

INDONESIAN PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) AND INTERPEACE ACEH PROGRAMME REVIEW

FINAL REPORT

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Indonesian Peace Institute-Interpeace Aceh programme (IIAP) started to operate in January 2007. Legally and formally speaking the programme so far has been largely an Interpeace Aceh programme, as the Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI) was being newly created and had to be registered, and as the relationship between IPI and Interpeace then had to be formalised. Collaboration with an Indonesian partner has been an objective and a prerequisite from the outset however and Indonesians associated with the legal creation of IPI have been active in support of the programme from the very beginning. For the sake of simplicity, this report refers throughout to the IIAP.

A Review Team consisting of Bivitri Susanti and Minna Fredriksson has had the opportunity to closer examine IIAP and the context it operates in by interviewing its management and staff as well as stakeholders in addition to document review. The review took place in Jakarta, Banda Aceh and three districts: Lhokseumawe, Aceh Tengah and Aceh Barat; between May 5 and June 25, 2008.

Special attention was given to the stakeholders' perceptions of critical issues for supporting and strengthening the peace process in their districts. Another important set of questions concerned their perceptions of the role and performance of IIAP to date in light of the contextual developments in their districts. Interviews with members of IIAP management and staff concentrated on a set of performance criteria and a set of questions that would highlight institutional strengths and opportunities for improvement from a quality management perspective.

The stakeholders in the districts were overall positive towards the role and performance of IIAP and made several references to situations where IIAP Field Facilitators had been playing an important role in bridging misunderstandings and differences of opinion between or within groups and building greater trust between different actors. They were also positive toward the use of dialogue as a mean to achieve this objective and recognized the IIAP, with references to IIAP's relationship to AMM and CMI, as an agency with enough credibility and clout to carry out this difficult task.

The interviews also revealed a couple of concerns held by stakeholders. The first concern is the expectations that IIAP is a continuation of the AMM. Although many say they have understood that IIAP is not the same as AMM, they say they want to understand what the differences are, in particular in responding to violations of the MoU. This relates to the second concern which is the lack of understanding/information regarding the responses of IIAP to serious incidents/cases. The third concern relates to the lack of information on IPI among not only stakeholders and the general public but also with IIAP staff.

The Review Team believes these concerns all relate to the lack of procedures and understanding on how the IIAP gathers, selects and uses the information from field level, as well as procedures on how the IIAP informs stakeholders and the general public about its motives, plans, activities and results.

Institutional and programme development objectives have been met for financial administrative procedures. Logistical objectives have also been met to a large extent with the establishment of IIAP head office in Banda Aceh and district offices in 6 districts throughout Aceh equipped with cars, laptops, USB flash discs and mobile phones. Recruitment objectives have partly been met with 13 Field Facilitators, Programme Manager, Regional Coordinator, Programme Officer based in Banda Aceh, and Senior Advisor: Helsinki MoU and Legal Expert and Interpeace Indonesia Director contracted for IIAP. Most programme support staff such as finance and administrative staff were successfully recruited during 2007.

The major challenge in institutional and programme development has been for Interpeace to understand and adjust to the untraditional two-pronged strategy of IIAP. Interpeace's approach to peacebuilding covers the full spectrum of society, from the grassroots to the political elite but works typically through informal processes. The IIAP, however, mixes an informal process with a more formal process among the key political actors that negotiated the peace agreement. It has taken time and effort on behalf of all parties involved, both at HQ, Jakarta and Aceh to discuss and agree on the best institutional set up as well as programme design for ensuring that Interpeace would be effective and efficient in supporting and strengthening the peace process in Aceh. A key decision and achievement to this end is the creation and partnership agreement with IPI and the agreement to make the initial Interpeace Aceh programme into a joint IPI-Interpeace programme. The important strategic question of how to strategize and manage the two-pronged strategy and balance the IIAP defusing role with a more preventative and promoting role will have to be continued and preferably in consultation with IIAP Field Facilitators. Within the scope of this review, the Review Team has only concluded that what IIAP has done up to date has been relevant according to stakeholders interviewed.

Despite the frustrations and difficulties experienced with institutional and programme development and the time it has taken for HQ and Indonesia-based staff to deliberate and agree on how to plan and execute the envisioned programme, the Review Team believes that it is exactly the two-pronged strategy or what has been referred to in the Review as the "multi-layered strategy" which at the same time presents the distinctiveness and added value of the IIAP in supporting and strengthening the Aceh peace process. Research on peace practice such as Reflecting on Peace Practice Project by Collaborative for Development Action claims that there is strong evidence that the most effective ways to support sustainable peace is to link engagement of 'more people' (i.e. broader societal involvement) with the engagement of 'key people' and to make sure changes on individual/personal level is transferred into policy change on the socio-political level. The two-pronged strategy of IIAP, with key persons such as Juha Christensen and Dr. Farid Husain on board on provincial, national and international level and skilled Field Facilitators recognized by key stakeholders on local level, gives IIAP a good foundation for supporting and strengthening the peace process in Aceh. One of the opportunities for improvement identified by the Review Team is to strengthen the role and performance of the IIAP on the provincial level.

As a result of the time and effort that have had to be spent on deliberating and agreeing on overall institutional and programme design including management set up, there has been

very little attention given to staff management. The IIAP needs to establish procedures for human resources management. Planning, recruiting, evaluating and enhancing capacity of management and staff members are an important part of ensuring high quality performance and results. There was a Foundational Learning Workshop in November 2007 for 11 Field Facilitators, Banda Aceh Programme and Programme Support Staff. Despite the identified need, the workshop preliminary scheduled for early 2008 has not yet been arranged. A very specific concern of the Review Team is the lack of procedures for dealing with security concerns that Field Facilitators might face as a consequence of the work they do for IIAP. Some developments in staff management are currently in progress, namely key performance indicators for all staff members as well as updated job descriptions.

Key output of the IIAP has been 10 FGDs in six districts, four MoU Round Table meetings and three FKK-KPA meetings. IIAP also arranged a big seminar in August 2007 *"Refleksi Dua Tahun MoU Helsinki/ Reflecting on Two Years of Helsinki MoU,"* in Banda Aceh with approximately 200 participants including prominent persons such as the Governor, the head of Aceh parliament and commander of provincial military in Aceh. Another seminar *"Peace Processes in Indonesia"* was arranged by IIAP in Jakarta on May 7, 2008 and approximately 250 persons attended the event. The seminar was arranged in conjunction with a breakfast seminar for representatives exclusively held for the diplomatic community in Jakarta. Approximately 50 persons attended the breakfast seminar that hosted among others former President of Finland and chairman of CMI and Interpeace, Martti Ahtisaari.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Review Team found that IIAP has realized many of the immediate start up objectives in the first year of its operation, though with some notes. The Review Team has also identified several opportunities for improvement that would assist in enhancing the performance and strategic relevance of the IIAP. Specifically, the Review Team recommends:

1. Strategy Planning
 - The IIAP needs to establish a strategy that defines the approach and intentions IIAP within the Aceh context.
 - There is need to prepare a workplan that can best translate the strategy in the framework of current Aceh context. IIAP actually has contextual information on the situation from the field facilitators. This information should be analysed and discussed in order to create a contextual and concrete workplan.
2. Processes
 - The management should together with field facilitators and staff members start to describe and map the major processes within the programme in order to enhance the understanding of how various activities are linked towards desired outcomes. Part of the mapping should be to establish mechanisms for evaluating activities in the processes as well as define responsibilities.
 - Explore possibilities for strategic alliances that could enhance programme performance and results.
3. Public Relation and Stakeholders' Expectation Management

- Establish a communication plan in order to communicate its intentions, plans, activities and results to stakeholders as well as the public. If not including the media, the IIAP should at least have a strategy for handling the media.
 - The location of the district offices needs to be discussed again within IIAP Staff in order to clarify the management's recommendation that it is the field facilitators who recommends a location that minimizes suspicion and mistrust, and maximizes the perception of IIAP as an impartial actor by key stakeholders and community.
4. Networking
- Broaden network and communication with the other organizations working on relevant issues, both local and national as well as international ones. The organizations working on peacebuilding and peacebuilding-related activities highly regard IIAP's approach and strength in terms of high-level networking. This view is strategic for IIAP in achieving its outcomes.
5. Management
- Put high priority to the establishment of a defined management system for the IIAP that provides the programme with ways to continuously assess and enhance capacity and results.
 - Communication lines between IIAP Indonesia-based management staff should be defined and regularly evaluated. The communication lines between Indonesia-based management staff and US and Geneva-based management staff also needs to be systemized into procedures.
6. Information and Analysis
- Establish clear procedures and systems for how the programme collects, selects and analyses information.
 - Develop mechanism for linking information and analysis of the situation on the ground with the strategic planning.
7. Staff Commitment and Development
- Establish procedures for human resources management.
 - Make sure everyone has a designated supervisor and that the responsibilities are clarified.
 - Develop mechanism for recognizing and rewarding achievements of individual staff to encourage development and improvement of not only personal performance but also to enhance programme capacity and results.
8. Results
- Define indicators but also operationalize the indicators by developing mechanisms for how to measure results. A better understanding among the staff of the outcomes/results/impact of the programme is a good way to booster motivation and inspiration.
 - Presenting outcomes/results of IIAP will be important for sustaining and strengthening trust from stakeholders as well as support from general public for the programme.
 - Based on the evaluations of FGDs by facilitators and participants the programme can measure and document outcomes/results of FGDs in a systematic way. The programme should develop a way to document and measure to what extent the IIAP facilitated dialogues support the desired outcome of sustainable peace in Aceh.

- Taking into the consideration the politically sensitive nature of the high-level dialogues, the IIAP should try to find a way to link programme results on the local level with results achieved in the high-level dialogues in order for IIAP staff as well as stakeholders and the public to better understand the role and results of IIAP.

9. Stakeholder Satisfaction

- IIAP would benefit from defining indicators for stakeholder satisfaction. Establish procedures for measuring stakeholders' satisfaction in order to inform strategy. Evaluations should be built into not only FGDs but also other activities where IIAP interacts with stakeholders.

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GLOSSARY

Indonesian/Acehnese Terms and Titles

Bupati	District Head
Duek Pakat	Acehnese term for discussion for deliberation. The terms is used for FGD by IIAP programme
Geuchik	Village Head (Acehnese title)
Kepala Desa	Village Head (Indonesian title)
Kabupaten	District
Kecamatan	Sub-district
Muspika	<i>Musyawarah pimpinan kecamatan</i> /Deliberative and decision-making meeting with sub-district leaders from civil authorities, military and police.
Dandim	Commander of District Military
Kapolres	Head of District Police

Districts in Aceh

Aceh Tengah	Central Aceh
Aceh Besar	Great Aceh
Aceh Utara	North Aceh
Aceh Barat	West Aceh
Aceh Selatan	South Aceh
Aceh Timur	East Aceh

Acronyms

ABAS	<i>Aceh Barat Selatan</i> , a name for an area meant to be a new province within Aceh given by a group of people who claim that the unfair wealth distribution to this particular area of Aceh has to be solved by separating this area from Aceh province. ABAS consists of Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, Simeulue, Aceh Barat Daya and Aceh Selatan.
ALA	<i>Aceh Leuser Antara</i> , just like "ABAS", this is a name for an area meant to be a new province within Aceh given by a group of people who claim that the unfair wealth distribution to this particular area of Aceh has to be solved by separating this area from Aceh province. ALA consists of Aceh Tengah, Bener Meriah, Singkil, Aceh Tenggara, Subulussalam and Gayo Lues
AMM	Aceh Monitoring Mission, EU/ASEAN sponsored monitoring mission following the Helsinki MoU
APRC	Aceh Peace Resource Center, an advisory board to the Head of BRA that serves as a supporting institution providing managerial support as well as donor relations and coordination.
BRA	<i>Badan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh</i> /the Aceh Reintegration and Peace Authority

BRR	<i>Badan Rehabilitasi dan Rekonstruksi NAD-Nias</i> /The Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Executing Agency for NAD-Nias
CMI	Crisis Management Initiative, a Finnish NGO chaired by President Martti Ahtisaari who led the negotiations of the MoU. CMI is being part of the dispute settlement mechanism agreed upon in the MoU.
CoHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
COSPA	Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EFQM	European Foundation of Quality Management
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FKK	<i>Forum Komunikasi dan Kordinasi</i> /Forum for Communication and Coordination. FKK was established by the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs for facilitating dialogues between stakeholders in various conflicts in Indonesia when needed.
Forbes Damai	<i>Forum Bersama Damai</i> or Forum to Support Peace in Aceh, a multi-stakeholders advisory board of the BRA.
GoI	Government of Indonesia
GAM	<i>Gerakan Aceh Merdeka</i> or Free Aceh Movement
HRC	Human Rights Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
IIAP	Indonesian Peace Institute - Interpeace Aceh Programme
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPI	Indonesian Peace Institute or <i>Institut Perdamaian Indonesia</i>
KIP	<i>Komisi Independen Pemilihan</i> /the Independent Elections Commission
KPA	<i>Komite Peralihan Aceh</i> or Aceh Transitional Committee; the post-peace agreement transitional political body of the GAM
LoGA	Law on the Governance of Aceh
MoU Helsinki	Memorandum of Understanding, peace agreement signed in Helsinki, August 15, 2005 between GoI and GAM.
NGO	Non-Government Organization
PILKADA	Pemilihan Kepala Daerah or the Elections of Governor, <i>Bupatis</i> and Mayor
POLRI	<i>Polisi Republik Indonesia</i> or Indonesian National Police
SIQ	Swedish Institute of Quality Management
SIRA	<i>Sentra Informasi Referendum Aceh</i> or the Aceh Referendum Information Center
TNA	<i>Tentara Neugara Aceh</i> or Aceh-State Military
TNI	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> Indonesian National Military
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

1. INTRODUCTION

Peacebuilding in Aceh is still in the early stage, considering that the peace is still very young and the decades-long conflict preceding the peace. The Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the work of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) have provided the foundation for peace, but we are still at the early stages of a process leading to normalization and sustainable peace. During the mandate of AMM, some senior Indonesian officials and Interpeace, whose governing chair President Martti Ahtisaari mediated the peace negotiations that resulted in the MoU, converged in the awareness that a more sustained peace consolidation process is required in Aceh post-AMM. Based on this awareness the Indonesian Peace Institute-Interpeace Aceh Programme (IIAP) was conceptualized and established, with the primary goal to contribute to consolidating an enabling environment for the continued implementation of the MoU while bringing about social reconciliation in Aceh.

Legally and formally speaking the programme so far has been largely an Interpeace Aceh programme, as the Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI) was being newly created and had to be registered, and as the relationship between IPI and Interpeace then had to be formalised. Collaboration with an Indonesian partner has been an objective and a prerequisite from the outset however, and Indonesians associated with the legal creation of IPI have been active in support of the programme from the very beginning. For the sake of simplicity, this report refers throughout to the IIAP.

The IIAP started to develop its managerial, operational, administrative and logistical capacities in earnest after the departure of AMM, i.e. in January 2007 and then the operational phase commenced in June 2007. One of the key fundamental principles for all Interpeace work is to strive for national/local ownership and the programme in Aceh is no exception. It also bears mentioning that in the case of Indonesia, Interpeace would not have been able to operate in Indonesia without a local partner. The strengthening of Indonesian ownership of the programme has been cultivated throughout. On April 1, 2008, a Cooperation Agreement between the Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI – *Institut Perdamaian Indonesia*) and Interpeace was signed and the programme's name was changed from the Interpeace Aceh Programme into the IIAP.

As it is commonplace for Interpeace-supported programmes to be regularly monitored, reviewed and evaluated, it is apposite for the IIAP to be reviewed at this point in time. The principal purpose of the review is to test the extent to which the current strategic, operational and administrative management of the programme are on track and what adjustments might be made to improve the programme. The three key topics for this review are: (a) the strategic relevance of the programme within a wider conflict analysis; (b) the performance to date of the programme and (c) the overall appreciation of the programme.

The review started on May 5 and ended on June 16, 2008. The review mission took place in Geneva and Indonesia by two independent consultants, Bivitri Susanti (team leader) and

Minna Fredriksson (collectively, the Review Team). This report contains the findings of the Review Team during the review process and analyses as well as recommendations to improve the programme.

2. METHODOLOGY

The review started on May 5, 2008 by initial document collection and review in Banda Aceh as well as coordination between the two reviewers and between the Review Team and the IIAP management. A small meeting with the key staff in Banda Aceh was held by the Team Leader on May 6 to inform them about the review and to elaborate on the purpose and the methodology of the review as it appeared that they were not aware of the review. The Review Team's needs of the necessary documents and information and the plan for the interviews and field trip were also discussed in the meeting.

The Review Team agreed on a division of work for the purpose of efficiency and effectiveness. Bivitri Susanti focused on the strategic relevance of the programme, while Minna Fredriksson focused on IIAP's performance and operational capacities. Both consultants, however, continuously discussed their respective focuses with each other and assisted and supported each other's work. While both members of the Review Team worked closely together, to ensure certainty of timely delivery, Bivitri Susanti played the role as the Team Leader responsible for finalizing and submitting the final report, including the inception report and mid-term update.

Based on the initial meeting, review of project document and coordination between the two reviewers, the Inception Report was developed as required in the Terms of Reference of the Review (see Annex 8).

A series of interviews were then conducted in Banda Aceh and Jakarta by Bivitri Susanti in the week of 12-16 May. Bivitri Susanti also had an opportunity to attend a team building workshop in Grand Nanggroe Hotel, Banda Aceh on May 14, 2008. The attendance in the team building workshop was important for gaining valuable information regarding the development of the organization since all field facilitators and management of IIAP were present and shared their views and concerns.

Minna Fredriksson started her part of the review on May 19th with document review, coordination with Bivitri Susanti and development of a bilingual framework for performance assessment to be used in discussions with IIAP staff in Geneva, Jakarta and Aceh. Minna then conducted interviews with Interpeace and IIAP management and staff in Geneva, Jakarta and Banda Aceh from 22 May to 30 May.

After a series of interviews conducted separately by the Review Team members, a field trip to three districts was carried out from June 2 to June 6 by both members of the Review Team accompanied by a driver of IIAP.

The criteria for the choice of districts to visit were: (i) districts where there are obvious tensions that could lead to new conflict; (ii) districts where IIAP has had the most activities

to date; and (iii) if possible, districts representing the commonly used geographical division in Aceh (north, central highland, west and east) in order to get different contexts. Based on those criteria as well as the efficiency of the trip, three districts were visited, namely Lhokseumawe (northern part of Aceh), Aceh Tengah (central part of Aceh), and Aceh Barat (western part of Aceh).

The Review Team interviewed various stakeholders ranging from Bupati (District Heads) to members of KPA (*Komite Peralihan Aceh* or Aceh Transitional Committee; the post-peace agreement transitional political body of the GAM). In-depth interviews with the field facilitators were also conducted at the field offices in order to gain information about the actual work they have been doing on the ground.

In total, 46 formal interviews were conducted by the Review Team (see Annex 5 for the list of people interviewed) in Geneva, Banda Aceh, Lhokseumawe, Takengon, Aceh Barat and Jakarta. In addition, the field trip experience and face-to-face communication with the stakeholders as well as the IIAP staff during the review were valuable in enriching the Review Team's comprehension of the programme.

The draft report was submitted on June 16, 2008 and then discussed by the Review Team and the IIAP management in Jakarta.

Performance Assessment

To guide us through the assessment of the performance and capacity of IIAP, the Review Team used the following framework:

- The Terms of Reference provided detailed questions to be answered.
- A framework to guide us in the research and analysis of IIAPs performance capacity was developed from the assessment models of European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) and Swedish Institute for Quality Management (SIQ). The EFQM-model and the SIQ-model divides the organization into various parts/criteria and for this review the various parts/criteria discussed with management and staff were:



- In order to explore the strengths and weaknesses in the criteria above, the interviews with IIAP management and staff members were structured around the following questions;
 1. How do you do in order to...? (Is there a defined procedure/method of how this is done in your organization/programme?)
 2. To what extent do you apply it...? (If there is a defined procedure/method, is it applied on relevant parts and at relevant times?)
 3. How does your procedures/methods of doing things relate to outcomes/results? (Is there a conscious effort to assess if you are doing things in the most effective way..?)
 4. How do you evaluate and improve what you do? (Are the procedures/methods used systematically evaluated and improved?)

