

CASE STUDY

CASE STUDY

The Scattered Beads

THE EXECUTING AGENCY OF REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION FOR ACEH AND NIAS (BRR NAD–NIAS)

April 16, 2005 - April 16, 2009

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With this BRR Book Series, the Indonesian government, its people, and BRR wish to express their deep gratitude for the many kind helping hands extended from all over the world following the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami in Aceh and the March 28, 2005 earthquake in the islands of Nias.

Four years on, the once devastated landscapes are again vibrant with the sporadic rhythm of human life. This achievement is the result of a steadfast commitment of the local, national and international community, combined with the resilience of the people who lost so much.

The dynamics and challenges encountered during the massive undertaking of rebuilding homes, hospitals, schools and other infrastructure, while striving to empower those who survived to reshape their future and redevelop their way of life, provide an important understanding of the disaster-recovery process in Aceh and Nias.

In light of this, within the pages of this book, BRR would like to share those experiences and the lessons learned as a small contribution to return the favor to the world for the invaluable support it contributed to building Aceh and Nias back better and safer; as a history of the humanitarian journey of a united world.

I am proud,
that we can share the experiences, knowledge, and lessons
with our fellow countries. It is hoped that what we have done
can be a standard, a benchmark, for similar efforts
at the national and international levels.

Speech of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
at the Official Closing Ceremony of BRR at the State Palace, April 17, 2009
about the BRR's trip to the Tsunami Global Lessons Learned Conference
at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, April 24, 2009

In both emergency relief and reconstruction periods, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' (IFRC) M-6 trucks played a very critical role on distributing logistics to remote and hardly accessible areas. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

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Introduction

For a period of three days, beginning on December 27, 2004, the Indonesian flag was drawn to half mast, and a nation was in mourning. A national disaster was declared and the world watched in disbelief. An earthquake, followed by a series of tsunamis, struck the western-end of Indonesia, causing an unprecedented loss of life and the obliteration of whole communities. For those who survived, their homes, livelihoods, and prospects for the future were swept out to sea.

The earthquake, one of the largest in recent history measuring 9.1 on the Richter scale, was the result of a convergence between two tectonic plates beneath the ocean floor. Although dormant for over 1,000 years, with the buildup of pressure caused by one plate slowly sliding under the other at an estimated rate of 50 mm per year, on December 26, 2004, these two tectonic plates ruptured along a 1,600 km length of what is known as the Sunda mega-thrust.

The epicenter of this earthquake was located 250 km south-west of the Indonesian province Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Its rupture - a slippage of up to 10 meters, resulted in the ocean floor being (permanently) lifted and dropped, pushing the entire water column up and down, and generating a series of powerful waves. Tsunamis swept violently up to 6 km inland over the shorelines of Aceh and surrounding islands, beginning less than half-an-hour after the earthquake. A total of 126,741 lives were lost and, in the wake of the disaster, an additional 93,285 people declared missing. Some 500,000 survivors lost their homes, while as many as 750,000 people lost their livelihoods.

In the private sector, which constituted 78 percent of the destruction wrought by the earthquake and tsunamis, up to 139,195 homes were destroyed or severely damaged, along with 73,869 ha of land with varying degrees of productivity. A total of 13,828 fishing boats vanished, up to 27,593 ha of brackish fish ponds disappeared, and 104,500 small-to-medium businesses ceased to exist. In the public sector, 669 government buildings, 517

health facilities, and hundreds of educational facilities were either destroyed or rendered non-functional. The loss to the environment included 16,775 ha of coastal forests and mangroves, and 29,175 ha of reefs.

The loss and damage of these regions did not end there and, on March 28, 2005, another major earthquake measuring 8.7 on the Richter scale struck the nearby islands of Nias in the Indonesian province of North Sumatera. This second natural disaster resulted in the death of 979 people and the displacement of 47,055 survivors. The proximity of this earthquake, a result also of two tectonic plates rupturing, slipping a length of 350 km, directly beneath the Simeulue and Nias islands, resulted in massive damage to the islands' infrastructure.

The eyes of the world once again watched in disbelief as the devastation of these regions unfolded, and helping hands began arriving from all corners of the globe to assist in the rescue and relief operations. Individuals of every race, religion, culture and political persuasion across each and every continent worldwide, along with governments, the private sector, non-government organizations and other national and international bodies, reacted in an unprecedented show of human concern and compassion.

From the scale of the devastation wrought by both disasters, it was clear that it would not be enough to simply replace the homes, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure. The rehabilitation and reconstruction program would need to embrace the rebuilding of the social structures that once thrived along the shores of Aceh and within the hinterlands of Nias. The trauma of losing friends, family and a means to support those who survived required that the recovery program focused not only on physical, but also non-physical, development, and on rebuilding an economy to a level that would ensure a firm foundation for future (re)development and growth.

On April 16, 2005, the Government of Indonesia, through the issuance of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 2/2005, established the Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi, BRR) to coordinate and jointly implement a community-driven recovery program for Aceh and Nias. BRR's mandate was to design policies, strategies and action plans, within an atmosphere of transparency and accountability, and to implement them through effective leadership and coordination of the combined domestic and international effort to rebuild Aceh and Nias back better and safer.

The rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias have constituted a challenge not only for the people and Government of Indonesia but for the entire international community. That this challenge was overcome successfully is reflected in the conclusions drawn in evaluations concerning the recovery program. In the final months of the program, the World Bank among others concluded that the recovery was an unprecedented success story and a model for international ship - outcomes which were realized through effective government leadership.

The nation's management of the recovery program gained the confidence of donors, both institutions and individuals, and through BRR's anti-corruption policies and processes, the trust of the international community. And without the cooperation of the international community, the post-disaster situation in Aceh and Nias - the unparalleled devastation - could never have been reversed.

In recording this humanitarian achievement, BRR has produced the BRR Book Series containing 15 volumes that detail the processes, challenges, solutions, achievements and lessons learned during the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh and Nias. It is hoped that these books will function to capture and preserve the experience of the recovery, and to establish guidelines for future disaster-recovery programs across the world.

Even more on the Recovery field, many unique cases came to surface, for its potential use of lessons learned, awaiting to be studied and disseminated. Case by case, like beads of a necklace that are loosed. These beads need to be collected and are necessary to be reunited in a form that people may value, although not in the original form of the necklace. The anthology of these case studies, therefore, may be appreciated as an offer to collect and then arrange those beads.

Presenting 90 case studies (50 in this book and the remaining available in the cd of BRR Book Series), this book titled *The Scattered Beads* discovers specific and interesting phenomenon on the field during, and related to, the Aceh-Nias Recovery.

4-Year Achievement
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

635,384 people displaced	
127,720 people killed and 93,285 missing	
104,500 small-medium enterprises (SME) destroyed	**155,182** laborers trained
	195,726 SMEs received assistance
139,195 houses destroyed	**140,304** permanent houses built
73,869 hectares of agricultural lands destroyed	**69,979** hectares of agricultural land reclaimed
1,927 teachers killed	**39,663** teachers trained
13,828 fishing boats destroyed	**7,109** fishing boats built or provided
1,089 religious facilities destroyed	**3,781** religious facilities built or repaired
2,618 kilometers of road destroyed	**3,696** kilometers of road constructed
3,415 schools destroyed	**1,759** schools built
517 health facilities destroyed	**1,115** health facilities constructed
669 government buildings destroyed	**996** government buildings constructed
119 bridges destroyed	**363** birdges constructed
22 ports destroyed	**23** ports constructed
8 airports or airstrips destroyed	**13** airports or airstrips constructed


4th Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias
ACEH-NIAS RISEN FROM ADVERSITY: HUMANITARIAN JOURNEY OF A UNITED WORLD
13 February 2009

Prologue

DISASTER is a tragedy, recovery is a triumph. The distance between the two can serve as a laboratory for understanding the physical and social factors that govern both. The December 2004 disaster in Aceh, and March 2005 earthquake in Nias, provided an opportunity for all government and non-government organizations to analyze the reasons behind the unimaginable human and physical loss wrought by these tragedies. In turn, and in many instances, the rehabilitation and reconstruction program that ensued resulted in a re-evaluation of established policies and practices in the implementation and delivery of humanitarian aid. It is these learning and re-evaluation processes and acquired knowledge that are recorded in the pages of this collection of case studies.

"Pick up a stone and throw it anywhere", was the Head of BRR Executing Agency Kuntoro Mangkusubroto's remark when he first arrived in Aceh and asked about his recovery plan. "Where ever that stone lands, start there!" he explained when first examining the extent of the destruction. Such was the devastation caused by the tsunami that frankly, at that time, anything, anywhere that anyone could do, would be of assistance. It was in this setting that one of the largest ever humanitarian recovery programs began, and it was within this context that aid organizations from all over the world began to apply their knowledge and experience in a united effort to rebuild Aceh and Nias back better and safer.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono opens the Coordination Forum for Aceh and Nias IV (CFAN-IV), Jakarta, February 13, 2009. The forum was the last joint event of BRR and all its Recovery Partners before BRR completed its four-year mandate. The President specifically emphasized the goal of CFAN-IV in consolidating the lessons learned of the recovery actors so that they could be disseminated all over the world for the sake of humanity. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Four years on, with more than $7.2 billion spent by up to 1,000 organizations and thousands of national and international aid workers, life has returned to normal in Aceh and Nias. The tragic memories remain, but the triumphant achievements have provided communities with hope and, concretely, a better understanding of disaster mitigation and community-based development. Similarly, it has provided implementing agencies with a better understanding of the complexities of rebuilding whole communities beginning with village planning through to the establishment of social and administrative support structures.

In an effort to record this journey between tragedy and triumph, this collection of case studies provides a glimpse of the experiences, the challenges and lessons, encountered by implementing agencies and their beneficiaries. These case studies were prepared by participating organizations in collaboration with BRR. While not all organizations had the opportunity to contribute, the collection represents a wide spectrum of those organizations who have participated in different ways, utilizing different skills, within the recovery program.

This compilation of case studies also covers a broad range of the different experiences, challenges and lessons organizations faced during this, one of the largest ever, humanitarian recovery programs. The aim of presenting this record of challenges and achievements in a case-study format is based on the understanding that stories from the field, prepared by implementing agencies on the ground, provide a basis for readers to either analyze, develop or simply absorb the different outputs and outcomes of the many and varied projects implemented to overcome an immense human tragedy. Moreover, it is an opportunity to study the lessons learned to ensure that in the advent of similar events, agencies and their beneficiaries will be even better prepared.

For convenience and ease of reading, this collection of case studies has been divided into 7 sectors even though, in some instances, individual case studies are cross sector. These sectors have been incorporated as chapter headings, in an effort to provide some structure to the 90 case studies included in this publication. With constraints on the number of pages available for this book, only 50 case studies appear in the printed pages, while the remaining 40 are contained on the CD of BRR Book Series.

Reading through this maze of different case studies implemented by government and non-governmental organizations from all corners of the world, the complexities of humanitarian work on such a scale is clearly apparent. Moreover, as the needs of beneficiaries can vary significantly according to a range of environmental, social and cultural factors, notwithstanding the extent of the disaster's impact, this compilation of case studies provides a rare (unedited) insight into the implementation and delivery of humanitarian aid.

Housing and Settlements

THE reconstruction of housing and settlements has been the hallmark of the recovery program. In addition to the achievements made within this sector, the building of homes and spatial planning for communities has been one of the most challenging aspects of the recovery for all implementing agencies. A total of 15 case studies are included in this book for this sector, with 9 appearing in the printed pages and the remaining 6 on CD. They provide an important perspective of the challenges and achievements associated with procurement, community-driven reconstruction and the issue of standardizing housing types.

Housing in Alue Naga, Syiah Kuala Sub-district, Banda Aceh, was built in parallel with the fishing ponds rehabilitation, April 3, 2009. Out of the target of 139,195 houses in accordance to the Presidential Regulation 47/2008, 140,304 houses have been built. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Canadian Red Cross (CRC)

Investing Time to Understand Uniqueness of the Beneficiaries

THE experience of the Canadian Red Cross (CRC) in Bapah Nipah village in Aceh Jaya demonstrated the imperative for organizations providing humanitarian assistance to view each community as unique in its capacities, assets, problems, needs and overall characteristics. Intense pressure from major actors such as local governments, donor fund centers and communities to quickly build houses, and the need to invest adequate time and resources to ensure that the unique needs of each community were met as fully as possible within the context of needing to provide thousands of houses, required a challenging balancing act that was critical to success.

The example of CRC's experience in Bapah Nipah may well be one shared by other organizations providing assistance to many communities in the form of dozens, hundreds, and in CRC's case, thousands of permanent houses.

While the actual story of Bapah Nipah may be considered a microcosm of a much larger-scale operation, the multitude of macro-level interests and positions all had to be balanced in decision-making. The key interests that were at stake were those of the community of Bapah Nipah, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) which was, by then, anxious about CRC's progress on housing construction using CIDA funds, BRR as the lead organization in Indonesia, and CRC itself, which was at the early stage of its integrated construction and community development operations. There was

also the interest of the Canadian public, who needed to be informed and reassured that as many people in Aceh and Nias as possible would benefit from the support they had provided for the tsunami victims.

Development and Implementation

In the spring of 2006, with the goal of accelerating the rate of construction and ensuring that there was sufficient capacity and expertise to guarantee the quality of materials and workmanship, CRC decided to change its strategy for the construction of permanent houses. It moved from working on a series of small contracts with different contractors to engaging a single international construction contracting firm to manage the construction process.

In May 2006, CRC's newly formed Shelter Program Management Unit visited Aceh Jaya to kick-start the housing reconstruction effort in Aceh Jaya. The Canadian Red Cross had agreed to build houses in 17 villages in the region roughly from Lamno and Calang. The early targets were between 1,800 and 3,000 houses. Construction was late, due in large part to the challenges of access to the isolated locations, and the fact that the level of land on the coast was seriously affected by the earthquake, often resulting in permanent flooding of many coastal villages. Many villages in the district had to be completely relocated. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), along with other Red Cross Societies from a number of countries, were in the process of supplying transitional shelters to allow people to move out of the emergency tent shelters during the construction of permanent houses. Most of the villagers at the time were living in tents or rudimentary shacks.

The CRC project management unit (PMU) arrived in Calang and was met by the CRC Field Team based in Calang, which worked in conjunction with the construction team to implement CRC's integrated approach to reconstruction. The Field Team, whose focus was the rebuilding of whole communities, was the key liaison team. The Field Team worked with local leaders and beneficiary households in the planning and implementation of the program, ensured that houses were built on land with secure tenure, and integrated plans for community facilities, roads and water and sanitation facilities into the process. This integrated approach ensured that communities would be better equipped to withstand future disasters by making sure that resettlement was done in areas that were not susceptible to flooding or other disasters, built houses that were better able to withstand the effects of disasters, and were assisted in developing methods for dealing with disasters when they occur.

The CRC Field and PMU teams set out to observe the surrounding area. Many houses had been lost in the tsunami and many villages lost to the sea. It became clear that in order to house many of the beneficiaries it would be necessary to relocate entire villages, which

meant the need to ensure that the land was either donated or bought by the government and that when the houses were built there would be security of tenure for all beneficiaries.

Assessing the need to relocate and where to relocate was fraught with difficulty in reconciling a number of variables and interests. The coastline had been so severely damaged that it would take many years for it to become stable again; nevertheless, judgments had to be made as to how the coastline would or might settle in the future. This was not always done without contention, and different opinions had to be taken into account. Beneficiaries also had their own interests and needs: some wanted to live away from the sea; others, despite the risk, wanted to be near the sea to continue fishing. All this caused friction within the tight-knit communities already confronted with many other challenges.

The visit included a number of villages. The landscape was essentially dead - no crops, no animals and virtually no fishing. The strain of prolonged recovery was evident, and in some of the tented villages, the tents were beginning to rot. With no houses, no income, relying on food handouts and becoming increasingly frustrated at the slow progress to recovery, people in most villages were downcast and dejected.

The CRC assessment team made its way to Bapah Nipah, a village precariously located in what had become a wetland area accessible only by boat, and situated in low-lying land obviously very vulnerable to flooding. In the event of another tsunami, there would be no escape to high ground. It was obvious to the CRC that Bapah Nipah should be relocated.

There was, however, something noticeably different about Bapah Nipah. Each household had set up their own vegetable garden, and there was a dynamic and relatively happy atmosphere in the village. Under the shade of a tree, the only one in the area, the CRC group spoke with the village head and elders of the village. CRC explained that it considered the site unsuitable for the construction of a village as there would be no escape in the event of another tsunami, that it would be impossible to infill the flooded areas, and that the village would be far better off relocated to somewhere safer. The community members said they understood the risks but wanted to stay where they were. CRC realized that trying to impose its conditions and wishes based on solid assessment criteria was futile. It became necessary to step back and take a longer view and recognize that most of the humanitarian organizations would leave Aceh Jaya in a few years, while most of the villages would remain. The spirit in Bapah Nipah was both optimistic and resilient —arguing further that relocation would accomplish nothing, and so CRC agreed to continue working with the community to find a solution.

In January 2007, CRC tendered the construction work for 2,100 houses in Aceh Jaya, with the provision for 65 houses in the existing village of Bapah Nipah. As expected, construction of the houses in Bapah Nipah proved to be a challenge, particularly as the land was low-lying and prone to flooding. In such cases the normal solution would be to increase the level of land by infilling the area, but in Bapah Nipah there was no source of suitable landfill without crossing the water. There were no bridges and the cost of

bridging would be prohibitive and delay the construction by six months. The use of pontoon boats was also rejected as being impracticable for the quantity of material. The only remaining possibility was to raise the houses above the water, and to change the house design by including stilts. This would keep the houses out of the water but the ground around the houses would be inundated during flooding. This was explained to the community, which recognized the challenges but accepted the risk. There was no other alternative given their commitment to stay in the location.

While the solution of using stilts may appear obvious, the practicalities were not. It meant significant adaptation of a design that had been developed through extensive community consultations for wide use in all the communities, and an increase in cost of about 40 percent per unit to adapt and build.

Unexpected Outcomes

The fact that the community was adamant about remaining in an area that would continually experience some hardship and risk was an unexpected outcome. Their perception of the benefits of staying was both an unexpected outcome and a lesson learned.

Another unexpected outcome was that CRC's first solution of relocating the community, although based on criteria and logic successfully applied elsewhere, was entirely inappropriate in this case. Adapting the building design by adding stilts was also an unexpected outcome, as changing the house design developed to accommodate the greatest number of needs across a large number of communities had not been part of the original range of solutions proposed to this community.

Lessons Learned

Bapah Nipah was a community that was functioning as well as it could under the circumstances. Relocation may well have extinguished or diminished the vitality of the community. This was more evident to the community members who refused to relocate than to the outsiders advocating for this solution. For CRC, the following are examples of learning from the Bapah Nipah experience. They can be considered as significant on a number of levels, applicable to future assessment and small- and large-scale reconstruction operations in a recovery context.

1. It is critical that adequate time is taken by the assessment and project/program teams to get to know the organization, structure and culture of a village and to identify the needs of villagers. It is necessary to involve villagers, including women, in the project through the use of various committees, community meetings, and the provision of opportunities for community members to provide input and, where appropriate, participate in some activities during construction, such as to earn money by clearing

land and assisting with house construction. Establishing early contact with the village leaders and existing local structures is necessary to make decisions and resolve disputes concerning the project. In this way, existing structures are strengthened and the use of participatory methods by the village leadership is either introduced or strengthened. In many cases, former village leaders had died in the tsunami and, in addition to strengthening local governance systems, the methods employed in the project reinforced their use by new, relatively inexperienced leaders.

2. Sustained benefits are only possible with full community participation in the decision-making process. Every proposed solution has to be weighed against risks and available resources, and extensive dialogue of these among key stakeholders (beneficiaries, local governments, donors) is critical.
3. Each stakeholder has to realize that other stakeholders will have non-negotiable criteria, and it is important that assessment teams have the capacity to have these made as explicit as possible, as soon as possible so that all essential interests are included in problem-solving and decision-making, and that final solutions will be accepted.
4. Ensure that budget forecasting and allocation is sufficient to allow for options and flexibility. It is better to build 1,500 houses where people want to live in than 2,000 that remain empty.
5. It is important to include assets such as community strength, cohesion and leadership in the assessment.
6. In problem-solving approaches, ensure that the assets and capacities of all stakeholders are considered in finding a solution. In this example, while Bapah Nipah was an established and strong community, CRC had strong construction expertise. Both of these assets were combined to find a solution.
7. When conducting assessments, it is necessary to remain flexible and open to a range of solutions, outcomes and decisions.
8. Rebuilding livelihoods and self-respect is a critical aspect of the recovery stage. Some of the destitution of the Aceh Jaya communities was directly attributable to not being able to provide for themselves. Although CRC's integrated program was designed for livelihood programs to work concurrently with construction and occupation of new houses, more immediate income-generating support even in the emergency and transitional phases would have helped. One example that was provided was that had an ice boat been available to transport fish, some of the fishermen could have started generating income for themselves even while they lived in tents.

Government Information Technology Executive Council (GITEC)

Rebuilding Communities

GOVERNMENT Information Technology Executive Council's (GITEC) role in the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Housing and Settlements in Aceh Province (RRHS-Aceh) was as the implementing consultant in partnership with PT Darena and Yayasan Mamamia, both of Indonesia.

Issues such as integrated settlement planning, housing, infrastructure and livelihood formed the base for sustaining RRHS program interventions and were embedded in each measure to achieve the RRHS programs' motto: 'Rebuilding Communities'. Reducing the scope of one component would have put into question the outcome and sustainability of the entire program. The motto Rebuilding Communities resulted in continuous and intensive cooperation with benefiting villages. The long-term strategy was to rebuild sustainable communities and economies. Each community was regarded as unique, with its own social framework, economy and skill base.

Rebuilding of communities began with planning at the grassroots level. RRHS discussed in detail the planned interventions with representatives of the community in the field and incorporated their knowledge on the local environment into the planning and implementation process of the housing, infrastructure and livelihood measures.

Participation and Assessment

Regular meetings were held in all villages to discuss the assessment and implementation process. An open exchange of views was the key to the success of the RRHS approach. Village-based MoUs specifying the terms and conditions of support were signed by the communities, local government, BRR and RRHS after all parties became acquainted with the program activities and promised to provide full support. The details of the interventions, however, were set up in discussions with the communities in the following planning and implementation stages. Activities were prioritized and targets specified in interactions between the communities and RRHS throughout the entire planning and implementation process.

The selection of beneficiary families required discussions within the communities in collaboration with the RRHS program partners in order to avoid future misunderstandings, envy and disputes. The beneficiary lists were cross-checked with the lists of the other organizations to avoid double housing and thereafter handed over to BRR for its records. RRHS signed a contract with each beneficiary specifying in detail the activities to be provided by RRHS, the responsibilities of the parties, the time frame and payment schedule. Each beneficiary had to provide certified proof of land ownership. The breakdown of the large-scale RRHS construction activities into contracts with individual families was a milestone of consequent grassroots participation. It respected the beneficiary as a partner and not as a recipient of charity. It empowered the beneficiary as the initiator of the reconstruction of his/her new home. The beneficiary had to inspect and sign for all materials and input received from RRHS. The program facilitated this process through advice and training. Upon completion, a certificate was signed by both parties to document the successful implementation of the work.

Participatory Planning

Community development plans were prepared for all RRHS villages on the basis of recommendations by the communities and site surveys. This exercise was carried out in partnership with the community action plan (CAP) initiative, which was supportted by Support for Local Governance for Sustainable Reconstruction (SLGSR) of German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). The CAP process was conducted in a series of workshops held in the respective village. Community members were coached through the needs assessment and planning process. The results were compiled in a comprehensive document as the basis for village development. The community plan was open to revision during the implementation process.

The programme developed a good cooperation with the local hollow block manufacturers. Their expertise in concrete stone production has been essential to achieve a standardised decent quality of the hollow blocks. They followed with their production lines close to the next house construction sites in order to minimize transportation cost and breakage. Photo: GITEC Documentation

RRHS supported the land acquisition process within the community without intervention or financial assistance of government authorities. Some local landowners, however, wanted to profit from the land reallocation and demanded unaffordable prices for the plots. It was the task of the community to negotiate accordingly as they were only eligible for support after the land issue was solved.

Strengthening of Local Democratic Structures and Social Capital

RRHS relied on the use of indigenous customs —deliberation, community focus group, etc— involving women and youth, for beneficiary selection, land use planning and consultation on program implementation. Villagers were challenged to make complex decisions on reintegrating individuals, such as tsunami/conflict refugees or ex-combatants into the community and reorganize land tenure structures to allow for new settlements or equal access to productive land.

Economic Stimulation

Stimulation of the local economy was an integral part of the RRHS reconstruction approach. It was the intention of the program to spend as much as possible of the reconstruction funds at the village level to overcome the economic breakdown, cash flow and production problems in the tsunami-affected areas.

The program developed good cooperation with the local hollow block manufacturers. Their expertise in concrete stone production was essential to achieving a standardized decent quality of hollow blocks. They set up production sites close to construction sites in order to minimize transportation costs and breakage. Each beneficiary received construction materials and a cash payment of Rp 8.7 million for labor costs for the house construction under the Mamamia self-help approach. It was up the individual beneficiary to do all the physical work himself or to employ local craftsmen and workers to do part of the job.

The rehabilitation of smallholder agro-forestry plantations followed a similar cash-for-work approach. This type of work, however, was always implemented by the beneficiary family themselves. The cash injections in the villages were important for small local enterprises and service providers to re-establish their businesses.

The beneficiary families were advised to open bank accounts when the program moved to the hinterlands in order to reduce the risk of transporting payments of large amounts. Mamamia established links with local banks and arranged for them to visit the Mamamia base camp twice a week in order to facilitate the opening of accounts and thus reduce travel expenses for the beneficiaries. The opening of bank accounts by the beneficiaries was another step toward their empowerment by entering into formalized economic structures and having access to formal loan facilities.

RRHS contractors were encouraged to closely cooperate with the communities in locally sourcing material and labor as well as using local enterprises. They mostly relied on experienced work teams and augmented them with local labor. The communities made agreements with the contractors on the provision of locally available materials and the number of workers to be employed from the area. The system was beneficial to both parties and ensured a safe and undisrupted working environment.

A number of small local concrete stone producers and construction companies were supported by training, advance payments and supply contracts to purchase production equipment and to establish hollow block stone production sites. The stone producers received requests from private parties and construction companies. The construction of infrastructure gave reliable access and provision of services to the communities. They were the foundation of a competitive environment for production and processing in the agricultural-based economy.

Legalized landownership for the beneficiaries was another milestone for future economic development of the communities. RRHS set the availability of traditional landownership certificates of a plot/garden as a main eligibility criterion in order to enhance land security. Traditional ownership certificates were eventually to be converted into legally recognized documents by the local government.

Sand for construction was usually sourced from nearby rivers using local labor, who were paid per cubic meter. The local communities that owned the riversides also benefited through mining concession fees paid by the contractor on the basis of sand and gravel quantity.

Operation and Maintenance

The rehabilitation and reconstruction measures of the program focused on two target groups: the individual beneficiary for housing and livelihood, and the village as a whole for the infrastructure component.

RRHS gave beneficiaries training and advice from the planning stage through to completion. After final inspection, the beneficiary took over responsibility for the house and co-signed a completion certificate with local government and RRHS. Regular on-site inspections, house occupancy and post-construction surveys revealed that 96 percent of the houses were occupied and properly maintained. Approximately 30 percent of the house owners had added extensions to their houses.

The long-term operation of plantations was supported through a system of local farmer organizations, cooperatives and Mamamia.

Basic settlement infrastructure interventions were planned and implemented with the communities. Low maintenance solutions were applied. Community members were always actively involved in construction activities. Joint inspection was carried out before the handing over of infrastructure to the local government. The handover document specified in detail the executed work, operation and maintenance tasks.

Sizeable piped water supply systems were handed over to PDAM water company. Small-scale water supply systems were handed over to water user groups that would collect monthly fees from households and employ a caretaker for the system.

GTZ developed standard operation and maintenance systems for small infrastructure works and conducted several training sessions in RRHS villages in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar and Pidie. RRHS handed over all program measures to the BRR asset management team, which was responsible for providing a comprehensive database on all reconstruction work that would eventually be handed over to local governments. Local governments would use the database to plan and allocate their respective operation and maintenance budget. The handover system developed by RRHS was used by BRR as a sample to be copied by organizations.

Sustainability

The transparency of the entire implementation process built trust at the community level. Ownership was considered essential for sustainability. The self-help approach provided the tools and expertise to build and maintain the newly constructed houses. Many house owners decorated and painted their new homes, expressing their individuality, pride and satisfaction.

The use of local expertise and resources was the focal point of RRHS. The cooperation between the RRHS team and the beneficiaries, communities and local government institutions in the implementation of the day-to-day activities ensured that the program measures could be sustained locally.

The cooperation with Mamamia as the main implementation partner guaranteed that local expertise would remain in Aceh and could be replicated in other areas. Mamamia also planned to transform some of its base camps into rural development centers to provide long-term advice in the livelihood sector to the communities.

House Designs

RRHS reconstructed 7,625 houses for some 38,000 beneficiaries in 145 villages in nine districts. Of these, 5,642 houses were funded through the German government and 1,533 houses through the Indonesian government.

The principal design of the plasterboard, or kalsiplank (KP), house was developed by Mamamia with a blend of traditional craftsmanship and modern building technology.

The 42-square-meter house has a bathroom, kitchen area and a small veranda. The foundation is made of stone while the structural elements are timber that is filled in with plastered brick walls up to 1.2 m. Plasterboard is used on the upper parts of the walls and ceiling. The roof is corrugated iron sheets and the floors are cement. The doors and windows are done in wood. Each house has a tiled bathroom, septic tank and electrical installations. The University of Banda Aceh tested and certified the house as earthquake-resistant. About 44 percent of the houses funded by German development bank KfW were built using kalsiplank, mainly in Bireuen district.

The hollow block house was designed as an alternative to the KP house but with thicker walls. The use of wood could be therefore reduced. The cement hollow blocks are more environmentally friendly than bricks as they require no firing. The 42-square-meter-house has a bathroom, kitchen area and a small veranda. The house has a stone foundation.

The University of Banda Aceh tested and certified the hollow block house as earthquake-resistant. About 44 percent of the KfW houses were built with hollow blocks, mainly in Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar, Pidie, Aceh Jaya and Bener Meriah.

RRHS's average cost per house in 2006 was Rp 53 million, in 2007 Rp 65 million and in 2008 Rp 75 million. The overall average cost for the construction of one RRHS house amounted to Rp 57,238,296 or around 4,800 Euros.

Photo: GITEC Documentation

Yayasan Inovasi Pemerintahan Daerah (YIPD)

Resolving the Vanished Land Boundaries

THE tsunami resulted in the loss of lives and property, including settlement areas where physical land boundaries, recorded documents of boundaries and land ownership also vanished.

The uncertain land boundaries were a major constraint in post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction, particularly in building donated houses. Without knowing land boundaries it was impossible to determine actual land plots and ownership.

Yayasan Inovasi Pemerintahan Daerah (Center for Local Government Innovation: YIPD) established an office and appointed a program coordinator based in Banda Aceh in February 2005 to help resolve this problem. It placed priority on identifying land boundaries through participatory community-based village mapping. YIPD was one of the first organizations to conduct community-based village mapping, with the main objectives being to avoid future land disputes among residents and facilitating the work of the regional government, BRR and other organizations in village planning and reconstruction of settlement areas and public facilities.

Location priorities were determined based on the level of damage and through coordination with districts, sub-districts, villages and BRR.

Development and Implementation

YIPD was appointed the implementing agency of the Aceh Governance Development Program (AGDP) of United Stated Agency for International Development (USAID). (February 2005 - September 2005), Bessemer Trust Assistance Program (June 2005-December 2005), Bush-Clinton Tsunami Assistance Program (September 2005-August 2006) and the Aceh-Nias Governance Enhancement Program (ANGEP) of Aceh Technical Assistance Recovery Project (ATARP)-USAID (April 2006-September 2007).

Community-based village mapping is part of the AGDP and ANGEP. For AGDP, YIPD provided assistance in developing community land maps at villages in Meuraxa, Kutaraja, Jaya Baru, Baiturrahman, Kuta Alam and Syiah Kuala sub-districts in Banda Aceh, and Lhoknga and Leupung villages in Aceh Besar regency. For ANGEP, YIPD assisted community-based village mapping at villages in sub-districts in the regencies of Aceh Besar, Aceh Barat Daya and North Aceh. The technical editing of the maps was done by specialists at the digital mapping studio of YIPD in Jakarta.

In the first initiative, simple land measurements were taken using compasses, hand-held Geographic Positioning System (GPS) devices and measuring tapes.

Action Taken

The purpose of the innovation was to have better and accountable maps that could be used as reference for future activities. The methods and steps were discussed by all the experts at YIPD, including specialists at its digital mapping studio.

This initiative started by preparing community-based mapping facilitators and providing them with simple equipment for mapping, and later approaching village heads and other officials. Local governments at the regency, sub-district and village levels were then informed. After receiving support from the local government, YIPD organized village meetings involving village and sub-district heads to disseminate information about the initiative. During the meetings, information was provided on the procedure to be used to identify land boundaries and registration of land claims was carried out, which involved residents and community leaders as witnesses.

YIPD collaborated with the local community to determine land boundaries and incorporated them into scaled maps with information on ownership. The initial maps were based on the satellite images data from IKONOS satellite and aerial photographs produced by NORAD and provided by BRR. In the refinement phase, the projected maps were adjusted according to the national geodetic system.

To make the initiative a success, YIPD first took measures to build villagers' trust and confidence in the initiative, collected data on the population of villagers who survived the disaster (including those in temporary shelters), organized meetings with villagers to confirm the interpretation of each aerial-based map (particularly in determining the shape of the lots and ownership) and reached agreement on activities to be carried out, such as filling out forms, placement of boundary stakes, and length and width of land plots.

Where possible, placement of boundary stakes was done individually by landowners to cover all the land in the villages. They also placed boundary stakes on collectively owned land and on land whose owners were living outside the villages and were not present during the activities.

Landowners then filled in a Surat Pernyataan Pemasangan Tanda Batas dan Penguasaan Fisik (statement of land boundary and physical possession). Landowners' neighbors witnessed the activity and the statements were certified by village heads.

In cases where discrepancies were found between a community-based map and an initial aerial map, land measurements were taken and drawn on the initial map with the owner's name on it.

Information gathered in the field was used to refine the boundary map. This was done in the digital mapping studio in Jakarta. The result was a projected map complete with coordinates in accordance with the national system.

Each revised map was displayed in a public area (usually in the Meunasah community center or a mosque) for at least 10 days, at least until after Friday prayers. Any complaints or objections were settled in meetings attended by village heads and related parties. After a settlement was reached, all of the decisions/agreements were written down, and any additional relevant information was added to the map.

After a public presentation was done, all revisions were documented and sent back to the YIPD digital mapping studio with the map.

Final revision was conducted and revised village lot maps were sent back to the village to be sign by the village head and other relevant officials. Each map could be used in future cases of land adjudication as well as in village spatial and development planning.

These activities received the full support of local governments and BRR as the agency responsible for the reconstruction and rehabilitation.

Challenges

Problems were encountered during implementation of the initiative, such as difficulty in assembling landowners, most of whom had been displaced and were living in different shelters. Furthermore, difficulty was experienced in trying to motivate villagers, most of whom were busy trying to earn survival money.

As the success of the community-based initiative depended on an adequate number of participants to determine land boundaries and ownership, this problem was addressed by rescheduling meetings to suit the villagers, village heads and community leaders.

Not only was demarcating land boundaries found to be difficult due to changes in land condition caused by the disaster, but much of the initial data selected for community-based village mapping was found to have accuracies. In addressing the inaccuracies, additional surveillance was conducted to determine the correct locations.

Lessons Learned

The activities carried out achieved the targeted results. All the maps were handed over to village heads and BRR, and were used for village planning and construction of settlement areas.

The YIPD initiative indirectly reshaped the community's mindset and ability in demarcating missing land boundaries. The steps carried out in the initiative were new to the community. Using digital technology, aerial and satellite images and participatory mapping were important skills for the villagers that should be widely taught.

In general, this case applied good governance principles, such as community participation and strategic vision.

Community members now know and understand how to identify and reconstruct damaged land boundaries. All initiatives that relate to or use scientific methods (engineering for instance) should meet a minimum level of performance according to its discipline and further use. One of the purposes of innovation is to meet standards in an efficient and better/simpler way.

An indirect result of these activities was that villagers who had been traumatized by the tsunami found a collective activity that helped revive their spirits and solidarity. The direct result was a map of the village that determined land boundaries through village consensus, which eliminated the risk of dispute.

Replication of Initiative

In collaboration with BRR, YIPD has compiled "Manual Kesepakatan Warga tentang Batas Bidang Tanah, Kepemilikan dan Penandaan Bidang Tanah dalam Peta" (Manual on Villager Agreement Regarding Land Boundaries, Land Ownership and Demarcation of Land Boundaries). Guidelines in the manual have been adopted by various organizations implementing similar activities in other location.

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Using the Traditional Village Meetings

SUCCESSFUL Community Action Planning in Aceh: Using the model of traditional village meetings, a team of experts organized the reconstruction of entire villages in cooperation with the inhabitants, supported by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ).

Introduction

"This is how our village will look!" says Baharuddin, village leader of Lamtutui, on the west coast of Aceh province. In front of him is a simple wooden model showing a new Lamtutui. The old one no longer exists. The tsunami that struck on December 26, 2004, did not leave a single house in this fishing village intact. About 1,000 of the 1,300 inhabitants died. Baharuddin lost his wife and two children, and he spent a month in an internally displaced persons camp. But then he returned to rebuild his village. He and the other survivors in his village got the necessary help for this difficult task from the team of experts at Community Action Planning (CAP) —part of the development project Support for Local Governance and Sustainable Reconstruction (SLGSR), supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) through its implementing agency German Technical Cooperation, the GTZ.

Inhabitants of Pasi Lhok village in Aceh Besar discuss the reconstruction of their homes as demonstrated by a wooden model in November 2006. Today their village is rebuilt according to the worked-out plans. Photo: GTZ/Volker Kess

Community Action Planning is a participative working method that organizes cooperation within a community. The SLGSR team's goal was to actively engage the inhabitants of approximately 40 ruined villages in the reconstruction of their homes. Indonesia has a long tradition of the village community deciding jointly on matters that affect everyone, and of jointly carrying out that decision. In this way, each person can air his or her ideas —and fears as well. This process, in Aceh called musyawarah, often takes several days, but it does ensure that everyone is behind the decision. The CAP team adapted its own working method to this process. The experts make their knowledge available so as to help the villagers to help themselves—although the villagers ultimately decide their own future.

This was the case in Lamtutui. The entire community spent two days sitting together and deliberating on the reconstruction of the village. A key part of the discussion focused on an escape route on the hill behind the village, in the event of another tsunami. But the villagers also discussed the position of the buildings and the route to be taken by the new main street. Should it be farther from the sea? This and many other questions ultimately led to a model that everyone was happy with.

Development and Implementation

The idea for the CAP team arose in April 2005, when the GTZ, in conjunction with the German Development Bank (KfW), was looking for a way to get tsunami victims in Aceh more involved in the reconstruction of their villages. The first challenge was to find a team that could offer technical advice to the selected communities, while also being able to give professional assistance in the social process of reaching a decision. Eventually, 12 local experts were chosen, each of whom had an important qualification that would be useful in a sensible village planning process. They included architects, geologists, land-use planners, economists and sociologists.

The team first spoke with the village leader and the local imam, to introduce themselves and to collect all the necessary information: how many people survived, how many buildings were destroyed, where are the sources of fresh water?

Subsequently, the site was surveyed and all the inhabitants informed of the results. Using a three-dimensional model, there was a collective brainstorming session to explore the various possible ways of reconstructing the village. The model houses were placed first here, then there. As soon as the villagers had reached a decision, the CAP team put together a plan for the reconstruction. This plan detailed the arrangement of the plots of land and the buildings, as well as their owners. It also held information on water supplies and possible escape routes in case of a natural disaster. Then the village leader was given the completed plan, which he could then pass on to the organization that was later to take on the reconstruction work.

The village communities were often initially skeptical toward the CAP experts. When the team first came to Lamtutui, for instance, a number of aid organizations were already present. These organizations had made all sorts of promises without intensively talking to the community about its needs. The villagers were suspicious, wondering what these strangers were planning to do after asking all their questions. But that attitude changed very quickly once the CAP team called on them to take an active role. With the help of the experts, they were able to survey their village and decide who would be allowed to build where.

"The crowd of people participating didn't even fit inside the temporary meeting room," says land-use planner Zamharira of the CAP team. "So we divided them up into working groups. The men talked about where to put the roads, the women about the structure of the houses, and even the children drew what they wanted on paper."

It quickly became clear that everyone stood to benefit from this cooperative approach. The villagers were able to incorporate their ideas. The village leader was able to make a decision that everyone supported. And the organization that was to rebuild the village was able to base its work on ready-made plans that corresponded with the wishes of the inhabitants.

As early as late 2005, the team was getting inquiries from other projects interested in the CAP method. The team began working for other organizations more and more frequently. They included the German Red Cross and the German Caritas. Due to the

increasing demand, the GTZ-supported SLGSR project finally decided to separate the CAP team entirely and to turn it into an NGO in its own right, one that could offer its services to anyone. The Yayasan Cipta Aksi Partisipatif (Foundation for the Creation of Participative Action) has been an independent Indonesian aid organization since Nov. 13, 2006.

But it retains its close ties to the GTZ. SLGSR officials assisted in the organizing of the new NGO in areas such as training in accounting, budgeting and management structure. In addition, CAP foundation members had to learn how to draft a project proposal and how to take part in a public call for tenders, so as to be competitive in the market. In the course of 2008, the new organization won its first public call for tenders. The team was commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme to work in cooperation with locals to plan an effective waste disposal system in the Aceh districts of Bireuen and Pidie. And since January 2009, CAP experts have been working on behalf of the German Red Cross to ensure that reconstructed villages are able to maintain their new fresh water and sanitation systems.

Analysis

"We were surprised ourselves at just how well our method was received," says Zamharira, who was a part of the CAP team from the very start. One key reason for its success was surely the fact that the Indonesian experts oriented their approach along the lines of traditional village meetings, just as they have been held in Indonesia for hundreds of years. Of course, the extraordinary circumstances also helped with acceptance of the CAP team. After the tsunami, hundreds of international aid organizations arrived in Aceh, but they lacked familiarity with the culture. They depended on the knowledge of local experts so as to truly be able to agree with the affected villagers on the reconstruction process. By September 2008, the GTZ-supported project team had worked together with a total of about 4,500 people.

As reconstruction in Aceh is largely finished, the CAP foundation is now focusing on the organization and communication of collective methods of operation —including planning processes in a government office, or simply determining who is responsible for the maintenance of a village water pipe. The team has also compiled topographical analyses in which land is not just surveyed, but also categorized according to its characteristics. These analyses are particularly important when it comes to major projects like a waste disposal site or an airport. In the long term, the CAP foundation would like to be involved in projects in other parts of Indonesia as well.

For the GTZ, the CAP method has certainly become an indispensable instrument. So that other organizations can benefit from this fund of experience and can build their own teams, the CAP experts have summarized the experience they gathered in Aceh in a handbook. Baharuddin, the village leader in Lamtutui, recorded his experience in a different way —in a poem thanking the CAP team for giving his village a future.

Yayasan Masyarakat Makmur Mitra Adil (Mamamia)

Rebuilding Houses and the Surrounding Cropland

Helping the Poor

FOUNDATION Mamamia was established in Aceh in early 2003 to promote the interests of poor people in the province, particularly in rural areas. Mamamia stands for Masyarakat Makmur Mitra Adil or People's Welfare through Equitable Partnerships. Mamamia's first activities were carried out in four villages in Montasik sub-district in Greater Aceh in early 2003 in partnership with Klat Limbang (KUB). The Montasik Project dealt with the production and marketing of chili.

Mamamia started its relief activities on the very day that the tsunami struck by distributing bottled water, instant noodles and the like. In subsequent weeks and months, Mamamia helped thousands of displaced persons by mobilizing teams of young Acehnese to distribute emergency goods supplied by non-governmental organization CWS.

Together with donor agencies, Caritas Austria and Germany mobilized the needed funds with which Mamamia built 1,057 houses in Lhoong sub-district as from March 2005. The program, called the Lhoong House Rehabilitation Program (PRR-L), has been one of the success stories of house reconstruction for victims of the tsunami. It was also the first program successfully carried out by Mamamia-Caritas using an empowerment strategy.

The success of PRR-L led to Caritas (German and Austria) placing more trust in Mamamia in reconstruction programs. In turn, other international donor agencies such as KfW and GITEC became willing partners in reconstruction. Through activities under the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Housing and Settlements in Aceh (RRHS-A), cooperation was forged to build 4,051 houses in various tsunami-hit districts and 462 houses in Bener Meriah district.

Besides the reconstruction program, Mamamia conducted activities in disadvantaged areas and rehabilitated destroyed agricultural land in the districts of Bener Meriah and Pidie Jaya.

House Reconstruction Program

PRR-L is the house reconstruction program for tsunami victims in Lhoong Aceh Besar, which involved the participation of those affected by the disaster. It was the first reconstruction program implemented by Mamamia in cooperation with donor agencies Caritas (German and Austria) and the Indonesian government through the BRR.

The PRR-L aimed at addressing all reconstruction needs of entire villages. The population of each village concerned became the partner of Mamamia in regard to reconstruction. Negotiations and consultations took place in village meetings. These meetings addressed issues such as: 1) the content of the Grant Contract offered to each beneficiary on the basis of which he/she would become both the principal and the builder of his/her own house; 2) eligible beneficiaries; 3) legal status requirements for the land on which the beneficiary would build his/her house; 4) the type of house that would be built and its technical features; 5) supply of needed building materials to each beneficiary by Mamamia; 6) technical assistance by Mamamia technical staff to each beneficiary; 7) logistical matters; and 8) relocation issues based on the "Blueprint for Reconstruction" of the Government of Indonesia.

In regards to the Grant Contract, in the application of Mamamia's "empowerment policy", each approved beneficiary was offered a Grant Contract on the basis of which he/she would become both the principal and the builder of his/her house. The whole package - comprising required tools, all necessary building materials and building costs - was offered to beneficiaries as a grant.

The contents of the Grant Contract were explained, proposed and negotiated during village meetings from initial contact between each target village and Mamamia as follows:

1) upon the signing of the Grant Contract and in application thereof; 2) the beneficiary would receive a package of tools comprising all items needed to construct a house; 3) subsequently, Mamamia's technical team would carry out the builder's specification on site]with the orientation indicated by the beneficiary; 4) hereupon, the beneficiary would excavate the places where the foundation would be laid; 5) simultaneously, Mamamia would supply the needed stones, sand/gravel and steel; 6) foundation beams;

7) construction of the foundation would be carried out by the beneficiary under the guidance and the supervision of Mamamia's technical team; 8) this procedure would continue until the house was finished; 9) total building costs would amount to Rp 7.5 million per house; and so forth.

Although each beneficiary was encouraged to carry out the building work him/herself, he/she was in turn allowed to hire the services of a more qualified person for all or part of the work. In such a case, the beneficiary him/herself would have to negotiate the contract conditions with the workman and settle the dues after receiving each installment of the building expenses. In many cases, a beneficiary would appoint a workman, who in return would hire the labor of the beneficiary against payment of a daily fee. In this way, some cash flowed between the beneficiary and the workman. The system allowed the beneficiary to monitor the workman and to inform the technical staff of Mamamia if he/she suspected something amiss, such as the disappearance of building materials.

After contract details had been decided upon, beneficiaries had to be determined before the program could be executed. Mamamia exercised caution and discretion in the establishment of the beneficiary list for each village. Beneficiary identification was done on the basis of lists established at village and sub-district levels. The Mamamia beneficiary identification team assessed the eligibility of each person listed on the basis of strict criteria, such as: 1) the beneficiary was a member of the village community at the time of the tsunami; 2) his/her house was destroyed by the tsunami; 3) only the surviving household head would be considered, not additional relatives who may also have lived in his/her house; 4) all house-reconstruction needs in each target village were to be attended to; 5) no distinction would be made for reasons of age and/or gender, neither for reasons of religious and/or political affiliation; and 6) the candidate beneficiary must be in control of the land on which he/she proposed to build his/her house.

For the execution of the PRR-L, Mamamia accepted the possession of a land deed as the basis for granting assistance. Land ownership obtained in accordance with Traditional Law was considered sufficiently strong legal proof of landownership to allow a beneficiary to start building/working on the land. There were three points to this policy: first a potential beneficiary was entitled to assistance in (re-)building his/her house under the PRR-L Program, provided that he/she could prove ownership of the land in the form of a land deed or could produce a letter stating his/her entitlement to the land. A letter of entitlement had to be signed by the land title holder and the village head, as well as by a witness from the village. The letter had to be accompanied by a diagram of the land on which the dimensions and the total size were indicated, as well as the land boundaries. The measurements of the land were checked by Mamamia's technical team before any endorsement. Second, a land deed had to be processed by the district office with a view to establishing a land certificate signed by the district head. Finally, a land certificate had to be converted to a land deed by the land office. The government had allocated a large number of certificates to be allocated to tsunami victims free of charge. Since both land

deeds and certificates represented a right to the concerned land, Mamamia accepted deeds as sufficient proof so as to start construction activities.

By April 2006, 985 houses had been built in 11 villages in Lhoong. The average price per house as per March 31, 2006 was Rp 30,312,583, including Mamamia's delivery costs. Subsequently, Caritas Austria agreed to finance an additional 73 houses at a cost of Rp 44,801,677 per house (including delivery costs and some additional features); to upgrade the initial 985 houses with an additional plasterboard wall lining; to install electricity in all houses and to connect the houses to piped water, the primary system of which was to be built by CWS. When the PRR-L was formally closed on Nov. 29, 2006, 1,057 houses were listed on the Memorial Stone unveiled in Krueng Kala village, Lhoong.

Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Housing and Settlements in Aceh (RRHS)

The successes story of PRR-L as implemented by Mamamia-Caritas resulted in increased trust in Mamamia on the part of foreign donors, and the German KfW Development Bank showed an interest in funding a similar program.

In the beginning of July 2005, Mamamia was approached by German consultancy firm GITEC Consult GmbH, which proposed joint participation in the KfW-RRHS Aceh Tender, with the understanding that GITEC would be the lead party and Mamamia would be the house reconstruction coordinator. Mamamia was to apply its empowerment model and GITEC would supervise Mamamia's technical and financial activities. As the lead party, GITEC would take care of all dealings with KfW, BRR and relevant institutions, and reports.

After the RRHS was commissioned to GITEC and its associates, a detailed Agreement of Cooperation was negotiated and signed between GITEC and Mamamia on October 1, 2005. Mamamia stated that GITEC could engage in alternative reconstruction models so as to ensure the achievement of the targets within the time-frame set for the program in the case that the Mamamia model did not produce results fast enough. However, Mamamia chose not to be involved in the execution of any alternative activities.

In accordance with the agreement, Mamamia administered its own finances and received financing in Euros from GITEC's head office in Germany. Mamamia agreed to report to the RRHS-Aceh general manager in Banda Aceh. When GITEC and Mamamia signed the agreement, the number of houses to be built by Mamamia was estimated at 5,000. By the end of 2008, 4,513 houses had been completed, comprising 555 in Baitusalam sub-district, Greater Aceh; 250 houses in Punge Blang Cut, Banda Aceh; 2,420 in Bireuen district, 826 in Aceh Jaya district, and 462 in Bener Meriah district.

Under the RRHS program, Mamamia built two types of houses: plasterboard and hollow block. Plasterboard houses had the same dimensions and layout as the plasterboard houses in Lhoong (42 square meters, including a six-square-meter inside bathroom).

However, some features were somewhat changed and/or reinforced such as a small terrace, thicker roofing, and a steel anchor between the foundation and vertical wooden beams. The hollow block houses were designed by GITEC at the end of 2005 and also measured 42 square meters with a six-square-meter bathroom inside. The walls were made from concrete blocks 15 cm wide with two inner holes. During construction of the walls, steel bars were inserted in the holes at regular intervals and the holes filled with concrete, resulting in a stronger construction. Of the 4,513 houses constructed, plasterboard houses numbered 2,574 and hollow block 1,939.

RRHS-DA Program

The RRHS-DA program was designed specifically for the development and rehabilitation of formerly productive land. There were two main programs, namely the home reconstruction and the development of agro-economic areas.

In the housing development program, 462 houses in Bener Meriah were built using the same empowerment strategy as in the earlier Mamamia interventions under the RRHS-Aceh Program. An adapted version of the hollow block house was developed in the form of a house measuring 36 square meters with an attached outside bathroom. The cost of each house was Rp 58,650,000, with an additional Rp 12,190,000 for the bathroom. Prices included the 15 percent delivery cost of Mamamia.

