

# CHINA'S ROLE IN GLOBAL & REGIONAL GOVERNANCE



**S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL  
OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**  
A Graduate School of Nanyang Technological University

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# CHINA'S ROLE IN GLOBAL & REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

REPORT ON A CONFERENCE ORGANISED BY  
THE CHINA PROGRAMME

S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (RSIS)  
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The conference set out to study China's role in global and regional governance in the context of China's increasing activism in international regimes and institutions including their policy deliberations and reforms.

It sought to accomplish several objectives. First, to understand the main motivations for China's activism in various global governance institutions. Second, to explore China's strategic thinking on international governance. Much of the discussion during the conference focused on China's vision, principles, and concepts of global governance. Third, to discuss in detail how China has approached various specific issues in global and regional governance, including economics and finance, development, environment and energy, international peace-keeping operations, cyber security, nuclear disarmament, regional trade in Asia, maritime security and non-traditional security in East Asia. Participants shared abundant empirical knowledge, which enabled the conference to better understand how China has dealt with these global and regional issues. Fourth, to discuss the impact of China's role and participation in global governance on the existing international order.

A total of 19 prominent scholars and experts from China, the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore presented papers

at the conference, which was also attended by dozens of local scholars, diplomats based in Singapore, government officials and business leaders. In general, the participants acknowledged the notable increase in China's presence and influence in global institutions and regional governance. They noted that China has become even more active in the wake of the financial crisis and will likely seek to play a more influential role in global governance. There is little evidence to show that China has developed a coherent strategy for global governance or is interested in overhauling the existing international system. Rather, China has been keen to selectively use some of the multilateral institutions for its domestic economic development, build a better image of China in the world, and compete for decision-making power in global and regional mechanisms. The conference showed that China has been an active learner of the rules and norms in global governance in the past decades and in many respects still learning. It was also highlighted that some of the values that China uses in its approach to global governance are at variance with Western values. The difference in values between China and the West limits China from playing a more influential role in global governance and also creates frictions between China and the Western world. The conference concluded that, China is no longer just a follower but has become an active participant, and in some respects a significant rule-maker, in global governance.

# INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

*Ambassador*  
**Berry Desker**



The conference on China's Role in Global and Regional Governance, organised by RSIS, was held at the Marina Mandarin Hotel, Singapore from 10 to 11 March 2011. The conference, coordinated by Dr. Li Mingjiang, Coordinator of the China Programme, was opened by Ambassador Barry Desker, Dean of RSIS.

Ambassador Barry Desker welcomed the participants and reiterated the necessity for a conference to be held on China and its role in global as well as regional governance. The pace of global governance had been shaped by globalisation. Consequently, multilateral and regional institutions now need to be established to promote multilateral frameworks and security mechanisms for trans-national issues at the global level.

Ambassador Desker noted that the conference on China in global and regional governance was timely for three reasons. First, China was now the second biggest economy in the world and a rapidly rising power in the international system. Hence, her role in global and regional governance was significant. At the international level, China's interactions with the outside world continue to intensify at a phenomenal pace. It was also an influential actor in major international forums. No longer being considered a follower of global institutions and rules, Beijing today demonstrates more willingness and capabilities to shape the discourse and agenda of global regimes on climate change, reform of the world financial system, and global trade arrangements. China was active in the Copenhagen and Cancun Negotiations on climate change, at meetings of G20 and the BRICs, as well as the Doha round of WTO negotiations. At the regional level, China was also involved in dealing with trans-national challenges in East Asia,

and ASEAN-led institutions and forums. Besides being an active participant in promoting economic and social integration, China had also been at the forefront of addressing non-traditional security challenges such as food security, health security, trans-national crimes, terrorisms, as well as maritime domain challenges.

Secondly, many aspects of China's position in global and regional governance have been insufficiently understood. For example, it remains unclear whether Chinese decision makers have developed any coherent strategic approach to global and regional governance to be shared with the wider international community, how China would respond to global and regional governance issues in relation to its domestic politics, how China prioritises its involvement in global and regional governance, the nature and extent of China's rise, China's strategic thinking, whether China was emerging as a revisionist or a status quo power, etc.

Thirdly, global governance is also a major aspect of the RSIS research agenda: RSIS's Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (NTS) deals with a variety of regional and global governance issues while RSIS's Multilateral Programme addresses a range of global and regional governance issues including the rise of new powers, the role of G20, and the role of BRICs. The future of global governance was also one of the four major themes at the Annual Singapore Global Dialogue. The study of China's role in global and regional governance, therefore, helps to link the research in China Area Study Programme with these functional responsibilities. The conference thus brings together attributes of broader issues studied within the school.

## SESSION 1:

### China's Vision And Strategy For Global And Regional Governance

#### China's vision of global governance: a new world order in the making?

**Lai-Ha Chan** sought to shed light on the underlying intentions of China's engagement in global governance. She examined the notion of *tianxia* and its implications to the contemporary China's politics. She also illustrated Chinese preferences for world order. Finally, Chan analysed the legitimacy that China possesses to be a leader in the global system.