The framework applies a process oriented approach with process mapping and analysis as important tools in understanding the capacity of the programme. Processes should be understood as a chain of activities leading to the desired results/outcomes of the programme.

The EFQM and SIQ-models emphasize the understanding, among members of management and staff, of how a single activity is part of a larger process leading toward the desired results/outcomes, as something essential for an organisation/programme in assuring high quality performance and results.

In addition to the systematic interviews with IIAP management and staff, the Review Team also discussed with stakeholders their perceptions of IIAPs performance and capacity. Questions regarding programme performance were for example “- What is your understanding of IIAPs effectiveness in supporting peace in Aceh?” “- What results can you see from IIAPs presence/work in Aceh?”

The Report’s Presentation

This report is organized according to the requirements stated in the Terms of Reference for the review. As such, the Review Team uses the three key topics to present the findings, provides a brief background of the conflict in Aceh, time lines to indicate important events during AMM mandate as well as during the period of January 2007 up to May 2008 and attaches a map of Aceh, the list of interviewees, the list of key documents consulted and two case studies as annexes. However, in organizing findings, analyses and supporting evidence, the Review Team opted to incorporate the evidence into the findings section in each key topic to make the report more coherent and easy to read instead of putting the supporting evidence in a separate section. The supporting evidence is presented in the forms of direct quotations from the interviews as well as reference to certain documents and interviews in the footnotes.

3. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Indonesia's Province of Aceh is located on the northern tip of the island of Sumatra and consists of 21 districts (see the map of Aceh in Annex 1). War and conflict in Aceh can be traced back to the colonization of the "Indonesian archipelago". Acehnese take pride as the strongest centre of resistance in Indonesia's history against colonial Dutch rule.

The conflict situation, however, continued after Indonesia's independence. The history of Aceh narrates grievances towards Indonesia's central government. Promises given to the province by President Soekarno in relation to Darul Islam movement in 1953¹ was never fulfilled. Further, under President Suharto the revenue of Aceh's natural resources poured to Jakarta with little attention to the prosperity of the Acehnese. This situation resulted in the feeling of being 'colonized' by the Indonesian government.

On December 4, 1976, Tengku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro announced the Declaration of Independence of Aceh Sumatra in Aceh in the name of the "National Liberation Front of Aceh, Sumatra" (NLFAS). This front is known as the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* or GAM). The GAM movement was responded by counter-insurgency operations from 1976 onwards. From 1989 to 1998 the Government of Indonesia (GoI) declared Aceh as "*Daerah Operasi Militer*" or military operations area.

The first peace negotiation attempt led to the Humanitarian Pause brokered by an international NGO the Henry Dunant Center (HDC). On May 12, 2000 the GoI and the GAM signed the document entitled "The Joint Understanding for Humanitarian Pause for Aceh", but it collapsed not long after it was signed. Further, in December 2002, a renewed effort, again facilitated by HDC, led to the signing of the "Cessation of Hostilities Agreement" (COHA). This new agreement, however, also collapsed in May 2003, which led to the application of military emergency in Aceh by GoI.

However, in June 2003, behind-the-scene preparations to encourage the parties to continue their efforts to reach a peaceful solution through dialogue were initiated. In addition to these extensive preparations, the devastation and impact of the December 26, 2004 Tsunami brought about a renewed momentum to the peace process and accelerated negotiations. Mediated by the Chairman of the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and Interpeace, former President of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, the GoI and GAM signed the MoU in Helsinki on 15 August 2005. This led to the establishment of the EU/ASEAN sponsored AMM, which mandate was to monitor initial implementation of key elements set out in the MoU.

Between August 2005 and the departure of AMM in mid-December 2006, key provisions of the MoU were implemented: disarming and demobilisation of former GAM and self-defence groups; the withdrawal of "non-organic"² military and security personnel from Aceh; and the

¹ Darul Islam is an Islamic movement in the 1950s seeking to transform Indonesia into an Islamic state.

² Non-organic means centrally as opposed to locally recruited and deployed (=organic) military and policy forces.

enactment of the Law on the Governance of Aceh (LoGA) that contains provisions mandated in the MoU.

Table 1. Time Line of Events, September 2005 - December 2006

• August 2005	GAM political prisoners were given amnesty (30 August), some GAM prisoners were pardoned on Indonesia's independence day (17 August)
• September 2005	AMM was deployed to Aceh (15 Sept)
	The first decommissioning of GAM weapons and the first relocation of TNI (<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> or Indonesian Armed Forces) and POLRI (<i>Kepolisian Republik Indonesia</i> or Indonesian Police Force) non-organic forces (completed on 26 September).
• October 2005	The completion of the first instalment of money allocations for former GAM combatants (12 October)
	The second phase of decommissioning and relocation (completed on 24 October)
	Indonesia ratified International Covenant On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights (Law No. 11 of 2005) and International Covenant On Civil And Political Rights (Law No. 12 of 2005) (28 October)
	The completion of the second instalment of money allocations for former GAM combatants (31 October)
• November 2005	The third phase of decommissioning and relocation (completed on 22 November)
• December 2005	Some Bupatis announced that they will strive for the establishment of the provinces of Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS).
	The final process of decommissioning (completed on 21 December)
	The establishment of KPA is announced by GAM leadership (27 December)
	The final relocation of non-organic troops (TNI) out of Aceh (29 December)
	The final relocation of non-organic police force out of Aceh (31 December)
• January 2006	The completion of the third instalment of money allocations for former GAM combatants
• February 2006	BRA established (15 Feb)
	Council of Europe extended the operation of AMM from March 15, 2006 to June 15, 2006 (27 Feb)
• May 2006	Council of Europe extended the operation of AMM to September 15, 2006 (11 May)
• July 2006	The LoGA was passed by the Indonesian parliament (11 July)
• August 2006	The LoGA was enacted as Law No. 11 of 2006 and came into effect (1 August)
• September 2006	Council of Europe extended the operation of AMM to December 15, 2006 (7 September)
• October 2006	EU Election Observation Mission was deployed (30 October)
• December 2006	Elections of Governor, <i>Bupatis</i> and Mayor (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah or Pilkada) (11 December)

	Kompas Newspaper: Peter Feith mentioned Interpeace as replacement to AMM (14 December)
	AMM departed from Aceh (15 December)

Political Developments

The enactment of the LoGA on August 1, 2006 brought about not only a better set up for safeguarding human rights and good governance of Aceh, but also a significant change in Acehnese politics. The LoGA created the basis for a more open political space in Aceh by allowing independent candidates to run in the Elections of Governor, *Bupatis* and Mayor (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah or Pilkada) in the first election in Aceh after the enactment of the LoGA and the establishment of local political parties. The independent candidacy has been adopted into the Indonesian legal system, which is also applicable in Aceh for future elections, due to the the decision of Indonesian Constitutional Court in July 2007, which mentions the 2006 Aceh election in the reasoning.

On December 11, 2006, the first Pilkada after the enactment of LoGA was held. The EU Election Observation Mission noted that there was an 80 per cent turnout. The independent candidate pair of Irwandi Yusuf (affiliated with GAM) and Muhammad Nazar (affiliated with the Aceh Referendum Information Center, known as SIRA or *Sentra Informasi Referendum Aceh*) was declared winner of the gubernatorial election with 38 per cent of all valid votes cast. Other GAM-affiliated candidates won in Sabang (Munawarliza), Aceh Jaya (Azhar Abdul Rani), Aceh Utara (Ilyas A. Hamid), Kota Lhokseumawe (Munir Usman), Kabupaten Bireuen (Nurdin Abdurrahman), Pidie (Mirza Ismail), Aceh Timur (Muslim Hasballah), and Aceh Barat (Ramli). The elected GAM-affiliated candidates, especially the governor, added to the change of the political situation in post-conflict Aceh.

Transformation of GAM

In line with the MoU point 4.2. regarding the demobilization of GAM's military troops, on December 27, 2005, GAM announced the dissolution of its armed forces (*Tentara Neugara Aceh/TNA* or Aceh-State Military). The statement was signed by the Commander of GAM's armed forces Muzakkir Manaf, who read the statement in a press conference in Banda Aceh with other GAM leaders such as Bachtiar Abdullah, Tgk. Usman Lampoh Awe, Nashiruddin, Munawar Liza Zein, Irwandi Yusuf, Sofyan Dawood, Darwis Jeunib and Mukhsalmina present. A couple of AMM officials were present at the press conference.³

The statement declares that the troops had been transformed into KPA as a civilian organization. The leadership of KPA, however, is the same as in TNA. Sofyan Dawood stated in the press conference that this is due to the transitional purposes. In addition, GAM as an organization still exists as a signatory party to the MoU, but now it has a different purpose, namely to guard the peacebuilding in Aceh.

³ Tempo Interaktif, Tuesday, 27 December 2005, "Sayap Militer GAM Resmi Dibubarkan," (Military Wing of GAM is formally dissolved) < <http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/12/27/brk.20051227-71275.id.html>>, accessed on 16 June 2008.

Further, on July 7, 2006, the KPA leadership announced in Banda Aceh the establishment of "*Partai GAM*" or GAM Party as a local political party, with a symbol copying the flag of GAM as the freedom movement. The announcement immediately became a controversial issue. The Indonesian politicians, government officials and military officials commented that GAM Party cannot be legalized by the government as it has the same name and symbol as GAM as the freedom movement.

A series of formal as well as informal talks then took place. In February 2008 the name of the GAM Party was changed into "*Partai Aceh Mandiri*" (Independent Aceh Party) and the symbol was changed although it still had some characteristics of the original one. The deed of establishment of Partai Aceh Mandiri was submitted to the provincial office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights to get the status of legal entity on February 25 Feb, 2008.

Further, on May 23, 2008, KPA spokes person Ibrahim KBS announced that the name of the party was changed again into "*Partai Aceh*" and more changes were also done to the flag. On the same day, the Head of the Aceh Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced 12 local political parties that had fulfilled all requirements as legal entities and Partai Aceh was included. The Chair of the Party Muzakir Manaf said that the MoU Round Table meetings facilitated by IIAP had led to the second change of the party name into "*Partai Aceh*".⁴

Aceh Reintegration and Peace Authority (*Badan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh/ BRA*)

As part of the reintegration scheme contemplated in the MoU, on February 15, 2006, the Aceh Reintegration and Peace Authority (*Badan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh*, more commonly known by its acronym BRA) was established. BRA is an Aceh government agency that makes policies, assesses the needs and implements reintegration programmes and activities.⁵ The governing body of BRA is led by the Aceh Governor and the day-to-day activities are implemented by the Head of BRA, who leads a multi-stakeholders board named Joint Forum to Support Peace in Aceh (*Forum Bersama Damai* or Forbes Damai) and an Executive Board (*Badan Pelaksana*). The Head of BRA is advised by the Aceh Peace Resource Center (APRC), which serves as a supporting institution providing managerial support as well as donor relations and coordination.

Whereas the Executive Board organizes the reintegration programmes of BRA, Forbes Damai is intended to constitute a forum for different stakeholders to discuss issues related to the peacebuilding and to meet when incidents occur. In terms of fund management, the Executive Board administers the government's reintegration fund while Forbes Damai conducts activities supported by donors with the administrative assistance of APRC.


Forbes Damai consists of representatives of KPA, central government, local and international experts, local NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) activists and donor agencies (see the organization chart of Forbes Damai in Annex 7). Juha Christensen, Interpeace Indonesia Director, is a member of Forbes Damai as a "representative of Interpeace". Forbes Damai

⁴ Modus Newspaper, 23 May 2008, see also Case Study in Annex 3.

⁵ From <http://www.bra-aceh.org/history.php>, accessed 5 May 2008.

does not have regular meetings for the members although it conducts a monthly meeting between FKK (*Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi* or Communication and Coordination Forum - Desk Aceh) as the representative of the GoI⁶ and KPA members sitting in Forbes Damai. The monthly meeting is named COSPA (Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh) meetings. COSPA meeting is designed as a forum in which KPA and GoI as the key stakeholders in the Aceh reintegration discuss current issues on peacebuilding in Aceh and not the membership meeting of Forbes Damai. So far there have been five meetings held on 16 February, 14 March, 16 April, 15 May and 17 June 2008.

There is also an Oversight Board (*Badan Pengawas*) of BRA that consists of the Financial and Development Oversight Body of Aceh (*Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan* or BPKP) and Regional Oversight Agency of Aceh (*Badan Pengawas Daerah* or Bawasda).



Communication and Coordination Forum - Desk Aceh (Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi/ FKK)

⁶ See the explanation on FKK below.

The Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs⁷ (Ministry) established the Communication and Coordination Forum (*Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi* or FKK) on April 18, 2007. In an interview with local newspaper the Head of FKK General Amiruddin Usman said that the Ministry also has special task forces ("desks") on Poso, Maluku, Papua, and North Nusa Tenggara.⁸ According to the Decree of the Minister No. 31 of 2007, FKK is tasked to facilitate dialogues among the stakeholders when incidents occur and to provide progress reports of the peace process to the Ministry.

FKK is the unit of the Ministry on Aceh; the Head of FKK reports to the Minister and the Minister reports to the President. Therefore, FKK participates in dialogues in the Aceh provincial level, such as the COSPA (Commission on Sustaining Peace in Aceh) meetings facilitated by BRA and the FKK-KPA meetings facilitated by IIAP. FKK also conducts enquiries on incidents occurred to be reported to the Ministry in Jakarta.

IIAP facilitates regular meetings between FKK and KPA leadership. IIAP facilitates the discussion because FKK requested such meetings, which was supported by KPA leadership. The participants of the IIAP-facilitated meetings are different with the COSPA meetings.

Table 2. Time Line of the Contextual and Programmatic Events January 2007-May 2008

MONTH	CONTEXTUAL	PROGRAMMATIC
Jan 2007	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aceh Task Force is created at Interpeace HQ to support IIAP • Temporary headquarters are set up in Banda Aceh with some equipment left by the AMM
Feb 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EU EOM came back to Aceh for the second round of Pilkada (12 February) • First International Conference of Aceh and Indian Ocean Studies organized by the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore (NUS) and BRR in Banda Aceh on (24-26 February. Former Head of AMM Pieter Feith participated in this conference as a key note speaker. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IPI is established • Robert Hygrell was hired. • IAP was registered with BRR. • Aceh Task Force members, Koenraad Van Brabant, Jack Hjelt, Dominique Hempel and Bogdan Lungulescu, Programme officer for IIAP, visit Indonesia • Recruitment of Programme Staff started
Mar 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Second Round of Pilkada (4 March) in Aceh Barat and Aceh Barat Daya 	-

⁷ A "Coordinating Minister" in Indonesia's structure of government coordinates several ministries. This particular Coordinating Ministry coordinates: Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Communication and Information, Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, the Attorney General's Office, Indonesian Police Force and Indonesian Armed Forces.

⁸ Modus Newspaper, "Brigjen TNI Amiruddin Usman, SIP, Ketua FKK: Bukan Badan Super Body," (*General Amiruddin Usman, the Chair of FKK: This is not a superbody*), Minggu V, January 2008.

MONTH	CONTEXTUAL	PROGRAMMATIC
	<p>Districts.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nisam Incident. On Mar 21, in Alue Dua Village, Nisam, Aceh Utara, four TNI members were beaten by villagers who suspected that they were intelligence agents. Two days later TNI soldiers returned to the village allegedly to investigate the incident, and beat at least 14 villagers. Lhoksukon Incident. On Mar 27 in Lhoksukon, Aceh Utara, a group of men drove up to the KPA office in Lhoksukon in the middle of the night and burned it down. 	
Apr 2007	FKK established (18 April)	IPI is registered as a legal entity
May 2007	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stewart Jackson, Senior Accountant Interpeace HQ visits Indonesia An Interpeace guesthouse/office opened in Jakarta
Jun 2007	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Cooperation Agreement is signed between Interpeace and CMI for the IIAP programme A temporary Programme Officer is retained by the IIAP to provide needed assistance IIAP operational phase commences. Field Facilitators deployed to Aceh Barat, Singkil, Pidie, Lhokseumawe and Gayo Lues districts.
Jul 2007	GAM Party was declared (7 July)	
Aug 2007	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A two-day workshop in Banda Aceh with all Field Facilitators and Researchers Aceh Task Force is dissolved and a new Programme Officer to be based in Banda Aceh, Rene Lariviere, is hired IIAP arranged a seminar <i>Refleksi Dua Tahun MoU Helsinki/Reflecting on Two Years of Helsinki MoU</i>, in Banda Aceh. Approximately 200 participants including heads of civil authorities,

MONTH	CONTEXTUAL	PROGRAMMATIC
		police, military and GAM
Sept 2007	-	-
Oct 2007	-	Programme head quarters moved to a new and permanent office
Nov 2007	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foundational Learning workshop (Nov 12-16) in Banda Aceh for all IIAP staff First district office opened in Lhokseumawe
Dec 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On December 10, 2007 in Bireuen, a grenade was thrown at the residence of Bupati Nurdin A. Rahman. Sawang Incident. On December 27, 2007, in Sawang, Aceh Utara, Teungku Badruddin, an ex-TNA commander, was assassinated by a commando of heavily armed men in Sawang, Aceh Utara. This was quickly followed by other violent incidents including a kidnapping and two shootings, one of which led to another death. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inia Asuncion, Roving Finance Officer Interpeace HQ visits Indonesia Former Head of AMM, Pieter Feith, and the newly appointed CMI Director, Kalle Liesinen visit Jakarta and Aceh IIAP facilitated 1st Round Table meeting 15 IIAP Field Facilitators was at this time deployed and operating in eight districts throughout Aceh province
Jan 2008	-	IIAP facilitated a FGD for Badron Group in Aceh Utara
Feb 2008	The name of the GAM Party was changed into " <i>Partai Aceh Mandiri</i> " (Independent Aceh Party) and the flag was changed. The deed of establishment was registered to the provincial office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights to get the status of legal entity (25 Feb).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Juha Christensen, Salim and Dr.Ulla Nuchrawaty visit Interpeace HQ in Geneva to discuss IPI-Interpeace partnership IIAP facilitated 2nd Round Table Meeting of MoU signatories IIAP facilitated a multi-stakeholder FGD in Aceh Barat. Participants included head of district, police, military, KPA, religious leaders, NGOs and women groups IIAP facilitated a FGD for female GAM ex-combatants in Aceh Utara
Mar 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Atu Lintang Incident. In the early hours of March 1, in Meurah Pupok village, Atu Lintang sub-district, Aceh Tengah, five KPA members were killed and one seriously injured in an attack on the Sagoe Merah Mege KPA office. Government Regulation No. 20 of 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mike Pejic, Head of Finance and Administration Interpeace HQ and David Whittlesey, Acting Head of Programme and Support Unit visited IIAP programme 2nd March, IIAP facilitated a FGD with KPA/GAM to discuss the Atu Lintang incident.

