be forbidden throughout Tolikara while the revival meeting was underway;
- Those who wished to celebrate could do so outside Tolikara in Wamena or Jayapura
- Muslim women were forbidden to wear headscarves.

The letter said that GIDI had already forbidden other religions and denominations from building places of worship in the district and had closed down a Seventh Day Adventist church in the Paido subdistrict; the congregation had since joined GIDI. It was signed by the head of GIDI for Tolikara, Rev. Nayus Wenda and the district secretary, Rev. Marthen Jingga.

Ust. Ali Mukhtar immediately went to the police to express concern, but the police chief, who was copied in, had not received his copy and had to send out an intelligence officer to track it down. The officer finally obtained it from the military Special Forces (Kopassus) post in Maleo. Why the letter was never delivered directly is unclear. The explosive nature of its contents was obvious.

The police chief contacted the *bupati*, who was in Jakarta, and then the president of GIDI, Rev. Dorman Wandikbo, asking him to change or revoke the letter. Wandikbo replied:

First, in the name of the GIDI church, I apologise. Because Idul Fitri only comes once a year, prayers must take place. Second, I will tell the district to immediately revoke or

²⁴ Interview with Ustadz Ali Mukhtar, 4 December 2015.

²⁵ “Laporan Tim Investigasi Independen” (Independent Investigation Team Report), August 2015 (unpublished report of Tim Koalisi untuk Perdamaian, Hukum dan HAM Pegunungan Tengah Papua).

²⁶ Messianic Judaism incorporates elements of Christianity and Judaism; its members believe that Jesus is the Messiah.

cancel that letter.²⁷

In the meantime, news of the 11 July ban spread quickly, and from the night of 13 July onwards, the Muslim community began discussing it after *taraweh* prayers, which the police chief also attended.²⁸ Muslims decided to go ahead with the Idul Fitri prayers outdoors in the Koramil field, but they asked for extra security, given the letter and the growing tensions. Eighty police, paramilitary police and soldiers were dispersed among three posts set up for the express purpose of guarding Idul Fitri prayers: one in front Bank Papua, and second behind the Karubaga subdistrict military command (Koramil 1702-11) and a third beside the musholla (see Appendix I).

On 15 and 16 July, text messages and phone conversations show an increasingly worried police chief trying to get assurances from the president of GIDI that the correction had been issued.

On the 15th there was the opening of the revival, but I wasn't there because there was a clan war in Panaga, and I went there with the *bupati* and the *head* of the district council. We got back at 4 pm. I called the GIDI president to ask about letter. He assured me it had been taken care of. That was on the 15th. I went home, that night I told the Muslims, "Rest assured, everything is fine. I've been in touch with president of GIDI, I've been in touch with the *bupati*". On the morning of the 16th I called the president of GIDI. He didn't answer, so I texted him. I've been vilified in the media, but I have all the communications here, take a look. I've been here 33 years. Here look at this, my sms. I asked him to call when he had a chance. He didn't. That night I sent another sms: for your information, tomorrow the Muslim community will celebrate Idul Fitri from 6:30 to 7:30 WIT. He sent back a message, "Fine, may your prayers go well (*selamat melaksanakan sholat*), God bless you." I sent back a message, "Amin, thank you". That was the evening of the 16th.²⁹

GIDI officials told NGO investigators that the corrected letter did not reach the police chief or Muslim leaders because they were so busy with plans for the revival. They insisted, however, that the *bupati* had made clear, at a meeting at his house several days earlier with the police chief, the president of GIDI and the military commander that prayers could go forward but they had to take place inside the musholla, with no loudspeakers.³⁰

The provincial police chief, Yotje Mende, who should have been alert (and been alerted) to potential problems had not been in Papua for weeks. Due to retire at the end of July, he had been pursuing his candidacy in Jakarta as a commissioner on the Anti-Corruption Commission and had for all practical purposes left Papua behind him. After the violence erupted, he had the Tolikara police chief removed for "failure to anticipate events", but the same charge could well have been directed at him. On 31 July, he turned over his post to the first native son to become Papua's police chief, Paulus Waterpauw, a Protestant from Fakfak in Papua Barat.

B. Prayers and Violence

The Muslim community began preparing for Idul Fitri prayers in the Koramil field early on the morning of 17 July. The organising committee for the prayers used indoor loudspeakers, which

27 Pimpinan Gereja Papua, "Kronologis Insiden Tolikara: Peristiwa Tolikara Menabrak Sejarah Peradaban Orang Asli Papua dan Membuka Mata Terhadap Keberagaman di Indonesia", 5 August 2015.

28 Interview with Tolikara resident, 6 December 2015.

29 Recorded interview with then Tolikara police chief (Kapolres) Suroso, December 2015, made available to IPAC.

30 Pimpinan Gereja Papua, "Kronologis Insiden Tolikara", op.cit.

could be heard out front and by all the assembled worshippers. There are different versions about how audible they were to the revival participants, meeting some 300 metres away, but some witnesses claimed the sound carried.³¹

From this point on, there are at least two different versions and sometimes more for every key development. No definitive chronology has ever been established for the three key phases, the rock-throwing, the shooting and the arson.

For example, there are three variants on who started the rock-throwing. Most accounts agree that as prayers began, some 30 GIDI youths led by a man with a megaphone, identified as Arianto Kogoya, rushed toward the field, with some shouting “Break it up! Stop it! No religious activities allowed but GIDI and the revival meeting!”³² The youths then began hurling rocks over the iron fence that separated them from the worshippers.