Chan Lai-Ha

Firstly, Chan revealed that the *tianxia* (all-under-Heaven) concept had come back in the past few years and had a considerable position in Chinese scholars' thinking. However, Chan also argued that in order to become the true *wangtao* (kingship), there was still a long way for China to go: it should place greater attention to the notion *yi* (moral and ethical principles) and gain more respect from the world. Secondly, when discussing the role of China in relation to the global public goods, Chan asserted that despite phenomenal economic growth, China's contribution to global public goods was still limited. Paradoxically, while hesitating to contribute, China had been utilising the intergovernmental organisations' resource such as WHO to tackle its domestic health issues, claiming itself to be a developing state. Coming to the issue of China's legitimacy, Chan argued that it was less likely for the rest of the world to perceive Chinese worldview as legitimate. She then came to the conclusion that the challenge in the foreseeable future would be a leadership deficit or vacuum owing to the competition between the United States and China.

#### Beijing's battle for moral supremacy and influence on global governance

**Alan M. Wachman** pointed out that China was now engaged in a battle for moral supremacy and influence over international norms that inform global governance. Explaining the values that animate Beijing's policy postures toward international society and why they should be understood as reflecting a coherent moral view of global governance, he argued that Beijing had the ambition to transform the nature of global governance in conformity with a coherent set of values reflected in its foreign policy.



Alan M. Wachman

Wachman affirmed that pursuing that objective, China always fought for supremacy with its own ideology and own moral values. Beijing believed that current international norms were fundamentally unfair and hence, it was China's mission to restructure international society to make it work better. This belief was also reflected in Beijing's foreign policy and its *hexia shijie* (harmonious world) concept as well as in the way that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) deals with its domestic issues. He mentioned the four known elements that China advocates, namely (i) democratisation of global governance, (ii) justice and common prosperity, (iii) diversity and pluralism, and (iv) peaceful resolution of international conflicts.


Wachman concluded by raising three questions: (i) Had China succeeded in establishing itself as a moral "pole" opposed to the principles advocated by liberal democratic states?, (ii) Have there been adjustments in the posture of China on moral matters and in what way could China do it? and (iii) Would China tolerate states on its periphery that hold radically different values, or would it seek to draw those states into moral alignment with itself? Finally, he asserted that even though China had hardly become a "moral pole", it certainly was trying to become one.



## China's role in regional governance in East Asia

**Dajin Peng's** presentation addressed the issue of China's role in regional governance in East Asia. Peng argued that China had made important changes in its regional strategy and as a result, its position within the region had changed too.

Peng pointed out four changes within East Asian regional governance since the 1997-1998 financial crisis in Asia: (i) Great pressure on Asian integration due to the rapid growth of regionalisation; (ii) Limitations in informal integration to meet the demand for economic governance in East Asia; (iii) Formal integration stimulated in East Asia; and (iv) The increasing need for regional governance. Further, the author asserted that East Asia was now facing two basic problems: a market that could not absorb its own commodities and a lack of its own key currency. On Asian governance, he argued that the region currently suffers from three major problems: (i) Huge regional differences, (ii) Lack of effective regional leadership, and (iii) the American influence.



Next, Peng remarked on the shift in China's regional strategy. Overall, China had changed from being a passive to an active actor within the region and China today pursues a pragmatic foreign policy. It had enhanced economic ties via economic agreements with ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, etc. Among those partners, Peng noted that ASEAN had played a leading role in China's formal integration in East Asia.

He also pointed out that ultimately, China's active role in regional integration had a close relationship with its domestic growth and this could be considered the interplay between these two factors. Taking a look further into the foreseeable future, he emphasised the need for China and its neighbors to work together to create a new order of regional governance that would be helpful to every country in East Asia.

## Discussion

**Yawei Liu** began by praising the timing of the conference in 2011, since the world in recent months had turned upside down, reflected via the ups and downs in the relationships between China and Korea, ASEAN, the U.S as well as in the Middle East.

Commenting on Chan's paper, Liu cast some doubts on the "*Tianxia*" arguments of both Zhao Tingyang and Yan Xuetong, the two scholars that were mentioned in the paper. He believed that neither an effort to create a *tianxia* system nor using wars to build up the national spirit would result in China becoming a global power. From his observation, since 1995-2010, the world changed dramatically and China had become a major part of it.

Citing Peng's paper, Liu raised a concern about how far China could go using its money power or its economic muscle. Liu also queried about the decision making process regarding China and the public global goods. He wondered (i) How decisions were made by global funds to give so much to China because, as was apparent, China did have its own money (ii) Whether there was any process in NGOs to find out who was qualified for the funds.

On Wachman's presentation, Liu felt that the points he made about tolerance and his comparison of the different conceptions held in the West and China were very interesting. He also added that from his perspective, what really mattered would be how the government treated its citizens. With more equality and freedom offered, there would be little room for a state to claim a leadership role.