MONTH	CONTEXTUAL	PROGRAMMATIC
	<p>2007 regarding the Aceh Political Party is issued (14 March).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10th March, IIAP facilitated a FGD with self- defence group, KPA, local government and political organisation to defuse the tension of Atu Lintang incident • IIAP facilitated a multi-stakeholder FGD in Gayo Lues district. Participants included head of district, police, military, local government, KPA, community and religious leaders and women groups
Apr 2008		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Cooperation Agreement is signed between IPI and Interpeace for the IIAP programme • IIAP facilitated 3rd Round Table Meeting of MoU signatories • IIAP facilitated a multi-stakeholder FGD in Aceh Selatan. Participants included head of district, police, military, district court, KPA, local parliament and religious leaders • IIAP facilitated two FKK-KPA meetings
May 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Martti Ahtisaari visited Indonesia and had a dialogue with President Yudhoyono in Jakarta on May 7. • Partai Aceh Mandiri is changed into Partai Aceh (21 May). • The provincial office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced 12 parties that passed the verification to be legal entities and Partai Aceh is included (23 May) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Martti Ahtisaari visited the IIAP Banda Aceh office and went to Takengon and Kutacane to request key stakeholders to commit to building sustainable peace in Aceh. Ahtisaari also participated in the IPI-Interpeace seminar "Peace Processes in Indonesia" held in Jakarta. • A Programme Manager based in Banda Aceh is hired for the IIAP • A Team Building workshop gathered 30 IIAP Staff in Banda Aceh. A workplan was subsequently drafted for the reconciliation component of the programme, for June-Dec 2008 period. • IIAP facilitated a FKK-KPA meeting • Programme management including recruitment and

MONTH	CONTEXTUAL	PROGRAMMATIC
		<p>contracting transferred from Interpeace to IPI</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • IIAP facilitated 4th Round Table Meeting of MoU signatories • IIAP facilitated a multi-stakeholder FGD in Pidie district. Participants included head of district, police, military, KPA, local parliament, religious leaders and women groups • 3rd May, IIAP facilitated a FGD for prominent leaders of Sawang in Aceh Utara. • 23rd May, IIAP facilitated a FGD with Muspika⁹ Sawang and Kepala Desa (village heads)

4. THE STRATEGIC RELEVANCE OF IIAP WITHIN A WIDER CONFLICT ANALYSIS

4.1. FINDINGS

4.1.1. The Need of Sustained Peacebuilding to Consolidate the Peace

The post-conflict situation in Aceh remains unstable and needs special attention. After the departure of AMM until now, many incidents have occurred (see Annex 4 for the list of incidents). There is obvious tension around the issue on how to label and to deal with violent incidents in the post-conflict setting. On the one hand a police official stated in an interview that according to the law those incidents are ordinary criminal cases and claimed that the police do not discriminate against the former combatants in KPA. On the other hand, KPA members interviewed stated that the police discriminate against KPA members in many cases by immediately pointing out the members of KPA as the people responsible in the cases. This tension has been present in Aceh since AMM ended its operation in the end of 2006. The number of local level incidents, as reported by the World Bank and Decentralization Support Facility (DSF), has been increasing since 2006 (see Figure 1 below).


“The conflict in Aceh is like a fire in a mountain of straw - you cannot see it now but it will be big for sure if we do not do anything about it”

*Samsidar
(Aceh Program Manager – ICTJ)*

⁹ Muspika, Musyawarah pimpinan kecamatan = Committee consisting of district level leaders from civil authorities, military and police.

All stakeholders interviewed readily acknowledged that it is only less than three years ago that the MoU was signed and mutual trust building takes time.

Figure 1. Violent Local Level incidents and total # of Local Level conflicts, by month, Up to April 2008



Source: World Bank/Decentralization Support Facility, Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1st of March- 30th of April 2008.

4.1.2. Critical Issues Seen by Stakeholders

a. Reintegration

Reintegration of the former combatant is still facing a big challenge. The issue of the welfare of former GAM combatants came up in almost all interviews with KPA members as well as the police. The police officials interviewed pointed out the high unemployment among the former combatants as the main cause for crimes.

Related to the welfare issue is the aid-related issue, especially the housing and direct funds provided to the conflict victims and the former combatants. As the follow up to the MoU, the government established BRA, which tasks include the channelling of funds and housing for the conflict victims. However, the capacity of the BRA to carry out this particular work has been under criticisms from various groups. The fact that BRA uses government funds that needs complicated disbursement procedure is often viewed as the main source of problem by local Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) working on reintegration issues. The BRA is also criticised as not providing enough reports to the public and to the local

parliament regarding their activities.¹⁰ Many of the conflict victims complain to the KPA district offices and local CSOs working on human rights issues.

b. Implementation of the MoU

KPA members interviewed expressed concerns with regard to the implementation of the MoU. Not all provisions of the MoU were implemented prior to AMM's departure. Major unimplemented issues include:

(i) Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in Aceh is one of the items on the top of the agenda of various local NGOs as well as international organizations working on transitional justice. The LoGA states that the Aceh TRC that is under the National TRC shall be established at the latest one year after the enactment of the LoGA. However, the law regarding the National TRC was nullified by the Constitutional Court in December 2006. Therefore, there has been debate on the legal setting for the Aceh TRC.

Local CSOs established the Coalition for Aceh Truth Recovery (*Koalisi Pengungkapan Kebenaran*) and have organized victims' groups. This coalition has already drafted a Draft Qanun (Aceh Local Law) regarding the Aceh TRC and conducted a series of lobby meetings with officials in Jakarta and Aceh, including the National Commission for Human Rights and the Aceh Governor. In early May 2008 the Governor issued a decree on the establishment of a working group on Aceh TRC.

IIAP contributes to the development of Aceh TRC by, among others, mentioning this issue in a discussion between Martti Ahtisaari and President Yudhoyono on 7 May, 2008.¹¹ Prior to that high level meeting, Martti Ahtisaari had a meeting with selected IIAP field facilitators and a representative of the Coalition for Aceh Truth Recovery at IIAP Office in Banda Aceh on May 6, 2008. Also, the topic has been discussed at the IIAP-facilitated MoU Round Table meetings (see Annex 3).

(ii) Human Rights Court

In line with the MoU, the establishment of Human Rights Court (HRC) in Aceh is regulated in the LoGA. The provisions in the LoGA have received criticism from certain quarters as it regulates that the HRC is established to examine cases occurring after the enactment of the LoGA, i.e. it is a forward looking HRC. The LoGA also provides that the HRC shall be established at the latest one year after the enactment of the LoGA on 1 August 2006, but at the time of this report the HRC has not yet been established.

¹⁰ Interview with Hendra Budian (AJMI) on May 14, 2008 and Samsidar (ICTJ) on May 12, 2008. See also International Crisis Group, "Aceh: Post Conflict Complications," Asia Report No. 139, 4 October 2007.

¹¹ Serambi Indonesia Newspaper, 8 May 2008.

IIAP contributes to the discussion on HRC by putting this issue on the table of the MoU Round Table meetings, especially on the fourth MoU Round Table meeting on May 8, 2008, in which President Martti Ahtisaari participated. Vice Governor of Aceh TM Nazar stated to the media that the HRC issue was one of the important issues discussed in the meeting (see also Annex 3).¹²

(iii) Implementing Regulations of the LoGA

The LoGA left home work for the Indonesian Government as well as the Aceh government and legislatures to issue a series of implementing regulations. The regulations that have drawn most attention are: the draft Presidential Regulation regarding the consultation of the Government of Aceh for national policies regarding Aceh and the draft government regulation regarding authorities of the Government of Aceh that will elaborate in detail the limitations to the authority of the Aceh Government according to the LoGA.

The implementing regulations of the LoGA have been discussed at the IIAP-facilitated MoU Round Table meetings (see Annex 3).

c. General election of 2009

The general elections for national and local legislatures and the president scheduled for 2009 were identified as a critical issue by all stakeholders interviewed. Newly established local political parties will run for the local legislatures and there will be competition between the party of the former GAM members and other groups in the society that could potentially create tensions. Although the Pilkada in 2006 and 2007 were held peacefully, the 2009 election is seen as a crucial issue that the stakeholders should pay attention to due to the different contexts.

On 23 May 2008, the Head of the Aceh Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced 12 local political parties that had fulfilled all requirements as legal entities. The 12 local political parties were the following:

1. Partai Darussalam (PD)
2. Partai Rakyat Aceh (PRA)
3. Partai Pemersatu Muslimin Aceh (PPMA)
4. Partai Aceh (PA)
5. Partai Generasi Atjeh Beusaboh Tha'at dan Taqwa (Partai Gabthat)
6. Partai Aliansi Rakyat Aceh Peduli Perempuan (PARA)
7. Partai Aceh Meudaulat (PAM)
8. Partai Lokal Aceh (PLA)
9. Partai Daulat Atjeh (PDA)
10. Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera (PAAS)
11. Partai Bersatu Atjeh (PBA)
12. Partai Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh (SIRA)

¹² Serambi Indonesia Newspaper, 9 May 2008.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, "Partai Aceh" is a party established by former GAM leadership. It is important to note that SIRA Party is a party established by SIRA and Gabthat Party is established by the religious figures in GAM.¹³

The next step is the verification process by the Independent Election Committee (Komite Independent Pemilihan or KIP) to determine the eligibility of the parties to participate in the election. The KIP verification process was conducted from 12 to 14 June 2008.

Clear rules of the game regarding local political parties, especially on how they should conduct the campaign and the election day monitoring, are needed to ensure successful elections in 2009. The concept of local political party is new not only in Aceh but also in Indonesia. The lack of experience and the post-conflict situation make this an important issue that must be addressed for the 2009 election. The central government as well as the Aceh government need to develop necessary regulations on this issue and international as well as local NGOs should also play a role in introducing democratic principles to all parties running in the elections.

Local NGO activists interviewed expressed their concerns over the situation after the 2009 elections combined with the completion of some of the financial support for Aceh. Many of the international organizations will be leaving during and/or after 2009 as the post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction will formally end. In addition, the political situation is likely to be fragile around the election for the new Aceh legislatures as well as the district level legislatures in 2009.

d. Demand to Form New Provinces

Another critical issue is the demand to set up two new provinces in Aceh area, namely the "*Aceh Leuser Antara*" (ALA, which consists of Aceh Tengah, Bener Meriah, Singkil, Aceh Tenggara, Subulussalam and Gayo Lues) and "*Aceh Barat Selatan*" (ABAS, which consists of Aceh Jaya, Aceh Barat, Nagan Raya, Simeulue, Aceh Barat Daya and Aceh Selatan; Singkil sometimes is regarded as ABAS instead of ALA). The supporters have lobbied and organized rallies in Jakarta in addition to banners and media publication in Aceh. KPA members and various local NGO activists interviewed indicated the relationships of the supporter groups for these demands with certain national political parties and the former self-defence groups.

On 22 January 2008, the Indonesian House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* or DPR) used its rights to initiate draft legislation in initiating draft laws to establish the two new provinces. Governor Irwandi Yusuf quickly voiced opposition, soon echoed by a wide range of actors, including members of the provincial and national parliaments, elements of civil society, and prominent figures of the former GAM.

4.1.3. Key Peacebuilding Programmes

¹³ World Bank/Decentralization Support Facility, *Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1st – 31st of October 2007*.

The Review Team found that the key peacebuilding programmes in current Aceh are centred on reintegration, technical assistance to key government agencies in building peace and reconciliation.

The target groups of the reintegration programmes are the former combatants, the former self-defence groups and conflict affected communities who was uprooted due to the conflict but now have returned back to their villages. All reintegration related programmes are coordinated by the BRA. There have been at least 115 activities in the donor matrix developed by BRA by November 24, 2007.¹⁴

Included in the reintegration programmes are activities related to the economic welfare of the former combatants and conflict victims. The critical issue is to provide necessary skills and employment to support the former combatants find alternative livelihood. IOMs peacebuilding programme in the Highlands of Central Aceh, for example, focuses on community stabilization through quick and visible development projects. By focusing on communities affected by the conflict through infrastructure projects, small-scale economic developments, and support to local art and cultural expressions, the USAID-supported programme aims to bridge the gap between the political peace process and the actual benefit of peace at the village level.¹⁵

Reconciliation programmes focus on two levels, namely the high level dialogues between the signatories of the MoU (GoI and GAM) and at the grass root level dialogues involving particularly the former GAM combatants, the former self-defence groups, local government agencies and the police. As mentioned earlier, there are concerns over the establishment of the Aceh TRC. Reconciliation, however, may not be fully implemented through the establishment of the Aceh TRC; community-based reconciliation is also needed. Local NGOs such as Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institution (AJMI) and KontraS (*Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan*/ The Commission for Forced Disappearances and Victims of Violence) are working on this issue while pushing for the formal reconciliation through the Aceh TRC.

Related to the reconciliation is the issue of conflict victims. Conflict victims have so far received limited attention from the government but their problems have been the concerns of many international as well as local NGOs. Redelong Institute,¹⁶ for example, has organized "The Family of Conflict Victims" in 10 sub-districts as the communication forum for conflict victims.

Training of former combatants in issues related to political and democratic institutions and support to newly established local political parties are also seen as an important type of peacebuilding programmes. The trainings provided include the democratic principles,

¹⁴ See: http://www.bra-aceh.org/download/donor_matrix/ ENGLISH_071124_Donor_Matrix_for_Peace_Building_Program_6.xls

¹⁵ IOM/USAID, *Peace-Building in the Central Highlands of Aceh, Indonesia*, report, 2007.

¹⁶ Redelong Institute is a local CSO working on conflict resolution and human rights issues; Redelong is the name of the capital of Bener Meriah District of Aceh Tengah.

organizing the political parties, the election system and the like, while mainstreaming the post-conflict and peacebuilding contexts.

Scenario buildings describing what Aceh should become and what should be done to achieve the ideal Aceh, have also been an activity shared by many local NGOs and supported by various international organizations in Aceh. There is the Aceh Recovery Framework initiated by UNDP, UNORC, and the Governor of Aceh. Various local NGOs and international organizations participated in the making of this framework. There is also the Future Aceh Scenario Building developed by a coalition of local NGOs led by the Acehnese Civil Society Task Force (ACSTF).

Areas of Donor Support

There are many donors that have been working on post-conflict Aceh.¹⁷ In order to portray key peacebuilding programmes in Aceh in this review, the Review Team looked at three major donors in Aceh: the European Commission, the World Bank, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

European Commission has three focuses in their assistance with regard to peacebuilding in Aceh.¹⁸ The three focuses are reintegration of the former GAM combatants and prisoners, MoU implementation and the establishment of "Europe House" as a means of enhancing co-ordination and ensuring efficient implementation of EC-funded rehabilitation and reconstruction and peace process projects and enhancing dialogue with local communities and authorities in the ground.

The World Bank provides support to peacebuilding in Aceh mainly through the "Conflict and Development Programme" in Aceh.¹⁹ The Conflict and Development Programme in Aceh focuses on the reintegration, research and analyses as well as advisory support.

The government of the United States of America through USAID has two programmes related directly to peacebuilding in Aceh, namely (i) "Reintegration Support for Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees/ex-IDPs, Their Dependents and Local Communities in NAD"²⁰ and (ii) Support for Peaceful Democratization.²¹ The support for peaceful democratization provides, among others, has been the main source of funding for APRC. COSPA meetings held by APRC and Forbes Damai are funded by USAID through this programme.

¹⁷ The donor matrix developed by the BRA, for instance, displays no less than 36 donors, although some of them manage funds from the same sources.

¹⁸ European Commission, "European Commission assistance to Aceh – Overview," <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/indonesia/assistance_to_aceh/index.htm>, accessed 25 June 2008.

¹⁹ World Bank, Indonesia, "Program Summary: Conflict & Development Program," <http://www.conflictanddevelopment.org/data/synopsis/Conflict%20and%20Development%20Program%20150107_eng.pdf>, accessed 25 June 2008.

²⁰ <http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Activity.228.aspx>, accessed 25 June 2008.

²¹ <http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Activity.150.aspx>, accessed 25 June 2008.

The donors conduct the programmes through multilateral agencies, international NGOs and local CSOs.

Table 3. Areas of Donor Support

No	Donor	Peacebuilding Programmes
1.	European Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The reintegration of the former GAM combatants and prisoners MoU implementation, which includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Support to the Pilkada by providing assistance to strengthen the electoral process, to increase technical skills of election officials, poll workers and to promote civic awareness. Support for the justice sector by the modernization of the civil district court system. Support for reform of Provincial Police Support to the Local Governance by providing advisory and training services to provincial and local authorities in relation to management of public administration, public finances and budgets, conduct of public affairs etc. The establishment of "Europe House"
2.	The World Bank	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Utilization of the World Bank projects to deliver reintegration and post-conflict assistance. Working with other aid agencies to design innovative approaches. The program works with agencies, such as IOM, TAF and Search for Common Ground, to develop new tools and experimental approaches. Projects include: psychosocial support for conflict victims; reintegrating displaced persons; local economic and private sector development; public information campaigns; and support to women's groups. Research and analysis supporting local government's post-conflict strategy. This has included: a pre-MoU conflict analysis, a GAM needs assessment, a damage assessment in every village in Aceh, support to the Aceh Public Expenditure Analysis, and a multi-stakeholder reintegration review. The program produces monthly Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates, which are distributed widely. Advisory support. The team provides TA to the government reintegration agency (BRA), through Forbes Damai and bi-laterally, and supports other World Bank project teams working on tsunami reconstruction programs.
3.	USAID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reintegration Support for Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs), Returnees/ex-IDPs, Their Dependents and Local Communities in NAD Support for Peaceful Democratization. Activities, which includes, among others, the support for APRC and Aceh Community Based Recovery

No	Donor	Peacebuilding Programmes
		(CBR) Project. The CBR includes: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Support for communities in the recovery process; 2. Promotes partnership between communities and government agencies; 3. Facilitates participatory planning to identify local needs; 4. Initiatives by women aimed at increasing their (and other especially vulnerable individuals) involvement in recovery and reconstruction decision-making and planning;

4.1.4. Perceived Distinctiveness of IIAP

As mentioned in the beginning of this report, the IIAP was a result of a series of talks between some senior Indonesian officials and Interpeace, whose governing chair President M. Ahtisaari mediated the peace negotiations that resulted in the MoU. Farid Husain and Juha Christensen, who had been involved in the negotiations long before the MoU, were in the center of the setting up of the IIAP. Therefore, the IIAP is perceived as having a broad network among high level officials of the GoI and GAM leaders, which means that IIAP is seen by the key stakeholders as well as local NGOs as a strategic organization in bridging the aspiration from the ground with the policy makers.

At the same time, the IIAP has 13 field facilitators on the ground who interact directly and immediately with key stakeholders when incidents occur, such as in the incidents of Atu Lintang in Aceh Tengah and Sawang in Aceh Utara (see Table 2 above). This fact is seen as an important distinctiveness by the stakeholders interviewed. In three districts visited there is not any field facilitator working on channelling dialogues between parties having tension. BRA, for example, is yet to have the "district field facilitators" under the "Peace Facilitation" Unit within APRC.²² KPA members interviewed in Lhokseumawe stated that IIAP's field facilitators communicated directly with them and provided concrete follow up such as the FGD on Sawang on May 3, 2008. In addition, IIAP also followed up the Atu Lintang incident directly by conducting an FGD on March 2, 2008, one day after the incident; and another FGD on March 10, 2008, in which self-defence groups, KPA, local government and political organization met and discussed the incident.

A consultant at the World Bank told the reviewer that he regarded the work of IIAP as high-quality and very useful.

4.1.5. Concrete contributions of IIAP and expectations for future achievements and impacts according to key stakeholders

a. IIAP's Contributions

²² See http://www.bra-aceh.org/download/chart/Chart_of_APRC.pdf, accessed 7 May 2008. Representatives of BRA in the districts are under the Executive Board of BRA and tasked with recipient data collecting and channeling the reintegration support to the recipients.

Dialogues among the key stakeholders are seen as the concrete contribution of IIAP. The key stakeholders interviewed pointed out the need for dialogues among them, however, it is very difficult to identify an organization that can facilitate dialogues and be trusted by all parties to be neutral. IIAP meets these requirements and is seen as the right organization to play this role. Its efforts in addressing complaints from and bridging communication among the key stakeholders are the concrete contribution to the peace process according to the key stakeholders. The Head of District Police in Lhokseumawe pointed out in the interview the fact that the media debates on the incidents are decreasing due to the dialogues held by IIAP.

“Acehnese need an institution like Interpeace... After AMM left we do not know who to talk to when we have complaints related to peacebuilding”

*(Tgk. Zulkarnain – the Chair of KPA
Pase Area)*

The series of the MoU Round Table Meetings is seen as key to the peace process. Statements from KPA/Partai Aceh leaders in the media show the significance of the round table meetings (see Annex 3 for the case study regarding the MoU Round Table).

b. Expectations

From the local CSO side, there is expectation on the role of IIAP to bridge between the local CSOs and key decision makers in relation to the above-mentioned perceived distinctiveness of IIAP.

Another expectation from the local CSOs is to have IIAP work on community-based reconciliation and reintegration by organizing mutual activities for women and children of different stakeholders, such as art or English language classes, especially in areas where the self-defence groups were strong.

A Head of District Police said in the interview that IIAP should also be able to have training on the legal procedure to KPA members so that they do not make unnecessary comments to media that can harm the peace. In expressing this expectation, he referred to the fact that the police cannot immediately detain people based on suspicions and affiliations without any sufficient legal evidence while some KPA leadership accused the police as “unprofessional” when they did not immediately put suspected people in detention.