In the agro-economic program, beneficiaries in Bener Meriah were each offered the opportunity to rehabilitate a maximum area of one hectare of destroyed coffee farms. In practice, house owners were unable to cover one hectare each, and so other affected coffee growers were offered the facility as well. At present, the number of assisted farmers reaches 562. This figure may increase to 750 farmers so as to reach the target of 450 ha of rehabilitated coffee farms. The rehabilitation costs total Rp 9.7 million per hectare, including the provision of selected seedlings, but not including Mamamia's delivery costs and general items such as surveys and aftercare measures.

Challenges

Mamamia did not experience smooth sailing in its reconstruction program. Problems were encountered relating to obtaining raw materials in the PRRL, RRHS-A and RRHS-DA projects, illegal fees and misunderstanding of Mamamia's operations.

The availability of wood, cement, sand and other materials is vital to the success of a construction project, and these were difficult to obtain in post-tsunami Aceh. To overcome this, Mamamia sourced raw materials from outside of Aceh, namely from Medan.

However, problems arose in the form of illegal fees due to the need to transport materials from Medan to Aceh, which were an additional burden to project implementation.

Misunderstanding of Mamamia's operations arose due to allegations that timber used by Mamamia was illegal wood. The large number of NGOs conducting similar housing reconstruction projects in Aceh created competition among NGOs, which could lead to such allegations. However, owing to the involvement of communities in reconstruction programs run by Mamamia, through the approach of the people of Aceh, the problems related to this issue were overcome.

Other Programs

Mamamia developed several other programs associated with reconstruction activities in Aceh, including programs involving 1) emergency assistance, 2) the RHSI program, 3) agriculture and agro-forestry measures, 4) RPWP, and 5) TMD.

In the emergency assistance program—in cooperation with CWS—during the weeks and months following the tsunami, ways and means were found to help the thousands of displaced persons who had converged on Banda Aceh in the wake of the tsunami. CWS delivered truckloads of emergency goods and Mamamia brought together teams of young Acehnese to distribute them.

The Rehabilitation and Health System Improvement Program (RHSI Program) is a program to expand health services in the eastern and central districts of Aceh province. By September 2007, GITEC had helped Mamamia build 79 village health centers in 10 districts and two cities with the understanding that the facilities would be built by applying the Mamamia "empowerment strategy." At present, 32 health centers are in operation, comprising 20 in Bener Meriah district, seven in Aceh Tengah and five in Bireuen. These clinics benefit the host communities and have improved the quality of health services in the target areas.

In the agricultural and agro-forestry arena, Mamamia's cooperation with the Belgian NGO Ieder Voor Allen (IVA) provides funds for disaster victims to rehabilitate agricultural and forestry plants. Plants like nutmeg, mahogany, grapefruit, tamarind, cacao and durian have been supplied to farmers and communities in Lhoong and Lamno.

The Rural People's Welfare Program (RPWP Program) is intended to increase the living standards of the poor in Juli sub-district, Bireuen district and was aimed at the improvement of poor farmers' living conditions in one village through the production of perennial crops. This program was funded by Caritas Austria.

Lessons Learned

Conditions in post-tsunami Aceh hampered early programs conducted by Mamamia in the field of reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, Mamamia's strong commitment to the recovery program ensured the success of the programs, as can be seen in Mamamia's house reconstruction and land rehabilitation projects.

In house reconstruction, for example, through the PRRL and RRHS-A programs, Mamamia's cooperation with foreign donors resulted in the construction of more than 5,000 homes, equivalent to nearly seven percent of the total houses built by all NGOs in Aceh. The active involvement of community members through Mamamia's empowerment strategy was key to its success. Communities were actively involved in the design of houses, raw material procurement and construction supervision right through to construction completion. Their involvement created a strong connection between Mamamia and the communities.

There have been no complaints by respective owners, indicating satisfaction with their houses and proving the effectiveness of the empowerment strategy executed by Mamamia.

Mamamia also rehabilitated damaged land to make it productive. In the coffee area in Bener Meriah district, for example, Mamamia involved local communities in rehabilitating land for growing coffee. People have benefited through the "share the yield" system, which is managed by Koperasi Usaha Bersama (KUB) and the local economy is improving. More than 750 people have become registered coffee farmers. This system is also being applied to other crops, such as chili, pepper, cloves and pine trees.

United Nations-Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)

From Building Houses to Assisting Urban Governance

Spatial Planning for Long-term Rebuilding of the Meuraxa Area

ONE year after the tsunami, the UN agencies initiated, within the framework of the United Nations Development Programme's ERTR program for sustainable reconstruction, the UN-Joint Programming (UNJP) in Meuraxa, Banda Aceh, and in Teluk Dalam, South Nias. The overall purpose of UNJP was to promote a well-planned and coordinated recovery at the local level, by means of joint UN actions and assistance programs for communities and local authorities.

In 2006, United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) entered into partnerships with local government institutions and non-governmental organizations. In both locations, it facilitated an Urban Forum and delegated teams of facilitators for spatial planning to the forum.

UN-HABITAT took a strong participatory approach in its spatial planning exercise and coordinated with other organizations involved in planning, including the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh-Nias (BRR) and the Banda Aceh city government.

Within the capital city of Aceh Province, Meuraxa is an important and complex coastal sub-district with a rich heritage. It was also the most heavily destroyed area, where massive loss of life occurred. UN-HABITAT aimed not to rush the completion of legal

land use plans but instead facilitate consensus building on such issues as basic spatial structure, major infrastructure reticulation and general visions and scenarios - elements and levels where the participation of the survivors proved to be possible.

UN-HABITAT's support for planning was an opportunity to strengthen local capacity and governance, considered vital in the following years of reconstruction. Planning activities by UN-HABITAT were also an instrument for the formation of operational links between reconstruction and long-term development goals.

Joint Programming and Participatory Planning on Nias Island, North Sumatera

Nias was hit by both the December 2004 tsunami and a strong earthquake in March 2005. The UNJP worked in Teluk Dalam, a small port town in South Nias district.

UN-HABITAT and P5-Diponegoro University (UNDIP), a participatory planning venture set up by UNDIP in Semarang, Central Java, designed a capacity building program for the local community. Its purpose was to improve the community's capacity in steering the process of planning and development in cooperation with local authorities.

The planning exercise in Teluk Dalam focused on tourism-supporting infrastructure. Following a rigorous participatory approach, its result proved to be a well validated priority matrix. The process also produced interesting and very useful byproducts, for example a participatory economic-cluster analysis of tourism and tourism-related activities. Furthermore, a waterfront design for a small urban area and its immediate fringe areas was initiated.

South Nias has a unique potential for tourism, from reputed surfing beaches to famous warrior villages. However, reconstruction work was degrading natural environments: scattered and unmanaged coastal sand mining, riverine stone and pebble mining, etc. Cultural destinations such as traditional villages were also degrading in both physical and socio-cultural dimensions. Poverty was clearly a result, and not necessarily the cause, of this degradation.

Settlement Recovery Monitoring: Comparing Urban and Rural Progress

In 2005, BRR encouraged Banda Aceh's Syiah Kuala University, in cooperation with UN-HABITAT, to provide third-party monitoring and evaluation of 161 villages. UN-HABITAT also contributed evaluations of the progress and of issues of settlement recovery.

It was found that most beneficiaries living in districts outside Banda Aceh were satisfied with their new homes, the way they were provided and the way they could participate

in the process. However, in the city of Banda Aceh the results gave reason to worry: the average construction quality was lower, a majority of beneficiaries was dissatisfied and most processes were less accountable. People in Banda Aceh did not receive less assistance than those living outside the city, but they failed to see the end of the tunnel. Remarkably, the number of people in need fluctuated in Banda Aceh. Many victims initially stayed in barracks in Aceh Besar, and many women and children had moved to the east coast by mid 2006.

By the end of two years, many settlement recovery cases in Aceh had not even started. Many small hamlets, communities along the west coast and wide areas of Nias were far behind. Banda Aceh required special attention: better planning, better infrastructure and a retrofitting program designed to make dense urban neighborhoods safe for the future.

Aceh Nias Settlements Support Programs

UN-HABITAT in collaboration with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), formulated the Aceh-Nias Settlements Support Program in January 2005 to support affected families to rebuild their houses in six districts in Aceh and North Sumatera provinces. During 2007, the program was extended in Nias and Simeulue islands in cooperation with UNDP and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Through this program UN-HABITAT was directly involved in: rehabilitation and reconstruction of housing and community infrastructure, mapping of basic information, spatial planning support, housing sector monitoring, and policy support to BRR.

Planning Never Starts After a Disaster

In May 2006, UN-HABITAT invited Dr. Kamal Arief to resume research into Banda Aceh's urban planning history, a topic he had studied for his PhD thesis. UN-HABITAT asked Dr. Kamal to expand his study with regard to master planning for Banda Aceh during the last 25 years. The analysis showed that post-disaster planning does not start from a void, but must carry along the legacy of pre-disaster events and planning work. For present-day Banda Aceh the legacy of failing to deal with the dangers of the sea dates back to more than a century.

Banda Aceh has been a city under siege for the past 100 years. The Dutch army built its own buffer zone, not toward the sea but toward the hostile Aceh Besar interior. In some places this was still noticeable: the drain canal diverting Krueng Aceh River was dug at the location of the eastern defense line of the city. Outside the defense line there was a small number of marginal settlements such as a leprosy village near Alue Naga. Poor fishing hamlets dotted the coastline. In the past 30 years many people had fled the countryside and crowded into the limited dry areas of the seashore of Banda Aceh. This movement was not limited to the poor since more affluent residents of Banda Aceh also considered it a safer area.

The city slowly woke up to the need to start dealing with the problems that arose from these spontaneous seashore settlements, especially after the disastrous high tide floods in 2000. A northern ring road was proposed that was to be built on a protective sea dike. The concept was integrated into the official 2003 master plan of the city, but remained controversial: existing mangroves and fishponds were doomed; fishermen were threatened to be cut off from the sea, while land speculation blossomed and grand ideas for property development cropped up.

From Action Planning to Building to Spatial Planning

In the first months after the tsunami, many organizations were tempted to exaggerate the planning needs for the devastated settlements or for new resettlement areas. Many villages and neighborhoods were not at extraordinary risk to a new tsunami. UN-HABITAT and other experienced organizations tried to limit village planning to small improvements of basic infrastructure, including escape roads and other facilities. UN-HABITAT assisted communities by facilitating the elaboration of their own village planning. This was part of a Community Action Planning process, which took place prior to community contracting and house building.

In Banda Aceh, the government planned to build wider infrastructure, for example sea dikes along Banda Aceh's coastline and new arterial escape roads. There was an increasing demand for more committed planning, especially at macro, citywide and regional coordinating level. The infrastructure for villages and urban neighborhoods needed to be connected to citywide or region-wide infrastructure.

Yet the macro spatial plans were not ready or were responding poorly or slowly to the reconstruction activities on the ground. The engineers appointed to do macro infrastructure planning for Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar were painstakingly doing the micro engineering for the district of Meuraxa. In 2006, Banda Aceh was rebuilt house by house. It seemed that in 2007 it would be reconstructed drain by drain and road by road.

Challenges for Urban Recovery

Ultimately, virtually each settlement in Aceh and Nias, whether urban or rural, would confront four issues of longer-term reconstruction: managing water resources and the environment in general, reaching out to the poorest, sustaining better services for all and rebuilding a peace-time economy. UN-HABITAT considered these four issues most critically turning up in the reconstruction of Banda Aceh.

Building better houses and more houses for poor people would be a start. Investing more in infrastructure was an absolute necessity. The greatest challenge was considered

the reestablishment of city governance and the maintaining of the freshly gained power of communities and their involvement in urban rebuilding and management, which would require a lot of assistance to the city government and to the provincial government.

Finally, there was disaster preparedness planning, which requires time and needs a process of consensus building. It has proven unhelpful to confuse it with urgent reconstruction of shelters. Creating new spatial plans right after a disaster creates new problems and it is impossible to achieve consensus amid hysteria and over-anticipation following such a disaster.

All districts of Banda Aceh had pre-existing spatial plans, which were formally still legal. These plans were a sufficient basis for quick reconstruction. The basis for an improved response to disasters of the future could be created by adopting respective measures in the revisions of the spatial plans.

UN-HABITAT in Meuraxa: From House Building to Assisting Urban Governance

UN-HABITAT started building houses in Banda Aceh in mid 2005, and by late November 2006 had financed and facilitated six village organizations and 127 community groups, which all together completed 1,372 houses.

As part of the collective UN recovery assistance for Meuraxa, UN-HABITAT started the coordination of many previously drawn up plans for 16 villages. Local communities were intensively involved. Facilitation teams visited all the villages to discuss village plans and then brought village stakeholders together to discuss how to connect separate urban neighborhoods.

At the same time UN-HABITAT, together with YIPD, assessed the environmental management and planning issues. Furthermore, UN-HABITAT regularly facilitated meetings of the Sub-district Forum Korrexa on a wide range of local issues. It also built a community center, contributed to the local radio station and published a community newsletter.

All this work entailed the outline spatial plan for Meuraxa. Consultations with Meuraxa stakeholders indicated that the so-called "Green Meuraxa" vision was most appropriate: wide boulevards and low densities to allow a slower-paced redevelopment and provide escape routes in times of peril.

Meanwhile, BRR and the city administration worked on a new spatial plan for the city. Various engineering teams started working on a range of infrastructure problems. German Cooperation Agency and BRR took care of spatial planning in five other urban sub-districts. Measures were taken to bring all this planning together so that spatial- and infrastructure plans were coordinated and supported each other.

Connecting the City

UN-HABITAT asked several Indonesian research institutes to study issues of urban change: Dr. Saiful Mahdi of Yayasan Masyarakat Iqra investigated the fate of inhabitants of Punge Jurong who failed to get houses; Dr. Suparti of the Bandung Institute of Technology examined the periphery of Meuraxa, which had been spared from severe damage but where urban management services stopped functioning; and Dr. Kamal Arief of UNPAR analyzed the history of master planning in Banda Aceh, in particular the ring road controversies that arose from the 2003 official city master plan.

Most city officials knew the challenges. At times BRR was blamed for lack of progress, but wiser people acknowledged that strong local governance processes took time. Mr. Zaehrudin, a former head of the City Planning and Development Agency put in charge of roads and water works, said: "It is not just the tsunami that weakened local governance. Decades of conflict caused people to have little trust in the civil service."

Here lay the real challenge: how could the community proceed from the early rebuilding work as it was facilitated by many NGOs; and how could this process be documented and integrated into local governance? Spatial planning as done in Meuraxa offered the chance to influence the coordination by indicating directions. For the city, the mission ahead was to grasp the opportunity to link planning with urban management and urban management with communities.

Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Indonesia

Coordinating Housing Construction

THE tsunami destroyed most buildings on Pulo Aceh, which resulted in the relocation of residents to shelters and displaced persons camps in Banda Aceh and Aceh Besar.

The Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Indonesia was one of the NGOs concerned with the handling of displaced persons from Pulo Aceh, which is a sub-district consisting of three small islands 24 kilometers (15 miles) off the coast of Banda Aceh.

In January 2005, JRS collaborated with Pulo Aceh sub-district officials and organizations Lampung Ikhlas, Yayasan Pagar Alam Semesta (PASE) and Aceh Relief to return displaced persons housed in shelters in Mata Ie to their homes on Pulo Aceh.

After complex coordination and communication, including with big organizations interested in building houses in that area, JRS decided to focus on the communities of the Meulingge, Rinon and Alue Raya Villages on Breuh Island.

Development and Implementation

JRS sent a team to Pulo Aceh to investigate the possibility of the residents returning to the island. A second team was later sent consisting of more than 20 community members, JRS, PASE and Aceh Relief staff to prepare for the return of displaced persons, such as by

establishing shelters, a temporary meeting point, a public kitchen, toilets and emergency port. When JRS arrived on the Lhoh-Lampuyang shore, 13 shelters and four separate wooden prayer rooms had already been built.

After assessing the needs, transportation routes and material availability, JRS decided to build houses residents of Meulingge, Rinon, and Alue Raya. The building of houses was to be community-based and not on a cash-for-work basis, so that the community would have a sense of ownership and unity. The process required clear information about the houses to be built, consultation and agreement from the community, sub-district and district officials.

To get the approval of so many stakeholders, JRS conducted a series of meetings with the heads of seven villages on Breuh Island in Pulo Aceh sub-district. After the approval of all parties, JRS performed a needs assessment once again to ensure the process and mechanisms for returning the displaced persons to the island and of building houses in the three villages ran smoothly. During the assessment process, JRS stayed with residents who had decided to return to the island while maintaining communication and relations with others who had decided to stay at the camp. For internal purposes, JRS tried to develop a model and house design that was simple in construction, earthquake-resistant, quick to build, and environmentally friendly in that it would not result in illegal logging.

JRS offered the community 36-square-meter prefabricated houses designed by the Surakarta Academy of Mechanical Engineering and Industry. The houses were built to particular specifications in consultation with the provincial Public Works Office. The Public Works Office approved the house type and categorized it as permanent housing. Members of the community approved the model of the house.

On May 11, 2005, JRS signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Aceh Besar district head to build 287 houses, comprising 118 in Meulingge, 69 in Alue Raya and 100 in Rinon.

As required by BRR as the coordinator of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh and Nias, JRS registered the recovery program for the community of Pulo Aceh through the RAND database. INFRA 233 IN was the JRS Program Code in the information system developed by BRR to facilitate coordination among institutions and organizations in Aceh.

In preparing for their return, community members prepared their land deeds (SKKT). Gradually the community members returned to the island and became involved in the construction process.

Problems were encountered when the residents of two villages suddenly rejected the houses from JRS. Their rejection was fueled by the presence of another NGO that was building houses of a different design without coordination with JRS or the government. Their rejection was conveyed during a community meeting on July 21, 2005. They

reasoned that JRS had not given sufficient information about the housing in the form of a sample of a house and therefore the communities of Rinon and Alue Raya had decided to reject the houses being offered by JRS.

Lessons Learned

Recognizing the good intentions and efforts of one of the organizations present in organizing the community, JRS approached the organization to seek a solution. After several approaches, nothing was agreed upon and the problem was reported to BRR, as the coordinating institution for rehabilitation and reconstruction work.

BRR then announced that no other institution should build houses in Rinon or Alue Raya because the JRS project was community-based while other projects were not. However, due to the complex nature of the issue and because the local government or BRR had offered no solution to the problem of resident rejecting the houses, JRS decided to abandon its projects in Rinon and Alue Raya.

In the meantime, the community members of Meulingge had expressed their intention to accept the houses from JRS, which subsequently built the houses and assisted in restoring the livelihoods of community members and building a schoolhouse by the end of 2006.

BRR then decided to build more houses for people in Meulingge.

JRS tried to coordinate with BRR regarding the construction of the additional houses in Meulingge but BRR appeared unwilling to accommodate this, explaining that the JRS houses were considered semi-permanent. There was no clear information as to why the people of Meulingge were offered more houses while no houses had been built by any organization for the people of Rinon and Alue Raya.

From this experience, it became obvious that coordination in constructing houses is crucial. The process could have been smoother had the database developed by BRR been utilized by all parties and if firmness had been exercised by the organizing parties involved in house reconstruction as well as in the effort to apply procedures to the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Muslim Aid

Building Traditional Wooden Houses

Introduction

MUSLIM AID is an international relief organization founded in 1985 in response to continuing conflicts and disasters around the world. The aim of Muslim Aid is to alleviate the suffering of the victims of poverty, war and natural disasters.

Muslim Aid Indonesia (MAI) is a joint program of Muslim Aid UK and Muslim Aid Australia. MAI has been active in Indonesia since 2005, initially in emergency response efforts for earthquake and tsunami victims in Aceh. MAI prioritizes its activities toward emergency response efforts, infrastructure development for basic community needs such as providing transitional shelters, permanent houses, roads, drainage systems and bridge construction, and is also involved in capacity building in education, skills enhancement, and other social activities.

Building Homes

Muslim Aid builds not merely houses but homes. To achieve this, Muslim Aid treats its beneficiaries as its customers, respecting individual preferences, understanding cultural sensitivities, and empowering local communities to enable them to cope in the future. This is demonstrated in the selection of the design of new houses. In line with

local tradition, the traditional wooden platform house/stilt house (rumah Aceh/rumah panggung) was considered the best choice. This style was also selected because the construction time is short, meaning the prospective owners were able to leave their temporary shelters, mostly tents, as soon as possible. An information campaign on the style of houses to be built was conducted involving recipients, village leaders and sub-district leaders. After displaying the basic model of the new house, the style was accepted unanimously although several prospective house owners wanted some changes made to meet their specific needs. These preferences were agreed to by Muslim Aid.

Project Description

Between August 2005 and February 2007, Muslim Aid with the support of DEC/ Oxfam built 522 houses for tsunami victims. Oxfam is a global movement dedicated to eliminating poverty and suffering worldwide. It approaches this aim in three ways: campaigning for change, development work and emergency response efforts. The Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) is made up of 13 aid agencies, which are leading UK-registered humanitarian charities.

Photo: Muslim Aid Documentation

In the first phase, 212 houses were built in the city of Banda Aceh and on Sabang Island, and 172 houses in Gampong Jawa from Oxfam/DEC funding. From the same fund, Muslim Aid also completed the construction of 25 houses in Iboih in Sabang, and another 15 houses in Iboih from Muslim Aid funding. All were stilt houses.

In the second phase, 310 houses were built, 30 percent of which were stilt houses and 70 percent brick houses with a floor area of 42 square meters. The total fund spent for both phases was US$2,990,765.

Challenges

The construction process faced several problems:

- Timber scarcity in Aceh. Not only was demand very high during the reconstruction phase, but the tsunami also wiped out almost all inventories of timber in the area. Consequently, some timber had to be brought in from outside Aceh by merchants.
- Scarcity of builders with knowledge of the structure and experience in building stilt houses, resulting in variations in the quality of the completed houses.
  Difficulty in finding reliable contractors capable of building good quality houses.
- Nonexistence of a standardized mechanism for managing complaints during the construction process. Complaints, if managed correctly, can function as a monitoring mechanism during construction so defects can be detected and eliminated long before a house is finished.

It was difficult to obtain good quality timber in Aceh several months after the tsunami. It was also difficult to differentiate between good and bad quality timber from what was available.

There was no visible difference in the quality of timber while building. It was discovered several months after some houses were occupied, that some of the timber was infested with boring beetles (woodworm). According to experts, this species was not found in Aceh and it was suspected that this pest was in the timber when it was transported into Aceh from outside.

The pest infestation, along with the inconsistency in the quality of platform houses being constructed, caused concern among recipients. Upon seeing rows of standardized new brick houses, they realized that these might be the right solution to the problems, especially in regard to the quality of timber.

After the pest infestation was discovered, Muslim Aid carried out fumigation, which was not thorough because some house owners refused access to fumigators.

Other problems related to construction were also encountered. During early data collection and the validation process to determine beneficiaries, there was no evidence

that any recipient had applied for more than one house. Their apparent honesty, emotional state and empathy led the donor organization to trust the accuracy of the data, which was approved by the village authority.

However, after the houses were occupied, it was discovered that some recipients received more than one house. This had a profound effect on the donors' trust, leading to reluctance to provide further aid.

Recommendations

Based on our experience, the following are some key recommendations to note:

- Specifications on the quality of timber deemed acceptable for house construction should be conveyed in detail, that is, by compiling a list of the kind of timber suitable for the construction of Acehnese stilt houses.
- Timber from outside of Aceh not included on the abovementioned list should be rejected.
- Although recipients were involved in the selection of timber in the construction process, there was no guarantee that woodworm infestation would be detected. This problem can only be prevented by selecting the timber on site at the saw mill. Timber that does not meet the specifications should not be transported to the construction projects.
- It is necessary to avoid a lenient selection process of contractors, which resulted in variations in the quality of the completed houses, in mediocre performance and dissatisfied recipients.
- The active role of house recipients in the construction process should be maintained. This can help in the direct supervision of the various phases of house construction. Dissatisfaction about the quality of materials, the work of contractors and the work of inspectors should be immediately addressed. Complaint forms should be made available —complete with procedures on how to write down information —and a solution immediately found that satisfies both parties.
- Information campaigns on the selection of the type of houses, should be repeated frequently and involve more women; a written agreement should be made with the house recipients and legalized by the local government, at least at the sub-district level. This would prevent demands for future changes in the preference of the type of house.
- Precision and discretion regarding the establishment of a beneficiary list for each village should be duly exercised. It is not only unfair to those in dire need of housing that some beneficiaries receive more than one house, but it is also a waste of aid and creates donor distrust.

Lessons Learned

To minimize future problems, Muslim Aid acknowledged that building brick houses was a better alternative to stilt houses. Problems still remain because there were variations in the quality of the houses due to the quality of the materials, workers' skills, the pressure of meeting deadlines, the limited amount of funds, and the difficulties encountered by Muslim Aid inspectors. It is Muslim Aid's moral responsibility to work harder, to coax and to provide direction so that the construction meets required specifications.

Ultimately, Muslim Aid was satisfied that it helped reduce the burden of the tsunami victims by providing them with a replacement for their destroyed houses. However, had the quality of the houses been standardized, the satisfaction level may have been higher.

Muslim Aid's experience has highlighted the importance of comprehensive understanding of the scarcity of resources (especially materials and skilled builders) after a massive disaster. Had it been anticipated that woodworm could be carried by importing timber from outside Aceh, Muslim Aid could have made preparations before using it for construction. However, the pressure to act quickly prevented this.

Furthermore, even in a post-disaster situation victims may be tempted to take advantage of the situation for their own benefit. Aid beneficiaries should be carefully selected to prevent deception and all of its ramifications.

Leuser International Foundation (LIF)

Spatial Planning for Villages

THE earthquake and tsunami devastated Aceh's society, economy, infrastructure and institutions, especially along the west coast. In this narrow coastal belt, communities and agricultural lands border protected forests and karst mountain ranges. These forested areas include the Mount Leuser National Park and the Leuser ecosystem (LE) in the south, and the Ulu Masen Forest in the north. Even within Indonesia —a recognized mega-diversity country —this area is unique, comprising the largest remaining contiguous forested area (3.3 million ha) with the richest assemblage of biodiversity in Southeast Asia, including tigers, elephants, rhinos and orangutans. These areas also provide valuable ecological services needed for Aceh's recovery, including water supply, flood prevention, erosion mitigation, forest commodities and germplasm, local and global climate regulation and carbon absorption.

It was feared that the increasing demand for building materials such as timber and mining products to reconstruct hundreds of thousands of houses, and public infrastructure in the post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction process would have a negative impact and threaten the conservation of forests and the environment in Aceh.

The Leuser International Foundation (LIF) was appointed by the Indonesian government to assist in the management of the Leuser ecosystem covering an area of 2,255,577 ha, including protection and safeguarding, conservation, restoration of the area's function and sustainable utilization. The LIF also assisted the government through

the Aceh Forest and Environment Project funded by the Multi-Donor Fund (MDF) to integrate environmental concerns, especially those relating to the forest and environment in Aceh, into the reconstruction and development process through spatial planning on the provincial, district and village levels.

Government Regulation No. 26/2008 on national spatial planning established the LE area as a National Strategic Area in the interests of its function and its environmental carrying capacity, five river areas as National Strategic River Areas (WS), three of which were located in the LE (WS Jambo Aye, WS Tripa-Batee and WS Alas Singkil) and the Rawa Singkil Wildlife Sanctuary, Mount Leuser National Park and the Linge-Isaq hunting park as a national conservation area, also located in the LE as concretely directed by the government in the development process to achieve the vision of a green Aceh.

In compliance with Law No. 26/2007 on spatial planning, the LIF in its effort to conserve the LE through the Aceh Forest and Environment Project (AFEP) compiled two village spatial plans under the provincial and district spatial plans. The purpose was to make provincial and district spatial plans more specific on the village level to increase effectiveness and efficiency. The LIF considered village spatial planning an important tool to anticipate conflict in the utilization of space for cultivation and conservation around the LE by clarifying what was allowed or disallowed in designated areas based on the status of the area in the district or provincial spatial plan. This also applied to production forest areas which in spatial plans were referred to as Forest Cultivation Areas.

Village communities generally had access to more detailed information concerning village spatial planning through the utilization of their village land compared to government officials. The long-established community-based natural resources management system was common, although this system was once degraded by the "top down" policy that affected the village government administration. Being aware of the communities' understanding of the role of village spatial plans, the LIF compiled community-based village spatial plans to build and develop community and stakeholder participation in sustainable village development planning.

Development and Implementation

Pisang-Labuhan Haji village in South Aceh and Pengidam-Bandar Pusaka village in Aceh Tamiang were selected for spatial plan compilation by the LIF. This selection was based on the geographical location of the two villages within the LE and their position in the water catchment area (Pisang village is the sub-watershed of Krueng Baro watershed area and Pengidam village of the Krueng Tamiang watershed area) with degradation already starting in forests in the upriver area. The compilation of spatial planning for Pisang and Pengidam villages was done using the "bottom up" process starting with discussion and information dissemination among village communities and followed by discussions on the problems and potential in the village. The village head then formed a team consisting of community figures to participate in starting the program and providing input for

spatial plan compilation. LIF team members had to take many points into consideration, such as selecting sites for buildings, public facilities, financial centers, social culture centers, roads, and mitigation plan taking into account environmental conditions and the needs of local communities.

Primary data was collected by conducting surveys on the bio-physical and socio-economic conditions in the village, which was overseen by several members of the village team. The LIF facilitated the analysis of data produced with the village team and local community figures to compile a draft village spatial plan. After the compilation of the draft village spatial plan, a presentation was held for the community and stakeholders. The purpose of making a presentation was to gain approval or corrections of all data analyzed. After the community agreed to all the information presented by the LIF, the spatial plan was formulated and established as a Village Spatial Plan document. To enable village officials to provide direction, the Village Spatial Plan document was sanctioned by the village head and submitted to the sub-district and district heads for legal approval.

Outcome

The compilation of the Village Spatial Plans around the LE was intended to contribute toward sustainable development that would improve the environment and its services and protect the LE. The spatial plan produced was a combination of land, water and air use arrangements and the use of other resources as shown in the village spatial plan map featuring the spatial structure plan, the spatial pattern and land use plan, the village facility site plan, and aim of the program. The village spatial plan map clearly showed the location of the village administration office, places for religious activities, public cemetery, residential area, business center, education facility, roads, drainage channel, sports and recreation center, open field and other public spaces needed by the local community. The village spatial plan was to become a guideline for the development of facilities and infrastructure.

Challenges

The isolated location of the LE site was a challenge as access to the villages was often cut off. Conditions were worse during the rainy season when roads could be impassable due to landslides or floods. Another challenge in the compilation of spatial plans was the uncertainty concerning land ownership and forests or other boundaries. This condition made it difficult to determine the size of village areas accurately without field surveys, which increased costs by up to 50 percent of the total budget allocated for the program. A relatively long time was also required to take coordinates due to the vast area of the villages. In the last phase, extra effort was needed to gain approval of the draft village spatial plan from a government authority above the village level such as the sub-district or district heads so that the village spatial plan could be adopted as soon as possible to facilitate the process of decision-making for village development.

Conditions for Success

The following conditions contributed to the success of the village spatial plan compilation program facilitated by the LIF through AFEP:

1. The LIF had administrative infrastructure in the program area, namely in Takengon, to support the spatial plan compilation program in Pisang village and administrative infrastructure in Langsa to support the spatial plan compilation program in Pengidam village. The LIF also had a Geographic Information System (GIS) to support village mapping with SPOT satellite imagery maps.
2. The district government was aware of the mission of the LIF in the conservation of the LE and of the legal status of the LE as a national strategic area in the field of conservation, which eased coordination and data gathering.
3. District spatial plans were available for South Aceh and Aceh Tamiang districts where the program's villages were located. These were useful as guidelines for the compilation of spatial plans for Pisang and Pengidam villages.
4. As the local community had experienced flooding in the location of the program, they were aware of how important it was to protect the forests in the LE.
5. Village community groups were familiar with the definite administrative boundaries of their village area.
6. The enthusiasm of the community for the success of this program was reflected in the formation of the village team.

Lessons Learned

Village spatial plans had informally been made by many village communities in Indonesia throughout the generations. However, with the enactment of Law No. 26/2007 on spatial planning, village spatial plans were recognized by the Indonesian government, albeit at the lowest level. The LIF considered this legal recognition an opportunity for environmental conservation because directions would be more detailed and explicit. Village spatial plans that were drafted in a participatory manner and incorporated local wisdom would be more effective in raising community awareness of the need to protect forests and of the sustainable use of village space.

At the time of compiling village spatial plans for Pisang and Pengidam villages, facilitated by the LIF, no village regulation had been issued with regard to the spatial plan.

A village regulation was deemed necessary to enforce the direction of the village spatial plan in the daily life of the community as a tool to control all community activities in the utilization of the village area. The regulation was also needed to determine the right to access and utilization of the land such as land conversion, plantation development,

watershed protection, water supply, mining, etc. This increased security would encourage individual farmers, cooperatives and outside entrepreneurs to invest in land development and production. Last but not least, such a regulation would clarify where conservation would take precedence over production, for reasons of long-term sustainability.

Potential for Replication

The LIF is of the opinion that village spatial plans should continue to be developed, especially with regard to villages in the buffer zone of forest areas, because a spatial plan can clarify the boundary between cultivation and conservation areas that would result in protecting the environment such as forests in areas threatened by encroachment and illegal logging that would result in the destruction of forests.

Infrastructure and Maintenance

THE sequencing of infrastructure development has been a central issue of the recovery program. Although a lengthy process, in some instances multiple years, the development of infrastructure is a prerequisite to the implementation of reconstruction in other sectors. In the 13 case studies appearing in this book for this sector, 6 in the printed pages and 7 on CD, the importance of establishing a practical and strategic infrastructure is discussed; practical in terms of providing a foundation for the development of other sectors and strategic in terms of sequencing and disaster mitigation.

The road between Banda Aceh and Calang, Lhoong, Aceh Besar, has its road-mark which was rarely found in any inter-city roads in Aceh before the tsunami recovery took place, February 20, 2009. As per April 16, 2009, 581 kilometer road has been constructed by BRR and its recovery partners (USAID and JICS) compares to the total 702 kilometer road along the west coast of Aceh that has to be constructed in accordance to the Presidential regulation 47/2008. The remaining, particularly the Banda Aceh-Meulaboh section will be finished in mid-2010. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Government of Japan (GoJ)

Establishing a Disaster-resilient Community

AFTER the emergency disaster relief stage, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) felt that the comprehensive rehabilitation of livelihoods was essential to realizing sustainable development.

In extending assistance for the development of a disaster-resilient community, JICA supported the development of disaster-resilient livelihoods in Meuraxa district in Banda Aceh City, where the damage was catastrophic.

In order to build a disaster-resilient community, Japan first supported city planning in Banda Aceh through the Urgent Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan for Banda Aceh City (URRP) from March 2005 until March 2006. A drainage system was built and the seawall rehabilitated to prevent flooding during high tide and heavy rain. In addition, Japan built an escape road and evacuation shelter, which is used as community center in normal times. Japan also supported community revitalization by promoting community activities that sometimes involved income-generating activities, as well as supported community disaster drills.

Through these activities, it was learned that a comprehensive approach to rehabilitation and reconstruction, which encompassed disaster preparedness, was very effective in revitalizing community activities.

Support for City Planning

From March 2005 to March 2006, JICA supported Banda Aceh City to prepare the study for the Urgent Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan. The study presented a comprehensive rehabilitation and reconstruction plan, which included a water supply network, sanitation and drainage, roads and transportation, healthcare, education, the environment and social impact considerations as well as the vision and strategy of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The Meuraxa study included:

- planning of zoning and land use
- planning, feasibility study and detailed design of road rehabilitation with escape road
- planning, feasibility study and detailed design of sanitation and drainage system
- planning of a community evacuation building.

JICA worked closely with the local community led by the district head of Meuraxa on city planning, include planning of evacuation buildings and escape roads. JICA and the district head invited local community members to join various workshops and training on the plan so that they would understand the role and function of the evacuation buildings and escape roads in the case of a disaster.

Rebuilding Key Infrastructure and Rehabilitating Basic Services

Reconstruction in Meuraxa was meant to be a milestone of reconstruction efforts in Banda Aceh by demonstrating how the development of disaster preparedness would lead to community and economic activities, and eventually facilitate future investment and development in the area.

Based on the URRP, the following reconstruction activities took place in Meuraxa with Japanese cooperation:

- construction of a drainage system
- construction of a junior high school and a high school
- construction of an escape road
- construction of a community evacuation building

Drainage facilities such as drainage pumps and drainage canals were damaged in the earthquake and tsunami. Rehabilitation of the facilities was aimed at reinstating submerged land and protecting the city against flooding. Based on requests of the city administration, Japan supported rehabilitation of some zones.

Japan also assisted in the reconstruction of local roads and the water distribution network in Meuraxa, as well as construction of SMPN 11 junior high school and SMA 6 high school, the students of which come from within and outside of Meuraxa.

Support for Community Activities for Livelihood Improvement

In addition to physical construction, Japan assisted in revitalizing community activities, such as through the Self-Sustainable Community Empowerment Network Formulation project from February 2007 to March 2009.

In this project, JICA supported a community bakery headed by a widow in Meuraxa. The JICA team, consisting of Japanese experts and a local NGO, provided training for skill development and business management (such as bookkeeping and marketing) and equipment for baking cakes. Total sales and profit increased consistently during the two years of activity support. After one year, the group was self-sustaining and no longer required financial assistance from JICA.

Furthermore, this group supported the establishment of other groups in the community, such as a fish-processing group and a sewing group, by providing funds. The members of the baking group supported these other groups and shared its experiences through training activities.

The community evacuation building is used as a community center where community members gather and conduct training sessions, workshops and exhibitions.

Support for the Development of a Disaster-Ready Community

To support community empowerment, a community disaster management drill was organized in collaboration with the Japan Red Cross Society (JRCS) and the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI) on August 24, 2008 under the JICA project.

The purpose of the drill was to build a strong community against future disasters and to create a community-based disaster management system by using an escape road, community evacuation building and emergency equipment stored in the evacuation building.

Prior to the drill, a two-day disaster management workshop was held at the evacuation building. Members of the Community Disaster Taskforce (SATGAS) joined the training on disaster management and learned how to handle situations in a disaster. After the training, SATGAS members could transfer their knowledge and skills to other community members. Through the drill, the community network was also enhanced.

Outcome

As a result of Japan's support for city planning, basic infrastructure construction and community empowerment activities, the basis of a self-sustainable community was established.

More concretely, Japan contributed to devising an urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction plan and constructed an escape road, community evacuation building and drainage system in Meuraxa. JICA also contributed to developing a disaster-resilient community through community empowerment activities, including income-generating group activities as well as the implementation of a disaster management drill at the community level. Through these community empowerment activities, community organization for disaster management has been established and disaster awareness enhanced. Furthermore, network and community ties among communities and their members have been enhanced.

After the construction of the community evacuation building in Meuraxa, similar evacuation buildings were built by the Indonesian government in five regions in Indonesia. One such building is the Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center (TDMRC) in Meuraxa.

Meanwhile, following the disaster management drill, Banda Aceh city and the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) implemented a national-level disaster management drill in Meuraxa through the TDMRC.

Challenges

In the process of community empowerment activities, difficulties were faced in gaining support for building a self-sustainable disaster-resilient community. For example, in the preparation of the disaster management drill, some community members hesitated to join the drill voluntarily and instead expected payment to join the drill. Japanese experts and Indonesian partners had to explain the importance and the benefits to the local community in the long term. Such awareness-raising activities were very important to the sustainability of the project.

Also, because of the extent of the damage not only to infrastructure but also to human resources, the capacity building of local partners was also a challenge. We conducted several workshops and training sessions as well as on-the-job training with Japanese experts.

Conditions for Success

Smooth implementation of the project was possible due to the collaborative work of experienced Japanese experts and people in Aceh such as local government officials, local partners (NGOs) and community members. JICA experts exercised patience in delivering skills and technologies to local partners.

In the project, we utilized a radio station to disseminate information and increase awareness, such as by sharing the best practices of community empowerment activities as well as information on disaster preparedness.

What's New

The characteristics of JICA cooperation are illustrated in our cooperation activities in Meuraxa in terms of hard and soft infrastructure rehabilitation, incorporating the idea of supporting a self-sustainable disaster resilient community through the collaborative work of Japanese experts and local people.

In a disaster-prone country like Indonesia, it would be beneficial for the community to take disaster-preparedness and damage mitigation into account in rehabilitation and reconstruction activities.

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

Applying Women-led Construction of Women's Spaces

THREE buildings modeled on the traditional Acehnese *Balai Inong* (women's hall) were built in Meuraxa sub-district under the supervision of construction committees made up of women from the local community. The women on the construction committees have gone on to manage and use the women's halls, which were formally opened in 2008. Now that the buildings stand as fixtures in the community, the women involved report feeling proud and empowered by their roles in the construction.

Introduction

The *Balai Inong* has played an important role in Acehnese culture for centuries. It was traditionally a place for women to gather, recite the Quran and prepare for community events. Prior to the tsunami, a *Balai Inong* could be found in every village in Aceh. It provided women a space to gather, discuss their needs and conduct joint projects. At the Second All Acehnese Women's Congress (Duek Pakat Inong Aceh II) in June 2005, the revitalization of *Balai Inong* was highlighted as a priority, affirmed by the Director of BRR, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto. The identification of this need reflected the desire of Acehnese women to rebuild their communities, and gather together to voice their hopes, needs, desires and expectations in the rebuilding of Aceh.

In 2005, UNIFEM, in collaboration with Building Bridges to the Future, supported the inclusion of a *Balai Inong* in the village of Rumpet, Aceh Jaya. UNIFEM adopted the Rumpet village *Balai Inong* as a pilot for replication and upscaling.

In 2006, UNIFEM began a larger project to build three *Balai Inong i*n Meuraxa sub-district, funded by United Nations Joint Programming with additional funding from the Jones Day Foundation and the Sisters of Mercy. The defining feature of these buildings was that women from the community would take charge of the planning, designing and construction processes.

Development & Implementation

To introduce the concept of women leading the construction of *Balai Inong*, UNIFEM approached the head of Meuraxa sub-district, the heads of Meuraxa and Tgk Chik Lamjabat settlements *(kemukiman)* and facilitated meetings with all village leaders and women representatives from each village. UNIFEM had funds for construction but not to buy land, so women from each settlement negotiated and lobbied the sub-district office to find suitable land. Two pieces of public land were allocated for the project and one piece of private land was donated by a local woman. Once the land was secured, UNIFEM worked together with women from each community to facilitate the selection of their own construction committees. One committee was established for each building and each committee was made up of 12 to 14 women.

Technical assistance was provided to the construction committees to oversee the construction. After a tendering process, UNIFEM contracted a construction engineering company based in Banda Aceh. Together with the construction committees, UNIFEM developed technical drawings and provided monitoring support to each construction committee on the construction of three *Balai Inong* buildings. The team provided by the construction engineering company included a team leader, an architect, a civil engineer, an environmental engineer, a surveyor, an Auto Cad chief, an Auto Cad operator and administrative staff. The team's responsibilities included:

- The team leader worked closely with the construction committees to gather input and ideas for the design of each building.
- Developing technical drawings and budget estimation for the construction of each *Balai Inong*, approved by each construction committee.
- Regular monitoring of each construction site to ensure construction was according to technical plans and specifications.
- Providing advice and guidance to the construction committees on labor and material costs, including the type and quality of materials needed (the consultant followed the fluctuation of materials costs in Aceh and consulted with the construction committee accordingly.

UNIFEM, the engineering company and the construction committees worked out the maximum budget required for the completion of three *Balai Inong*. UNIFEM invited the company to hear from the women about the kinds of buildings they wanted to build. The women made free-drawings that were converted into technical drawings. The construction committees provided feedback to the company on the technical drawings and approved the final plans prior to construction.

The construction committees then hired construction teams to build the buildings with support from the engineer, who was on site daily to monitor the construction. The construction committee was responsible for purchasing materials and conducted ongoing monitoring of the construction. When problems arose, the construction committees consulted with UNIFEM to find solutions.

The members of each construction committee gained experience and knowledge throughout the construction process. Committee members had strictly defined roles, such as secretary and treasurer, and followed a roster of multiple site visits per day to monitor progress. Visits were scheduled around existing commitments, such as work and picking up children from school.

The key to successful project implementation was consultation and good communication between the construction committees and UNIFEM. The construction committees reported being very satisfied with their levels of involvement and control over the construction process. The technical assistance team gained new skills working with women on the committees and managing a consultative and participatory construction process.

Structure of Construction Committees



In support of the construction committees, UNIFEM implemented a program of capacity building, including organizational self-assessment workshops, management training and photography and documentation training.

As the buildings took shape the construction committees were buoyed by the success of their efforts, taking great pride in their construction of a valuable community space for women. The involvement of the construction committee ensures that a community already exists around the *Balai Inong*, increasing the likelihood of community ownership and sustainability into the future.

UNIFEM facilitated the establishment of management committees to run the *Balai Inong* as a community institution and provided management training for those on the committees. Most of the women involved in construction have gone on to participate in the management committees and be active members in the *Balai Inong* communities.

Challenges

The main challenges faced in this project related to the increase in fuel and material costs in 2007 and 2008. Flooding also delayed construction and increased costs, particularly at one site when large amounts of backfill soil had to be purchased to counter effects of flooding. These problems were overcome one by one as committees met with UNIFEM to discuss alternative solutions. The *Balai Inong* Meuraxa I Construction Committee in Punge Jurong dealt with the increase in the price of materials by buying materials in bulk and negotiating some discounts, and also spent extra time researching suppliers and sourcing the lowest price available.

The same construction committee also faced challenges when they were approached by the construction team and told that a third party had informed them of 'taxes' they were required to pay. The women dealt with it by insisting that they wanted to speak to the third party in person before giving any money. After that no further requests were made.

A number of women sitting on the construction committees found it difficult to assert themselves in a public committee, or verbalize opinions when consulting with the technical experts, as they were used to more passive participation in public meetings. Through encouragement and training —which led to increased confidence —more women felt comfortable with active participation in discussions and decision-making, which was a great benefit of their involvement in the project.

A challenge to the realization of full participation on the part of local community women was a lack of motivation to engage in leadership roles and a 'self-help' model. The large number of donations being given to the community perpetuated a "receiving" mentality that this project aimed to overcome. In final evaluations, women involved in the construction committee have reported that the experience has had a great impact on their work skills and confidence, which has convinced the women of the value of a 'self-help' approach.

As this project model requires women to work outside of traditional gender roles there was some resistance from members of the community, albeit minimal. One community leader requested that he control the construction as he was concerned about the women's capacity to do so. UNIFEM explained that the women would be well supported and that an aim of the project, as important as the construction of the building itself, was to build the capacity of the women sitting on construction committees. Ongoing discussion and support from other community leaders for the project saw the resistance replaced with unreserved support and enthusiasm for the project.

Another challenge faced was the preconceptions of a *Balai Inong*, which was often confused with Family Welfare Programs (Program Kesejahteraan Keluarga, PKK) for which activities are centered on cooking and sewing. It is also usually headed by the wife of the head of the village regardless of capacity or suitability. This approach would have limited the broader empowerment goals of the project by limiting the concept of work that is appropriate for women and the agency to engage in community activities and take leadership roles regardless of social standing. Extensive promotion of the project prior to commencement served to mitigate these challenges. UNIFEM promoted the idea that the *Balai Inong* is an institution where women can learn different skills, including leadership skills.

Lessons Learned

UNIFEM's implementation of this project greatly benefited from its existing networks in Meuraxa sub-district, particularly with Korexxa, a forum for media coordination supported by donors for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Meuraxa, bringing together the community, government and NGOs to share information and solve problems together. Support from community leaders was invaluable when promoting the project and securing land to build *Balai Inong*. A UN Joint Planning meeting also contributed to a strong foundation for the project, drawing from a variety of experiences with construction and community engagement in Meuraxa.

UNIFEM conducted interviews and focus group discussions prior to project commencement. This ensured that the construction of *Balai Inong* responded to a genuine need in the community. Also important was the time taken to discuss the nature of the project with the community and the expectations upon those who would be involved. This served to allay concerns that women in the community could not handle the task at hand, and stimulate enthusiasm among women in the community to get involved.

The success of this project was fundamentally dependent on community engagement and ownership. The value of a building can only be measured by the community's ownership and engagement with it. In addition to the community engagement model of construction, the extensive training program run in tandem with construction served to prepare women to run the *Balai Inong* independently, strengthening networks and friendships among participants along the way.

Another essential component to the success of the project was the cooperative, equal and respectful relationships between the technical advisory team and the construction committee members.

Involvement in the construction committees has benefited each individual, who report increased confidence, a sense of civic pride and new social networks as some of the most valuable aspects of their involvement in the project.

"The skills I gained through my participation in Balai Inong were great—greater even than those gained in eight years of work experience. This Balai Inong has given us chances to study, opportunities to be bright women and given us skills transferable to both domestic and public life. I have gained the spirit to be productive for the success of my family and the community"
—Nevi Ningsih

This community-led construction model offers excellent potential for replication, and other humanitarian aid agencies have indicated plans to do so. Still many villages in Aceh are without *Balai Inong* and the processes of formulating construction committees and building the women's spaces provide great benefits for individuals and the community. The women's space and the community cohesion fostered by the process of construction are sustainable assets and a lasting reminder of the potential for cohesive community action.

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Opening the Access through Community Engagement

ALUE Lehob is a poor rural community in Aceh Barat district on the west coast of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province, midway between Meulaboh and Calang. As Aleu Lehob is located a safe distance from the coastline, the houses in this community were not swept away by the tsunami but were nevertheless rendered uninhabitable by the preceding earthquake.

Between March and October 2007, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) constructed 37 permanent houses in Alue Lehob for its "Transitional and Permanent Shelters in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam" reconstruction and rehabilitation project funded by the American Red Cross (ARC) to improve access to shelter for tsunami-affected communities.

Early into the IOM-ARC shelter project, it became apparent that the three-kilometer road shared by Alue Lehob with a neighboring village, Teuin Perahu, could not withstand the traffic of heavy trucks transporting building materials for the ongoing reconstruction. In areas where the road was subject to flooding during rain, it became almost impassable for days until the road dried sufficiently.

In August 2007, IOM identified operational funds in its ARC budget to cover the cost of road repairs. While the local government had been planning to rebuild the road in 2008 in any case, in September 2007 the American Red Cross approved IOM's request for immediate road repairs as a necessary expense for the shelter project, and IOM proceeded with a formal tender for the construction.

Though there was little contractor interest due to the low budget of the road repair work, IOM was able to identify one interested contracting company with sufficient capacity. However, in early November 2007 this company withdrew its offer at the last minute. Faced with continued delays in starting the repairs, IOM was forced to find another solution quickly.

IOM's water and sanitation liaison staff active in Alue Lehob promptly commenced discussing the possibility of the two affected communities jointly implementing the road repair themselves. After several meetings on the modalities of implementation and transparency on related costs and payments, an agreement with both communities was reached, and in January 2008 a community-based construction process was initiated that incorporated livelihoods through on-the-job training and cash-for-work. The people of Alue Lehob and Teuin Perahu contributed a percentage of their labor and locally available materials, and IOM-ARC contributed remaining materials, rented equipment, and technical expertise and supervision. The communities' contribution from both Alue Lehob and Teuin Perahu came to more than 11 percent of the total cost for the road repairs.

IOM-ARC Model House Unit with 5 rooms in an area of 44 square meters. Photo: IOM Documentation


Road Reconstruction Phase I: Mobilizing the Community for Common Interest


Road Reconstruction Phase II: Backfilling and Compacting


Road Reconstruction Phase III: Installation of Side Panels


Road Reconstruction Phase IV: Installation of Retaining Walls


Road Reconstruction Phase V: Finishing Up

IOM-ARC Opening Ceremony for Road and Permanent Houses in Alue Lehob, February 2008. Photo: IOM Documentation

Within six weeks, the construction work was completed, and the opening ceremony for the repaired access road was held in conjunction with the opening for the 37 houses in Alue Lehob. It is important to note that many residents of Alue Lehob regarded this joint ceremony as the "best" of the 15 ceremonies they had witnessed in their village until that date, mainly due to the fact that it was the first time they had worked together for the common good of their own community and they were proud of what they had achieved. Workers from the community proudly wore special T-shirts identifying them as part of the road repair team, and many people came together happily to welcome representatives from IOM and ARC on the opening day.

Lesson Learned

Strong Community Engagement is Essential

Small infrastructure grants to communities can serve as a standard model for community-based project implementation in order to solve minor construction needs and to strengthen the community's capacity through participatory structures.

The community-based road repair initiative detailed here was not only successful in its aim to rebuild a vital access road in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami, but also greatly successful in engaging the local community in the process and strengthening community cohesion. As evident here, small community infrastructure grants can be excellent tools for addressing various infrastructure needs at the community level and improving internal cohesion and external relations with neighboring communities based on common interest. Furthermore, strong engagement of local communities enhances recognition of ownership and helps to ensure follow-up maintenance. Local Liaison Facilitators are critical in helping to ensure that the community becomes and remains engaged throughout the project.