Other participants raised the following points:

- Was China really seeking leadership in world affairs at the moment, or should one differentiate between China wanting to be one of the equals and China wanting to be the first among equals. They were two totally different things.
- Wachman should identify the ideology in China's foreign policy since he had asserted that the ideology was not necessarily communism. The need to define what China was and where China was. It was a real challenge to identify whether China was a developed or undeveloped state.
- It was doubtful that China was ready to be a leader regionally or globally; that was the role other countries asked China to play, not what China really wanted because of its domestic concerns. Was the key currency or the single currency in East Asia desirable?



- Though it was clear that bilateral FTAs could proliferate into a regional integration in East Asia, was it really possible?
- It was also noted that the current trilateral trade agreement negotiations between China-Japan-Korea were still at a stalemate.

Chinese presenters should help Westerners understand how the Chinese thought about public goods, and international public goods; also why the Chinese thought they must contribute to the public goods, what the state had done with its funds, and how China thought about global governance, etc.

## SESSION 2

### China's Changing Role In Global Economic/Financial Institutions

#### China's approach to global economic governance: from follower to challenger?

**Gerald Chan** examined China's position in the economic and financial sectors and addressed three interrelated issues: China's admission to major multilateral financial institutions; whether China could use its growing wealth to enhance its influence; and would China provide the global public goods of international financial stability.



Reflecting upon China in the global economic order, Chan looked at China's participation in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). He noted China's varied role in these financial institutions: China had a stronger position in the WTO than in the

other two because of its rising trading power, and its relatively weak position compared with developed countries in the World Bank and the IMF. He also mentioned China's active role in the G20, which offers both challenges and opportunities for China.

As for China's huge trade surplus with the rest of the world, especially with the U.S., and the appreciation of the yuan, Chan asserted that not much had been done since China had continued to rely on export-oriented industrialisation to sustain high economic growth.

He argued that China was not in a position to take the lead because of its moderate political will and its lack of international experience, for cultural, historical, and diplomatic reasons. He reasoned that any major change in global economic governance depended very much on rich countries and big multinational corporations. Chan concluded that China strived to learn and adjust to outside constraints rather than to redesign or reconstruct the existing system, much less to overturn it.

#### China's experience with the WTO dispute settlement system

**Xiaojun Li** reviewed China's experience with the WTO dispute settlement system over the past decade, and sought to answer three research questions: How to explain China's abrupt change from cautious observer to active participant in the WTO's dispute settlement system? What was

holding China back from participating more often by virtue of its sheer market size and trade surplus? And what were the implications of this change?



Xiaojun Li

Using both case studies (when China was a respondent and when it was a complainant) and quantitative analysis (comparative perspective), Li argued that China's absence from WTO litigation in the initial period following its 2001 accession could be largely attributed to the normative constraints and the concern for reputation. However, later, through a learning and socialisation process, China began to shift its normative orientation and use the WTO dispute settlement procedure to both defend its domestic industry and push for market access abroad. Here, he also reminded us of the Checkel's two types of socialisation: conscious instrumental calculation being replaced by conscious role playing, and by "taken-for-grantedness".

Li concluded that China's expanded role and involvement in the Dispute Settlement Body could strengthen the multilateral trade regime and generate positive externalities in other areas of regional and global governance. Talking about the implications of China's changing behaviour in the WTO dispute settlement system, Li pointed out three: for the multilateral trade regime, for global and regional governance in other areas, and for the West.

## Coping with dollar hegemony: China's new monetary policy and its implication for the regional monetary governance

**Li Wei's** presentation tackled the issue of China coping with dollar hegemony. He claimed that since the financial crisis in 2008, China is no longer a junior partner and staying silent, but has become more vocal within the international monetary system. The author dealt with three puzzles: Why was the Chinese government trying to shift from its traditional monetary strategy of bandwagoning with the U.S. dollar to balancing against the global monetary hegemony? Faced with two different strategic choices, building a regional multilateral currency union or expanding its own

currency unilaterally, which one would China take? And how would China's new monetary strategy affect East Asian regional monetary order building at present and in the future? Li argued that the East Asian monetary regionalism and governance in the future must be understood in the context of change in China's monetary strategy.



Li Wei

Discussing the "dollar trap", the author revealed that China had been seeking a greater international role for its renminbi and was ambitious to make it go global. Beijing also blamed the U.S for running unsustainable current account deficits, resulting in the global financial crisis. Therefore, in its new monetary move, Beijing aimed to counter balance the dollar hegemony both externally and internally. However, China was now faced with a dilemma, since it was still vacillating between the choices of a multilateral union like Germany and unilateral expansion like Japan.

He concluded by emphasising the need for a better cooperation among East Asian states. In particular ASEAN+3, especially China and Japan, should join hands to overcome the security dilemma, go beyond the idea of unilaterally internationalising their currencies, and work together to build a regional currency union.

## The politics and economics of the renminbi-dollar relationship

**Yale H. Ferguson** began by discussing the term invented in 2007 by Niall Ferguson and Moritz Schularick: Chimerica. However, the question was not whether to slay it or try to keep it alive as asked by policy-makers, but rather whether there would be an "amicable divorce" or a bitter "currency war".