Almost all stakeholders interviewed during the field trip mentioned the need for IIAP to have more field facilitators in the respective districts. Two field facilitators for Aceh Utara and Lhokseumawe, one field facilitator for Bener Meriah and Aceh Tengah and one facilitator for Aceh Barat and Nagan Raya are considered not enough by the stakeholders.

Almost all stakeholders interviewed know IIAP as “Interpeace” while IPI was not renowned by them. All KPA members interviewed associated Interpeace with Martti Ahtisaari and Juha Christensen. IIAP is then perceived by KPA members as an international organization related to the MoU and the AMM. This perception then created expectation that IIAP can directly resolve conflicts like the AMM did.


4.2. ANALYSIS

4.2.1 The Need of Sustained Peacebuilding to Consolidate the Peace

The two and a half years' period since the MoU have been important for Aceh to set the ground for peace, but it is only a short timeframe for building lasting peace. As noted above, some developments have occurred, ranging from the establishment of a reintegration body to the opening of political space for the former combatants. These developments, however, are mainly centred in the elite circle of the key stakeholders. The people on the ground – the former GAM combatants, conflict victims and the grass-root level communities – still have to face challenges in the reintegration process in the effort to build sustainable peace. Distrust among them is still prevailing and can easily lead to local level conflicts, as shown in Figure 1 above. The increasing number of local level conflicts clearly indicates the need of sustained peacebuilding efforts. It shows that, among others, there is an increased need for the type of dialogues facilitated by IIAP to date.

The economic welfare of former GAM combatants is another critical issue. The aid provided by the GoI through BRA has been perceived as inadequate and without planning by the victims and the former combatants. As a result of economic difficulty and the distrust prevailing within and between groups in society, the level of crime is high. World Bank/DSF Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1st of March- 30th of April 2008 reports that the number of crime is increasing from January to April 2008 (see Figure 2). The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted that there are problems with the former combatants of GAM, namely extortion and violence, rising crime, and illegal logging.²³

Figure 2: Armed crime and other forms of violence (# of cases), from Oct 07 to April 08



Source: World Bank/Decentralization Support Facility, Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1st of March- 30th of April 2008.

²³ International Crisis Group, "Aceh: Post Conflict Complications," Asia Report No. 139, 4 October 2007.

Furthermore, whereas Aceh is undergoing development after conflict and tsunami, there are still uncertainties regarding the political situation that could lead to potential conflicts. The 2009 election brings up questions on the political configurations in the Aceh local parliaments. Will the elected members of parliament have the same opinions with the elected Governor, Bupatis and Mayors elected in the 2006 and 2007 Pilkada? Will the GAM-affiliated Governor, Bupatis and Mayors get support from the local parliaments after 2009?

“Aceh people have an immense accumulation of disappointments as the post-conflict reconciliation has not been done. At present there is BRR as the target to express the disappointments. When BRR is dissolved in 2009, who will be the target?? It could be Irwandi and Nazar. At the same time, the local parliaments will be filled by different factions... then the potential conflict occurs again”

(Hendra Budian - Director of AJMI)

In addition, the Aceh Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (*Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi* or BRR, which deals with the post-tsunami reconstruction and rehabilitation) will stop its operation in Aceh 2009 and the development work will be taken over by the Aceh government. This means conflicts between groups in the political elite as well as the grass-root level could occur due to the new economy-political space created by the dissolution of BRR.

Based on the above, the Review Team concludes that a sustained peacebuilding effort is needed. There is a need for an increasing number of dialogues between the conflicting groups, tension defusion efforts and comprehensive reintegration programme.

4.2.2. The Relevance of the Programme and the Current Situation

The findings during the review show four characteristics, which can normally be found in different weight and importance in post-conflict contexts. *First*, since Aceh is a large province and the conflict went on for an extended period, the types of tensions and unique social issues are varied. Thus, different approaches could be used according to the social and political situation in the respective districts. *Second*, the long conflict created a deeply rooted distrust and scepticism in the grass-root level of the society. *Third*, the creation of political (and economic) space after the MoU has led to the creation of a new elite and internal conflicts within the group of the former combatants. *Four*, the deceitfulness of the government in the past in terms of political and economic promises and the failure of peace agreements before 2005 has made Aceh people trust foreign groups more than they trust Indonesians.

Therefore, inclusive dialogues that build trust and empower stakeholders to manage peacebuilding need to be emphasized in this regard. As shown in the IAP project document, the core strategy of the programme is in the use of the participatory research and inclusive dialogue at multiple levels of society. This strategy is still relevant in the current Aceh context and is the strength of IAP. This strategy, however, could be improved by preparing a concrete workplan that can best translate the strategy in the framework of current Aceh context. Due to a variety of reasons, such as the challenges of finding the right operational-managerial structures of IAP, the amount of effort and time spent on recruitment, as well as urgent priorities related to rising tension, the resources available did not allow a detailed workplan to be developed. It is important to note that the effort to

improve the programmatic performance in the current Aceh context is in progress. As a follow-up to a team building workshop in early May 2008, a draft workplan for the reconciliation component of IIAP was developed. This workplan describes how the programme intends to broaden its approach over the next six months to include a broad variety of groups on local level in a sustained preventative effort that is not driven or motivated by incidents. Instead this effort that IIAP calls Diagnostic Listening Exercises, aims to analyse in greater depth the underlying issues and seek to build broad consensus on how to address them.

4.2.3. The Current Key Peacebuilding Issues

The Review Team concluded from the findings elaborated above that the current key peacebuilding issues include:

- Reconciliation, in formal way through advocacy for establishing Aceh TRC as well as in community-based approach reconciliation.
- Reintegration, the approach used mainly is to create community groups, to organize activities involving groups in tension and to use art and culture as the means for reintegration to the society.
- Technical assistance to key government agencies in building peace


At the level of policy makers, there have been discussions on the implementation of the MoU. For instance KPA has raised the issue of the implementation of the LoGA, which should guarantee the implementation of certain provisions of the MoU such as the Aceh TRC and Aceh HRC, on the IIAP facilitated MoU Round Table meetings (see Annex 3) and COSPA meetings. Major actors in Aceh peacebuilding view this issue as one source of tension at the policy makers level. Therefore, efforts have been made to facilitate dialogues on the issue of the MoU implementation.

At the "grass-root" level, the tensions have been centred on the reintegration issue. The former GAM combatants still group themselves exclusively, although as civilians, in KPA. Their economic welfare also needs attention; research reports show the connection between the former combatants and the rising crime, including extortion and illegal logging.²⁴ On the other hand, the former self-defence groups still actively push on certain issues, such as the establishment of ALA and ABAS provinces.

The district level governments and the police have to handle the tension in the post-conflict situation. The support should be provided in this regards by facilitating dialogues at the local level. In the dialogue, the involvement of the other stakeholders such as local CSOs, religious leaders and customary community leaders is also important.

In order to build sustained peace, reconciliation efforts need to be done at two levels: the high level and the local level.

²⁴ See International Crisis Group, loc. cit. and World Bank/Decentralization Support Facility, "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update, 1st of March- 30th of April 2008."



The Review Team found that major key peacebuilding programmes in general identified the need to have the two-level strategy. The local level efforts are mainly done on the reintegration issue, while the high level efforts are done collectively through the BRA considering the involvement of different stakeholders in the BRA, particularly in the Forbes Damai.

As IIAP also uses the two-level strategy, the distinctiveness of IIAP will be further elaborated below.

4.2.4. IIAP's Concrete Contributions and Perceived Distinctiveness

Interviews and document reviews show that the concrete contributions of IIAP to date are two-fold. The first is contributions on the ground by defusing the tensions and building trust among key stakeholders in the field through dialogues. The second contribution is on the higher level by facilitating dialogues between the signatory parties of the MoU. The dialogues serve the purpose of defusing tensions around incidents, building trust and discussing policies and laws related to the continued implementation of the MoU.

"I noted a progress here. The "war" in mass media is actually decreasing since IIAP started to facilitate the dialogues"

(Zulkifli – Head of District Police of Lhokseumawe)

Perceived distinctiveness of IIAP includes:

- Historical aspect. IIAP is perceived as an organization established by some individuals involved in the long term peace process resulted in the MoU.
- Network aspect. Because of the involvement of certain individuals, the IIAP is perceived as having a broad network among the high level officials of the GoI and GAM leaders. IIAP is thus seen by the key stakeholders as well as local NGOs as a strategic organization in bridging the aspiration from the ground with the policy makers.
- IIAP has facilitators in the field who could involve directly and immediately with key stakeholders in the field when incidents occurred.

The perceived distinctiveness of IIAP can be seen in the level of activity. The most comparable activities to see the distinctiveness of IIAP are the BRA (APRC and Forbes

Damai) facilitated COSPA meetings and IIAP facilitated MoU Round Table meetings as well as FKK-KPA meetings. Both BRA-facilitated meetings and IIAP facilitated meetings put GAM/KPA and GoI on the same table. The main difference is on the participants, which affects the result of the meetings. The KPA participants of the BRA facilitated meetings are the ones sitting in Forbes Damai or related directly with the key people in BRA, while GoI is represented by FKK. The participants of the IIAP-facilitated MoU Round Table meetings are the signatory parties of the MoU (Malik Mahmud and Hamid Awaludin), with GoI representatives from the central government in Jakarta.

Although both forums cannot directly make decisions, for example by issuing a government regulation, the types of participants affect the results of the meeting. As a unit in a ministry, FKK's task is more on the coordination and communication to the minister before it is reported to the President in a cabinet meeting. In contrast, the signatory parties of the MoU have sufficient network and knowledge on the MoU and the peace process that allow them to arrive at a more concrete result, as shown by the legalization of Partai Aceh and the acknowledgement of President Yudhoyono on the Aceh TRC issue (see Annex 3).

Despite the differences, however, the meetings facilitated by IIAP and BRA have the same goal of defusing tensions and resolving conflicts between GoI and GAM. This fact is acknowledged by BRA as well as FKK. Zainal Arifin of FKK mentioned that the meetings facilitated by the two organizations are not contradictory; instead, they are complementing to each other.

The Field Facilitators are also the strength of IIAP. International NGOs working on local level mainly focus on the reintegration related activities and directs the local level reconciliation activities through BRA and local CSOs. As pointed out earlier, BRA is yet to have the "district field facilitators" under the "Peace Facilitation Unit" within APRC²⁵ and the local CSOs working on the local level reconciliation are yet to have representatives in as many districts as IIAP does.

Yet another distinctiveness of IIAP is its links to important key persons in the formal peace process, IIAP has direct links to the head of AMM, Pieter Feith and Chief Negotiator of the MoU, Martti Ahtisaari. Ahtisaari is part of the dispute settlement mechanism as agreed in the MoU and he is supported by IIAP partner CMI in this role. IIAP consequently is uniquely positioned to support the continued implementation of the MoU.

IIAP, however, should pay attention on the balance between being a representation of an international organization and national organization. Key stakeholders in the field emphasized "Interpeace" as an organization of the MoU negotiator and a foreign organization that can be trusted more than the national organization. However, the ongoing support from the government is mainly gained from the involvement of prominent Indonesians in

"We never agree that Interpeace as an international organization operates in Aceh, but IPI-Interpeace Aceh Programme is different since it has an Indonesian counterpart. We need IIAP to support peacebuilding in Aceh"

(Zainal Arifin - FKK)

²⁵ See http://www.bra-aceh.org/download/chart/Chart_of_APRC.pdf, accessed 7 May 2008.

IIAP.

5. THE PERFORMANCE TO DATE OF THE IIAP

The review looks at two phases of programme development; the preparatory phase from December 2006-May 2007 and the operational phase starting in June 2007.

Although in theory a clear distinction can be made between the two phases – in practice the process of moving from preparations to operations happens in a transitional manner.

5.1. FINDINGS

5.1.1. Main Steps In Programme Development Jan 07 – May 08

a. Recruitment

The majority of key positions of the programme were filled by the end of 2007. The demand for local staff with proven competencies and experience as well as a good reputation and acknowledgement among key stakeholders to peace in Aceh is high and as a consequence the time and effort required for recruitment have been considerable. In May 2008 a few key positions in the programme are still vacant, namely: Executive Secretary, Senior Programme Coordinator, Project Coordinator (adding one more to the two already in place) and additional Field Facilitators to increase the current number of Field Facilitators to a minimum of two in each of the ten districts.

b. Partnership

A fundamental principle in the Interpeace approach to peace building is local ownership. To this end, Interpeace discussed with key stakeholders of possible local actors/organizations/institutions to partner with for its long-term commitment to support the peace process in Aceh. Mainly due to a highly polarized post-conflict environment, Interpeace chose to support the creation of IPI in February 2007. The institute was registered as a legal entity in April 2007. In late January 2008, Juha Christensen, Salim Shahab and Dr. Ulla Nuchrawaty from Interpeace/IPI visited Interpeace HQ in Geneva to discuss the partnership between Interpeace and IPI. The IIAP was established as a joint programme between IPI and Interpeace. A Cooperation Agreement between the two institutions was signed in April 2008.

The IIAP programme has as an objective to give particular attention to the participation of women in the peace process. A Cooperation Agreement was established between CMI and Interpeace in June 2007, which states that the two organisations will collaborate on ensuring that women play a role in the peace process. The Cooperation Agreement further states that the two organisations will collaborate on supporting and further strengthening the peace process in Aceh.

c. Institutional Development

Stewart Jackson, Senior Accountant of Interpeace visited Indonesia in May 2007 to assist and ensure proper adoption of an accounting software and to briefly introduce financial procedures used by Interpeace's other programmes.

In May 2007, Juha Christensen and Robert Hygrell visited Interpeace HQ in Geneva to discuss the challenges associated with establishing functioning communication and coordination mechanisms between Interpeace HQ and Indonesia office.

Interpeace Roving Finance Officer, Inia Asuncion visited Indonesia in December 2007 in order to gain understanding of the IAP as well as to provide samples of office manuals used by another Interpeace programme.

Mike Pejic, Head of Finance and Administration Interpeace HQ and David Whittlesey, Acting Head of Programme and Support Unit Interpeace HQ, visited Indonesia in March 2008 to coordinate financial-administrative aspects as well as to discuss programme development with IAP management and staff members. Mike and David also met with Dr. Farid Husain and Dr. Ulla Nuchrawaty from IPI during their visit.

d. Programme Development

Aceh Task Force consisting of Jack Hjelt, Koenraad Van Brabant, Bogdan Lungulescu (Programme Officer for IAP) and Dominique Hempel from Interpeace HQ visited Indonesia in February 2007 to discuss organisational-managerial aspects of the IAP programme.

In November 2007, Rene Lariviere, the IAP Programme Officer replacing Bogdan Lungulescu in August 2007, and David Whittlesey, Acting Head of Programme and Support Unit, visited Indonesia and arranged a Foundational Learning Workshop for 11 Field Facilitators and 3 Research Coordinators in Aceh. The workshop discussed the Interpeace approach to peacebuilding and how this could be applied in the Aceh context to support peace.

In May 2008 all IAP Staff in Aceh gathered for a Team Building Workshop in Banda Aceh. After the workshop, a draft workplan has been put together with planned activities of the reconciliation component for June-Dec 2008. The workplan is currently being deliberated by IPI and Interpeace management.

e. Programme Management

The Cooperation Agreement between IPI and Interpeace describes the responsibilities of each organisation. In accordance with the agreement, programme management including recruitment and contracting was "transferred" from Interpeace to IPI in May 2008. However, decisions are only to be made after consultation and/or approval from Interpeace. Assets of the programme were transferred to IPI according to the agreement in April 2008.

f. Logistics

(i) Establishment of Offices

In addition to IIAP head office in Banda Aceh, IIAP Field Offices have been established in 6 districts, namely: Aceh Barat, Aceh Utara, Pidie, Gayo Lues, Aceh Tenggara and Bener Meriah

Several of the field offices cover more than one district such as: Aceh Barat office, also covers Aceh Jaya and Nagan Raya districts, Lhokseumawe office, also covers Aceh Utara district, Aceh Timur office, also covers Kota Langsa and Aceh Tamiang district, Aceh Tengah office also covers Bener Meriah district, Pidie office also covers Pidie Jaya District and Aceh Selatan office also covers Aceh Barat Daya district.

In total 13 IIAP Field Facilitators operate in 18 districts throughout the Aceh province.

Interviews with Field Facilitators and programme management staff indicate that information regarding where to place the IIAP district offices is unclear. While a member of management in Jakarta claims that it has been clearly communicated from the beginning that each district needs to identify the best location for themselves since they are the experts of their respective area, the Field Facilitators in Aceh Barat and Aceh Tengah told the Review Team that they had understood that they should locate the office in the district heads office.

(ii) Transport

All district offices have a car for city roads. However as road conditions in some districts are still very poor, there are good reasons for looking into the possibility of procuring cars with four wheel drive, except from one district office which already uses a four wheel drive car.

(iii) Information Communication Technology (ICT)

All IIAP staff members are equipped with high-quality laptops, USB flash discs and mobile phones. Internet access however is not available in all offices.

5.1.2. Major Achievements So Far

Achievements within the scope of this review should be understood mainly as output/activities rather than outcomes/results. Having said this, research on peace practice²⁶ presents strong evidence that the process is inextricably linked to the outcome in programmes with objectives to build and support peace.

a. Indonesian Peace Institute

Interpeace implements its programmes through non-partisan local partner organization. This approach operationalizes the Interpeace core principle of local ownership and serves the objective of enhancing local capacity for peace building. In Aceh, the highly polarized

²⁶ See for example Andersson, Mary B and Olson Lara, *Confronting War: Critical Lessons For Peace Practitioners*, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, Collaborative For Development Action(2002)

post conflict setting, made it difficult to find an already existing organization that was not colored by the previous conflict and consequently seen as partisan by some stakeholders. It was decided that Interpeace would support the setting up of a new institute and this work started in February 2007. In April 2007 IPI was formally registered as a legal entity.

Based in Jakarta the institute implies a potential to provide peacebuilding support to all parts of Indonesia. IPI has its own governing structure separate from Interpeace and the board and management have several prominent persons such as: Dr. Farid Husain, Dr. Ulla Nuchrawaty, Hasballah M.Saad and Ibu Rosni Idham.

A Cooperation Agreement between IPI and Interpeace was signed in May 2008 for the IIAP. During the time IAP started and the IPI and Interpeace Cooperation Agreement was signed, important set up activities were conducted to set the ground for IIAP operation, such as exploring and deciding on the legal status of Interpeace in Indonesia, discussions on operational-managerial aspects of IIAP, as well as necessary trustbuilding for establishing a constructive partnership.

b. Focus Group Discussion (FGDs)

The FGDs facilitated by IIAP serve to illustrate the linkage between the process and the outcome in peace practice. A Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with high attendance record, open and constructive dialogue between conflicting parties and search for consensual solutions to conflicts should be understood and documented beyond just output/activity.

The IIAP has arranged and facilitated ten FGDs in the following six districts: Aceh Selatan, Aceh Barat, Pidie, Aceh Utara, Aceh Tengah and Gayo Lues. Four of the FGDs have been so called multi-stakeholder FGDs for high-level decision and policy makers. The head of districts, head of police, head of military, head of KPA, head of local parliament and government, CSOs such as aid organisations, religious leaders and women groups have participated. Two of the FGDs have invited a specific stakeholder group such as female GAM ex-combatants and Badron group. Four FGDs have been arranged for stakeholders to discuss a specific issue/case of high tension, namely developments in the Sawang area in Aceh Utara²⁷ and the Atu Lintang incident in Aceh Tengah²⁸. These are initial FGDs and intended to reach the high level people before reaching out to other groups. They were decided and designed by the key field facilitators.

“ – The discussions in the FGD were open, interesting, honest and interactive. There were representatives from military, police, NGOs, womens organizations and head of villages participating. We all agreed on ten points of how to protect and support the peace process. We agreed to protect the peace together. A workshop like this is very much needed. I seldom have the opportunity to meet with NGOs for example and to talk with them in an honest, straightforward and open manner.”

(Head of District Military Command, West Aceh)

c. Socialization

²⁷ Sawang is a village where there is a break-away group of GAM fighters.