Drawn from this particular case study in Alue Lehob, IOM adopted important recommendations to engage local communities in the implementation of infrastructure projects to strengthen community capacity to initiate and implement future self-help projects. This lesson has been applied not only to the construction of access roads but also to the construction of internal roads, irrigation systems, drainage systems, retaining walls and community water supply systems. ■

Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika (BMG)

Installing Tsunami Early Warning System

THE Indonesia Tsunami Early Warning System (Ina-TEWS) was developed by 18 government agencies and was financially and technologically supported by five donor countries: Germany, China, Japan, US and France.

Ina-TEWS aims to protect people against future tsunamis by warning them of the possibility of a tsunami within five minutes of an earthquake that has the potential to generate massive waves. Ina-TEWS can also contribute to protecting people in Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean nations against potential tsunamis.

The design for Ina-TEWS was initiated in 2005, but physical development did not begin until 2006. This early warning system comprises 160-seismometer broadband and 500 accelerographs, 40 GPS, 80 tide gauges and 23 Dart Buoys.

Information for the tsunami early warning system relies on seismic observation results from the Ina-TEWS seismic network under the coordination of the Jakarta Meteorology and Geophysics Agency (BMKG). Early information based on seismic observation is subsequently confirmed by the National Survey and Charting Coordination Agency (Bakosurtanal) through observing ocean waves (using tsunameter/Dart Buoys and tide gauges), strata deformation, monitoring tide gauges and GPS.

Ina-TEWS in Aceh

BMKG developed this system by installing seismographs, accelerographs and tsunami alarms. Seismographs have been installed in the Matale Geophysics Center, Lhokseumawe Meteorology Station, Tapaktuan, Singkil and a number of locations in coastal areas.

Five tsunami alarms were installed in the coastal areas of Lam Awe, Lhok Nga, Blang Oi, Kahju and Lampulo, and one at the governor's office. It is expected that in the future, the Aceh government will be able to expand the number of alarms to other areas vulnerable to tsunami, especially those along the west and south coastal areas of Aceh.

The development of the tsunami early warning system was highly appreciated by communities in Banda Aceh and its surroundings. However, in early June 2007, once all the alarms had been installed, a technical mistake occurred despite routine maintenance, resulting in alarms sounding erroneously and creating mass panic.

To overcome ensuing skepticism, the Banda Aceh municipal administration and BMKG strived to convince communities of the importance of the early warning system. Familiarization of this issue was continuously instigated by BMKG, local government and NGOs to ensure that communities in the coastal areas understood the function and the importance of Ina-TEWS.

Apart from tsunami alarms, BMKG also granted internet radios (Ranet) to the Aceh government. Ranets were installed at the governor's and mayor's offices and at several BMKG technical implementing units throughout Aceh. Ranet functions to disseminate information on earthquakes and tsunamis. This tool is also called 5 in 1, as it distributes five types of information: Web, email, SMS text message, FAX and alarm.

Tsunami alarms in Aceh were initially under the jurisdiction of the Medan Area I Meteorology and Geophysics Agency (BBMKG). Due to the vast distance between the controller and alarm location, and to ensure optimal utilization, jurisdiction was transferred to Aceh. The Aceh government subsequently developed a Crisis Center at the governor's office.

The alarm control system was relocated to the Crisis Center between Aug. 14 and 17, 2008, under the management of BMKG headquarters and with permission from the head of BBMKG Area I. The relocation was executed by PT PSN as the contractor, staff of BMKG from Matale Geophysics Station, BBMKG Medan and personnel of the Crisis Center.

To ensure that the early warning system would be effective, on Nov. 2, 2008, the Banda Aceh municipal administration organized a tsunami drill. The exercise involved government agencies, community neghborhoods, NGOs and students, and was deemed a success in informing communities of the actions to be taken in the event of a tsunami.

Concept of Information Dissemination

It was vital to disseminate information about the early warning system to ensure coordination and participation of all parties, in particular local government, interface organizations (BMKG clients) and communities.

Interface organizations are organizations or individuals that play important roles in disseminating tsunami information. These include the Regional BMKG Center, local BMKG stations, local government, military and police headquarters, television and radio stations, the National Disaster Management Coordination Board (Bakornas), GSM/CDMA providers, etc. Information is disseminated by these organizations to the smallest units in order to reach communities in disaster areas, particularly those in coastal areas.

Information dissemination begins with BMKG as the agency responsible for observing, processing and analyzing meteorology, climatology and geophysics data. Within the Ina-TEWS dissemination system, BMKG contributed to installing earthquake sensors, and monitoring, processing, analyzing and disseminating information to relevant organizations.

Ina-TEWS employs Decision Support System (DSS) technology. DSS is a system that collects all information from earthquake monitoring, tsunami simulation, tsunami monitoring and strata deformation after an earthquake. This information supports the dissemination of the early tsunami warning and the evaluation of the warning.

Information gathering begins with monitoring, processing and analysis (modeling) and is disseminated through BMKG's dissemination server in Jakarta via the 5 in 1 BMKG information system. This information is delivered to BMKG clients, including BMKG stations and interface organizations via public IP, Ranet and SMS.

Components of the Tsunami Early Warning System

BMKG has succeeded in issuing a tsunami warning within five minutes. This is achieved through the following components of the tsunami early warning system:

1. Monitoring : data compilation
2. Processing : information collection
3. Dissemination : communication
4. Preparedness : education, evacuation

When an earthquake occurs, within the first five minutes BMKG executes an interactive analysis of the earthquake's parameters (epicenter, magnitude, depth, time). The data are then compared to previous tsunami data and tsunami simulation to determine the necessity of issuing a tsunami warning. In the first 10 minutes, information from the National Center (PGN) is distributed to clients (interface organizations) for further

dissemination to communities for preparedness, education and evacuation. Thirty minutes later, tsunami information is updated from data from the National Survey and Charting Coordination Agency and Dart Buoys (BPPTs). Within another 30 to 60 minutes, information is again updated to determine whether to cancel a warning.

In conclusion, participation of all parties is vital to mitigate disaster, especially in the event of an earthquake. A tsunami early warning system is critical in this area as it is vulnerable to disaster. The system developed in Aceh, therefore, should be developed in other areas, particularly those vulnerable to natural disasters and the potential of a tsunami. Moreover, education should be provided for communities in order for them to understand the importance of an early warning system. It is hoped that the Aceh disaster and the subsequent early warning system will inspire local governments and communities to be more aware and prepared in anticipating disasters.

Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross)

Introducing Drilled Wells as a Safe Reliable Water Supply

WATER wells, the sole source of drinking water in the coastal areas of Aceh, became brackish and/or polluted, or were completely destroyed, as a consequence of the tsunami. As it was hard to predict when the shallow aquifer would completely regenerate with fresh water, it was decided that alternative sources, such as a deeper aquifer, needed to be exploited for the areas outside the communal water distribution scope.

The main goal of the Norwegian Red Cross (Norcross) drilling program was to provide boreholes in rural areas for water supply projects in schools, health centers and rural communities where groundwater was deemed to be the most viable solution.

Two main challenges of this program involved the engineering and social aspects. While the former dealt with extreme geological variations, the latter concerned bringing water from deep wells to customers. To address the first challenge, the pumping system and the level of required technology to supply water was adapted to different cases. For the second challenge, each partner of Norcross had their own water system design and their own way to interact with the beneficiaries.

Groundwater availability depends on hydro geological conditions and on the existing drilling technology to tap the suitable water table with a tube well. Aceh coastal areas presented extreme geological variations, from a sedimentary setting in Banda Aceh and Meulaboh catchments to marine limestone, mudstone or volcanic settings. Therefore, drilling techniques needed to be specified to these geological contexts.

Moreover, there is diversity in water level and quantity in deep wells. As a consequence, the pumping system and the level of required technology to supply water had to be adapted for different cases.

Apart from the engineering aspect, bringing water from the wells to community water taps also involved social aspects, which represented a challenge to the success of this project.

Norwegian Red Cross' Experience

To achieve its goal, Norcross needed to establish a professional crew especially trained for the Norcross drilling equipment, a PAT301TP rig unit (Thailand made). It also required close collaboration with the Aceh mining agency, which is in charge of underground water control and management.

Norcross started this project in 2005 in collaboration with the French Red Cross to provide water to temporary settlements for displaced people in Pidie district. In 2006, the project moved from the emergency phase to reconstruction phase, supporting the tsunami reconstruction effort.

From the end of 2006 to mid-2008, in collaboration with United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Norwegian Red Cross extended the underground water project and increased its drilling capacity with one additional drilling unit, and expanded the area of intervention to the west coast of Aceh and Banda Aceh.

During this project, 46,000 beneficiaries were reached by drilling 199 wells, comprising machine drilled and hand drilled wells. This figure included around 4,000 beneficiaries living in temporary settlements during the emergency phase.

A total of 74 water systems were constructed, from very simple types with tap stands next to the deep well to more elaborated ones with elevated reservoir and pipe network. The beneficiaries were communities and local institutions. Most of these drilling projects were achieved in collaboration with various international and national partners as well as beneficiaries' contribution.

Stakeholders

This project was achieved with the participation of numerous partners involved at different implementation levels. The drilling operation itself was fully handled and controlled by Norcross. UNICEF joined the project in October 2006 with a co-funding scheme as well as in kind equipment support including an additional drill rig and geophysical equipment.

Norcross was only in charge of the drilling process for the majority of the projects with a few exceptions where complete water projects were achieved with piping system, tank installation and beneficiary relations. Other partners, including Red Cross members, NGOs

and local institutions, were responsible for water system construction to bring water from the deep well to customers. A total of 23 different partners were involved.

Permanent collaboration was established with the Aceh Mining and Energy Agency. Two observation wells were drilled in Meulaboh in collaboration with the agency aiming to support the Aceh groundwater monitoring program.

Agreement with Partners

Norcross selected sites limited to Aceh mainland coastal areas, mainly in rural areas, on a request basis. Non-profit organizations addressed their deep well needs to Norcross or UNICEF.

A pre-agreement defining the role of each party was made to initiate further study. A field assessment was then carried out to identify the quantity and quality of water needs. The potential water resource around the concerned area was assessed, with a deep well being one of the last options, after having considered a communal water system, a gravity flow system or shallow water catchments (traditional shallow well). In cases where a deep well was the preferred option, a hydro geological survey was made to measure the potential success rate of drilling activity.

Once a deep well construction was agreed to be the only option for the water supply project, an agreement was discussed with the future partner. A formal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) stating responsibilities and obligations of each party was then signed. The MoU stipulated that the responsibility of Norcross was related to all drilling activities, from hydro geological survey to pump test, including water quality control. In a few cases it helped partners in pump installation. The drilling phase was completed with the participation and help of the community. Each partner was in charge of water supply network construction and the handover phase, which included social aspects to ensure sustainability of the project.

Drilling Process

All the wells were drilled using light drilling equipment PAT301TP, coming from the Promotion of Appropriate Technology company in Bangkok. Specific field training with a specialist from this company was provided at the early stage of the program.

Borehole and Well Designs

Boreholes were designed depending on the hydro geological formation that was studied prior to the drilling operation.

Drilling and Designing in Confined Aquifer-alluvial Plains

In the Banda Aceh, Sigli and Meulaboh basins, where 80 percent of our drilling operations were conducted, the alluvium setting could be simplified and defined by multiple clay layers inter-bedded with thin sand aquifers. The borehole and well design used for this setting was telescoped casing and used the fluid circulation drilling technique.

Completing a deep well in alluvium formation takes around a week if no specific challenges are encountered. This design presents advantages and some limitations. It is one of the simplest ways to tap a deep aquifer and protect it from pollution. Material costing less than US$1,500 is needed to complete this type of well, depending on the depth. Most of the wells that were drilled in this formation were artesian.

Factors crucial to success in this setting included: a well-trained drilling crew; understanding and controlling fluid drilling circulation (mud viscosity and density) to ensure the construction of a well that would not collapse; high quality pipes and screens to ensure the durability of wells.



Drawing1: Extract from PAT.com / reviewed

Well Design in Hard Formation

This refers to wells that were drilled either in marine limestone formation, hard sandstone or mudstone formation or grey formation with Down the Hole hammer technique.

This drilling technique is also very fast to implement (less than a week). The cost, similar to that of fluid drilling, is also low depending on the depth of the well.

Hand Drilling Technique and Design

The hand operated drilling technique was used for very specific places and contexts.

The hand drilling activity was used for shallow (30 m and shallower) sandy aquifer where water demand was low (around 20m3/day) and for some exploratory drilling. The implementation of this activity is easy in terms of logistics; results are easily obtained and the cost is very low.

Development and Pump Test

Once the wells were developed and cleaned, a pumping test was performed to evaluate performance (yield, water levels). A well-development procedure was adapted to the well construction design. The equipment used was a small compressor equipped with an airlift hose. The artesian wells were "naturally developed" and then cleaned up with the compressor whereas the other wells were developed in a more classical way, taking from a few hours up to three days. A pumping test for three different pumping rates with stable drawdown was performed on each well.

Water Quality Control

Every well to be used as a drinking point was checked and compared to Indonesian standards before being handed over. The minimum controlled parameters were electrical conductivity, PH, manganese, total iron, hardness, nitrate, Nitrite, E. coli, and arsenic. Special attention was given to the latter owing to its probable presence in the Aceh context and more specifically in the alluvium catchments. These parameters were chosen according to the particular Aceh context and results were obtained with field test kits. Some laboratory results were also gathered from different sources. Tests of some important representative drilled wells were performed by the geosciences laboratory of Hannover in Germany (BGR). The results were used as a cross-reference to back up our field results.

Construction of Water Facilities and Community Participation

Each partner had its own water system design and way to interact with the beneficiaries. In general, for a village water system, a participatory approach was utilized, the level of which varied. The minimum observed was community responsibility for land utilization where the facility was being constructed. In most cases public land was provided; in other cases the community bought private land or agreed on a right of usage with a private owner. Design of the water system was also discussed and agreed with the concerned community.

Additional participation was also observed with regards to manpower and construction material that was provided free of charge or at discounted prices for specific work. The construction itself was usually completed by local contractors. On average, the amount of money involved was between Rp 5 million for very small water systems to Rp 500 million where the piping was longer and the reservoir larger.

Typical Water System Design

Every partner decided, together with the beneficiaries, on the appropriate type of water system. However, some constraints remained. The first involved water quantity. On average, a Norcross constructed deep well is able to provide between 0.5 to 2.5 liters per second. Depending on the water utilization (drinking, other domestic use), a borehole can benefit from 300 to 1,500 people on average. We usually consider a well as serving 500 persons at a yield of one liter per second.

The cheapest water system adapted to this rural water supply scheme was public facilities (public taps) supplied by an elevated water reservoir filled by the deep well water pump. This system was commonly used in Aceh. Within this typical design, some variations were observed: (1) a deep well was located far from customers, or customers resided over a wide area (more than one village) and (2) a variety of pipes and tanks were used, from PVC to HDPE quality for pipes, and from concrete to fiber quality for tanks.

The choice of pump was crucial as it would have a direct impact on the long-term sustainability of the water system. It was one of the key elements of the system. In cases where the water level in the well was below eight meters (dynamic level), a submersible pump was required. This type of pump is considered "high technology" because repair or pump replacement is expensive (from Rp 2 million to Rp 10 million). When the water level is less than eight meters, a surface pump was preferred. Its cost is much lower and the required technology is also lower. Depending on the size, the price of a new one varies from Rp 500,000 to Rp 4 million.

A few partners decided to provide water at the house level, avoiding public facilities. This type of design was more expensive and required a higher level of customer involvement in terms of operational costs. It represented around 10 percent of the built systems (six places).

Life Expectancy of a Water System

Different scenarios can be foreseen for the future of these water systems, depending on overall regional development. It could be assumed that some of the newly built water systems will be replaced by a communal water system in the long term, but this is a remote possibility as most of these systems are in remote areas.

A common understanding is that such a water scheme could last from seven to 15 years depending on the level of maintenance, bearing in mind that the management belongs to the local recipients with very little help from the government. After this period, some major reinvestment may be needed. A realistic scenario is that communities would manage and cover the cost of operation and daily maintenance. However, the high cost of amortization would make it difficult for a community to fully cover it.

Water System Sustainability

All the water systems were handed over either to the rural community (around 90 percent) or to local institutions (school, health centers or prisons). As support from the local government was limited, or almost nonexistent at the time, communities had had to and will have to handle the complete system management, from technical to cost recovery aspects. Therefore, long-term sustainability completely depends on each community.

A lot of different factors influence the sustainability. The first issue deals with alternative water sources. Some communities have backup water sources of lower quality and/or lower quantity (traditional well, river). Depending on the degree of the added value of the introduced deep well water system, communities will assign a different priority to it in the long term. The longer the system is used, the higher the costs will be, so there will be a border line where the added value of the system will not represent the money needed for it to last.

The second factor is related to operational costs. Water systems have operational costs in the form of electrical bills, daily maintenance costs and payment for the local operator/technician. A submersible pump involves higher electrical cost than a small surface pump. A big village will need more than one operator. On average, the operational cost per family per month varies from Rp 3,000 to Rp 20,000 with an average of around Rp 10,000.

Another very important component is a village's capability for managing the costs of the system. A well organized village with strong leaders will have little problem in collecting water fees, whereas a village with weak leadership will face difficulties in managing money collection. All partners organized technical training and management training to help villages organize themselves at the beginning and in order for them to be completely autonomous.

The water systems can be classified into sustainability risk categories. A system where operational costs are very low (Rp 3,000 to Rp 5,000), would entail a simple design (cheap surface pump with limited pipe network) is easy to maintain and would have a low risk rate, whereas a village with a submersible pump and long pipe system would be considered high risk. A medium rating would be where the system remains simple but some pipe networks are installed and/or where the community has difficulties in managing fee collection for various reasons (other existing water sources of lower quality, weak village leadership, etc.).

Given the above classification, our analysis estimates that 33 percent of the systems have a high risk of sustainability, 33 percent a medium risk and 33 percent a low risk. Future development of the areas and local economic growth will also play a role in the long term. A six to 12 month period would be needed for a community to face the first challenge and resolve the problems. During this period, we can observe the setting up of local mechanisms to manage the systems, adapt and modify the management or technical aspects. ■

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

Introducing Concrete Canal Lining through Participatory Construction

ASIAN Development Bank (ADB) as provided $31.5 million to rehabilitate and reconstruct irrigation systems in Aceh and Nias. The assistance is part of a $291 million ADB grant that is helping to rebuild the areas devastated by the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami.

More than 70,000 farming families, and 72,000 hectares of farms, will benefit from the irrigation initiative. ADB previously provided $68 million to rehabilitate irrigation systems in Aceh and four other provinces through the Northern Sumatera Irrigated Agriculture Sector Project, which ran from 2002 to 2005.

ADB is working closely with local communities to strengthen traditional water groups and rehabilitate irrigation systems in Aceh and Nias. The direct involvement of communities through water users associations ensure local ownership, which translates to better and more sustainable irrigation systems.

Through water users associations (WUA) ensure associations are the central theme of the irrigation component of the ADB financed Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project (ETESP). In Aceh, these WUAs are known as *Perkumpulan Petani Pemakai Air Kejreun Blang* (P3A). Under the ETESP irrigation component, irrigators are involved right from beginning in the design and implementation of the reconstruction and improvement of their irrigation systems.

"Community Plenary Meetings" have been introduced to agree on the design and to decide which works are to be undertaken through community contracts, called *Surat Perjanjian Pemberian Pekerjaan* (SP3), and those through contracts awarded to civil works contractors using local competitive bidding (LCB) but with community involvement. The LCB contracts with community involvement are commonly known as *Kerjasama Operasional* (KSO) and the community involvement can involve supply of materials or provision of labor, or both, to the contractor. SP3 contracts are mostly applied for the smaller civil works at the level of tertiary and secondary canals. Typically, the value of SP3 contracts is in the range of Rp 50 million to Rp 299 million, and about one to 33 WUAs usually participate in the construction work.

During the early implementation stage, the engineering design team of the consultant engaged under the ETESP irrigation component proposed using structural wire mesh reinforced concrete instead of the traditional stone masonry for canal lining construction.

The main consideration was resistance against earthquakes combined with simplicity of construction and reduced costs.

However, the proposal initially resulted in some skepticism, particularly from some of the project managers of the agency in charge of the irrigation reconstruction program (Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency for Aceh-Nias: BRR). They were concerned that the WUAs would not have the capacity and knowledge to build work of a satisfactory quality. Previously, farmers had never used wire mesh reinforced concrete in the construction of canal lining. Furthermore, the agency staff also had limited experience in using wire mesh construction for canal lining.

Discussions in the field by the consultant's sociology team revealed that in general WUAs were not immediately ready to carry out canal lining using wire mesh. The WUAs stated they had considerable experience and skill in using stone masonry but not in creating wire mesh reinforced concrete lining. This was not surprising as ETESP is the first project in Indonesia to involve WUAs in the construction of this type of canal lining.

Being "a first", constructing wire mesh reinforced concrete lining successfully through WUAs was a challenge for everybody involved in the ETESP irrigation component. This challenge motivated and encouraged all team members, including the BRR project management staff and the consultant's teams. The BRR inspectors and the consultant's construction monitoring team in conjunction with the sociology team made frequent visits and provided onsite technical assistance to the WUAs during the construction phase to ensure the correct construction methods and quality.

WUAs have now completed wire mesh reinforced canal lining for 12 kilometers of secondary canals (usually the construction of secondary canals is done by contractors) and for 17 kilometers of tertiary canals in 10 irrigation schemes in eight districts in

Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province. The quality of the construction is relatively good —usually better than that of work carried out by contractors. But perhaps most importantly, the WUAs involved now have a sense of ownership and a feeling of responsibility.

As the head of the WUA Putra Barona in the Krueng Tuan scheme said: "This is our asset and these canals will provide us with adequate water. Therefore it was important for us to do the best possible job".

Lessons Learned

Clearly, a new experience has been gained, and an innovative technique introduced and implemented through participatory construction. WUAs involved in the participatory construction stated that constructing canal lining using wire mesh reinforced concrete was faster and easier than using stone masonry, and it should be stronger too.

This successful implementation encouraged all project team members to apply wire mesh reinforced concrete lining for other planned irrigation reconstruction and improvement work. Based on this first experience, BRR's project management staff and the consultant's teams have become confident of the ability of WUAs to build works with a satisfactory quality. The experience has taught us that introducing a new technique to rural communities is possible, but that it requires strong motivation, patience and hard work by all parties involved. It has also helped to strengthen the cooperation between team members. Because of this experience another 340 contracts will be executed through the WUAs under the ETESP irrigation component.

The participatory construction phase is now being followed up by the participatory operation and maintenance (O&M) phase. The consultant's sociology team is preparing the training for O&M and, during the training, the team will try to ensure further involvement of the WUAs in the operation and maintenance activities for the irrigation schemes in which the WUAs have assisted in reconstruction.

Finally, learning by doing real work is more meaningful and powerful rather than even 1,000 words spoken in classical training. The understanding is: "*We heard and then we forgot. We saw and now we remember. We did and so we can*". ■

Economy and Business

CLOSELY linked to the reconstruction of housing, settlements and infrastructure, the economics and business sector has focused on the development of livelihoods. While macro economics remains a long-term development initiative, in the short-term, it has been critical to enable beneficiaries to maintain their families and ultimately their communities. In combination with small-scale infrastructure programs and the provision of micro-financing, many of these objectives have been met as described in the 10 case studies appearing in this book for this sector. Of these case studies, 7 of which appear in the printed pages and the remaining 3 on CD, a perspective on supporting small-to-medium enterprises in provided.

Most of the community has their livelihood, as seen in a shop-residence in the Singkil Market, Aceh Singkil, December 20, 2008. In addition to focusing on rural-economic development, the Aceh-Nias recovery revitalized small businesses in large and small cities. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD)
Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

Simplifying Business Licensing in Aceh Barat District

THE small and medium enterprise (SME) sector in Indonesia, including Aceh, plays an important role in driving regional economies. Until now, the development of this sector has been handicapped by limited access to capital from banks and other financial institutions. Common reasons for this include business ineligibility due to lack of official registration, in part consequent to the lengthy and time-consuming licensing process and lack of transparency regarding registration fees. An integrated licensing service known as the One-Stop-Service (*Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu*) is the solution to simplify licensing processes so that they are fast, cheap and transparent. This case study shows how Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD)-Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)-led efforts LOGICA-led efforts to simplify the licensing system have resulted in business operators registering their SMEs, which in turn has resulted in them gaining much needed access to capital. In addition, the One-Stop-Service (PTSP) offices have subsequently become models of good customer service.

Background

Business operators play an important role in the economy at national and regional levels. However the bureaucracy in Indonesia often becomes an obstacle to business

development. World Bank Data (2006) shows that Indonesia ranks the worst on an international index for time taken and outlay of expense for business registration.

As is the case in other regions in Indonesia, the licensing bureaucracy in Aceh is a complicated and confusing process involving the applicant having to visit several district government offices (SKPD) in different locations within one district. It is a time consuming process without clearly stated and regulated costs. Efforts to simplify the procedure have been made in various districts of Indonesia such as Sragen, Jembrana, Malang and Yogyakarta, from which LOGICA drew inspiration.

The AIPRD-LOGICA program supported the simplification of bureaucratic processes in business registration and in attracting investment and supporting the SME sector. The development of the SME sector has been handicapped by limited access to capital from banks and other financial institutions, as well as by processes requiring business registration. The cutting of bureaucratic red tape directly assists poverty eradication by enabling local businesses to develop and employ more people, contributing to the expansion of the local economy. The establishment of the One-Stop-Service was intended as a realistic and cost-effective assistance to district administration capacity building and regional economic development.

Significant Events

AIPRD-LOGICA facilitated the development of One-Stop-Service offices in four districts in Aceh Province following a campaign to promote the existence and potential of PTSP offices. This campaign proposed that improvement in services would assist the SME sector to register businesses, gain access to finance and therefore grow and employ more labor. This would increase regional economic growth, attract more investment to Aceh Barat District and increase tax revenue for the region.

The campaign motivated the Aceh Barat District to activate a PTSP office. The Aceh Barat District Administration had previously initiated a committee to establish a PTSP office in May 2007; however, the office did not function because there was not sufficient government capacity to fulfill this commitment. The District Administration thus sought the help of AIPRD-LOGICA to help realize a functioning PTSP office.

The first step in the creation of a PTSP office was the recruiting of an office head and other staff. The new staff members were trained in the running of a One-Stop-Service model such as those operated successfully in Malang City and Sragen District in Central Java. The office was also outfitted with new equipment. Once the staff fully understood the purpose and procedures of a One-Stop-Service office, the next step was the identification of business license types that the PSTP would issue. Together with LOGICA, the PTSP team identified which licenses would be issued at its office, such as permanent business trading licenses issued by the Trade Agency, and the Building Construction License issued by the Public Works Agency.

The result was the priority listing of 19 license types important for the SME sector and investors. Assisted by LOGICA, the PSTP team then established a license granting checklist standard and customer service standard. The PTSP staff agreed to process licensing applications according to ethical standards and developed a clear process for handling complaints professionally. Licensing fee standards were also established. All this information was clearly communicated within the office on a notice board, explaining and guiding standard office practice, which was prominently displayed for both the public and staff to read. Business communities were involved in the process through a survey on procedures to obtain business permits, consultation on standards for business licensing, and via a complaint handling system established by the PTSP.

An advertising campaign was then run so that the community and business operators were aware of the new system. The PTSP staff ran preliminary trials using the new prescribed protocols and standards of service. After all the preparations were in place, the office finally opened on November 1, 2007, to serve the community in an integrated manner.

The opening of the One-Stop-Service office brought dramatic change. The result was a fast and efficient streamlined mechanism. Multiple business licenses vital to establishing SMEs were now obtainable in a single office. Licenses, which in the past had required the applicant to visit numerous government offices in different locations, often with unclear and variable costs, and which could take up to five months to procure, were now available in only six days from the PTSP in line with transparent and accountable processes, and with information about PTSP disseminated through community notice boards and advertisement through publicly displayed banners and brochures. The business registration process was transformed into a simple, clearly articulated and transparent public service.

Business operators responded enthusiastically to the establishment of the PTSP. The number of licenses processed increased by 170 percent in 2007-2008. The average number of licenses rose from 170 per month in 2007, to an average of 370 per month in 2008. A large proportion of the applicants are also seeking financing from banks. Capital can be used to expand businesses and create a greater need to employ labor. PTSP has not provided assistance to business owners seeking financial support from banks, but the licenses and permits issued by PTPS are the key documents required by the bank for channeling loans.

Today PTSP staffers are disciplined in working the required hours, in following set procedures and in meeting service standards, which has resulted in faster, more efficient and friendlier service.

Rolling out the PTSP office only required four months in Aceh Barat. It is said to be an Indonesian record in setting up a PTSP office. On average, the time needed for setting up an office in other regions is one year. The Aceh Barat PTSP has become a study model for the Sabang Municipal Administration, in Aceh, which has also set up a PTSP office.

Because of its productivity, the PTSP office in Aceh Barat District was nominated by the Aceh Provincial Government for the best public service unit award, which is granted by the Indonesian State Minister for Apparatus Empowerment. This nomination is impressive because in just one year this PTSP office was able to prove itself to be the best public service unit in Aceh Barat District. It was one of just eight nominees put forward by Aceh province for the award. This is all the more significant because the Province of Aceh consists of 23 districts and cities inclusive of hundreds of offices providing public services.

Challenges

1. Resistance within SKPD to surrendering authority and functions.
   Although the PTSP in Aceh Barat is now providing better public services, the office itself faces opposition from within certain sectors of SKPD that do not wish to surrender any authority or functions to the PTSP. For example, the Transportation Department continues to retain the licensing function for private bus operators and the Health Department continues to issue licenses for businesses in the health sector. In order that the benefits of a PTSP can be more widely felt it is recommended that the issuing of these and other licenses should be transferred to the PTSP office.
2. Vulnerability to corruption.
   Normally, government officials are accustomed to receiving extra payments for accelerated issuing of licenses. Changing this long-standing practice is a significant challenge to the successful operation of PTSP offices. After the establishment of the PTSP office, however, this opportunity has been restricted by utilizing several means of regulation, namely: a control card (to regulate the time required to issue a license); a published schedule of fees (to clearly explain the official fee schedule); and a prominently displayed outline of the processing steps in the STSP office space. However, when field inspections - which involve SKPD staff - are required, it is difficult to control illicit payments to staff. The handling of this matter is an ongoing concern requiring professional management in order to avoid any negative feelings among the staff involved.
3. Fair remuneration.
   The PTSP office is essential to giving better customer service in business licensing. Given the poor standard of work habits common within the SKPD bureaucracy, the PTSP staff work environment and productivity is demonstratively new and outstanding. Regional administration leadership should make the PTSP office practices an example to be promoted as a benchmark model to be replicated by other SKPD. Importantly, fair remuneration must be given to PTSP staff, due to their exemplary standards of work practice. If not, it is feared that PTSP work productivity will decline because the staff workload in PTSP offices is effectively greater than that of other staff in the SKPD; keeping in mind that the district administration ultimately pays and treats both parties equally.

4. Networking and collaboration.
   The PTSP's bureaucratic streamlining has proven to encourage the growth and licensing of SMEs. However, this is only one part of the effort needed to help SMEs to grow. Other components of government need to be involved as well. For example, the Labor Department prepares profiles and databases on labor conditions, which could ideally be accessed by business operators, and BAPPEDA holds economic data that could attract investment. Greater cooperation between these bodies and the PTSP would greatly assist the dissemination of valuable information on business activities and financial opportunities, and bring a positive impact to regional SMEs and the development of the broader economy.

Lessons Learned

1. Government support required to ensure economic growth.
   Economic growth depends not only on the availability of sufficient physical infrastructure and labor, but also requires that the government establish a system and mechanism that provide easy access for business licensing and permits. PTSP has offered standard procedures, which motivate the business community to register their businesses for new investment, and access to loans, as well as other reasons.

2. Support from government leaders is an important factor in the success of PTSP.
   The PTSP experienced some resistance from other government agencies with regard to transferring their authority in issuing permits and licenses, but with strong support from the head of the district administration, some permits and licenses are now managed by PTSP. The commitment of government leaders to build an investment-friendly environment is a key factor contributing to the success of PTSP. ■

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Strengthening Small Businesses with a Big Role to Play

THE German Technical Cooperation (GTZ)-supported Economic Recovery and Microfinance (ERMF) project assisted eight rural credit banks in Aceh to implement a modern system of microfinance, which helped boost the province's economy.

Introduction

Even before the tsunami, Mrs. Rohani was famous for her spicy garlic crackers. But the tidal wave that rolled over her hometown of Lhoknga washed away her beachside house and everything she owned. One of her children died. It took her two years to rebuild her livelihood while living in an internally displaced persons camp. With the help of micro credit, she was able to buy new equipment and re-open her bakery. Today, she has five people working for her and plans to expand her business.

Small and very small enterprises like Rohani's are often considered the engine that powers the economy, particularly in developing countries like Indonesia, where sometimes more than 90 percent of the population works in the informal sector. Whether they are cookie bakers, ironmongers, or moped mechanics, all of them contribute to economic stability in their region. This, in turn, has an influence on political stability, because people with jobs have fundamentally fewer fears for their livelihood. So, political change is not a matter of immediate urgency.

Yet many small businesses fail when it comes to expanding because they cannot get loans from commercial banks, which want security in the form of a house or land. Indonesia has many private moneylenders, but they demand interest of up to 100 percent per annum —a risk that leaves many borrowers facing ruin. A better alternative is a microfinance institution (MFI). These institutions give loans as small as 30 Euros, and are satisfied with security in the form of a refrigerator or television.

That said, many people in Aceh did not even have a television after the tsunami. Businesspeople had lost their businesses and were not able to repay existing debts. Banks and MFIs also suffered —many of their workers had been killed, and files and other records had been washed away. This lack of clarity in the area of finance crippled the economy and the reconstruction effort in Aceh. Outside help was needed.

The GTZ financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) does work in conjunction with the Indonesian central bank, Bank Indonesia, to set up a modern microfinance system with, among other things, eight rural credit banks, known by their Indonesian abbreviation as BPRs.

Before the ERMF project developed new Islamic microfinance software, employees in rural banks in Aceh had a lot of manual work to do. Photo: GTZ/Pauline Haebel

These are banks for Indonesians: They offer savings and loans to those running small and very small enterprises. The amounts involved range from the equivalent of 30 to 5,000 Euros. The aim was to enable these banks to become active once more by helping to boost the economy in Aceh with micro credit.

Development and Implementation

"The eight BPRs that we worked with were on their last legs when the project began," says GTZ project worker Matthias Range. The almost 30 years of armed conflict had severely weakened Aceh's financial institutions. The province was shut off from the outside world, and only one commercial bank and a few MFIs had managed to survive. The tsunami was the last straw.

"Under normal circumstances, we work with partners who can guarantee a certain stability. But after the tsunami, nothing here was normal. And there were no institutions that would have been better suited to the task," says Range.

One important prerequisite for sustainable development is that BPRs are regulated by the central bank. In addition, five of the eight rural banks in Aceh operate according to the Islamic system (BPRS) that forbids usury. These banks, therefore, look to share the profits and risks instead of demanding interest when they make an investment. In a strictly Islamic region such as Aceh, this is a necessary step toward gaining the confidence of the people. Yet this social philosophy of the Islamic banks presented quite a challenge. A large part of their previous business was based on what was called "channeling" —dispensing loans from the Indonesian government to selected customer groups. Because the government did not always insist on repayment, the banks did not think along commercial lines, and the customers even seemed to believe they had a right to the money. Staff had been poorly trained. Because of the loss of repayments and the material losses incurred due to the tsunami, the BPRs' equity had shrunk to a level at which the central bank would have had to intervene. But Bank Indonesia made an exception for the BPRs in the disaster area for two years after the tsunami.

A major task was to restore the BPRs' liquidity. For that to happen, their most important source of returns had to be restored —the repayment of loans. However, in the wake of the tsunami, most customers could not offer any kind of material security. In response to this, the ERMF project introduced cash-flow-based lending as a new method of allocating loans. Under this method, potential borrowers are not assessed according to their existing property. Rather, they are judged according to how reliably they will be able to make their repayments in the future. The viability of the business plan plays an important role here, but so does other income the family has. For instance, Rohani had no trouble getting a loan of five million rupiah (then about 450 Euros) from the BPRS Baiturrahman because, among other factors, her husband grew chili and garlic, not only earning regular cash, but also providing ingredients for his wife's product. GTZ workers provided specialized

training for bank employees in the use of this method. In addition, bank officials were schooled in all levels of credit analysis, risk assessment and time management. There was international training in credit technology, product development, and central bank regulation specifically for the bank managers.

Islamic banking principles, Islamic financial analysis and Islamic accounting were all important issues. Before the tsunami, most of the BPRs administered their loans manually or using homemade computer programs. Some of them had employees whose sole duty was to carry over the numbers into a new, thick ledger every month. Even the lines were often ruled by hand.

"The previous system was so out of date that it seemed pointless to try to improve it," says Range of the GTZ. "So we agreed with the bank managers to implement a completely new system." There was no appropriate software for Islamic microfinance institutes, and so the project adapted one, the world's first Islamic management information system. The new program is based on the MicroBanker (MBWin) system, which was worked out some 25 years ago with the support of GTZ and the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in Bangkok. The new system was implemented in close cooperation with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the US aid organization Mercy Corps. With small alterations, it will soon be ready for worldwide use.

Not least because of this new computer program, the BPRs in Aceh are now looking good. For instance, the BPRS Baiturrahman, founded in 1994, was just about broke after the tsunami. The deadly wave had washed away almost everything in its office, including its few computers, and three smaller offices in other locations were destroyed. The head of the loans department was killed, and 60 percent of borrowers had been badly affected by the disaster. With the help of the ERMF project, the BPRS Baiturrahman rated as "fairly sound" —the second-best rating category based on Bank Indonesia's evaluation - just three years later, and for 2008, it is likely to get a "sound" rating, which is the best in Bank Indonesia's rating category. Between December 2005 and September 2008, shareholders increased their equity capital by 38 percent. The German insurer Allianz played a key role in expanding this financial base even more. The number of active customers rose from 273 in December 2005 to 992 in September 2008. In the same period, the average amount still owed per customer fell from Rp 9.15 million (some 700 Euros) to Rp 3.93 million (about 300 Euros.) This reflects a stronger focus on small business —and precisely the hoped-for effect. Today, 80 percent of customers are female. In December 2005, only 30 percent were women.

Analysis

Before the tsunami, the rural credit banks in Aceh regarded themselves as social institutions that helped poor people attain a modest level of prosperity. During the conflict in Aceh, this function was underlined —becoming one part of their camouflage

Happy clients are good clients. Photo: GTZ/Volker Kess

that prevented the banks from becoming a target of attack. Most of the bank employees had no training specific to their job. Providing it was to be one of the first essential tasks, along with laying the foundations for microfinancing and loans. During the training, it was soon discovered that a further specialization in Islamic banking was also desperately needed, because most of the participants had only a vague understanding of its principles and misinterpreted many processes. The GTZ experts had to advance very carefully in this sensitive terrain. In cooperation with MICRA, a new technical services provider set up in the region, they designed new training materials for Islamic microfinancing —the world's first such materials made to international standards. These materials are already being put to use in other countries. They also form the basis of the new course of study in microfinancing at Syiah Kuala University in Banda Aceh.

Last summer, GTZ consultants were surprised by the BPRs' new refinancing strategy - because the banks' creditworthiness had improved so much, they were able to refinance purely with commercial loans. In this comfortable position, it seemed they no longer thought it very important to attract depositors. Growth in this area was far lower than forecast.

It is true that in many developing countries there is no broad palette of products for savers. Yet for depositors, savings plans offer a kind of insurance against events such as illness, natural disaster, or expensive weddings. The ERMF experts are continuing their

attempts to motivate the BPRs to encourage deposits. Other weaknesses that are still being worked on are personnel management and marketing. Many of the newly trained staff has switched to the commercial banks that have since come to Aceh because the pay is better.

In all other areas, the BPRs have developed beyond expectations in a short time. "An external consultant could hardly believe it when they came back after three years for another organization," says Range. "Successful development was only possible because everyone involved worked very hard. Every week our experts sat down with the employees of each bank, to look at the books, analyze problems and discuss decisions. This continuous, intense exchange was necessary for us to be able to react in time to local or cultural problems."

Small entrepreneurs like this moped mechanic contribute to the economic stability of Aceh. Photo: GTZ/Pauline Haebel

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Shifting from Conventional Farm to Organically Grown Cocoa – A Recipe for Success

THE German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) supported small farmers in Aceh's former conflict zones to switch to organic cocoa cultivation.

Introduction

Lush green rolling hills in the hinterland of Aceh Utara reach out all the way to the forests of the Gunung Leuser National Park. But the magnificent landscape has an ugly past —most of the villages in this area got caught in the crossfire of the 30-year conflict in Aceh province. Many farmers fell victim to brutal consequences of the conflict. One who suffered was Teuku Muhammad Nasir, from Pucok Rintis village. In 2000, he was lucky to survive an attack by armed men that left his house burned down to its foundations. He took his family and fled the 315 kilometers to the provincial capital, Banda Aceh, leaving his cocoa plantation behind.

Concerned about his farm, he returned to his home village in 2002, taking his wife and children with him. The rest of his family stayed in Banda Aceh, and died in the tsunami, which had washed away large parts of the coastal city. The family's few possessions were also gone. Many of Aceh Utara's farmers have a similar story to tell —the region's people fled to many parts of the province. When the Indonesian government finally signed a peace deal with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in August 2005, there was new hope:

international aid could now get through to the formerly no-go area. Since small-scale farmers in those areas make a large contribution to the overall Acehnese economy, their support was a key factor in the reconstruction of this battered province.

The aim was to help smallholders rebuild a sustainable livelihood, so it seemed a good idea to introduce them to organic farming and the export-oriented fair trade marketing system. The conditions were promising, as no chemical fertilizers or pesticides had been used on the farms for many years. New cultivation and processing methods would not only increase production, they would raise the quality as well. Cocoa was selected as a particularly suitable crop for this kind of project for two reasons. First, there were already many hectares planted with cocoa, and although the plantations had been neglected, the trees were at their most productive age. Second, demand for organically grown cocoa on the world market was far greater than supply. That made an expectation of wide profit margins seem reasonable. Under these circumstances, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to support the Economic Recovery and Microfinance (ERMF) and the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) projects with the introduction of organic cocoa production to the districts of Aceh Utara, Pidie and Pidie Jaya.

Due to the quality of their fruits, the Cooperative Organic Cocoa of Aceh (CoCoA) received Organic and Fair Trade certification in 2008. The cooperative's establishment in 2006 was supported by GTZ-assisted ERMF-project. Photo: GTZ/Gunnar Stange

only increase production, they would raise the quality as well. Cocoa was selected as a particularly suitable crop for this kind of project for two reasons. First, there were already many hectares planted with cocoa, and although the plantations had been neglected, the trees were at their most productive age. Second, demand for organically grown cocoa on the world market was far greater than supply. That made an expectation of wide profit margins seem reasonable. Under these circumstances, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to support the Economic Recovery and Microfinance (ERMF) and the Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) projects with the introduction of organic cocoa production to the districts of Aceh Utara, Pidie and Pidie Jaya.

Development and Implementation

The project was aimed at smallholders and their families who had either suffered due to the tsunami or who had left their plantations because of the conflict and had spent a number of years in displaced persons camps or living with relatives outside their districts. The first question was, of course, whether these people would be prepared to switch to organic farming and fair trade methods. On top of the favorable market for organically grown cocoa, there were a number of other arguments in favor of doing so. Conditions in Aceh are ideal for growing high-quality cocoa, and although the farms had been badly neglected, there were many with a high potential for organic production. In addition, most of the farmers had long had no choice but to use traditional methods and had fertilized their crops with manure only.

However, there were several disadvantages that GTZ project workers had to discuss intensively with farmers. To get the quality and yield of their crops up to export standards, the farmers had to change their working methods entirely. In the past they had simply left the trees to grow. They had harvested the pods when they were ripe, opened them and sold the beans either very cheaply while they were still damp, or at a slightly higher price when dried. But the real profits went to the many middlemen and exporters. Due to the fact that every farmer worked his own plantation and sold his own produce, he was dependent on such buyers. During the conflict, Aceh was so isolated from the outside world that direct marketing was not an option. Thus, the farmers who wanted to become involved in fair trade had to get organized, since one of the most important prerequisites for fair trade certification is the formation of a cooperative. It has to be democratically structured, and a proportion of the profits has to go locally to social projects such as schools or hospitals for the public good. No child labor is to be used.

Despite the many changes and complex procedures ahead of them, 2,330 small farmers in Aceh Utara, Pidie and Pidie Jaya took up the challenge. GTZ experts helped them organize themselves into three cooperatives. The farmers of Pucok Rintis and several other villages joined to form the Cooperative organic Cocoa of Aceh (CoCoA).

Teuku Muhammad Nasir is the elected chairman of his cluster, a subgroup of the cooperative. "It's a big responsibility —I am the link between my group and the cooperative leadership," the 32 year old explains proudly. "I'm very happy that they have placed their trust in me, because in this position I can gain a lot of new experience."

Like other selected farmers, Nasir attended a course in the new cultivation techniques, which he then had to pass on to the farmers in his cluster. There were techniques such as how to prune the cocoa trees to improve the quality of the fruit, and the proper way to ferment the beans. This is important because Europe —the biggest market for organic cocoa —accepts only fermented beans, and places great emphasis on flavor.

Along with the technical training, the farmers heading each cluster underwent intense training in the founding and organization of a cooperative. This included seminars in financial management and company law, as well as Internet courses and English lessons: international trading means being able to communicate internationally.

The entire training program took two years. During that time, the impoverished farmers also received material aid from the projects— from brush cutters to clear the plantations, to financial support for administration, to a cocoa processing plant to make fermentation easier. The GTZ experts also helped the cooperatives get in touch with banks, find potential customers and prepare the necessary documents for the process of certification. The GTZ-supported projects also made contact with the Swiss Institute for Marketecology (IMO), which undertook the inspections for the "bio" label, which guarantees organically grown produce, while the international Fairtrade Labeling Organization (FLO) took care of the cooperatives' certification as fair trade organizations.

All the hard work paid off: more than two-thirds of the cocoa farmers in the three cooperatives have received the bio certificate. CoCoA in Aceh Utara was the first of the cooperatives to be recognized as a fair trade organization in Aceh, and was able to sell its first 10 tons of high-quality cocoa to a Swiss chocolate maker in December 2008. Further exports are soon to follow.

"It's a great feeling that we, the farmers, can now export our own cocoa and receive the profits for it directly. Naturally, that gives us a lot of motivation to improve," says Nasir. The demand for organically grown cocoa outweighs the cooperative's current output several times over. Right now, there are enough inquiries from Europe to ensure sales for several years.

Meanwhile, the other two GTZ-backed cooperatives in Pidie and Pidie Jaya have successfully introduced the organic cocoa model from Aceh Utara to small farmers in their districts and now wait for their fair trade certification. In addition, another international organization has contacted the GTZ experts with the aim of replicating the model in yet another area.

Analysis

The difficult transformation from conventional farming to organic cultivation requires strong determination from the farmers. Their key motivation was surely the prospect of a better income, and the opportunity to improve their social and economic lot. Yet the cocoa farmers knew that they were relying on outside support because they themselves did not have either the money or the knowledge to bring about such a transition.

However, working with an outside organization requires the creation of deep trust among themselves, as well as between them and the GTZ experts supporting the project.

"It was very important that we were honest with each other from the word go, and always kept our promises," says GTZ senior advisor Ashabul Anhar. "Most importantly, we could not try to force our decisions on the farmers. They had to choose their own way. We were just there to offer advice."

This strategy included the election of the cooperative chairmen and cluster heads from among the farmers' own ranks. "Of course, it took longer to train farmers in company management than it would have to employ specialists. But this was the only way to ensure that the cooperative chairmen had the trust of all their members," Anhar explains.

Now the three GTZ-supported organic cocoa cooperatives in Aceh Utara, Pidie and Pidie Jaya are planning to amalgamate into a regional network, so as to streamline communication with export customers, for instance. Such a union of farmers belonging to very different ethnic groups could even help secure peace in the province. The Aceh provincial government also supports the project, and is interested in holding a "Bio and Fair Trade Forum". The registration of an internationally recognized trademark for organic cocoa from Aceh could open up a lucrative niche in the world market for the impoverished province, where two-thirds of the population are farmers.

The worldwide financial crisis has also hit the cocoa market. However, by exporting

The young cocoa fruits are constantly examined to ensure highest quality standards of the final product. The first export of the Cooperative Organic Cocoa of Aceh (CoCoA) to Switzerland was realized in December 2008. Photo: GTZ/Pauline Haebel

organic cocoa under the fair trade system, the farmers still earn far more than they could have in the conventional way via middlemen. The "bio" label guarantees an export price that is always around 50 Euro cents per kilogram higher than the world market price. And for being part of the fair trade system, they also get about 120 Euros per ton of exported beans —money the cooperatives are obliged to spend on upgrading social infrastructure. This in turn significantly improves the quality of life in the villages. Along with better health care and education for their children, the cocoa farmers can build assembly halls, repair roads and even make public gardens.

"Maybe I will soon even be able to fulfill my greatest wish," says Teuku Muhammad Nasir, "that is to rebuild my family home that was burned down. I want my children to grow up in it in peace."

Forum Bangun Aceh (FBA)

Making Micro-credit Work with Local Motivators

Money Is Not Enough

RECOGNIZING that micro-entrepreneurs needed not just money, but also capacity building, in areas such as business planning and bookkeeping to ensure profitability and loan repayment compliance, local NGO Forum Bangun Aceh (FBA) used Local Motivators as key intermediary persons between the FBA head office and beneficiaries in supporting micro-credit programs.

There was also a need for ongoing support at the community level and regular flow of information for monitoring and evaluation purposes. Unable to achieve all this with the limited time and resources of FBA's head office in Banda Aceh, and with beneficiaries located many hours away from the city in every direction, we designed a system whereby prominent members in each area were appointed as Local Motivators and employed as part-time staff.

Strategic Intermediary Role

Local people were hired as Local Motivators to play a strategic intermediary role between the FBA head office and beneficiaries. They are businesspeople, religious or other community leaders who understand local values, culture and economic practices, and live among and personally know the micro-entrepreneurs we support. Their tasks have proven

that gaining social capital in supporting micro-credit programs is an important element in achieving the goal of community development and its sustainability.

Development and Implementation

FBA employs 10 Local Motivators on a part-time basis. Each Local Motivator is responsible for a certain geographic area, the scale of which varies from one village to a number of villages spread out over a district depending on the situation in that area. The role of the Local Motivator is to identify individuals or groups in their area that are eligible for micro-credit. They also help those identified to complete the credit application process by giving them information, assisting them to complete the required paperwork, and submitting their paperwork to the FBA head office in Banda Aceh. All of FBA's Local Motivators receive financial management/bookkeeping training and they are then obligated to share these skills and knowledge with the micro-credit applicants/recipients in their area. They also continue to provide support and encouragement for beneficiaries to maintain financial records for their businesses. Local Motivators touch base with beneficiaries on a regular basis and thus are able to monitor their progress, identify any problems, and work together on solutions. As one of their responsibilities, Local Motivators also report on the progress of their beneficiaries to FBA's head office in Banda Aceh. Local Motivators also perform the task of collecting loan repayments from the beneficiaries in their area and returning those repayments to FBA in Banda Aceh.

The incorporation of Local Motivators in the micro-credit program has yielded positive results —such as the identification of suitable credible candidates for micro-credit with a good business sense and in a position to share the benefits with the wider community by employing locals as staff or having a large number of dependents —thanks to the Local Motivators' high level of local knowledge, established relationships and networks, and informed judgment.

The engagement of Local Motivators has resulted in the receipt of FBA micro-credit being less burdensome on beneficiaries. This is because they are not required to travel to Banda Aceh or visit a bank to apply for micro-credit or to make loan repayments, as this can all be done through the Local Motivators in their area. Due to the support given by Local Motivators during the application process, throughout the duration of the loan, and when applying for secondary loans —the whole process has become less stressful and less difficult for the micro-entrepreneurs.

Positive Results

FBA has been brought closer to the people it serves. Beneficiaries have direct access to the foundation through their Local Motivators. This has also created an effective channel for information from the communities to FBA. The high quality of service and effective

communication channels have been achieved without placing extra burden on head office staff and without too much extra funding requirements.

Another positive outcome of involving Local Motivators is for community leadership. Taking up the role as Local Motivators necessarily results in the development of individual capacity and leadership development, an important prerequisite for community capacity development, as well as socio-economic development.

Through their roles as Local Motivators these individuals have built strong social capital with other community members, leading to an increased sense of community and commitment to each other. Apart from the leadership and community development benefits of the local motivator role, Local Motivators are also given the opportunity to supplement their incomes through meaningful part-time employment offered by FBA (rather than just being burdened with extra work for no compensation).