Appraising the fluctuating relations between the two major powers regarding dollar and renminbi policies since 2004, Ferguson asserted that despite the dollar/renminbi issue, both sides seemed to have a tacit understanding that an evolution in China's policies would be gradual at best and hence, they have backed away from immediate confrontation. The reason is attributed to domestic politics of both countries. For Beijing, there was concern about the fragility underlying its remarkable rise: the autocratic system, the leadership transition in 2012, the bureaucratic contests, the

independent military establishment, and other economic and social issues. For Washington, the concern was the so-called “inbox from hell”: conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global financial crisis, terrorist threats, deficits, immigration, health care issue, etc.

Ferguson concluded his analysis with three observations. First, what started as a bilateral issue had now morphed into a global issue—there are early, yet significant calls for a new international monetary system that would not rest exclusively on the US dollar. Second, there were few secure predictions in political life. Finally, the fascinating dollar/renminbi issue also invited exploration of broader questions on state sovereignty, multilateralism, the shift in power structure, how issues were constructed, etc.



Yale H. Ferguson

## Discussion

**Henry Gao** commented on the topics discussed from the perspective of trade law. On Chan's paper, he highlighted a point that he partly disagreed with: this concerned China reaching the “rule maker” position. Instead, Gao categorised China as a “rule shaker,” trying to utilise the existing rules in WTO and other international institutions to suit its own interests rather than making new rules. Gao added two additional explanations why China kept a low-key profile in the WTO during its first years here. First, when China initially joined the WTO, it was somehow forced to accept many provisions, i.e. China was at that time not considered a normal member of the WTO. Second, the market access issue, about which China was regularly questioned. China therefore chose to keep a low profile during the first few years of WTO membership to avoid being asked to make concessions (in the Doha round negotiations) and remaining a second class citizen.



Henry Gao

Commenting on Xiaojun Li's presentation, Gao strongly agreed with the point that China had overcome reputational fear in the WTO to become more active and this was the main reason for the shift in China's attitude toward the dispute settlement system. However, he thought that it would be inexact to use the China's VAT case as an example to illustrate the argument about China's reputational fear, and suggested using the debate about Coca Cola in 2004 as an alternative. In addition, Gao agreed that China was most worried about its second class citizenship and hence, chose to lie low during its first years in WTO. When China was no longer worried about second class citizenship it chose to make more active use of the WTO dispute settlement system.

On Li Wei's presentation, Gao argued that before Chinese renminbi could become the international currency, China should think about exporting not only manufacturing products but also agricultural products and services; in that way, the Chinese currency would be the international trade currency. Finally on Ferguson's presentation, he remarked that every problem in Sino-U.S. relationship became a trade problem. As a WTO member, every country, not just China, had to accept the rules. Gao felt that the U.S.-China relationship would continue despite differences. However, the answer to the question whether they shared the same dream was: probably not.

## SESSION 3

### China And Global Energy And Environment

#### China's geopolitical drive in search for geoeconomic space in world energy market

**Jieli Li** began by stating that China was now rising not only geopolitically but also geoeconomically. It had turned out to be a formidable geoeconomic power venturing into the world market, especially into energy markets over the past decade. Its demand for energy and natural resources had made its imports grow almost as fast as its exports.



Based on his theoretical framework of geopolitics and geoeconomics, he calculated the emerging geopolitical power of China in its geoeconomic drive into the resource-rich regions of the world. Li argued that China's geopolitical rise benefited from two factors: the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the decline of U.S. hegemonic power in the world, especially after September 11th, 2001. Beijing was provided an opportune geopolitical position from which its geoeconomic expansion became possible, witness the influence of China in Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Latin America. He claimed that geoeconomics followed geopolitics, and that Chinese global energy policy had been prioritised by its long-term geopolitical/strategic concerns rather than by pure economic/commercial needs. Li revealed that China's geoeconomic expansion into some South and Central America countries had been geopolitically driven by its intention to squeeze Taiwan out of the region through economic assistance. Li also remarked on the role of China's state-owned companies in China's search for a stable and secure investment environment.

#### Breaking the impasse in international climate negotiations: A roadmap for China to 2050

In his presentation, **ZhongXiang Zhang** discussed an issue on which China faced criticism: carbon emissions and concerns regarding China's commitments. He proposed a solution to the impasse in international climate negotiations by suggesting a new direction and roadmap for China to the year 2050.

Zhang suggested China take on absolute emission caps around 2030. He also proposed three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations beforehand. They were (i) Further credible energy-conservation commitments starting in 2013, (ii) Voluntary "no lose" emission targets starting in 2018, and (iii) Binding carbon intensity targets starting in 2023, leading to emissions caps around 2030.



Zhang asserted that the current targeted date of 2020 left both China and the U.S. little room for completing their commitments. Therefore, if it was extended to 2030, it would open the possibility for the U.S. and China to make the commitments that each wanted from the other in the same form, although the scale of reductions would differ from each other.



## China and climate security in High Asia: Lessons for regional governance

**Katherine Morton** discussed and began her presentation by emphasising that climate change was not simply a development issue; it was also integral to national and human security, and that China's role in global climate governance was critical. What was needed was to look more closely at "hard cases" that reveal the tensions at play between national self-interest and regional collective gain, she suggested looking at High Asia, or the Tibetan-Himalayan Region, since this was the most densely populated mountain ecosystem on the planet and the source of water for millions of people in South and East Asia. Besides, the ecological crisis that was unfolding had significant implications for regional stability.