²⁸ See Table on page 8

Socialization efforts in order to establish and build trust with stakeholders have been carried out by Field Facilitators in 18 districts. The response to IAPs presence in the districts has been overall positive. The main indicator for stakeholders' perception of IAP role is the number of requests for assistance that the Field Facilitators receive. The Field Facilitators say that at the local and provincial level people know of Interpeace and have high expectations regarding their role. On the other hand, the knowledge about IPI is lacking and even the Field Facilitators themselves admit to know very little about IPI.

d. Seminars

In August 2007, the IAP organized a seminar: *Refleksi Dua Tahun MoU Helsinki* (Reflecting on Two Years of the MoU) in Banda Aceh. Approximately 200 participants from all sectors of society attended the event where reflections were made on changes since the signing of the MoU and the future of Aceh. Several prominent persons, such as the Governor, Chairperson of Aceh Province Parliament and Commander of Provincial Military attended the event.

In May 2008, IPI and Interpeace jointly arranged a seminar *Peace Processes in Indonesia* in Jakarta and approximately 250 persons attended the event. The seminar was arranged in conjunction with a breakfast seminar for representatives exclusively held for the diplomatic community in Jakarta. Approximately 50 persons attended the breakfast seminar that hosted among others former President of Finland and chairman of CMI, Martti Ahtisaari.

e. Defusing Tension

The Review Team could verify in interviews with key stakeholders that IAP Field Facilitators in Lhokseumawe/Aceh Utara and Aceh Tengah/Bener Meriah district have played an important role in defusing tension due to very serious incidents/cases with high potential to disrupt the peace process. The facilitators' role was described as a neutral party that conveyed messages between conflicting parties in order to decrease mistrust and convince the parties not to resort to violence.

"- Our communication with the IAP Field Facilitator has never broken down."

(Teungku Basri, KPA Bener Meriah/Aceh Tengah districts)

f. MoU Round Table Meetings and FKK – KPA Meetings

IAP has facilitated four MoU Round Table meetings for the signatories of the MoU. The 1st MoU Round Table meeting was facilitated in December 2007, the 2nd in February 2008, the 3rd in April 2008 and the 4th in May 2008.

IAP has also set up additional meetings, so-called FKK-KPA meetings, after receiving requests from the two parties to act as a bridge and support trust building. Two FKK-KPA meetings were held in April 2008 and one in May 2008. These meetings will continue on a regular basis.

g. Recognition

The MoU Round Table meetings as well as the FKK-KPA meetings as well are recognized by stakeholders as important forums for key stakeholders to continue to meet and discuss the implementation of the MoU and related issues. The attendance and participation is the main key indicator used to measure the continued relevance of the IAP facilitated meetings. It is worth noting that the Chair of Partai Aceh Muzakir Manaf revealed that the change of the name from “Partai GAM” into “Partai Aceh” was actually one of the results of the third MoU Round Table.²⁹

Too few FGDs have been carried out in order for the Review Team to make a general comment on the recognition of IAP facilitated FGDs. The key stakeholders in Aceh Barat that the Review Team spoke to, however, were very positive about the usefulness of the FGD they had attended.

A consultant at the World Bank also acknowledged the work done by IAP Field Facilitators as high-quality and very useful.

5.1.3. Significant Influence/Impact, Position of Programme in Aceh Context

a. Stakeholder Satisfaction

Key stakeholders in the three visited districts referred to IAP as the only peace building programme in their district that they are interacting with. All key stakeholders consulted expressed a strong need for continued presence of an international organization focusing on supporting continued dialogue between conflicting parties. When asked how long they envisioned this kind of programme would be needed, the answer varied from until after the elections in 2009 to up to 15 years.

“A positive outcome from the presence of Interpeace in our district is that people feel like the world outside care about their situation.”

(Drs.H. Djauhar Ali, Deputy Head of District, Aceh Tengah)

b. International + National

All key stakeholders on local level expressed a continued need for international support to the peace process.

It is important to note that local key stakeholders’ perception of the continued need and relevance of the programme is directly linked to the international dimension of the programme. Continued international monitoring of the peace process is believed to have a significant influence and impact on the reconciliation process.

²⁹ Modus Newspaper, Friday 23 May 2008.

At national level however the trust and credibility of the programme as manifested by political support from the GoI is to a large extent due to the partnership with IPI. Dr. Farid Husain and Juha Christensen are key persons in the IIAP in ensuring the support from the GoI.

In addition, IIAP has facilitated a number of high level visits to Jakarta and Aceh by international key persons in the peace process. Persons such as former head of AMM Pieter Feith and Martti Ahtisaari have visited Jakarta and Aceh in order to support various events and discussions related to the peace process in Aceh.

c. Expectations

It is worth noting that there is a general expectation and hope that Interpeace will investigate and correct any parties violating the MoU in the same way as AMM did. Many key stakeholders make references to AMM and feel unsure about the mandate and authority of IIAP.

“The results of Interpeace presence is not possible to assess yet as it is now in 2008 that more and more incidents have started to reoccur.

(Armizan, Kontras and Redelong Institute, Bener Meriah and Central Aceh)

d. Information on IIAP

The knowledge about IPI held by key stakeholders interviewed varied from nothing to very little.

Managers and staff of other international programmes supporting peace in Aceh expressed concern over the lack of information they had about the IIAP programme, particularly considering the important role the MoU Round Table meetings.

“ I have no idea what they (IIAP) are doing and I believe this is a critical shortcoming for them that people do not know. “

(James Bean, Project Manager IOM)

e. Defining Key Stakeholders

Although recognizing the importance and high relevance of the MoU Round Table meetings facilitated by IIAP several representatives of local and international NGOs expressed concern that the MoU Round Table meetings for the time being according to them are not including all factions of the GAM movement and the possible consequences this may have on the peace process.

5.1.4. Changes to Stated Objectives

a. Including Non-Signatory Parties to MoU

As a widely recognized facilitator, the IIAP has the potential to bridge between the various factions of the GAM around the common concern of MoU implementation.

b. Building Strategic Alliances

The interviews conducted with local and international CSOs and organizations in Jakarta and Aceh indicates that the IAP has yet to fully explore the possibility to enhance performance and results through strategic alliances with other CSOs and international organizations working to support and strengthen the peace process in Aceh. Partly this can be explained by the sensitive nature of the MoU follow up component of the IAP and partly this is a result of prioritising made within the IAP.

c. Keep Interpeace Visible

While strengthening the local/national ownership of the programme through transition of power to IPI, the programme management needs to be sensitive around the fact that many key stakeholders as well as the general public in Aceh to a large extent supports the programme due to its international dimension and direct links to Martti Ahtisaari, chief negotiator of the MoU. IAP Field Facilitators said that the general belief among people in their districts is that only an international organization or institution can be trusted as impartial in supporting the peace process.

5.1.5. Current Operational Capacities

a. Number of Field Facilitators

Incidents with the potential to negatively impact the peace process have increased over the last 12 months and most key stakeholders expect the upcoming elections of local legislatures in 2009 to make tension rise.

The sensitivity of cases dealt with by field facilitators and the security concerns that come as a result of their involvement needs attention.

There is a need to prioritize recruitment of facilitators particularly to districts only staffed with one field facilitators.

b. Policies, Procedures and Systems for Information

According to IAP local and provincial staff, there are no procedures defined how the programme management and staff gather, select and analyse relevant information from the outside world, and how information is used to inform programme strategy and implementation. They could also not refer to any procedures defined of how the programme management and staff inform the outside world about its intent, plans, activities and results. These procedures are developed by individual staff members on in an ad hoc manner.

“We facilitators in Aceh Barat have asked for plans for what to do if we face security concerns as a result of our job – but we have had no answers yet.”

(Dewi Fithria, IAP Field Facilitator Aceh Barat)

It is unclear to several programme staff what the information gathered in the field is used for and how it supports the peace process.

c. Policies, Procedures and Systems for Analysis, Strategic Planning and Results

Programme staff could not identify procedures for strategic planning, analysis and felt unsure about what indicators are used to measure results.

d. Staff Management

Several staff members do not know who to consider as their supervisor. They also do not have any personal development plans. There are no procedures defined of how to deal with security concerns faced by IIAP Field Facilitators.

IIAP staff are currently developing key performance indicators to be used in evaluations of their performance. Updated job descriptions are also currently being discussed by the IIAP management.

e. Logistics

(i) ICT

All IIAP staff are equipped with high quality laptops, USB flash discs and mobile phones.

Some Field Facilitators do not have internet access in the office. They are provided with USB flash discs and use public internet cafes.

(ii) Transport

The IIAP offices rent Kijang Innovas that are suitable for urban driving. Many roads in Aceh, with the exception of the Banda Aceh – Medan Road, requires a car with four wheel drive.

(iv) Offices

The program has offices in Jakarta, in Banda Aceh and in 6 districts throughout Aceh province. The location of the district IIAP offices are a sensitive issue and needs further discussion and follow up by IIAP management.

5.1.6. Communication Flows

a. Interpeace HQ and IIAP Staff in Indonesia

The Interpeace HQ and Interpeace Indonesia offices have had difficulties in agreeing on coordination and communication procedures between the two offices.

Some challenges identified are how to deal with the political sensitivity of some parts of the programme, time differences and different work styles.

“Juha Christensens careful information management is a major factor in the success of the programme. But it also presents challenges to information flow in management terms.”

(Scott Weber, Director-General of Interpeace)

The HQ staff described feeling frustrated with lack of contact and information about the developments in Indonesia, while Indonesia based staff described feeling frustrated about the lack of understanding regarding the politically sensitive nature of issues, the overall contextual situation in Indonesia, the working environment in Indonesia with at times no access to email and phone, as well as a general sense of mistrust from HQ.

Both offices describe a pattern where improvement in coordination and communication happens after face-to-face meetings with representatives from the two offices, most recently the visit to Indonesia in late March 2008 by the Head of Finance and Administration Interpeace HQ and the Acting Head of the Programme and Support Unit. Both offices acknowledge that the situation has improved over time, but that there is still room for further improvement.

b. IIAP Programme and Acehnese Officials

Key stakeholders in the three districts visited claimed that they have an open and good relationship with IIAP Field Facilitators and said that they had called the Field Facilitators several times to inform about incidents or cases that could impact the peace process.

Programme Staff in Banda Aceh (except for Interpeace Indonesia Director Juha Christensen) have yet to establish relationships with key stakeholders on provincial level. The delay on filling the vacant Programme Manager position is part of the explanation. Another factor has been the decision by IIAP management to initially focus on the district level. With the recruitment of Ronnie Delsy in April 2008 the networking in Banda Aceh are expected to start. Until now the relationships with key stakeholders on all levels have mainly been built by Interpeace Indonesia Director Juha Christensen, with support from Robert Hygrell, who has de facto been acting as the programme manager until March 2008.

c. IIAP Programme and State Officials

The programme informs authorities about its intent, plans, activities and results mainly through Interpeace Indonesia Director, Juha Christensen and IPI chairman, Farid Husain who both have good relationship with prominent persons in the Indonesian government.³⁰

d. IIAP Programme and Donors

Donor coordination is mainly done through face-to-face meetings conducted by Juha Christensen and Robert Hygrell in Jakarta.

Donors in Jakarta describe the communication with the programme representatives as irregular and not systematic. However when meeting with Juha Christensen and Robert Hygrell they describe the dialogue as open and the information given as high-quality. All donors believed that the programme would benefit from establishing procedures for regular

³⁰ Farid Husain, *To See the Unseen*, 2007.

donor updates as well procedures for informing the public about the programme and its achievements.

Two donors expressed concern about the lack of knowledge about the IIAP programme among Acehnese as well as international NGOs in Aceh.

e. Internal IIAP Programme

Procedures for ensuring effective communication of information internally are only partly developed. While the communication between districts and Banda Aceh office is highly systemized, the communication between Interpeace HQ and Interpeace Indonesia and IPI still needs to be developed and refined.

5.2. ANALYSIS

The analysis of the findings is made through applying a framework that draws on concepts of the EFQM and SIQ models. Findings are discussed in relation to the seven performance criteria provided by the model.

Every criterion is presented with a short description. This is followed by a short list of key strengths (+) and opportunities for improvement (-) identified by the Review Team.

5.2.1. Performance criterion 1: Management

The criterion refers to the management's ability to provide leadership and guidance on how to enhance capacity and results in consultation with stakeholders.

- The Review Team has not been able to verify programme management policies, procedures and systems for the IIAP programme. Interviewed staff members were not aware of management systems for the programme.
- The Indonesia management team felt like the first Programme Officer, based in Interpeace HQ in Geneva, spent too little time on supporting the Aceh programme.
- + Rene Lariviere was hired as Programme Officer, Aug 2007-Feb 2008 to replace Bogdan Lungulescu and the Aceh Task Force.
- + The duty station of the programme officer position was changed from Geneva to Banda Aceh with the hiring of Rene Lariviere.
- The HQ initiative Aceh Task Force to support the management of IIAP was not functioning well and had to be revised in mid-2007.
- The IIAP management in Indonesia feel like programme management and development did not progress in a timely manner during 2007 partly due to Programme Officer working in Geneva for periods instead of designated duty station, Banda Aceh.
- + David Whittlesey joined the management team as Acting Head of Programme, in September 2007.
- + A programme manager, Ronnie Delsy started in April 2008

- + A programme officer, Theresa Dela Cruz (Marites) hired in January 2008 and deployed to Banda Aceh in May 2008.

5.2.2. Performance criterion 2: Information and Analysis

The criterion refers to how information is collected, selected and used to enhance the capacity and results of the programme. Aspects considered are procedures that assure the accuracy, accessibility and security of information used by the programme. The review has also looked at how information is used for decision making and analysed in order to assess programme performance and results in light of contextual developments and other relevant organizations/programmes working in the same field.

- There are no procedures and systems for how the programme management and staff informs themselves about situational developments and also not for how the programme informs the outside world about its intentions, plans, activities and results. Gathering information about conflict-related issues is an important part of the work carried out by Field Facilitators but they as well as Banda Aceh based staff are unsure of for what and how this information is used. It is not clear how information gathered informs the strategy and activities of the programme.

“- For a period Juha was in daily phonecontact with Interpeace Director-General Scott Weber while at the same time he was expected to keep the Aceh Task Force informed about developments in the field. This meant two parallel lines of communication and that of course created problems.”

(David Whittlesey – Acting Head of Programme and Support Unit, Interpeace)
- Programme staff interviewed were not sure about how the analysis is carried out.
- Interpeace HQ staff have often felt frustrated with the lack of information about the developments in Indonesia and have often questioned the time it has taken to get an answers from Indonesia management staff.
- Interpeace HQ and IIAP management staff in Indonesia are not in agreement regarding most effective means of communication. The HQ mainly communicates through email while the Indonesia based staff have emphasized the need to use sms as a complement to emails considering that the tasks in the field only permit limited amount of time at the desk.
- There is no filing system developed for the programme. All documents, soft and hard copies are individually stored by management and staff members. There is no systemized effort to ensure security of information in any of the offices reviewed.
- Several key representatives from international and national NGOs said they had very little information about the IIAP.
- + There are procedures agreed upon for reporting between IIAP Indonesia Offices, IPI and Interpeace HQ.
- The procedures for reporting between IIAP Indonesia, IPI and Interpeace HQ are not yet implemented.
- The IIAP do not have a media strategy.
- + Jakarta office stores hard copies in locked space.
- + Several key stakeholders said that they are in regular contact with IIAP Field Facilitators regarding issues that might challenge the peace process.

- + The donors interviewed said that they get high-quality information regarding developments in the Field from Juha Christensen and Robert Hygrell.
- + The communication between Field Facilitators and Regional Coordinator in Banda Aceh is done in a systematic way. There are clear procedures defined and applied for daily, weekly and monthly reporting between Field Offices and Banda Aceh offices.
- No active use of Interpeace Intranet as repository for Aceh programme information.

5.2.3. Performance criterion 3: Strategy Planning

The criterion refers to how strategies, objectives and workplans are developed and how relevant parties are included in the processes.

- Most staff interviewed in Aceh felt unsure of how the strategic plans were developed and whether or not they had ever been involved in the process.

5.2.4. Performance criterion 4: Staff commitment and development

The criterion describes how human resources are planned and developed, based on strategic plans, objectives and workplans. The review also looked at the individual aspects of the above such as personal development plans and capacity building for individual staff members. Staff members' participation in developing and improving programme capacity and results were discussed along with mechanisms for recognizing achievements and developing a good working environment. A final aspect concerns mechanisms for measuring results linked to staff members' commitment and development.

- Most staff was unclear about who to consider as their supervisor. Field Facilitators interviewed said they felt that because they had a close relationship with the Regional Coordinator they felt like they could turn to him for advice or debrief. However they were not sure that this was part of his job to look after their physical and mental health.
- No staff in the IAP was aware of any personal development plans.
- As of June 2008, no 2nd Workshop after the 1st Foundational Learning Workshop in 2007, although workshop evaluations showed that there was a strong need for a 2nd workshop by spring 2008.
- + Key Performance Indicators are being developed by all IAP staff to enable individual performance evaluations. Extension of contract would partly depend on the results of the KPI evaluation carried out by direct supervisor and/or programme manager.
- + The Field Facilitators in the three districts visited feel a high level of trust towards the Regional Coordinator Saifuddin M.Haitamy.
- + The daily reporting system between district offices and Banda Aceh office makes possible an immediate response from the Regional Coordinator to problems.
- + Foundational Learning Workshop in November 2007
- + Two-day workshop for IAP Field Facilitators in August 2007 in Banda Aceh. Field Facilitators presented their work in the district and coordinated with the researchers in Banda Aceh.

5.2.5. Performance criterion 5: Processes

The criterion refers to the defining, mapping/description and management of the main process (activities) of the programme. The review also comments on mechanisms for improving processes as well as mechanisms for including stakeholders in the effort to enhance the capacity and results of the programme.

- The Review Team could not verify any mechanism for systematic process mapping. The programme staff interviewed understand their activities in isolation and have difficulties in describing how their activities are linked with other activities leading towards the desired outcomes of the IIAP programme.
- All Field Facilitators interviewed as well as programme staff in Banda Aceh felt unsure of how the information in the field were to be used in order to achieve programme objectives.
- + All Field Facilitators interviewed described examples of initiatives they had taken themselves in order move forward in regards to a certain incident, however both Aceh Tengah and Aceh Barat facilitators felt like they would benefit from clearer instructions and/or coordination with Banda Aceh office on the best way to move forward on a specific issue.
- + A draft workplan chart for June-December 2008 for reconciliation part of the programme has been drafted and is currently being discussed by the IPI and Interpeace management. The draft workplan chart describes a process with activities, output and outcome within a timeframe.

“ – The work of IIAP in the field is good but in terms of results we do not know what more there is than documentation.”

(Dedi Safrizal, Spokesperson KPA member, Lhokseumawe)

5.2.6. Performance criterion 6: Results

The criterion refers to the outcome/results of the programme. Particular attention is given to efforts aimed improving results. The second aspect concerns the use of partnership in order to enhance results.

- There was limited understanding among IIAP staff interviewed of how to define and measure results of the programme.
- Representatives from CSOs in Jakarta and Banda Aceh said that they lacked any first hand information from IIAP regarding their results.
- + There are indicators developed for some output/activities.
- + The Cooperation Agreement with IPI is a strategy to ensure that the benefits of local ownership are used to enhance the capacity and relevance of the programme.
- + The Cooperation Agreement with CMI is a strategy to enhance the programme capacity on supporting women's participation in the peace process.

5.2.7. Performance criterion 7: Stakeholder satisfaction

The criterion refers to how the programme informs itself about stakeholders' current and future needs, demands, wishes and expectations. The Review Team has looked at how the

programme interacts with stakeholders and build and maintain their trust, as well as how the programme measures stakeholder satisfaction and make comparisons with other organizations/programmes in the same field. A final aspect concerns the documentation of results related to stakeholders' satisfaction with IIAP programme.

- The Review Team could not identify procedures and systems for defining and measuring stakeholder satisfaction in a systematic way.
- + Interpeace regularly conducts reviews and evaluations of their programmes. This review of IIAP will present a number of stakeholders' opinions about the capacity and relevance of the IIAP programme to date.
- + There is an evaluation by participants built into the FGD exercise.
- + The attendance to the MoU Roundtable Meetings as well as the FGDs are high. Important key stakeholders on the various levels of society are interested in attending IIAP facilitated events.
- + IIAP management and staff interact daily with key stakeholders on various levels to discuss issues related to the peace process.
- + Actor mapping is one tool that the programme uses to understand stakeholders.
- + Several key stakeholders interviewed said they have taken own initiative to contact IIAP staff to discuss or request assistance in relation to a certain incident or case that might affect the peace process.