Some witnesses testified it was Arianto doing the shouting and on the basis of their statements, he was arrested as a provocateur. But the same witnesses also said that he was using the local language which they did not understand. Arianto and his fellow accused, Jundi Wanimbo, claimed that they were both trying to calm the mob, and that the real provocateurs were three GIDI members from Jayapura attending the revival, Yulius Weya, Welles Weya and Yosua Wandik. Jundi, who was head of the planning committee for the revival, told police after his arrest that the three told him on July 14 that they were going to stop Idul Fitri prayers and close the mosque in Tolikara.³³

GIDI’s version is that the youths came with the intention of peacefully conveying that the prayers be moved inside the musholla and not use loudspeakers.³⁴ They said a request along these lines had been outlined in a second letter from GIDI’s district leadership, which was portrayed as a “correction” to the 11 July letter.³⁵ The problem was that no one in the Muslim community ever saw the corrected letter until after the violence, even though it was dated 15 July. It allowed Idul Fitri prayers to take place if they were conducted in the musholla and immediate environs and not in an open field.³⁶ Whatever may have been the original intentions of the GIDI youths to “negotiate”, the rock-throwing was a fact, and several of the worshippers were hit.

As more and more people joined the rock-throwers, with Papuan youths coming from all directions, the prayers broke up and many Muslims took shelter behind the Koramil. After the police chief’s calls to desist were ignored, some officers fired “warning shots” to disperse the mob – so many, in fact, that one eyewitness reported that they were refilling the magazines of their weapons. Here again there are contradictory sources for what happened next.

The church version suggested that in the indiscriminate firing, twelve Papuans were shot, of whom one, Endy Wanimbo, aged 16, later died. Angered at seeing their friends shot, the Papuans set fire to the kiosks.

But bullet casings were found in two locations, in front of the field where prayers were taking place, which would have been from the warning shots, and near the kiosks, which is where the Papuans fell, some of them hurt by ricocheting shrapnel. No one has established who was responsible for the second round of shooting.³⁷

31 Interview with Tolikara resident, 7 December 2015.

32 Berkas Perkara Nomor BP/21/VIII/2015/Dit Reskrim Umum, Testimony of Ferly Mengko, 15 August 2015.

33 Berkas Perkara (Case Dossier) Nomor BP/21/VIII/2015/Dit Reskrim Umum, Testimony of Jundi Wanimbo, 24 July 2016.

34 GIDI’s version is reflected in the 5 August statement of the church leaders, op.cit.

35 Letter No. 90/SP/GIDI-WT/VII/2015, 15 July 2015.

36 Pimpinan Gereja Papua, “Kronologis Insiden Tolikara”, op.cit.

37 See Appendix I, “Sketsa Khusus Posisi Penemuan Selongsong Peluru dan Korban dari Massa” in case dossier of Jundi Wanimbo, 15 August 2015.

Police investigators did not make a serious attempt to discover who opened fire, although they said the bullets that hit the victims did not come from their guns.³⁸ After an internal investigation, twelve police officers were disciplined for 21 days but it is not clear why. When asked in May 2016 about what violations they had committed, a police spokesman refused to answer. Any hope of uncovering the facts through a crime scene investigation was lost on 22 July when the local military, whose members may well have been involved, decided to undertake a civic action operation to clean up the ruins of the burned kiosks. The district military (KODIM) commander said they decided to clear the site to ease the trauma of the victims.³⁹

Establishing a clear chronology of the shooting and the arson is probably no longer possible, but it matters in assessing accountability whether the Papuans were shot before or after the arson attacks on the kiosks began. The church statement says:

The GIDI community did not attack or use violence against Muslims; they only burned the kiosks as a form of protest against security officials who shot GIDI members.⁴⁰

It is disturbing that the writers apparently did not see arson attacks as violence. Moreover, if the sequence was police firing – kiosks torched – second shooting near the kiosks, with casualties (and eyewitness testimony is contradictory), then the arson may have been less spontaneous.⁴¹ In the end, however, no shooters and no arsonists were identified, let alone prosecuted. The three men named by Jundi Wanimbo as intending to cause trouble were apparently never questioned.

Even though some of the shopkeepers ran back to protect their kiosks, very little could be saved from the flames or looters. In the end, about 60 kiosks that doubled as homes were damaged or destroyed, six of them belonging to indigenous Papuans. Many of the traders in the area decided to flee with their families to Wamena until the situation returned to normal; only about half had returned as of mid-2016.⁴²

VI. THE RESPONSE

The media coverage of Tolikara was instantaneous, as was the call from hardline Muslims for revenge after photos of the burned musholla began circulating. The priority of the Jokowi government was to calm down the situation, stop the narrative of Christians burning a mosque, be seen to helping the victims and bring about reconciliation between the two communities.

The problem was that there were several audiences with what appeared to be mutually exclusive demands and expectations.

38 “Rusuh Tolikara, Hasil Uji Balistik: Bukan Peluru Polisi”, Tempo.co, 15 September 2015.

39 “Laporan Tim Investigasi Independen”, op.cit.

40 Pimpinan Gereja Papua, “Kronologis Insiden Tolikara”, op.cit.

41 One witness said that a group of youths was massed near the kiosks, throwing rocks, when shots rang out. One youth ran to get gasoline from the kiosk of Haji Colleng, in the upper end of the kiosks, furthest away from the musholla. The witness tried to stop him but to no avail. He got a jerry can full of gas, then carried some it to the kiosk of Pak Sarno, some 50 metres away, the first set on fire. If the mob had simply wanted to torch the kiosks, they could have started with Haji Colleng’s and those adjacent to it. But this group seemed to have a deliberate intention of moving down the slope. It was only when they reached the first security post that they may have realised they could not go further and someone then set fire to the kiosk owned by Pak Sarno, an administrator at the state junior high school in Karubaga who had lived for 25 years in Tolikara. The flames were quickly extinguished. The kiosk belonging to Silvi, just next to Pak Sarno’s and closer to the musholla, was however consumed by flames and then the musholla itself caught fire. Because of the sensitivities of the case, it became politically impossible to question whether the mosque itself had been the target all along. See “Laporan Tim Independen”, op.cit. and IPAC interviews with investigators.