Considering that the overall trend in the region was one of glacial retreat, Morton warned that regional institutions for dealing with climate change and water security did not exist yet, which might lead to the potential for conflicts. In that context, China's active engagement was considered central to any future political and diplomatic solution. She also mentioned the Sino-Tibet conflict and the unresolved territorial claims along the Sino-Indian border.

Morton offered four lessons drawn from her fieldwork, scientific research, and broader observations on the changing policy context in Beijing. They were (i) A region-wide strategy for responding to the crisis could only work if it was linked to ongoing development efforts, (ii) Informal rather than formal institutional processes may prove more effective in the shorter term, (iii) Much could be achieved by building on the region's ongoing experiences in disaster relief operations, and (iv) This was a regional problem and not just a China problem. She concluded by emphasising that developing a regional framework for sharing water resources could not evolve in the absence of greater cooperation across the Sino-Indian border and that building trust among actors played a crucial role.

## Discussion

**Lai-Hai Chan** started by claiming that she believed NTS issues such as climate change, energy security, energy cooperation played a crucial role in regional and global governance since these issues would sooner or later affect the whole region as well as the whole world.

On Li's paper, Chan had three concerns. First, she remarked that in some issues such as public health, finance, peacekeeping operations, etc, China had joined many international organisations and used a multilateral approach to deal with them. However in terms of energy security or energy governance, it seemed China favored the bilateral approach. Therefore, she wondered what the reason for China's choice was. Besides, she questioned whether China expanding its energy suppliers to Latin America or Central Asia would affect the U.S.-China relation and how it would affect it, especially when Latin America was usually considered the backyard of the U.S. Lastly, Chan questioned whether there was a conflict between the point Li made that political and strategic purposes were more important than economic reasons, and the point about China's expanding energy market (Africa, Latin America and Central Asia) being driven by its increasing demand.

For Zhang's paper, Chan asked for elaboration on the reliability of the data and on the influence of external parties. In addition, she raised a question on the reason why the Chinese government revised the value for 2009 on the same date (15 July 2010).

Chan concluded her commentary on Morton's paper by querying whether or not Beijing had ever used the term "climate security" or the word "security" to describe climate change, and the reason for that.

## SESSION 4

### China And Global Development

#### Assistance with Chinese characteristics: China's aid programme in Africa and its consequences

**Yawei Liu** reviewed China's aid programme in Africa from 1949 to the present. He pointed out the programme's challenges and problems and proposed some preliminary policy recommendations on how to improve the quality as well as the sustainability of China's aid programme.



Liu revealed that China had four primary interests in Africa: natural resources, political support in international forums, China's promotion of the One China policy, and China's exports and economic growth. The author asserted that China's medical programme had been a big success and claimed that this programme had developed strong economic and personal ties between China and African countries. However, there were also some concerns regarding China's long-term presence and involvement in Africa, both economically and politically. These concerns were mainly about environmental issues, competition between African and Chinese businesses, low quality or counterfeit goods, as well as the lack of Chinese interaction with Africa's private sector.

On future projections and policy recommendations, Liu offered some suggestions: more transparency between China and African countries, increased collaboration with local communities; for China to take a more proactive stance towards regional and international security issues; and China to become a proponent and advocate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Africa. Further, the author argued that in order to prevent African states from falling back into debt, China should focus more on the quality of its aid instead of quantity, and diversify its aid program. Finally, Liu emphasised that China's mantra of mutual benefit-mutual reward was hardly an accurate assessment of China's involvement in Africa. However he also hoped China had its own way to deal with things and ultimately, what was good for Africa would be good for China, and for the world.

#### China and the refugee regime in Southeast Asia

**Bryony Lau**'s presentation dealt with China and its position on the issue of the refugee regime in Southeast Asia. She investigated two interlinked questions: (i) What does the Cambodian deportation of Uighurs to China, and the reaction to this action, tell us about respect for and acceptance of international refugee law in Southeast Asia and (ii) What does the incident portend for the potential effect of China's growing regional involvement on the plight of refugees and asylum seekers in the region? Lau argued that although China and mainland Southeast Asian states, Cambodia included, share a highly securitised view of all forms of migration in general and refugee flows in particular, there were differences in their policy responses and willingness to cooperate with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).



In the discussion about the challenges of protection in Southeast Asia, she studied China and two Southeast Asian states, Thailand and Malaysia. The case that Lau chose to discuss was the Uighur refugees' case, in which a group of Uighurs was deported back to China in December 2009 after fleeing to Cambodia. Using it as an illustration, Lau then came to the conclusion there was little guarantee that state parties (Cambodia, China) to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Additional Protocol would respond more consistently and predictably to refugees and asylum seekers than non-state parties (Thailand, Malaysia). Moreover, Southeast Asian governments remain unwilling to establish legislation or procedures that were able to identify individuals entitled to protection under international refugee law.

