**Anti-trafficking Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia
and the Global Linkages from Geopolitical Perspective**
*Borders and Anti-trafficking Strategies between Burma,
Laos PRD and Thailand*

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Introduction

For a long time, Southeast Asian countries have been considered as a major axis for legal trade of goods and migration. Since peace returned to Southeast Asia (1980s – early 1990s) changes led to unprecedented growth in trade and an increasing significance of trade within the region. However countries in parts of this region are also confronted to illicit trade from areas of production to consumption centers, both locally and internationally. On the one hand the areas from where the traffic starts remain inhabited by ethnic minorities and are usually characterized by a high level of poverty, a low level of development and poor access to a communication infrastructure. In this context illegal activities and smuggling have increased since the beginning of the XX century. Traffickers and organized crime operate in networks and control the territories in which the authority of the State is lacking or is not considered as legitimate and where there are no clear legal boundaries. On the other hand, trafficking is also going through developed areas and well-established borders such as Mae Sai / Tachileck between Burma and Thailand, and through major regional strategic roads of licit trade.

It is well known that the so-called 'Golden Triangle' is a major area of illicit activities and transnational crimes, including illegal drugs and economies of predation such as human trafficking and exploitation of non-renewable natural resources. Drug Trafficking and human trafficking are transnational crimes, since they involve countries from which the victims belong, transit areas and countries which are the destination points for the victims. We have here to distinguish trafficking from smuggling as far as human beings are concerned. The criminal act of smuggling[1] involves persons who have consented to the act of

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[1] "*the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident*", Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, UN Convention against Transnational

being smuggled; it should end with the arrival of the migrants at their destination. In cases of human trafficking, victims have either never consented or that consent has been rendered meaningless by the coercive, deceptive or abusive actions of the traffickers[2].

At the international level, these illicit activities have been considered gradually by multilateral agencies in charge of those crimes. The mandate of the international agencies, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has only recently taken into account traffics in their diversity: the International Convention against transnational organized crime was adopted only in 2000. Indeed, within the UN agency, two illicit activities overshadowed others throughout the twentieth century: drug trafficking (since 1909) and human trafficking (since 1949). Both kinds of trafficking are a global phenomenon which has been subject to increasing international attention in recent years. Anti-trafficking initiatives have been developed globally and regionally. They have become an important item on international policies in the post-Cold War global agenda. However the clandestine nature of the illicit activities makes it difficult to estimates and to gather statistics on the magnitude of the phenomenon. The absence of reliable global data makes it more complicated for governments and international organizations to fight trafficking effectively, as it is, for example, much easier said than done to distinguish clearly at the border between illegal precursor trade and legal trade.

Regarding the geographical framework of this study, we would like to focus on border areas, where law enforcement officers have the resources to prevent illicit flows from entering into the national territory. Firstly, although drug control policies have been implemented in the region for nearly a century, illicit cross-border trade has been diversified and new routes of trafficking have been developed. Secondly, the demarcation between kingdoms has, for a long time, been a frontier ("*intervals that mark the separation between two politico -territorial entities*"[3]) fluctuating according to circumstances. Thongchai Winichakul[4] highlighted that between Siam and Burma frontiers have existed as "*intervals that mark the separation between two politicos -territorial entities*" (political frontier) and as areas that mark "*the result of relationships that a society maintains with the space […]. The locations, the nature, the form of frontiers are determined by the nature of spatial structures and dynamics of a territory and the geohistorical inheritance*"[5] (structural frontier). Since the colonial era, clear boundaries have been drawn by western countries such as Great Britain and France between Burma and Thailand, between Thailand and Laos People's Democratic Republic (Laos PDR), yet the concept of "border" ("*linear ruptures that splits two territories in a brutal manner*") is recent within Southeast Asian countries. Yet the western concept of border refers to geographic boundaries fully or partly controlled that delineate political entities and legal jurisdictions. It is different than the concept of delimitation of sovereignty within Southeast Asian countries[6].Some areas remain more of a frontier than a border.

Organized Crime. Migrant smuggling is always transnational; it is a crime against public order as there is no victim in the traditional sense beyond the State, which immigration laws have been broken.

2 "*the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation*", Article 3a of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It is a crime against the person.

3 Sébastien GADAL and Robert JEANSOULIN, *Borders, frontiers and limits : some computational concepts beyond words*

4 Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1998_228 p

5 Sébastien Gadal et Robert Jeansoulin, *Borders, frontiers and limits : some computational concepts beyond words*, Cybergeo, Epistémologie, Histoire, Didactique, article 125, mis en ligne le 01 mars 2000, modifié le 03 mai 2007. URL : http://www.cybergeo.eu/index4349.html. Consulté le 20 mai 2008.

6 Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1998_228 p

On the one hand, a broader framework of this study will be the State and its strategies against transnational illicit activities within a context of recent state-building and on the other hand, licit (globalization of trade) and illicit networks. Due to the complex links between illicit activities, the increasing regional circulation and the fragile political and socio-economic contexts at the border areas, we can understand those areas as a matrix of territories and networks complementary, in rivalry and comparable[7]. Indeed modalities of anti-trafficking strategies depend firstly on rivalries of power and opposition between different actors, whether linked to the State or not[8]. This can lead to the development of corruption and of parallel authorities which may be linked to ethnic rebellion (Burma) or not (Lao PDR). Secondly, root causes which can explain the development and durability of illicit activities, stakes of increasing regional circulation, and challenges of anti-trafficking policies may be complementary; they are linked to the question of sovereignty, of infrastructure's capacities and of government's agendas. Lastly, the stakes for actors are comparable as the overall aim is to enhance influence or control on specific territories which were at the margin of those countries but which are becoming a hub for regional trade.

Based on the case study of anti-drug policies, the train of thought of this study is an analysis of implementation's modalities of anti trafficking actions as well as obstacles to decision-makers and operational officers. One of our methods consists of measuring the relevance and sustainability of actions implemented for fighting illegal trafficking in a context of borders opening. This paper is focused on Burma, Laos PDR and Thailand, three countries that are geographically contiguous with political, economic and social issues and whose concerns, declared or real, are understood through current and past political struggles.