The Local Motivator approach has contributed positively in terms of FBA's micro-credit program planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. Local Motivators represent real community participation in all of these activities. As a result, program planning more correctly responds to the needs of the community, program implementation is prompt with less scope for implementation failure, and the community has the opportunity to monitor the program themselves. Thus involving Local Motivators in the program amounts to higher program relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability.

It is due to the engagement of these Local Motivators and the aforementioned outcomes, as well as the trusted and respected status of Local Motivators in their communities that FBA's micro-credit program has achieved such a relatively high rate of repayment. We can also attribute the wide coverage of our program (over six districts/cities in Aceh) to the presence of our Local Motivators in those areas, a feat surely not possible without the presence of the Local Motivators.

The main challenge now faced by FBA is how to ensure that the program continues to be sustainable (becomes self-sustainable) while also remaining beneficial for small business owners. The official period of reconstruction after the tsunami has almost come to an end and therefore donor funding is becoming scarcer. Thus, FBA now needs to devise a strategy to ensure the sustainability of the micro-credit program and the organization in general.

There are a number of conditions that influenced the successful incorporation of Local Motivators into the program. First, as an Acehnese founded, run and staffed organization we possessed the local knowledge and contacts needed in order to identify current or potential community leaders that could be approached to take on Local Motivators' roles. In order for the system to work smoothly we had to ensure that there were open communication lines between head office and the Local Motivators. Most importantly, we established trust.

FBA's system of micro-credit provision utilizing Local Motivators is very simple with a high potential for replication throughout Aceh and in other areas of Indonesia or the developing world. The system is particularly appropriate for small NGOs with limited resources extending micro-credit to rural people dispersed over a large area.

Challenges

In running a micro-credit program, the main challenge is based on how the institution tackles the problem of asymmetric information that can create moral hazards for beneficiaries. This is important due to the high rate of nonperforming loans in micro-credit, which is often caused by asymmetric information. Thus, micro-credit institutions need to devise an effective and efficient way to overcome the problem in the monitoring and evaluation stage, such as through the employment of Local Motivators.

Grameen Foundation (GF)

Empowering Women through Micro-finance

THE role of microfinance in a post-disaster context is often debated; while loans for income generation are not always an appropriate intervention during the relief phase, they can play a very powerful role in helping communities' transition from relief to long-term economic recovery. This case study captures Grameen Foundation's experiences in supporting two local organizations introducing microfinance to tsunami-affected women in Aceh.

In the months following the tsunami, Grameen Foundation (GF) mobilized a team of microfinance experts to conduct a comprehensive survey in Aceh. The study assessed the demand for microfinance services in the affected communities, and identified local microfinance institutions (MFIs) that, with the necessary financial and technical support, would be best equipped to meet that demand.

Although GF traditionally partners with established organizations with proven track records and experience working in the community, we were unable to identify existing Grameen-style microfinance institutions in post-tsunami Aceh. We therefore based our selections on the survey report's findings, and in July 2005 entered into partnerships with Yayasan Mitra Dhu'afa (YAMIDA) and Yayasan Karya Bunda Sejahtera (YKBS), two very young MFIs based outside of Banda Aceh and both headed by long-time microfinance practitioners. Both organizations expressed a strong desire to expand into Aceh province,

and with GF support, we were confident in their capacity to provide quality financial services to the affected communities. This partnership project was called GF's Post-Tsunami Microfinance Initiative.

The overall goal of the Post-Tsunami Microfinance Initiative was to support the establishment and expansion of local MFIs' operations in Aceh, and to provide technical assistance and capacity building support to ensure the long-term sustainability of these programs. The main objective of the microfinance activities was to create local employment opportunities for tsunami-affected women, and ultimately to help these borrowers move out of poverty. The expected benefits of the microfinance program extended beyond income generation, to women's empowerment and increased household expenditures for healthcare, nutrition, shelter, and education.

Development and Implementation

The actual work of GF's Post-Tsunami Microfinance Initiative in Aceh started in October 2005. GF provided YAMIDA and YKBS with capital for on-lending, financial support for MFI operations, technical assistance and training; YAMIDA and YKBS were responsible for daily program implementation. In October 2007, GF entered into a partnership with the American Red Cross to further expand our partners' coverage through the establishment of six new branches in the districts of Bireun, Pidie, Pidie Jaya and Aceh Jaya. To date, Grameen Foundation has provided over US$1.7 million in funding to YAMIDA and YKBS, who are collectively reaching over 12,000 women in 10 branches throughout Aceh province. As of December 31, 2008, disbursements totaled Rp 31 billion (US$3.1 million), showing that the credit velocity of the bank in three years of operations almost doubled from the initial funds provided by GF to YAMIDA and YKBS.

The operational method of GF's Post-Tsunami Microfinance Initiative adopted the Grameen Bank's Microfinance Model. The basic principle of this model is the bank believes that borrowers who are mostly poor women are trustworthy, and are therefore not required to put up collateral. Loans are secured by social collateral through group cohesion, mutual self-help and peer pressure. This model also emphasizes the proactive approach in which the bank goes to the customers, and not vice versa. The bank's credit officers visit the village every week and any activities related to the credit are settled in the village.

The mechanism of the credit delivery system begins with the establishment of groups of five prospective borrowers. Each group chooses a group leader and a secretary to manage and coordinate with bank field staff. Once the grouping system is well established, the bank disburses loans. In the first step, YAMIDA and YKBS provide loans to two members of each group decided upon through group discussion. Other group members take turns in receiving subsequent loans.

The bank determines each loan amount based on the business size of the prospective borrower, with loan ceilings being Rp 2 million (US$200) for the first cycle, Rp 3 million

(US$300) for second cycle and Rp 4 million (US$400) for the third and consecutive cycles with an interest rate of 20 percent per year. The process of credit delivery from customer assessment until loan disbursement takes maximum 15 days. The repayment system works on a weekly basis with 15 installments. The repayment rate was almost 99 percent, making the nonperforming loan rate only one percent.

Challenges Faced

In implementing a microfinance program in post-tsunami Aceh, the following key challenges were faced:

Grant Mentality of Borrowers

In post-disaster situations where there has been a substantial influx of relief aid, a 'dependency syndrome' often takes hold among beneficiaries —an expectation for aid to continue indefinitely that undermines the crucial transition to self-reliance. GF has seen this syndrome demonstrated in Aceh, where the most common question asked by prospective clients is, "Why a loan? Why not a grant?" This question is understandable in Aceh's post-disaster environment, but the grant mentality of tsunami survivors must be changed in order to support the transition from relief to livelihood recovery. For GF to develop successful microfinance programs in Aceh with a strong repayment rate, borrowers must understand the need for loans instead of grants.

Competition with Grant-Based or Subsidized Credit Programs

In Aceh, microfinance programs charging sustainable interest rates have to compete with grant-based programs, NGOs providing a mix of grants and loans, and government programs charging zero-interest loans. Although these programs play a critical role in the aftermath of a disaster by allowing affected communities to replace productive assets and meet basic needs, they are less appropriate once the immediate post-disaster phase is over. The grant-based and subsidized credit programs make it extremely difficult for sustainability-focused, long-term microfinance programs to operate. Furthermore, many of the subsidized, grant/loan programs do not sufficiently emphasize the importance of repayments. In this way, the repayment culture in these communities is weakened, undermining the effectiveness of MFIs reliant on a strong repayment rate for reaching self-sufficiency.

Working with Displaced Populations

In order for a woman to be eligible for a loan from the Grameen Bank, she has to be a permanent resident in her village and have lived there for at least three years. Likewise, many microfinance experts advise against working with displaced populations, as it is virtually impossible to maintain high repayment rates and strong portfolio quality. In the case of post-tsunami Aceh, we did not see this as an option. Our mission was to work

with tsunami-affected women, and those living in tents and barracks were clearly those most physically affected. The psychological benefits for these women of working and earning money also could not be ignored. This meant, however, that we encountered significant challenges in ensuring repayments and tracking clients when they moved out of temporary housing back to their villages far away.

Another challenge in working with the displaced population were the limits their situation placed on their opportunities to generate income. GM founder Professor Yunus often says that a poor woman's home doubles as her workplace. Without homes, displaced women by definition lack the physical space they need to conduct their work. This was another challenge in supporting microfinance programming in post-tsunami Aceh.

Analysis (Lessons Learned)

Managing microfinance in post disaster (tsunami, earthquake, flood, etc) areas is more difficult than in normal situations. Therefore, it needs more effort to maintain the continuity of microfinance operations. These are lessons learned from GF's experiences in contributing to empower tsunami-affected women through the development of microfinance.

Engaging Community Leaders

Soliciting the support and participation of community leaders is crucial in the success of a microfinance program. Particularly for potentially controversial programs working exclusively with women or providing interest-bearing loans, it is critical to secure the buy-in of influential community leaders from the very beginning. In the context of Aceh, GF partners set up meetings with the village head and local imam to explain the mission and vision of their program. If the leaders were supportive of the program, they helped arrange a general meeting involving the entire community, providing MFI staff the opportunity to share key features of the microcredit program, answer questions and clear up any misconceptions. Having community leaders as some of our strongest supporters helped us to avoid potential problems or misunderstandings in the community.

Importance of Educating Clients in the Value of Loans vs. Grants

For those that have come to expect grants instead of loans, it is important to explain the value of a loan program —that microfinance is not a short-term gift, but a sustainable, long-term solution. Rather than receiving just one grant, microfinance clients can continue to take out loans in larger amounts (after successfully repaying their earlier loan) for as long as they need. This concept is explained to the community leaders and members from the very beginning. It is made very clear in the earliest sessions and throughout the group training conducted prior to loan disbursement. Once this concept is understood, most clients conclude that having long-term access to credit and savings is indeed a better and more appealing option.

Tracking Loans of Displaced Clients

When GF and its partners first began operations in Aceh in late 2005, we targeted women living in the barracks and tents. Despite the challenges they faced in generating income under these conditions, the women were incredibly innovative and created relatively successful micro-enterprises. Many women bought small stoves with which to cook or bake cakes and snacks, which they then sold in the barracks or to local shops. However, as these clients moved out of the temporary housing and relocated to their villages, we found it very difficult to track them and ensure repayment of their loans.

In response to these obstacles, GF and partners developed new systems to address this problem. When a displaced client joined the program, for example, loan officers were required to get information on where they were originally from, and make sure that their village was within the MFI's existing coverage area. People from outside the MFI's geographic coverage area were not eligible for loans. Weekly meetings helped field staff monitor clients' plans to move out of the barracks, and these updates became an integral part of the client center meetings. Clients were encouraged to let field staff know of their relocation plans in advance, so that staff had time to coordinate with the branch working in the new location and give the client the necessary documents to share with the branch staff there.

Do not Mix Loans and Grants

When shifting from relief to livelihood recovery interventions, many organizations go from providing grants to providing a mix of grants and loans. Although the intention is to ease the transition from donations to credit, it tends to give mixed messages. Beneficiaries have little incentive to repay the loan portion given by the same organization that previously gave them full grants. They are also less likely to make repayments to a program that they know is working in their area on a short-term basis, or that has limited funds for their microfinance operations. One of the main motivations in repaying a loan is the promise of more loans, at higher amounts. As a result, short-term grant-loan programs often yield low repayment rates, and undermine the long-term work of microfinance programs charging the interest or service fees necessary to become operationally self-sufficient.

Organizations providing grants should consider partnering with a separate organization committed to working in the community long-term to administer loans. Those that decide to provide loans directly should consider re-branding the loan products to differentiate the program in the beneficiaries' eyes. ■

Swisscontact

Breathing New Life into Small and Medium Enterprises

BESIDES the recovery of basic infrastructure in tsunami-affected areas, the creation of job opportunities/long-term employment for survivors is an important key to sustainable recovery. Swiss Project for Business Recovery in Aceh and North Sumatera (SPAN) was designed to support the recovery process and the start-up of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) in the tsunami and earthquake-affected areas of Aceh and North Sumatera. In order to achieve its goal, SPAN aimed to create jobs and generate income by supporting the recovery of existing and new established MSMEs in tsunami-affected areas.

Business Recovery Information Centers

The Swiss Project for Business Recovery in Aceh and North Sumatera (SPAN) was designed to induce private sector recovery through assisting entrepreneurs in Aceh and North Sumatera. One of the project's objectives was to create and support local business service units, called Business Information Centers (Pusat Informasi Bisnis: PINBIS (independent businesses) located in eight different areas throughout Aceh and North Sumatera.

The first PINBIS units were launched in July 2005. In general, PINBIS extend business support services, e.g. business planning, accountancy training, to local entrepreneurs who

want to recover formerly existing businesses or create new, start-up businesses. Hence, PINBIS forms an integral part of SPAN activities and has helped to address a range of existing market inefficiencies on both the supply and demand sides —characterized by scale, formalization, and information asymmetry.

SPAN is jointly funded by Swiss Solidarity; the Swiss government, through the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO); and the Chevron Foundation. SPAN also provides financial assistance through an Equity Matching Grant Fund and a credit line to help economic development of the region. In collaboration with financial institutions, SPAN disburses funds to MSMEs for investment and working capital needs. SPAN integrates PINBIS and the financial assistance to MSMEs. It is designed to foster synergy and achieve the main program goal of job opportunities and income for affected communities.

PINBIS units were created as a catalyst between financial institutions, local consultants, known as Business Development Services Providers (BDSPs) and MSMEs, with the objective to stimulate the flow of funds to MSMEs. Swisscontact developed the technical capacity of the PINBIS units and helped them develop a network between the three groups of stakeholders.

The PINBIS units play an important role in project implementation. All of them, except the one in Medan, facilitate training, develop business plans and provide continuous monitoring of MSMEs. Unlike the others, Medan PINBIS is responsible for media

A Discussion during PINBIS Workshop. Photo: Swisscontact Documentation

Monitoring to the MSME in Blang Pidie. Photo: Swisscontact Documentation

campaigning. Through PINBIS Media, a semi-commercial tabloid available at various newsstands on the city's sidewalks, shopping malls, airport, Medan PINBIS publishes the project's activities, including training activities, MSME profiles and other relevant issues, as well as providing advertisement space. The primary aim of the PINBIS units is to offer a range of services for MSMEs and other clients. By providing these services, it is expected that all PINBIS units will become financially solvent, self-sustaining institutions by the end of 2009, when SPAN comes to an end.

Business Development Service Providers

In the project region there are plenty of professional Business Development Service providers (BDS) providing various assistance to customers. The BDS are trained extensively by SPAN and other international organizations to provide non-financial services to clients. SPAN works with selected BDS to develop business in cooperation with MSMEs.

Equity Matching Grand Fund

Commercial recapitalization of affected MSMEs is impeded by a lack of adequate collateral and equity capital. SPAN manages an Equity Matching Grand Fund for

Programs, Object, SPAN's Characteristics of Financial Support

Programs	Object	Supporting Scheme
Business Recovery Program	Micro Recovery	SPAN provides grant contributions of up to Rp 25 million for investment and small portions of working capital. The enterprises must contribute at least 50 percent of the capital required for the recovery of their business. Business plans are developed in cooperation with PINBIS.
	Small and Medium Recovery	SPAN provides 50 percent of the contribution of total recovery capital required for investment and small portions of working capital. Own contributions and/or third party financing are expected from business partners, relatives or financial institutions. Business plans are developed in cooperation with PINBIS and professional BDSP.
Business Start-up Program	Micro Start-up	SPAN provides grant contribution of up to Rp 25 million for investment and small portions of working capital. The enterprises must contribute at least 50 percent of the capital required for the recovery of their business. Business plans are developed in cooperation with PINBIS.
	Small and Medium Start-up	SPAN organizes credit fairs in the project area to present promising start-ups to financial institutions. Business plans are developed by PINBIS. Enterprise contribution is targeted at 20 percent of capital requirements, with 60 percent of the capital for their ventures expected to be provided by financial institutions in the form of commercial loans, refinanced through the credit line. The risk is borne by the financial institution (30 percent) and by SPAN (70 percent).
	Franchise-like Start-up	SPAN develops several franchising and easily replicable business opportunities under the start-up program that focus on less entrepreneurial people for whom self-employment is the only option to generate income. These people prefer low-risk investments by replicating the successful business ideas of others. Therefore, SPAN facilitates the development of new business models and access to existing standards and easy to replicate business ideas. According to the needs of local start-up candidates SPAN supports the selections and adaptation of franchise-like business models, as well as contact farming schemes. Franchising start-up candidates might be under the micro or small and medium start-up program, depending on the franchising model, the capital required, and the expected job creation capacity.

Source: Swisscontact File, 2008

investments and working capital and a credit line for financial institutions. The credit line is financed by Chevron and is to be used for additional capital needs to start-up enterprises. After the repayment of the credit line, the respective funds are transferred to a revolving fund established by Swisscontact's TAAP project and managed by the new Aceh polytechnic. SPAN has cooperation agreements with selected financial institutions in the project area in order to support the recovery process and the start-up of enterprises through access to credit.

Development and Implementation

In July 2005, five PINBIS units were established in Banda Aceh, Bireun, Lhokseumawe, Blang Pidie and Medan. This effort was facilitated by various government agencies, such as the Provincial Chamber of Commerce and the district administration.

The Swisscontact-subsidized PINBIS units were initially set up solely as information centers for MSMEs, donors and other NGOs. However, after approximately one and a half years of operation, it became obvious that organizational constraints limited the role of PINBIS in SPAN activities and their direct contribution to the project objective. In response, the PINBIS concept was transformed from information center to local project

Kick-Off of PINBIS Association. Photo: Swisscontact Documentation

coordinator in mid-2007. As a consequence, the PINBIS units' role as information providers was reduced and they focused more on providing business plan services for MSMEs. By shifting the role of PINBIS, disbursements of SPAN funds could reach project targets. At the same time, this generated additional income for the units. The modified concept proved to be successful and was replicated in the other areas. It allowed SPAN to open three more units in Nias, Meulaboh and Langsa at about the same time.

Challenges and Obstacles

Initially, SPAN faced data collection barriers due to the loss of MSME data in the tsunami. SPAN collected data through remaining government institutions, financial institutions and field work. Destroyed road infrastructure also made data collection difficult, as did post-tsunami trauma among entrepreneurs. Under these conditions, the BDSP were vital in addressing entrepreneur trauma. Collecting MSME data also met with obstacles due to the pre-tsunami conflict. Another challenge was overcoming moral hazards, which was addressed through onsite visits to MSMEs.

Lessons Learned

By June 2008, the transformation of PINBIS had been completed. The role of PINBIS was transformed from local coordinator to local partner. Ownership has been strengthened and, thereby, PINBIS units have become less dependent on project support and have registered as separate legal entities. The new status has provided PINBIS with additional flexibility to collaborate with other organizations and to tap other sources of income.

Ten major MSME successes

No	Company	City	Total Jobs	New Jobs	Product
1.	Usaha Ikan Asin Cangrebong	Aceh Tamiang	118	57	Dried Fish
2.	Bina Usaha Doormat	Aceh Besar	68	38	Doormats
3.	Bina Usaha Timber	Banda Aceh	52	20	Furniture
4.	Cempaka Lima	Banda Aceh	46	11	Clinic & Pharmacy
5.	CV Nibo Corporation	Banda Aceh	43	6	Cement Bricks
6.	Bordir Aceh Tuah Dek Ari	Aceh Utara	42	0	Bags
7.	UD Citra Baru	Blang Pidie	40	32	Nutmeg Essence & Cookies
8.	CV Prakarsa Perdana	Banda Aceh	40	27	Garments
9.	Nyak Ni	Banda Aceh	39	36	Handicrafts
10.	Monisa Souvenir	Banda Aceh	39	19	Handicrafts & Bags

Source: Swisscontact Files, 2008

Today, Swisscontact assistance to PINBIS has been significantly reduced; the units are now funded on a performance basis only.

PINBIS units have progressed rapidly. In the past one-and-a-half years, they have helped to disburse approximately Rp 17 billion to 732 MSMEs and created and retained around 4,500 jobs. The reshaping of organizational processes accelerated PINBIS efficiency and led to a dramatic performance increase. It is expected that PINBIS will exceed the overall projected targets by the end of 2009.

As part of the SPAN exit strategy, all PINBIS units have been encouraged to become less dependent. Each PINBIS is in the process of submitting a business proposal to Swisscontact. The proposals detail the business strategy of each PINBIS beyond the withdrawal of SPAN. Each proposal includes core business areas, future sources of income and a budget plan. Although many PINBIS units are already financially sound, it is expected that the business proposals will reveal the last challenges on their way to economic sustainability.

PINBIS units have been running at a rapid pace in some areas and have been very pedestrian in others. Increasing overall performance of PINBIS units has been a balancing act, since PINBIS units had to be integrated with other SPAN activities. In hindsight, it would have been more practical to restructure the multitude of complex processes and design them in a simpler way. SPAN has internalized this lesson and managed to reorganize the structure. This has given PINBIS the needed operational clarity to enhance their efficiency on their own.

A key suggestion would be to start each new activity only upon successful completion of the previous one. Through this phasing of activities, running many processes simultaneously is avoided. More importantly, it would give PINBIS units more time to develop the necessary, internal capacity. From an organizational development perspective, the formation of new institutions like the PINBIS units would not have been successful without the vision and ownership of the PINBIS managers. They have been the crucial ingredient and are the main reason why PINBIS have become independent businesses that will ultimately run their own operations unaided.

The major basis for setting up information centers and gradually shifting to local partners was the needs of the target group, i.e. MSMEs, and the needs of each individual PINBIS. The participatory approach, the constant perusal of exchanges at all levels and the commitment by all stakeholders to the project contributed to the positive development. In conclusion, Swisscontact's overall approach to nurturing PINBIS has been successful. ■

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)

Supporting Women Small Business Owners to Make Great Strides

IN the aftermath of the tsunami, women as well as men lost their jobs, businesses and sources of livelihood. A lack of women-friendly institutional norms, procedures and services, and women's marginalization from land ownership negatively affected women's access to credit, training, markets and income, thus delaying recovery. Ensuring women's economic rights and security is also important because 20 percent of households are headed by woman.

United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has the objective to provide financial and technical assistance for innovative approaches aimed at fostering women's empowerment and gender equality.

During the recovery period, UNIFEM supported several activities to empower women in Balai Inong (traditional Acehnese women's spaces) in Rumpet, Lamno, such as training in sewing, computer skills and other potential income-generating activities. As these activities progressed, it became clear that participants needed access to credit to realize their potential. The recovery of the environment in Rumpet also brought back the potential for livelihoods, such as making cigarette papers from thatch palm, and shell-fishing. The women needed new equipment and materials to tap into income-generating opportunities, such as canoes for shell-fishing, jugs/jerry cans and funnels for selling fuel,

making the need for capital even more visible. UNIFEM partnered with Foundation for Small Startup Enterprises (Pusat Inkubasi Usaha Kecil or Yayasan PINBUK Aceh) once again to establish a microfinance institution for the women of *Balai Inong* Rumpet.

In response to this, UNIFEM worked with Yayasan PINBUK and 10 local financial institutions called Baitul Qiradh to channel funds to women running small businesses in three sub-districts. UNIFEM also supported the women with capacity-building activities and training in women's empowerment.

Development & Implementation

The Baitul Qiradh are Islamic financial institutions that provide capital support for small businesses in the form of soft loans with profit-sharing mechanisms instead of interest charges. Some Baitul Qiradh were damaged and destroyed in the tsunami, with client data and contacts lost in the damage. This was at a time when survivors had lost their assets and were in need of support to restart their businesses.

Comfortable with the Baitul Qiradh system, many people were turning to the financial institutions for capital loans, but as the Baitul Qiradh struggled to get back on their feet, most loan requests were being rejected.

Badriyah's Story: the Entrepreneurial Spirit

Traveling along the Pidie-Banda Aceh highway, you cannot miss the big coffee shop owned and operated by 60-year old Badriyah.

Badriyah's life has changed since joining the PINBUK-Baitul Qiradh loan program. "I did not know that such a program existed for small entrepreneurs."

Her homemade Nasi Bebek (rice with duck meat) is hugely popular among Pidie residents, so Badriyah decided to borrow Rp 1 million to add a Kopi Aceh (Acehnese Coffee) stall to her existing restaurant.

True to her entrepreneurial spirit, Badriyah paid off the first loan within one month and borrowed another Rp 3 million for expansion. She also renovated the entire restaurant using her own savings.

After the expansion, Badriyah's daily income tripled to Rp 660,000 per day.

Badriyah believes it is easier now for women in her region to obtain loans from microcredit institutions because women have proven to be determined and reliable.

Yayasan PINBUK Aceh, a non-profit institution whose main activity is to empower communities through micro-finance, was founded in the 1990s to help establish Baitul Qiradh. Yayasan PINBUK Aceh and the Baitul Qiradh function as loan providers, however they recognize the need to support capacity building of beneficiaries for income generating activities in tandem with provision of capital.

A project was implemented with three main objectives:

1. First, loans to beneficiaries for income generating activities (average loans around Rp 1-2 million);
2. Second, increased capacity of Yayasan PINBUK Aceh and Baitul Qiradh staff and beneficiaries; and
3. Third, increased awareness of gender and women's development issues, including making available trained staff on gender issues in the local context, who can train other staff on gender and serve as focal points for beneficiaries.

   Capacity building activities included refresher training on gender and management for Baitul Qiradh and Yayasan PINBUK Aceh staff and skills training in income-generating activities for the beneficiaries. The project saw a high repayment of loans and small businesses growing at high rates as beneficiaries implemented the skills they had gained from capacity building and their own business savvy.

   With the success of the Baitul Qiradh project, UNIFEM worked with Yayasan PINBUK Aceh again to establish a microfinance institution (MFI) in Rumpet, Lamno, built around the Balai Inong Rumpet. In a series of meetings, women participating in the project created the organizational structure of the MFI, and were assisted to establish the organization including opening a bank account for future activity.

   Yayasan PINBUK Aceh had a series of consultative meetings with members of the Balai Inong Rumpet to disseminate information about the project and discuss the suitability of the microfinance model for the group. During these consultations, Yayasan PINBUK Aceh found that a humanitarian aid agency had started a cash grant project in the community. There were initial concerns that a cash grant program would undermine a loans scheme, but Yayasan PINBUK Aceh and UNIFEM decided to proceed with the project.

   An under-utilized cooperative already existed in Rumpet so Yayasan PINBUK Aceh decided to utilize the staff of the existing cooperative instead of selecting new staff. The staff of the cooperative, known as MFI-Rumpet, received training on how to run a microfinance institution and deal with administration and related activities. Training included basic management training, loan and savings mechanisms, administration of an MFI and financial reporting.

   Before disbursement of funds, Yayasan PINBUK Aceh reiterated the working mechanism of revolving funds/microfinance. The regulations that the participants agreed to included:

4. Basic Saving of Rp 50,000. PINBUK suggested this and the women agreed. These funds would be used to open the Balai Inong bank account.
5. Maximum first disbursement to participant of Rp 1 million. PINBUK would disburse an amount according the needs of each woman.
6. There would be profit sharing from MFI that would be calculated by PINBUK based on the amount of financial support provided and returned.
7. The women must establish a group to apply for the financial support.
8. The women must save a minimum of Rp 2,000 per week. This money would be given back to the women when they finished servicing the loan.
9. Members would pay back their loan every week, in conjunction with regularly occurring religious activities.
10. If a member in the group failed to meet the loan repayments the other members would be responsible for it.

Challenges

Yayasan PINBUK Aceh disbursed funds to Baitul Qiradh in Rumpet that MFI-Rumpet would disburse to the women in Rumpet. Each woman received an initial loan of Rp 1 million and new loans became available to a borrower when her initial loan was repaid.

An early challenge for the project included changes to the *Balai Inong* committee, including the placement of the wife of the village head as chief of the *Balai Inong,* which caused disruption for the organization. There were also divisions in the community along the lines of who had remained in the village during the conflict and who had left. The social divisions in the community negatively impacted the cohesion and cooperation required for a revolving fund mechanism.

When PINBUK initially briefed participants on the mechanisms of the loan, some of the women hesitated about the profit sharing, which they viewed as bank interest, but after further explanation, the women accepted the mechanism. Every week the borrowers repaid loans to the MFI regularly and until now the program is continuing well.

Challenges for both projects included finding the most appropriate sized loan to balance the burden on the beneficiary and the beneficiary's competitiveness with other small businesses. As all beneficiaries were women, another challenge faced regularly was that families of beneficiaries expected women to spend more time in the home to take care of the family. There were also reported cases of women taking out loans to support their husband's businesses, which the husband would repay even though the guidelines for loans stipulated that loans were for businesses owned and run by the women beneficiaries. Some of the beneficiaries also chose not to attend regular meetings as they did not see value in the capacity building component of the project.

Another broad challenge for such a microfinance project was that in the emergency phase many organizations implemented cash grant policies for most of their projects. In the beginning, some beneficiaries assumed that UNIFEM and Yayasan PINBUK Aceh used the same system. It was crucial to convey the differences between each model and for the women to accept those conditions.

Lessons Learned

UNIFEM's strength in its livelihood programs has been its comprehensive approach in establishing pilot projects with local partners in key locations throughout Aceh. UNIFEM combines strategic activities such as mobilization, training, capital and equipment assistance, and creation of market linkages to achieve long-term, sustainable livelihood options for women. New skills have also been creatively introduced to young women previously lacking access to such opportunities.

To combat some beneficiaries' low engagement in the capacity-building components of the projects it is essential to plan meetings at a time suited to women with myriad other responsibilities, such as preparing meals and collecting children from school.

Also, if women are going to channel their loans to husbands' businesses it is essential for broader empowerment objectives that this translates into beneficiaries increased engagement with the business. Close monitoring and one-on-one contact with beneficiaries would go some way to ensure this.

A microfinance scheme with capacity-building components, including gender training for both beneficiaries and staff of the financial institutions has excellent potential for replication, especially into existing microfinance schemes. Yayasan PINBUK Aceh, strengthened by its partnership with UNIFEM, has gone on to expand its reach to many more beneficiaries using a modality of loans, skills training and women's empowerment to great effect.


PRENAGEN

Education, Health and Women Empowerment

UNDERLYING all efforts to rebuild a better and safer Aceh and Nias, lies the need to ensure an education for future generations, and health facilities. These fundamental and vital needs, combined with the important role women play in this respect, have received perhaps more attention than any others. The concern for this sector is reflected in the 20 case studies, 9 of which are included in the printed pages while 11 are on CD, appearing in this book for this sector. As described in these case studies, the development of education and health services at a community level requires innovation and the involvement of the community itself. The importance of women, as the lead-family caregiver, in the implementation of pedagogic objectives and health services practices, is also discussed.

The maternity ward at the Gunungsitoli hospital, Nias, November 14, 2007. Since the 28 March 2008 earthquake, health services in the islands of Nias have been significantly improved, especially in terms of developing integrated health services. The Gunungsitoli hospital is a referral hospital for the islands. Photo: BRR/Bodi CH

Save the Children

Revitalizing Posyandu through Partnership and Participation

SAVE the Children has successfully revitalized 214 *Posyandu*, or village health posts, and trained over 1,000 *Posyandu* cadre members in 10 sub-districts in Pidie Jaya, Lhokseumawe, Bireuen and Simeuleu in coordination with the district and sub-district Health Offices, health providers, women's groups (PKK) and village leaders in the sub-districts.

Introduction

The *Posyandu* program was established in Indonesia during the mid-1980s to provide basic health services for mothers and children through monthly gatherings with volunteer health workers and midwives. In Aceh, decreasing government oversight, years of conflict and the 2004 tsunami weakened the *Posyandu* in Aceh. Save the Children chose to focus on reviving the *Posyandu* in its target areas because it recognizes the impact a well-functioning *Posyandu* can have on the health of children.

Save the Children has been working with communities and government health care workers since 2006 to revitalize the *Posyandu*, improve the quality of its services, and increase the impact it has in the community through focusing on community ownership and skills training. Save the Children's experience can serve as a model for other NGOs, communities and government health workers seeking to revitalize the *Posyandu* system

in a sustainable manner in other areas through consultation, partnership and active involvement by the government and community.

Save the Children worked closely with volunteer health workers, government health workers (especially village midwives) at the sub-district and district level, village leaders, the *Bupati* (District Head), members of Legislature and BAPPEDA, the PKK and mothers in each area to revive the *Posyandu*.

Development and Implementation

When Save the Children first began assessing the situation of *Posyandu* village health posts in Pidie Jaya and Lhokseumawe, staff found poorly functioning *Posyandu* health centers that were not meeting regularly, were poorly attended and typically under-staffed by poorly trained health workers who suffered from high turnover rates. Some cadre members reported that years of conflict had disrupted *Posyandu* meetings; others described their limited knowledge or little support from the *Puskesmas* (sub-district health center) as barriers to maintaining a functioning *Posyandu*.

Save the Children staff also observed that for special events, such as free food distribution by an NGO, a *Posyandu* would experience increased attendance during the distribution, but once the activity was completed the *Posyandu* would return to more sporadic meetings with limited attendance.

After the assessment, Save the Children met with both village leaders and community members to come to a common understanding on the plan for revitalizingthe *Posyandu*. It was relatively easy to come to an agreement because the framework for successful *Posyandu* health centers already existed. The next step in the process was recruiting cadre members. Most *Posyandu* only had two cadre members, so each community had to recruit an average of three more people to work in the cadre. Representatives from the community, including the village head and community members of the PKK, identified criteria and named potential volunteers. The communities agreed that a cadre member should be a woman or man who had completed high school, were over 18, were from the village, and had good communication skills and a desire to serve their villages. Involving village leaders in the selection process was important to ensure village ownership and volunteer consistency.

Once the cadre members were chosen, Save the Children provided a Training of Trainers (TOT) for District Health Office (DHO) and *Puskesmas* staff, who then served as trainers together with Save the Children staff in conducting trainings for cadre members over a four-month period in late 2006. Over 1,000 cadre members participated in batches of training courses covering *Posyandu* management and health promotion. The cadre members learned the five-table approach (registration, weighing of children, data entry into the growth monitoring book, interpreting results and counseling, and immunization) and learned about healthy child growth, good nutrition, exclusive breastfeeding and

signs of illness that require referral. In 2007, each of the 214 *Posyandu* were also equipped with uniforms for cadre members and baby and child scales for accurate measurement of child growth, in addition to receiving standard *Posyandu* equipment, furniture and kits.

Save the Children also supported monthly or bi-monthly meetings with batches of cadre members to provide coaching and mentoring on common challenges in collaboration with midwives and other *Puskesmas* health providers, DHO and PKK leaders. There were also review sessions on health topics such as malaria control, nutrition, immunization and breastfeeding. In addition, cadre members reviewed issues related to *Posyandu* management, such as correctly filling out the growth monitoring (KMS) card. Over time, the gap between the monthly meetings increased as cadre members became more comfortable and confident in their roles; nevertheless, cadre members continue to meet several times a year.

In addition, informal team building and gatherings were also important in building the team of *Posyandu* cadre members in each sub-district together with *Polindes* midwives and other health providers from the *Pustu*, *Puskesmas* and DHO. Several *Posyandu* Cadre Jamborees were conducted to publicly introduce and recognize the *Posyandu* cadre members and midwives in front of the *Puskesmas*, DHO, and village, sub-district and district leaders. These activities developed solidarity among the cadre members and reinforced their connection to government health providers.

Recently, the *Posyandu* have begun planning for village committee meetings two to three times a year to highlight progress and identify areas that need improvement and support from the village leaders. The women's group PKK has been an active part of this approach and has helped to increase support from the *Bupati* and raise awareness about health issues through periodic health promotion events.

Another critical aspect for laying the foundation for sustainability was the increased participation of government health workers. Government health workers were involved not only in the initial meetings and cadre training, but also in monthly supervision, monitoring, coaching, mentoring and yearly evaluation of *Posyandu* health centers. In January 2007, Save the Children conducted the first *Posyandu* assessment with an official from the District Health Office. Although the Ministry of Health has an established grading scale to assess *Posyandu* on their strength and sustainability, government officials had not been conducting regular evaluations of the *Posyandu*. Initiating these evaluations in coordination with DHO officials helped call attention to improvements made as well as persistent challenges, and highlighted the importance of conducting regular evaluation and assessment to improve the quality of the *Posyandu*. In December 2008, Save the Children conducted the second yearly evaluation of *Posyand* health center in Pidie Jaya with government counterparts. The results showed that all 37 *Posyandu* in Panteraja and Trienggadeng sub-districts had improved to Madya and Purnama categories (second and third out of four possible ranks) from Pratama in 2006.

Involving the government in the *Posyandu* health centers was a challenging but rewarding process. It was often difficult to convince members of the DHO or *Puskesmas* to attend the monthly *Posyandu* days and the supervisory structure of *Posyandu* health centers was confusing. In addition to a point person at the *Puskesmas* and DHO, there are also cluster leaders at the *Puskesmas* who are responsible for all of the *Posyandu* health centers in their cluster. Save the Children staff worked to identify and connect the various individuals and bodies in charge of monitoring the *Posyandu* to coordinate their efforts.

Data collection was another challenge; sometimes staff found differing data in *Posyandu* logbooks and government files and they believed there was a lack of capacity in the government on collecting data and interpreting it. Government health workers were also reluctant to accept data from the field on malnourishment or immunization rates, for example, particularly if the condition appeared worse than expected.

Although involving government officials and community members, especially village leadership, can be challenging, they are critical partners and instrumental to ensuring *Posyandu* sustainability. The *Posyandu* health centers require active participation and involvement not just by mothers, children and volunteer health workers, but also by fathers, community leaders and the local government leaders and agencies.

Lessons Learned

Save the Children's approach to revitalizing the *Posyandu* health centers was simply to re-energize and strengthen the existing structure and ensure all aspects of the *Posyandu* were participated in, supported by, and eventually owned by the community. Although some organizations mobilized the *Posyandu* days over shorter periods of time and for limited purposes, Save the Children's approach sought to create sustainable *Posyandu* by improving the facilities, skills of cadre members, and coordination among government bodies and village leadership. The involvement of the *Puskesmas* and DHO from the very beginning, for meetings, training sessions and monitoring, was another crucial aspect.

The social mobilization officers working on *Posyandu* revitalization emphasized the importance of village leadership in community ownership of the *Posyandu*. Although the governmental structure includes the *Posyandu* under the supervision of health entities, the success of the *Posyandu* depends equally on village leaders and the PKK, who can be strong advocates for the success of the *Posyandu*.

Others seeking to replicate this process should also work on building the capacity of the DHO to develop a common understanding with the communities on *Posyandu* management, and to establish their role in training, collecting data and supervising *Posyandu* health centers. Organizations can also take advantage of periodic immunization, provision of Vitamin A or de-worming activities to provide opportunities for *Puskesmas* staff to monitor *Posyandu* activities. One thing that could be done differently in the future

Photo: Save the Children Documentation

is to advocate for a permanent budget for the *Posyandu* health centers to account for future training sessions for new cadre members or other needs that may arise. Village leaders and the PKK can also be approached for funding. In addition, although there is a scale for grading *Posyandu* health centers, NGOs or government bodies should also develop a tool, with input from the community, for monitoring *Posyandu* and their cadre members' competence.

Save the Children's approach can be applied in all areas with *Posyandu* because it strengthens existing infrastructure and fosters partnership and participation. Efforts will be most successful when the community, government and other stakeholders are willing to work together, and there is a sustained commitment to complete the entire process, from assessment to training, refurbishment, and consistent monitoring and evaluation.

Profile of a Cadre

Fadlina became a *Posyandu* cadre in 1995 when her village leaders were looking for someone influential in the community with the spirit to help people. A 32-year-old mother of four in Rawasari village, Trienggadeng, Pidie Jaya, Fadlina says she wanted

to become a cadre to "help my community, my children, my brothers and sisters, my nephews in this village." Although a *Posyandu* should have five cadre members, Fadlina had only one other partner when she started and they struggled to encourage mothers to bring their children to the *Posyandu*. Many children did not have a growth monitoring card and parents did not know how to fill it out, and most families were afraid of immunizing their children.

After the tsunami affected the coastal area where she lives, families prioritized economic survival, but Fadlina still worked to promote healthy practices in her community. Save the Children arrived in Fadlina's community shortly after the tsunami, providing equipment and materials for the *Posyandu* and training Fadlina and other volunteer community health workers so that they would have all the skills and support they need to run a *Posyandu*. Fadlina received training in managing *Posyandu*, health promotion for breastfeeding, pregnancy care, immunization, nutrition and the Positive Deviance approach to community mobilization.

Fadlina says, "I am happy and I am proud to become a *Posyandu* cadre because I have a lot of knowledge now," adding that now she is able to practice basic health practices with her family, "such as keeping the house clean, cutting nails, washing hands, cooking nutritious food, cleaning the environment, exclusive breast feeding, and my husband also became a *Suami siaga* (a husband alert to family emergency)."

Fadlina's husband echoes her enthusiasm and says "I am also proud of her spirit to help people as a cadre, I always support her." With support and training from Save the Children, Fadlina's efforts to serve the community have become easier than before.

Save the Children

Riding on the Listening Journey

SAVE the Children's Family Base Care (FBC) project is a three-year initiative that responds to the effects of long-term conflict, as well as the 2004 tsunami, on the capacity of families to provide quality care for their children. FBC's overall goal is to improve the quality of care for children by building family, community and institutional capacity. In achieving this goal, FBC works to reach the most vulnerable families and children both in the communities and through residential care.

One of the key objectives of this project is to improve the managerial capacity of childcare institutions and their understanding of quality care. Since mid-2008, Save the Children has been working with 11 childcare institutions in Pidie and Aceh Utara districts, covering 36 communities. By building the capacity of the childcare institutions, the project aims to increase the standards of care within these institutions and thus improve the lives of hundreds of children within these institutions.

The project works to build closer relationships between childcare institutions, the communities, and the social welfare department (DINSOS) in order to develop better systems and improved practices in child admission, care and protection, and better administration and management. In addition, local NGOs are also involved in building the capacity of communities to reach vulnerable families and promote children's right to quality care (ideally at home). This partnership advocates an agreed standard of care as the basis for jointly developing interventions that are responsibly implemented by all parties.

Analysis

Obtaining commitment and active participation from the managers of the childcare institutions was not easy during the information dissemination phase of the project. The effects of published reports on abuse, neglect and unacceptable conditions in childcare institutions made them very skeptical; they did not fully trust the organization's intent. They feared that children would be taken from their care or that their institutions would be closed, and these fears influenced their interactions with Save the Children.

During the launch of the project, some institution managers bravely raised this issue and emotionally expressed their opinions to Save the Children. However, because DINSOS is Save the Children's main partner in this initiative, their apprehensions and reservations have lessened. The district head also overwhelmingly expressed his support for Save the Children, and this helped bring a level of trust among the childcare institution managements.

However, support from Save the Children's main partners did not automatically gain the full commitment of the childcare institution managers to the project. During the initial stages of the project, it was still a challenge for Save the Children to secure the childcare institution managers' strong involvement.

Analysis

To start improving care for children in childcare institutions, the project first had to define "quality standards of care". Save the Children's FBC project builds on research conducted in 2007 by Save the Children/UK, UNICEF and DINSOS, which resulted in a report titled *Someone that Matters*. The study presented areas, domains and indicators of quality care. Save the Children's FBC project adopted some of the domains and determined four major areas: Professional Practice, Personal Care, Staff Recruitment and Placement, and Resources and Administration.

It is at this point that the FBC team embraced the use of "appreciative interviewing" as a way to generate information. Using Appreciative Inquiry principles and processes, the team developed a protocol around the four domains. The protocol highlights the institutions' best practices, aspirations, as well as areas of growth.

The relationships and trust established resulted in the successful implementation of the two major activities that followed; the "family" atmosphere was strongly felt during the Peer Assessment Workshop and the Summit for Partnership Planning. The participation of the childcare institution managers was exceptional during these events. Without objection, they accepted the low ratings that their institutions received on some indicators. Besides this, they partook in real exchanges of ideas as to how these "areas of growth" could be addressed by all the parties present. Such constructive dialogs led to the success of both events, and because of this success, the director of the Department of Social Services openly praised the participants' commitment and promised his department's full support and cooperation.

Engaging in positive conversations and using appreciative questions is a new experience both for those conducting such interviews as well as for the respondents. Asking questions about "moments they are proud of" in a situation where they feel so much "lack" seems to be an impossible way to engage people in a conversation. Furthermore, asking about participants' dreams is seen as an unrealistic approach to generate factual information. These apprehensions were expressed by Save the Children's staff as they began to practice this new approach. Many interviewers had to guide a seemingly negative conversation to a more positive or liberating one, and they found this challenging. During the first interviews, such experiences eroded their confidence in the process and made them question the validity of the approach.

At the onset of the interview process, staff explained the new approach to the respondents. A team of three was also formed to provide support in asking questions, clarifying answers, as well as documenting properly the stories and conversations that transpired. Respondents were also asked debriefing questions on their perceptions of the conversations. In addition, a debriefing meeting was also conducted for the interviewers to check their level of comfort and confidence.

Conditions for Success

Staff capacity building is a very important factor that made this initiative successful. Since the new approach required a new way of seeing and doing things, staff were provided with training, as well as coaching and mentoring in the field, in order to be able to carry out appreciative interviews with childcare institution managers, staff and children under their care. Aside from a whole packet of information provided for them on how to conduct the conversation, a clinic was also conducted before every interview. A debriefing questionnaire was also distributed among the respondents to define areas that inspired them during the process as well as areas that needed to be improved. This feedback helped build the staff's confidence as well as guide them on how to improve their conversations for the next interviews.

Lessons Learned

Engaging the childcare institution managers in positive and encouraging discussions to generate baseline information about the quality of care in these institutions could be considered a revolutionary approach. This "strength" based approach as a main component has been used widely in several contexts, however the application of this approach in this specific setting is ground breaking. Present literature on the quality of care in childcare institutions mostly dwells on problems or gaps in services. This is due to the usual way of conducting inquiries. In our problem-based paradigm, this is how it works: find what is not working and fix it!

However, in recent years, new ways of approaching issues have been proven to change the situation with the same, if not more empowering, impact. Appreciative Inquiry involves different principles and approaches to conducting inquiries. As one of its tools, appreciative interviewing has been tested and is now being embraced by Save the Children's FBC team in order to guide the change process among the childcare institution managers and other stakeholders.

If more resources (time and funding) were available, it would be even more empowering if the childcare institution managers and other stakeholders could be involved in defining areas of inquiry for quality care as well as crafting the appreciative questionnaires. This means beginning at least three steps before the actual conducting of appreciative interviews. This may include sessions on paradigm shifting, engaging and hearing different stories on quality care, and training on Appreciative Interviewing. With such preparation, childcare institution managers themselves could serve not only as respondents but also inquirers. The childcare institution managers and other stakeholders would formulate their own framework for quality care based on their own experiences and values.

Potential for Replication

The use of appreciative interviews, or more generally said, positive conversations and dialoging, has been proven applicable to all situations in small and large groups. The Appreciative Inquiry approach, which is the spirit of this initiative, has been applied in several contexts and documentation of its success has been well published. One of the keys for its successful replication lies in how fully we understand and believe in the process of Appreciative Inquiry and how it applies to a particular context. Choosing the most appropriate theme for inquiry is an essential start for the process. The more participative the process is, even during this very initial stage, the better the chances of its success. Also, managing small or big groups during the inquiry process is a skill that facilitators should master to make the experience empowering for all participants.

Through the FBC experience, baseline data was generated using appreciative interviewing. Ways were also found to change the mindset of the childcare institution managers from mistrust and skepticism to being more active and even catalyzing. Most of the childcare institution managers volunteered to serve as members of task groups that would further advance the process of improving quality care standards within their own ranks. As their mindset changed, they took on more responsibilities and acted to help create change.

In conclusion, altering our mindset about how change can be approached is the key to making this initiative successful. This is not an overnight process —changing mindsets takes time and entails acquiring new knowledge and building new skills. But most of all, it requires commitment to focus on positive and affirmative choices in the face of all the challenges that may come along.

Australia-Indonesia Partnership (AIP) Communities and Education Program in Aceh (CEPA)

Implementing Conflict-sensitive Assistance Program that Makes the Difference

PRESERVING stability and peace, and community development are still significant challenges for the Acehnese, the government of Indonesia and international donors. Through a series of capacity building programs, AIP-CEPA delivered an assistance program for school committees and communities in implementing AIP-CEPA grants so they would have the capability to manage other incoming grants. This constituted the responsibility of school committees and communities to manage grants transparently and accountably, and to comply to grant procedures and follow them in managing the grants.

School Committee

The role of school committees was basically administrative, non-financial and routine in nature. They had received no previous training on the management of grants and found it difficult to monitor and control grants from AIP-CEPA.

One of the objectives of AIP-CEPA programs was to give assistance through training and practice in the management of grants so that the objective of the grants would be achieved efficiently and effectively. Training and practice were given to those who would manage the grants by forming School Development Committees, each of which consisted of a school committee, teachers, religious leaders, community leaders and democratically elected community representatives. Community leaders included former GAM members.

Members of School Development Committees were required to disseminate information on the implementation and the application of the grants to all members of the community to give them a sense of belonging to their schools.

Implementation and Constraints

The management of grants often encountered demands for various payments by certain parties for so-called security and operational costs. The individuals or groups who imposed these fees were usually people who did not understand the benefit of the grants. This practice applied to various kinds of grants to the community and schools and amounted to 2 to 5 percent of a total grant.

The importance of the grants being disbursed to the right recipients with effective management was explained to the community and school administration as the first step to eliminating this unscrupulous practice.

Dissemination of information on the importance of proper and transparent grant management practices and a training program on grant management for communities and school committees were imperative, as it was they who were to manage the grants. Strict control over any fund leakage was the first step to ensuring successful grant management.

Limited availability of human resources and unscrupulous practices were seen as the main hurdles in the successful, transparent and accountable management of grants. Proper understanding of the benefits of the grants was one way to eliminate the practice. A training program on professionally managing grants for a community and school was one step in the continuous implementation of transparent and accountable management of grants.

The success of AIP-CEPA in managing its grants was the result of the implementation of a conflict-sensitive approach and training in financial management. In this training, managements learned that effective internal control of cash required appropriate procedures to protect cash inflow and outflow. There were three key principles: (1) the clear separation of responsibilities between those conducting transactions and those handling the cash, (2) all cash had to be deposited in the bank daily, and (3) all expenditures had to be paid by check, except when petty cash could be used for small payments.

Formation of School Development Committee

The program was implemented by a School Development Committee. Members of a committee consisted of teachers, school committee, religious leaders, community leaders and democratically elected community representatives. Community leaders included former GAM leaders. In relation to the management of grants, members had to attend Block Grant Application Proposal and Block Grant Management training.

School Committees learned to manage CEPA Block Grants transparently and accountably. This was demonstrated by the ability of school committees in preparing Block Grant proposals for school construction, as well as by the ability to prepare periodic reports (weekly, monthly and final report) on the progress of construction projects, which were audited by independent auditors.

School committees demonstrated the ability to enforce agreed upon rules and procedures amicably. School committees enforced rules on transparency and accountability. They also made weekly, monthly and final financial reports, as well as construction progress reports for block grants and accreditation reports.

School communities supported safe and sustainable construction practices. Sustainable harvested timber was used. No asbestos was used in school buildings, the construction of which is now earthquake proof.

World Vision Indonesia

Establishing Child Friendly Spaces

CHILDREN are national assets on whose shoulders rest the destiny of a nation, which is mainly why World Vision focuses on children in its various programs. One of World Vision's activities is the Child Friendly Space (CFS) program. It is a new terminology in community development. CFS was initially put in operation in Kosovo in response to the conflict there. This concept and approach emphasizes the physical, spiritual and psychosocial needs of children so rarely addressed in conflict situations.

A Child Friendly Space is a place where children and the young can meet and learn many things about life in a safe and comfortable environment. As a concept, the Child Friendly Space can be made available in schools, tent camps and barracks. In places such as these, children tend to hide their suffering and anxieties. The CFS provides a variety of information in a space where they can share, learn, play and seek help. It also gives them an opportunity to anticipate changes in community life.

As a prominent non-governmental humanitarian organization, World Vision felt it was important to provide Child Friendly Spaces in Aceh. The people were not only victims of disaster but also of prolonged conflict, which led to unfavorable conditions for children. Such an unprecedented and huge disaster meant that parents were unable to give their children the attention they needed. War and conflict had already cut access to education for some children.

That World Vision is of a different religious persuasion than the majority of the population of Aceh initially created challenges in carrying out humanitarian aid. Moreover, impacts of the conflict and disaster made the victims suspicious of World Vision Indonesia and its offer of aid as it had not previously operated in Aceh. For that reason, mapping, in the form of obtaining data to determine areas where CFS would be established, and explaining the mission played an important role in facilitating the process of providing humanitarian aid.

Mapping proved important in areas hit the hardest by the tsunami as it became the entry point for World Vision to approach and promote its programs to victims.

Implementation

Information dissemination was carried out in the barracks housing tsunami victims. Introduction and openness about World Vision and its missions, and the objectives of the Child Friendly Space program met with interest from the internally displaced people. World Vision established its mission near the barracks and gathered information about the number of children, space, possible local facilitators and necessary program content for the Child Friendly Space Program.