In conclusion, Lau argued that Southeast Asian states had chosen to manage forced displacement across their borders outside the framework envisioned by the 1951 convention. Taking into consideration China's deeper involvement in the region and how China handled the refugees' cases, she concluded that Chinese citizens who flee to seek asylum around China's perimeter – whether in Southeast Asia, Central Asia or South Asia – were unlikely to find a robust refugee regime that could protect them any time soon.



## Discussion

**Zhang Jiadong** began his commentary on Liu's paper by emphasising the importance of studying the country's foreign aid policy and expressed his agreement with the points that Liu made (about China's three interests in Africa, the characteristic of China's aid program, etc.). He also suggested broadening the discussion by evaluating China's role in European countries' foreign aid policies to African states. On Lau's paper, Zhang highlighted that the issue of refugees, from Chinese perspective, was neither legal nor academic, but rather a political issue. At the same time, he emphasised the importance of defining or even differentiating between refugees and criminals before proceeding with discussion about China's law toward refugees, which was a really challenging task. He also urged further discussion on how many Chinese refugees had been forced to go back to China.

**Another participant** commented that both papers were excellent examples of the comparison between Chinese exceptionalism and Western liberal norms. On the point made by Liu about China's lack of transparency, he raised some concerns: (i) What made Liu come to this assertion, (ii) If that was the case, what would it take for China to comply with international institutional norms and rules, (iii) What could the international community do to promote Chinese transparency and compliance?, and (iv) Could be it done through NGOs and other mechanisms?

## SESSION 4A

### China And Global Security

#### Cyberwarfare or arms control? Options for the Chinese defense establishment

**David Fouquet** spoke a spiralling dynamic of tension between China and potential rivals that carried with it the seeds of possible confrontation and conflict in cyberspace that could emerge to test policy-making and conflict-prevention for Beijing and Washington and other capitals. He remarked that recently there had been reports of the hacks to government, industrial and private information and data network systems, for which China was blamed. In response to these threats, the U.S., NATO and other military and defense establishments had made plans for their own defenses against such contingencies. This could lead to a technological race between major states, especially between Beijing and Washington.

Fouquet drew an analogy between the current race with the one during the Cold War between the U.S. and Soviet Union, which was followed by the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. He asserted that such a race could only be an uneven one that could be to the advantage of the U.S. China should therefore be more receptive to a negotiated process. He also argued that China's expansion of military capacity was aimed at the conduct of "asymmetric" military warfare that could negate the perceived U.S. advantage.



In a wider context, Fouquet pointed out that there had been debates regarding the issue for years between the U.S. and China. Recently, there were also mounting debates over Internet freedom, particularly coming from speeches of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2010 and 2011. However, from China's perspective, the U.S. Freedom to Connect (F2C) agenda was considered an intrusion of modern psychological warfare aimed at promoting subversion and regime change, which should naturally be countered and resisted.

## China's conceptual and practical evolution on UN peace-keeping operations

**Jianwei Wang** appraised the role of China in UN peace-keeping operations. He discussed the change in China's approach to the issue since the 1970s, stating China's perceptions and attitudes toward UN peace-keeping operations (PKOs) had experienced a sea change. Wang also argued that although Beijing had become the largest man-power contributor to PKOs among the "big five" in the UN Security Council, its approaches to international PKOs was still entangled by its long-standing foreign policy principles of national sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, tangible national political and economic interests involved, the delicate balance among major powers, the domestic situation of the country in question, and its assessment of the necessity and feasibility of world governance in general.

The author argued that from a "non-player", China had made great progress to become the "most active" one among the Big Five in the UNSC and illustrated this argument through three case studies: Cambodia, Guatemala, and Sudan. He concluded that the evolution of China's perceptions and practice regarding the UN's PKOs had gone a long way in the last four decades.




From initially expressing strong opposition Beijing became a quiet "non-participator", then gradually turned into "reluctant participant" and finally changed to an enthusiastic embrace of PKOs as a useful tool in maintaining international peace and security. Consequently Beijing was now a leading major power contributing to the legitimacy and effectiveness of UN PKOs.

Wang also emphasised that China's behavioural adaptation had led to perceptual changes, which in turn reinforced the behavioural changes. The author concluded that China's participation in UN PKOs was still constrained by many factors (its domestic affairs as well as regional and global governance issues) and that Beijing strongly believed that its internal conflicts needed to be sorted out by itself.

## China's approach to global nuclear security architecture

**Tong Zhao** discussed China's growing influence on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Zhao asserted that the unique and increasingly significant influence of China on global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation institutions would inevitably have profound implications on great power interaction and cooperation on a wide range of regional and international security issues. He also sought to shed light on how China would impact the future evolution of institutions in global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.



On nuclear disarmament, Zhao remarked that the U.S. and Russia were now very concerned about Chinese nuclear capability and the trajectory of its future development. In other words, China's position towards nuclear disarmament would presumably have considerable influence among other second-tier Nuclear Weapon States. Consequently, China's commitment would be critical for transformation of the global nuclear disarmament framework from a traditionally bilateral one to a more inclusive multilateral process. Here, the author discussed nuclear disarmament as part of a comprehensive arms control arrangement, nuclear taboo as the cornerstone of a new nuclear security framework, a shift of focus to nuclear operation policy, and transparency and confidence building. On the Chinese approach to counter-proliferation, Zhao pointed out that China and the West have different approaches in applying economic sanctions against proliferation. China's approach for compliance enforcement was fundamentally different from the traditional Western approach in that China dismissed the efficacy of coercive measures based on its own experience in resisting sanctions.