42 Interview with Tolikara resident, 7 December 2015.

- The Papuan community saw the outbreak as yet another instance in which Papuans had died at the hands of security forces, and they wanted justice. They did not see intolerance as a factor, when they believed they had a right to say who could do what on their land.
- Muslims in Tolikara wanted compensation for their losses and acceptance of their presence by the local community, in a way that would guarantee their personal security and livelihoods.
- Muslims in much of the rest of Indonesia wanted the government to defend the Muslims' right to worship and prosecution of all those responsible for crimes against the Muslim community, as well as compensation for the victims.
- The Jokowi government had placed a high priority on winning the support of Papuans and focusing on Papua's needs and aspirations; any missteps here could undermine that program.

The political pressure to go the aid of beleaguered Muslims was enormous. The political elite in Jakarta, including many of Jokowi's ministers, wanted to be seen actively aiding victims in a way that would earn them praise in their own political constituencies – or halt criticism of not doing enough to help Muslims under attack. Some hardline Muslim organisations called for *jihad*, which is exactly what some in the government feared most and were determined to head off.

The security forces had their own agendas. In the unending competition between police and military, the police in this case were the clear losers. But both the police and TNI had an interest in not looking too closely into the shootings; accountability has never been their strong suit. At the same time, because police and soldiers were among the Idul Fitri worshippers, the prayers were taking place at the subdistrict military command, and the military ended up handling most of the post-violence assistance, the identification of Islam with the state was reinforced in a way that ultimately is not helpful to sorting out Papua's complicated relationship with the central government.

The end result was a strong sense on the part of Papuans of favouritism toward the Muslims, in a way that has probably worsened communal relations. Pressure from Indonesian officials on Papuans to acknowledge some responsibility for events – and specific criticism of Governor Enembe for his long silence afterwards – produced more defiance than remorse.⁴³

A. Reconstruction

Immediately after the event, all local officials went into relief and damage control mode. The KODIM commander and the military took charge of helping the wounded and setting up tents for the displaced, first on the grounds of the Koramil, then around a building that had once been the *bupati*'s office. They provided blankets, food and small amounts of cash, and generally took the lead in arranging logistic support.⁴⁴

Then the focus shifted to rebuilding the musholla and kiosks. Officials from the central government began streaming into Tolikara, eager to show concern, visit the arson victims, and make symbolic donations of aid. In some cases four or five high-level visitors arrived on the same day; their meetings had to be staggered with the key participants. (As of early 2016, the provincial and district governments still had unpaid debts from the accommodation, food, and transport expenses incurred.) No one in the first wave of Jakarta delegations thought to visit the

⁴³ See for example "Kerusuhan Tolikara: Kapolda Sindir Gubernur Lukas Enembe," *Kabar24.com*, 21 July 2015.

⁴⁴ Interview with Tolikara resident, 6 December 2015.

shooting victims, six of whom remained in hospital in Jayapura. Various fact-finding teams were also dispatched, from Muslim organisations as well as rights and conflict resolution groups.

A top priority, not just for the Muslims but for the *bupati* as well, was to rebuild the musholla. It was in everyone's interests that the anger outside Papua over the burned mosque cool down.⁴⁵ On 21 July, Minister of Home Affairs Tjahjo Kumolo flew in for the ceremony of laying the cornerstone for the new building – in the volleyball court of the Koramil.⁴⁶ It was not that the military wanted to have the building on its grounds, and all agreed that it was a temporary solution. But the problem was that land everywhere in Tolikara was contested.

GIDI itself claimed ownership of the area that had been burned, including the houses and musholla and the area around the Koramil. It was also reclaimed as customary land by a Papuan member of the Koramil. Ali Mukhtar said he had a certificate of ownership (Sertifikat Hak Milik, SHM) for the land on which the musholla had been built, issued by the local office of the National Land Bureau in Jayawijaya, before Tolikara became a *kabupaten*. Some of the kiosk owners also had certificates of ownership.⁴⁷ It quickly became obvious that finding suitable land outside the Koramil was not going to be easy.

GIDI did not attend the cornerstone ceremony for the mosque. According to the district military commander, the ceremony had taken place spontaneously so there was no time to coordinate with GIDI. When a "reconciliation meeting" took place the next day at the Koramil, GIDI's district head, Rev. Nayus Wenda said that he could not comment on the construction of the new musholla; it still had to be negotiated with GIDI and to await an inventorisation of GIDI's property.⁴⁸

Land became an issue in the reconstruction of the kiosks as well. On 24 July 2015, the first bricks for these were to be ceremonially laid on the grounds of the old *bupati*'s office. But at the last minute, someone from the Jikwa clan objected, saying the previous *bupati* had never paid for the land. Everyone who had gathered for the ceremony, including the provincial police and military commanders, went to the Koramil to wait until the *bupati* and the KODIM commander could come up with another location. After a few hours they decided to have the ceremony at the Golkar office, thus indicating that the kiosks would be built on land that apparently belonged to Usman Wanimbo's main political rival, John Tabo. Eventually 75 kiosks were built by a TNI construction team of 120 soldiers. Of the 70, 60 were to replace those burned and an additional fifteen, at President Jokowi's direction, were designated for indigenous Papuans. As of mid-2016, only six were occupied by fire victims – one a migrant, the rest indigenous Papuans. The Papuans in question were victims of the 2012 conflict who lost their livestock and trading goods or whose family members had been killed in that violence.

Fire victims did not want to move into the new shophouses for several reasons. Some did not have the capital to begin business again, although as of late March 2016 the government made long-promised funds available. Second, the buildings, which were 4 x 7 meters, were empty and did not have shelves or any furniture that could be used. Third, potential occupants worried that the land used could always be reclaimed by John Tabo's family, especially as the 2017 elections approached. Finally, they had heard rumours that the purchase of the wood used in the construction was still unpaid by the Tolikara government, although they were assured that all expenses had been taken care of.⁴⁹

45 "Laporan Tim Investigasi Independen", op.cit.

46 The ceremony was attended by senior officials including the provincial military commander (Pangdam XVII Cenderawasih), Tolikara police chief, district military commander, and a member of the national parliament representing Papua, Willem Wandik.