In this context, through this paper, we would like to focus first on networks which are being developed at the border areas and which are understood as a threat by the central authorities. Secondly, we will analyze the development of more bilateral relations upon trust at the border areas in order to improve the efficiency of strategies originated from national or international agencies. Then we will highlight the necessity to develop a global approach to fight not only drugs or human trafficking but to combine expertise, best practices and capacities in order to enhance the efficiency of the fight against common issues.

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[7] des "*espaces concurrents ou complémentaires des territoires, mais en tout cas comparables*" , in Jacques Lévy, Michel Lussault (dir.), *Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l'espace des sociétés*, Paris, Belin, 2003. 1032 p.

[8] There is a rivalry between the central authorities (considered as legitimate or not), local authorities (considered as legitimate or not) and networks of illicit activities (local or transnational organized crime).

1.   The difficulties in controlling remote areas which have porous and open borders.

The aim of this part is to analyze the duality of regions where anti-trafficking activities take place. On the one hand, the effectiveness of these activities is limited by the porosity of borders and the lack of control (or of legitimacy as is the case for Burma) of central governments in remote areas. On the other hand, the effectiveness of national and international anti-trafficking activities is reduced by the structuring of major axis in regional legal trade. This geoeconomic trend weakens the capacities of control at the borders.

a.   Porous borders within poor socio-economic situation aggravate the problem of cross-border trafficking.

A certain vagueness remains at the very definition of the boundaries especially between Burma, Lao PDR and Thailand[9]. The western concept of boundary refers to a line which geographically delimitate national sovereignty. It is "*a line while frontier refers to a zone*"[10]. The concept is recent within countries part of the GMS. Indeed "*the boundaries between the Siamese and Burmese consisted of a tract of mountains and forest, which is several miles wide and which could not be said to belong to either nation*"[11] and which contains various populations. According to the Siamese and to King Rama III, the delimitation of the borders has not to be done by the central government but by local ethnics groups. Thongchai Winichakul highlights the difficulties to fix border lines between Burma and Thailand. As both countries are "*arch-rivals since the sixteenth century*"[12], "*no boundaries could ever be established between the Siamese and the Burmese. But the English desire to have these fixed. Let them enquire from the old inhabitants residing on the frontiers of Mergui, Tavoy, and Tenasserim, what they know respecting the contiguous territories, and let what they point out be the boundaries between the English and Siamese possessions*"[13].

Therefore central authorities have only recently tried to be involved in and to control what are now border areas. It results a certain weakness in terms of capacities and sometimes of legitimacy of the central government at the border areas. Illicit networks which have been developed in the region since the end of the XIX century may have taken advantage of this context to become more structured illicit networks and part of transnational organized crime. As we can see below, in 2001 the majority of the seizures of illicit amphetamine were made in the border provinces with Burma. The majority of the arrests were made on the way from the border provinces with Burma and Lao PDR to major urban centers such as Bangkok.

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[9] Around 70% of Thai borders are not clearly delimited in 2008, according to a diplomat from ADB. 65% of the land border was demarcated between Lao PDR and Thailand in November 2000 (IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Spring 2001)

[10] J.R.V. Prescott, *Boundaries and Frontiers*, in Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1998, p31.

[11] Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1998, p 64-65

[12] Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1998, p62

[13] from D.G.E. Hall, Henry Burney: *A political Biography*, p 154-5, in Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1998, p 64

Saisies d'amphétamines par région en Thaïlande en 2001.
Source: Office of Narcotics Control Board, 2001

■	1 320 000 à	4 470 000
■	870 000 à	1 320 000
■	660 000 à	870 000
■	140 000 à	660 000
□	0 à 140	000

Arrestations de trafiquants de drogues en 2001, par région

■	56 500 à	56 600
■	32 700 à	56 500
■	19 500 à	32 700
■	5 200 à	19 500
□	0 à 5	200

Map 1: Seizures of amphetamine in Thailand in 2001
Source: Office of Narcotics Control Board, 2001
Map 2: Arrest of traffickers in Thailand in 2001
Source: Office of Narcotics Control Board, 2002

Trafficking is a complex issue. It has its basis in politico and socio-economic factors as well as disparities which exists between countries and provinces. The most powerful push factor, amongst others, is poverty as well as a lack of economic opportunities. The temptation of higher wages and the opportunity for prosperity are pull factors both for trafficking illicit drugs and for smuggling. Traffickers target their prey in the poverty stricken rural areas which have a high level of poverty. The data for incomes are quite low and those for the number of poor on the border areas with Laos PDR and Burma are high compared with the other regions in Thailand and in Burma. The "poor" according to UNDP are people living under the poverty line. The average poverty line for the Kingdom is 1242 Thai baht per person per month, 1078 baht in the Northeast and 1131 in the Northern part of Thailand. However, we can highlight here that unemployment rates are not a factor for being involved illicit activities such as drug trafficking, as they are quite low in those border areas as far as Thailand is concerned (See Map 3).

Map 3: Poverty in Thailand and in Lao PDR
Source: UNDP, Thailand Human Development Report 2007
Asian Development Bank 2002

As for Burma, rural poverty is a serious issue. 71% of the poor live in rural areas[14], as the poor have either no land or too small an area of land to be viable. With limited availability of non-agricultural work and low prices for the output of small farmers, migration (licit or illicit) and involvement in illicit activities such as transportation of illicit drugs may be considered as a solution to earn some money.

Map 4: Poverty and income in Burma and Thailand[15]

In Laos PDR voluntary and irregular cross-border migration of people is wide-spread throughout the country, especially on the borders with Thailand where extensive cross-border networks and contacts facilitate the finding of employment. The reasons for Laos citizens leaving their country to seek employment in Thailand, for longer or shorter periods of time, are manifold and complex, such as poverty, lack of employment opportunities in their country, and cultural factors (the Thai language, and the young Thai modern urban lifestyle). According to the Asian Development Bank, the proportion of population below the national poverty line is very high in Laos PDR (32,7 % in 2003) and in Burma (26,6% in 2001)

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[14] Source: World Bank, *An economic and social assessment*, August 1999.

[15] It is quite difficult to compare data in Burma as there is a huge gap between the official exchange rate (which has varied since 2001 between 5.75 and 6.70 kyat per US Dollar) and the street rate. This black market rate takes the standing of the national economy into account, and has varied from 800 kyat to 1335 kyat per US Dollar since 2001. In this paper, we decided to use only the street rate, which highlights the situation in Burma. According to the newspaper The Irrawaddy and Khitpyaing, the black market rate in September 2007 was 1$ = 1350 Kyat.

compared to Thailand (9,8% in 2002). Socio-economic differential are thus reinforced by borders[16]. The exploitation by traffickers and organized crime of those gaps creates specific illicit activities.