However, he emphasised that despite those differences, as a recognised Nuclear Weapons State under NPT, China still shared the goal of nuclear disarmament and the concern about further nuclear proliferation with other countries in the international community. Zhao asserted that China's position was that a world free of nuclear threat was impossible to achieve without China's substantive participation and cooperation, as long as all countries were committed to continuous engagement and comprehensive communication.

## Discussion

**Bryony Lau** commented on the general themes of the presentations, i.e. the three main characteristics of China as a major actor on global security issues. First, China clearly seems to have different relationships with countries that were the focus of international security concerns. For example, the paper on PKOs gave examples about the relations of China and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, China's pressure on the Khartoum regime, and China having different relations with nuclear proliferating states such as North Korea and Iran, etc. These were the issues that the international community needed to contend with and tried to secure Chinese cooperation. Second, China had a different set of vulnerabilities because it engaged in different economic policies abroad, had different military postures and domestic politics. For example, Fouquet's paper revealed the effect of the disclosure of private government information to the public sphere through Wikileaks. China had a different perspective on cyber security. Third, regarding China and the global security issue: China had a specific self-perception that made it particularly sensitive to inequality within the international system. Altogether, these main characteristics pointed out that the international community increasingly felt the need to cooperate with China on global security issues. At the same time, however, this need was affected by the distrust of the Chinese government's intentions or suspicions which were driving China's foreign policy. Lau concurred that for those three main issues of nuclear nonproliferation, peacekeeping and cyber warfare, the international community had different options to deal with the security questions: trying to integrate China into the existing regimes, trying to alter them or creating new ones.

**A participant** pointed to the need to differentiate between espionage and cyber crimes before proceeding with the discussion. Further, he asked for any evidence to show the involvement of Chinese agencies or the government in these cyber attacks. There was a suggestion that to look at inter-governmental cooperation against cyber attacks (among Europe, Asia and America).

**Another participant** stated that in the Security Council, China was ranked 14th in terms of member state contributors, quite low compared to Nepal, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Denmark, Pakistan, etc. Those states contributed mainly engineering, logistic and medical personnel, not peace enforcers. He also mentioned Lebanon and asked why there was such a big investment in this state (1,355 UN peace keeping personnel). He asked why China did not get involved in Afghanistan. He also questioned China's position on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty FMCT as well as China's comfort zone in terms of stockpile that could allow them to enter into the FCMT. He also opined that China was lacking in doctrinal transparency and hoped Zhao could provide some sources for his assertion on China's nuclear doctrinal transparency. On China's role in future nuclear arms control reduction, his concern was when the US and Russia reduced their weapons down to about 1,000, and China also had about 1,000, whether there would be a need for China to participate in a multilateral or at least trilateral nuclear arms control negotiation.

## SESSION 4B

### China And Asian Maritime Security

#### From “Imperial Systems” to “Interdependent Nationalisms”: China’s evolving approach to the South China Sea

**Alessio Patalano** examined China’s approach to the South China Sea (SCS) issues, especially in the evolving maritime order in the SCS. While historically the factors underpinning today’s tensions were not novel, what was different was that the presence of one major power, had been replaced by multiple state actors with different national agendas, uneven military power, and interdependent economies.

Based on that framework, Patalano discussed the SCS in terms of complexity and fluidity of maritime geography and maritime security. His major conclusions were first, the resource-rich SCS had always been at the heart of a wider economic system by providing connectivity for the region. Second, in the SCS, prospects for stability and cooperation were directly linked with the question of connectivity. Third, SCS was also a means to create separation. Finally, increasing maritime shipping and naval build up in the region were symptomatic of the fact that sea power was likely to be central to the shifting political balances and rivalries.



Dr. Alessio Patalano

With regards to China’s role, Patalano suggested that the use of naval forces, especially in their non-war fighting missions, should represent a top priority as a way to gain a leading role in the SCS. Also, China should use its naval power to take the lead in common approaches and joint activities to tackle vital trans-national issues such as environmental pollution, fishery protection, piracy, maritime terrorism, and energy security. By doing so, China may gain a place as regional *primus inter pares*.

#### China’s jurisdictional challenges to East Asia’s maritime order

**James Manicom** surveyed jurisdictional difference between China and other regional maritime powers in the Yellow Sea, East Sea, and South China Sea. He argued that China’s recent activities, while consistent with its longstanding position on international maritime law, could be interpreted as a challenge to regional maritime order.



James Manicom

First, he pointed out four pillars of East Asia’s maritime order, namely (i) the function of the U.S. as an offshore balancer through forward deployed U.S. forces in the territory of its regional allies, Japan, South Korea and access arrangements with Southeast Asian states, (ii) the widespread adherence to the freedom of navigation, (iii) the near universal acceptance of UNCLOS as a basis for the rules and norms that govern maritime interaction at sea, and (iv) the continued salience of national sovereignty.