47 Interview with Tolikara resident, 7 December 2015.

48 "Laporan Tim Investigasi Independen", op.cit.

49 Interview with head, Team for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Tolikara, 6 December 2015.

B. Financial Aid

Aid in kind and cash flooded into Tolikara after the incident. Some Rp.60 million in cash from the provincial police and military commanders was distributed directly to the displaced. Funds also came from the Social Affairs Ministry. Those displaced by the arson received three or four disbursements of cash that ranged from Rp.700,000 to Rp.2 million and then various forms of in-kind donations: instant noodles, rice, mattresses and clothes.⁵⁰

Many individuals and organisations sent contributions for the Muslim victims through Ali Mukhtar. He was not the leader of the entire Muslim community in Tolikara, but as imam of the burned musholla, he became the de facto representative of the victims. By 1 August, when he left Tolikara to take part in a meeting on Java, the aid totalled some Rp. 370 million.⁵¹ By this time the district government had set up a Team for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation. Ali Mukhtar turned over the full amount to the Team, witnessed by the district military commander, and did not handle any funds from then on.

When a meeting with religious leaders and representatives of the arson victims took place at the Coordinating Ministry for Security, Political and Legal Affairs in Jakarta in August, Usman Wanimbo promised to give start-up capital of Rp.10 million to each affected household. At the time, the representatives of the families protested strongly that the amount in question was nowhere close to the value of the losses they had suffered, especially when the high cost of living in Tolikara was taken into consideration. Wanimbo said he would raise the allocation to Rp.30 million.⁵² At the end of March, the victims finally received the money from the district Industry and Cooperatives office, though it started a new round of complaints as each kiosk owner received the same amount, regardless of losses incurred.

In addition, the political party Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) reportedly promised to donate Rp 1.3 billion to Tolikara, including Rp.20 million per affected household.⁵³ When six months passed without anyone receiving the promised amounts, PPP's secretary-general explained that he had to get a letter from the *bupati* for each household, verifying that they had suffered losses. After the paperwork was done, each household would be asked to open a savings account so that the Rp.20 million could be directly transferred. The money in question had already been deposited in Bank Papua, under the name of the provincial party chief, Tommy Munif Jikwa.⁵⁴

C. The Shooting Victims

As ministers poured into Tolikara in the days after the violence, the shooting victims were all but forgotten. It was only on 22 July that the *bupati* began organising visits to the hospital in Jayapura where six Papuans were still being treated. He himself came with the provincial military commander, bearing money and assurances that GIDI and the district government would handle all costs, saying it was the ministerial visits that prevented his coming sooner.

The Papuans saw themselves as victims of government discrimination, especially after the police on several occasions explained that most of the wounded had not been hit directly but by ricocheting bullets that struck them as they were trying to run. (This not only suggested that

50 Interview with Tolikara resident, 6 December 2015.

51 Interview with Ustadz Ali Mukhtar, Tolikara, 4 December 2015.

52 Interview with Ustadz Ali Mukhtar, Tolikara, 4 December 2015.

53 Interview with Ustadz Ali Mukhtar, Tolikara, 4 December 2015. He said the PPP donation would also include funds for a building in Bondokini, the housing complex of TNI and Polri. Some money was also to be used for the construction of the musholla and to help with the costs of acquiring land for the new shophouses.

54 "PPP Djan Faridz Sumbang Kios dan Musala di Tolikara", *BeritaSatu.com*, 24 July 2015.

their wounds were less serious but that they were also involved in the violence.) The sense of grievance was palpable in the church leaders' statement where they compared the shootings in Tolikara to those in Keerom on 6 September 2014, Paniai in December 2014 and Yahukimo in March 2015.⁵⁵

D. The Reconciliation Efforts

As is often the case in Indonesia, government officials pressed for reconciliation without fact-finding, as if a ceremonial papering over of differences would produce lasting peace.

The first reconciliation meeting took place on 22 July at the Koramil, where GIDI and Muslim leaders were brought together by the district military commander. In the presence of the *bupati*, the head of GIDI-Tolikara apologised for the violence. Ali Mukhtar conveyed the community's concerns that GIDI leaders had not attended the ceremony laying the cornerstone for the new musholla and said what the Muslims needed was not a fancy new building but acceptance by the indigenous community of their presence.⁵⁶

On 29 July another meeting was held at the district council under the auspices of the provincial Forum for Religious Harmony office, with a peace agreement signed by local Muslim and GIDI leaders, witnessed by their provincial counterparts. The agreement noted:

- The incident on Idul Fitri in Karubaga, Tolikara, was not a religious conflict but rather a "miscommunication among ourselves, and we express our condolences over the loss of both lives and property.
- We forgive each other sincerely.
- We agree to settle this through customary mechanisms and the legal process must be stopped.
- We agree to rebuild the musholla.
- We agree to a periodic review of this agreement and to preserve harmony and peace.
- We will protect and respect and urge all religious communities in Indonesia to respect the GIDI and Muslim communities so that they can carry out their normal worship activities.
- We urge the government to protect freedom of religion and belief as well as the construction of houses of worship.

But there were many problems with such a superficial peace. The reduction of what happened to a "miscommunication" served to absolve the GIDI church of any responsibility for the violence. The decision to use "traditional" mechanisms rather than a formal legal process was done without consultation with the victims who in many cases came from outside Papua and did not necessarily accept "traditional mechanisms" as an appropriate path to justice. At the same time, the deeply flawed prosecutions through the formal legal system did nothing to help the peace process.