Local traffickers and organized crime take advantage of the socio-economic context and of corruption of law enforcement officers on the border and remote areas. People are able to enter illegally into Thailand for example by foot along remote areas. Thailand shares long borders with Burma and Lao PDR[17]. These border areas are considered nowadays as an issue for the stability of the kingdom. The Royal Thai Army uses its task force there to prevent convoys of illicit drugs from entering into Thailand and convoys of chemicals from entering into Burma. Various techniques are developed such as control, surveillance and identification of cross-border points, and intelligence missions a 30 to 50 km strip along the Thai border. Nevertheless, it is more complex to understand the sustainability of illicit activities in those border areas. The border line may delineate a region at risk[18], an unstable region whose situation can lead to a conflict. Rivalries and opposition exist between Burma, Lao PDR and Thailand in cultural, political, economic or military sectors. As a consequence to control border areas is a stake for the central authorities. As an example the Northern part of Thailand is located on the one hand in proximity to regions characterized by unsettled social and political contexts. The lack of peace and security matches there[19] with trafficking of drugs and human beings. One the other hand the Northern provinces of the Kingdom are located on the way to developed urban areas where there is a huge demand for illicit drugs and for workers.

b. A lack of control of peripheral areas.

In this fragile socio-economic situation traffickers may develop new routes of illicit trade and of illicit activities more easily. Besides, those peripheral areas are characterized by a lack of political maturity, lack of legitimacy of the central authorities, rampant corruption and civil unrest. Weak national political structures and parallel local or provincial powers strengthen issues of good governance and corruption. Many states in the region are newly-born political entities or newly independent countries with political systems in evolution or in transition, whose relationships are characterized by ancient antagonisms[20]. As a result, these are limiting factors for the regime to focus their agenda on illicit activities. In Burma, especially in Northern and Eastern part at the border with Laos PDR, China and Thailand, well-established criminal networks take advantage of unrests between ethnic groups and the junta. One of the issues is the legitimacy of the central government according to ethnic groups on the one hand; of ethnic groups movement in the eyes of the central government on the other hand. Following the policy of stabilization and unification through cease-fire agreements since 1988, the peripheral territories have kept a certain degree of self-government, which lead to some specialists specifying that Burma is not one country but many countries. This preserves a lifestyle which can be characterized as tribal in those areas as they have their own governance and even their own operational army which are *de facto* in charge of the control of the borders. Criminal networks strengthen the tribal structure of

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[16] Groupe Frontière, Christiane Arbaret-Schulz, Antoine Beyer, Jean-Luc Piermay, Bernard Reitel, Catherine Selimanovski, Christophe Sohn et Patricia Zander, "La frontière, un objet spatial en mutation.", EspacesTemps.net, Textuel, 29.10.2004

[17] Respectively 2 401 Km and 1 810 Km.

[18] « un espace à risque », Groupe Frontière, Christiane Arbaret-Schulz, Antoine Beyer, Jean-Luc Piermay, Bernard Reitel, Catherine Selimanovski, Christophe Sohn et Patricia Zander, "La frontière, un objet spatial en mutation.", EspacesTemps.net, Textuel, 29.10.2004

[19] such as in Shan State in Burma.

[20] in Claude Chancel, Eric-Charles Pielberg, Cédric Tellenne, *Géopolitique de l'Asie méridionale et orientale*, L'Autre Monde, September 2005, 420).

many ethnic groups. We do not mean here that military dictatorship is better than tribal systems; however criminal organized groups exploit this complex matrix of governance and this relative autonomy[21].

The cause of the rivalry between central authorities and local authorities is quite different in Lao PDR. Local governors may have more political power than members of the central government. It results that they can negotiate or take decision without referring to the central authorities. The rivalry here is more about the strength and the hierarchic power than the legitimacy of the authority. Therefore we can say that remote border areas are part of a contemporary geopolitical process. There is both a multiplication of spheres of influence at the local level and an increase of ethnical identity tensions. It is through these areas that a major part of illicit trafficking is done. Following an opium ban in 2005 decided by the Wa leader in Wa areas in Burma, a third of the population had to leave the region. Not only the men, but also young Wa women migrated and are now working as sew workers on both sides of the Wa-Chinese border[22]. The women are mostly smuggled through the porous border into the southwestern Chinese province of Yunnan and then taken to central and north China, where poverty and a skewed sex ratio means many farmers cannot find wives. Although Laos PDR is mainly a sending country of migrants to Thailand, and to a lesser extent, to China, there is also a flow of Vietnamese, Chinese and Thai migrants working within Laos PDR[23]. In areas close to the border, where there are extensive cross-border networks, people most often cross the border utilizing their contacts and knowledge from earlier stays or from friends or relatives. Agents are used, but mostly avoided where possible due to their high fees. However in remote areas, where there is little knowledge of how to cross the border undetected, facilitator's services give the impression of reducing the risk of being exposed. However it is under these conditions that villagers are most susceptible to falling victim to traffickers[24].

As for Thailand, its higher purchasing power and more vibrant economies create a corresponding demand for cheap labor, cheap sexual services and for illicit drugs such as *yaa baa*. Therefore, there are increasing illicit networks in the Greater Mekong Subregion towards the urban areas in Thailand. Of course, for a long time, the Northeastern part of Thailand had been a buffer zone towards Communism during the Cold War era. This geopolitical context and the lack of roads and infrastructures enable traffickers to escape the law/punity/detection. Local traffickers and organized crime take particularly advantage of the poor infrastructures of communication in Northern part of Thailand partly due to the fact that this region used to be a buffer zone between Siamese and Burmese kingdoms[25]; and to the fact that it has been for a long time a buffer zone against communism during Cold War. Nowadays Thailand has become a major hub for those illicit trades due to its road transport system and its position as a crossroads in the GMS and towards international markets. Thailand's advanced road network continues to be a vital link in the supply line for commodities and materials needed by trafficking groups in neighboring areas. Good roads in Northern Thailand connect laboratories in Burma and in Cambodia with a well-developed transport system. The border areas are currently becoming a crossroad between Thailand, Laos PDR and Cambodia, which are a new trade axes and new illicit routes for both drug and human trafficking. Thailand's position as a regional airline hub is an advantage both for

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[21] ONUDC, Country Profile, Burma, 2001

[22] Shan Herald Agency for News 2005

[23] Undocumented workers and Chinese girls and women are smuggled largely into Northern Lao PDR. The Vietnamese girls sent to the South work in the sex industry.