Once the data was obtained, the next step was deciding on an appropriate site for a Child Friendly Space. Through discussions with victims, it was agreed that land lent by the local community would be used for the CFS building. The first CFS was built in the hall of Aceh Social Welfare Agency at the displaced persons tent camp. This site was chosen as it was the largest shelter for tsunami victims. Children were then categorized into groups, namely elementary school age (five to 12 years) and high school (13 to 18 years).

It was not easy for World Vision to quickly find competent facilitators post-tsunami. World Vision invited teachers, parents and adults concerned about children, and youths with skills and artistic creativity to join as facilitators. Local facilitators were required to create a friendly environment for the children and provide them with programs with local content.

World Vision facilitated training for the facilitators to enhance their ability and knowledge about children's rights in Child Friendly Spaces. The CFS program activities include drawing, storytelling, dancing, traditional poems recital and outdoor activities. In conducting this program, World Vision collaborated with BRR to provide supporting equipment for the Child Friendly Space program.

In addition to the CFS program, World Vision also provided 22,400 students from 171 schools with stationery, furniture, uniforms and textbooks. It also provided 129 prefabricated buildings for 25 schools and helped reconstruct 16 schools in a number of areas all over Aceh.

World Vision enjoyed success in all of its programs, including CFS. In just six months, the number of CFS had increased to 26 in Aceh and Nias and they were used by 3,500 children. However, by 2006 the number of children participating in the CFS program had declined since they gradually entered formal school and moved to permanent housing. Some CFS are still operating and are run by a local Muslim youth organization.

Meanwhile, a mobile library used in the CFS program has been handed over to Yayasan Pembina Kegiatan Generasi Muda (Foundation for Guidance for Children's Activities) to be used under the supervision of a local library in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam province. World Vision continued working in education by training more than 500 teachers in December 2007.

Lessons Learned

The disaster saw people lose not only their loved ones and their belongings but also their spirit due to their intense suffering. The disaster victims needed so much more than physical support; they needed psychological support as well. World Vision, as an international humanitarian NGO, believes that psychological support is needed in the recovery process. Through the CFS program, World vision attempted to create special space for children to rebuild their spirits through learning and fun activities.

It was not easy to convince people who had lost hope and determination to accept non-physical aid and support after the disaster. Because the Child Friendly Space program did not offer material or physical benefit, it was important to disseminate information on the program and explain it thoroughly to victims. Openness and clear information about the inclusiveness of the program for all people was stressed. Involvement of local people in the CFS program helped it run smoothly and gain acceptance. However, it took time to train facilitators according to their individual abilities.

Coordination among donor institutions and NGOs is crucial to avoid overlooking those in dire need.

Yakkum Emergency Unit (YEU)

Initiating Sahabat Clinic Outreach Program

AFTER the tsunami, there was not much left in Nagan Raya, including in the form of health facilities. Like many other agencies, the Christian Foundation of Public Health (YAKKUM) operated a mobile clinic in the relief phase to serve people in the absence of regular health services run by the local government, which had been paralyzed by the disaster.

Many agencies handed over their services to the local government after the relief phase, which compromised health services as the local government was still recuperating.

The YAKKUM Emergency Unit (YEU), which started work on the third day after the disaster, has found that health remained the biggest concern in the area even four years after the tsunami. For this reason, YEU and its Sahabat clinic developed an outreach program to increase awareness of healthcare issues and to encourage people to view health as a main priority.

Initiative

Sahabat Clinic in Nagan Raya was established as a result of the mobile clinic run by YEU in the relief phase of the disaster. It was initially set up in the Padang Panyang camp to cater to the needs of displaced persons from several villages living in the camp. Services were initially free in the effort to save lives and improve the affected population's health immediately after the tsunami.

In 2005, the clinic acted as an inpatient clinic, while a local community hospital was being constructed. Three years later, the clinic moved to a more accessible location along the Meulaboh—Tapaktuan road, with better facilities and increased capacity to serve patients at a low cost. As treatment was no longer free, the clinic strived to give the best treatment for the lowest cost possible.

Besides treating patients, Sahabat Clinic also conducted promotion campaigns and preventive action through an outreach program. The program began as an information campaign conducted by the clinic's medical staff. While treating patients, nurses and doctors would take the time to give them information on health to raise their awareness of health issues in an effort to reduce their healthcare costs.

In the outreach program, health workers in nearby villages were trained and given assistance in offering basic medical treatment to fellow villagers. Close coordination with *Puskesmas* (public health clinics) and health offices, plus the direct involvement of *Posyandu* (maternal and childcare integrated health posts) and other health-related activities in the villages, formed most of the outreach program.

Seminars and other training were also held as part of the outreach program, targeted not only at medical staff but also at residents interested in health issues. These efforts were aimed at raising health awareness and improving community members' health.

The clinic also provided consultation and assistance to community members who lacked the resources to access proper healthcare. People unable to afford the full cost of treatment could ask for assistance and avail of the *Dana Peduli Sahabat* (Friend's Care Fund). The program not only helped patients pay for medical treatment but also tried to address a family's health awareness and the financial problems that led to the patient being unable to afford medical treatment.

Photo: YEU Documentation

Contribution to Disaster Risk Reduction

The outreach program not only dealt with health problems but also preparedness and mitigation efforts. By training health workers in villages to address simple health problems, assisting the local hospital and *Puskesmas* in their disaster plan, and acting as a source of disaster relief and mitigation, the clinic contributed to the disaster risk reduction effort.

By having village health workers, a community reduces the risk of losing lives in a disaster. Workers trained in first aid and basic healthcare can offer the first help in any emergency situation. They can care for the injured before they are taken to a health facility. Since healthcare is the first need of disaster-affected populations, having health workers ready in their own villages is highly beneficial to a community.

The workers also serve in non-emergency situations by organizing information workshops at *Posyandu*. This increases awareness among the community, starting with women and children, about the importance of health issues and how they can maintain their health and reduce the instance of illness.

A disaster plan is needed in every health facility to help people cope with emergency situations. Within each possible emergency situation, a disaster plan is formulated to enable the health facility to handle the flow of new patients while still taking care of existing patients. Effectiveness and efficiency in giving medical treatment is ensured by having such a plan to begin with. The plan also offers the opportunity to link up with other health facilities and institutions in order to create a workable referral system.

Photo: YEU Documentation

Being an open source of knowledge, an information center on disaster is important in raising community awareness and preparing people to not only deal with emergency situations, but also to reduce casualties in any future disaster.

Good Practices

The project developed a comprehensive healthcare system in that it gave not only excellent curative treatment at the clinic, but also conducted information campaigns and offered preventive care through its outreach program.

Key factors that contributed to good practices in the program included:

- The idea of disaster reduction through a health facility;
- Commitment to improving health awareness in the villages despite the risk of a reduction in patient visits;
- Involvement of nearby villages and health institutions in the outreach program;
- Introduction of comprehensive healthcare services;
- Ensuring health access to anyone in need;
- Direct involvement of clinic staff in villages in the vicinity of the clinic;
- Understanding of the local culture, social and economic status, which made it possible to introduce proper health measures and create awareness.

All of the above key factors contributed to a system called "Hospital without Walls", which has been a signature service of the Christian Foundation of Public Health since its establishment in Indonesia 59 years ago.

Potential for Replication

These practices could be replicated in similar contexts using the same strategy of offering comprehensive healthcare services.

This could be done by establishing a solid ground for medical care and extending it through an outreach program for nearby villages. Training and other initiatives should be carried out in tandem, with risks and needs identified in particular areas.

To avoid government agencies construing such projects to be in direct competition with their work, it is important to approach them at an early stage to establish partnership agreements, as well as to make it clear that the initiative also aims to strengthen their role.

For maximum benefit in such initiatives, there is a need to promote stakeholder participation, including at the design stage, and to further evaluate positive and negative experiences. ■

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Institutionalizing a Quality Cure for Aceh's Health Service

THE German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) promotes the introduction of modern quality management to health centers all over the province to improve the sector, which had been devastated by the tsunami.

Introduction

Your first impression upon entering Zainoel Abidin General Hospital in Banda Aceh is its remarkable cleanliness. When the December 26, 2004 tsunami devastated large parts of Aceh, the hospital was left full of mud and debris swept in by the wave. As the main health center in the province, it was also overcrowded with tsunami victims who started lining up the moment the water receded. Today, more than four years later, all the hospital buildings are spotlessly clean. The health care here appears to be well organized. But it is not only the hospital's outward appearance that has altered; the system inside it has changed too.

Along with new diagnostic equipment and organizational changes, the hospital adapted a modern quality management system —supported by the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) whose projects were financed by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

After Aceh's health system had literally broken down, the German government helped the provincial capital's general hospital get back up and running from the very beginning of the international relief efforts. They also have assisted a lot of other clinics and health centers in the province. The German Development Bank (KfW), for example, supported the rebuilding of damaged infrastructure and replaced medical equipment that was lost or destroyed in the tsunami. The GTZ-assisted program Health Service Management Systems, which aims to improve health and hospital management, is complementing these efforts.

To reach the target of a modern quality-oriented management, medical and administrative staff had to adopt a totally new concept of quality work while being trained in planning, monitoring and financial management. The different divisions formed quality circles and implemented quality improvement projects. These were tested in assessments of patients' and staff satisfaction. To measure the outcome of these efforts, the hospital directors chose the model of the European Federation of Quality Management (EFQM), since it reflects the conditions of social services better than other quality management models such as the International Organization of Standardization (ISO). This quality

Waiting times at Zainoel Abidin General Hospital have been greatly reduced since a quality circle introduced changes to the registration system.
Photo: GTZ Documentation

system includes all levels of health care provisions and involves health workers and health authorities, users of the health services as well as visitors who are not patients.

Development and Implementation

In the first step, the program partners developed survey methods to determine the actual quality of the health services as perceived by external users, and by the staff members themselves. The findings of the first surveys were taken as the base line for regular follow-up surveys. The first results from 2007 at Zainoel Abidin Hospital, for example, revealed a variety of complaints: long waiting times, poor hygiene, unfriendly staff and inadequate information during the treatment process. However, overall, service was judged positively.

"Initially, some of the staff members found it hard to take the criticism," says Hendrianto Trisnowibowo, a consultant for quality management. "Some even felt that outsiders could not judge any work process at a hospital at all. So we needed to professionalize the later assessments, so as to prove the statements using scientific methods. We reworked the questionnaires many times, modified the interviewing technique and reduced the questions to the essential points until everything worked." The results of each survey were then presented to the staff and analyzed to see if further action was needed.

In order to overcome the problems raised by clients and staff, the program advisors suggested the creation of Quality Circles (QCs). The members of the QCs were hospital employees who had at least one common responsibility, for example, doctors, nurses and administrative staff who all worked at the polyclinic or whose shared task was to prevent infection. These teams discussed the results of the surveys referring to their area of responsibility from a professional point of view and looked for ways to change them. At the Zainoel Abidin Hospital, for example, three QCs were set up initially: one to improve the prevention of infection, and two to overcome the long waiting times at registration and the consultation area.

Every QC then started planning projects aimed at raising the quality of service in their areas. To do this, they first had to set their targets, and then develop appropriate indicators to measure any improvement. For the team examining the reasons behind the high number of infections, for example, a lower percentage of wound infections among inpatients indicated progress. After they had identified the causes of these infections, they gave advice on preventive measures and increased checks on the people responsible. Subsequently, the number of infections dropped from 11 to 5 percent.

The team whose target was to reduce waiting times for outpatients introduced a couple of innovations: they set up a number system, added a new counter to the three existing ones, installed a new electronic registration system and connected it directly to the state's health insurance system. Although the results of a recent survey have not yet been analyzed, the waiting times appear to have dropped considerably.

"Judging by what I see, the whole process is much faster now," reports nurse Nurleyla.

Each group met several times a month and reported regularly on their results. Their respective quality improvement projects (QIPs) lasted between four weeks and six months. They cost between US$1 and $2,000. To monitor the process of each project, every participating health facility selected a quality coordinator, whose task was to intervene if the process slowed down or the circumstances required a change in concept. Once a QIP was finished, the team evaluated it together with the coordinator. Some teams even asked other QCs to review and comment on their results before presenting them to the general meeting of staff.

"Because the first three circles had such positive results, it was much easier to motivate staff to start new ones later on," says Hendrianto Trisnowibowo.

The Zainoel Abidin General Hospital has so far established eight quality circles, realizing five projects from January to October 2008. In this period, client satisfaction increased by 22 percent compared with the initial survey. The seven district hospitals set up a total of 15 QCs and realized 11 QIPs in the same period. Their client satisfaction improved by 28

A patient registers at a counter equipped with the newly introduced electronic regis-tration system at the polyclinic of Zainoel Abidin General Hospital. Photo: GTZ Documentation

percent. Another 19 projects were initiated at 42 selected primary health care centers all over the province.

QC members had to be skillful and have a positive attitude for the quality management to be successfully introduced into their service units. A kind of push-and-pull effect made most of the QIPs successful. The team working on cutting down waiting times, for example, received the initial push for their project from the clients' complaints in the initial survey. The staff got a huge surprise when the next assessment showed very positive responses to the new work processes, and became determined to further shorten the waiting time. So instead of slowing down as they were reaching their target, they pulled further in the direction the patients initially pushed them.

Lessons Learned

Health professionals in Aceh were the group most exposed to the full dimensions of the tsunami. Aceh health facilities lost up to 254 staff, while 413 reported missing.

Those who survived were traumatized by the loss of family members and the shocking events they had witnessed. At the same time, they had to care for badly injured tsunami victims under appalling conditions. The unfamiliar methods used by international relief organizations further upset their accustomed work processes. So the majority of health workers was not ready for too many further changes, and tended to cling to the established forms of health care. Under these circumstances, the questioning of the quality of their system and the changes required to improve it were sometimes just too much to bear. Health workers often felt their professional image was being called into question when client surveys yielded negative results. They tended to defend their methods, saying patients were unable to judge health issues. So the hospital management needed to motivate or even compel staff to take negative feedback seriously. Without the backup of the hospital director or other authorities, it was rather difficult to establish a new quality management system inside the established service culture of an institution.

Sophisticated modern equipment, however, was always welcome. The sheer availability of more and better equipment made the request for better service quality almost irrelevant. Specialist doctors in particular often considered quality management a matter to be dealt with by less qualified staff. Some specialists also feared their private medical practice would suffer if they suddenly had to compete with well-organized public health services. Considering these difficult conditions, the overall response from the health workers, and their implementation of quality management, was satisfactory.

"Building a culture of quality management is not something you can achieve in one or even a few years. Just look at how long it took Germany to reach the standard it has now," explains Hendrianto Trisnowibowo. "We still have to go a long way and we can't afford to stop. But experiencing success makes it much easier to continue." Positive

feedback from outside observers is therefore very important. When current problems seem overwhelming, QC members need motivation to continue their project. The quality coordinator, the hospital director or any other interested employee can all be motivators. Even the hospital general meetings can create motivation by recognizing the efforts and positive results of QIPs. All QC members who have successfully implemented a project are highly motivated to start a new one, and thus to continue the ongoing quality improvement process.

Photo: GTZ Documentation

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Providing Psychological Support for Traumatized Children

THE earthquake and tsunami had a devastating affect on Aceh's children, who had lost all semblance of the life they once knew. Those who had been orphaned were suddenly left homeless and burdened with responsibilities beyond their comprehension.

Trauma could be seen in many forms, such as in the fear produced by the sound of waves or anything that resembled the sound of the tsunami.

In addition, the three-decade conflict in Aceh had left its mark on the people, including the children. Every day, children had seen media reports of conflict violence. Some even experienced the brutality of the conflict during and after the imposition of martial law.

Acehnese children were at risk of deep trauma. Not only had they lost the love and affection of their parents, but they had to live in displaced persons camps, lacked medical care and could not attend school. According to a 2007 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) study of more than 200 children in conflict areas, 35 percent of the children had been involved with the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), acting as cooks, food procurers, firewood collectors, weapon cleaners, informants and bomb throwers. Another 9.5 percent had worked for somebody related to the conflict. Although they may have felt like "little soldiers", they were not GAM personnel.

One of the activities of UNICEF was the psychological support program, which took two different approaches: (1) establishing an activity center for children and (2) integrating psychological support into the education system. UNICEF and the Education Office designed a new concept that introduced a psychological approach to existing school subjects.

In the following phase, to respond to the psychological needs of children, in March 2005 a program called "Art in a Bag" was conducted in Aceh. Its concept was that art and story-telling were important forms of constructive expression for children. Because of the success of a pilot project in one tsunami-affected area, this project was developed in five other districts, including conflict areas, as a key to conflict recovery in Aceh.

Twenty-three forums were established at the district level and one at the provincial level.

UNICEF collaborated with other agencies and coordinated with the Aceh Health Office to design guidelines on the emotional needs of tsunami and conflict victims. In each district and city it also trained doctors and nurses in mental health care. The program was implemented by the provincial health office and supported by UNICEF partners.

Children's Centers

In the middle of 2005, UNICEF established activity centers where children could experience normal childhood activities, such as sports, games, craftwork, radio communication, homework, and reading children's magazines. Staff was on hand to help the children with these activities.

An evaluation of the first phase in 2006 showed that the program had helped improve the health development of children and teenagers. It provided opportunities for children in five psychological centers in West Aceh and Nagan Raya districts to participate in sports and other activities, such as traditional Acehnese games, which encouraged intellectual development, physical development and increased pride in traditional Acehnese art and games. Furthermore, a right to play program provided coaching for trainers that ensured that the program would be effectively implemented.

During the second phase in 2007, the right to play program was expanded and modified with the following strategies: (1) continuing programs on the west coast and expanding to the east coast at 19 child psychological centers, (2) modifying the program with three main purposes; (a) targeting specific child groups such as the disabled, street children, genders, (b) expanding target groups, such as orphanages and child protection institutions, (c) technical assistance from the Social Services Office and UNICEF as a partner in the implementation of the activities.

In 2007, a survey by the University of l'Aquala Italy found that 86 percent of tsunami-affected children still experienced trauma/stress even two years after the disaster. Children who participated in the UNICEF psychological program displayed fewer symptoms of trauma and stress than those who did not participate.

Psychosocial Support Through Schools

UNICEF and the Aceh Education Office collaborated to develop the concept of the psychological approach in school subjects such as in geography and language (Indonesian). Teachers totaling 1,200 from 500 schools were trained to contribute ideas on how to implement the psychological approach in school subjects.

Special Approach for Teenagers

Based on a 2005 study, training in life skills can improve teenagers' lives (15 to 18 years). A study of junior and senior high school students in rural areas revealed that many Acehnese children lacked knowledge on important issues, such as HIV, reproductive health and drug abuse. UNICEF collaborated with local NGO Yakita to improve teachers' knowledge on these issues so that they could transfer knowledge to their students. Yakita also provided counseling to youths and teenagers at psychological centers. Seventy-two youths were trained to be peer educators and by November 2007, the program, from 2005 onwards, had reached over 8,669 people in the target groups. UNICEF's expansion of target groups from children to youths and teenagers was called "Youth and Adolescent Development" and targeted victims of conflict and those in need of psychological support in general.

UNICEF Post-conflict Response

The goal of the UNICEF program for child victims of conflict was to support the government in responding to the needs and rights of these children, and to safeguard the peace process and prevent a re-emergence of the conflict through empowering youth and adolescent groups. To achieve this goal, UNICEF focused on: reintegration and psychological assistance, peace education, youth and adolescent empowerment, and increasing the human resources capacity of the community, the government and former GAM members.

Adolescent Development

UNICEF supported the government, through the Social Welfare Ministry and the provincial office for social welfare, by providing initial reintegration assistance to 19 youths who were identified through the formal registration process. Each youngster received a voucher worth US$500 which could be exchanged for basic commodities, such as school materials, hygiene kits and food. UNICEF then provided individualized reintegration assistance by youth training, which was designed, via a specific evaluation, in function of its own plans.

In its psychosocial assistance and peace education program, UNICEF established child psychology centers in tsunami-affected areas. These centers were run independently by community members who had been trained in this area. UNICEF also trained several staff to help run the centers.

In collaboration with UNICEF and the religious affairs office, the provincial Education Office decided to replicate the Simeuleu "Art in a Bag" program in five other districts. This included conflict areas, and was therefore aimed not only at tsunami-affected areas but also benefited children in conflict areas.

UNICEF also collaborated with a local NGO to design a program on peace education. In 2008, as many as 270 teachers were trained to integrate peace education into the school curriculum. The first phase of this program reached 8,000 students at 90 selected schools.

Youth Empowerment through Youth Forums

UNICEF collaborated with the Social Welfare Office to establish 23 youth forums at the district level and one at the provincial level. The members of these forums consisted of youths aged below 18 years with an interest in child protection. These forums were able to make recommendations to government policymakers, promote children's rights and peace education, as well as provide space and opportunities for children to express themselves. On July 23, 2008, UNICEF and its partners facilitated a meeting for all forums throughout Aceh to discuss the priorities of child protection in Aceh.

Peace and Capacity Building

As part of the assistance directly related to children affected by conflict, UNICEF provided advocacy to protect children in the post-conflict phase and in the implementation of the peace deal for child protection and to all stakeholders through training and a workshop in 2005.

Although some progress was made, several post-conflict issues emerged. This was partly due to a lack of coordination between agencies, overlapping programs by various agencies and a failure to organize effective capacity building for the Aceh Reintegration Agency.

Lessons Learned

Many agencies offering psychological assistance during the emergency period were successful. However, trauma caused by the tsunami and conflict in Aceh could have a serious effect on children's mental health, and psychological support through psychology centers and schools is not sufficient to cover all the children in Aceh. Therefore, new breakthroughs are needed, such as identifying the need for more psychology specialists and enhanced implementation techniques for their activities.

Psychological assistance is available to children through child centers. Now that Aceh has returned to normal and schools have reopened, UNICEF is implementing a psychological assistance program to be integrated into the school curriculum. Many teachers have been trained to implement this program at schools, but no serious attention has been paid to the psychological needs of the teachers themselves to enable them to help others. To date, coordination meetings have been organized to gain support from teachers, but rewards and teachers' welfare have been overlooked.

Plan International

Rolling a Community-Based Early Childhood Care and Development

PLAN International's recovery programs were conducted in the areas of Banda Aceh, Aceh Besar and Aceh Jaya and focused on fulfilling post-disaster needs of children and families. They included assistance for children, housing and school construction, provision of sustainable clean water systems, health services, household economic improvement and child protection.

Plan International's Early Childhood Care and Development (ECCD) program in Aceh strived for long-term improvements in aspects concerning children's growth (health) and development (education) and involved mothers as the most important keepers of children's growth and development. The most strategic entry point was through activities of Posyandu (integrated health services posts), preschools (playgroups and kindergartens) and Polindes (village maternity/obstetrics posts).

The ECCD program focused on developing the quality of early care in connection with child growth and development. Developing human quality from the early stages is like building a strong foundation for a house. Developing children means developing the nation.

Plan International applied its paradigm of Child Centered and Community Development (CCCD) through the following principles: child centeredness, learning, integration, environmental sustainability, stakeholder participation, and empowerment and sustainability.

In this framework, the first year was the emergency response period; the next two years were the recovery period in the form of infrastructure construction, such as school buildings in settlement areas; and the last two years were the period for capacity building of all stakeholders in the program, and the process of handing over the management of the program to those in charge.

Activities of the ECCD program included:

1. Building children centers during the emergency response period, namely kindergartens, Posyandu and Polindes buildings as the ECCD learning centers in villages.
2. Providing media for communication, information and education related to ECCD learning as well as the development of local learning media.
3. Initiating and training village cadres about the ECCD program.
4. Information dissemination and raising awareness on the importance of the ECCD, to stakeholders, especially the authorities: community leaders, government bodies such as the Health Office and Education Office, Family Empowerment and Wellbeing (PKK) groups, the Community Empowerment Body (BPM), and the legislative body (DPRD) in Aceh Besar district.
5. Initiating and building the capacity of local government and organizations directly related to the ECCD program. NGO Yayasan Anak Ceria was specifically involved in the ECCD program.
6. Building a network and stakeholder support for ECCD activities in villages.
7. Plan International specifically worked with the PKK Mobilizing Team of Aceh Besar district in mutual efforts to ensure children's rights by improving access to, and the quality of, ECCD services for all children under six years old in Aceh Besar, for which a Memorandum of Cooperation was signed by both parties on April 11, 2008, in Jantho city. Having learned directly from the experience of the PKK Mobilizing Team of Surabaya city, which is supported by Plan International, the PKK Mobilizing Team of Aceh Besar felt it was necessary to become directly involved by going to villages to meet with Posyandu cadres and kindergarten teachers in order to motivate them and build a harmonious relationship with community members. It was here that the role of the PKK was important, since its function was to reach families in the communities.

Obstacles

One obstacle that was immediately recognized when dealing with the cadres was their dependence on money. Money had become society's main motivation for working after they received so much aid from humanitarian organizations that had a lot of money at their disposal. In programs/humanitarian projects, they mobilized people by providing money to participants, which created a widespread attitude of "*Hanna hepeng, hanna diskusi*," (no money, no discussion).

Plan International tried to reduce the use of money to mobilize members of society, but did support operational expenses for those involved in project activities. It was clear at that time that Plan International was not a favorite choice from among the other humanitarian organizations, which offered hundreds of thousands of rupiah per day to attend training or some other activity. However, based on Plan's experience in other areas, using money as an incentive has bad future repercussions.

Plan International instead appealed to participants' consciences by stressing the direct benefits of the ECCD program. In this way, people developed a genuine desire to learn, and thus natural selection did its work and the intended goal was reached.

Another obstacle was the deep suspicion between the local people themselves, which made assembling working groups for program disclosure at the beginning of the activity extremely difficult. This phenomenon was a result of decades of war and conflict. An effective way was to give the leading role to chosen individuals of a community to execute the project or program initiations, which was managed by the local committee (community managed project). In this way, society members were mobilized with publicly transparent and accountable implementation.

Outcomes and Impacts

The infrastructure construction handed over to the community and the local government includes 39 Posyandu buildings and 28 Polindes buildings located in 56 villages in seven sub-districts, namely Baitussalam, Darussalam, Masjid Raya, Peukan Bada, Lhoknga, Leupung and Lhoong in Aceh Besar district. Previously, in the emergency respond period, Plan provided 80 child centers to accommodate the ECCD activities, which also included trauma counseling.

The ECCD program trained 504 Posyandu cadre members and 50 village midwives, and built the capacity of 20 managers from the Aceh Besar PKK Mobilizing Team. Building the capacity of the PKK Mobilizing Team was done as a continuation of the entire ECCD program in Aceh Besar district. Involvement and direct participation of the government, in this case the Education and Health Department, enabled empowerment for sustaining ECCD program activities in society, with support from DPRK and Aceh Besar BPM.

The children gained much benefit from the ECCD program in that they actively studied and became bolder compared to children who did not join the ECCD program.

Challenges

The major challenge of nearly every program, including the ECCD program, is the sustainability of efforts carried out to achieve optimal and widespread results. Although the government was involved from the very beginning, it did not automatically guarantee

sustainability. In some cases, government workers took advantage of their involvement in programs to make financial gains.

Genuine support by government agencies, such as the PKK Mobilizing Team, is a social asset that should be supported and enhanced. Ultimately, the sustainability of the ECCD activities very much depends on the awareness of the women and village leaders, including direct support from village officials, knowing that the ECCD program is a form of community learning to enhance the quality of life of children and therefore the future of the nation. The recent introduction of the Kampong Fund Allocation means an additional resource is now available for village development.

The question is, how extensively has the ADG fund been utilized for the interests of the growth and development of village children, and not just physical infrastructure?

Replication

ECCD program activities conducted in a number of villages are social assets for further development for villages as yet not reached. There are 599 villages in 22 sub-districts in Aceh Besar. The existence of the PKK Mobilizing Team and trained cadres make replication and expansion to other areas possible. One of the reasons the PKK Mobilizing Team attempted to build an ECCD training center was to extend its experience and develop a place to learn and to share knowledge on children's growth and development, and family welfare empowerment.

Lessons Learned

The ECCD program activities are now owned by every traditional community. The program is an open learning opportunity for many members of society so there is increasing knowledge of and experience in the development of children. Through this activity, the social relationship becomes more harmonious and creates better conditions for many other activities and working plans at the village level.

Involving every stakeholder, especially influential people, officials and legislative members from the beginning of the program, enabled the building of a communal foundation for the sustainability of the ECCD program activities.

Strengthening the role of Aceh Besar PKK Mobilizing Team, especially in continuing and broadening the ECCD program activities, has placed the organization in a strategic position in the nation's child development. Through this organization, potential local resources, including members of the legislature and the private sector, can be optimized by developing a network as broadly as possible with communal cooperation and required policy support. ■

United Nations Office for Project Service (UNOPS)

Revising School Concept Design

WITH 3,415 schools destroyed or severely damaged in Aceh and Nias, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) committed to building new permanent primary schools in the province, as well as on Nias Island. The project aimed to restore educational facilities to a much higher standard than previously existed.

When deciding whether or not to build a permanent primary school in a given area, UNICEF checked whether there was a risk of further population movement away from the school location. UNICEF carefully selected affected school sites for reconstruction on the basis that:

- The school was heavily/structurally damaged by the tsunami, earthquake and/or conflict;
- There were at least 90 pupils per school;
- There was at least two kilometers separation from the nearest primary school or junior secondary school;
- Or, there were more than 200 pupils in two schools separated by a small distance;
- There was commitment from the Education Office to provide teachers, principals and other school support staff;
- There was evidence of population settlement (after the tsunami, earthquake and conflict);

- There were projections and/or evidence showing an increase in student numbers by the end of the school reconstruction;
- Sites were without major soil problems (hills, swamps, rocks, flood) and therefore could offer an appropriate learning environment;
- There was no land ownership dispute, and the land certificate had to be duly signed and approved by all concerned stakeholders; and,
- There was convergence with other UNICEF supported programs.

UNICEF selected United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to manage all aspects of the reconstruction of 226 primary schools, which employed engineers to ensure that all schools met the National Standards of Indonesia and the revised Aceh Building Code.

The basic school modular design sets new standards in earthquake resistance and typically incorporated six classrooms, separate toilet facilities for girls and boys, a teacher's office, an outdoor play area and a library or laboratory. The design of all school facilities was adapted to the specific needs of each community and the requirements of each site of construction.

Challenges

As part of the reconstruction effort in Aceh and Nias, the primary building type employed by UNOPS comprised reinforced concrete resisting frames with brick infill panels, similar to the conventional building types in Aceh province.

However, project implementation faced various obstacles, including the challenge of sourcing and transporting large quantities of high quality building materials on road networks and bridges that in many cases had not yet been rebuilt. Several sites on Nias Island were located off the main roads, across rivers in densely vegetated areas. Some sites could only be accessed via crude footpaths. Problems were compounded during the rainy season when rivers overflowed and access roads became slippery and treacherous. Poor soil conditions were also uncovered at many sites following geotechnical investigations and lab tests, especially in low-lying areas prone to flooding, thereby necessitating a lighter structure.

Similarly, the limited know-how and overall capacity of local contractors had a negative impact on both quality and timeliness. Traditional reinforced concrete buildings were therefore not considered to be the ideal choice for these remote locations. UNICEF and UNOPS agreed to diversify implementation options in terms of building design and execution capacity. Wider use of alternative materials and construction methods was therefore explored. Likewise, UNOPS and UNICEF revised the standard modular concept designs for cost savings and to further improve the learning environment.

Revised Concept Design

By changing the morphology of the classrooms opportunities existed to significantly improve the natural ventilation, lighting and hence the level of comfort while respecting UNICEF's Child Friendly school principles.

The new concept design featured vaulted ceilings and skylights and received overwhelming support from the concerned government authorities. Despite low maintenance designs, the general maintenance of buildings was also a concern as demonstrated during past visits to semi-permanent schools. To ensure the sustainability of the permanent structures, UNOPS and UNICEF developed manuals on building maintenance that were later passed on to the Education Office.

The remote sites were packaged into one tender so as to attract large-scale contractors from major cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya and Medan. Such an option also limited the risk of corruption associated with a parochial market when companies may collude to influence the outcome of tender procedures.

Accordingly, UNOPS launched a pre-qualification process to be followed by a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the detailed design, build and transfer of remote schools using acceptable alternative construction methods and materials. This initiative tried to extend the scope of operations and bring in new possibilities and opportunities in order to overcome the geographical, technical, and non-technical challenges faced by both UNICEF and UNOPS on Nias Island.

Request for Proposal Process

In light of the above, a list of large scale Indonesian construction companies was put together following consultation with the UNICEF Construction Unit, Public Works Department of Medan, North Sumatera and the Association of Indonesian Contractors (AKI). Invitations to prequalify were sent out to dozens of firms potentially meeting the minimum prequalification criteria.

Following the prequalification process, the pre-qualified firms were issued with the RFP and a contractor was finally selected following a thorough review of the technologies and price being proposed. As opposed to the traditional reinforced concrete buildings or heavy "hot-rolled" structural steel sections, the successful contractor proposed a lightweight cold-formed steel structure anchored to reinforced concrete slab foundations by hot-dipped galvanized expansion bolts.

Lightweight Cold-formed Steel Framed Structures

Cold-formed steel is formed from cold sheets of steel and can be made in a wide variety of lightweight shapes and sizes. Cold-formed steel is often used in commercial buildings and is being used more and more in residential and institutional buildings, particularly where traditional building materials are scarce, costly, or of lower quality. Given the remoteness of sites in Nias and the difficulties associated with sourcing sound concreting materials or certified timber, cold-formed steel was considered a good choice of alternative materials and construction methods.

The earthquake resistant designs, structural calculations and shop drawings were prepared, signed and sealed by an independent registered professional engineer with internationally recognized credentials. UNOPS, UNICEF and the selected contractor met with Public Works in Medan to present the design. The design was later approved by the concerned government officials.

Cold-formed steel studs and tracks were fabricated in Canada and China with heavy galvanizing suitable for the corrosive environment on Nias Island.

Analysis

Workers demonstrated relative ease in transporting, handling and assembling lightweight cold-formed steel at these remote sites under the full-time supervision of UNOPS engineers and quality inspectors.

However, it should be noted that remote villages should benefit from school reconstruction only if, in addition to technical considerations related to the education environment, the target communities express genuine interest and enthusiasm in having the buildings and in contributing to construction and long-term maintenance. Local government provision of public utilities such as power, drainage and water and sanitation services connecting to the buildings is also important for the long-term sustainability of the schools. ■


NEVER MIND
THE BOLLOCKS
SEX PISTOLS

Social Development

THE development of communities, their religions, culture and traditions, while often regarded as less tangible compared to physical development, has been an important aspect of the rehabilitation and reconstruction program in Aceh-Nias. Given the significance of these aspects in day-to-day life, many implementing agencies focused on social development as a means to strengthen communities, their involvement in the recovery, and the sustainability of both the physical and social achievements of the recovery. A total of 15 case studies concerning social development have been included in this book for this sector, 10 in the printed pages and 5 on CD. Each of these studies provides an insight into the importance and complexities associated with the redevelopment of religion, culture and social structures.

Enjoying the afternoon atmosphere while jogging at the international park known as "Aceh Thanks the World", at the Blang Padang, Banda Aceh, has become a new and popular activity for the community, February 20, 2009. Along the development, the local village heads, land owner, local government, and the military were actively involved so that high sense of ownership was achieved, ensuring the sustainability. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Government of Japan (GoJ)

Airing 'Suara Aceh': the Real Voice of Aceh

RADIO Suara Aceh (Voice of Aceh) was one of Japan's tangible contributions to victims of the tsunami. The temporary radio station was established mainly to function as a medium of communication and to disseminate information to the people of Aceh during the breakdown of radio and TV communication and other electronic media in Aceh after the tsunami.

Of the 30 registered radio stations in Aceh, 15 stations were completely destroyed and the remaining 15 were in no condition to broadcast due to minor damage caused by the earthquake. Understanding the urgent need for a media and information center in such a time of crisis, Japan and the Association of National Private Radio Broadcasting Indonesia (PRSSNI) joined forces in February 2005 for a six-month humanitarian assistance project to broadcast information to tsunami victims. For this project, Japan donated US$19,058 (Rp 170,855,000) to PRSSNI to establish *Radio Suara Aceh* to temporarily replace the damaged radio stations.

Radio Suara Aceh officially started airing on January 6, 2005, to function as a 24-hour emergency radio station. PRSSNI staff manned the radio station, which was located in Banda Aceh.

Its main task was to give current information to the public as well as other radio stations, such as on food distribution coordinated by the State Logistics Agency (Bulog), material aid from various sources and crucial information on missing people.

Radio Suara Aceh also collected data and conducted field surveys to get a better picture of the actual needs of people and established coordination with local governments, security officers and other relevant parties to produce accurate and update information for those in need.

Voicing the Real Needs of Aceh

A *Radio Suara Aceh* advance team was dispatched to Banda Aceh the day after the disaster to prepare studio installations and distribute radio receiver kits to relief camps. An operational team was dispatched in early January 2005 to begin the technical operations of the radio station. The operational team was responsible not only for the radio programs, but was also in charge of recruiting volunteers as radio announcers, journalists and administrative staff, and building a network for smooth communication with other radio stations in Indonesia.

Radio stations from Jakarta, West Java and North Sumatera also contributed by dispatching staff to help *Suara Aceh* and local radios stations in Aceh that had volunteered to be included in the making of *Suara Aceh*. The team also garnered support and various contributions from the Indonesian Department of Transportation, the Information and Communications Department (INFOKOM) in Aceh, the Aceh Police Department, *Rakyat Aceh* newspaper, the Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) and several other organizations and radio stations.

Radio Suara Aceh based its activities on the following aspects:

1. Technical Aspect
   Radio Suara Aceh was equipped with proper broadcasting equipment that allowed it to operate 24 hours a day if needed. The equipment and some of the operational tools were provided by the Government of Japan under its Grassroots Aid Scheme.
2. Support Aspect
   Aside from continuous updates on material aid, *Radio Suara Aceh* also stressed the importance of psychological support for survivors. The programs were brought to the Aceh audience in the form of discussions and talk shows featuring professional psychologists and religious figures.
3. Communication Aspect
   This aspect involved the main task of *Radio Suara Aceh* as an information center in Aceh during the crisis; containing news programs (news flashes) on the latest situation, aid distribution, and information on missing people.
4. Interlude Aspect (Entertainment)
   A radio is not complete without music and entertainment. Despite its main function as an emergency radio station, *Radio Suara Aceh* also aired entertainment programs like local and international pop music segments, Quran recitals, and regular religious programs that stressed the importance of religious faith in overcoming the crisis.

Suara Aceh acted as an information giver as well as receiver of information from listeners. From the first day of airing, *Suara Aceh* received information from hundreds of listeners and other sources on aid and missing people to be passed on to the public.

The studio, which was located in the Divre Bulog building in Banda Aceh, also readily welcomed those who wanted to post pictures of missing family members on the studio's walls and those wanting to just drop by to see if there was new information on missing family or relatives. The walls of *Suara Aceh* were covered with pictures of missing people. Every day, the hall of *Suara Aceh* studio was packed with people looking for missing family or information on aid distribution.

As a result of its hard work, *Suara Aceh* was successful in reuniting scattered families, including the family of one of the announcers. The radio was also utilized by the International Red Cross Committee, the Indonesian Red Cross, UNICEF, WHO, MER-C Indonesia, *ABC* news, *Time* magazine and other international and local organizations to disseminate news and information, and to work together in providing media assistance.

Suara Aceh devised a special show to psychologically support tsunami victims. The disaster had caused pain and trauma for some people, especially women and children. The grief of losing partners, parents, children or other family members caused intense trauma that manifested in many forms. Some children became afraid of the rain, clouds or the beach. Others had stronger reactions; trembling, groaning or screaming was often seen in traumatized children.

To deal with the issue, *Suara Aceh* invited psychologists and experts from universities, government agencies, international and local organizations to work hand-in-hand on the psychological recovery of tsunami survivors. The talk shows were aired every day for one hour during the first months of *Suara Aceh*'s operation and were gradually reduced to three times a week in March, and to twice a week in the following months.

They opened interactive consultation sessions through the radio where listeners from all around Aceh could call in and talk about their grief. The team of psychologists in charge also made a creative breakthrough by giving psychological therapy through the radio on physical relaxation (self-healing) to mitigate the grief and pain. The activity was further extended to help the psychological recovery of survivors in relief camps after the closing of *Suara Aceh*.

Toward Future Hopes and Dreams

The emergency radio station contributed by collecting data on missing persons and was a source of reference for the Aceh provincial government, Indonesian Customs, state telecommunications company Telkom, state electricity company PLN, Bulog and many others in assisting the searching for survivors.

In May 2005, four radio stations in Banda Aceh and two in Meulaboh were ready to resume airing, marking the return of electronic media in Aceh. As scheduled, on June 30, 2005, *Suara Aceh* closed its operations.

As part of the agreement with the Government of Japan, PRSSNI committed to utilizing the radio equipment for emergency purposes in any part of Indonesia. After *Suara Aceh* closed, the equipment was sent to Yogyakarta to help establish a PRSSNI media center as an immediate response to the 2006 Yogyakarta and Central Java earthquake. The media center functioned as a project coordinator for emergency radios there in relaying news and information to the public.

Canada Aceh Local Government Assistance Program (CALGAP)

Improving Core Library Services and Learning Opportunities

THE Canada/Aceh Local Government Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (CALGAP) aims to support post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh. The project, which is run by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) in collaboration with the Government of Indonesia and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh-Nias (BRR), provides responsive support to local government and promotes intergovernmental cooperation models. Its purpose is to rebuild and strengthen local governance (operations management, service delivery and participatory mechanisms) in the city of Banda Aceh, and the districts of Pidie and Aceh Jaya.

In Pidie district, which is located at the northeastern tip of Aceh province, two-thirds of the town of Sigli, the capital of Pidie, was hit by the tsunami. Post-tsunami population of Pidie District was 512,720. The tsunami caused devastating damage to infrastructure, human life and property, as well as the cultural heritage.

The tsunami severely affected the library system in Pidie due to the destruction of 247 schools, all of which had housed libraries and provided library services to children and youth. Not only were the buildings destroyed, but all the books were also lost. This placed considerable pressure on the one municipal public library in Pidie to provide additional services to students, as well as to continue to provide services to the general public.

Some of the specific challenges facing the public library in Sigli and the district included: (1) Inadequate library collections, poor facilities, weak technology, and lack of appropriate staff training; (2) Insufficient funding; (3) Inability of the library to provide adequate services; and (4) Government regulation that constrain services; new books are received only once a year, thus preventing responsive service to the public.

FCM's support for a library services project in Pidie arose from the need expressed by the community in December 2006, which led to a workshop that was attended by local decision makers. During the workshop, one of the three priorities identified was improving library services.

The project was designed to support the Pidie Library Service Agency and its staff to assess their current library situation and find ways to accommodate the increased demands placed on the municipal library. The project allowed Canadian municipal partners with similar mandates and goals to share their experiences and work together to find solutions to practical problems and challenges. The FCM methodology is built on a peer-to-peer transfer of expertise in specific areas of municipal responsibility. In this case, the project included two volunteers from the Canadian library system who offered technical assistance to local library staff.

Between May 2007 and June 2008, the Canadian team undertook four missions to Pidie district to implement the project. Pidie library staff worked with the Canadian volunteers to develop new approaches to library management, services and operations, notably on how to modernize the libraries from the limited traditional lending and reference functions to more responsive facilities that meet the needs of the community for a resource and information center. The goal of the project was to improve core library services and enhance learning opportunities.

Approach and Objective

Before beginning work, it was crucial for the Canadian project team to understand the local conditions and needs for library services in the district. As such, the project began with a "definition mission" to assess and plan the technical assistance needs for Pidie. The resulting "Project Plan" set out the scope, objectives, results, deliverables and work plan for the project over its approximately 18-month duration.

In creating the plan, the Canadian and Indonesian team worked together to assess the current capacities of the Pidie Library Service Agency, including deciding which library function would best meet the current and future demands of the community, especially children and youth. They also reviewed current levels of services and operations, as well as conditions of the existing library, including physical and equipment needs.

The staff at the library compiled information about the community demographics and use of the library. They also researched national and regional cultural celebrations for future program development and developed a list of Indonesian publishers.

Through discussions with staff and presentations during the first mission, the team determined three priority objectives for the library project: (1) to create a more welcoming space; (2) to improve public understanding of the role of the library; and (3) to develop an efficient system for library circulation and collection management.

Implementation and Results

Objective 1: Creating a Welcoming Public Library Space

Initially, the library space in Pidie was not conducive to visits as the building was hot and stuffy, had a poor floor plan and was generally unwelcoming. The library staff began by developing a better floor plan and options for use of the space. The plan was developed using data collected about current use and users of the library. This helped to build an understanding of the steps needed to attract visitors of all ages and backgrounds —men and women, young and old.

The baseline data helped the staff to determine how current collections were being used and to develop an approach to enhance the collection and the library space based on what the users and potential users wanted to use and borrow. This information also helped the staff to evaluate the library operating hours and services offered.

The staff ultimately created a more welcoming, accessible and functional environment that attracted more visitors by revitalizing the building and furnishings, and by creating distinct spaces for different age groups. They also developed community-based displays to promote messages of local government related to the prevention of dengue fever, deforestation, health and nutrition and other messages that support good citizenship. The Canadian team also worked with staff to improve client-centered customer service, through both training and exposure visits to Yogyakarta and Singapore.

As a result of these efforts, the library's physical space has improved, a 270 percent increase in visitors has been recorded and is expected to increase further, and library services provided to children and youth are steadily improving.

Objective 2: Improving Public Understanding of the Library's Role

The project aimed to improve the skills of library staff to conduct outreach activities, to deliver children's and youth programming, and to enhance upper level officials' understanding of the library.

Outreach Activities

An important component in improving public understanding was to improve the skills of the library staff to plan for and undertake library-related activities and events. In developing outreach activities, the library staff first had to understand the demographics and use of the library and bookmobile. By conducting various surveys that allowed them to understand the context of the services they were offering, the staff was able to plan and conduct suitable programs and outreach activities at the Sigli location and through the bookmobile.

Improving services throughout the district using the bookmobile was one of the most important outreach activities of the project. The new bookmobile schedule has been implemented with visits to 22 sub-districts every 15 days (up from only six districts in 2007). CALGAP also purchased a second bookmobile, which enables the library to visit even the most remote locations.

Children and Youth Programs

Given the tsunami's destruction of a number of school libraries, it was also critical for the library to increase its understanding and delivery of library services for children and youth. Interactive workshops were delivered on the value of preschool programming, specifically the library's role in fostering early literacy and recognizing parents' critical role as their children's first teachers. The project developed content for brochures about early reading and literacy programs and increased awareness of the need to provide collections and programming for distinct age groups. Events such as World Environment Day, which used puppets to tell stories, provided the first of many programs that will continue to attract children and families to the library.

School teachers are now visiting the library and there are several requests for class visits as extracurricular activities that are expected to encourage and enable students to read and to use the new computer workstations.

Increasing Political Support

In order to gain sufficient funding and support, the library needed to work on enhancing upper level officials' understanding of library services. The project helped the staff and library leaders to understand the importance of gaining political support.

The library staff worked with the Canadian team to deliver a presentation to political leaders on the library project. After a business case seminar held by the Canadian project team, the staff submitted its business case to the local council, which successfully attracted additional financial support to the library's budget and a promise of future support for further improvements. The deputy mayor was invited to join the project team during the exposure mission to Singapore and Yogyakarta and became very engaged with the group in learning about the activities and systems of both host libraries.

In general, the project has been quite successful in increasing awareness and understanding among the public and senior officials about the importance of the library. Local officials have committed to providing more funding, and there has been a marked increase in the number of visits to the library.

Objective 3: Developing Efficient System for Library Circulation and Collection Management

An important aim of the project was to assist the Pidie Library Service Agency and its staff to modernize the libraries to go beyond their traditional lending and reference functions to incorporate a more responsive approach to meeting community needs as a resource and information center. In particular, this goal involved technical assistance and capacity building to improve library services and functions, as well as operations and management.

The Canadian volunteers began by working with library staff to assess and develop the library collection. Collection development involved assessment of the community's needs, development of a policy that described the library's intentions for building its collection, and addressing a number of basic functions.

The second task was to automate the library services and introduce computers to visitors. The library catalogue was the first library process to be automated. The staff was trained how to use the system installed on library computers. In addition, staff members are now able to prepare library reports to support library administrative functions (performance measurement, creation of library signage, preparation of brochures and communication with the public).

Public access to the Internet supports the project's goal of using the library to respond directly to the needs of its users, so automation also included introducing computers for public use. Staff received training on the use of computers and electronic resources by the public in order to assist visitors with problems.

Nine staff members attended four days of training on Word, Excel, Power Point and Internet use. Staff members who received training are sharing their experience with other staff, and two of them are designated to support the computer systems. By the end of the project, there were three computer stations available to the public for a small fee. The staff also worked with the Canadian team to develop an Internet policy to help staff operate the public Internet computers.

As a result of the efforts to develop an efficient library system, the collection has been refined and enhanced, the cataloguing system modernized and automated, staff has been trained in computer use, and computers have been made available to the public.

Implementation Challenges and Ability to Replicate

Working with Ineffective Government Regulations

The Canadian team members saw great progress over the course of the 18-month project. Nevertheless, some minor challenges related to government funding and other specific constraints remain. For example, the Canadian project team was promoting regular and scheduled ordering of material to ensure a steady flow of relevant materials to respond to local needs of library customers. This ordering schedule was difficult for the library due to government processes that restrict ordering books to only once a year. The deputy mayor was informed of this issue and is working with staff to address the problem. The same kind of challenge exists regarding opening hours. Some efforts were made to increase them, but it is difficult to get around government constraints regarding public servants' salaries and working hours. Little flexibility exists.

Initial Need for Direct Support and Guidance from Municipal Practitioners

The program required considerable direct support from the project team and, while some of the information could be transferred through the creation of tools and other resources, peer-to-peer support was critical to the success of the project. Local staff learned directly from the experience of the Canadian volunteers who also worked in the local government context and were able to understand some of the issues facing the Pidie staff. The exposure mission to libraries in Yogyakarta and Singapore helped the Pidie staff to learn by seeing a successful library in action. With the success of the project, the Pidie District Library could itself be used as a model library for other area library staff to visit and learn from the improvements.

Incorporation of CALGAP Cross-cutting Themes

The project was particularly successful at incorporating three cross-cutting program themes incorporated in all CALGAP projects —environmental sustainability, gender equality and social cohesion.

Environmental sustainability was a significant focus, with the library now using better environmental practices, such as green sourcing of materials, planting trees to increase shade, and lowering the air-conditioning temperature to conserve energy. In addition, the library was effectively used to raise awareness on environmental sustainability issues.

Significant efforts were made to promote gender equality, to ensure that in managing and developing the collection, the specific needs and interests of women were considered.

The project aimed to provide equal access to all in the community to channel ideas and share information, and in doing so the library has been a key vehicle for promoting social cohesion in the community.

Many of the presentations and activities focused on supporting better governance structures for the library. Through these presentations and the development of transparent funding, the project made strides in promoting anti-corruption principles in the library community.

Lessons Learned

While much was done in all the cross-cutting areas to ensure that these issues were well integrated in the project, the environmental sustainability theme was particularly successful and provides an excellent model for all the cross-cutting thematic work. For example, the success of using library events and displays as opportunities to highlight environmental issues could be replicated to highlight issues related to women's issues, such violence against women, women as economic actors and women's political participation. Project planning documents should also include specific and deeper results related to all the cross-cutting themes. For example, although collecting disaggregated data about women's participation is an important aspect of understanding the needs and users of the library, gender equality results should address specific questions, such as greater understanding of women's rights or greater participation of women in decision-making. In all of those areas, explicitly identifying the results expected in the cross-cutting themes will allow a better analysis of success achieved.

Canada/Aceh Local Government Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (CALGAP)

Engaging Local Communities through Support Facilities

NOT only did the tsunami cause unprecedented levels of destruction in Aceh, people's livelihoods also suffered similar devastation, as fishing boats were lost, aquaculture ponds destroyed and 13,610 hectares of land was affected by the tsunami.

This desolate situation was exacerbated by the lingering impact of the 30-year conflict between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) that had weakened the economy by destroying infrastructure, taking approximately 10,000 lives, and displacing about one million people. The conflict also had significantly undermined the relationship between the government and the people of Aceh, with mistrust high on both sides. In this context, the most useful contribution the international community could make was to re-establish the trust between them.

Within this context, the most effective way to improve public services was to create efficiency gains within the existing system, as close as possible to the point of contact between government and citizens.

The Canada/Aceh Local Government Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (CALGAP) provides responsive support to local government and promotes intergovernmental cooperation models. Its purpose is to rebuild and strengthen local governance (operation management, service delivery and participatory mechanisms).

CALGAP has supported post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh. The project, funded by the Government of Canada through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), was run by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM) in collaboration with the Government of Indonesia and the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency for Aceh-Nias (BRR).