6. OVERALL APPRECIATION

The overall strategic relevance and performance of IIAP is appreciated by commenting on the outcomes-outputs stated in the IIAP Project Document against the contextual backdrop and findings in the programme development.

However, in the first year of its operation, there are also a number of more immediate start-up objectives and some crucial intermediate objectives of the IIAP programme. These objectives form yet another framework that will be commented on in order to recognize the value of the Programme to date.

As a final exercise the Review Team comments on the key strengths and weaknesses that we have identified in regards to the five desired outcomes stated in the IIAP project document.

6.1. The Outcome-Output Framework

Outcome 1: Strengthened levels of trust and cooperation,

Key output: established communication channels and dialogue spaces for stakeholder cooperation.

Communication channels and dialogue spaces are established through the FGDs, MoU Round Table meetings, FKK-KPA meetings and channelling communication between groups having tensions in the field, especially in terms of incidents.

In addition to these formulized events, IIAP staff and management interact with various stakeholders on a daily basis. This work should also be understood as an important part of building trust and commitment for sustainable peace in Aceh.

The MoU Round Table meetings are widely recognized as important forums for facilitating dialogue between the signatory parties.

The FGDs and the efforts to channel communication, however, have different level of success in different districts. In Aceh Utara (North Aceh) and Aceh Barat (West Aceh) for example, KPA members interviewed questioned the follow up of the dialogues. Most participants are positive about the opportunity for dialogue but facilitators said that they are asked about concrete results and follow up of the FGDs. The IIAP field facilitators felt that they needed clearer understanding of how to respond to this need expressed by the participants. The Review Team assessment is that the programme has good potential to follow up FGDs through videos or descriptions of how the input given by the participants in the local level FGDs are informing dialogues at a higher level such as the MoU Roundtable meetings or FKK-KPA meetings.

Interviews and documents reviewed by the Review Team revealed that IIAP on several occasions had played an important role in defusing tension caused by a particular case/incident through the communication channelling. Although IIAP does not need to make public its success story, the Review Team believes it is important to give feed back to the concerned parties in order to strengthen the level of trust and cooperation.

Outcome 2: Stronger engagement of actors,

Key output: proposals and recommendations on specific issues that resulted from informed debate and dialogue among key stakeholders.

The Review Team finds that the 10 FGDs, the four MOU Round Table meetings and so-called FKK-KPA meetings have resulted in proposals from the participants.

The FGDs have been implemented at district level and have included both high-level persons and various CSOs in creating high level engagement that brought about concrete recommendations in how to address challenges to peace and how to support peace in the respective districts.

The MOU Round Table meetings are of the high level dialogue, which had come up with important policy level recommendation such as the change of the name of the local political party established by former members of GAM. The FKK-KPA meetings have served as a forum for trust building between FKK and KPA.

Outcome 3: Better informed Aceh public

Key output: communication products and events for the public.

The Review Team finds no systematic means for informing Aceh public on the MOU and the implementation. This topic is discussed in the FGDs and ad-hoc meetings with the stakeholders in the districts. There have been some press releases about some IAP facilitated events. Also in August 2007 IAP organized a big seminar commemorating the two years of Helsinki MOU where approximately 200 people participated.

There is no information kit and website as the “communication products for public” as stated in the key output. IAP website (www.ipi-ipi.org) is still under construction and the Review Team finds that IAP brochure does not serve as a communication product for the purpose of public education on the MOU.

It also bears mentioning that no adequate information on the IAP is available on the Interpeace website.

Therefore, the Review Team recommends IAP to pay attention to this outcome.

Outcome 4: Decrease in tensions and confrontations,

Key output: tensions defused and alternatively channelled before they escalate into violence or returned to dialogue and/or arbitration away from continued violence.

Despite several stakeholders’ acknowledgment of the positive impact of the IAP on defusing tension due to particular cases/incidents in their districts, and the concrete agreements and recommendations produced by the FGDs, the number of violent confrontations and incidents are increasing. The Review Team, however, believes that there are many other factors that contribute to this particular outcome and the key output cannot also be measured in a review of a programme as such, especially that the programme is only in its first year of operation. However, the Review Team recommends that the IAP have a way to systemize the analysis of their actions on multiple levels in order to fully understand the impact of the programme in supporting peace in Aceh.

Outcome 5: Respected IPI,

Key output: a well-governed and well-managed IPI with a diverse staff operating as an effective team, and skilled in peacebuilding.

The Review Team will only comment on the IAP part of IPI.

Several key management and staff positions have been filled. Banda Aceh office and six district offices are operational and programme activities such as channelling of dialogue at local level, the MoU Round Table meetings, FGDs and FKK-KPA meetings have been implemented. Dr. Ulla Nuchrawaty has been appointed as a focal point for IAP management in Jakarta.

The IAP programme staff interviewed within the scope of this review said they had very received very limited information about IPI and therefore had a poor understanding of the organization. It is worth mentioning that the management of the IAP program was

"transferred" from Interpeace to IPI in May 2008. As a consequence the Review Team feels that it is premature to comment on the governance and management of IPI in relation to the IIAP programme.

The Review Team concluded that IPI is still in the beginning of defining its internal management structures.

6.2. Appreciation of the 12-Month-Objectives Achievement

Table 3. Appreciation of the Start-Up Objectives

START-UP OBJECTIVE	ACHIEVEMENT
<i>Institutional</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completion of the basic IIAP team through further recruitment (30 people hired) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In May 2008 the staff comprised of 13 Field Facilitators, 2 Project Coordinators, Regional Coordinator, Programme Manager, Programme Officer and Senior Adviser Helsinki MoU and Legal Expert, Finance Manager, Accountant, Finance assistant, ICT Specialist, Audio Visual Specialist, Administration and Logistic Assistant, Office and HR Coordinator, Driver and Office Assistant.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foundational learning / training of the team 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1st Foundational Learning Workshop in November 2007.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Central management systems of IIAP (finance, HR, information) up and running 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Most finance and administrative procedures for IIAP are defined and applied.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strong IPI-Interpeace relationship and trust 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Dr. Ulla Nuchrawaty assigned as IPI focal point for the IIAP. A Cooperation Agreement between IPI-Interpeace signed in April 2008.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Parameters of communication and coordination requirements between Interpeace in Geneva and in Indonesia defined and implemented 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reporting procedures are defined but not yet fully implemented.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Communications flows and coordination modalities between Interpeace and CMI defined and implemented 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Periodic joint donor meetings as programme support group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A couple of meetings have been held, the last one in Jakarta on 26th May 2008.
<i>Programmatic</i>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Funding secured (target of 100 % for 2007 budget and 30% of 2008 budget) 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued and widening political support for the structural peacebuilding programme 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key stakeholders attending IIAP facilitated dialogues on local, provincial and national level.

START-UP OBJECTIVE	ACHIEVEMENT
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued widening of social contacts, trust and interest building in Aceh 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Field Facilitators introduced IIAP to stakeholders in 18 districts. 10 IIAP facilitated FGDs in six districts.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Logistical infrastructure 90% complete (a permanent office in Banda Aceh, representation in 10 districts, an IPI office in Jakarta, equipment, means of transport (75%) and means of communication) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Objectives achieved, however see recommendations on cars with four-wheel drive and portable Wi-Fi for district offices.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Foundational learning / training of team 70% achieved against learning objectives 	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint analysis and initial actor-mapping 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Actor-mapping currently being done by field facilitators.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline descriptions and initial operational planning 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A draft workplan for reconciliation component, Jun-Dec 2008.
<u>Key programmatic activities</u>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Networking and presentations of the team on the programme's intent and its core principles, sometimes primarily to establish contact, in other instances to solicit the active engagement of key actors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IIAP presentation at multi-stakeholder FGDs.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Broad diagnostic listening exercises through individual interviews, focus group discussions and public debates, to better map the diversity and convergence of perceptions and priorities across the socio-political spectrum; compilation and public presentation of the findings in the form of a written report and a video documentary; this will also be the first concentrated public communications work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10 FGDs facilitated in six different districts in Jan-May 2008. Seminar: <i>Refleksi Dua Tahun MoU Helsinki</i> (Reflecting on Two Years of Helsinki MoU) in Banda Aceh, August 2007. Approximately 200 participants.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tension defusing interventions for selected flash-points, with possibly already some facilitated encounters and dialogues between antagonistic groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Key stakeholder interviewed in Aceh Utara and Aceh Tengah districts said IIAP have played an important role in defusing tension around particular cases/incidents in their districts. Four FGDs facilitated in direct response to a particular incident/case. Follow up of incidents at the MoU Round Table meetings and FKK-KPA meetings.

The table below indicates the strengths and weaknesses of the IAP in the framework of the outcome of IAP.

Table 4. Strength and Weaknesses of the programme

ISSUE	STRENGTH	WEAKNESS
Trust and cooperation with of the stakeholders	The IAP programme offers a multi-layered strategy with possibility to be effecting in linking changes on individual behaviour, attitudes and values to institutional change at socio-political level.	Lack of procedures on how to communicate programme intentions, plans, activities and outcomes. Lack of information and understanding of IPI among some local and provincial stakeholders as well as IAP staff.
Engagement of actors in peace process	The multi-layered dialogue strategy with FGDs, the MoU Round Table meetings and FKK-KPA meetings ensure local input to the peace process from various levels and groups of society.	Limited interaction with CSOs in Banda Aceh.
Better informed Aceh Public		The sensitive nature of the the MoU Round Table meetings and FKK-KPA meetings have limits regarding the amount of information that can be made public. There is very limited information about the programme on the internet. The programme lacks a communication plan and media strategy.
Decrease in tensions and confrontations	The multi-layered dialogue strategy makes it possible for IAP to simultaneously address issues on local,	The sensitive nature of the follow up in the MoU Round Table meetings and FKK-KPA meetings limits the ability of

ISSUE	STRENGTH	WEAKNESS
	provincial, national and international level.	local level IIAP staff to account for programme responses to particular cases/incidents. As a consequence stakeholders do not get the full picture of all the activities of IIAP programme.
IIAP management	The composition of the management team enables the multi-layered dialogue strategy of IIAP programme. Key persons in IIAP ensure access to “hard-to-reach” actors who have strong influence on the peace process in Aceh.	<p>IPI is a newly established association that is still defining its internal management structures.</p> <p>Most management members from Interpeace such as Juha Christensen, Robert Hygrel and Theresa Dela Cruz (Marites) are relatively new to Interpeace.</p> <p>Communication and Coordination between Interpeace management staff in Indonesia and staff based in Europe and US is challenged by the time-differences.</p>

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Review Team found that there is high demand of the sustained peacebuilding programme in Aceh. The post-conflict situation in Aceh is still fragile, proven by the high level of local level conflicts and the increasing level of crime as shown by reports by international organizations quoted in the finding and analysis sections above.

There have been important developments with regard to peacebuilding in post-AMM Aceh, ranging from the establishment of a reintegration authority to the opening of political space for the former combatants. These developments, however, are centred in the elite circle of the key stakeholders. The people on the ground – the former GAM combatants, conflict victims and the grass-root level communities – are still facing challenges in the efforts to build sustainable peace. The multi-layered dialogue strategy of IIAP, with key persons such

as Juha Christensen and Dr. Farid Husain on board on provincial, national and international level and skilled Field Facilitators recognized by key stakeholder on local level, gives IIAP a good foundation for supporting and strengthening the peace process in Aceh. The opportunity for improvement identified by the Review Team is to strengthen the role and performance of the IIAP on the provincial level.

IIAP has also realized many of the immediate start up objectives, though with some notes. The Review Team has identified several opportunities for improvements in regards to the strategic relevance and the performance of IIAP. In particular, the Review Team recommends:

1. Strategy Planning. There is need to prepare a workplan that can best translate the strategy in the framework of current Aceh context. IIAP actually has contextual information on the situation from the field facilitators. This information should be analysed and discussed in order to create a contextual and concrete workplan.

There are at least two aspects that require special attention, namely the contemporary issues and the distinctiveness of problem in different districts. The two aspects have to be examined regularly against the workplan and the progress of the workplan.

2. Processes. The management should together with field facilitators and staff members start to describe and map the major processes within the programme in order to enhance the understanding of how various activities are linked towards desired outcomes. Part of the mapping should be to establish mechanisms for evaluating activities in the processes as well as define responsibilities.

The Review Team believes that the programme should explore possibilities for strategic alliances that could enhance programme performance and results.

3. Public Relation and Stakeholders' Expectation Management. There is a need for the IIAP to establish a communication plan in order to communicate its intentions, plans, activities and results to stakeholders as well as the public. This is a critical requirement in order to solidify the relationships and trust extended to the programme by various actors. Information about the IIAP activities and achievements is necessary to ensure continued support for the programme in Aceh. Information is also the tool for addressing the expectations of IIAP to be a continuation of AMM and other misunderstandings that might undermine the credibility and achievements of the programme. If not including the media, the IIAP should at least have a strategy for handling the media.

The location of the district offices needs to be discussed again within IIAP Staff in order to clarify the management's recommendation that it is the field facilitators who recommends a location that minimizes suspicion and mistrust, and maximizes the perception of IIAP as an impartial actor by key stakeholders and community.

4. Networking. IAP should broaden its network and communication with the other organizations working on relevant issues, both local and national as well as international ones. The organizations working on peacebuilding and peacebuilding-related activities highly regard IAP's approach and strength in terms of high-level networking. This view is strategic for IAP in achieving its outcomes.
5. Management. Put high priority to the establishment of a defined management system for the IAP that provides the programme with ways to continuously assess and enhance capacity and results.

Communication lines between IAP Indonesia-based management staff should be defined and regularly evaluated. The communication lines between Indonesia-based management staff and US and Geneva-based management staff also needs to be systemized into procedures.

Important tools are for example matrices of authorities and responsibilities, meetings and decision making within IAP. Clarity on the mentioned issues is necessary in order to avoid delays, misunderstandings, confusion and mistrust between different "offices" of the programme.

6. Information and Analysis. Establish clear procedures and systems for how the programme collects, selects and analyses information. Develop mechanism for linking information and analysis of the situation on the ground with the strategic planning.

We would recommend the IAP to look into the possibility of portable Wi-Fi provided by Telkom Flash among others. This would enable improved coordination and communication across all levels of the programme as well as increase security of information management.

7. Staff Commitment and Development. The IAP needs to establish procedures for human resources management. Planning, recruiting, evaluating and enhancing capacity of management and staff members are an important part of ensuring high quality performance and results.

Make sure everyone has a designated supervisor and that the responsibilities are clarified.

Develop mechanism for recognizing and rewarding achievements of individual staff to encourage development and improvement of not only personal performance but also to enhance programme capacity and results.

8. Results. Define indicators but also operationalize the indicators by developing mechanisms for how to measure results. A better understanding among the staff of the outcomes/results/impact of the programme is a good way to booster motivation and inspiration.

Presenting outcomes/results of IIAP will be important for sustaining and strengthening trust from stakeholders as well as support from general public for the programme.

Based on the evaluations of FGDs by facilitators and participants the programme can measure and document outcomes/results of FGDs in a systematic way. The programme should develop a way to document and measure to what extent the IIAP facilitated dialogues support the desired outcome of sustainable peace in Aceh.

Taking into the consideration the politically sensitive nature of the high-level dialogues, the Review Team still believes that the IIAP should try to find a way to link programme results on the local level with results achieved in the high-level dialogues in order for IIAP staff as well as stakeholders and the public to better understand the role and results of IIAP.

9. Stakeholder Satisfaction. Define indicators for stakeholder satisfaction. Establish procedures for measuring stakeholders' satisfaction in order to inform strategy.

Evaluations should be built into not only FGDs but also other activities where IIAP interacts with stakeholders.

Annex 1 – Map of Aceh

Annex 2 – Case Study: FGD in Meulaboh

CASE STUDY: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION “Duek Pakat”

BACKGROUND

Based on a conflict analysis of the district, IAP Aceh Barat-Selatan facilitated a multi stakeholder Focus Groups Discussion (FGD) making use of Acehnese traditional approaches (local wisdom) and understood as “Duek Pakat”. The objectives of the “Duek Pakat” (FGD) were to facilitate a process where mutual trust could be built between stakeholders, information could be collected regarding things that disturb the peace, cooperation built for promoting peace and search for solutions to problems through the empowerment of stakeholders.

OBJECTIVES

1. Trustbuilding together with stakeholders and to decrease feelings of mistrust and suspicion harmful to the peace process.
2. Gather information about the perceptions, knowledge and experience of participants about things related with problems identified as challenges to peace.
3. Build coordination, communication and cooperation between stakeholders in building sustainable peace.
4. Promoting peace dan problems solving. Promote peace with Interpeace method to stakeholders and to search for consensual solutions together as a way to safeguard important principles of peace in Aceh Barat district.
5. To have a FGD pilot project in Meulaboh as a first step to initiate PAR (Participatory Action Research) which will be continued in other parts of the Aceh Barat and Selatan districts as part of a larger process to build a long term peacebuilding programme of Interpeace in Aceh Barat and Selatan districts.

Theme: Continuous safeguarding of values of peace in Aceh Barat (Meulaboh)

Date: 27 February 2007, 8am until end

Location: Meuligou Hotel, Meulaboh

Participants: In this first pilot project Duek Pakat will be arranged for a group of stakeholders that are decision makers or High-level stakeholders (Policymakers). The group of stakeholders consists of: Bupati, Sekda, Bapeda, Ketua BRA, Dandim, Kapolres, Ketua KPA, Ketua Forkab, Ketua DPRD, MPU, MAA, representatives of women’s groups, community groups and NGOs. 25 participants were invited:

No	Organisations
1	Bupati = Head of District

No	Organisations
2	Dandim = Head of District Military
3	Kapolres = Head of District Police
4	Bappeda = District Development Board
5	Ketua DPRD = Chairman of District Parliament
6	MPU = Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama (<i>Religious Leaders</i>)
7	MAA = Majelis Adat Aceh (<i>Aceh Customary Council</i>)
8	Ketua Sekber Aceh Barat = Chair of the Joint Secretariat of Aceh Barat
9	Rektor UTU = Head of University
10	Ketua BRA = Head of Reintegration and Peace Agency
11	Ketua KPA = Head of GAM political organisation
12	Ketua Forkab = Head of Forum Komunikasi Anak Bangsa
13	Perwakilan LSM bidang konflik = Representative from NGO (conflict focus)
14	Perwakilan LSM/ Ormas Perempuan bidang agama (Rep from religious women CBO/NGO)
15	Perwakilan LSM Perempuan bidang pemberdayaan ekonomi = <i>Rep from women NGO (economical empowerment focus)</i>
16	Perwakilan Ulama Dayah = Representative from Religious Leader
17	Perwakilan Pemuda (KNPI) = Representative from Youth group (KNPI)
18	Perwakilan Masyarakat (geuchik dari daerah konflik tinggi) = Rep from community (villagehead from conflict affected village)
19	Perwakilan kelompok budaya = Rep from cultural association
20	Perwakilan mantan GAM sebelum MoU = Rep from GAM ex-combatants that
21	UNDP = UN Development Programme
22	UNORC = UN Recovery Coordinator for Aceh-Nias
23	IPRD
24	SEMA
25	P2TP2 = Pusat Pelayanan Terpadu Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Anak/ <i>Center for Integrated Empowerment Support to Women and Children</i>

IIAP Facilitators: Rosni Idham, Fachrul Razi and Dewi Fithria

GENERAL OVERVIEW: PROCESS AND CONTENT

Agenda Duek Pakat

08.00 – 09.00	Registration of participants
09.00 – 09.30	Opening (Reading of Al Quran and poetry)
09.30 – 09.45	Discussion about FGD ground rules
09.45 – 10.15	Present IIAP objectives and Interpeace Aceh Programme.
10.15 – 10.45	Explain objectives of FGD and expectations of participants.
10.45 – 11.30	Break
11.30 – 12.45	Start the FGD
12.45 – 13.30	Lunch Break
13.30 – 14.30	Discuss FGD (Duek Pakat for Peace in Aceh)
14.30 – 15.15	Closing and evaluations

15.15 – 16.00 Break, informal discussions dan return home

Output Duek Pakat as hoped for:

1. A problem map created by all stakeholders.
2. A Framework for solving problems based on capacity and potential of all stakeholders in Aceh Barat.
3. Recommendations to further coordinate and understand FGD as a step of PAR. To create a manual for IIAP in implementing FGDs as part of a long term peacebuilding programme in Aceh Barat and Aceh Selatan districts.
4. Create guidelines for FGD to be used as a reference in implementing following FGDs in other parts of Aceh Barat and Selatan districts.