[24] Nicola Piper, A Problem by a Different Name? A Review of Research on Trafficking in South-East Asia and Oceania, International Migration, 2005, vol 43, 31 pages

[25] Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation*, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, 1998, p62

illicit drugs trafficking and smuggling in human beings as Thailand is itself an exporting country to the other richer countries of Asia (e.g. Hong Kong, Japan). As we can see below, smuggling and trafficking routes follow the ancient and new routes of licit trades. They are oriented either toward China or Bangkok and are originated from Northeastern Burma and the Northern and Western part of Laos PDR.

Map 5: Major illicit trafficking routes and ancient licit routes toward Thailand
Source: Andrew Forbes & David Henley, 1997; and Bounthavy Sisouphanthong & Christian Taillard, 2000
Source: international and national anti-trafficking agencies (UNODC, ONCB, CCDAC, ADB, UNESCAP)

This map is a synthesis of the ancient caravan roads, current trade routes and trafficking routes. Two key illicit routes are going from Burma to Thailand. The first one is directly; it represents 26% of methamphetamine's seizures in 2005. The second one goes through Lao PDR into Thailand; it represents 65% of methamphetamine's seizures in 2005. The three networks presented here are almost the same except for the routes through Lao PDR and Cambodia, which are the new illicit routes in order to avoid increasing controls on the border between Burma and Thailand.

c.   Opening of the borders to trade.

Trafficking and illicit activities at the border areas increase with the spirit of free trade as traffickers and organized crime may rely on well connected roads which are less controlled. Anti-trafficking officers cope both with an increasing movement of circulation and a movement of diversifications of illicit drugs and illicit routes within the region. Therefore, the structuring of major axes in regional legal trade may weaken the capacities of control at the borders; it may hinder the actions of law enforcement agencies as it extends the licit flow to transnational level. Besides the opening of the borders to regional trade within South-east Asia has to be seen through the context of vagueness of border we have already discussed. It is thus an opportunity for the traffickers to increase their illicit trade. This also reduces the State's capacity to control and to protect its territory and its population against external illicit activities. In a context of reinforcement of anti-trafficking strategies the opening of national borders creates a new challenge for state sovereignty. In a context of reinforcement of anti-trafficking strategies, the opening of national borders creates a new challenge for state sovereignty.

Burma, Thailand and Laos are therefore becoming a major axis for illicit drugs and human trafficking, as "*the young Asian Highway system has the potential to have a socio-economic significance in this century that equals or surpasses what the historic silk route had in ancient times*"[26]. The definition of major strategic roads within the Asian Highway project promoted by UNESCAP and the creation of economic corridor through the Asian Development Bank project created in 1992[27] increases legal trade thanks to transport infrastructure development and to improving intraregional and interregional transport. These network routes aim to link capital to capital, main sea and river ports, and major terminals and depots. Both projects link activity centres and major cities. This could amplify issues of control at border check-point and could under these circumstances strengthen illicit cross-border activities as the amplification of legal trade thanks to regional trade axis increase *de facto* linear flows and amplify issues of control at border check-points. Besides, peripheral areas remain neglected as increasing trade and flows do not imply a better control of illicit activities except if it becomes a fulcrum which allows a better integration of those remote areas and decreases poverty with activities such as tourism.

As we can see below, roads and axes for both projects are the same as major illicit trafficking routes (See maps 7 and 8). Major roads used by traffickers are though the North-South, South and East-Western corridor from the ADB project. The new routes of illicit drug trade through Lao PDR and Cambodia developed in order to escape from controls follows some axes of the Asian Highway and of the East-West economic corridor. Traffickers may consequently take advantage of the modernisation of the infrastructures and of the flexibility to cross borders. Drug traffickers quickly adapt to new challenges. Smuggling routes and methods change rapidly in response to changing conditions such as enhanced regional drug law enforcement regimes and reinforced border controls. The challenge is to dismantle the criminal networks without hindering growing licit trade.

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[26] In Asia Times, 14/06/2006

[27] Through the regional cooperation strategy and program within the Greater Mekong Subregion, trade volumes in 2004 were eleven times higher than in 1992.

Map 6: Major illicit trafficking routes to Thailand
Source: data from national anti-trafficking agencies in Thailand, Laos PDR and Burma.

Map 7: Development of new trade routes in the GMS
Source: Asian Development Bank, UNESCAP

Nevertheless the threat of an increasing illicit trafficking due to the improvement and the expansion of infrastructure within the GMS has to be toned down. Indeed the idea of those projects is to minimize the number of routes included in the networks and to develop regional road and railway networks. Licit trade will be concentrate in some well fenced and well controlled selected highways and railways, with modern and well-equipped cross-border checkpoints. As a matter of fact two geopolitical processes are currently taking place within the GMS: borders dissolution on the one hand (porosity of borders, geo-economic trend such as development of major axes of regional licit trade), borders strengthening on the other hand. This is reinforced by the fact that borders are not any more only a linear border. There is more and more reticular border as licit and illicit trades are increasingly made through airport, railway stations, ports…. As a consequence the majority of the licit traffic will cross the borders at selected crossing points. On the one hand it could be easier to distinguish between licit and illicit trade off those strategic regional road. Cross-border checkpoints will be on the other hand better equipped to control illicit trade going through regional highways. The border can be an area (frontier), a line (line of demarcation), a nodal point (cross-border point), or a network (network barrier)[28]. We already have got onto areola and linear borders: the first one was mostly what delimited kingdoms in Southeast Asia before western concept of linear border was introduce by the British and the French. We would like here to highlight a new geometry of border within the GMS: reticular borders. As we have seen, the western concept of border as geographic boundaries which can be crossed legally at selected crossing points is a recent concept within the countries part of the GMS. The building of strategic regional roads may be seen as "*barriers networks, which consist of links which either block flow or resist flow*". The reticular cross-border infrastructures reinforce the role of the border. There are thus control points along specific transport networks. Central authorities have nowadays to control airport, highway and railways. As a consequence the border is considered as a control system of circulation in order to have power over territories through filtration. Consequently the border has not only the role of delimitate sovereignty, it also has a political mission of barrier against unwanted circulation, filtration and stimulation of circulation[29]. As a consequence increasing strategic roads may be a way toward better controlled border. The movement of increasing circulation could be paradoxically an advantage in controlling illicit trade. According to Jean Gottman in The Significance of Territory (1973) circulation is both linked to the extension of the geographical space and to the compartmentalization of the region[30].