Background

The CALGAP CSF staff learned from FCM's Palestinian Municipal Management Program (PMMP) experiences, in which they have been very successful in running the Community Support Facilities (CSF) Program. In May 2007, FCM sent a delegation with technical expertise on the PMMP CSF to Banda Aceh to work closely with and train the CALGAP Funds Officer and other staff. During the mission, the team shared experiences and best practices from the PMMP CSF and developed CSF guidelines, tools and a program framework adapted to the Aceh context.

During consultation with local government partners, they clarified the objectives of the program and developed the criteria for grants. Each district had its own perspective on which groups local government should support through CSF funding. While the city of Banda Aceh was more concerned with empowering women's groups and people's livelihoods, the districts of Pidie and Aceh Jaya were more concerned with supporting small-scale infrastructure projects to improve agriculture and economic development.

Local government partners also needed to clarify the responsibility of each stakeholder and decide on the process and activities required before engaging NGOs, which is not always easy due to their tendency to criticize the government without offering solutions. The CALGAP Funds Officer suggested a more transparent process, whereby public meetings would be conducted to raise awareness about the CSF and to form the CSF Committee. After long discussions, two districts agreed to this process while a slightly different win-win solution was found for the third. In this case, the local government chose one NGO, and CALGAP conducted a public meeting to raise awareness about the CSF and offer the opportunity for other NGOs to join the CSF Committee.

To help resolve these challenges, CALGAP sought the advice of the Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (Yappika), which had a similar program, also funded by CIDA. The local NGOs recommended by Yappika (Perak and IMPACT) were very interested in the CSF and willing to participate on the Committee. Despite the challenges, they believed that the CSF model was a good one to help build the relationship between local government and the community and that everyone would benefit by working together with the small amounts of funds available to address local priorities for reconstruction and rehabilitation. They allowed participating local administrations to respond directly to community-identified needs for investment in small-scale service provision or infrastructure projects. The CSF structure and process has created opportunities to build or reinforce good governance, transparency and accountability, as well as build project management capacities.

Based on the implementation process, the CSF committees held meetings to review detailed proposals, for which Aceh Jaya submitted the most concept papers, followed by Pidie and Banda Aceh. The following table identifies the steps for the selection processes in each district.

CSF: Implementation Process



District	Concept Papers	Administrative Verification	Field Verification	Final Selection after Training	Groups Having Received Grants
Banda Aceh	240	81	46	11	11
Pidie	87	58	56	11	10
Aceh Jaya	59	35	17	11	11

Delivering Results for the Community

As a result of their participation in the CSF program, the activities of Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and groups are better planned and structured. Groups are now operating with clearer rules, guidelines and defined activities.

The CBOs and groups are now more confident in their ability to seek assistance from other local government institutions and the private sector for financial and technical support. The local administrations, the private sector and other non-governmental organizations have recognized these groups as important stakeholders in community development.

Groups are now capable of effective group administration and management, financial management and reporting, fundraising, and proposal writing. CBOs and groups have developed an awareness of issues related to gender equality, environmental sustainability, anti-corruption drives and peace-building, which has led to more effective programming and project implementation.

Greater Access for Remote Areas

The CSF program has provided opportunities for rural communities to increase their access to economic activities as a result of improved small infrastructure development. The remote villages in Pidie and Aceh Jaya now have greater access to surrounding areas as a result of small-scale infrastructure projects funded by the CSF, such as roads and bridges. This has enabled villagers to gain access to more services and goods, and opportunities to support their livelihoods.

Higher Yields in Agricultural Production

Irrigation systems to support the production of rice in Aceh Jaya and Pidie have resulted in an increase in rice production from one to two tons per hectare in Aceh Jaya and from four to six tons per hectare in Pidie. Farmers have earned higher incomes as a result. Forty-two hectares of agricultural land have been rehabilitated after being abandoned due to conflict and the tsunami in Aceh Jaya. This land is now ready for peanut and cacao farming.

Increased Incomes for Livelihood Projects

Livelihood projects have increased their profitability by 25-30 percent on average, with roughly 2 percent of the livelihood projects being funded by the CSF and managed by women, giving them an opportunity to become more financially independent.

Stronger Relations with Local Administrations and Community Members

The CSF model has dispelled misconceptions by the community that local administrations are unable to respond to community-identified needs and priorities. The multiple stakeholder CSF model has been extremely useful in combating corruption by encouraging transparency and democratic decision-making.

Lessons Learned

The CSF fosters community involvement and builds synergy between the community and the local government in the implementation of local government programs

and objectives and leverages a significant community counterpart contribution. The experience highlights the value of enhanced cohesiveness between local authorities and their communities.

The CSF has introduced participatory and transparent approaches, which are new to the Aceh context. Various stakeholders from NGOs, community leaders, elected and non-elected officials have been involved in decision-making and selection of projects following objective criteria. Through the process, they have provided the public with information about the program and involved the local media. There is no doubt about the replication value of such practices in other local government initiatives as well as for other local governments.

Sustainability

In an effort to promote sustainability, the aim of CALGAP and the three CSF Committees is to provide all of the CSF livelihoods projects with training in writing business plans before the completion of the program. The training assists the groups in identifying ways to grow and expand their projects. For small-scale infrastructure projects, CALGAP engineers, together with their local government counterparts, work with project beneficiaries to create simple maintenance plans to ensure the longevity and structural integrity of the infrastructure built. Where possible, CALGAP and the CSF Committees also try to connect CSF projects with NGOs that are engaging communities in similar project areas so that beneficiaries can continue to be supported either financially or through technical assistance when CALGAP ends.

Although it is too early to determine if the local governments will be able to sustain their respective grant programs, they have all clearly demonstrated great enthusiasm, have learned how to manage such programs and appreciate the value of working more closely with their communities. Both the city of Banda Aceh and the district of Pidie have expressed interest in using their own budgets to support micro-credit or revolving funds using the CSF model. CALGAP will be providing technical support to help develop guidelines for these programs. Certain departments, such as Social Affairs and Community Empowerment could be more involved in supporting others to learn from the CSF experience and apply some of its lessons.

Caritas Germany and Save Emergency for Aceh (SEFA)

Supporting the Transition from an Activist Group to an NGO as Part of Civil Society

Partnering with Local Organizations

CARITAS Germany, the international section of the German Caritas Association, has been active in rehabilitation of post-tsunami Aceh and Nias. Caritas provides humanitarian assistance worldwide in response to the needs of people affected by different kinds of disasters. Immediately after the devastating tsunami in December 2004, the German NGO decided to support the people of Aceh and Nias as part of its wider emergency response.

Initially, Caritas Germany involved itself in reconstruction and social programs in the emergency phase, but later shifted its focus to long-term social and development programs, such as child protection and advocacy, psycho-social activities, community empowerment and livelihood, community-based rehabilitation of disabled people, as well as drug prevention and rehabilitation. In its strategic working fields, Caritas Germany primarily concentrates on children and adolescents, on the disabled, the elderly and the sick (including drug use and related diseases like HIV/AIDS) and on marginalized people.

As a donor, in an effort to implement these activities, Caritas Germany rarely implements any projects itself but works with local partners, which are supported financially and with technical or institutional input whenever needed. One of these

partners is the Save Emergency for Aceh (SEFA), a local institution with a deep understanding of the Acehnese culture that focuses on psycho-social activities and education, especially for children.

Caritas does not only provide funding support, but also technical support. This is to ensure the sustainability of programs and activities of partners when Caritas Germany eventually withdraws from the area. Strengthening an institution to become professional was the first focus of this cooperation, followed by the implementation of new programs by partners with funding from Caritas Germany. Implementation of the SEFA program included psycho-social and health projects for children affected by the tsunami.

Some activities implemented in 2005 included playground activities in the displaced persons barracks and camps, trauma counseling, nutritional support for pregnant and breastfeeding mothers and activities for traumatized children, such as traditional dance or reading the Quran.

Cooperation Pattern

As an Acehnese organization that started off as a team of dedicated volunteers aiming to assist their people during the conflict, SEFA was not supported by a strong organizational or management structure. Nor did it have a data system. However, after joining forces with Caritas Germany in 2005, SEFA underwent significant changes, especially in terms of organizational professionalism.

SEFA's willingness to change, to grow and to improve its professionalism were the main reasons Caritas Germany decided to support SEFA, and over the next three years, Caritas Germany invested a lot of time and effort in strengthening SEFA. Efforts to expand the capacity of SEFA were conducted in various ways, such as by providing filing system training, workshops and discussions, both formal and informal. These activities helped to strengthen the relationship and communication between Caritas and SEFA.

In the framework of cooperation, accountability and transparency, especially in the management of funds provided, Caritas Germany trained SEFA staff in bookkeeping and accounting to give it proficiency in financial management and the capability to obtain funds from various donor sources. Nowadays the partner is in a better position to deal independently with its financial matters.

Training in compiling proposals and reports was also provided by Caritas to enable SEFA to record achievements within a specific reporting period and to analyze them and their work in general. Caritas Germany meets partners once a report has been completed to review its strengths and to jointly work on the shortcomings. Periodical monitoring of the partner's progress to review the quality of proposals and meetings to discuss the partner's weaknesses were activities undertaken to determine strategies for further improvement.

Caritas has a strong focus on institutionally strengthening a partner, and supports programs that are successfully implemented. Nevertheless, Caritas also has standards that must be met in the implementation of partner programs. If a partner does not implement a program as required in the cooperation agreement, it must re-design the program with support and input from Caritas Germany.

Caritas funds are made available to partners only after a sustainable program is designed for the benefit of recipients and the community. SEFA activities focusing on children outside the realm of education are an example of such a program. The future of children is the future of a nation, and as such Caritas is willing to provide funding for the implementation of development programs. Children's centers were built in some of the villages in order to give the young ones a safe place to meet and play. In the beginning these centers were very much under the control of SEFA, but step by step they are being handed over to the individual communities.

Focus was initially on education activities for children in coastal areas, and later shifted to more difficult areas such as rural areas. SEFA also attempted to move the activities of children in conflict areas such as in Pirak Timue —a sub-district in which Caritas Germany is strongly engaged —to more secure places.

Challenges

One of the major challenges faced by Caritas Germany was that many local organizations, like SEFA, were very dedicated in their work but lacked strong organizational or managerial structure. As a result, it was not enough to merely provide funds and training. Instead, partners needed strong support on all levels in order to improve their professionalism.

Change, however, requires time and patience, especially when it involves organizational structure and capacity. Increased effectiveness and efficiency of an organization in the long term also play an important role as they have strong influence on the structure and capacity of an organization. In the initial response to a disaster, such aspects may be of less importance to providing assistance to victims as quickly as possible. It is only after longer-term development is initiated that structures and approaches play a crucial role. It is important that organizations are not only effective, but also efficient in what they do.

To help local organizations develop, it is important that appropriate approaches and priorities are identified. Caritas found this could be hampered by cultural differences relating to standards and efficiency. The ability of each team is different in each partner organization.

A lack of enthusiasm and proactive initiatives on the part of partners, including in the case of SEFA, also prove to be major challenges for donors. For example, in some cases proposals did not meet set standards, proposal submissions were delayed, there was a lack of initiative, and problems arose in the introduction of new components in a program. To overcome this, Caritas often worked together with the partner to meet the requirements so that donor funding would not be stopped.

Lesson Learned

To measure the success of an activity involving a partner is by no means easy, especially in abstract activities. Quantity and quality of set parameters can be used as a guide, but it can be very difficult to judge success by statistics.

Initiative, regular supervision and communication are vital keys in achieving success in developing a partner's professionalism. To address the lack of initiative, regular monitoring and interaction with the partner are of utmost importance. As a partner is not always able to identify problems or, if they have been identified, to deal with them, it is crucial that Caritas Germany ensures that all proposed activities are carried out and the envisaged outcome is reached. This requires a fine balance between trust and close involvement with the partner while at the same time remaining distant enough to identify any shortcomings.

The process of capacity building requires time and organization. Dependence on donors especially in terms of funding, as well as for decisions concerning internal problems faced by a partner, can be major obstacles. To foster independence and sustainability, donor agencies need to allow partners to solve any internal problems independently. Caritas merely helps in the process of decision-making by offering a range of options and criteria that can be used to assess various aspects, while the final decision rests with the partner.

Financial problems rarely allow for compromise, but adjustment and adaptation of standards, especially in the case of newly introduced guidelines, is always offered to partners. Lack of experience was found to be largely due to the impacts of conflict and the tsunami.

Although SEFA has made much progress, there may be many future challenges to face, not only for SEFA but also for Caritas Germany. During the almost four years of cooperation, SEFA has become a professional, structured organization, and its programs are run efficiently. However, without the desire, effort and perseverance to continue to improve, a partner's process toward a better future will be hampered. This applies not only to SEFA, but also to Caritas and other agencies. ■

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Establishing of Women's and Children's Desks at NAD Police Departments

UNICEF supported the reconstruction of two women's and children's desks (*Perlindungan Perempuan dan Anak*: PPA) at provincial level (POLDA NAD) and Banda Aceh District; as well as training policewomen at different police stations to handle cases involving women and children. The purpose of the Desk is to ensure child-friendly treatment of juvenile victims or perpetrators that is in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, including the stipulations that children shall not be detained with adults and detention shall be used as a last resort. The Desk also plays a role in referring victims and perpetrators to other services they may need. Third, the Desk gathers data on cases of domestic violence, abuse, sexual abuse and crime that can be used as an evidence base to improve policy.

Introduction

After the tsunami, UNICEF immediately involved itself in actively advocating security measures and setting into place principles to protect women and children in internally displaced persons settlements and to establish mechanisms that prevented and limited the exposure of children and women to abuse, violence, exploitation and trafficking.

First, UNICEF started to train policewomen from both inside and outside Aceh on child protection and the application of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), which

covers child-sensitive juvenile justice systems, child protection laws, domestic violence and gender sensitivity. The key partners in this effort were the Aceh Provincial Police (POLDA NAD) and the Criminal Investigation Bureau of the National Police Headquarters (*Badan Reserse dan Kriminal*: Bereskrim Mabes POLRI). UNICEF engaged the Jakarta Police Headquarters and policewomen from other provinces to support the policewomen to be deployed in Aceh so that they could transfer knowledge and skills. A pre-departure training program on child protection was organized for 34 policewomen.

Between April and June 2005, the first batch of policewomen (50 out of a total of 195) was deployed. Linked to the UNICEF Child Centers but living in the camps and barracks, the policewomen formed community-based patrolling mechanisms. They protected children living in camps from exploitation, abuse and violence by interacting closely with the community. They also managed cases of children in contact with the law. As a result of the prolonged conflict that had impacted the region before the tsunami, most people felt uncomfortable with the police and did not trust them; that is why policewomen chose not to wear their uniforms when working in the barracks and camps.

Secondly, UNICEF supported the reconstruction of two women's and children's desks at the provincial level (POLDA NAD) and in Banda Aceh District. In connection with this, UNICEF trained policewomen at different police stations on how to handle cases involving women and children. Concretely, these desks were housed in separate rooms in the police office for conversations with children or women who could be victims, witnesses or offenders.

With scores of policewomen armed with knowledge of how to handle such cases in the barracks taking charge of the Women and Children's Desk in police stations, the initial foundations to build protective systems were solidly laid during the emergency phase.

Also in 2005, UNICEF supported LBH ANAK (Legal Aid Foundation for Children) for one year in developing a legal aid referral system for children in contact with the law. Lawyers were deployed under this project in order to provide legal assistance for children in contact with the law, whether as victims or perpetrators, and children with other legal needs, such as guardianship issues. The lawyers reached out into the barracks in order to gather data on children.

Development and Implementation

The Establishment of a Child-Friendly Justice System

After the emergency, UNICEF assisted the government through different judicial institutions for developing a model for a child-friendly justice system that could be replicated in other provinces. This integrated model is based on physical structures and mechanisms: Women's and Children's Desks and Juvenile Court Rooms, as well as the concept of diversion and restorative justice.

When implementing this model, UNICEF always used the same approach, which is based in the commitment of the heads of the different institutions; awareness of and knowledge building relating to child-friendly justice among law enforcement and justice officers at all levels; as well as the establishment of a network with adequate technical knowledge.

On one hand, UNICEF worked on the formal judicial procedures by strengthening the existing law enforcement system; while on the on the other hand, the concept of diversion and restoration was introduced as a non-formal judicial procedure.

Formal Judicial Procedures

The police force had been made familiar with child-friendly approaches during the emergency phase and by the end of 2007, 21 district police stations in Aceh had set up Women's and Children's Desks. To strengthen this system, UNICEF developed the Minimum Standard of Services to provide police officers with clear guidelines concerning the application of child-friendly procedures when dealing with children in contact with the justice system. In 2007, the National Police formally endorsed the concept of the Desk, thus establishing a legal basis for the 21 units. UNICEF also invested in building the human resources capacity of the police force in order to enable them to deal with children effectively and sensitively through training on CRC, child rights, and child-friendly judicial procedures.

UNICEF also established a special courtroom for children in Banda Aceh district and a Women's and Children's Desk at the provincial State Attorney's Office. In addition, various training programs on a child-friendly justice system were provided for prosecutors, prosecutors, judges and probation officers. Many of the participants are trained to be trainers in order to establish a sustainable system.

Once the existing law enforcement system had been strengthened and the law enforcers acquainted with the child-friendly approach in formal judicial procedures, UNICEF decided to introduce the concept of diversion and restorative justice as an alternative procedure to the formal judicial one.

Non-Formal Judicial Procedures

The Indonesian police have discretionary power to halt an investigation according to National Police Law No. 2/2002, its complementary guidelines, and the professional code of conduct for police officers. However, a Juvenile Justice Assessment conducted by UNICEF in collaboration with researchers from the Law Faculty of Banda Aceh-based Syiah Kuala University in June-July 2005 revealed that the concept of diversion and restorative justice was not known by investigators.

In practice, some juvenile cases were being resolved informally between the perpetrator and the victim instead of resorting to a formal sentence for the minor but

these cases were not recorded. Moreover, the Acehnese community had a settlement mechanism for certain criminal cases under customary law. This practice was codified in articles 4 and 5 of the *Qanun* (bylaws) for 2003.

These different policies and practices motivated UNICEF to consolidate its strategy and develop an alternative to the formal judicial procedures. Consequently, UNICEF strongly advocated the development of diversion and restorative justice mechanisms within the framework of a child-friendly justice system. In this respect, a circular letter was adopted by the Head of Police Headquarters in 2006 and the Director of Investigations, while the Criminal Division of POLDA NAD adopted a similar instruction in 2008 —both concerned the implementation of child-friendly judicial procedures and diversion.

In practice, UNICEF worked on building the awareness of the community on diversion and restorative justice, and more generally on child protection via discussions with village leaders and heads of sub-districts. UNICEF's approaches used the different experiences of the keys leaders with children in contact with the law to build a positive perception of these children. Moreover, training workshops on diversion and restorative justice were provided for judges, prosecutors, probation officers, correction institution staffs, lawyers, and police officers.

Furthermore, a pilot project on diversion —community-based restorative justice —was implemented in Aceh Barat, Aceh Besar and Banda Aceh. In all three districts where diversion and restorative justice programs were piloted, guidelines were developed taking local circumstances into account. The guidelines were finalized in June 2007 and have to be reviewed by the legal bureau of POLDA before being signed by the NAD police chief. Additionally, upon the realization of the need to institutionalize the knowledge and practice for sustainable child protection, UNICEF supported the establishment of a Restorative Justice working group in February 2007. The group possesses competencies to support and provide technical assistance to law enforcers and government officials working on the strengthening of a child-sensitive juvenile system in NAD.

Analysis

In Aceh, UNICEF supported the law enforcement system in establishing child-friendly procedures and other measures to better protect women and children. Women's and Children's Units were established at the provincial level and scaled up through all 21 regencies of the province; a child-friendly courtroom was set up; and new thinking on restorative justice and diversion was introduced through an intensive series of seminars and training programs.

In a hierarchical structure such as the police force, a genuine commitment from high-ranking officers is essential for success. In Indonesia, good laws and policies exist, but often they are not implemented in the provinces and districts due to lack of awareness and technical capacity. This is where UNICEF offered support. The first step was to find

existing formal tools to be used as leverage. In Indonesia, a policy on the civil nature of the police was used to introduce child friendliness into the system, starting at the highest level institution in the province. The concept of Women's and Children's Units had been developed previously as well, mainly by a group of retired police officers.

However, a high level of commitment was not sufficient for successful implementation of new policies or strategies to better protect children, because one case goes through all levels of the law enforcement and legal/judicial system. Therefore all levels of the police force must be targeted: the officers at the Women's and Children's Units, the Head of the Crime and Investigation Unit of a police station, the Head of the police station and up to the higher levels. The process starts with training, because not all police officers are familiar with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and child protection. Academics, who were likely to be perceived as more unbiased by all target groups, were involved in this process and engaged as trainers and resource persons.

It's also worth mentioning that by providing modern office equipment for the Women's and Children's Units, UNICEF showed police officers that women's and children's protection was important enough to allocate such valuable resources to. Tangible inputs were very enabling for all stakeholders and could trigger more commitment. On the other hand, over time, the commitment, creativity, open-mindedness, pro-activeness and networking abilities of police officers would prove to be more important for a successful Unit than material resources. UNICEF only provided supplies for the first 13 Units; the others were equipped with resources from the police budget. This shows that a good model can be replicated from within the police force if there is a commitment.

It is also important to find ways to provide incentive and justification for police officers at the lower levels to improve the quality of the Units. The protection of women and children does not normally generate prestige or benefits, so not all individual officers may be intrinsically motivated. As a solution, an assessment on the performance of all Units was carried out in 2008, and the best performing Units received an award. The formal award ceremony was conducted by the provincial level of the police force, reaffirming the importance of child protection among all of the lower level police officers from all regencies. This event triggered a healthy competition between police officers, who are now working to improve their Units.

United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator (UNORC) for Aceh and Nias

Using Aceh Recovery Newsletter and Coordinated Approach to Communication and Advocacy

A GROWING number of NGO and Governments activities in Aceh need an effective media of communications to ensure proper information for stakeholders, so the regional government, the BRR and the UN have taken the joint initiative of publishing a newsletter. Despite constraints in coordination, information management and the issue of sustainability, the *Aceh Recovery Newsletter* (ARN) has proven that it can effectively disseminate important messages to the people for a wide range of purposes, including the sharing of experiences. ARN has also proven to be able to generate a sense of partnership among all stakeholders in the recovery community.

Introduction

The various media play a strategic role in ensuring that important messages are delivered to all kinds of people. In an attempt to efficiently communicate the details of their projects and programs to beneficiaries and donors, each organization tries, quite rightly, to ensure that their story gets covered in the press and that their message is appreciated and understood by stakeholders and partners alike. While this need to communicate is both natural and necessary, these separate voices often result in a cacophony of confusion as each organization develops their own communication channels; the target market is literally flooded with information products, such as

newsletters, websites, press releases, etc. Ultimately, the overabundance of well-intended advocacy and communication resources contributes to a situation in which nobody is heard; or where one message or another drowns out the others.

BRR, we are very glad that ARN is being published. Please include us on the distribution list. - EU

Thank you very much for your kind information and interesting newsletter. It is a great medium among the concerned working for rehabilitation of Aceh. - AMDA Indonesia Aceh Program

Congratulations on this newsletter! What a great contribution to Aceh! We were forwarded this newsletter, but want to be added to the distribution list. Thanks so much! - Save the Children

As is the case of the overall recovery effort in Aceh and Nias, coordination has been a dominant issue in the communication field, leaving some —donors and local communities alike —with a feeling of confusion.

In response to this reality, UN, BRR and the Provincial Government of Aceh, created the Aceh Recovery Newsletter, a joint initiative seeking to provide a shared platform for all recovery stakeholders, thereby enabling a one-stop-shop for readers interested in recovery. With a syndication of over 5,000 subscribers, the Aceh Recovery Newsletter has quickly become the go-to source for information and updates on recovery and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias. Released monthly, *ARN,* as it is often referred to, features 24-pages of news, updates, interviews, human stories and photos, and provides timely reports on recovery challenges and progress achieved.

I have been reading the Aceh Recovery Newsletter with interest over the last 6 months with the goal to develop a project to bring teachers from Banda Aceh to our community here on the Gold Coast. - Imnau Foundation Secretariat, Australia

Great to see the ARN is continuing to distribute news about Aceh. Keep it up - good news is always worth reading! - IOM

This is really good. I look forward to receiving more issues. —UNDP: Poverty Reduction Unit

Special thanks for ARN. Professionally done, main accent on the issues, and photos illustrating the process —Great! Let's continue our mutual and fruitful cooperation. - ILO

Responding to The Need

Starting from the reality described above, UNORC, BRR and the Provincial Administration wanted to ensure that there was a shared platform from which international, national and local actors could get their message across. It was decided that the newsletter would be open to submissions by anyone and that the publication belonged to the recovery community as a whole. The reason for this open submission approach was two-fold: 1) it did not necessitate a large editorial team to manage

the process (instead, the public information/communication officers of individual organizations effectively became the editorial team by being in control of the material); and 2) it meant that no one organization would control the message, thereby preventing the *ARN* from being discarded as propaganda and/or advertisement.

After an extensive outreach campaign during September 2007, submissions started arriving from partners and stakeholders in October. The first issue of the newsletter was released in November and, judging from the reception, filled a void (see boxes). Here was a publication; people seemed to say, which told the story of the recovery effort as a whole, ad not only from the perspective of a specific program or organization.

In this spirit, since November 2008, as many as 14 issues of the *ARN* have been produced, all filed with submissions from a wide cross-section of the recovery community. International public organizations and aid agencies (all UN agencies and a number of Red Cross/Crescent Societies), international NGOs (Oxfam, Save the Children, Care, Mercycorps, Project Concern International, Help Age, IDLO, Tzu Chi Foundation, UMCOR, Peace Brigades International, AustCare, etc.), international donor institutions and funds (ADB, World Bank, MDF), bilateral institutions and donor countries (Norway, GTZ, USAID, Finland, KfW, AUSAID, Singapore, etc.), local partners (district and provincial PEMDA, BRA, FKK, Bappeda, Bappenas, KIP, etc.), and local organizations (LINA, YIPD, KRF, UPLINK, etc.) have all contributed to filling the pages of the *ARN* with updates from the field, interviews and stories. Simply by providing a shared platform for partners to communicate from, the Aceh Recovery Newsletter has able to generate a partnership that includes actors from all corners of the recovery community.

Strengthening Local Communication Capacity

One stand-out lesson from the experience of publishing the Newsletter has been the extent to which the communication offices of local government —district and provincial —are in need of ongoing support from the recovery community. At a basic level, their ability to target messages to the broader recovery community and to couch these in professional English is very limited. The ongoing relationship developed through the ARN experience also revealed a lack of international and national actors working to strengthen the ability of local governments to talk to the media —a broader observation, to be sure, but still relevant for future missions.

To ensure that Provincial Administration messages were not drowned out by the chorus of international actors, the ARN editorial team —comprised of communication officers from UNORC, BRR and the Provincial Administration —structured the newsletter in a way that would, as much as possible; help highlight the perspective of the democratically-elected provincial and district/city governments. Utilizing the services of UNORC's intern team (10 handpicked graduate students from some of the best universities in the world), the *ARN* made it possible to assist the local governments with producing professional-sounding English material that could cater to a broader, global audience.

Critically, the ARN was also structured in the same way as the governor's Aceh Recovery Framework (ARF), the mid-term provincial development and recovery plan developed in 2007-2008. In accordance with the holistic approach taken by the governor in the ARF, the Newsletter mimicked the cluster structure in its chapter headings. Thus, there was a section in each issue dedicated to the Peace Process and Reintegration; Good Governance, Rule of Law and Democratic Decentralization; Basic Services; Capacity Building and Asset Management; Economic Development; and Infrastructure and Housing. A recurring special feature section focused on such cross-cutting issues as Disaster Risk Reduction, Environment, Gender, etc.

Conclusion

With 14 issues and counting, submissions from over 40 different recovery actors, 336 pages of stories, news, and features and countless interviews with some of Aceh's and Nias' most interesting people —and with over 5,000 subscribers worldwide —the Aceh Recovery Newsletter has come to stand out as both a key information resource for partners and stakeholders interested in the recovery of Aceh and Nias, and as a unique information product. Its publication has helped foster a spirit of cooperation in the communication field, uncommon to similar recovery efforts across the world. All in all, ARN has also become an important media that has aptly pictured the development programs in Aceh; especially the challenges faced during the recovery period.

Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)

Formalizing More Rights for Aceh's Women

The province of Aceh has introduced the first Women's Rights Charter in the Islamic world —a signal that women are to have an equal say in the societal development of the Indonesian province. The German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) supported this process on behalf of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ).

Introduction

"The women of Aceh don't get a choice," was the headline in a German daily some 18 months after the 2004 tsunami. And yet women in the province were especially hard hit by the disaster: about one-third of the survivors were female.

As the deadly wave approached, many mothers ran toward the sea to save their children, but in their traditional garb, the sarong, they were not able to run as fast as the men. Many of the women who did survive were not at home at the time of the disaster, but lost their families. One of those was Samira (not her real name). When the 30 year old returned to the place her house had been, all that remained was the foundations. Her husband, her two children —her whole life —had disappeared into the sea. But that was not all. Her father-in-law, who survived the tsunami, intended to take not only the land away from her, but also the money she and her husband had paid into a joint savings account. He believed he had the right to do so. According to the interpretation of sharia

law in Aceh, a woman could neither be the head of a family, nor could she own land. That meant a widow had no right to the remains of her home, nor did she have the right to sole custody of her children. A woman can seek to uphold her civil rights before a state-run court, but for that she must produce legal documents. Only with a marriage certificate can a woman claim her husband's property, and only with an identification card can she get a land title. Samira's papers had all been washed away in the tsunami. To get new ones, she would have had to travel to the next town. But under Aceh's sharia laws, women were not allowed to travel far from home without a male relative. Unable to get the necessary documents, Samira had no access to a ruling by a state court.

Cases like Samira's caused public concern. Some politicians, Islamic scholars and human rights activists in 2005 started debating how to improve the role of the province's two million women. At the same time, the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) was commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) to assist the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs in the development of population administration in Aceh. Right from the start, special emphasis was placed on women's rights: As Samira's case shows, legal documentation is an essential prerequisite for getting access to full civil rights.

"Facing the need, we decided to organize regular forums on women's rights," says Cut Sri Rozanna of the GTZ-supported project on population administration in Aceh (PAS NAD). Over several years, these forums —made up of representatives of government,

The signatories of the Charter, among others: The Governor of Aceh, Head of the Provincial House of Representatives, Heads of local civil society organizations, the Military Commander of Aceh, Head of Police, Head of Regional Islamic Scholars Council (MPU), Head of Sharia Authority and Head of Traditional Adat Association. Photo: GTZ Documentation

religious and civil organizations —worked out a detailed charter on the rights of women in Aceh. The document was publicly signed by all stakeholders in November 2008. The signatories committed themselves to making the charter into a constituent basis for Aceh's future legislation, policy and agendas in Aceh.

Development and Implementation

The regular meetings between religious and civil society organizations facilitated by the PAS NAD project began in June 2005. These soon gave rise to the Population Administration Forum Aceh, which set clearly defined goals and became a legally registered organization. The initial goal was to convince the population of the general benefits of legal documents when it comes to exercising their civil rights. For that to happen, it was necessary to clarify the Islamic stance toward a reformed system of administration, because sharia law is subject to widely differing interpretations. Working in conjunction with the national Islamic Scholars Council (MUI) of Indonesia led to a legal opinion declaring that the government registration of births, marriages and other vital events contributes to the good of the Islamic community, and therefore should be supported. After carefully considering the matter, the regional Islamic Scholars Council (MPU), which is highly influential in Aceh, agreed. The MPU issued an Islamic legal decision or fatwa, obliging all Muslims in Aceh to register with the authorities. At the same time, it encouraged the government to improve its public performance.

Once this religious legitimation was in place, a more intense debate on the rights of women became possible. There were many facets to the issue concerning everybody. Like Samira, many women were not allowed to travel alone to the nearest town to obtain a new identification card; without the document, they could not even ask for state aid provided for tsunami victims. After the tsunami, however, many households were headed by women alone. Given this situation, an increasing number of citizens called for a rethink of the status of women in the province.

"Women in Aceh are not in a strong position these days. Although there was a time when Acehnese women were renowned for their strength," says Rusjdi Ali Muhammad. The 58-year-old is a professor at the sharia faculty of the State Institute of Islamic Studies Ar-Raniry and a member of the MPU. "Our society needs its women. After all, they are working just as hard as the men to rebuild our province. So they must get the same rights —in every aspect of life: in the family, education and in politics."

Soon, the small discussion groups with which the GTZ began its work within the PAS NAD project became an influential societal forum, one in which politicians and legal experts, Islamic scholars and women's rights activists discussed how to ensure greater rights for Acehnese women without contravening Islamic law. In November 2006, participants set out a 20-point resolution. Their central demand was that women in Aceh be granted all civil rights as defined in the Quran.

"In fact, it became clear that some of the previous interpretations of sharia law in Aceh were not in line with the Quran. However, some representatives of conservative organizations first had to be convinced of that," says Surayia Kamaruzzaman, founder and president of Aceh's oldest women's organization, Flower Aceh. "Then later, all sides had to make compromises. We kept altering the draft until we had an acceptable basis for a later charter."

In February 2007, the forum founded a multi-stakeholder partnership (MSP), which was given the task of drawing up the Women's Rights Charter. In this, the MSP members were guided by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Aceh Charter's 16 articles of the final document guarantee women in Aceh the right to legal protection and equality before the law, to their political and civic, social, economic and cultural rights. For the first time, they are given the right to be the head of their family —and consequently, to sole custody of their children. Apart from that, the Charter grants them protection from domestic violence and the right to own land. There were especially heated debates on the issues of abortion and polygamy. The forum members ultimately agreed that women who have been raped should be allowed to terminate a resulting pregnancy within 40 days. Women

The ceremony on November 11, 2008, was attended by more than 800 participants from all over Aceh. Photo: GTZ Documentation

in polygamous unions were guaranteed full rights —this means, for example, that they cannot be divorced arbitrarily. Polygamy itself remains legal. In a solemn ceremony on November 11, 2008, the Charter of the Rights of Women in Aceh was adopted.

The Charter is considered a pioneering step in the future development of Acehnese society. More than that, it may serve as a model for other Muslim states. It is the first charter of its kind in an Islamic region to be officially recognized by representatives of all the relevant groups. Its signatories include the governor of Aceh, the chairman of the provincial legislature, the chairman of the sharia authority, representatives of the judiciary, police and the military, members of the regional Islamic Scholars Council, and women's organizations.

The biggest challenge now is making the contents of the charter known to the people all over the province.

"It will not be as easy in the villages as it is in the city. Many women know absolutely nothing about their rights," says Rosmarwardani, deputy chairwoman of the sharia court in the district capital Jantho. Flower Aceh and other organizations represented in the MSP

Irawati, a women's rights activist from the village of Lampageu, expresses her gratitude to the Governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf. Photo: GTZ Documentation

have held initial workshops in the 23 districts of the province, aimed at paving the way to a fundamental awareness of the —now officially recognized —rights of women. The next step foresees the application of the charter as the basis for all future decisions concerning women.

"It would be ideal if the most important points in the charter were adopted into our laws," says Professor Rusjdi Ali Muhammad. "But there is a lot of work to be done before that happens —media reports, public forums, workshops in every village. It would be naive to imagine that we already reached our goal when the charter was adopted. We are only just getting started!"

Analysis

When the project began, many of those taking part had strong reservations. Conservative Islamic groups in particular felt that a new system of administration combining population and civil registration threatened to westernize their traditional society —and that this process would be reinforced by strengthening women's rights. Therefore, the first step was to convince doubters that women in Aceh do in fact suffer discrimination, and that this is something that harms all of the society. The declaration by the MPU that the charter had been written solely by Acehnese according to Acehnese law —and in no way contradicted the Quran —was one of the most important prerequisites for the project's success.

Another key factor was the restraint maintained by the international GTZ team. They facilitated the overall process by organizing events and making their specialist knowledge available to participants. But the material contained in the charter was formulated by Acehnese representatives alone. The final draft reflects the draftees' broad spectrum of opinion. It advocates moderate Islamic values, demonstrating that women's rights are certainly compatible with Islam. As the first officially recognized charter of women's rights in an Islamic region, it may serve not only as a model for other parts of the world, it can also be held up as an example of a peaceful and just Islam that follows the principles of equality and tolerance —qualities upheld in the very first words in the Aceh charter of women's rights.

During the discussions, some groups kept calling for the result of the effort to be given legal status —to become law. Yet the broad-based consensus reached, and the public recognition of the charter by the Islamic Scholars Council, the provincial government, and the Aceh legislature, as well as all the other institutions and organizations —gives the document as well a very fundamental, constituent significance. The experience of the past shows that the deeply traditional people of Aceh often feel a greater obligation to follow a religious or moral recommendation than a piece of legislation, which is repeatedly being adapted and amended.

"The Acehnese believe that when they make a promise before God, they will also be punished by God —and not by any worldly power —if they do not keep that promise," explains GTZ advisor Cut Sri Rozanna, herself from Aceh.

Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Hivos)

Making Social Change through Gender Trajectory

GENDER quality is one focus of development. Hivos, through gender specialists and local partner organizations, promoted gender mainstreaming in Aceh to ensure that both men and women had an equal voice in the recovery and ensuing development processes. One of the approaches employed in this effort was called Gender Trajectory, which was designed to meet the specific needs of Hivos partner organizations in their efforts to promote gender equality in the province. Gender Trajectory constituted a series of activities designed for partners to ensure that the specific experiences and interests of women were reflected in the planning, implementation and evaluation processes within the various partner organizations themselves. This process involved three parties: local partner organizations, independent gender specialists, and Hivos. In the Gender Trajectory approach, the principles of equality had to be strict, but the strategies were flexible. There was no one recipe for intervention and the resolution of various issues; the characteristics of organizations and political contexts all influenced methodology and strategies. Moreover, in the larger socio-cultural context of Aceh, the existence of Islamic Sharia law and related local interpretations and customs presented special challenges for implementing the Gender Trajectory program.

Introduction

At the outset of any effective development effort, it is always necessary for societies and governments to understand that gender equality is one of the main aspects of any effective development program. Hivos, a Netherlands-based international NGO concerned with gender equality issues, was founded with two main objectives: to promote gender perspectives worldwide, and to support organizations that focus on advocating gender issues and promoting gender perspectives in individual societies. To achieve these objectives, Hivos implements its programs by establishing local organizations and providing gender specialists to guide and support them.

To these ends, Hivos has several agency offices in various countries. In Southeast Asia, Hivos has a regional office in Jakarta (Indonesia), and also established a local office in the wake of the earthquake and tsunami in Aceh to support, empower and facilitate the reconstruction process.

Building a new perspective of equality between men and women is a long process in any socio-cultural environment because promoting gender issues challenges established values. Within the overall Indonesian context of diversity across the provinces, it proved relatively more challenging to promote justice among men and women in Aceh, where the traditions and customs of the local populace have strong, deep roots in Islam and who advocate and apply Sharia law in their regional governance systems, than in other provinces in which other traditions and national law prevail.

Although Sharia law in general places women in a relatively equal position to men, a lot remains open to interpretation at the local cultural level in Aceh, in which the male role is predominant, with the role of women perceived as most appropriately focused on the home and domestic concerns.

This socio-cultural context has posed special challenges for implementing gender equality programs in Aceh.

Gender Trajectory Program

In order to address these socio-cultural issues as effectively as possible at a core level to establish a workable pattern for applying gender equality that could be expanded and widely duplicated, Hivos developed the Gender Trajectory Program to ensure power sharing between men and women would take place within the organizational structures and programs of all of Hivos' partners.

The Gender Trajectory Program is a tri-partite intervention strategy involving the joint efforts of Hivos, independent gender specialists, and partner organizations. Hivos used gender trajectory grants to hire independent experts to carry out the facilitation process that took about three years.

The Gender Trajectory Program constituted a series of activities designed to ensure women's specific experiences and interests were reflected in the planning, implementation and evaluation processes in each of Hivos' partner organizations. This involved a comprehensive approach deliberately designed to challenge the organization's top level decision-makers (most of whom were men) to transform their way of thinking and to empower the second layer of management (mostly female).

The partners' active involvement in the Gender Trajectory Program was pivotal in initiating change —first on an institutional level, then on a larger social level —as was that of the gender specialists who were encouraged to be creative about designing and implementing individual intervention strategies for each of the different partners, who would then apply what was learned within their organizations in the field. For example, one of Hivos' gender specialists used examples from a farmer's daily family life to explain women's exploitation, while another invited progressive ulemas to start up Gender Trajectory programs among their communities.

The specific Gender Trajectory strategy for each organization was designed based on the particular needs of the various partners, who were working on different issues, in different areas, and at all levels of society, within widely varied contexts. Gender Trajectory was not meant to be a one-recipe-for-all type of approach; therefore it was imperative for the gender specialists to become integrally involved, at times even living with the organizations, in order to ensure that actual transformation of thinking about gender and social justice was taking place.

After holding gender training toward changing its partner organization's perspective on equality between men and women in the second semester of 2005 in Banda Aceh, Hivos, which carefully monitored the results of the workshops, was concerned that participants continued to understand "gender" as being a blanket term for women's issues instead of a new framework of analysis to identify injustices.

It was thus determined that, in general, the usual centralized workshop paradigm of training would not be effective in the context of Gender Trajectory, whose main purpose was to empower women to speak up within their own male-dominated organizations and then within the context of the patriarchal society of Aceh itself.

For that reason, Gender Trajectory training was then undertaken through fun activities, such as role playing and "girl talks", which were considered important elements in empowering the predominantly female second layer of management in the partner organizations. Through these casual "girl talks", the basic principles of feminism and leadership were shared. Since building a new paradigm of justice is about challenging the values that people hold, change must start with individuals, Gender Trajectory made interventions at as personal a level as possible. Consultants also used the opportunity to live around and work with Hivos' partners to build the emotional bonds that would prove crucial to ultimately transforming the minds of not only the female managers, but also those of the decision-makers who were mostly men.

Thus far, the Hivos Gender Trajectory Program, which has involved approximately 25 partners, three gender specialists and one Hivos Program Officer for Gender, Women and Development, has proven that from the funding side, gender mainstreaming does not have to cost much money because it leverages knowledge toward eye opening awareness, the breaking of myths, and the facilitation of critical thinking.

This understanding has enabled Hivos to change its grant-making strategy and stop providing the separate gender trajectory grants that were motivating partners to undertake their own separate gender programs without proper preparation or grounding. The budget initially earmarked for the grants is now used for hiring more gender specialists to help the partner organizations to better integrate gender equality principles into their main programs.

Hivos has also made several other advances toward greater gender equality in its various partner organizations, including instilling the understanding in Disaster Risk Management (DRM) partners that women can be agents of change instead of just victims of disaster. These organizations are now able to identify the different needs of men and women, and have revised their Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) tools to ensure the inclusion of gender perspectives. Furthermore, the Disaster Risk Management partners have also begun promoting women's representation in community disaster management structures, and have set mechanisms into place to channel complaints of sexual harassment and violence against women; these mechanisms are now officially part of the partner organizations' Standard Operational Procedures (SOP).

During dissemination of information on a coconut drying program held in Alu Lehob village in Meulaboh, 2006, the local women sat outside the meeting place because they were too shy to join the meeting. Photo: HIJRAH Documentation

Gender Trajectory Program Challenges

At the beginning of the Gender Trajectory program, obstacles emerging from the social context, such as the negative perception that Hivos might try to force its gender equality program on the local people, tested both the creativity and patience of the gender specialists and the organizations they were trying to assist.

And this initial local response proved to only be the tip of the iceberg in relation to efforts to address the overall gender equality problems in Aceh province. This was particularly true in relation to the livelihood programs, meant to encourage women to work outside of their homes to boost family income, which were supported by many development organizations. If the experiences and needs of women were not consciously and carefully considered in the formulation, planning and implementation of these livelihood programs, women could have, albeit inadvertently, been exploited rather than assisted. It is important for all development organizations working on sustainable livelihood issues to analyze all risks. This proved crucial to ensuring that the livelihood programs established were actually benefiting and not burdening women.

A similar gender sensitivity problem occurred among the microfinance organizations, whose beneficiaries are almost 100 percent women. There was a decided lack of understanding of the core principles of women's empowerment among these groups because the root cause of the problem of poverty that they were trying to address was the imbalance in the power relations between men and women; a matter that remained all but unrecognized in initial attempts at assisting women to start their own small enterprises.

In the case of both the livelihood and microfinance organizations, externally, development activities were not considered appropriate or lucrative for the women who were to be empowered.

Internally, the cultures of the organizations themselves were not friendly for women. Women on the staff were not able to influence programs the way the male staff could. The Hivos Partners' Standard Operational Procedures did not acknowledge the different needs of men and women on staff, nor did they address their fulfillment. For instance, one women's organization did not even have any complaint procedures for sexual harassment or violence against women in its SOP.

Using Gender Trajectory to Address Specific Problems

Three specific problems relating to the traditional roles of women emerged in efforts at implementing the Gender Trajectory Program within the partner development organizations in Aceh.

The first was rooted in the customary decision-making process within which men hold the prevailing voice and the needs and opinions of women are frequently overlooked. One of the Hivos partners (SEPAKAT) had established weekly staff meetings designed to formulate and make management decisions. However, these meetings were often not held for one reason or another, and when he considered it necessary, the director would go ahead and make decisions for the management by himself. Once, he decided to buy a *Win* motorbike for field monitoring purposes. The problem was that the female members of the staff, who generally wear skirts, could not use the motorcycle to go into the field to monitor programs as had been intended when the bike was procured.

After some internal discussions guided by Gender Trajectory strategies through which the input of the female staffers was finally accommodated, the management decided to buy an automatic *Vega-R* scooter-type bike that would enable female staff to monitor in the field.

The second problem was rooted in the Aceh tradition dictating that married women focus on their households rather than outside activities. Hivos Partner organizations experienced a high rate of turnover because when their young female staffers married they would most often give up their jobs to start raising a family. Although the female staff members liked their jobs and were capable of doing their work, tradition reigned in the personal decisions that they made. As a result of this high rate of turnover, the partner organizations eventually became reluctant to send their single female staff members to training sessions, workshops and/or conferences.

Gender Trajectory strategies, which do not discourage young women from marrying to keep them in the workforce, were initially applied at one organization in 2006 in order to try to find appropriate ways to address this problem when a key member of the staff left her job to get married. Her colleagues expressed anxiety that having still another staffer leave would increase workloads, as well as cause monetary constraints related to training in someone new and lead to diminished field capability overall.

The Gender Trajectory strategy of "girl talks" brought the female staff together to discuss the problem. During these peer group gatherings, the women offered support to one another and tried to define for themselves the real meaning of feminism. They concluded that it was important for a woman to be able to get married without losing her livelihood or discarding her dreams. They developed further strategies for supporting each other in their efforts to be assertive in communicating their interests to their boyfriends and/or families before marriage. These "girl talks" eventually expanded into a peer support group that empowered the young women at a very personal level. In parallel, gender specialists initiated "boy talk". Basically boy talk is the same as "girl talk" but the purpose was to accelerate the commitment of male staff to gender equity through direct and open discussions.

At an organizational level, gender specialists invited the staffs of various partner organizations, including the male managers and other male staff, to analyze the negative impact of female staff members having to leave the organizations due to marriage on Aceh's overall social, political and economic balance. After all, this problem was not specific to the development organizations; it affected people working in all sectors.

The third challenge was poor organizational development due to an imbalance in to authority/power within organizations**.** Most top level management positions are male dominated. Gender Trajectory was applied to ensure the establishment of Standard Organizational Procedures for internal control purposes that would stipulate adequate power sharing among decision-makers and staffers of both genders.

Gender Trajectory Sustainability

In the face of the challenges inherent within the socio-cultural environment of Aceh, Hivos gained a great deal of invaluable experience toward resolving some of the problems faced by women through gender friendly organizational development.

Hivos' development and application of the Gender Trajectory Program was a learning process for everyone concerned; Hivos itself, its gender specialists and its partner organizations.

From this process, Hivos has concluded that the following factors are vital to ensuring the sustainability of the Gender Trajectory approach:

- the tri-partite method of intervention, involving Hivos, gender specialists and partners, which ensures a strong contribution to the gender trajectory process of integrating the principles of equality between men and women into the organizations' cultures, structures and programs;
- political commitment on the part of all stakeholders must be established during contract negotiations; it is vital to convince your potential partners that development work without gender mainstreaming is useless and may cause exploitation;
- the clear defining of goals from the outset with each and every partner on the basis of their existing organizational vision-mission stipulations toward supporting gender equality;
- the Gender Trajectory concept must be adaptable to different contexts and situations through the strict but flexible implementation of the principles of gender equality —a one-recipe-for-all approach is not workable;
- accommodation of the local context in which religious or local cultural norms could emerge as resistance to the promotion of gender through a strict focus on the principles of justice, which are universally applicable anywhere within any socio-cultural environment;
- facilitation of partners in defining their own most suitable strategies for integrating gender perspectives into their own organizational contexts because no specific template for gender mainstreaming could be applied for all partners in all contexts;
- expertise-based rather than fund-based facilitation of partners' activities in order that Gender Trajectory not be perceived as a donor driven activity, but as part of a social change process;
- the expansion of Gender Trajectory strategies beyond organization frameworks to achieve wider social change; and
- cultural sensitivity of gender specialists is a key success factor for gender trajectory.

Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center (TDMRC)

Developing of the Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center

SYIAH Kuala University (Unsyiah) established Unsyiah for Aceh Reconstruction (UAR) to actively work with the government and the community in designing a blueprint for Aceh's rehabilitation and reconstruction. In early 2005, it established the Tsunami Research Center (TRC) as an earthquake and tsunami information center and a Mitigation Center (MC). In 2006, these two centers were merged to form the Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center (TDMRC) to avoid an overlapping of activities.

The TDMRC aimed to develop a reputable, self-supporting center of expertise in the area of natural disaster risk reduction with specific emphasis on earthquakes, tsunamis and floods. Its objectives were:

1. To establish and manage a comprehensive Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) database and develop research capacity to provide the foundation for conducting research and disseminating relevant information based on the needs of national and international organizations;
2. To develop and implement education and tailor-made training programs on natural disaster risk reduction issues based upon the request of specific groups or institutions;
3. To provide practical solutions to DRR-related issues through the provision of consultancy services to national and international organizations.

To achieve that purpose, TDMRC formed an effectively and efficiently managed organization to devise a strategic plan. The organization was formed in accordance with the area of scope. It comprised:

1. Data and information management
2. Research
3. Education and training, and
4. Consultancy.

Data and Information Management

Being affiliated with the university, TDMRC is closely connected to conducting research and disseminating its findings through education and policy studies and advice. Data is an indispensable tool for research and policy advice. Therefore, in order to develop a reputable knowledge center, TDMRC collects, processes, analyzes and disseminates data and information on natural disaster-related issues. Due to the fact that BRR and numerous other (inter)national organizations processed various types of data during the earthquake/tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation phase, TDMRC was presented with a potential gold mine of information. To manage all this and other data required an interactive database. This Disaster Risk Management Information System (DRMIS) comprised data on coastal defense and management, escape facilities, river basin management, reconstruction and rehabilitation modalities and outcomes, etc. It would be further capable of effectively linking up with other databases in Indonesia to create better opportunities for research and policy guidance.

Research

Research within the context of TDMRC had the important role of providing the basis for policy advice, of generating new theories and knowledge that would help mitigate the impact of disasters for future generations and of providing input for education and training programs. Within the context of research, TDMRC activities included:

- Conducting data analysis on specific natural disaster-related, mitigation and rehabilitation issues
- Preparing scientific and popular publications on specific natural disaster-related topics.
- Establishing and maintaining research contact with relevant national and international institutions.
- Using its database to investigate and adequately respond to specific questions from clients, such as the provincial government.
- Acting as a resource center on specific disaster-related issues for other universities in Sumatera, the country and possibly worldwide.

Education and Training

Data from the DRMIS was used for research purposes and for generating policy advice, providing an excellent environment to design and implement highly relevant education and training programs. These included:

- Designing and implementing tailor-made training programs in disaster management-related issues based on specific demands from clients;
- Designing and implementing certificate and degree courses in disaster management for certain target groups, e.g. government officials, university students;
- Designing and implementing course components on DRR issues for curricula in university departments, such as civil engineering, health, urban and regional planning;
- Establishing and maintaining work relations with national and international universities that provide DRR-related education and training services in order to be able to exchange programs and/or expertise as well as upgrade its courses; and
- Organizing an annual international seminar on a disaster management.

Consultancy

TDMRC activities in the areas of data and information, research and education brought the center in close contact with the field realities of disaster mitigation. This presented an excellent opportunity to achieve its mission of providing disaster solutions. In other words, translating DRR expertise generated by TDMRC through its research into practical solutions for specific DRR-related issues provides a strong basis for consultancy services for potential TDMRC clients, which has the potential to generate an income for the center.

Program Implementation and Results

Since its establishment, TDMRC has conducted various activities concerned with strategic planning to achieve the expected goals. The development of TDMRC was facilitated by BRR through the establishment of the TDMRC building in Meuraxa district to support various DRR activities.