55 Pimpinan Gereja Papua, "Peristiwa Tolikara Menabrak Sejarah Peradaban Orang Asli Papua dan Membuka Mata Terhadap Keberagaman di Indonesia", 5 August 2015. In Keerom, a pregnant transmigrant woman was hacked to death by a drunken Papuan highlander, and migrants then torched 15 Papuan homes in the settlement where the Papuan lived. Some 125 Papuans were displaced; at least one alleged that security forces stood by and allowed the torching to take place. See "125 Warga Keerom Masih Tinggal di Tenda", *Tabloid Jubi*, 17 October 2014. In Paniai, four Papuan teenagers were killed on 8 December 2014 when security forces open fire on a protest over a speeding military vehicle. Despite repeated promises of President Jokowi to resolve the case, no one has been prosecuted. In March 2015, Deni Bahabol, a member of the pro-independence West Papua National Committee (Komite Nasional Papua Barat, KNPB), a mass non-governmental group, was found dead in a river after having led a march in support of independence several days earlier.

56 Interview with Tolikara resident, 6 December 2015.

E. Flawed Prosecutions

The chances of justice through the formal justice system were very low from the outset. Many senior police had been taking part in the prayers at the Koramil and some had opened fire when the rock-throwing started. They were not neutral observers, and Jakarta should have ensured from the outset that investigators from police headquarters be sent in, given the sensitivity.

On 24 July, provincial police arrested Arianto Kogoya and Jundi Wanimbo on charges of criminal incitement under articles 160 and 187 of the criminal code. They were apparently singled out because police cameras took their photographs and because they were both well-known to the shopkeepers whose kiosks they patronised. GIDI leaders strongly objected to any trials at all, saying they were considered to be in violation of the 29 July peace pact. Backed by church leaders from other denominations, they exerted enormous pressure on the police and central government officials to stop prosecutions, saying it would just lead to further grievances and divert attention from the shootings. But the police were also being urged to name the “intellectual actors” behind the violence and make arrests.

The trials in the Jayapura district court attracted huge media attention. Some witnesses from Muslim community, including Ustadz Ali Muktar, appeared in court to testify while others, including arson victim Haji Colleng, had his testimony read out instead. According to one source, Haji Colleng felt threatened by a group belonging to the family of one of the accused and so chose to stay in Makassar.⁵⁷ Local lawyers found it odd that no one from GIDI appeared as a witness.

As Idul Adha or the Feast of Sacrifice, Islam’s second holiest day, approached in late September, Muslim leaders became more and more worried that they would face a new round of attacks and collected signatures from the Muslim community to request that the two suspects be released into the custody of their families pending trial. (When prayers did take place, it was under the watchful eyes of more than 400 soldiers and police.)

Police investigators focused only on incitement, the crime with which the two were charged, and made no effort to elicit names of who might have started setting fire to the shops or what discussions had taken place with the three men from Jayapura on July 14 about stopping prayers. They made no effort to ask about the shootings or determine a precise chronology, and if they had any interest in doing a thorough crime scene investigation before the military cleaned up the charred remains of the kiosks, they did not show it. They had two men in custody, and if they were not precisely the masterminds that prosecutors might have been hoping for, they had at least done their duty as law enforcement officers. Both men were sentenced to time served and released in February 2016 to a heroes’ reception by a GIDI crowd.

In the end, the government in Jakarta was not interested in upholding the rule of law. It was interested in resolving a conflict with potentially explosive repercussions, apparently not realising that the first was critical to the second. If no one who committed criminal violence was punished, then justice was not served. Likewise, if the state took a strong stance against religiously-inspired violence everywhere, it would be easier to resist political pressures in specific cases. But just as the vandals of FPI frequently go unpunished in West Java, the arsonists and looters in Tolikara ended up going free.

When no move was made to investigate or prosecute the shooters, the family of Endy Wanimbo, the one fatality in the violence, insisted on justice through national law, not traditional mechanisms. His older brother Jimmy said the family wanted an investigation of the revival

⁵⁷ Interview with Tolikara resident, 7 December 2015.

meeting and of the regulation on GIDI's "specialness" that they saw as discriminatory, and the arrest of the perpetrators of both the arson and the shootings. They did not want any substitute for a thorough judicial process.⁵⁸

VII. AFTER THE VIOLENCE

Despite peace agreements, government visits and the outpouring of aid, the violence has seriously damaged the relationship between the Muslim and GIDI communities and led to greater resentment of both toward the central government. Six months after the violence, the *bupati* was still speaking of how Jakarta seemed to place a greater value on non-Papuan property than on Papuan lives.⁵⁹

A. Muslim Concerns

The Muslim concerns emerged in a series of meetings with local officials before Idul Adha. The new mosque, given the name "Khairul Ummah" (the chosen people), had been completed, thanks to army labour, and inaugurated by Minister of Social Affairs Khofifah on 23 September 2015. Immediately all the old issues arose. After Minister Khofifah left, someone took down the signboard with the mosque's new name and placed it on the side of the building. The KODIM commander told the community in effect that it would be better for all concerned if they did not insist on using the word "mosque" or using loudspeakers during prayers. At a meeting of religious leaders at the district police command, one of the mosque officials asked in front of the other participants if the building was going to be called a mosque or a musholla and whether Muslim women were going to be allowed to wear headscarves. The same questions arose in a meeting around the same time at the *bupati's* office: the head of the MUI Tolikara asked what the role of the state was if Muslims had to live in fear while practicing their religion. He said that if Muslims in Tolikara were not allowed to conduct Idul Adha prayers in Tolikara, then the government had a responsibility to organise them in Wamena. Moreover if Muslims were to be forbidden to worship according to their beliefs, then the government should give them an official letter to that effect.⁶⁰

The central government had a golden opportunity to take the Muslim concerns out of the local Tolikara context and sit down in a small group with leaders of religious minorities in Muslim majority areas and talk these issues through – because these are the same issues that Christians, Ahmadis, Shi'a and others are facing elsewhere. Most interfaith dialogues in Indonesia are of limited value because they do not focus on concrete problems in need of solution, but this was a chance for the government to make a case for equality of all citizens before the law and take a more forceful role in support of religious freedom. Instead, one after another, senior officials insisted that Tolikara was not a religious problem.