OUTCOME/RESULTS: POINTS AND QUOTES FROM PARTICIPANTS

As the Review Team could not read the evaluation forms of the FGD, the points and quotes below cannot fully serve to comment on the outcome of the FGD, but rather the comments below will illustrate and verify the content of the FGD as well as give a few examples of perceptions of participants regarding the role of FGDs.

CRS representative:

- "FGD yang seperti ini sangat baik bila dilakukan berkala dan jelas kesimpulan dan follow serta target yang akan dicapai." *(FGD like this is really good if done regularly and if there are conclusions and follow up of what achievements have been made towards targets.)*

Deputy Head of District:

- A better understanding of values of peace: "Masih banyak di kalangan masyarakat yang belum dapat memahami arti Perdamaian secara majemuk, hal yang seperti ini telah timbul persepsi yang salah di tengah – tengah masyarakat, hal seperti ini sangat lumrah terjadi mengingat tingkat pendidikan yang masih endah khususnya masyarakat pedesaan, maka sangat perlu materi pendidikan peace untuk pemahaman arti perdamaian tu sendiri." *(There are still many groups in society who have yet to understand the meaning of peace in a deeper sense. Misunderstandings like this happen naturally considering the fact that education levels are low, in particular in villages, so there is a strong need for peace education so that people understand what peace means for them.)*
- POLRI dan TNI kuatkan bina mitra *(Strengthened partnership between police and military.)*

Unsur Tokoh Perempuan Meulaboh (Ibu Cut Fitri):

- Masyarakat jangan diprovokasi dengan berbagai issue konflik yang melahirkan konflik horizontal *(People should not be provoked to let the conflict create new horizontal conflicts.)*

- Satukan persepsi dalam mengartikan nilai-nilai perdamaian bagi masyarakat (*to create a unified understanding about the values of peace for the people.*)

DPD II Hizbu Tahrir Meulaboh :

- Adanya solusi bagi setiap issue konflik (*There is a solution to every conflict*)
- Penyelesaian issue konflik dapat dilakukan dengan local wisdom (*Solutions to conflicts can be found with the help of local wisdom*)

Dandim 0105 TU:

- Fahami MoU aceh dalam bingkai nkri (*Understanding MoU within the framework of the Unitary State of Indonesia*)

On 4 June 2008 the Review Team interviewed the Dandim and this is what he said regarding the FGD:

"The discussions in the FGD were open, interesting, honest and interactive. There were representatives from military, police, NGOs, womens organizations and head of villages participating. We all agreed on ten points of how to protect and support the peace process. We agreed to protect the peace together. A workshop like this is very much needed. I seldom have the opportunity to meet with NGOs for example and to talk with them in an honest, straightforward and open manner."

Ketua KNPI Meulaboh:

- Damai cita-cita semua orang (*Peace is everyone's wish*)
- Visi dan misi perdamaian yang tertuang dalam MoU Helsinki perlu pemahaman yang baik dan benar (*The vision and mission of peace as it is defined in the MoU Helsinki needs to be understood correctly.*)

Perwakilan KPA Wilayah Meulaboh Raya:

- Pasca mou masyarakat merasa nyaman dalam beraktifitas (*After the MoU people feel safe to carry out their activities.*)
- Jangan ada lagi provokasi yang dapat merusak perdamaian yang indah ini. (*Let there be no more provocations that destroy this beautiful peace.*)

Unsur DKA Meulaboh:

- Sosialisasikan Pemahaman Pesan Perdamaian Sampai Kepada Masyarakat Pedesaan Dengan Melihat Nilai Seni Yang Sesuai Dengan Syari'at Islam. (*Socialize an understanding of the message of peace to people in the village and look at values that are in accordance with Syari'at Islam.*)

P2TP2A:

- The Review Team interviewed Ibu Maimanah in Meulaboh on 4 June 2008. She said that the FGD gave her an opportunity to speak out on behalf of Acehnese women and their commitment to peace.

"This is what I said at the FGD 'Kamo han ek lee, ka hek tat ngon konflik yang kaleh, seb yang ka. (We do not want more, we are already too tired, with the last conflict, we had enough). I also said that women in Aceh wants to live in peace, we do not want to go back to how things were during the conflict. Life was very difficult for women during the conflict. Some were alone with everything as their men left and when they had to flee from their villages they usually could take no belongings with them. Many women lost everything they had during the conflict and they had nowhere to turn. Many of these women in this district have yet to receive any kind of assistance to help them recover".

Chair of BRA Meulaboh, Tgk Rajuddin:

- Keterlambatan proses reintegrasi dan rekonsiliasi tetap saling menjaga keutuhan dalam kontek damai (*Despite the delay in reintegration and reconciliation efforts, let's keep united within the context of peace.*)

Deputy head of police Meulaboh:

- Satukan persepsi dalam memberi arti damai bagi semua stakeholders dan masyarakat (*To unite the perception of the meaning of peace for all stakeholders and the people.*)

SAID ABOUT TRUSTBUILDING IN THE FGD:

Deputy Head of District:

- Komunikasi terbangun dengan baik (*The communication developed well*)

Deputy Head of District Military:

- Kejujuran Dalam Ber'tikad Baik 'tidak ada lagi dusta di antara kita' (*Honesty and good intentions between us. There are no more lies told between us.*)

Annex 3 – Case Study: MOU Round Table

CASE STUDY: MOU ROUND TABLE

BACKGROUND

The “MoU Round Table” is a series of meetings between the signatory parties to the Helsinki MoU facilitated by IAP. Toward the end of AMM’s mandate, the two signatory parties and the Head of AMM as well as representatives from the European Union (Javier Solana) signed an open letter to the Acehnese people declaring that the MoU remains valid and that the signatory parties undertake to continue meeting to resolve outstanding MoU-related issues.

Against this backdrop and subsequent requests from various parties, IAP initiated a process of establishing a suitable forum for continuation of MoU-related issues. In addition, the post-conflict situation with the tendency of high tensions on the ground needs a regular forum for dialogue between the parties to defuse tensions and resolve conflicts.

IAP has been trusted by the signatory parties of the MoU to facilitate the dialogue due to the involvement of IAP management and to the MoU mediator President Martti Ahtisaari being the chair of the Interpeace Governing Council.

Four MoU Round Table meetings have been held so far, with topics determined by IAP in consultation with the signatory parties.

Due to the high degree of sensitivity of this activity, much of the documentation in IAP’s possession directly related to these meetings, such as minutes of meeting, are considered confidential. The signatory parties have requested that these documents are not circulated, but are only for the consumption of the individuals directly involved in the meetings. In light of the foregoing, most of the information that serves as the basis for this case study was obtained from media reports and an interview with Robert Hygrell, Senior Adviser Helsinki MoU and Legal Expert of IAP.

THE FIRST MOU ROUND TABLE: JAKARTA, 14-15 DECEMBER 2007

The first MoU Round Table was held in Jakarta on 14-15 December 2007 in a very conducive atmosphere. This was a very important meeting considering that the parties had not met in a ‘formal’ manner for over one year – the last Commission on Security Arrangements (CoSA) meeting with AMM was in early December 2006. In the initial meeting, the discussion was quite general in nature, but both expressed their strong support for the MoU Round Table and agreed that these meetings need to be convened on a regular basis. There is no statement made for the press. Thus, there is no media coverage on this meeting.

THE SECOND MOU ROUND TABLE: MAKASSAR, 9-10 FEB 2008

The second meeting was held in Makassar with the presence of Malik Mahmud, Zaini Abdullah, Zakaria Saman, Usman Lampoh Awe, Ibrahim bin Syamsudin KBS, Muzakkir

Manaf, Jahja Muad, etc from the second signatory party of the Helsinki MoU (GAM). From the first signatory party (GoI), there were Hamid Awaludin, Usman Basyah and Farid Husain present.

The second meeting discussed, among other things, the challenges in the reintegration process and the implementation of the MoU and LOGA. Further, KPA spokesperson Ibrahim KBS stated, "We also discussed GAM's expectations to revise the Law on the Governance of Aceh based on the Helsinki MOU."³¹

THE THIRD MOU ROUND TABLE: JAKARTA, 6-7 APRIL 2008

The third MoU Round Table took place on 6-7 April 2008 in Jakarta. Malik Mahmud, Zaini Abdullah, Zakaria Saman, Ibrahim KBS, Kamaruddin, TM Nazar and Haji Arman participated in the meeting from the side of the MoU's second signatory party. As for the first signatory party, Farid Husain, Sofyan Djalil, Hamid Awaludin and Iris Indira Murti participated in the meeting. In addition, a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives who chaired the deliberations of the LoGA, Ferry Mursyidan Baldan, was also present in the meeting.

A press release signed by IPI representative and KPA Spokesperson Ibrahim KBS stated that the valuation of Helsinki MoU was discussed in the meeting, including recent conditions in Aceh. The focus was on the demand to form the Provinces of ALA and ABAS. Malik Mahmud and his group disagree with the demand and asked the central government not to approve the draft laws establishing the two provinces, which have already been submitted to the House of Representatives in Jakarta.

The discussion also touched upon the issue of the Aceh development. It was agreed that the development of Aceh will not only be focused on the victims of tsunami and conflict, but on the development of Aceh as a whole. Other issues discussed include: security issues, local political parties, the implementation of reintegration and the speeding up of the removal of GAM political prisoner detainees from various prisons outside Aceh who were not included in the amnesty scheme to prisons in Aceh so that they can be close to their families.

It is important to note that the Chair of Partai Aceh Muzakkir Manaf revealed that the change of the name from "Partai GAM" into "Partai Aceh" was actually one of the results of the third MoU Round Table. He further stated that although it was already discussed in the second MoU Round Table, the definitive result came up in the third meeting.³²

THE FOURTH MOU ROUND TABLE: JAKARTA, 8 MAY 2008

The most recent MoU Round Table held prior to this review was the one in Jakarta on May 8, 2008. The fourth MoU Round Table was held at the same time as the visit of President Martti Ahtisaari so that he was able to participate in the meeting. Malik Mahmud, Zaini Abdullah, Zakaria Saman, Muzakkir Manaf, TM Nazar, Jahja Muad and Tengku Ramli

³¹ Analisa Newspaper, 12 Februari 2008.

³² Modus Newspaper, Friday 23 May 2008.

attended the meeting representing the second signatory of the Helsinki MoU, whereas Sofyan Djalil, Farid Husain and Hamid Awaludin represented the first signatory of the MOU.

In the meeting the second signatory party requested the central government to soon issue government regulations and presidential regulations as mandated by the LoGA. Vice Governor of Aceh TM Nazar further stated to the media that Aceh government also questioned why reintegration funds as much as Rp.450billion has not been disbursed by the central government whereas Aceh government already allocated Rp.200billion for the reintegration efforts. Issues on reconciliation and Human Rights Court plus Visa on Arrival in Aceh were also discussed in the meeting, said the vice governor.³³

REVIEW AND ACHIEVEMENT

The MoU Round Table is not a decision-making forum that can immediately bring the results to the table. The implementation of the MoU in the peace building context is indeed an on-going negotiation process of the signatory parties of the MoU. Therefore, the results cannot also be quick and tangible as it is a political decision-making. The fact that a space for continuing dialogue has been created is an important contribution to the peacebuilding. In addition, the participants from both parties will then be able to communicate the discussion points to the key decision makers to be followed up. A channel of communication has been created.

The achievements of the MOU Round Table are the following:

1. Concrete contribution to the peace process. The MoU Round Table is acknowledged by the key stakeholders as an important forum that can defuse tensions among the two signatory parties of the Helsinki MoU. This is apparent from the statement of the Chair of Partai Aceh referring to the Second and Third Round Table Meeting as the fora where they finally agreed to change the party's name to prevent disagreement with the central government.
2. Agreed proposal resulted from discussions among key stakeholders. IIAP's role to facilitate dialogue and encourage conflicting parties to try to resolve the conflict is achieved in this activity. While IIAP helps formulating the proposals, the thoughts and conformity of the formula came from the participants.

These meetings confirm that we are willing to communicate issues hindering the (peace) process... The weakening trust-building between the two parties must be recultivated."

(Ibrahim KBS in Serambi Indonesia Newspaper, 11 February 2008)

³³ Serambi Indonesia Newspaper, 9 May 2008.

Annex 4 - List of Big Incidents

No.	Place	Date	Brief Description
1.	Alue Dua Village, Nisam, Aceh Utara	21 March 2007	Villagers became suspicious of four men who had arrived in the village and slept a night in a school building without reporting to village authorities. It was then discovered that they were TNI soldiers and that they had brought their firearms in their bags. The villagers, suspecting they were intelligence agents, then beat the four men, badly injuring several, and incarcerated them overnight in the village meeting hall. Two days later TNI soldiers returned to the village allegedly to investigate the incident, and beat at least 14 villagers.
2.	Lhok Meureubo Village, Sawang, Aceh Utara	11 March 2007	Villagers beat eight people described as <i>jamaah tabligh</i> (an Islamic missionary movement), who had come to the village to teach Islam from house to house, and accused them of teaching "improper Islam".
3.	Lhoksukon, Aceh Utara	27 March 2007	A group of men drove up to the KPA office in Lhoksukon in the middle of the night and burned it down. The office had been vandalized in the past, following a dispute between KPA and police. 1
4.	Bireuen	10 December 2007	A grenade was thrown at the residence of Bupati Nurdin A. Rahman.
5.	Sawang, Aceh Utara	27 December 2007	Teungku Badruddin, an ex-TNA commander, was assassinated by a commando of heavily armed men in Sawang, Aceh Utara. This was quickly followed by other violent incidents including a kidnapping and two shootings, one of which led to another death.
6.	Meurah Pupok village, Atu Lintang sub-district, Aceh Tengah	1 Mar 2008	In the early hours of March 1st, in Meurah Pupok village, Atu Lintang sub-district, Aceh Tengah, five KPA members were killed and one seriously injured in an attack on the Sagoe Merah Mege KPA office. The Atu Lintang massacre followed a smaller incident in Takengon on the previous day, in which three KPA members were injured in an altercation with hundreds of members of the Terminal Workers Union (<i>Ikatan Pekerja Terminal</i> – IPT), an organization dominated by former self-defence groups, upon their arrival at a meeting

No.	Place	Date	Brief Description
			to sort out a long-standing argument over control of employment at the Takengon bus terminal.
7.	Aceh Tengah	13 March 2008	Mukhlis Gayo, former candidate for Bupati in Aceh Tengah, was kidnapped in Takengon. The kidnappers abandoned their victim when stopped by police in Bireuen. The identity of the victim led to suspicion of possible connections with the ALA/ABAS issue or to the theory of a retaliatory action undertaken by elements of KPA after the March 1st Atu Lintang massacre. However, the police investigation concluded rapidly that the kidnapping was motivated by ransom.
8.	Banda Aceh	29 March 2007	In the early hours of March 29th, a military police officer, Ujang Ardiansyah, was shot and killed by two individuals on a motorbike as he was driving a car near the Lhong Raya Stadium, Banda Aceh. Among the passengers of the car were another military police officer and two KPA members, one of whom fled the scene right after the incident. Despite the heavy-handed response by police and the military, perpetrators have not been identified and the motive of the crime remains unclear. Sources quoted by the press indicate Ujang might have been the victim of a settling of scores related to drug trafficking (<i>shabu-shabu</i> : crystal methamphetamine), with both military officers and KPA members involved in the traffic.
9.	Gayo Lues	27 April 2008	On April 27th, seven Chinese nationals and one Indonesian were kidnapped by armed men in Pining sub-district, Gayo Lues, while conducting an investment survey for an Indonesian mining company. Perpetrators demanded Rp 300 million (US\$ 33,200) as ransom. After two hostages were released the next day, all were finally freed on April 29th, after half the ransom was paid. No arrest was made.
10.	Dusun Jabal Antara, Desa Alue Dua Kecamatan Nisam Antara Kabupaten Aceh Utara	30-31 Mei 2008	Villagers reported that an unidentified group of 30 armed people came from the Bener Meriah direction and burned down 3 houses and 4 motor cycles and shot a cow of a villager.

Source: extracted by the Review Team from the World Bank/DSF's "Aceh Conflict Monitoring Updates" and Serambi Newspaper.

ANNEX 5 - LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED

No	Name	Affiliation	Interview Date
1.	Samsidar	Aceh Program Manager - International Center for Transitional Justice Commission, Advisor to UNIFEM, Banda Aceh	12 May
2.	Agung Wijaya	Aceh Project Coordinator - Demos, Banda Aceh	12 May
3.	Juha Christensen	Interpeace Indonesia Director, Banda Aceh	13 May (Bivitri) and 28 May (Minna)
4.	Hendra Budian	Director – Aceh Judicial Monitoring Institution, Banda Aceh	14 May
5.	Zainal Arifin and Masykur	Forum Komunikasi dan Koordinasi (Communication and Coordination Forum) Desk Aceh, Banda Aceh	14 May
6.	Syarwan	Field Facilitators for Sigli - IIAP, Banda Aceh	14 May
7.	Robert Hygrell	Senior Adviser Helsinki MoU and Legal Expert – IIAP, Jakarta	15 May (Bivitri) and 26 May (Minna)
8.	Mike Pejic	Head of Finance and Administration - International Peacebuilding Alliance (Interpeace) HQ, Geneva	22 May
9.	Dominique Hempel Rodas Posso	Senior Legal Counsel and Programme Advisor –Interpeace HQ, Geneva	23 May
10.	Scott Weber	Director-General – Interpeace HQ, Geneva	23 May
11.	David Whittlesey	Interim Head of Programme for Aceh, East-Timor and Guinea-Bissou – Interpeace, Geneva	23 May
12.	Murtadha Zaisar	Office and HR Coordinator - IIAP, Banda Aceh	28 May
13.	Saifuddin A. Haitamy	Regional Coordinator - IIAP, Banda Aceh	28 May
14.	Theresa Dela Cruz (Marites)	Programme Officer –IIAP, Banda Aceh	28 and 29 May
15.	Stephen Almsteiner	BRR Safety Advisor	28 May
16.	T.M. Nazar	KPA (Aceh Transitional Committee),, Banda Aceh	29 May
17.	Ronnie Delsy	Programme Manager – IIAP, Banda Aceh	29 May
18.	Marfikar	ICT Specialist – IIAP, Banda Aceh	29 May

No	Name	Affiliation	Interview Date
19.	Afif Afifuddin	Project Officer - European Commission, Banda Aceh	29 May
20.	Yusnidur Usman Musa (Adi)	Project Coordinator – IIAP, Banda Aceh	29 May
21.	Radhiah Abdurrahman (Ira)	Accountant –IIAP, Banda Aceh	30 May
22.	Andrian Morel	Consultant for <i>Conflict Monitoring Update</i> at World Bank, Banda Aceh	30 May
23.	James Bean	Project Manager – IOM, Banda Aceh	2 June
24.	Ahmad Human Hamid	Chairman – Aceh Recovery Forum, Banda Aceh	2 June
25.	T. Zulkarnain (Chair), Dedi Safrizal (spokesperson)	KPA (Aceh Transitional Committee) of Pase Area, Lhokseumawe	3 June
26.	Fatimahsyam	Executive Director - LBH Apik Aceh, Lhokseumawe	3 June
27.	Hafinidar and M.Rizwan Ali	Field Facilitators for Lhokseumawe and Aceh Utara (Aceh Utara District) - IIAP, Lhokseumawe	3 June
28.	Zulkifli	Kapolres (Head of District Police), Lhokseumawe	3 June
29.	T. Basri	KPA (Aceh Transitional Committee) of Aceh Tengah, Takengon	4 June
30.	Armizan	Volunteer - KontraS (<i>Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan</i> /The Commission for Forced Disappearances and Victims of Violence) and Redelong Institute, Takengon	4 June
31.	Drs.H. Djauhar Ali	Wakil Bupati (Deputy Head of District) Aceh Tengah, Takengon	4 June
32.	T. Iqlil Ilyas Leube	Advisor – KPA (Aceh Transitional Committee), Takengon	4 June
33.	Fakhruddin	Field Facilitator for Aceh Tengah and Bener Meriah, IIAP, Bener Meriah	4 June
34.	Ramli MS	Bupati (Head of District) Aceh Barat, Meulaboh	5 June
35.	Dewi Fithria	Field Facilitator for Aceh Barat and Nagan Raya, IIAP, Meulaboh	5 June
36.	Harfendi	Komandan KODIM (Commander of District Military) 0105/ Aceh Barat, Meulaboh	5 June
37.	Dra. Maimanah	Kepala Bidang Pemberdayaan Perempuan Dinas Sosial dan	5 June