TDMRC established a website as an indispensable tool for input for research and policy advice, information gathering, processing, analysis and disseminating of data and information on natural disaster-related issues. The website contains various information on DRR issues, such as TDMRC activities, research information, disaster updates, etc. The Disaster Institution (SATKORLAK) in Aceh needed support from a research institute for knowledge enhancement. The results of research will be used as a basis for determining

disaster policy by the Aceh government. Thus far, TDMRC has conducted various research activities in cooperation with several organizations such as BRR, coastal defense, etc.

Research activities conducted by TDMRC include:

- Contingency plan for Banda Aceh;
- Conservation and potential study of coastal area in Aceh;
- Survey on escape routes in rural villages;
- Tsunami and sea level rise in disaster risk management guidelines;
- Conservation and environmental measures for a green Aceh; and
- Natural resources conservation policy.

To increase resources capacity, the TDMRC training and education department conducted various activities related to training and education. Training on capacity building measures was given not to only internal staff, but also to government officials as the implementers of government policy. The training programs conducted by TDMRC included:

- Tsunami and database training;
- Coastal defense training;
- Saving elementary schoolchildren's lives; and
- Training on lessons learned from the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Aceh.

TDMRC aims to become a self-supporting institution by generating an income through its consultancy services. The signing of an MoU with Japan's Hyogo prefecture concerning a tsunami museum could be the beginning of cooperation with many other clients. As a partner of the Aceh government, TDMRC established a cooperation agreement with the Aceh Disaster Management Coordination Board (SATKORLAK PBP NAD) to consolidate disaster management in Aceh. TDMRC has cooperated with many other organizations, such as UNDP concerning technical assistance, the American Red Cross, etc.

Information on TDMRC activities and their results are disseminated to various partners and the community through seminars and workshops. A third annual international workshop and expo on the Sumatera tsunami and recovery was held in December 2008. Future workshops and seminars related to DRR issues will also be held.

Lessons Learned

TDMRC was established by the Mechanical Engineering Department of Syiah Kuala University, and as such many of its staff members have an engineering background. Given the multi-disciplinary nature of DRR, TDMRC needs to widen its knowledge and expertise base outside engineering boundaries. It needs to strive toward becoming a multi-disciplinary entity capable of providing DRR-related services to meet market demand.

To achieve this, it will develop a multi-disciplinary DRR perspective among its senior management and establish links with departments, institutions and freelancing experts specializing in complementary DRR areas.

Disaster management requires the cooperation of various stakeholders to ensure that the community is fully prepared in the event of a disaster. As a research institute, TDMRC's activities were made easier due to its cooperation with the Aceh government in establishing the Crisis Center.

The results of its research will be used as a basis for the Aceh government to determine the province's disaster management policies.

Paving the Way for a Better and Faster Reconstruction Effort

FOLLOWING the destructive and deadly 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami that struck off the coast of northern Sumatera, World Food Programme (WFP) was on the ground within two days supplying much needed food assistance to 200,000 men, women and children. Immediately after the tsunami hit, WFP supplied 403 metric tons (mt) of high energy biscuits and instant noodles to those most in need in the city of Banda Aceh at an initial cost of US$350.000. Only a few weeks later, WFP expanded its assistance to 17 affected districts (including the islands of Simeulue and Nias) and eventually reached 1.2 million people affected by the tsunami.

Over the next three years, WFP would reach more than two million tsunami survivors with food assistance as well as lay the groundwork for reconstruction efforts.

WFP's rapid and prolonged response helped avoid widespread hunger and malnutrition immediately after the tsunami. WFP's work was also instrumental in restoring livelihoods and paving the way for a better, faster reconstruction effort.

By the time WFP closed its food assistance in the Aceh region in 2008, WFP had delivered more than 200,000mt of food. The Shipping Service had moved more than 95,000 mt of reconstruction materials and opened previously destroyed ports. The UN Humanitarian Air Service had flown in countless emergency supplies and transported more than 22,000 passengers to the most devastated regions.

Photo: WFP Documentation

In total, WFP provided food and technical assistance (including the shipping and air services) valued at more than $220 million to the people of Aceh and Nias.

This report describes WFP Indonesia's first response to the tsunami and how its food assistance was transitioned into longer-term recovery projects. The report also includes lessons learned from WFP and stories showing the more human side of the relief effort.

Waves 10 Meters High

December 26, 2004 will forever be remembered in Indonesia as a day full of fear, destruction and heartache by millions of people caught in the path of the Indian Ocean tsunami. The giant waves were so fierce that in some places, entire towns and villages were completely destroyed. Many communities simply ceased to exist that day such was the force of the water. The tsunami struck many countries including Thailand, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Somalia and Kenya, but Indonesia, by far, suffered the greatest losses.

This date will also be remembered for the incredible community spirit that prevailed and of heroic tales of neighbor helping neighbor. Those that had lost everything were taken into people's homes and community groups quickly organized themselves to supply much needed food and shelter. The international response was also rapid, and WFP is proud to say it was one of the first organizations on the ground.

A massive earthquake measuring a practically unheard of 9.1 on the Richter scale was the cause of the tsunami. The northern-most islands of Sumatera, Simeulue and Nias suffered the gravest losses as they were nearest to the epicenter. Witnesses talk of a wave 10 meters high approaching at a colossal speed followed shortly by two smaller, but no less devastating waves.

WFP Map Showing Earthquake Epicenter

Within minutes, many people's lives were gone and for those that survived, there was absolutely nothing to salvage or eat. A young student from Banda Aceh describes people wandering about in a daze having lost everything they owned from the impact of the water. Elsewhere, bodies and rubble littered the beaches and towns. Large, ocean-going vessels were ripped from their anchorages and deposited far inland.

The days immediately following the tsunami posed the greatest risk for the survivors as there was little in the way of clean water or nutritious food. The aid community knew that a quick response was essential in order to avoid further casualties. As the food aid arm of the United Nations and the largest humanitarian organization in the world, WFP was already arranging food drops, transportation and logistics planning for the most affected areas.

Partnerships

To successfully deliver food assistance to those most in need, an organization needs two important things; cooperation and funding. Fortunately, WFP was already present in Indonesia and had a long record of working together with the Government. A joint UN/ Government needs-assessment team quickly put out a call for additional large-scale food assistance for the Aceh region.

WFP instantly accessed emergency funding, and purchased 403 metric tons of fortified biscuits and noodles as emergency rations. WFP's first delivery of food aid to tsunami victims was carried out on December 28, 2004 using existing stocks in-country, only two days after the tsunami struck. WFP transported and delivered food aid through existing

arrangements between WFP, the Government of Indonesia and Cooperating Partners with assistance through leading global logistics company TNT. This was the start of a program through which WFP provided over 100,000 tons of food assistance to over a million people affected by the tsunami.

TNT provided invaluable logistics support in the early days of the tsunami relief effort, including essential logistics staffing, trucking and office space. TNT especially helped WFP transport food aid to tsunami victims in Banda Aceh during those first two months.

Coordination

To coordinate the assistance, the Government of Indonesia formed the Aceh and Nias Reconstruction Agency known as BRR (Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekontruksi). All aid efforts were coordinated by BRR, including the construction of a massive warehouse that held 100,000 mt of food in the town of Banda Aceh.

Unloading WFP food shipment in Medan port. Photo: WFP Documentation

The UN agencies were coordinated by the UN Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias (UNORC). Meetings were held with community leaders, government agencies, UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) every day during the first few months of the disaster and later, every week. Such meetings helped to ensure all parties were aware of each other's efforts and allowed for better cooperation when assisting victims.

WFP forged an agreement with the Indonesian National Food Logistics Agency (BULOG) allowing the local purchase of rice. BULOG sold Indonesian rice to WFP at below market value, which allowed for larger distributions to those who needed it most.

Donors

Immediately following the tsunami disaster, WFP rapidly mobilized a substantial response, launching an appeal to provide food assistance for six months to two million people in the affected countries, which included Sri Lanka, Indonesia and the Maldives.

Donations for victims in Indonesia flowed in from a variety of sources, both government and private. Key donors included Australia, Japan, the USA, the American Red Cross, the European Union, Canada, Germany and the United Kingdom, among many other generous supporters.

2004-2005

Emergency Operation

The first initial wave of food assistance consisted of the afore-mentioned 403 mt of pre-packaged noodles and high energy biscuits brought in by truck. WFP was able to use its existing in-country food stock to quickly deliver food to 200,000 men, women and children who were most in need in the city of Banda Aceh. WFP also utilized its existing partnerships with the Government of Indonesia, World Vision, Save the Children, CARE, Mercy Corps and Action Contre la Faim to distribute and monitor the assistance.

The scale of the disaster was immense covering an area larger than one million square kilometers. As a response, food aid was delivered to as many people as possible with the simple goal of saving lives[1]. A systematic beneficiary registration process simply was not possible during the first few months as internally displaced people (IDPs) were often changing locations daily. Later however, the majority of the IDPs would be systematically counted thanks in large part to the Government's efforts to supply shelter to those displaced and order amid the chaos.

However, many bridges, roads and other vital infrastructure were not simply damaged, but completely gone. This caused a huge logistical challenge not to mention great worry for those who were unable to reach loved ones in the most affected areas.

WFP therefore used its land transportation assets, including TNT trucking fleets, as well as helicopters, ships and even aircraft. This allowed even those in the remotest of locations to receive basic aid needed to survive during the first few weeks. WFP initially supplied assistance to the immediate Banda Aceh area but later expanded to Aceh Barat, Aceh Jaya, Aceh Besar, Nagan Raya, Aceh Seletan, Simeulue, Aceh Barat Daya, Aceh Singkil, Aceh Tamiang, Langsa, Aceh Timur, Aceh Utara, Lhokseumawe, Bireuen, Pidie, Sabang and Nias districts. WFP also maintained a sub-office in Medan to assist with logistics.

The assistance to tsunami victims was formally declared a WFP Emergency Operation (EMOP) by January 1, 2005 thus allowing foreign and domestic donors to channel their resources toward this large-scale, food assistance operation. The scale of the disaster in Indonesia surpassed all expectations. Therefore, the EMOP was later adjusted to include food assistance for an additional 1.2 million Indonesian tsunami victims.

Overall, 1.6 million tsunami survivors received food assistance during 2004 and 2005 (approximately 890,000 women and 740,000 men; 560,000 of whom were under the age of 18). The food assistance was delivered to temporary government housing known as barracks, schools and distribution centers. The food was mostly trucked in via shipping ports established in Lhokseumawe, Banda Aceh, Calang, Meulaboh, Simeulue and Nias.

Getting Food Fast

WFP was able to quickly mobilize food and equipment using its emergency response facility in Asia known as a depot. The development of the depot started with the Humanitarian Response Network project, which aimed to create a global network of strategically located warehousing facilities for use by WFP and other UN agencies. This allowed for the pre-positioning of food and equipment for faster response times.

The Asia Emergency Response Facility (AERF)[2] is one of the original "four corner depots" proposed by WFP to ensure preparedness globally. The AERF served as the Asia facility during the first response stage of the tsunami relief and was also used by other UN agencies, the Red Cross, international and local NGOs.

The AERF allowed for:

- First-line response emergency equipment that was country specific
- Maintenance of WFP's response facility in Dubai including pre-identified suppliers
- The sharing of regional knowledge on preparedness and response
- The provision of equipment, services and the ability to respond on a 24-hour basis, without delay, to any crisis within the region.

AERF helped eliminate any delays that might normally be caused by administrative red tape or huge distances. Of course, AERF would be useless without the support of local government and fortunately the Government of Indonesia was extremely supportive by allowing massive amounts of aid supplies to arrive while dealing with the "paperwork" later.

Air, Land and Sea

Transporting food assistance to over a million people is no easy task unless you are an aid organization with ships, trucks, helicopters and planes at your disposal. WFP utilized its existing fleet to transport the food assistance to those areas worst affected by the tsunami and hired or bought additional transportation as needed.

By ground, WFP used trucks hired from local companies. WFP was able to move more than 300,000 tons by land alone. The ground transportation was mostly used for the immediate Banda Aceh area but in order to reach the outlying districts, the food had to be sent by ship.

By sea, WFP used the newly established Shipping Service[3] as a means to ensure that recovery materials (primarily building materials) were being efficiently transported to inaccessible areas and ports in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias (northern Sumatera region known as NAD-Nias) in the aftermath of the tsunami.

The service was used mostly by BRR and local and international NGOs in order to facilitate their operations. By early 2007, the focus of the Shipping Service had evolved into a broader mandate, including not just shipping but also reconstruction of logistics assets such as ports and other infrastructure. The new service was re-named the Logistics Support Unit (LSU) and aimed to support government shipping with logistics expertise and capacity development. The LSU will run through 2009.

An Aid Worker's Point of View

Eugene Ha, a WFP staff member, remarked upon the early days of the Aceh operation when everyone slept in a large, un-air-conditioned tent at the site of the WFP office that, "mosquitoes and sweat were a part of the job but it was nothing compared to the suffering being experienced by the Aceh residents." Eugene was a program officer in Aceh and one of the first staff members on the ground.

"In the beginning, it was pretty chaotic, the coordination was scattered and you could not locate people helped just the day before ... there was no way to systematically track the food assistance." She said the priority was to deliver food to those who might perish without it. Local community groups assisted by identifying areas and people of whom they knew to be in dire need of food.

2006 Shipping Service Outputs	
Amount of cargo shipped	95,943 mt
Volume of cargo shipped	250,194m³
Shipping vessels on a time charter to the Special Operation	8

2005-2006 UNHAS Outputs	
Fixed-wing aircraft	3
Helicopter	2
Flight time	2,432
Passengers	22,755
Medical evacuations	60

In early 2005, WFP established the UN Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS)[4] in order to provide the humanitarian community with safe and reliable air transportation during the humanitarian response. UNHAS operations in Indonesia facilitated emergency cargo and passenger deliveries to affected communities suddenly cut off by the massive destruction of roads, bridges and other infrastructure. UNHAS also became an essential component of the international humanitarian response to the devastated islands of Simeulue and Nias.

The special air operation was initially slated to end in December 2005, but following a request from the humanitarian community, air support continued through most of 2007 to help facilitate the transition from relief to recovery.

It is not possible to determine how many lives were saved but Fauzi Ahmer, a recipient of WFP food and sole tsunami survivor from his Banda Aceh family, put it best when he stated, "WFP gave me basic food so that I could concentrate on locating my family without having to worry about my next meal."

Does Emergency Food Assistance Actually Work?

A UNICEF-led rapid nutrition assessment conducted in February and March 2005 concluded that the emergency relief food aid had a positive impact on at-risk groups and contributed to reducing the adverse impact on acute and severely malnourished children[5].

Left: Shipping Service mechanical loaders help with reconstruction efforts.
Right: UNHAS helicopter landing in Calang. Photo: WFP Documentation

Additionally, the survey revealed that no significant difference was noted in nutritional status between IDP children and non-IDP children (11.6 percent IDP and 11.4 percent non-IDP). This indicates that WFP food assistance helped avoid increased hunger or malnutrition as a result of the tsunami.

2005-2006

Transitions

The nature of WFP's assistance shifted throughout 2005 and into 2006. In mid-2005, WFP expanded assistance beyond IDP barracks to school-age children through school feeding programs, and support to children under five and pregnant/nursing mothers in mother-child health centers through nutrition rehabilitation programs. WFP also provided key support to the government in the form of disaster risk reduction training, particularly in the districts most prone to devastating earthquakes and tsunamis.

WFP incorporated its activities in NAD-Nias within its larger country framework called a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) and established clear and specific objectives for its operations in the region:

- preventing deterioration in the nutritional status of the disaster-affected population
- improving food and livelihood security of food-insecure households and increasing their resilience to shocks
- improving the learning capacity and nutrition status among primary school children
- improving the nutritional and health status of children under 5 years of age and pregnant and nursing women in vulnerable areas.

An Eyewitness View

"Dedi was enjoying a sunny day in the hills surrounding Banda Aceh at his friend's place when someone exclaimed excitedly and pointed over his shoulder. Dedi turned around just in time to see a long, unusual shape on the horizon slowly moving toward the port. As the shape drew nearer, Dedi knew that it was a massive wave and the closer it got, the faster it became. Within seconds, a wave he estimated to be more than 10 meters high crashed with unimaginable force into Banda Aceh and before his eyes, he saw his city being destroyed.

Soon after the first wave tore through Banda Aceh, another one hit, completely flooding the lower section of the city. And then a third came that ensured any buildings that remained standing were flattened. Brown water swirled through the streets, completely inundating the city and leaving only the central mosque standing in a kind of eerie defiance of this force of nature.

Dedi could only helplessly watch from his position on high ground and knew that he had probably just witnessed the loss of his entire family. In fact, eight members died that day with only a brother surviving. But Dedi did not know this for days. All communication had been cut by the waves and Dedi and his friends spent three days surviving on coconuts and river water before he was able to find his way to an aid station.

Dedi was one of the first to receive WFP food assistance at a government distribution center and from there, he slowly unraveled the events of the week only to discover his great loss. Fortunately, Dedi decided to partake in the relief efforts and eventually became a WFP radio room operator in Calang. He said he will never get over his loss but the disaster has given him a new type of spirit and he believes it is his calling now to always help others."

School feeding recipient in Calang and tsunami survivor. Photo: WFP Documentation

2006-2008

Phasing Down

In 2006, WFP began phasing down its operations as the region began to recover from the effects of the tsunami and many people no longer required food assistance. WFP's regional logistics hub in Medan, on the east coast of Sumatera, closed toward the end of 2006, followed shortly by the closure of offices in Calang, Simeulue and lastly, Meulaboh in 2007. Residents in these affected areas no longer solely relied on WFP food assistance and many were able to re-establish their livelihoods, and regain employment.

WFP continued to support those who were still without permanent homes and had no other sources of income. WFP also assisted the most vulnerable groups, including school-age children, pregnant and nursing mothers. Moving away from just focusing on relief assistance, WFP also supported new food-for-work programs that offered rice in exchange for the construction of small infrastructure projects.

Toward the end of 2007, WFP had scaled down operations and approximately 500,000 people in total were receiving assistance.

In April-May 2008, WFP handed over the nutrition rehabilitation and food-for-work activities to local authorities.

Monitoring efforts continued to demonstrate that WFP assistance played a key role in helping people recover from the tsunami and supported the overall rehabilitation process.

People Received Food Assistance* from 2006-2007 In Aceh-Nias

	Students	Pregnant/ nursing women	Children under five years of age	Food for Work	Tsunami displaced	TOTAL
Banda Aceh	122,351	14,581	42,751	58,075	46,369	284,127
Simeulue	14,279	3,595	9,763	3,020	5,008	35,665
Meulaboh	45,087	3,326	10,765	255	17,231	76,664
Lhokseumawe	139,795	21,598	44,545	-	300,144	506,082
Calang	14,815	0	0	0	23,746	38,561
Nias	0	0	0	0	9,127	9,127

**Food assistance consisted of vegetable oil, high energy biscuits, pre packaged noodles and rice for the food-for-work program.*

Initial Results

Emergency Operations

Even in the early days of the emergency response, WFP emphasized building the capacity of the local government so that it could better respond in the event of future disasters. WFP worked with the National Disaster Management Agency (BAKORNAS) of Indonesia and its provincial and district counterparts to develop contingency and emergency preparedness plans for rapid and effective emergency responses.

As an example, WFP worked closely with local authorities in West Sumatera to develop comprehensive emergency preparedness plans for six districts.

This plan has been put into action, especially after the earthquake that struck Bengkulu in September 2007 on the western coast of Sumatera. Residents of Bengkulu said the plan and their preparedness helped enormously with the relief efforts, thus improving the recovery of their city.

Food Security

WFP also invested significant resources into building the capacity of the central and provincial governments in the fields of analyzing and mapping food security and nutrition, hunger monitoring and disaster preparedness and contingency planning. These efforts helped produce the 2005 Food Insecurity Atlas for Indonesia. The Atlas has been used by the Government of Indonesia to assist its strategic efforts to reach the most vulnerable populations. An updated Atlas will be issued in 2009.

Nutrition Status

Various independent surveys have confirmed the positive impact of WFP's feeding programs on nutritional status and implementation[6]. There was a 10 to 20 percent increase in local health center registrations for example. More mothers came to the centers to weigh their babies, receive health advice, nutrition education and WFP commodities.

Furthermore, an efficacy study conducted by the Bogor Agriculture Institute and Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Association (SEAMEO) and the Regional Center for Community Nutrition (University of Indonesia) showed a reduction in anemia levels among WFP beneficiaries under the nutritional rehabilitation program[7]. Another study of children in primary schools involved in the School Feeding program showed modest improvements in cognitive performance among school children.

Follow-up

To further monitor outcome level objectives, follow-up surveys were conducted in NAD-Nias in 2007 to measure anemia levels and knowledge attitude practice (KAP). The

results indicated that the nutrition rehabilitation efforts once again effectively reduced anemia levels in children under five, school children and pregnant and nursing mothers as well as had a positive impact on cognitive performance[8]. Micro-nutrient (anemia) status improved significantly in terms of nutrient outcomes.

Additionally, the attendance rate increased in schools receiving WFP assistance. Teachers reported that the students' concentration and cognitive performance increased.

The number of rural health centers under the nutrition rehabilitation program increased, thus contributing to the government promoted "health revitalization". Additional training received at the health center level also helped to contribute to the increased capacity of local health workers.

Food-for-work outputs varied according to the communities' willingness to extend or expand their projects. The clearing of irrigation channels and building of roads were two projects in particular that aided certain communities in mitigating the effects of flooding. The projects benefited from local contributions of land, labor and basic tools.

Clearly, WFP food assistance and capacity building had a real impact on those communities that received assistance. Gone were the days of blanket food distributions and poorly planned handouts. WFP showed that food assistance, delivered systematically, can provide a profound and long-term benefit to those most in need.

UNHAS

UNHAS flights flew 22,755 passengers representing 150 different organizations. UNHAS also lifted 174 mt of cargo and carried out medical evacuations for 60 people via 31 special flights.

In 2006, UNHAS managed a fleet comprised of air assets as follows: from January to February, one DHC-7 fixed-wing aircraft, two DHC-6 fixed-wing aircraft and two MI8-T helicopters; from March to mid-July one DHC-7 fixed-wing aircraft and two MI8-T helicopters; from mid-July to December one Beechcraft 1900D-BC1900D fixed-wing aircraft and one MI8-T helicopter[9].

Shipping Service and Logistics Support Unit

The Shipping Service was instrumental to the recovery and reconstruction effort and ensured the availability of food and reconstruction materials.

The WFP Shipping Service was more than a shipping operation as it provided logistics coordination, port captains, load consolidation, advice on packaging, equipment (mobile cranes, container handling equipment, fork lift trucks and beach matting) to ensure that rebuilding materials were able to be delivered to the communities that needed them. Since its inception in December 2005, 80 organizations (both local and international) received reconstruction materials and food totaling 95,943 tons delivered to more than 30 locations in the Aceh region and the nearby islands[10].

The WFP Shipping Service enabled local and international organizations to implement reconstruction and rehabilitation projects by easing logistical challenges and bottlenecks. The availability of building materials such as lumber, glass, cement and other relevant housing materials aided in meeting the communities' longer-term shelter needs. Rapid reconstruction was able to begin shortly after the tsunami as a steady supply of materials was being shipped directly to the port in Banda Aceh.

In 2007, upon the request of BRR, this service changed its focus, emphasizing instead on building the capacity of port operations in the region. Therefore, starting on July 19, 2007, the Shipping Service became the Logistics Support Unit[11].

Lessons Learned

Strong and existing links with government officials were instrumental to the success of WFP's relief operation. WFP did not maintain a presence in Aceh and Nias before the tsunami struck, but WFP had significant operations throughout the rest of the country and had established a strong track record of demonstrable success. This record of achievement, combined with strong relationships with the most senior military and political leaders, greatly facilitated WFP's response, especially in the early days.

Financing Mechanisms

Also, based on experience from past disasters, WFP learned that quick access to emergency funds is essential in order to supply emergency food assistance. By having such a financing system already in place, WFP wasted no time in delivering food relief to the NAD-Nias region.

Private Sector

Support from WFP's key private sector partner, TNT, was invaluable in the initial start-up phase of the operation. TNT helped secure trucking capacity and provided key staffing in the early stages. Its logistics experience was a key element to WFP's quick response and a strong, continuing partnership was forged.

Hand-over Process

All levels of government (local, district, provincial and central) should be involved as early as possible in the planning stages.

Shipping Service

The lack of extensive pre-planning by organizations responsible for the re-rebuilding of the infrastructure and the lack of a supply chain management system, in many instances, placed an enormous burden on the Shipping Service.

Arabico Gayo

IT is common to walk into a coffee shop anywhere in the world and see the words "Sumatera Blend" written above furiously steaming espresso machines. Just the name Sumatera conjures up images of lush tropical foliage and deep brown, roasted coffee grains. The World Food Programme, through its food-for-work (FFW) program, was happy to support communities in Northern Sumatera in their efforts to produce and package coffee from their region.

These communities in the district of Lhokseumawe had been torn apart by civil unrest and the affects of the 2004 tsunami. Many were in desperate need of restoring lost livelihoods. Not only did communities suffer from a loss of inhabitants who fled the fighting, but they were also affected economically due to a lack of labor. Fortunately, a peace agreement was signed in August 2005 and the communities have since witnessed reconciliation efforts among former conflicting groups. Many have since returned to their villages eager to continue or re-start their livelihoods.

WFP decided to implement a coffee plantation clearance project in coordination with the local communities, NGOs and Department of Agriculture (DoA) to assist those communities worst affected during the conflict. The main objective was to allow the communities to cultivate and harvest a coffee crop from their plantations which, in turn, would help improve their level of welfare by allowing them to sell the crop at a profit. Seeds were given by the DoA to farmers at selected sites in three villages and more than 9,900ha of previously abandoned plantations were rehabilitated to produce a crop through FFW. Since the land had already been cleared, no additional clearance of forest growth was necessary.

From August 2007, the first packages of coffee started being distributed under the brand name Arabica Gayo. Local agents purchase the coffee and sell for export to a number of international companies. Not only did the product demonstrate high quality, through the FFW program, farmers were able to concentrate more on production for profit and less on subsistence agriculture. Mr. Banta Cut, Head of Toweran Toa village, mentioned the assistance from WFP was an unpredictable blessing that helped them re-cultivate abandoned and damaged land. The Head of Bakongen village mentioned how the rice helped the villagers to focus more on re-building their burned village without having to worry too much about immediate food needs.

The community has benefited as it now has a strong economic program that is profitable. FFW gave residents of these communities just enough of a helping hand to bridge the income gap that prevents so many people from escaping the endless cycle of poverty. ■

Moving Forward

WFP officially handed over its Nutritional Rehabilitation Programme and assets in the Aceh region to the Government of Indonesia on April 29 and 30, 2008, including the large WFP warehouse in Banda Aceh and the various tented warehouses throughout the region. For four months, more than 7,000 counterparts from the Ministries of Health and Education were trained at the district and sub-district level to enable them to continue implementing WFP-originated programs, such as school feeding and support to mothers and children in village health clinics using government resources.

The American Red Cross was an integral part of the training and continues to provide invaluable support for the region following WFP's departure.

In Closing

WFP will continue to provide nutritional assistance to the poorest people in Indonesia. WFP will also continue to support building the capacity of the government in disaster preparedness, analysis of food security and nutrition security.

Everyone hopes that the people of Indonesia will not suffer another catastrophe comparable to the tsunami that struck NAD-Nias. But if disaster strikes again, WFP stands ready to help if needed.

Institutional and Human Resource Development

SUSTAINABILITY of the recovery can only be achieved through well-developed institutions and local human resources. As local government services will take control and continue the work carried out by implementing agencies, many programs designed to enhance the capacity of local human resources have been implemented. These programs, some of which appear in the 9 case studies included in this book for this sector, have introduced a range of different ways and methods to ensure local government engagement in the recovery. These 9 case studies, 4 of which appear in the printed pages while 5 are on CD, project across different sectors and describe ways in which capacity building has been achieved.

The Aceh Geospatial Data Center (AGDC) in operation at the Regional Development Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah, BAPPEDA), Banda Aceh, October 27, 2008. The AGDC, which was established by BRR, is one of the first facilities for prompting good governance to be handed over to the provincial government. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD) Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

Developing Blang Krueng Village through Participatory Planning and Budgeting

FOLLOWING an influx of humanitarian aid in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, Blang Krueng village began a process of governance and development renewal. The newly elected local leadership, supported by development aid and technical support, wrought considerable change in the village. Since early 2006, Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA) has been working closely with Blang Krueng on building local governance capacity, in particular through support for direct elections of the village head *(Keuchik),* and village planning and budgeting. The village's capacity for self-governance subsequently improved a result of the village authorities' increased capabilities and the enthusiastic participation of residents.

Background

Blang Krueng (Baitussalam Sub-District, Aceh Besar) lies just along the coast, 3.4 meters above sea level. The village had a long history of armed conflict. Village facilities were minimal, and crime and youth delinquency were both concerns. Unemployment and poverty were, and remain, major problems.

It was after the devastating impact of the 2004 tsunami that Blang Krueng began to move forward, supported by government and aid organization rehabilitation and

reconstruction programs. As it happened, parallel changes in national Indonesian laws had increased decision-making authority concerning development and public service delivery at the district and village local levels.[12]

The renewal program began with the passing of the baton to an emerging young leader, Khairul Huda, who proposed bringing more development opportunities to the village. Huda's renewal plans were warmly received and despite being less than 30 years old, in December 2006 he overwhelmingly won direct elections *(Pilchiksung)* for the village head position.

From the beginning, the greatest task facing Huda's leadership was to determine what steps were needed to develop the village. This task required the input and support of many parties. In months that followed, community demands and dynamics greatly constrained Huda's decision-making on governance, religion, education and tradition. After several months as village head, the recovery process showed minimal progress and development concepts were still relatively undefined.

In March 2007, the LOGICA team offered to assist with the Village Development Program. LOGICA was a component of the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD), which had been involved with Blang Krueng village since July 2005. It was therefore appropriate for LOGICA to make such an offer. The village head gratefully accepted, calling it a piece of unexpected luck.

Significance of Events

Assisted by village apparatus and LOGICA, the village head created a vision and agenda for realizing efficient governance mechanisms and a supportive environment at the village level, paying close attention to the need for community participation. His vision was founded on participatory planning and budgeting, and involved the development of three key documents: i) a village spatial plan; ii) a five year development plan for the years 2008-2012; iii) the 2008 annual development plan and the 2008 broader village government budget.

Supported by LOGICA, an initial community forum was held at the Blang Krueng village hall on July 18, 2007. This information session was aimed at promoting village planning and budgeting among the village apparatus, Village Council, community leaders, religious leaders, youth leaders and women's activists. The meeting ended with the formation of a team to organize the Five-Year Development Plan. This team, which comprised village members with development planning expertise, was then formally recognized in a decree issued by the village head.

LOGICA assigned staff to provide this team with routine assistance on the development of planning documents, until the completion of the master plans. Team members also created documentation so that stakeholders could be held accountable.

Following the completion of the village spatial plan, a stakeholder forum (known as a *Musrenbang*) was held in which community stakeholders shared their development aspirations with sub-district government representatives on issues such as infrastructure, economic development, education and health. A small team of stakeholders then acted to further develop the results of these early *Musrenbang* meetings into a structured development agenda for the village, including the collection of relevant data to support this agenda.

This team held another meeting of village stakeholders at the end of August to present the draft 2008-2013 Five Year Village Development Plan for community consultation and input. Residents added more ideas and revisions at this meeting. On April 15, 2008, the village head and Village Council formally endorsed and adopted the document at the community prayer hall, as witnessed by residents.

Following the formulation of the Five Year Village Development Plan, the team developed a yearly village works schedule in line with the priorities of the Five Year Plan, a schedule known as the Village Annual Development Plan. The 2008 Annual Budget was in turn developed based on the 2008 Annual Plan. Another meeting was held with community stakeholders including the village head, the Village Council and other civil societal organizations, prior to the budget's ratification by village law.

The implementation of these development plans were continuously monitored and evaluated by community members at regularly held community stakeholder meetings. Special committees were created to oversee the development, management and execution of specific community projects such as the LOGICA-funded and mentored Community Infrastructure Grants Program, with its specific focus on community infrastructure. All these initiatives helped village development stay on track, improve village governance, build facilities and alleviate poverty.

It was the first time that sequential stages of village development planning had been implemented in Blang Krueng village, a development echoed across other villages throughout the province of Aceh. The development process afforded Acehnese villages the ability to participate in autonomous development planning processes, in line with other villages across the nation, which began implementing these systems subsequent to the national laws on government decentralization introduced in 2001.

Challenges

Keeping Commitment Levels High

The commitment and support of community-based organizations and community figures needed to be constantly reinforced. Policy-making processes that are insufficiently participative or that lack transparency can generate a sense of disappointment that

sabotages the development process, undermining the success experienced by Blang Krueng village.

Village Government Staff and Village Council Capacities

Village officials and Village Council needed to be able to handle a critical public, and to implement village development plans (which had been compiled in a participative manner and ratified in accordance with local regulations) in a correct and accountable manner.

Lessons Learned

1. Public trust is essential. Local, democratically elected leaders such as Khairul Huda shoulder a community mandate. Huda was able to facilitate cooperation from all parties and channel the aspirations of his community by first establishing trust.
2. The village council is essential to passing laws/development plans. It is essential that non-government organizations, including donors, work with village councils as well as village heads and other stakeholders in facilitating village-level development planning initiatives.
3. Village planning is the forum through which the various interests are reconciled. The various government planning processes and documents must be able to accommodate and reconcile varying interests. Participative planning, based on community agreement and consensus, is essential to avoid the railroading of community concerns by factional interests or by individuals. ■

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Supporting Transformation of the Local Government

THE election of the Governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusuf, came at a time when BRR was beginning to prepare for its winding down and the transition of responsibilities to district, provincial and central government authorities. The incoming Governor was keen to establish a team that would be up to the task of leading the province forward. It was understood that it could not be "business as usual" for the provincial administration because that would mean a return to the pre-tsunami levels of spending and performance. Instead, the Government needed to find a way to raise its game and respond to the challenge of handling increased budgets and coordinating the ongoing recovery.

Aceh Governance Transformation Programme (AGTP)

An initial response to this new challenge was a functional analysis of government departments within the province and the subsequent restructuring of these departments that took place in mid 2007. The next task was to ensure that these newly restructured institutions provided the necessary leadership required to assume transition challenges.

In an innovative move, the Governor decided to open up the positions of head of provincial departments and other agencies (Echelon 2) to a full assessment and recruitment process. This had never been done before in Indonesia as a whole, let alone the NAD province; normally these posts were filled one by one without transparent criteria at the discretion of senior public service management in consultation with the Governor. In a further innovation, the posts were advertised nationally and open to those currently holding posts one grade below (Echelon 3). This open recruitment provided opportunities for Acehnese civil servants elsewhere to return home, and for other committed staff to apply. Incumbents were invited to apply for their own jobs.

Leading international experts were hired to lead this process including Dr Willy McCourt, Head of the Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM), University of Manchester, United Kingdom, and Ms. Lee Meng Foon, the former Deputy Director of INTAN —the Malaysian National Institute of Public Administration. The two experts were teamed up with Indonesian Good Governance and Anti-Corruption experts including Pak Alit from local NGO YIPD; Ibu Nurdasila D from the Management Institute of the Economic Faculty of the Syiah Kuala University (Unsyiah) in Banda Aceh; and Professor Jasman Ma'ruf also from Unsyiah.

An assessment center was the chosen methodology for the selection process. This event was held in January 2008 and involved candidates gathering together for a week of individual interviews, written tests, group interviews and other tests. An internationally accepted IQ test used in public service selection was applied during this process. Care was taken to ensure gender sensitivity; the team of assessors was gender balanced and women were included on interview panels (unfortunately there were few women applicants).

The tests were organized according to the phrase: "from professionals to public managers". This is based on an understanding that the head of education does not need to be a teacher and the head of health does not need to be a doctor. Instead, the focus was on public service principles, integrity and management capacity. The results from each of the interviews and tests were weighted and aggregated according to a formula designed to reflect the optimum balance of attributes required for a public service manager.

Applicants were ranked in terms of their performance, which then enabled the Governor to get a full picture of the strengths and weaknesses of available staff, and to begin the next step in the process, i.e. allocation of heads to each department. This process followed the general principle that the 'best' applicants should be allocated to the 'most important' departments.

However, applicants had also expressed their own preference and despite the "from professionals to public managers" principle there were some whose CVs and experience clearly favored a particular post. The result was a shortlist of two to three candidates for

most positions. The candidates were then required to prepare a detailed PowerPoint presentation to the Governor, with supporting documentation, that outlined their plans for the department. During a second week of intensive activity, the Governor sat through a long series of presentations and the successful candidates were appointed.

Challenges

The next step is to strengthen the capacity of the newly created Human Resources and Training Agency so that it can support the newly appointed heads of agencies, provide them with the necessary training and help them continue with the restructuring and strengthening of their respective departments to enable them to handle the additional resources and new responsibilities they will inherit following BRR's closure.

This work is underway and involves a job analysis of the main positions in the Aceh government, together with an outline of the skills and knowledge required to perform these positions in the context of the increased responsibilities following the transition. The job analysis will list the required skills for each position (including language, computer literacy and management skills in addition to the standard qualifications). The NAD government will then launch another fit-and-proper test for the key posts within the newly restructured agencies, and BKPP will ensure that post holders are provided with various skills as required.

Sustaining the transition will require more than simply training the new heads of agency. It will need a new approach toward human resource management that enhances staff performance and that learns from the best practices introduced by BRR. The newly appointed head of BKPP hopes to support this new approach by evaluating and accrediting training provided by international agencies and others in post-tsunami recovery. Accreditation means that the training course is recognized as contributing to a skill identified in the job analysis. Civil servants will be encouraged to complete training courses covering the skills identified in their job analysis and to train for the skills required for promotion to other positions.

CVs will be held on a database by BKPP and the training obtained/attended by any government officials will be taken into account in the filling of posts. This approach will enable the province to take advantage of the wide range of materials available in the recovery period and to mainstream issues like gender awareness as part of the required skills for positions. It is hoped that the gender mainstreaming efforts will gradually alter the gender balance of the provincial civil service.

Implementing Best Practices

There are three sets of best practice that the project is implementing. The first comes from BRR, which is a central government agency with a time-sensitive and specific mandate to "build back better"—to reconstruct Aceh to be better than before. One manifestation of this has been some of the institutional practices of BRR itself. These have been relatively innovative, clean and efficient in a country marred by public sector scandals. The project hopes to instill some of these practices into mainstream governance in Aceh.

The second set comes from the plethora of projects and interventions that have descended on the province since the tsunami. Many of these have used individual methods and practices that are not replicable. However, there are some principles that can be learned and followed by mainstream local government. One of these is an awareness of gender issues. The governor has made this a priority and the AGTP project is helping make this a reality.

Finally, the project will place Aceh in the forefront of public sector reform in Indonesia, together with other innovative provinces such as Gorontalo, Bali and North Sumatera. The Aceh Governance Transformation Programme is ensuring that this experience is feeding into the Ministry of Home Affairs team working on the revision of Law No. 32/2004 on the role of provinces and districts.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Strengthening Technical and Operational Capacity of the Coordinating Agency

THE Technical Assistance to BRR (TA-BRR) project supports BRR in its mandate to coordinate and implement the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Aceh and Nias after the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, as well as the March 2005 earthquake that devastated the island of Nias, and coordinating the ongoing recovery. Aceh Government Transformation Programme (AGTP) is designed to support the Governor in meeting these challenges.

Initially, BRR needed significant technical support to respond to the overwhelming demands in coordinating the vast amount of donor projects, as well as the implementation of its emergency reconstruction program. In mid-2005, TA-BRR stepped in to fill this gap with a number of technical advisers who work alongside BRR employees to complete specific tasks and activities crucial to BRR. Additionally, BRR needed immediate support for operations in human resources, quality assurance and relocation services, as well as for its knowledge management department.

The project was developed in two phases. Phase I was completed at the end of April 2008, with the second phase running until BRR's closure. During Phase I, BRR's requests focused on enhancing its technical capacity to develop policies and programs, implement projects and monitor program implementation; enhancing BRR's operational capacity with a particular focus on information technology and human resources management;

and enhancing the transparency and participation of stakeholders in the reconstruction processes through the establishment of an anti-corruption unit, the provision of legal services as well as supporting relocation services.

During the second phase of its implementation, TA-BRR adjusted to accommodate the need for BRR to transfer its ownership of activities to local government in Aceh and Nias. This request required advisers with high levels of expertise to support key departments such as asset transfer and knowledge management. In particular, BRR requested support in completing its projects before April 2009, and to transfer assets to local government and specific communities; and support for the development of BRR's asset transfer strategy, information systems for assets and documentation, knowledge management, and human resource support for the repatriation of BRR staff.

The project assisted BRR in realizing its needs through work planning and developing appropriate Terms of Reference for technical assistance. Furthermore, it assisted BRR in carrying out procurement processes for a variety of goods and services. The use of results-based management had positive effects on BRR's efficiency and effectiveness. Since its inception, 90 TA-BRR advisers (national and international) have joined BBR.

Beneficiary of the Joint-Land Titling program.
Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Impact and Results

The project was successful in enhancing BRR's operational and technical capacity, strengthening its efficiency, participation and transparency and ultimately its ability to deliver the relief and recovery required by the people of Aceh and Nias. Moreover, the project has ensured the smooth transition from BRR to local government and community ownership. Quality technical assistance - to both BRR and local beneficiaries - to support the handover of assets and activities resulted in increased capacities of local government and communities to manage assets, and to coordinate and monitor the recovery process after BRR.

One key element to the success of this initiative was the flexibility of the project to adapt to the culture of urgency that characterizes BRR. Following UNDP procedures, but finding efficient ways to plan and prioritize, the project was successful in responding to the continually evolving BRR size and structure, delivering services quickly while following due process.

Spatial Information and Mapping Center (SIM-C). Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

According to BRR, every aspect of operations and management of the wider program have been influenced or supported by the advisers. Indeed, the support provided to BRR by the project has been critical to the success of the overall Aceh-Nias rehabilitation and reconstruction program. The expertise provided by the advisers significantly enhanced BRR capacity in a range of vital areas such as policy development, program governance, anti-corruption programming, program and project planning, quality assurance, procurement monitoring, legal affairs including contract management, human-resource management, intra-governmental relations and international stakeholder relations.

According to a survey that aimed to measure the project's effectiveness, the support provided by advisers has been evaluated as successful and with a significant impact. On a scale of 0-10, beneficiaries evaluated their satisfaction with the advisers as 8.5, and the perceived efficiency of their work with 7. Moreover, it was reported that the TAs have introduced best practices in over 20 technical areas.

Notable Impacts

Fighting Corruption

The technical assistance provided by UNDP was instrumental in creating the highly successful BRR Anti-Corruption Unit. According to BRR officials, the level of integrity achieved is due to the support of UNDP technical assistance. As pointed out in independent reviews of the project, technical advisers have significantly contributed in strengthening organizational integrity in BRR.

Relocation Center

The technical assistance provided to the BRR Relocation Center made possible access to land for thousands of beneficiary households with little or no prior land rights. A joint-titling program was initiated by the Center, a major and groundbreaking initiative through which equal access to land for both women and men was provided.

Spatial Information Mapping Center

UNDP technical assistance supported the development of the Spatial Information Management —Center (SIM-C). This Center immediately became the real backbone of Aceh and Nias geographical planning capacity. The Center has already been transferred to the provincial government of Aceh, and is now being used as the basis for strategic planning and decision making by the Governor and his team.

Assets Transfer

A successful assets transfer and management strategy was supported by the project. Additionally, an assets information system was developed by a team of highly qualified advisers with the intention to give to local government and the community ownership on BRR assets.

Activity in the in-patient facility of Gunungsitoli Hospital, Nias. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Knowledge Management

A knowledge manage ment program has been created to consolidate and structure BRR's internal knowledge in an easily accessible format. This will be vital for future generations who want to know what BRR did and how they did it.

Lessons Learned

Recruitment

The involvement of UNDP (TA-BRR) in the recruitment procedures allowed for procurement of international expertise than BRR otherwise would have been able.. This ensured that BRR received the quality and skills in the advisers they wanted, making use of the vast network UNDP could provide.

Advisor-Manager Relations

Working as a technical adviser requires good relations between advisers and national counterparts. In order to be successful and efficient, the advisors also have to be flexible and address tasks not foreseen in their original terms of reference.

Challenges

Capacity Development

A challenge for UNDP will be to translate and make best use of the TA-BRR project experience in support of recovery efforts in emergency situations. This would contribute improved operational policies and practices for UNDP's global programs in this sector.

Monitoring and Evaluation

Advisers working under this program have been very effective and contributed to the success of BRR. However, it has been rather challenging to plan and capture their results. UNDP has therefore adapted its monitoring and evaluation system to strengthen its results-based reporting. Furthermore, the system has been consistently adapted to reflect the feedback and recommendations from a variety of reviews and changes in the project. Another challenge in this context has been improving communication with beneficiaries and partners on the successes of technical assistance.

Looking Ahead

Other UNDP projects are building up strategies based on the good practice of TA-BRR. This is the case in particular for the UNDP Aceh Governance Transformation Programme (AGTP), which builds on the foundations of TA-BRR. AGTP has ensured a smooth transition of BRR activities to local government and the community, as well as establishing working relationships between BRR and the provincial and local governments. AGTP's challenge now is to support and guide local government to fulfill its responsibilities related to the rehabilitation program handed over by BRR. ■

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Bringing Social Services to Rural Areas

THE Social Welfare Service Center project (Pusat Pelayanan Kesejahteraan Sosial/ PUSPELKESSOS) is a new integrated welfare system at the sub-district level capturing the whole social welfare system in which child protection is a component. This structure mobilizes the local human resources at village/ sub-district level to provide solutions for social welfare issues or to refer them to the external agencies or higher level government institutions. The local government will coordinate the works. A social worker (TKSK) is included in the team of PUSPELKESSOS to ensure that children's rights are protected.

Introduction

Post 2004-Tsunami disaster and conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction activities have greatly impacted the social welfare sector. The complexity of the problem caused by the massive disaster and conflict has prompted parties involved in the social welfare area to develop and deliver better services in this sector. Efforts of all of the social workers and volunteers in providing better services to the community in the emergency, recovery and reconstruction phases still continue to this day.

The resources and investments brought in by various parties following the tsunami disaster led the government of Indonesia to devise ways to capitalize on these inputs. However, due to the political realities in Aceh at that time coupled with complex recovery

programs, it took the government a few years to approve a strategy and allocate budget for the Child Centers.

Shortly after the tsunami struck Aceh in December 2004, United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) engaged a formalpartnership with four Indonesian agencies, i.e., the Department of Social Welfare/the Provincial Office for Social Welfare (Departemen Sosial/ Dinas Sosial, or Dinsos), the Department for Women's Empowerment (KPP), Yayasan Pusaka, and Muhammadiyah and decided to respond immediately by establishing Child Centers (CCs). CCs are children-friendly spaces set up for the children of both Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps and host communities to continue their normal life. The main goal of these spaces is to fulfill the needs of children for their self-development, and in an emergency such as the tsunami, the needs are really important and specific. Child Centers provided all the services needed by children that were otherwise not available, such as the supplementary food, the cash assistance, or the medical treatment. Soon, the centers developed their activities, taking into account specificities of the Acehnese culture. By March 2005, there were 21 CCs set up in the critical areas affected by earthquake, tsunami and conflict, providing psychosocial activities and helping the children to learn to play and enjoy life again. The CCs also assisted in finding solutions to problems that are physical, mental, spiritual, in strengthening the government structure and social workers, providing Child Protection and Child Rights training, direct material support (scholarship, etc), family tracing and reunification, psychological trauma recovery, and other services. All the centers have been phased out and are now under Dinsos management and supervision.

Based on lessons learned and achievements of the CCs program, it was decided that this program should be extended to the next three years. This decision was based on the suggestion from provincial level of Dinsos as the main stakeholder of the Social Welfare Service in Aceh Province. The government indicated that the crucial missing link in the social welfare system in Aceh was that social services were mostly at the district level without addressing the sub-district level. For an average villager, district level services are too distant. The government proposed a strategy to convert existing Child Centers or similar structures into Social Welfare Service Centers, which was supported by international and national child protection agencies. Therefore, emergency-based Child Centers triggered an entry point to strengthen not only child protection but also social welfare services and bring them closer to the community. UNICEF welcomes this strategy, which is the first of its kind in Indonesia. The strategy was to establish one Social Welfare Service Center per sub-district implemented by non-state actors officially recognized by the Government.[13] The main factor leading to this development was the vision of the decision-makers in the National Department and the Provincial Office for Social Welfare, influenced by the child protection interagency group. The focus of the social welfare service program is expanded to include services such as handling various social welfare-related problems (PMKS/ Holders of Social Welfare Problems) rather than the original objective to raise awareness toward the fulfillment of children's rights.

PUSPELKESSOS functions:

1. As a center of integrated, accurate and complete database on welfare information system.
2. As a first stage of family welfare counseling service provider as well as provider of other social welfare services.
3. As a reference service to fulfill the needs and to solve the next level of social welfare problems.

The Main Tasks of PUSPELKESSOS:

1. Social empowerment
   To provide and enhance the capacity of Social Welfare Problems Holders/PMKS, and those who need PUSPELKESSOS service as an individual, family, group or community regarding knowledge, skills, mental and spiritual improvement. PUSPELKESSOS targets groups, families, the poor, marginalized communities, vulnerable women, youth, grassroots social organizations, volunteers (PSM/TKSK), veterans and tsunami victims. The scope of the activity includes training/capacity building, providing stimulation assistance (in the form of technical, capital, equipment, etc.), using the PUSPELKESSOS network in sub-districts, districts and the province.
2. Support and social security
   To provide assistance and direct social support in the form of material and non-material, moral and spiritual to social welfare problem holders/PMKS who suffer, are neglected, vulnerable or are in a threatened condition as a result of natural and manmade disasters and conflict. This task targets individuals, groups, families and those who are directly or indirectly affected by natural disasters or social disorders. The scope of activity includes data collection and management and distribution of assistance and support using the PUSPELKESSOS network in sub-districts, districts and the province.
3. Social rehabilitation
   To conduct activities that restore or recover the function or the role of the social welfare problems holders in the society, and those who require the PUSPELKESSOS services to achieve their normal social condition. This task targets individuals, groups, families and those who are directly or indirectly affected by natural disasters or social disorders, which include neglected persons such as the homeless, beggars, sex workers, victims of drugs and substance abuse, people with HIV/ AIDS, former inmates, etc. The scope of activity includes protection, assistance, therapy and distribution of assistance and support using the PUSPELKESSOS network in sub-districts, districts and the province.
4. Child Protection
   To conduct activities that ensure the fulfillment of Child Rights including the right to live, develop, participate and be protected in various social settings (individual, family, group, community) with respect to physical, intellectual, mental and spiritual aspects of the children. This task targets children under 18 years old, especially orphans, neglected children, school dropouts and institutionalized children. The scope of

activity covers services such as child-care, guidance, socialization, training, advocacy and fulfilling children's needs through the utilization of referral system mechanism and network in sub-districts, districts and the province.

5. Data and Social Welfare information system
   To organize and utilize the data and social welfare information system in a complete, integrated, accurate and fast mode with fixed parameters that are well-integrated with other sector parameters in the Aceh Government administration. The main task concerns the citizens of Aceh who have an identity card that includes heads of household and adults or children whose identity cards are recorded the in social welfare information system. The scope of activities includes the identification, collection, entry, distribution and utilization of data, and data updates.

Development and Implementation

In line with the Aceh Government annual Budget, Dinas Sosial, UNICEF and other partners started 10 PUSPELKESSOS Pilot Projects throughout 2008. The locations were selected based on the following criteria: positive response from the local community, the availability of a permanent building, human resources, partner institution/co-organizer and social welfare resource potentials, partnership with Dinas Sosial or government institutions that run Child Protection programs and support from the local government.

The 10 locations of the Pilot Project are: Syiah Kuala Sub-District, City of Banda Aceh/ Children's Center (CC) Rukoh Building; Jaya Baru Sub-District, City of Banda Aceh/CC Punge; Mesjid Raya Sub-District, Aceh Besar District/CC Neuheun/Cote; Lhoong Sub-District, Aceh Besar District/CC YPHL; Baitussalam Sub-District, Aceh Besar District/CC Labuy; Johan Pahlawan Sub-District, Aceh Barat District/Gedung CC Suak Ribee; Kuala Sub-District, Nagan Raya District/Gedung CC Kuala; Kota Atas Sub-District, City of Sabang/ LBK Building; Pidie Sub-District, Pidie District/Gedung LBK- CC Keuniree; and Jaya Baru Sub-District, City of Banda Aceh/CC Punge.