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[28] Groupe Frontière, Christiane Arbaret-Schulz, Antoine Beyer, Jean-Luc Piermay, Bernard Reitel, Catherine Selimanovski, Christophe Sohn et Patricia Zander, "La frontière, un objet spatial en mutation.", EspacesTemps.net, Textuel, 29.10.2004

[29] Ratti, 1995, in Groupe Frontière, Christiane Arbaret-Schulz, Antoine Beyer, Jean-Luc Piermay, Bernard Reitel, Catherine Selimanovski, Christophe Sohn et Patricia Zander, "La frontière, un objet spatial en mutation.", EspacesTemps.net, Textuel, 29.10.2004 ; Luca Muscara, « Les *mots justes* de Jean Gottmann », *Cybergeo*, Politique, Culture, Représentations, article 54, mis en ligne le 26 mars 1998, modifié le 23 avril 2007. URL : http://www.cybergeo.eu/index5308.html. Consulté le 26 mai 2008.

[30] Ratti, 1995, in Groupe Frontière, Christiane Arbaret-Schulz, Antoine Beyer, Jean-Luc Piermay, Bernard Reitel, Catherine Selimanovski, Christophe Sohn et Patricia Zander, "La frontière, un objet spatial en mutation.", EspacesTemps.net, Textuel, 29.10.2004 ; Luca Muscara, « Les *mots justes* de Jean Gottmann », *Cybergeo*, Politique, Culture, Représentations, article 54, mis en ligne le 26 mars 1998, modifié le 23 avril 2007. URL : http://www.cybergeo.eu/index5308.html. Consulté le 26 mai 2008.

2. Surveilling the border, a renewed role to enhance state sovereignty.

Following the strengthening of anti-trafficking policies the illicit routes may just move from one place to another which has a lower level of control. The balloon effect is usually seen "*where the majority of illicit drugs is produced and trafficked and where international interdiction efforts are focused. Drug trafficking continues to expand, with networks including cross-border cooperation and international connections*"[31]. Consequently a focus on cross-border strategies and a focus on the share of information at the regional level are all ways towards an effective fight against illicit trade. This includes the development and the strengthening of common tools, a common understanding of a legal and judicial system and the reduction of corruption. Most of all, this includes a common perception and recognition of the issue, instead of considering for example that they are victims of a flow coming or attracted from/by other countries.

However, this perceiving process is slow-moving between countries whose capacities and priorities are different (stability, control of territories, development, unrests…). Anti-trafficking police unit and task forces have been formed in Burma, Lao PDR and Thailand especially around the borders. This is linked to the fact that each country considered itself as a victim of a threat coming from neighbouring countries. The army watches over the border areas and strengthens patrols in order to prevent criminal networks from exploiting weaknesses at the border level. Borders are that way more an "*asymmetrical membrane*"[32] rather than a "*synapse*". Current anti-trafficking strategies focus on projects which could prevent illicit flows from entering into the country. Anti-trafficking police units and task forces have thereby been formed in Burma, Laos PDR and Thailand especially around the borders. This is linked to the fact that each country considered itself as a victim from the threat coming from neighbouring countries. Therefore the army watches over the border areas and strengthens patrols in order to prevent criminal networks from exploiting weaknesses at the border level.

a. A cross-border initiative to curb trafficking: the Border Liaison Offices.

The porous and currently opening borders around Thailand have a renewed function. They have become used by the central government in a new strategy. The aim is to use border areas as a rampart against what is felt by central authorities as the major external threat at the beginning of the 21st century, that is to say illicit trafficking and transnational organized crime. If Asian countries have tried to counter unilaterally traffickers for a long time, governments of each country have become attentive of the need to strengthen cooperation to fight against global illicit activities. Under a regional programme financed by Japan, 48 Border Liaison Offices (BLO) in 2008 were established on the Cambodian, Chinese, Thai and Vietnamese borders, staffed by five or six police and custom officers. It is an operational mechanism established in areas identified as major illicit border crossing in order to develop joint information exchange with counterparts. BLOs in Thailand are situated in major routes of illicit trade: Chiang Kong, Mae Sai, Mae Sot, Klong Yai and Aranyapradeth. In Burma, there are mainly located along the Thai border namely Tachileik, Myawaddy and Kawthaung.

The main stake of this sort of punctual border mechanism is to develop a certain level of trust within counterparts. Indeed between Laos PDR and Burma, limited cooperation and seizures have been made so far as BLOs counterparts have not yet developed confidence.

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[31] http://www.drugpolicy.org, 2008
[32] Michel FOUCHER, *L'obsession Des Frontières*, Edited by Perrin (Paris, 2007), 17-18.

They are still trying to get more contacts and to share more data. When officers in Bo Keo want to share information or want to obtain information from a Burmese officer, they use a Thai BLO as a mediator. Interactions and joint Mekong patrols since June 2003 have indeed increased confidence between border officers in Thailand and Laos PDR[33] even if diplomatic and political relationships remain quite tense between both shores of the Mekong as there are still unresolved border disputes.

Map 8: Border Liaison offices in Southeast Asia

b. A hidden way to enhance state sovereignty.

The BLO mechanism may be analyzed in two ways a movement of information sharing and cross-border cooperation, and a movement of compartmentalization of national sovereignty. As "*large law enforcer presence […] against unwanted flows*"[34], the anti-trafficking fight in this subregion follows a global trend of focussing more and more on the concept of border. Michel Foucher[35] highlights that the border lines "*have never been so much delimited, demarcated, characterized, kitted out, guarded and patrolled*". The border areas within Thailand, Laos PDR and Burma are therefore becoming "*a modern version of the old walled line […] in order to contain threats to the national security […and] to slow down migration*" and illicit trafficking.