Luhut Pandjaitan, for example, then still the president's chief of staff, met with church leaders on 5 August 2015 in Jayapura and said religion was not involved -- it was only an issue of miscommunication and everything was now settled. He said the solution was opening Tolikara up and ending its isolation.⁶¹

58 "Korban tak Ingin Kasus Tolikara Diselesaikan Secara Hukum Adat", *Republika.co.id*, 19 September 2015.

59 Recorded interview with *bupati* Usman Wanimbo, 6 December 2015, made available to IPAC.

60 Interview with head of district branch of Majelis Ulama Indonesia, Tolikara, 6 December 2015.

61 "Begini Hasil Pertemuan Luhut dengan Pimpinan Gereja Papua," *Tempo.com*, 5 August 2015.

B. *The Coming of Ja'far Umar Thalib*

Tolikara was quickly taken up by the hardline Muslim community as an example of the failure of the government to come to the defence of Muslims under attack when it was overly quick to arrest terrorist suspects. Concern about the hardline response was exactly what had prompted the Jokowi government to act as quickly as it did in delivering aid and getting the mosque rebuilt, but for some this was not enough.

In December 2015, Ja'far Umar Thalib arrived in Papua with 33 followers. Ja'far, a Salafi leader best known for his role in leading the militia Laskar Jihad at the height of the Maluku conflict (2000-2002) as well as for his close relations with the military at the time, declared his intention of opening a pesantren and religious outreach (*dakwah*) centre backed by his Salafi foundation, Yayasan Ihya' As-Sunnah, and word went out that he was looking for 200 ha of land to purchase, either in Jayapura or Keerom.

Religious leaders in Papua, including many prominent Muslims, forcefully rejected the idea. Ja'far had issued an incendiary statement a few days after the violence.⁶² His arrival was seen as raising the potential for religious conflict in Papua. The Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) Papua and mass Muslim organisations in Papua asked Ja'far and his followers to return to Java, on the grounds that his style of *dakwah* was not appropriate for Papua's pluralist society.⁶³ District heads -- the *bupati* of Keerom, the *bupati* of Jayapura and the mayor of Jayapura city -- all agreed that Papuans would give no space to radical groups.⁶⁴ Responding to community reactions, Ja'far said he was ready to leave Papua if there was an official letter from the Papuan government asking him to do so because he had a right like any other Indonesian citizen to be in Papua. He eventually did go home, but as of May 2016, the issue of his building a pesantren was still alive.⁶⁵

62 The statement read: "*Kafir* (infidels) have physically attacked a Muslim village on Idul Fitri while Muslims were at prayer. The mosque and several houses and kiosks of Muslim traders were burned by these *kafir*. The Indonesian government, which always takes the *kafir* side, blamed the Muslims at the crime scene, with Vice President Mohamad Yusuf Kalla saying the Muslims liked to use loudspeakers in their worship.

"That's the attitude of the *kafir* government, if there is an attack on Muslims, it's always the Muslims who are blamed. We have to worry about hurting the feelings of these *najis kafir* because they are the citizens who have human rights while Muslims don't.

"If Muslims are the majority they are ordered to show absolute tolerance toward religious minorities. At Christmas, they are ordered to guard churches so that churchgoers will feel safe while undertaking their idolatrous activities. And if they are a minority in a particular area, they have to take the feelings of the minority into account while practicing their religion. Don't use loudspeakers for the call to prayer, don't conduct Friday prayers if they fall on the Nyepi holiday in Bali. Don't celebrate Idul Fitri if there's a big program in a church and other regulations that trample on the feelings of Muslims in that area.

"The *kafir* Indonesian government is always demanding that Muslims interpret their religion in way that accords with its *kafir* ways. Hoping that the government will defend Muslims whose blood has been shed is like hoping the sun won't rise. This is what I myself experience during the massacres of Muslims in Ambon and Poso. Now it is the turn of Muslims in Papua, and Muslims, especially Salafis who sit around and do nothing, are hoping the government will come to their defence.

"I'm warning you all, the conditions of our brothers and sisters in Tolikara are such that they need us badly. The government will not defend them. Instead they flirt with the *kafirs* so that oppression of the Muslims will continue. Jihad in the way of Allah is the only way to fight them, and *kafir* both here and there are equally enemy combatants! [cites religious argument of two well-known salafi scholars]

"So the only solution to the problem is jihad, the obligation of all Muslims in the immediate area to take up arms, if Muslim villages are attacked and their property and dignity and lives threatened, and if they can't do it then it becomes the obligation of Muslims nearby and so on.

"You cowardly teachers and preachers, go ahead and stay home with your wife and children. Go ahead and guard Java as the center of Indonesia so the djinn don't come in. Go ahead and play with other ulama and urge Salafis not to leave on jihad. Go ahead and ignore the call to jihad and may Allah treat you appropriately now and in the hereafter." See "Ini Pernyataan Panglima Laskar Jihad Untuk Tolikara [sic] Papua", www.voa-islam.com, 21 July 2015.

63 "Ustaz Mantan Mujahidin Afghanistan Diusir dari Papua," jpnn.com, 28 December 2015.

64 "Pemprov Tolak Kelompok Radikal Pimpinan Ja'far Umar Thalib," salampapua.com.blogspot.com, January 2016.

65 A local group calling itself Forum Kewaspadaan Dini Masyarakat (FKDM) said it would not allow Ja'far to build a pesantren in Kampung Hulukubun, Arso 14, Sidtrik Skanto, Keerom "Penolakan Kelompok UT di Keerom Kembali Muncul," *Bintang Papua*, 17 May 2016.

Ja'far's longstanding relationship with conservatives in the military raises the question of who was backing his Papua plans. The overwhelmingly negative response from Papuans, however, may have put an end to them.