Lessons Learned

Given the limited capacity of the government in fulfilling children's rights, the CC establishment strategy allows the government to gain firsthand experience and UNICEF to offer guidance on applying a human rights-based approach to child protection. This approach helps build the capacity, trust and personal relations with the government.

As Social Welfare Service Centers (PUSPELKESSOS) came into reality, UNICEF continued to encourage a strong community development component within Child Centers and invested heavily in raising awareness and concern on children's issues while building the capacity of task and claim-holders. In Aceh, sensitization and involvement of communities started with the leaders and decision-makers in the communities. Existing community groups and parents were also mobilized and became involved in the Child Centers. Their

involvement was gradually formalized into community-based Child Protection Bodies.[14] Suitable approaches to the communities depend on local culture, levels of awareness and attitudes. In Aceh, this was challenging but already within half a year after the tsunami, the communities expressed willingness to donate their land and other resources for the centers to ensure their sustainable activities in the area. In order to not lose the focus on children, UNICEF ensures that community-based child protection bodies are sustained and attached to the PUSPELKESSOS. ■

Organizational Structure of PUSPELKESSOS



PUSPELKESSOS Service Mechanism




B C D E F G
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) Badan PBB 60,238,005 554,190
GTZ Bilateral 58,169,511 544,360
IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) Palang Merah 52,436,727 482,418
CARE International NGO 50,856,819 467,883
kurs 1 USD = Rp 9269
Sumber: Recovery Aceh Nias Database, 26 Juni 2006
62%
persen top 16 total committed

Funding, Operations and Monitoring

THE management of the recovery has emerged not simply as an administrative need, but also as a critical success factor. Considering the scale of the devastation, the number of participating agencies and the funding available, it has been essential to introduce a range of mechanisms to manage the recovery program. Some of these mechanisms have been included here among the 8 case studies for this sector. In these case studies, 5 of which are included in the printed pages while 3 are on CD, a description of some of the procedures implemented by participating agencies is provided. The aim is to illustrate procedures peculiar to the situation in Aceh and Nias and to explore the viability of such mechanisms and their appropriateness for replication.

The Center for Data and Information (Pusdatin) collects, manages, and dispenses data concerning the activities of NGOs and donors participating in the recovery process, Banda Aceh, July 25, 2007. Photo: BRR/Arif Ariadi

Multi Donor Fund (MDF)

Pooling Funds for Greater Impact

UNDER pooled financing, donors and governments combine their financial resources to support an initiative, program, or sector. Donors use common disbursement, procurement, reporting, and auditing procedures and the funds are channeled to projects through one source. The resultant advantages of pooled financing include a more comprehensive approach to providing services, greater coordination of various projects implemented and the ability to focus on higher-level outcomes across a greater financial investment than if the projects were administered and funded by separate sources.

Multi-donor Trust Funds are a way of pooling financial resources, especially in post-conflict or post-natural disaster situations when there is a need to provide an effectively and efficiently coordinated international aid response. In line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness[15] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations[16], Multi-donor Trust Funds are considered to be good practice as post-crisis funding mechanisms. The Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF) is an example of such a pooled financing mechanism.

Vision and Approach

The MDF is a pool of about US$692 million in grant resources provided by 15 donor countries, including the World Bank, to support the implementation of the government's rehabilitation and reconstruction program after the tsunami in December 2004 and the subsequent earthquakes in March 2005. At the request of the Government of Indonesia (GOI), the World Bank serves as the trustee to administer the MDF, which is in turn governed by a Steering Committee comprising of donors, GOI, and civil society representatives, with participation by the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations as observers.

The MDF has been established to support the rehabilitation and reconstruction needs of Aceh and Nias in the wake of the earthquakes and tsunami. Support can be in either of the following two types:

The MDF portfolio is strongly aligned with the GOI's strategies and priorities since the Government, through the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR),[17] sets strategic priorities and leads the project selection process by serving not only as the entry point for all project proposals, but also prepares the pipeline and allocations to all projects for MDF funding.

Channeling funds through the Government's own budget is the preferred implementation mechanism to ensure sustainability. Of date, 74% of the MDF portfolio is implemented in this manner. These projects are implemented by national agencies through the on-budget/on-treasury modality. There are also projects in the MDF portfolio that are implemented off-budget as well as on-budget/off-treasury modality for implementation expediency. The use of the country's own institutions and systems in most of the MDF programs/projects implementation is in alignment with the Paris Declaration to increase aid effectiveness and to further strengthen Indonesia's institutions. In fact, MDF strives towards adopting international good practices in its entire operations.

Key MDF Features

The overall goal of the MDF is to efficiently and effectively contribute to the reconstruction of a better Aceh and Nias following the earthquakes and tsunami. A better Aceh and Nias therefore means not only improving infrastructure, in accordance with GOI's Master Plan, but also adhering to social concerns such as reducing poverty, improving livelihoods, and increasing equity.

This overall goal is to be accomplished by:

- Pooling donor resources to support a mutually-agreed portfolio of projects and programs;
- Working through and within the Government's Master Plan for recovery;
- Promoting bottom-up and demand-driven development of initiatives that are eligible for financing;
- Partnering with Government and non-government agencies;
- Serving as a forum for donor coordination;
- Supporting a policy dialogue between the international community, civil society and the Government on progress in the recovery process;
- Having funds flow through the Government budget wherever effective, and outside of the budget if the Steering Committee deems this more effective;
- Pursuing gender-sensitive activities;
- Seeking opportunities to support the peace process (conflict sensitivity); and
- Avoiding worsening regional disparities.

The expected outcomes are accordingly:

- Communities/community infrastructure regenerated;
- Larger infrastructure rebuilt;
- Local governance improved;
- Rebuilt environment sustained;
- Recovery process enhanced; and
- Livelihoods restarted.

Governance and Operations

Alignment with the Government of Indonesia

The MDF provides a good risk management vehicle through its inclusive, responsibility-sharing, multi-tiered governance structure comprising of multi-levels of government, donors, representatives of civil society, NGOs, and international NGOs to ensure national ownership. This multi-tiered structure consists of (i) the Steering Committee (SC) which is a deliberative body that sets policy and MDF program agenda; (ii) the Technical Review Group (TRG) which is a funding and project review body; and (iii) a Secretariat engaged by the World Bank that services the other two bodies as well as the World Bank on trusteeship matters.

With BRR as co-chair of the Steering Committee of the MDF, it is integrally involved in decision making on funds allocation. BRR also prepares the pipeline for funding and participates in the Technical Review Group meetings for their endorsement, thereby assuring that the MDF's portfolio is strongly aligned with the Government's strategies and priorities. The BRR has a PCN selection workshop mechanism to ensure a transparent selection process. The role of the Provincial government has also been critical in each of the MDF financed projects to help define local needs, both through consultation with BRR on pipeline and as representative on the Steering Committee.

World Bank Roles, Procedures and Policies

The World Bank fulfills various roles within the MDF —those of Trustee, Fiscal Agent, Partner Agency, Steering Committee Member, Secretariat and Contributor. Typically the trustee of most trust funds assumes all or several of these roles. In the case of the MDF, other agencies can also be assigned the role of Partner Agencies. While the roles are distinct in terms of the responsibilities they carry, it is not always clear to external clients when the Bank is participating in one role or another, and what influence it has in each role. There are three ways in which the potential for a perceived conflict of interest is addressed by the MDF structure. First, the Secretariat seeks an independent evaluation of project concepts and appraisal documents where the World Bank is proposed as the Partner Agency. Second, the internal organizational structure of the World Bank separates accounting and internal and external audit functions (Trustee role) from project appraisal and implementation supervision (Partner Agency role). Third, the Bank cannot vote as a Steering Committee Member on proposals and projects under implementation for which it is the Partner Agency. Even in cases where the Bank is involved in allocation decisions at the SC, it is one decision maker amongst many. This separation of roles is an important factor in the operation of the MDF.

As Trustee, the World Bank is fully responsible to the donors and the government for managing the funds. The key role as Trustee is thus in financial areas to establish, maintain and report on financial records and accounts regarding contributions, commitments financed and disbursements made for projects and programs. An implication of this role is the assurance that it provides to donors that the full coverage of the Bank's fiduciary oversight mechanisms will apply to the management of their taxpayers' money. This assurance has helped to bring in the large contributions to the MDF. Direct funds flows from donors into government channels would have been unlikely given the need for such a risk mitigation framework.

Implementation and Execution

Partner Agencies are responsible for individual project design and subsequent administration alongside with the relevant government counterparts. UNDP, ADB, WFP, and the World Bank are the approved Partner Agencies for MDF, each with their own procedures and policies in project preparation, appraisal, approval, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. These differences in procedures at times lead to delays, particularly in the early set up of implementation and oversight arrangements when all stakeholders are not familiar with the processes.

It is important to note that the Bank does not play the role of implementing agency in any of its programs. This means that when the SC allocates funds to projects where the Bank is Partner Agency, these funds are transferred to implementing agencies —most of it through govt. budget. The Bank's financial participation is limited to cost recovery of appraisal and supervision services. As such, conflict of interest that could arise from having authority over both allocation and use of funds is not relevant in this context.

Furthermore, the World Bank and all its stakeholders, including the donors that have entrusted their funds, have established a governance structure and operating policies and procedures that allow the WB to carry out these multiple functions in a transparent and accountable manner.

For the MDF, channeling funds through the Government' budget is the favored implementation mechanism to ensure sustainability. Thus, funds utilization follows government mechanisms and processes, regardless of whether these are internally or externally sourced. Currently 75% of the MDF portfolio is government executed and implemented by national agencies (on-budget and on-treasury). There are a number of donor programs that are not implemented by GoI but executed directly either by donors or channeled through prominent international agencies. While this direct execution modality is often regarded quick in terms of route, process, and disbursement, it runs the risk of leaving out the central stakeholders —national and local governments and their own policies, procedures and priorities.

Performance

As a Partner Agency the Bank also reduces operational risks in projects through its appraisal, supervision and monitoring activities. Improved quality and long-term sustainability of interventions is a critical outcome of this role, to ensure that the benefits of investments are maintained beyond the project period and maximum value for money is achieved. There is, however, an inevitable tension between quality and speed of implementation which needs to be balanced. The balance should ensure that interventions are of high quality but able to keep up with evolving needs in a rapidly changing environment. At the same time, sustainability and impact considerations should not be unduly compromised in the pursuit of addressing immediate emergencies only. As importantly, there should be clear understanding of, and agreement on, the implications of the trade-offs among the partners.

In the context of the magnitude of the program, project delivery in the Aceh MDF has been significantly faster than in comparable situations in other countries. MDF disbursement rate is similar to overall reconstruction disbursement rate as recorded in the Aceh Tsunami Reconstruction Expenditure Tracking Update released in April 2008. During that reporting period reconstruction disbursement rate in Aceh was 64%, and for the MDF disbursement rate was 61%. This also compares favorably with overall donor disbursement rate of 55%. To improve its responsiveness to post-disaster and post-crisis situations, the World Bank has now adopted new procedures (OP/BP 8.00, *Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies*), effective in March 2007, to further streamline procedures and processes to be more agile in emergency contexts.

Harmonization and Coordination

The MDF is considered a sound funding mechanism that enhances coordination, harmonization and alignment. The pooling of donor funds reduced the transaction costs to the GOI and BRR significantly. 15 different donor requirements on policies, implementation, reporting and financial management were collapsed into one system that provides flexibility in funds use and management. While many donors maintained bilateral funding as well, the MDF represented a mechanism through which each donor's contributions leveraged a much larger pool of funds for greater impact. Harmonization efforts have been coordinated with non-donors through facilitation of reconstruction policy dialogue meetings, with thematic dialogues on environment, disaster risk management and transition-related capacity building for broader stakeholders.

Summary

The key advantages of the MDF are in promoting: (i) government ownership to align funds with national priorities; (ii) lower transaction costs through pooling of funds; and (iii) government execution of donor funds to ensure sustainability. Fiduciary risks are addressed through a Trustee who is accountable to donors and government for the appropriate use of funds, operational risks are addressed through a Partner Agency responsible for quality assurance and oversight, and governance risks are addressed through an inclusive, burden-sharing, multi-tiered governance structure comprising of multi-levels of government, donors, representatives of civil society, and NGOs, and international NGOs.

Over the 3-1/2 years of MDF operations, all projects and activities funded through the MDF are all government-led and fully aligned with the government-developed strategic priorities for Aceh and Nias. Even with 15 donors, under the MDF umbrella, more or less one set of procedures, reporting formats, and accountability mechanisms has been adopted with GOI having control over the use of funds and mostly channeled through the GOI budget. The World Bank, as trustee, administers MDF in accordance to fundamental principles of good governance, and having a separation of responsibilities for allocation, fiduciary and administrative functions of the MDF, while ensuring full transparency and openness in the process. ■

Asian Development Bank (ADB)

Handling Complaints Efficiently

The Project and its Institutional Arrangements

THE Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Support Project (ETESP) Grant Agreement signed by the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in April 2005 provides US$329 million for assistance in 12 sectors. The executing agency was BRR, which houses the Project Management Office and was also the implementing agency for most sub-projects.

Implementation of the ETESP started in April 2005 and is scheduled for completion by December 2009. To facilitate project administration, ADB established the Extended Mission in Sumatera (EMS) in July 2005. International and national advisors coordinate and monitor ETESP components in conjunction with ADB's Southeast Asia Regional Department and Indonesia Resident Mission.

A local non-governmental organization, Bina Swadaya, was engaged by ADB for community empowerment activities for the agriculture, fisheries and irrigation sectors. This includes organizing farmers' and water users' associations, facilitating community discussions and providing basic capacity building for community-based associations. ETESP recruited another six NGOs under its housing component.

Rationale for Establishing Grievance Mechanisms

Grievance mechanisms were established under the ETESP to help resolve disputes and conflicts arising during implementation, particularly during the preparation and implementation of subprojects; to ensure that resources under the project were used for the intended purpose; and to help ensure open communication and feedback among project implementers, communities and beneficiaries. The legal basis for the establishment of the mechanism is contained in the ETESP Grant Agreement, which requires the GOI to establish a grievance review and resolution mechanism with BRR.

Benefits of a Grievance Mechanism

A grievance mechanism gives notice of problems early and provides information on the quality and adequacy of project design and implementation. It underpins client orientation and promotes transparency. The more complex a project is, the more likely it is that complaints will arise and the more important it is to devise efficient ways of dealing with them. Setting up a grievance mechanism provides clarity and greater efficiency in dealing with complaints.

Important Features of the ETESP Grievance Mechanisms

There are multiple intake points for ETESP-related complaints and queries. The public is encouraged to first approach the units and individual staff who are directly involved in subproject preparation and implementation. Given their knowledge on the implementation schedules and budget, eligibility for support, and civil works design, they can respond to simple queries directly. In case the complainant is not satisfied with the responses or actions taken, he or she can take the query to a higher level in the complaint mechanism. Grievance focal points were designated in consultant teams and in the BRR work units to coordinate, follow-up complaints received, record and provide feedback to the complainants. In addition, the public can access existing external grievance redress and anticorruption systems under BRR. Anyone with a complaint, feedback or question related to the goods, civil works, project staff, consultants, provincial or district offices of government line ministries, and others involved in the ETESP has the right to register complaints or questions. All complaints and feedback are treated with confidentiality. The complainant or reporter may or may not reveal his or her identity. Complaints, grievances, feedback or queries about the ETESP can be reported through letter, SMS/text message, verbal narration (walk-in complainants), phone call or facsimile. A memo from the head of EMS supports the establishment of grievance mechanisms and clarifies their implementation.

The grievance mechanisms are tailor-made, adapted to and varying with the implementation arrangements and staffing of the different sectors and units. This has resulted in different flow charts, all part of an overall complaint-handling system. The grievance mechanisms are also graded: Issues that cannot be resolved at the village level are referred to the next level, and to a third level if needed. A complainant who does not agree with the action or decision on a complaint may file an appeal with the next level of the grievance redress system. At the village level, complaints are worked out using existing traditional and village-level conflict resolution structures, where possible. In the housing sector, community-based associations organized under the project also act as grievance intake units and facilitators. Sub-district-based grievance committees organized and funded by Transparency International in six districts also help in grievance facilitation.

For the agriculture, fisheries and irrigation sectors, more than 900 village facilitators hired by Bina Swadaya from 2005 to 2008 among the community residents were oriented to act as grievance intake points in the village for the project. At the district level, the Community Mobilization Specialists (CMS) act as the Grievance Focal Point. Issues that cannot be resolved through the facilitation by the CMS are referred to the Bina Swadaya core team through its team leader. Through this system, 39 percent of queries and complaints were resolved at the village level, while another 53 percent of the cases were resolved through facilitation by the CMS. Only 8 percent required intervention by the core team.

Grievances Resolved at Various Levels of the Complaint Handling System by Bina Swadaya.



Many complaints/ grievance were not shown because they can be solved immediately by CF/ TTP hence they were not recorded in the complaint document

The grievance mechanism covers various issues encountered in the preparation and implementation of subprojects. For instance, the grievance mechanism established by the Oversight Consultants for the housing sector enabled the project to identify and address conflicts/disputes in the community, construction quality concerns, land and legal issues, as well as management/contractual issues. From August 2006 to October 2008, a total of 701 complaints had been received, recorded and responded to under the ETESP housing on-budget sector.

Cases Received under the ETESP Housing (On-budget) Sector from August 2006 to October 2008 (701 cases)



Participatory Design and Training

Staff from different sectors jointly designed their grievance mechanisms in a series of complaint management workshops with an aim to (i) support a streamlined approach to complaint handling among the diverse stakeholders involved in the implementation of the ETESP; (ii) draft flowcharts for complaint management and discuss links to relevant existing external mechanisms; (iii) clarify the responsibilities and functions of the many actors involved in ETESP complaint handling; and (iv) train staff in appropriate complaint facilitation.

The ADB Office of the Special Project Facilitator (OSPF) organized five training sessions for different target groups:

- a two-day session for the Project Management Office (PMO), design and implementation sector consultants of the different components, and Bina Swadaya;
- a half-day workshop for the project implementation units (PIUs);
- a two-day training session for NGOs involved in the housing component; and
- two one-day pilot training sessions for village mobilization specialists from Bina Swadaya.

A ready-to-use orientation module for PMO was developed, which enabled ETESP to further orient village mobilization facilitators and community mobilization specialists.

Establishing Grievance Mechanisms

Setting up grievance mechanisms involves the following steps: (i) defining the scope, principles and types of complaints; and (ii) detailing the complaint handling process, which includes its commencement, processing, action and feedback. Technically, the setting up of a grievance mechanism requires a flow chart that shows the grievance intake points, the levels at which and by whom complaints are dealt with, and the feedback flow. The responsibilities for keeping the log (registering and updating), grievance focal points (sorting, acknowledging receipt, referring, providing guidance and reviewing progress) and individual staff are clearly assigned. It is the project management's responsibility to create an environment conducive to complaint management and to provide skills for complaint facilitation.

The Grievance Facilitation Unit

The Grievance Facilitation Unit (GFU) was set up to provide an independent outside grievance mechanism and to comply with the Grant Agreement. The scope of the GFU runs across the various sectors and levels. The GFU receives complaints directly from beneficiaries and from the general public through text message, phone calls, office visits and during field visits. Village facilitators also forward complaints they receive from the public that are not directly related to their specific activities or subprojects, and EMS sometimes refers cases for follow up. The GFU monitors media reports on issues or complaints related to ETESP operations or staff and conducts validation visits to check on the veracity of the reports as part of its proactive and preventive complaint-handling responsibilities.

The GFU Office was mobilized in June 2007 and is composed of a Facilitation Specialist supported by one technical staffer and one administrative staffer. The existence and contact details **of** the GFU were advertised in local newspapers, and the GFU conducted community orientations. Flyers on the complaint-handling system were distributed in these orientation sessions and during fieldwork.

The GFU's functions include (i) maintaining a database of grievance cases and queries on the ETESP; (ii) designing and overseeing the conduct of orientation sessions; (iii) coordinating, verifying and following up on ETESP-related grievances and coordinating with external accountability mechanisms (e.g., the multidonor fund ombudsman or the anticorruption commission); (iv) analyzing trends and concerns and proposing actions to address these; and (v) serving as facilitator or mediator to settle conflicts.

As of October 2008, the GFU had received and recorded a total of 103 complaints/queries related to ETESP consisting of reports received by text message (42 percent), phone calls (31 percent), walk-in complaints (8 percent), mailed complaints (2 percent)

and complaints raised during field visits/workshops conducted by the GFU (11 percent) or referred by EMS (7 percent).

When the GFU ran advertisements in local newspapers, the volume of complaints received from the public increased (see figure). This indicates the importance of using the media in improving the visibility of the GFU.

Public Complaint Received by GFU



More than half of the cases received by GFU (56 percent) were complaints against project staff and implementers, another 38 cases (37 percent) were questions and comments. A few others (7 percent) were allegations of corruption or irregularities in procurement. Most complaints and questions came from beneficiaries (36 percent) or concerned citizens and neighbors (17 percent). Others were raised by village heads (8 percent) or by project implementers, staff or workers (4 percent). A considerable number

Classification of Complaints

Type A: Queries, comments and suggestions

Type B: Allegations of violations of rights or poor performance of consultants, contractors, staff, government officials or NGOs

Type C: Allegations of fraud and/or corruption

of the questions and complaints received by the GFU were from people who requested to have their identity kept confidential and undisclosed. As much as possible, efforts are made to respond, validate or address anonymous calls and reports.

Complaints and questions received revolved around quality issues, delays in implementation or funding, exclusion of beneficiaries or allegation of wrong beneficiary targeting, allegation of corruption or irregularities, adverse effects of the subproject, salaries of project staff/workers, budget changes/ discrepancies and other concerns.

In terms of location, the bulk of the cases (80 percent) were in Aceh Province. Another 13 percent were in Nias Island, while 8 percent were general or unspecified. Complaints and questions came from 13 districts. However, higher percentages were reported in Pidie (12 percent), Aceh Barat (12 percent), Banda Aceh (13 percent), Aceh Besar (18 percent) and Bireuen (8 percent).

Having an independent GFU encourages people to come forward and raise their complaints, and expedites resolution of cases. Although there are sector-specific complaint-handling mechanisms, a number of complainants are more comfortable approaching the GFU to raise their concerns. Others who are not satisfied with the response or action they obtain from the sector consultants or PIU can approach the GFU to seek assistance. Moreover, resolution of cases is facilitated when the GFU helps follow up with the concerned PIU or consultant team.

Lessons Learned

"For complaint handling to work in a complex project such as the ETESP, everyone needs to have a clear understanding of roles and accountabilities. Complaint handling also requires time and resources, which is not always recognized at the time of project design." *Pieter M.Smidt, Head of ADB Extended Mission in Sumatera*

Set Up an Effective Complaint Handling Mechanism

- Identify the budget and include it in project documents. The effectiveness of the grievance mechanism relies on its ability to undertake information dissemination activities (including mass media advertisements) and conduct field verification and validation of complaints at an early stage. Include grievance handling in terms of reference of consultants.
- Develop an internal system (with the PIUs) with a strong village-level complaint handling system, clarify levels, and link it to an external complaint management system to provide the public with various avenues for raising their concerns or queries about the project.
- Designate and train grievance focal points and village facilitators on the grievance mechanism and on their roles early in the process so that concerns/queries can be handled and recorded systematically. This will also determine who from among the

project staff will be responsible for following up the actions undertaken in relation to the complaints received.

Avoid or Minimize Complaints through Timely Communication

- Many conflicts and complaints arise because of delayed, insufficient or inconsistent information regarding subproject background, current status of subproject or proposed changes. Mere familiarization activities are inadequate. Delay in the deployment of community and village facilitators also hampers the flow of information.
- Community consultations should be as inclusive as possible.
- Staff must see complaints and grievances as part of their role and responsibilities.
- Regular coordination meetings between concerned units fosters consistency in the information provided to the communities and the public.

Assure Proper Functioning

Post important information (in the local language) about the subproject, including whom to contact for clarification, additional information, or suggestions, in key and conspicuous places in the villages. Use of local media is more effective than flyers.

- Reputable people from the local academe can be effective for grievance facilitation. Their knowledge of the local culture and conditions and their reputation in the community fosters trust during grievance facilitation and encourages people to raise their concerns.
- Make extra efforts to reach beneficiaries and key stakeholders who are not present in consultations and planning sessions to inform them/seek their consent.
- Field staff should proactively seek inputs and feedback from the community at the early stage of planning the subproject and provide opportunities to the beneficiaries to express their opinions and concerns before finalizing any planned revisions.
- Identified problems are best solved immediately. The longer it takes to find a solution, the larger and more complex each problem becomes, making it much harder to solve. Moreover, the real benefits of the subproject as envisaged are delayed.

Complaint handling is affected by the attitude of project implementers about receiving and reporting complaints. During the initial stages, some PIU representatives and consultants viewed complaints as a mark against their performance. Hence, there was resistance to reporting and addressing complaints that they received from the beneficiaries. Some also viewed complaint handling as an additional burden that would only delay subproject preparation and implementation. It is therefore important that the project implementers be properly oriented on complaint handling so that they treat complaints as opportunities for improving project design, implementations and outcomes.

Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development (AIPRD) Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh (LOGICA)

Building Accounting Systems for Village Government

ARMED conflict and the 2004 tsunami caused severe damage to the effective function of local governance institutions. Due to the long standing limited effectiveness of most village government administrative units in Aceh, the layer of governance most immediate to community concerns lacked capabilities in effective budgeting, financial management and development planning. LOGICA, in collaboration with local NGOs, addressed the issue by assisting the development of financial administration and accountability systems at the level of village government. The initiative resulted in a technical model for financial accountability and transparency at the village level being adopted by the district government of Aceh Besar.

Background

Armed conflict and the predominant presence of military forces had been a defining feature of Acehnese life in the thirty years prior to the earthquake and tsunami at the end of 2004. As the military assumed control over the government and civil authority under martial law, public administration was disrupted, and village leaders did not function properly. No regularity or certainty existed in village governance at the time. Even after the Helsinki Peace Accord was enacted in Aceh beginning in 2005, ineffective governance has persisted.

At the village level, most officials lack knowledge of proper administrative and policy-making processes. Despite the instigation of new democratic processes that have resulted in the election of new village heads, many of these leaders know very little about planning, budgeting and other administrative aspects of governance. Most village governments had previously not implemented development planning and annual budgets, and had little knowledge of proper bookkeeping, planning and budgeting practices. As well, there was little that village governments could be held be accountable for: accountability was something beyond their knowledge and experience.

Most village heads in the project area (Aceh Besar, Aceh Barat and Aceh Jaya) came to power after they had won direct election in 2007. They were thus newly responsible for village development, public service provision and ensuring community participation in political processes. Many started from a basis of little or no background in government administration, with little to inherit from the practices of the previous pre-tsunami conflict era: there was generally no supporting administrative equipment, no file storage systems, or established systems of reporting. In general, they inherited a severe shortage of skills and equipment necessary to run village administrations.

Technical and administrative skills are essential as villages are entitled to substantial funding mechanisms via district and provincial governments from 2008 onwards.[18] These funds will be managed via the village annual budget.[19] LOGICA chose to assist village governments in developing the skills and know-how to manage funds in as accountable, transparent and publicly inclusive manner as possible.

Significant Events

In response to village government administrative capacity weaknesses, LOGICA undertook to assist village governments in building their administrative skills. In collaboration with local NGOs, LOGICA developed an accountability system for village governments. To ensure that the system matched existing budgeting and financial mechanisms in target villages, LOGICA defined main objectives: i) Villages should have financial standard operating procedures and ii) financial reports should be made available to the public on a regular basis.

In order to accomplish this, LOGICA decided to support two local NGOs specializing in governance and community organizing: Masyarakat Partisipatif (Masif) in Aceh Jaya, and Pugar Foundation in Aceh Besar. Each NGO worked with five pilot villages respectively. After a series of discussions, the program kicked off in August 2008 and AIPRD LOGICA agreed to provide the local NGOs with technical assistance and consultation.

The local NGOs started with participatory village asset mapping, which was considered one of the prerequisites for inclusive financial administration and ensured that many tangible village assets were recorded and publicly reported; the results were brought to a community forum for agreement and endorsement. The list of assets contained many

details concerning the type, cost, source, and location of assets, including photographs.

The NGO teams also drafted village financial standard operating procedures and accountancy manuals, in consultation with village heads and treasurers. The teams also customized accounting software to record financial transactions and other data so that financial data could be generated automatically.

Upon the completion of the standard operating procedures, accounting manuals, list of assets and the customized accounting software, the NGO teams continued with the training of village staff in how to effectively utilize these new administrative techniques. As there was a need for ongoing assistance, the team undertook to assist village governments through consultations and technical assistance on an agreed schedule during which village officials where familiarized with procedures and entered financial information into the new systems. As required by government regulations, the village administrations generated quarterly financial statements for both the public and the district government.

By the end of 2008, the four pilot villages in Aceh Besar had published their first quarterly financial statements. Another five villages in Aceh Jaya were on the way to publishing theirs through ongoing assistance from LOGICA and the local NGOs. All village governments involved are now producing publicly disclosed and accountable budgets.

During the project, the district government of Aceh Besar worked with LOGICA to draft financial guidelines for all village administrations throughout the district in consultation with *Pugar Foundation,* adopting most of the standard operating procedures previously drafted by *Pugar Foundation* in consultation with village officials in LOGICA's pilot villages.

Challenges

Lack of computer skills. The computer-based accounting system applied requires computer literacy. Most village administration officials, however, are not familiar with computers. It thus takes time to introduce computer-based systems to village officials despite the availability of the equipment at village offices.

It takes time, patience and persistence to learn new budgetary techniques, as most village government officials in Aceh had no previous experience of such techniques.

Lessons Learned

Capable local NGOs proved valuable assistants in improving village government capacity. NGOs equipped with the appropriate training, skills and knowledge concerning accounting and governance can play key roles in assisting village governments to adopt the new administrative techniques and systems. Utilizing NGOs also builds local capacity that exists beyond the donor project cycle.

The proven success of new systems through pilot programs encourages District governments to adopt them readily as part of their standard operating procedures. The district government of Aceh Besar was eager to adopt standardized systems that had proven effective in improving village government budgeting and development planning techniques and systems. Pilot programs proved an effective means of demonstrating the success of reforms. The support of district governments is also essential in ensuring the adopting of successful standard operating procedures.

Muslim Aid

Implementing Complaint Management for House Construction

MUSLIM Aid built 686 houses on the east coast of Aceh with funds from ADB: 518 houses in Pidie Jaya district, 53 houses in Bireun district, 40 houses in Lhokseumawe and 75 houses in North Aceh district. The brick houses were designed to withstand earthquakes by using a spiraled iron bar of an appropriate diameter, anchor, lintel block, ring, etc. Each house was 44.5 square meters in area and had an environmentally friendly biofil tank for bathroom waste.

As the donor, ADB requested that complaint management be part of the construction process. Complaint management enabled transparency in suggestions, opinions, protests, dissatisfaction and complaints about construction discrepancies, building quality, worker/contractor performance, quality of building materials, environmental aspects, construction delays, field inspectors' attitude and other matters related to dissatisfaction.

Complaint forms were provided for this purpose. Muslim Aid field inspectors assisted in filling out the forms when asked.

Muslim Aid field inspectors were able to immediately respond to complaints and offer solutions without referring cases to the head office. The authority to receive and respond to complaints on site was practical and reduced bureaucratic red tape.

Lessons Learned

In the implementation of Complaint Management, the project leader paid considerable attention to motivating the person in charge and ensured that field inspectors implemented the system correctly. Details about complaint forms were disseminated early in the construction process. Information sessions on how to use the complaint forms were conducted periodically.

The most common complaint concerned construction delays. After evaluation, it was found that most delays were due to a lack of capability on the part of contractors. As a result, Muslim Aid terminated several contractors' contracts.

Guidance and counseling for local contractors (small and medium category) was absolutely necessary. When reconstruction and rehabilitation was completed, the government agency was expected to proactively guide and counsel the contractors, giving them guidance on: planning activities, estimating costs and cash flow (financial management), preparing financial reports, planning resources and the field inspectors required, and monitoring work and evaluation methods.

Since the community was not accustomed to expressing complaints in writing, the field workers needed to guide them and convince them that written complaints were the best way to monitor complaints and minimize bias concerning content of complaints.

The Complaint Management concept sponsored by ADB was developed for implementation in all reconstruction and rehabilitation activities. This helped identify complaints early in a project so that solutions could be found as soon as possible. Resolving minor complaints quickly helped to prevent them from developing into major protests. The added-value of Complaint Management implementation was that it could be used as an evaluation tool during construction projects or after completion of construction to identify weaknesses and make required adjustments to improve performance and to increase awareness of the importance of meeting quality standards.

Complaint Management facilitated transparency. A summary of complaints and their solutions was relayed to the community to encourage them to express their complaints constructively.

Written complaints and solutions could be used as a basis to evaluate involvement, meticulousness, a sense of belonging, togetherness and degree of satisfaction.

Notes

1 Save lives in crisis situations
2 Project no.10352.0 SO-ODB-Asia Emergency Response Facility 2005
3 WFP Shipping Service Special Operation (SO10498.0)
4 WFP Special Operation (SO10407.0)
5 WFP Standard Project Report (10402.0)
6 WFP Standard Project Report (10069.1)
7 Base value: Feb-2005, SEAMEO, Rapid Nutrition Assessment of Women of Reproductive Age/children under 5, WFP survey. Previous Follow-up: Jul-2006, SEAMEO, Rapid Nutrition Assessment of Women of Reproductive Age/children under 5, WFP survey.
8 Base value: Feb-2005, SEAMEO Health and Nutrition Status Survey for Primary School Children NAD/Nias, WFP survey. Latest Follow-up: Nov-2007, SEAMEO Health and Nutrition Status Survey for Primary School Children NAD/Nias, WFP survey.
9 WFP 2006 Standard Project Report, Regional Special Operation (10407.0)
10 WFP 2007 Standard Project Report SO (10498.0)
11 World Bank set up the Multi-Donor Fund, which represents over US$700 million and has 15 donors; EU, Netherlands, UK, Canada, WB, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Finland, ADB, USA, New Zealand, Ireland
12 Law of The Republic of Indonesia Number 32 Year 2004 regarding Regional Government; Law of The Republic of Indonesia Number 11 Year 2006 regarding the Governance of Aceh; and Government Regulation of The Republic of Indonesia Number 72 Year 2005 regarding Villages.
13 There are 267 sub-districts in Aceh province. In 2008, the provincial legislature approved the sub-district level social welfare centers and allocated a budget that will increase through the years to scale-up to all sub-districts. In November 2008, the Government was to officially launch the Social Welfare Service Center initiative, piloting 10 from which six were previously UNICEF-funded Child Centers.
14 The Bodies are formally acknowledged with a structure and terms of reference. This was a replication of successful practice elsewhere in Indonesia, see: “Child Protection Institution (LPA) evaluation 1998-2004,” UNICEF Indonesia, 2004.
15 The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005 commits all signatories to achieving aid effectiveness through the principles of (i) national ownership; (ii) alignment; (iii) harmonization; (iv) managing for results; and (v) mutual accountability. Indonesia has endorsed the Paris Declaration together with 117 other partner countries and international organizations, who have committed to follow these principles.

16 The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) endorsed a set of Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations in 2007 which emphasizes the need to: (i) take context as the starting point; (ii) ensure all activities do no harm; (iii) focus on state-building as the central objective; (iv) prioritize prevention; (v) recognize the links between political, security, and development objectives; (vi) promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies; (vii) align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts; (viii) agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors; (ix) act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance; and (x) avoid pockets of exclusion ("aid orphans"). These Principles aim to complement and inform the commitments set out in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness which also notes the need to adapt and apply aid effectiveness principles to differing country situations, particularly fragile states.

17 BRR refers to the Indonesian name for the Agency, *Badan Rekonstrucksi dan Rehabilitasi*, specifically established in 2005 to lead the reconstruction and recovery efforts in Aceh and Nias. BRR was closed in April 2009. The GOI issued a Presidential Decree on the BRR transition. The MDF worked closely with the various parties to ensure a smooth transition. It is understood that Bappenas (National Planning Agency) is to take over the coordination role of BRR with relevant line ministries taking up the implementation responsibilities of on-going and pipeline projects.

18 Government Decree No. 72/2006 on Village Government. The fiscal transfer from annual district budget is known as *Alokasi Dana Gampong* (ADG, or Village Financial Allocation), while funds from the provincial government's annual budget is called *Bantuan Keuangan Gampong* (Village Financial Assistance).

19 Ministry of Interior Bill No. 37/2007 on Village Financial Management Guidelines.

Glossary of Abbreviations

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
ADB	Bank Pembangunan Asia	Asian Development Bank
AERF	Fasilitas Tanggap Darurat Asia	Asia Emergency Response Facility
AFEP	Proyek Kehutanan dan Lingkungan Aceh	Aceh Forest and Environment Project
AGDP	Program Pengembangan Pemerintahan Aceh	Aceh Governance Development Program
AGTP	Program Transformasi Pemerintahan Aceh	Aceh Government Transformation Programme
AIP	Australia-Indonesia Partnership	Kemitraan Australia-Indonesia
AIPRD	Kemitraan Australia-Indonesia untuk Rekonstruksi dan Pembangunan	Australia-Indonesia Partnership for Reconstruction and Development
AJI	Aliansi Jurnalis Independen	Alliance of Independent Journalists
AKI	Angka Kematian Ibu	Maternal Mortality Rate
ANGEP	Program Peningkatan Tata Kelola Pemerintahan Aceh-Nias	Aceh-Nias Governance Enhancement Program
APBD	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah	Provincial Annual Budget
APBN	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara	Government of Indonesia's National Annual Budget
ARC	Palang Merah Amerika	American Red Cross
ARF	Kerangka Kerja Pemulihan Aceh	Aceh Recovery Framework
ARN	Surat Kabar Pemulihan Aceh	Aceh Recovery Newsletter
ASEAN	Perhimpunan Negara-Negara Asia Tenggara	Association of South East Asia Nations
Bakornas (PBP)	Badan Koordinasi Nasional (Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi), sekarang bernama Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB)	National Coordination Agency (for Disaster Mitigation and Refugees); Now it is the National Agency for Disaster Mitigation
Bakosurtanal	Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan Nasional	Indonesia's National Coordinating Agency for Survey and Mapping
Bapel	Badan Pelaksana	Executing Agency
Bappeda	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah	Regional Development Planning Agency

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
Bappenas	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional	National Development Planning Agency
BDS	Jasa Pelayanan Pengembangan Bisnis	Bussiness Development Service
BDSP	Penyedia Jasa Pelayanan Pengembangan Bisnis	Bussiness Development Service Provider
BGR	Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe; Institut Federal Jerman untuk Ilmu Bumi dan Sumber Daya Alami	Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe; Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources
BMG	Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika	Meteorology and Geophysics Agency
BMKG	Badan Meteorologi Klimatologi dan Geofisika	Meteorology Climatology and Geophysics Agency
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung; Bidang Kerjasama Ekonomi dan Pembangunan Kementerian Federal Jerman	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung; German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BPPT	Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi	Agency for The Assessment and Application of Technology
BRA	Badan Reintegrasi-Damai Aceh	Aceh Peace-Reintegration Agency
BRR	Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Wilayah dan Kehidupan Masyarakat Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam dan Kepulauan Nias Provinsi Sumatera Utara	Agency for the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of the Regions and Community of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and the Nias Island of the Province of North Sumatra
Bulog	Badan Urusan Logistik	Indonesian Bureau of Logistics
CALGAP	Program Bantuan pada Pemerintah Daerah Aceh dari Kanada	Canada Aceh Local Government Assistance Program
CAP	Rencana Aksi Masyarakat	Community Action Plan
CBO	Organisasi berbasis masyakarat	Community Based Organization
CC	Pusat Anak	Child Centre
CCCD	Pusat Anak dan Pengembangan Masyarakat	Child Centre and Community Development
CD	Cakram padat	Compact Disk
CEDAW	Konvensi Penghapusan Segala Bentuk Diskriminasi terhadap Perempuan	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CEPA	Program Komunitas dan Pendidikan di Aceh	Communities and Education Program in Aceh
CFS	Ruang Ramah Anak-anak	Child Friendly Space

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
CIDA	Badan Pembangunan Internasional Kanada	Canadian International Development Agency
CMS	Ahli Mobilisasi Masyarakat	Community Mobilization Specialists
CoCoA	Koperasi Coklat Organik di Aceh	Cooperative organic Cocoa of Aceh
CRC	Palang Merah Kanada	Canadian Red Cross
CSF	Fasilitas Pendukung Masyarakat	Community Support Facilities
CWS	Pelayanan Gereja se-Dunia; Nama sebuah LSM	Church World Service
DEC	Komite Darurat Bencana	Disaster Emergency Committee
DHO	Kantor Dinas Kesehatan Kabupaten	District Health Office
Dinsos	Dinas Sosial	Social Affairs Office; Usually of a province/district
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat	House of Representative
DPRA	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Aceh	Aceh's Regional House of Representative
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah	Regional House of Representative
DPRK	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Kabupaten	District House of Representative
DRM	Pengelolaan Resiko Bencana	Disaster Risk Management
DSS	Sistem Pendukung Keputusan	Decision Support System
ECCD	Penanganan dan Pengembangan Dini terhadap Anak	Early Childhood Care and Development
EFQM	Federasi Eropa untuk Manajemen Kualitas	European Federation of Quality Management
ERMF	Pemulihan Ekonomi dan Keuangan Mikro	Economic Recovery and Microfinance
ETESP	Proyek Sektor Bantuan Darurat Gempa Bumi dan Tsunami yang dibiayai oleh Bank Pembangunan Asia (ADB)	Earthquake and Tsunami Emergency Sector Project funded by Asian Development Bank (ADB)
FAO	Organisasi Pangan Dunia	Food and Agriculture Organization
FBA	Forum Bangun Aceh	Forum for Aceh's Awakening
FBC	Penanganan Berbasis Keluarga	Family Base Care
FCM	Federasi Kotamadya di Kanada	Federation of Canadian Municipalities
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka	Free Aceh Movement
GF	Yayasan Grameen; Nama sebuah LSM	Grameen Foundation
GFU	Unit Fasilitasi Keluhan	Grievance Facilitation Unit
GIS	Sistem Informasi Geospasial	Geospatial Information System
GITEC	Dewan Eksekutif Teknologi Informasi Pemerintah (Jerman)	Government Information Technology Executive Council

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
GoI	Pemerintah Republik Indonesia	Government of Indonesia
GoJ	Pemerintah Jepang	Government of Japan
GPS	Sistem navigasi satelit	Global Positioning System
GTZ	Gesselschaft for Technische Zusammenarbeit (Kerja Sama Teknis Indonesia-Jerman)	Gesselschaft for Technische Zusammenarbeit (German Technical Cooperation)
Hivos	Institut Kemanusiaan untuk Kerjasama dengan Negara Berkembang	Humanistisch Instituut voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking
IDP	Penyintas	Internally Displaced Person
Ina-TEWS	Sistem Peringatan Dini Tsunami Indonesia	Indonesia Tsunami Early Warning System
INFOKOM	Informasi dan komunikasi	Information and communication
IOM	Organisasi Internasional untuk Migrasi Penduduk	Internal Organization for Migration
ISO	Organisasi Internasional untuk Standarisasi	International Organization of Standardization
IVA	Ieder Voor Allen; Nama sebuah LSM	Ieder Voor Allen; Name of an NGO
JICA	Badan Kerja Sama Internasional Jepang	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JRCS	Komunitas Palang Merah Jepang	Japan Red Cross Society
JRS	Jesuit Refugee Service; Nama sebuah LSM	Jesuit Refugee Service; Name of an NGO
K/L	Kementerian Negara/Lembaga	Ministry/Institution
Kabapel	Kepala Badan Pelaksana	Head of Executing Agency
Kasatker	Kepala Satuan Kerja	Head of Project Implementing Unit
KPP	Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan	Department for Women's Empowerment
KSO	Kerjasama Operasional	Operational Cooperation
KUB	Koperasi Usaha Bersama	Joint Effort Cooperative
LCB	Penawaran Lelang Lokal	Local Competitive Bidding
LIF	Yayasan Internasional Leuser	Leuser International Foundation
LIPI	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia	The Indonesian Institute of Science
LOGICA	Pemerintahan Lokal dan Infrastruktur untuk Masyarakat di Aceh	Local Governance and Infrastructure for Communities in Aceh
LSM	Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat	Non-government Organisation (NGO)
LSU	Unit Pendukung Logistik	Logistics Support Unit

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
MAI	Muslim Aid Indonesia; Nama sebuah LSM	Muslim Aid Indonesia; Name of an NGO
Mamamia	Masyarakat Makmur Mitra Adil; Nama sebuah LSM	People's Welfare through Equitable Partnerships; Name of an NGO
MDF	Dana Multi-Donor	Multi-Donor Fund
MFI	Lembaga Keuangan Mikro	Micro Finance Institution
MoU	Nota Kesepahaman	Memorandum of Understanding
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat	People's Consultative Assembly
MSME	Usaha Mikro, Kecil, dan Menengah	Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise
Musrenbang	Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan	The meeting for Planning Development
NAD	Provinsi Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province
NGO	Organisasi nonpemerintah/ Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM)	Non-Governmental Organization
Nisel	Kabupaten Nias Selatan	District of South Nias
Norcross	Palang Merah Norwegia	Norwegian Red Cross
O&M	Operasi dan Pemeliharaan	operation and maintenance
OECD DAC	Komite Pendukung Pembangunan pada Organisasi untuk Kerjasama Ekonomi dan Pembangunan	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee
off-budget	Anggaran non-Pemerintah Indonesia (non-APBN)	Non-Indonesian state budget
on-budget	Anggaran Pemerintah Indonesia (APBN)	Indonesian state budget
OSPF	Kantor Fasilitator Proyek Khusus	Office of the Special Project Facilitator
P3A	Perkumpulan Petani Pemakai Air	Association of Water-User Farmers
PASE	Pagar Alam Semesta; Nama sebuah LSM	Fence of the Universal Nature; Name of an NGO
PBB	Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa	United Nations (UN)
Pemda	Pemerintah Daerah	Regional Government
Pemkab	Pemerintah Kabupaten	District Government
Pemprov	Pemerintah Provinsi	Provincial Government
Perpu	Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang	Government Regulation in Lieu of Law
PHLN	Pinjaman/Hibah Luar Negeri	Foreign Soft Loans/Grant
PINBIS	Pusat Informasi Bisnis	Center of Business Information
PINBUK	Pusat Inkubasi Usaha Kecil	Foundation for Small Startup Enterprises

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
PMI	Palang Merah Indonesia	Indonesian Red Cross
PMKS	Penyandang Masalah Kesejahteraan Sosial	Holders of Social Welfare Problems
PMMP	Program Pengelolaan Kotamadya di Palestina	Palestinian Municipal Management Program
PMO	Kantor Pengelolaan Proyek	Project Management Office
PMT	Pengakhiran Masa Tugas	Exit Strategy
POLDA	Kepolisian Daerah	Regional (Provincial) Police
Polindes	Poliklinik Desa	Village Polyclinic
POLRI	Polisi Republik Indonesia	Indonesian Police Force
Posyandu	Pos Pelayanan Terpadu	Integrated Health Service Post
PP	Peraturan Pemerintah	Government Regulation
PPA	Perlindungan Perempuan dan Anak	Protection for Women and Children
PRA	Persetujuan Desa Partisipatif	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PRR-L	Program Rehabilitasi Rumah di Lhoong	Lhoong House Rehabilitation Program
PRRO	Operasi Penyelamatan dan Pemulihan Abadi	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSSNI	Persatuan Radio Siaran Swasta Nasional Seluruh Indonesia	Association of National Private Radio Broadcasting Indonesia
PTSP	Pelayanan Terpadu Satu Pintu	One-Stop-Service
Pusdatin	Pusat Data dan Informasi	Center for Data and Information
PUSPELKESSOS	Pusat Pelayanan Kesejahteraan Sosial	Social Welfare Service Center
QC	Pengendalian Mutu	Quality Control
QIP	Proyek Peningkatan Mutu	Quality Improvement Project
RAND	Basis-data Pemulihan Aceh-Nias	Recovery Aceh-Nias Database
RANTF	Dana Perwalian Pemulihan Aceh-Nias	Recovery Aceh-Nias Trust Fund
RFP	Permohonan Proposal	Request for Proposal
RHSI	Rehabilitasi dan Peningkatan Sistem Kesehatan	Rehabilitation and Health System Improvement
RI	Republik Indonesia	Republic of Indonesia
Rp	Rupiah	Rupiah (Indonesian currency)
RPWP	Program Kesejahteraan Masyarakat Desa	Rural People's Welfare Program
RRHS-Aceh	Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Perumahan dan Permukiman di Aceh	Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Housing and Settlements in Aceh Province
SAK	Satuan Antikorupsi	Anti-corruption Unit

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
Satker	Satuan Kerja	Project Implementing Unit
Satkorlak	Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksana Penanggulangan Bencana dan Penanganan Pengungsi	Unit for Coordinating Implementers of Disaster and Displaced Persons Management
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (presiden keenam RI)	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (the 6th presiden of Indonesia)
SC	Komite Pengarah	Steering Committee
SEAMEO	Kementerian Asia Tenggara untuk Asosiasi Pendidikan	Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Association
SECO	Sekretariat Negara (Swiss) untuk Urusan Ekonomi	(Swiss) State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
SEFA	Save Emergency for Aceh; Nama sebuah LSM	Save Emergency for Aceh; Name of an NGO
SIM-C	Pusat Informasi Spasial dan Pemetaan	Spatial Information and Mapping-Centre
SKPD	Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah	Regional Working Unit
SLGSR	Dukungan untuk Pemerintahan Lokal bagi Rekonstruksi Berkelanjutan	Support for Local Governance for Sustainable Reconstruction
SME	Usaha Kecil dan Menengah (UKM)	Small and Medium Enterprise
SMPN	Sekolah Menengah Pertama Negeri	State Junior High School
SOP	Prosedur Operasi Standar	Standard Operating Procedure
SP3	Surat Perjanjian Pemberian Pekerjaan	Agreement Letter for Work Project Awarding
SPAN	Proyek Swiss untuk Pemulihan Bisnis di Aceh dan Sumatera Utara	Swiss Project for Business Recovery in Aceh and North Sumatera
Sumut	Sumatera Utara	North Sumatera
TA	Tahun Anggaran	Fiscal Year
TDMRC	Pusat Riset Tsunami dan Mitigasi Bencana	Tsunami and Disaster Mitigation Research Center
TGLL	Hikmah Ajar Global Tsunami	Tsunami Global Lessons Learned
TOT	Pelatihan untuk Pelatih	Training of Trainers
TRC	Pusat Riset Tsunami	Tsunami Research Center
TRG	Kelompok Pengkaji Teknis	Technical Review Group
TVET	Pelatihan dan Pendidikan Teknis dan Kejuruan	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UAR	Unsyiah untuk Rekonstruksi Aceh	Unsyiah for Aceh Reconstruction
UMCOR	United Methodist Committee on Relief; Nama sebuah LSM	United Methodist Committee on Relief; Name of an NGO
UN	Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa (PBB)	United Nations

Abbreviations	Indonesian	English
UNDIP	Universitas Diponegoro	Diponegoro University
UNDP	Program Pembangunan Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa	United Nations Development Programme
UNHAS	Universitas Hasanuddin	Hasanuddin University
UNICEF	Dana Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa untuk urusan Anak-anak	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	Dana Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa untuk Perempuan	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNJP	Pemrograman Bersama Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa	United Nations Joint Programming
UNOPS	Kantor Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa untuk Layanan Proyek	United Nations Office for Project Service
UNORC	Kantor Perserikatan Bangsa-Bangsa untuk Koordinator Pemulihan Aceh dan Nias	United Nations Office of the Recovery Coordinator for Aceh and Nias
Unsyiah	Universitas Syiah Kuala, Banda Aceh	Syiah Kuala University, Banda Aceh
UPLINK	Urban Poor Linkage; Nama sebuah LSM	Urban Poor Linkage; Name of an NGO
URRP	Rencana Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi Mendesak	Urgent Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan
US$	Dollar Amerika Serikat	American Dollars
USAID	Badan Amerika Serikat untuk Pembangunan Internasional	United States Agency for International Development
UU	Undang-Undang	Law
UUPA	Undang-Undang tentang Pemerintahan Aceh	Law on Governing of Aceh
WFP	Badan Pangan Dunia	World Food Programme
WUA	Asosiasi Pengguna Air	Water Users Associations
WVI	World Vision Indonesia; Nama sebuah LSM	World Vision Indonesia; Name of an NGO
YAKKUM	Yayasan Kristen Untuk Kesehatan Umum; Nama sebuah LSM	Christian Foundation for Public Health; Name of an NGO
YAMIDA	Yayasan Mitra Dhu'afa	Foundation of Dhu'afa Partners; Name of an NGO
YEU	Unit Darurat YAKKUM	YAKKUM Emergency Unit
YIPD	Yayasan Inovasi Pemerintahan Daerah	Center for Local Government Innovation
YKBS	Yayasan Karya Bunda Sejahtera	Yayasan Karya Bunda Sejahtera; Name of an NGO