The temptation to contain and control illicit flows within those three countries is consequently more addressing in a security manner *via* renewed border policies. The consequence is that the BLO mechanism may also be used by central authorities as a process of assertion of national sovereignty and legitimacy. It may act as a tool for control of the territories and for better integration of the peripheral areas, especially for Burma and Laos PDR.

c. A non-sustainable strategy?

Even if cooperation is becoming stronger between law enforcement agencies in the GMS, the conception of anti-trafficking policies remains focused on national perspectives, especially due to domestic stake and different priorities in the agendas of each central government, and due to a lack of capacities at the border areas in Burma, Laos PDR and even Thailand. The rapid turn-over of border staff (less than two years) as it is difficult to keep officers in remote areas especially in Laos PR due to promotions, operational needs - and the gap between the capacities –human resources, financial capacities, capacities to implement

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[33] Once or twice per week, joint patrol takes place on the Mekong river which is one of the major routes for illicit trafficking between Lao PDR and Thailand.

[34] Michel FOUCHER, *L'obsession Des Frontières*, Edited by Perrin (Paris, 2007), 17-18.

[35] Michel FOUCHER, *L'obsession Des Frontières*, Edited by Perrin (Paris, 2007), 7-9.

laws…- are major issues. Resultantly, a lack of knowledge and experiences as far as identification, observation, surveillance, data collection, investigation and inquiries is concerned.

Besides, wages are very low at the border areas even for law enforcement officers: between 30 and 40 dollars a month according to several UNODC experts in Laos PDR. This is intensified by high diversity between provinces. The average income per inhabitant around Vientiane was 4,5 times higher than in Oudomxay province[36] on the borders with Burma. Experts from UNODC and officers from foreign anti-trafficking agencies emphasize that customs, army and police officers at the local level in Burma earn also far less than their Thai counterparts, around 40 dollars per month. According to the Burmese Ministry of Finance and Revenue, in 2006, law officers earned between 20 and 30 dollars per month. Even if the minimum monthly salary in the public sector was set at around 1,18 dollars in 1994 and military personnel's minimum salary was increased to 11,76 dollars, officers still have to resort to corruption to live. On April 1, 2006 the military government increased public sector salary from five to twelve times, yet army's wages in Thailand are still double that of their Burmese counterparts.


Figure 1: Army's wages in Burma (2004, 2006) and Thailand (2002)[37]
Source: Ministry of Finance and Revenue, Burma, 2006 / Sébastien Proto, *l'économie souterraine en Thailande,* French Embassy, novembre 2002, 35p.

The perception of corruption, according to Transparency International in 2007, is quite high especially in the areas of diversification of illicit routes, such as Laos PDR and the Southern part of China. As we can see below corruption within police and judicial institution in Asia and the Pacific are particularly affected compared to other countries. Indeed the value of the percentage of bribery within judicial institutions and the police are the same or

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[36] Bounthavy Sisouphanthong, Christian Taillard, *Atlas de la république démocratique populaire Lao, les structures territoriales du développement économique et social*, Reclus, 2000, 24

[37] Exchange rates: Thailand: 1 $ = 43.03 Baht in average in 2002.
Burma: 1$ = 850 Kyat in May 2004 / 1 $ = 1 300 Kyat in April 2006. We decided to use here black market rate for Burma, as with official rates there is no comparison possible with Thailand as the wage would be too high (around 4 036 dollars per month for a corporal) compared to the standard of living.

even higher in Africa. However, we can see that corruption in judicial institution is in third place in Africa; it is in second place in Asia and the Pacific.


**Figure 2: Bribery in public sector in 2007**
Source: Baromètre mondial de la Corruption, 2007, Transparency International

Consequently, different kinds of corruption are more or less institutional which stems from a relationship between traffickers, or influential groups such as Wa leaders in Burma, Jao Pho in Thailand or Chinese gangs and local authorities and law enforcement officers. In return traffickers or influential persons invest in building roads or infrastructures in areas under their control or which are the under control of ethnic groups[38]. Even if there is no explicit proof at the high level in Thailand, Laos PDR and Burma of police and army officers and politician in this corruption, this situation is an advantage for organised crime to develop a parallel power at the border areas. The majority of people who are arrested are not criminal network bosses but middlemen who are doing one kind of trafficking. As army staff have an influence at the local level, their involvement in trafficking especially in remote areas in Burma, hinders the effectiveness of anti-trafficking agencies.

The third limit to a full effectiveness of the BLO mechanism at the borders between Burma, Laos PDR and Thailand is that central government and national anti-trafficking agencies do not view it as a sustainable project. As a consequence central authorities are waiting before making more commitments in term of human resources, capacities and financial resources. This structural obstacle follows from the impact of donors as defined by central authorities in their anti-trafficking agenda and activities. The BLO programme is fully financed by Japan which is one of the main targets for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Considering that donors interests depend on the intensity of the threat coming from this region, anti-trafficking strategies are less oriented by the effectiveness and the sustainability of the fight but by political and economic interests of the major donors as long as those countries are dependent on external financial aid. We can see below that interests of the main donors vary from one country to another in accordance with their national strategy. Since the mid 1990's Japan has been taking a leading role in calling for more policy attention to ATS

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[38] International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, March 2000

because of decades-long experience with ATS in the country. In the same way, due to its geographical proximity, Australia is especially interested in extending aid to Asia and the Pacific. The government highlights regional threats as a key priority with a focus on transnational organized crime, particularly relating to trafficking in human beings. This focus on human beings is shared with the United States, whose programmes are orientated towards the prevention of human trafficking and law enforcement projects. As for the European Union, the Commission[39] supports drug control activities within the framework of the fight against transnational crime with a new emphasis on challenges of globalization and goals of international peace such as security and prosperity. The Commission underlines the need for law enforcement in the fight against terrorism, migration, trafficking of human beings, money laundering, organized crime and drugs.

Main interests of Australia

- Data collection
- Law enforcement
- Prevention
- Regional cooperation and regional capacities
- Demand reduction
- ATS
- Human trafficking
- Money laundering

Main interests of Japan

- Data collection
- Law enforcement
- Prevention
- Regional cooperation and regional capacities
- Demand reduction
- ATS
- Human trafficking
- Money laundering

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[39] Through the New Partnership with South East Asia in July 2003.