C. Land, Elections and the Lippo Hospital

Meanwhile, Tolikara continues to suffer periodic paroxysms of inter- and intra-clan violence.⁶⁶ In April 2016, Papuans from subdistrict Timori clashed, reportedly over allegations of unequal distribution of village funds, resulting in a civil servant being killed and some 95 homes burned. Tolikara officials tried to downplay the violence, saying everything had been settled by traditional means and all was normal.⁶⁷

Given the wholesale replacement of village heads and the corruption allegations, however, these issues are likely to feed into the campaign for *bupati* as Tolikara moves toward elections in 2017. The leading candidates are likely to be the same as in 2012 and the potential for violence will shift back to Papuan Golkar (Tabo) vs Papuan Demokrat (Wanimbo) and their associated clans and families. But some of the issues that came up with 2015 violence could resurface in a new context: the district government's management of post-conflict assistance; land ownership issues related to where the new kiosks were constructed; and role of the security forces.

More than ever, those concerned about violence in Tolikara will need to identify potential flashpoints and take measures to prevent them from erupting. There are certain to be disputes, for example, potentially lethal, over the composition of local election administration and monitoring bodies, and it is critical that the Jokowi government not simply continue with its predecessors' laissez-faire stance towards the blatant fraud that all too often characterises Papuan elections, especially in the highlands.

Also more than ever it is critical that the police assign competent, well-trained police to Tolikara, so that they can develop roots in the community, anticipate problems and react responsibly. Going back to the original circulation of the 11 July letter, the cascading sequence of events could have been avoided by more effective police intelligence. It would not have solved the problem of GIDI exclusivism but it would likely have prevented the violence on Idul Fitri. Instead, one of the results of the 2015 violence has been to increase distrust of police, making the task of law enforcement tougher as the elections approach.

Problems over land are also likely to surface around another post-conflict decision to build a new Siloam Hospital and supermarket, run by the Lippo group, in Tolikara. The idea was first mentioned when Luhut visited Tolikara in early August 2015 and plans quickly progressed. The district government reportedly has purchased 48,265 square metres of customary land from traditional leaders at a cost of Rp.7 billion (about \$528,000); a ceremony marking the formal transfer of ownership – and payment in cash, in stacks of Rp.100,000 bills – was held on 5 April 2016.⁶⁸ The project will almost certainly benefit some in the Tolikara political elite above others and thus add to pre-election tensions. It is interesting to note that the three clans involved – Wakur Yikwa, Wandik Yikwa and Yikwa Wanimbo – had originally agreed to turn over the land for government buildings in 2003, shortly after Tolikara became a *kabupaten*, but the transfer was never implemented because of general acceptance of the principle, then backed by church leaders, that customary land could not be bought or sold.⁶⁹ It is not clear how the subsistence

66 There is a long history of such violence. As one scholar notes, "In Tolikara, clan conflict was so pervasive that services barely existed until recently." See Bobby Anderson, "Papua's Insecurity: State Failure in the Indonesian Periphery", East-West Center, Policy Studies No.73, Honolulu, 2015. p.33.

67 "Laporan BPBD Tolikara Tidak Benar! Tolikara Aman", *tabloidjubi.com*, 24 April 2016.

68 "Tolikara beli tanah adat untuk rumah sakit dan supermarket," *Tempo.co*, 7 April 2016. The article cited here has a photo of the cash transfer.

69 "Masyarakat Gurikme Serahkan Tanah Adat Seluas 48,265 M2", *Bintang Papua*, 7 April 2016.

farmers of Tolikara will be able to take advantage of the supermarket or how the complex more generally will reduce dependence on non-Papuan.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Different factors caused Tolikara to erupt on 17 July, but many aspects of the government's response created new problems. It is exactly the kind of concrete case study that could be usefully discussed in a dialogue between the Jokowi government and Papuan civil society because it touches on so many core issues: Papuan identity, demographic developments, *pemekaran* and its consequences, the weakness (and frequent absenteeism) of local government, the failings of the formal legal system, the need for more accountability of security forces, both military and police, and freedom of religion. Tolikara is a useful case for dialogue because it involves no overtly separatist actors but illustrates some of the frustrations on which separatism feeds. It is also useful because there is so much shared responsibility for what happened: no institution, Papuan or non-Papuan, comes out looking good.

The *kabupaten* government failed to anticipate problems before the outbreak or help reduce tensions afterwards, in part because the *bupati* was deeply involved on one side. The *bupati* was chairman of the organising committee of the revival meeting and thus bore some responsibility for ensuring that the event did not violate the rights of others in his jurisdiction. His role suggests that the central government might consider setting guidelines designed to discourage the participation of local officials in religious activities that promote discrimination. Similar guidelines could be used to discourage participation of officials in events organised by groups such as the National Anti-Shi'a Alliance, the Islamic Defenders Front or other groups that preach intolerance.

At a more general level, the central government needs to put more intensive resources into training for elected Papuan executives at all levels. It is striking in Tolikara how many tasks the district military took on which should have been the responsibility of local government. Too often, however, local officials in the highlands are absent or unprepared to govern, a problem made worse by the proliferation of new districts and subdistricts. Some analysts have suggested that this fragmentation is part of a deliberate strategy of co-opting local leaders with the aim of weakening the independence movement.⁷⁰ But the local Papuan elite has enthusiastically embraced the process, even if it means more opportunities for non-Papuan civil servants and more reliance on the military, because it translates into political and economic power.

The central government and some Papuan religious leaders failed to uphold freedom of religion for Muslims in Tolikara, then rushed into reconciliation efforts without a concerted effort to establish facts or ensure justice. While Jakarta was eager to provide assistance to the arson victims, it showed little inclination to address GIDI exclusivism, even if by doing so, it could defend a key principle of equality under the law and increase its credibility in demanding respect for that principle from hardline Muslim organisations on Java and elsewhere in Indonesia.