No	Name	Affiliation	Interview Date
		Kesejahteraan Sosial (Head of Women Empowerment Division within Social and Welfare Department) Kabupaten Aceh Barat, Meulaboh	
38.	Linggo	Kapolres (Head of District Police) Aceh Barat, Meulaboh	6 June
39.	Abu Yus (Chair), M. Nadi (Vice Chair), Tgk. Bustanuddin, Tgk. Rajudin, Arifin	KPA (Aceh Transitional Committee) Aceh Barat, Meulaboh	6 June
40.	Yarmen Dinamika	Secretariat Coordinator - Forbes Damai Aceh and Executive Director - APRC, Banda Aceh	6 June
41.	Farid Husain	Chair of the Board of Patrons - Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI), Jakarta	9 June
42.	Sidney Jones	Researcher - International Crisis Group, Jakarta	9 June
43.	Bernardino Regazzoni and Georg Stein	Ambassador and 1 st Secretary: Human Security Advisor – Embassy of Switzerland, Jakarta	9 June
44.	Mette Kottman	Counsellor – Royal Norwegian Embassy, Jakarta	9 June
45.	Åsa Theander and Frederik Frisell	First Secretaries - Swedish Embassy, Jakarta	9 June
46.	Weldon Epp	First Secretary - Canadian Embassy, Jakarta	9 June

ANNEX 6 - LIST OF KEY DOCUMENTS CONSULTED

BOOKS, REPORTS, PROJECT DOCUMENTS, PAPERS

No	Author/ Institution	Title	Date
1.	AMM	AMM welcomes the start of allocations for former GAM Combatants – Press Release	12 October 2005
2.	AMM	Former GAM combatants receive second economic facilitation package - Media Advisory	Not available
3.	IIAP	Building Lasting Peace in Aceh: A Peacebuilding Partnership Programme 2006-2010. 2007 Annual Report	12 February 2008
4.	IIAP	Project Document	1 November 2007
5.	International Crisis Group	Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh, Asia Briefing No. 61	22 March 2007
6.	International Crisis Group	Aceh: Post Conflict Complications, Asia Report No. 139	4 October 2007
7.	World Bank/Decentralization Support Facility	Aceh Conflict Monitoring Update	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1st – 31st of October 2007. • 1st – 31st December 2007 • 1st January – 29th February 2008 • 1st of March- 30th of April 2008.
8.	Mary B. Andersson and Lara Olson	Confronting War: Critical Lessons For Peace Practitioners, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, Collaborative For Development Action	2002
9.	Farid Husain	To See the Unseen	July 2007
10.	World Bank	GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment. Enhancing Peace through Community-level Development Programming	March 2006
11.	World Bank	The Aceh Peace Agreement: How Far Have We Come?	December 2006
12.	IOM/USAID	Peace-Building in the Central Highlands of Aceh, Indonesia	2007
13.	Coalition for Aceh Truth Recovery	A Proposal for Remedy for Victims of Gross Human Rights Violations in Aceh.	30 November 2007
14.	Kirsten E. Schulze	Mission Not So Impossible: The Aceh	July 2007

No	Author/ Institution	Title	Date
		Monitoring Mission and Lessons learned for the EU	
15.	European Union Election Observation Mission Aceh 2006/2007	Acehnese go back to polls in Aceh Barat and Aceh Barat Daya in a peaceful, transparent and well organized run-off election to freely elect their district leaders. Statement of Preliminary Conclusions and Findings	6 March 2007
16.	Hamid Awaludin	Damai di Aceh: Catatan Perdamaian RI-GAM di Helsinki (Peace in Aceh: A Note on the Peace Process Between GoI-GAM in Helsinki)	2008
17.	Edward Aspinall and Harold Crouch (Published by East-West Center)	The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed	2003
18.	No author, taken from BRA website	Compilation of most serious concerns regarding the implementation of the MoU	Not available
19.	Crisis Management Initiative (Sami Lahdensuo)	Building Peace in Aceh – observations on the work of the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) and its liaison with local civil society	Not available
20.	BRA	Donor Matrix	24 November 2007
21.	European Commission	European Commission assistance to Aceh – Overview	Not available
22.	World Bank Indonesia	Program Summary: Conflict & Development Program	Not available
23.	USAID	Support for Peaceful Democratization	Not available

INTERNAL IIAP DOCUMENTS

- Monthly reports from Aceh Utara District
- Cooperation Agreement between The Internal Peacebuilding Alliance – Interpeace and the Crisis Management Initiative Concerning their Collaboration in Aceh, Indonesia.
- Cooperation Agreement between The Indonesian Peace Institute (Yayasan Institut Perdamaian Indonesia) and The International Peacebuilding Alliance – Interpeace Concerning their cooperation in the Joint IPI Interpeace Aceh Programme
- Materials distributed in the November 2007 Workshop
- Best Practices Experiences – Aceh Utara (power point presentation without date)
- Terms of Reference of the FGD in Aceh Barat.
- Indonesian Peace Institute-Interpeace Aceh Program (IIAP), a power point presentation dated 20 May 2008
- What do we understand by PAR: an Interpeace Perspective

- *Kebutuhan Fasilitator Tambahan* (The Need for Additional Facilitators), proposed by Saifuddin, Regional Coordinator.
- Updated Job Descriptions
- Workshop Report – Amended. First round of foundational training November 12-16, Banda Aceh
- Example of an individual monthly workplan
- Key Performance Indicator Form and Weekly Planning
- *Draft Uraian Tugas Fasilitator IPI-Interpeace Aceh Program* (Draft Job Description for Field Facilitators of IIAP)
- *Draft Struktur Kerja IIAP* (Draft Organigram)
- Finance Calendar
- Procedure Reimbursement Expenses Claim
- Procedure Settlement Cash Advance FGD/ Others
- Procedure Reimbursement Travel Expenses
- Expenses Claim Form
- Cash Advance Request Form
- Travel Authorization Form
- Various documents from Aceh Task Force.


MEDIA REPORTS

- Tempo Interaktif, Tuesday, 27 December 2005, <<http://www.tempointeraktif.com/hg/nasional/2005/12/27/brk,20051227-71275.id.html>>, accessed on 16 June 2008.
- Modus Newspaper, 23 May 2008
- Modus Newspaper, Week V, January 2008.
- Serambi Indonesia Newspaper, 8 May 2008.
- Analisa Newspaper, 12 Februari 2008.
- Modus Newspaper, Friday 23 May 2008.
- Serambi Indonesia Newspaper, 9 May 2008.
- Kontras Tabloid, No. 438, 22-28 Mei 2008.

ANNEX 7 – THE ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE OF FORBES DAMAI



Chart of Joint Forum to Support Peace in Aceh



(Based on the SK of Aceh Governor, 23 April 2007, No. 330/145/2007)

ANNEX 8 – TERMS OF REFERENCE 1st IIAP REVIEW

1. BACKGROUND.

The modern history of the province of Aceh in Indonesia has been quite turbulent, marked by resistance to the colonial power, and in recent decades a separatist struggle against the central government of Indonesia. The current situation in Aceh has been largely shaped by two major events: the deadly tsunami of December 2004 and the signing of a peace agreement (Memorandum of Understanding or MoU) between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in August 2005. Under the terms of the peace agreement, the GAM formally gave up its secessionist aspirations in exchange for formal autonomy and devolution of certain powers.

Between September 2005 and December 2006, the international Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) played an important facilitating, mediating and at times arbitrating role to help the parties to the MoU with its implementation. The current political landscape in Aceh is further determined by the Law on Governance in Aceh (LOGA) adopted by the Indonesian parliament in July 2006, and the outcomes of the local election (provincial governorship, several districts and mayoral positions) in mid-December 2006 in which former GAM members, several at such time standing as independents, did relatively well.

The current situation also needs to be understood against the backdrop of the Indonesian Presidential elections, as well as elections for the Aceh provincial legislature, that will take place in 2009.

2. THE INTERPEACE PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME.

The Interpeace connection to Indonesia and Aceh came through President M. Ahtisaari, who mediated the peace process and is also chair of the Interpeace Governing Council. Coming from different experiences, some senior Indonesian officials and Interpeace converged in the awareness that a signed agreement may be a necessary but is rarely a sufficient condition to consolidate peace, and that a more sustained peace consolidation effort would be required.

The Interpeace strategy in Indonesia was designed around two familiar and one unfamiliar axis:

- a. Strengthening local capacities: sustainable peace requires that a society has the internal capacities to manage and resolve its inevitable differences without resorting to violence. To that end Interpeace always seeks to work with and support a programme team of people of the society itself. In the course of 2007, the Indonesian Peace Institute (IPI) was created whose first programmatic role is intended to be peacebuilding in Aceh in partnership with Interpeace;
- b. Consensual solutions: Interpeace has significant experience in a variety of contexts around the world with an approach that allows local stakeholders to identify critical issues that do or could lead to high tensions or violence and then applying participatory-action-research principles to develop consensual solutions. The approach typically seeks to be broad-based and inclusive, seeking to involve all

sectors of society. Such approach creates the spaces and attitudes for constructive dialogue across society ('across' can be both horizontal and vertical) and in doing so supports not only reconciliation but also good governance. There remain critical issues within Aceh province, some of them directly related to the separatist struggle with the state, others not or less so.

- c. MoU follow-up: Less familiar for Interpeace is a supporting role in the further dialogue between the signatory parties to the MoU, a role that is made possible through the confidence that both parties have in the persons of Juha Christensen, who played an important facilitating role in the peace process and in the AMM, and in President Ahtisaari. The latter maintains a role of guarantor of the peace agreement. In this capacity he is supported by the Crisis Management Initiative, a Finnish organization of which he is also the Chair. This process and dialogue takes place mostly at the 'formal-official' level, and thus operates more at a top level, although it does connect to various levels within Aceh province and among Acehnese in the diaspora.

Goals and outcomes: The goal of the joint IPI-Interpeace Aceh Programme (IIAP) is to contribute to consolidating an enabling environment for the continued implementation of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) while bringing about social reconciliation and good governance in Aceh. The IIAP's main outcomes have been reformulated as:

- Strengthened levels of trust and cooperation between MoU stakeholders and the Acehnese society.
- Stronger engagement of Acehnese civil society and MoU stakeholders in the peace and reconciliation process.
- A general public in Aceh that is better informed about the MoU and its implementation process and about other relevant governance-related issues.
- Decrease in tension, clashes and confrontations between opposing interest groups in Acehnese society, and more recourse to constructive dialogue as a mechanism to find solutions for these differences.
- IPI is widely recognised as a trustworthy and effective national capacity for peacebuilding, and therefore an asset to the nation.

To avoid any possible confusion with the Aceh Monitoring Mission, Interpeace did not get engaged until the departure of the AMM in mid-December 2006. In practice that meant that all managerial, operational, administrative, logistical etc. capacities had to be built from scratch starting in January 2007. This laying of the foundations for a programme also required a legal framework within which to operate. Formally speaking a preparatory phase took place between December 2006-May 2007 with the operational phase starting in June 2007.

3. THE FIRST REVIEW: PURPOSE AND KEY QUESTIONS.

Interpeace-supported programmes are regularly monitored, reviewed and evaluated. This will be the first review of the Aceh peacebuilding programme, taking place some 15-16 months after its inception.

The principal purpose of the review is to test the extent to which the current strategic, operational and administrative management of the programme are on-track (in a double sense: in the right direction and efficient/effective) and what adjustments might be made to improve the programme.

To that effect the evaluator(s) will focus on the following questions:

A. The strategic relevance of Interpeace's programme within a wider conflict analysis:

1. Is there still broad recognition for the need of sustained peacebuilding to consolidate the peace? Where do various Indonesian and external stakeholders see critical issues and what is their primary provenance, e.g. controversial issues directly related to the implementation of the MoU; controversial and conflictual issues less directly related to the implementation of the MoU (e.g. related to the economic situation, the governance situation, aid-induced tensions, issues related to equality before the law etc.), more local or wider provincial issues and conflicts etc. What do various stakeholders believe *must* be addressed prior to Indonesia and Aceh fully going into electoral campaigning for the 2009 elections?
2. The Interpeace programme is not the only programme with 'peacebuilding intent' in Aceh. What do various stakeholders see as the key peacebuilding programmes? WHAT sort of conflicts, tensions, fault lines are currently being addressed by the major peacebuilding programmes – and what are the major characteristics on HOW they try to address them?
3. What is the perceived position / distinctiveness / added value of the Interpeace programme in this context? How is Interpeace currently perceived by other actors?
4. What concrete achievements / contributions do key stakeholders believe the Interpeace programme has realized in these first few months of operation? What are the expectations for future achievements and impacts?

B. The performance to date of the Interpeace programme:

5. What have been the main steps in the programme's development over the past 12 months and what has been the reasoning / underlying logic behind the key steps? What does the programme see as major achievements so far, or as cases of significant influence / impact? How well has the programme positioned itself to be able to have impact as it progresses?
6. Are there significant areas where the programme could make changes to address its stated objectives more effectively or efficiently?
7. What are the current operational capacities of the programme, in terms of the operational infrastructure and logistical equipment, but also in terms of human resources (numbers, backgrounds and personal networks/connections, competencies)? Are the current capacities already deployed to maximum effect (i.e. being used strategically and efficiently)? Are there important capacities missing or in need of strengthening?
8. How have the communication flows worked: between Interpeace headquarters and the programme, between the programme and Acehese officials (at provincial and

district level), between the programme and central state officials, between Interpeace and donors? How can they be improved?

C. Overall appreciation.

9. Is the Interpeace programme 'on track' in a double sense i.e. is it strategic and bringing added value AND is it efficient and effective in its operation? Is it doing the right things, right?

The primary audience for the review will be Interpeace management and the donors to the programme.

4. **METHODOLOGY.**

The review will make use of the following tools:

- a. Study of key documents on the Aceh conflict and of Interpeace internal documents, which will be made available;
- b. Discussions with Interpeace management and representatives, in Geneva and in Indonesia;
- c. Discussions with programme and programme support staff, in Banda Aceh, in the districts and in Geneva;
- d. Interviews with selected officials of the Aceh provincial administration and selected officials in at least 3 districts; interviews with a few selected officials in Jakarta;
- e. Interviews with senior staff of at least 3 other Aceh-programmes with peacebuilding intent.
- f. Interviews with representatives of key donors to the programme, in Jakarta and possibly elsewhere;
- g. If and where possible sit in on meetings, focus group discussions, workshops, conferences etc. inasmuch as they can be relevant to the review.
- h. Discussions/interviews with 'friends of the programme' in Indonesia;
- i. The eliciting and documentation of at least two short 'case studies' of a concrete Interpeace programme 'achievement' or 'impact' in a given district and another short 'case study' of an achievement/impact at provincial level or national level. This will involve additional discussions with other actors beyond the programme staff and provincial / district level authorities, the precise identification of which will depend on the specific case study at hand.

5. **DELIVERABLES.**

Inception report: Following a detailed briefing but prior to fully engaging in the analysis and interviews, the reviewer(s) will present an inception report of no more than 8 pages, detailing further how they will explore the major questions listed above, with a tentative list of the people to be contacted, the criteria for the choice of districts, and a tentative time table. If there is more than one reviewer, the inception report will also indicate the primary responsibilities of each and who has the responsibility for the overall final product.

Mid-term update: Mid-way through the review an update will be provided, which can be in the form of bullet points that are then elaborated in a verbal interaction.

Draft report: A draft report will be presented to Interpeace senior management, and shortly thereafter discussed in workshop format.

Final report: The final review report will be in English and contain findings with analysis and supporting evidence and recommendations. An executive summary of no more than 4 pages will precede the full report. The case studies, a map, a list of key documents consulted, a list of people interviewed and other detailed materials will be attached in annex.

The report will

- Provide very briefly the background to the longer-standing Aceh conflict, and some more focus on the process leading up to the peace agreement of August 2005;
- Use a time line representation to indicate the most significant events during the period when the AMM was deployed (September 2005) up till the end of 2006.
- Use a time line representation to indicate the most significant events in the start up and initial operations of the Interpeace Aceh programme in 2007, and correlate this with the contextual time line for 2007;
- Have separate sections with the findings, analysis and supporting evidence for each of the main domains of inquiry listed above (Points 3 A and B). *Significant differences of perception or opinion between key stakeholders need not be ignored* as they will be an issue to manage in the further development of the programme.
- The final section of the report will provide a *reasoned and balanced appreciation* of the overall relevance and performance of the programme in this initial year, indicating strengths and weaknesses. It will do this against three different frames of reference: the contextual situation as it has evolved, the original project document with its description of the original programme design, and -where available- agreed international benchmarks of programmatic performance. This overall assessment will then be complemented with *specific recommendations* on how the programme's relevance and effectiveness can be enhanced and its management and performance strengthened.
- As mentioned the annexes will include a map, list of people interviewed, list of key documents consulted, and the case studies. The case studies should be no more than 3-4 pages each, succinctly spelling out the context, what happened and what outcomes it led to. They should however also provide substantiating evidence, e.g. in the form of some quotes or testimonies, reference to documents relevant to the case, observable or observed changes in behaviours, relationships; apparent changes in trends etc.

Review report discussion: If donors would request an opportunity to discuss the review report with Interpeace and with the reviewers, the reviewers will make themselves available (following due notice!) to present their findings and answer questions about the review process.

6. QUALIFICATIONS.

- Solid understanding of the deeper historical context of conflict in Aceh, and in particular the secessionist struggle waged by GAM since its creation in the mid-70s; understanding of the current national political context and sensitivities around the Indonesia-Aceh relationship and around the role of outsiders in that dynamic;
- Attention to and preferably a certain familiarity with the internal differences and other possible sources of conflict within Aceh;
- Ability to conduct a credible and nuanced conflict-analysis; (which is more precise than a mere context-analysis, and focuses on the drivers and triggers of conflict)
- A solid understanding of and sensitivity to Indonesian and Acehnese culture and behavioural expectations, based on an adequate history of actual presence in Indonesia / Aceh;
- Good functional knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia and of English is an essential requirement.
- Tact and sensitivity: There are evident sensitivities in doing any kind of review: nobody, whether 'staff' or 'management', likes to be 'evaluated' and every person is typically concerned about criticism of her/his performance.

There are additional sensitivities that need to be actively taken into account: many of the relationships within the Interpeace programme and between the Interpeace programme and other Indonesian and foreign stakeholders are still new, and trust is still being built or deepened.

A review or evaluation itself is an 'intervention' that has its own effects and influences on individual and programmatic relationships and perceptions.

While this review is also intended to strengthen the programme, it could possibly be taken out of context with potentially damaging effect to the programme.

In short, we want the review to be serious and robust, yet it is also of utmost importance that the overall process is *felt to be constructive by all concerned*. That will require significant tact and care of the reviewer(s) in how the review is presented, how questions are asked, how findings are presented.

- Demonstrated writing skills in English.
- Previous consultancy and evaluation experience and a track record of delivering against ToR and deadlines;
- A background in peacebuilding / conflict transformation, including meaningful practical experience in one or more real-life contexts.

7. Tentative time frame:

Ideally the review will start in the second half of April and be concluded or have at least reached the point of a draft report by the end of May 2008. A precise time table will depend on the availability of the reviewer(s) and of key stakeholders to be engaged in the process, and on the budgetary resources available. Flexibility and periodic adaptations may be required.