Main interests of United States

| Data collection |
| Law enforcement |
| Prevention |
| Regional cooperation and regional capacities |
| Demand reduction |
| ATS |
| Human trafficking |
| Money laundering |

Main interest of the European Commission

| Data collection |
| Law enforcement |
| Prevention |
| Regional cooperation and regional capacities |
| Demand reduction |
| ATS |
| Human trafficking |
| Money laundering |

Figure 3: Donors priorities in Southeast Asia
Sources: UNODC, SPF Projects and donor Priorities, 01/2007 / UNODC, Donor Assessments, 2007

3. The concept of "transnational organized anti-trafficking strategy".

As we can see above, interests of donors vary not only in terms of anti-trafficking initiatives but also in terms of the kind of trafficking they are targeting such as human beings or endangered species. South East Asia, particularly the border areas between Burma, Laos PDR and Thailand are no longer the origin of major illicit drugs for North America and Europe's markets, therefore those donors have transferred part of their money to activities against human trafficking in the same region. As a consequence, it is no longer relevant to focus projects on one kind of trafficking as it had done during the 20th century.

a. To unify anti-trafficking policies; toward a transversal approach

As modalities of smuggling and routes of trafficking are similar between Burma, Laos PDR and Thailand, it would be relevant and effective to accumulate best practices, knowledge and capacities of different anti-trafficking agencies in order to develop a global

strategy to fight against all kinds of trafficking in the Greater Mekong Subregion. The implication is to be able to make governmental, non-governmental and international agencies working in the region develop more multi-agencies coordination. However, a global strategy with local implementation that takes into account weaknesses and strength at the local and at the national level needs to be created. We can highlight here for example the necessity in Burma and in Laos PDR to negotiate both with the central government and with local actors in order to be able to implement such a project.

The idea of a global strategy is to pass from fights against various kinds of illegal activities to the fight against trafficking. The main objective is to unify a fight which has been compartmentalized for a centuary and to elaborate a common strategy. This international system is indeed facing obstacles at two levels, decision-making and operational (capacities, local and national priorities, development…). In order to propose more effective answers to illicit trafficking, strategies have to follow the same structure of traffickers and organized crime, that is to say to integrate all kind of trafficking and to develop transnational organized investigation[40] and cooperation.

One of the main obstacles to this unification is the dimension that drug control policies have reached in domestic security strategies especially in Thailand and in Burma. Through a conscious or unconscious development of the concept of International Drug Complex by the central authorities, traffickers and organized crime linked to illicit drug trafficking have become the new enemies for the stability and the security of the regime. As law enforcement staff and traffickers are working at the same levels (local, national and transnational) and are both increasing their influence on society as they strengthen their power and authority, Hans van der Veen highlights that "*the 'War on Drugs' is so in many respects taking over the functions of the Cold War, in legitimizing the coercive use of state powers to foster internal order and discipline, but also in setting up control mechanisms to defend the state and society against external threats, at home and abroad. The internationalization of police cooperation and the concomitant proliferation of tools to intervene in the sovereignty of individuals, peoples and foreign countries is, however, highly liable to decrease the prospect of a world order in which peace, justice and freedom could develop*"[41]. The United Nations deal with drug trafficking as a security threat. Since the end of the Cold War the concept of security integrates both traditional hard threats and new stakes (soft threats). Those new threats do not follow anymore the ancient western concept of borders; there are transnational and the actors are not a State. As drug trafficking is not an action against the State, it is not a traditional threat for national security[42]. However the more the power of the State and its capacities to maintain domestic order are decreasing (through globalization, lack of territorial unification…), the more the actions of the central government can be seen as an exacerbation of threats such as drug trafficking. The idea of this is that drug trafficking represents a parallel power which is able to weaken internal and external security[43]. We can for example view the operation as "the Kingdom's Unity for Victory over Drugs"[44]. Through this new initiative, the Thai government is trying to use the concept of War on Drug again and to unify the population in a context which lacks stability.

It is necessary to break this vicious circle of drug control policies. One way to do so could be to decompartmentalize anti-trafficking policies through the development of a matrix of anti-trafficking initiatives.

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[40] Michel Bonnieu, senior legal advisor, UNODC Bangkok, September 2007.

[41] Hans T. van der VEEN, "The International Drug Complex," Université d'Amsterdam, Août 2000

[42] Niklas SWANSTROM, "The Narcotics Trade: A Threat to Security? National and Transnational Implications," *Global Crime* février 2007, 25.

[43] Guillermo AUREANO, « *L'État et la prohibition de (certaines) drogues* », Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien 32 (juillet-décembre 2001) : 15-38 ; Richard B. Craig, « *Illicit Drug Traffic and US-Latin American relation* », The Washington quarterly, 1985, vol 8, n°4, pp 105-124.

[44] 1 April – 30 September 2008

b. A network of anti-trafficking initiatives within transnational organized strategies.

Nowadays traffickers have established themselves in organized criminal networks. They include different kinds of trafficking and increasing their structure through well-connected systems particularly among countries which share common borders. Linked across territorial borders, criminal groups have embraced today's globalized economy and the technological advances that go with it. They have learned to exploit differences between the laws of one jurisdiction and another. Legitimate freedoms offered by increasingly borders opening and accessible markets are distorted by them to further their illegal enterprises. As a result, transnational organised crime presents a global challenge that can only be successfully met with a global response. Kofi Annan highlighted in Palermo on December 12 2002[45] that « *if crime crosses all borders, so must law enforcement. If the rule of law is undermined not only in one country, but in many, then those who defend it cannot limit themselves to purely national means. If the enemies of progress and human rights seek to exploit the openness and opportunities of globalisation for their purposes, then we must exploit those very same factors to defend human rights, and defeat the forces of crime, corruption, and trafficking in human beings*". This implies that anti-trafficking officers have to take into account, as defined in global strategies, that traffickers are working in networks on territories where they develop a strong influence, or sometimes a control like in Wa area, due to the fragile context of remote border areas.

Phil Williams and Roy Godson[46] have developed a macro-model of organized crime which highlights push and pull factors. To conclude we have tried to analyze how these models may fit to the situation in the border areas between Burma, Laos PDR and Thailand. Border areas between Burma and Lao PDR and with Chinese province of Yunnan may be characterized by the political model. Indeed the "weak state" model fit both to the geopolitical context in North Western part of Laos PDR and in Shan State; the second model characterizes the situation of the border areas in Burma with China, Laos PDR and Thailand more.