The push for reconciliation papered over serious grievances on both sides. A thorough establishment of the facts would have helped, but local police never even established a basic chronology of the shooting and allowed the military to "clean up" a crime site before it had been adequately searched. At a minimum, the Jokowi government should have ensured that a task force from police headquarters be sent to the site immediately to do a professional investigation rather than leave it to the locals. The model could have been the special police task force sent from Jakarta to Poso after the October 2005 beheadings of three schoolgirls, when the local

⁷⁰ Bobby Anderson, *op.cit.*, p.33.

populace needed reassurance that justice would be delivered. The problem in Papua, as elsewhere in Indonesia, is that the formal justice system is deeply corrupt and distrusted. The solution, however, is to improve it, not dispense with it. The Jokowi government could take a step in this direction by choosing the next Minister of Law and Human Rights and Attorney General on the basis of professional competence rather than political party affiliation.

The police failed to take preventive measures before the violence or to do a minimally acceptable investigation afterwards. Both shooting and arson victims are aggrieved that not a single perpetrator of violence was punished. In July 2014, before leaving his position as provincial chief of police for Papua, Tito Karnavian set out a series of lessons for police on how to handle law enforcement in Papua.⁷¹ None of those lessons, most of which revolve around improving communications and intelligence, seems to have been adopted. Karnavian also recommended that the incentive structure within the police be changed to ensure that personnel assigned to remote areas have a high degree of motivation and that such jobs be seen as a step toward career advancement rather than as punishment for poor performance. Karnavian's lessons need to be implemented, especially as the need to head off violence in the 2017 elections becomes more urgent.

The speed with which the government moved to help migrant victims contrasts with the perceived slowness of Jakarta's usual reaction toward violence against Papuans. The best way the government can respond to Papuan concerns that the government values non-Papuan lives and property above their own is to speedily fulfil its commitments to resolve several major outstanding human rights cases, such as the Paniai killings of December 2014, and to act speedily to ensure impartial investigations and prosecutions after any future outbreaks of violence in Papua.

More scrutiny of the military's role is needed, both to examine any role in the shootings as well as the TNI's assumption of many civilian tasks. As local government shortcomings in Papua grow ever more apparent, the Jokowi government has turned to an institution that can get things done more efficiently: the TNI. One result is an increasing role of the military in many infrastructure and construction projects, including building the new mosque in Tolikara, as well as teaching school, providing agricultural extension services and generally stepping in wherever other government services prove inadequate. One of the many reasons for strengthening the governance skills of local leaders is to protect the principle of civilian supremacy and ensure that administrative weakness does not leave a political vacuum for the TNI to fill. It would also be useful to encourage more transparency about military funding, and an audit of the post-conflict aid managed by the KODIM in Tolikara would be one place to start.

Papuans themselves need to decide how to handle intra-Papuan disputes. As soon as the Tolikara government because as soon as the district government changes hands, there will be new claimants to land on which the kiosks were built and on the land set aside for the new hospital – and thus new possibilities for conflict. One solution is to go back to the 2003 practice of banning sales of customary land and instead restrict all transactions to fixed-term contracts or rentals.⁷² This will only help prevent future disputes, however, if there is an agreement over boundaries through a mapping process; it may not help resolve disputes that are already underway. Another complicating factor is that sub-clans in Tolikara are often divided along political party lines, especially Golkar and Partai Demokrat. This ensures that political battles have communal overtones and vice-versa. In the case of the Lippo hospital, the current *bupati*

⁷¹ Tito Karnavian, *Guardian over the Land of the Cenderawasih*, Jakarta 2014.

⁷² In 2013, while the idea for an amended and strengthened law on special autonomy called "special autonomy plus" or *otsus plus* was still alive, drafters from West Papua province included an article that would have prevented sale of any indigenous land and required provincial and district governments to undertake a participatory land-mapping project to determine customary boundaries. There was no such provision in the draft prepared by the Papuan government of Lukas Enembe. See IPAC, "Otsus Plus: The Debate over Enhanced Special Autonomy," IPAC Report No.4, 25 November 2013, p.5.


facilitated the customary sale, but his Golkar rival may well challenge it as the campaign heats up.

Tolikara urgently needs to focus on education. The Tolikara incident shows how dependent Papuans have become on non-Papuans for their economic and administrative needs. Like every other remote highland district, Tolikara needs a better educated and more skilled population, and it has the budget to produce one, yet much of the funding goes to waste. Before the July violence, Tolikara had made the national news only once, for something positive: hosting an Asia-Pacific Astronomy Olympiade for high school students in which one young Papuan student from Tolikara, trained by an educational institute called the Surya Institute, walked away with a bronze medal.⁷³ Papuans do not have to accept dependency and it is important that Jakarta's policies toward Papuan development not increase it. But as the Olympiade shows, Papuans themselves can take more pro-active measures to ensure better access to education and the recruitment of more qualified teachers willing to serve in remote highland areas.

The anniversary of Tolikara should be a time for reflection on what might have been done differently and what lessons have been learned in a way that might help anticipate and prevent more violence in the lead-up to the 2017 elections.

73 "Cara 'Gila' Membangun Indonesia: Pengalaman dari Tolikara Pak Kun and colleagues," www.kompasiana.com, 9 December 2010.

Appendix 1: Sketch of Bullet Casings Location



INSTITUTE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT (IPAC)

The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) was founded in 2013 on the principle that accurate analysis is a critical first step toward preventing violent conflict. Our mission is to explain the dynamics of conflict—why it started, how it changed, what drives it, who benefits—and get that information quickly to people who can use it to bring about positive change.

In areas wracked by violence, accurate analysis of conflict is essential not only to peaceful settlement but also to formulating effective policies on everything from good governance to poverty alleviation. We look at six kinds of conflict: communal, land and resource, electoral, vigilante, extremist and insurgent, understanding that one dispute can take several forms or progress from one form to another. We send experienced analysts with long-established contacts in the area to the site to meet with all parties, review primary written documentation where available, check secondary sources and produce in-depth reports, with policy recommendations or examples of best practices where appropriate.

We are registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs in Jakarta as the Foundation for Preventing International Crises (Yayasan Penanggulangan Krisis Internasional); our website is www.understandingconflict.org.