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[45] Roderic BROADHURST (dir.), "Bridging the Gap, a Global Alliance Perspective on Transnational Organized Crime," in *Bridging the gap, a global alliance perspective on transnational organized crime* (Hong Kong, 18-21 mars 2002), 299

[46] Phil WILLIAMS and Roy GODSON, "Anticipating Organised and Transnational Crime," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 37 (2002), in Roderic BROADHURST (dir.), "Bridging the Gap, a Global Alliance Perspective on Transnational Organized Crime," in *Bridging the gap, a global alliance perspective on transnational organized crime* (Hong Kong, 18-21 mars 2002), 299.

Political condition	Implications	Results
Weak State.	Opportunities for organized crime to develop with little interference. Organized crime: a substitute for protective and regulatory functions of the State.	Organized crime can flourish and use some parts of the state as a home base.
States characterized by ethnic conflict, insurgency or terrorism.	Rival factions use criminal activities to fund their political struggle, use trade and other embargoes as an opportunity for trafficking and profiteering.	Increase in organized crime, within the region; conflict cessation leads to transformation of terrorist organizations into primarily criminal organizations.

The economic model, especially the market dynamics, highlights the situation in Thailand which attracts the majority of illicit trafficking originated from Burma and Laos PDR.

Economic condition	Implications	Results
Market dynamics	Organized crime responds to market dynamics and exploits demand for its goods and services, especially in prohibited markets.	Criminal organizations become major participants in a variety of criminal markets, but will not have a monopoly over these markets.

The social model can be fully adapted to the situation in border areas between Thailand, Laos PDR and Burma. As a result, both drugs and human trafficking are firmly implanted in those remote areas.

Social model	Implications	Results
Cultural and sub-cultural model based on patron-client relations, ties of kinship or patterns of corruption.	Loyalty is not to state but to kin or ethnic group; personal exchange relationships are more important than rule of law.	Criminal organizations flourish, creating crime-corruption networks that are difficult to eradicate.
Ethnic network model based on ethnic ties in immigrant communities	Transnational ethnic networks and marginalized immigrant communities provide cover and recruitment for criminal organizations and are difficult for law enforcement to penetrate.	Diaspora may be followed by the growth of organized criminality and host societies experience diversification of organized crime.
Social network model based on the notion that networks are not "disorganised" but sophisticated organizational forms.	Organised crime can be understood in terms of networks characterized by high levels of flexibility, rebundancy, resilience and capacity to cross boundaries.	Crime networks extend into the licit political and economic spheres across national borders: resistant to traditional law enforcement.

So multi-component (political, economic and social) factors may be used to understand better why traffickers and transnational organized crime have developed their illicit activities in the remote border areas between Burma, Laos PDR and Thailand. If we still follow the models proposed by Phil Williams and Roy Godson, the transnational organized crime characterizes the situation of border areas between Burma and Laos PDR while the transshipment model characterizes the situation of Thailand more.

Composite model	Implications	Results
Transnational organized crime model	Transnational criminal organizations operate from a safe home base characterized by weak government, economic dislocation, social upheaval and integration into the global economy.	Transnational criminal organizations take control of much of the domestic economy of vulnerable states and operate in a variety of host states with lucrative markets and ethnic networks.
Transshipment model	Organized crime identify and exploit states where there is ease of transit to the final destination for the transshipment of illicit goods.	Coastal states with large export markets subject to corruption or instability are major targets for transshipment for illicit goods.

Extract from: Phil WILLIAMS and Roy GODSON, "Anticipating Organised and Transnational Crime," *Crime, Law and Social Change* 37 (2002), 311-355, in Roderic BROADHURST (dir.), "Bridging the Gap, a Global Alliance Perspective on Transnational Organized Crime," in *Bridging the gap, a global alliance perspective on transnational organized crime* (Hong Kong, 18-21 mars 2002), 299.

Conclusion

The areas on the borders of Burma, Lao PDR and Thailand are a crossroads, both for licit and illicit trade. A dual process defines it: a high increase of regional circulation and a movement of compartmentalization of the sovereignty. Countering illicit activities which have been perpetuated by fragile socio-economic and political factors is linked to central authorities with a process of control of the circulation and within the recent process and affirmation of state-building. The overall aim is to create "*synapses*" or controlled synapses at these borders and to have sustained power over networks that are increasing across national borders. The question is whether it is possible for the central governments, in view of the fragile situations at the borders of the three countries, to enhance the potentiality of legal crossroads and to use the buffer centrality of remote areas to get over an age-old unstable relationships with neighbouring countries. Indeed through strong border controls and zones of coordinated enforcement within Burma, Lao PDR and Thailand current anti-drug strategies may be partly compared to the drug security belt in and around Afghanistan required by Russia, China and India since the beginning of the XXI century[47].

At the local level this happens in a context of lack of control (or legitimacy) of the central government in remote areas, lack of capacities on the borders and different priorities in domestic agendas. Within the recent process of state-building criminal organized crime increases their influence at the local level and appears as a substitute for the power of the State.

At the international level one of the main obstacles of the international system for sustainable anti-trafficking strategies is the fluctuations of donors' funding according to their domestic interests. The new trend toward a transnational approach of anti-trafficking policies could be an advantage for the State to avoid lack of sustainable capacities and funding to fight against domestic threats. This could also enhance the effectiveness of control illicit networks by accumulated capacities. The objective for the central government is to reach spatial continuity and sustainable information-sharing in order to bring networks and territories linked by those networks under control.

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[47] Transnational Institute, *Afghanistan, Merging Wars, Drugs and Terrorism*, Drugs and conflict n°3, December 2001.

Synthesis

	Major Cities
	Boundaries
	Transhipment model (local level)
	Market dynamic (high)
	Market dynamic (medium)

Model of situations at the border areas

	Transhipment Model
	Transnational organized crime Model
	Weak State Model
	Ethnic Network Model
	Cultural / subcultural Model
	Ethnic conflict, insurgency

Routes of trafficking and smuggling

	Diversification of trafficking/smuggling routes
	Traditionnel routes of trafficking and smuggling
	Major routes towards international markets

Map 9: Synthesis of socio-economic and political contexts between Burma, Lao PDR and Thailand.

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