Then, he analysed the two challenges China faced on maritime order in East Asia: the freedom of norms vs. the military activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the location of base points and the status of landward waters. In assessing the implications for regional security drawn from China’s challenges, he pointed out two implications: China’s move may challenge states that share Chinese security concerns, yet prefer the U.S. presence, and greater uncertainty for U.S. vessels operating near China’s coast.

Manicom concluded that China was now challenging East Asia’s maritime order and Beijing’s behavior seemed broadly consistent with the final two pillars of regional maritime order. It generally accepted UNCLOS language as the basis for regional rule and norms and continued to address maritime issues in this way.

## Discussion

**Li Mingjiang** commented on the South China Sea issue by stating that he agreed with the presenters on some points: In East Asia, maritime order, sea and sea power were extremely crucial issues, even in the coming decades; China was a crucial player because of its size, power, position, behavior, etc.; and geography, history, economics, security, etc. could not be totally separated and needed to be analysed when discussing the maritime order in the region.

On Patalano's paper, Li thought the author could elaborate more on how the pattern of imperial dominance in the South China Sea, in all the battles of World War II and all the contentions post-World War II, had impacted on the strategic thinking of the claimant states and on the regional maritime governance. He also questioned how it was possible for China to push for more cooperation and to take initiative to build regional maritime governance structure. Finally, he suggested Patalano provide some evidence or arguments from the Chinese side for Chinese historic claims regarding the South China Sea (the nine-dotted line as an example).



On Manicom's paper, Li agreed that there was a big challenge from China for maritime order or maritime governance for the years ahead as China was obviously unhappy about the status quo. Li, however, disagreed with the point that China had accepted the maritime order since the 1970s, saying even in the 1990s or early in the past decade, some people in China may not have agreed with the American naval supremacy in keeping order and suppressing Japanese military expansion.

On Manicom's discussion of the four pillars of East Asia's maritime order, Li had the same view on the first pillar. However on the second pillar, he thought while it would be fine to talk about freedom of navigation in terms of commercial navigation, when it came to military surveillance activities,

this would not always be the case. On the third pillar, Li argued that none of the regional states actually abided by UNCLOS, citing the cases of the Philippines and Vietnam breaching UNCLOS. Similarly, he felt that in practice, none of the regional states agreed on the current order.

Li also argued that in East Asia, there was not much open support for the U.S. position in terms of naval surveillance activities. If that was the case, who was challenging the order, the U.S. or China? The answer still remained unclear.

Li agreed with Manicom on the point that China's interpretation and application of UNCLOS were inconsistent with UNCLOS in many respects, but argued that this was the same for other states (such as the Philippines and Vietnam).

Other points made by participants included:

- Concern whether there was a potential base area in the South China Sea.
- Agreement that UNCLOS was a weapon or at least a tool in this region.
- Possibility of UNCLOS or ASEAN (via the DOC) serving as the basis for establishing a stable order encompassing the South China Sea and East China Sea.
- What the difference was between maritime order and maritime governance: the former had a strong power politics dimension and the latter did not.
- Pardo should think about the normative question of what governance should look like given his historical thesis and what should be the relationship between international law and regional norms.
- On Patalano's point that China should use its naval maritime power to take the leadership role in tackling trans-national issues, was "should" according to the author's or the Chinese perspective.
- The reason for the assertion that China did accept UNCLOS.
- How did UNCLOS treat air space (over the EEZ, for example).



- The presenters should distinguish more clearly between maritime research and military surveillance.
- Another participant raised three questions: (i) Should China provide more public goods in the South China Sea and how could that be done?, (ii) What did presenters think about Japan's activities in disputed areas with China?, and (iii) If China should be more responsible, in what way?

## SESSION 5

### China And Asian Regional Governance

#### China's initiatives and dilemmas for regional free trade in East Asia

In her presentation, **June Park** examined China's position in East Asia free trade via free trade and economic partnership agreements. She asserted that bilateral agreements were still the preferred method for trade and investment in the region and that China had become a strong and active pursuer of regional trade through Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). She listed the signatories of signed and negotiation-in-process EPAs: Southeast Asia, major Northeast Asian states as well as India and EU. Park also noticed that China's aggressive positions in WTO trade disputes and abuse of trade policies remained a concern for its trading partners.



Park pointed out that since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China had also been active in pursuing bilateral free trade agreements outside the WTO framework. The most extensive and crucial arrangement for China would be the China-ASEAN FTA, or the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation signed in 2002. Some important partners of China included Singapore, Hong Kong, Macao, Korea. She also remarked on the two dilemmas of China's economic regionalisation and leadership. The dilemmas of China's trade consisted of pressure from the U.S. on global

Finally, it was suggested that the discussion should focus more on security issues rather than commerce issues. This was because the issues would become more severe over the coming decades because more nations have long-range arsenal capability and submarine capability.

imbalances and trade frictions. Meanwhile, the dilemmas in financial cooperation included the debates on monetary policy and exchange rates.

Concluding, Park asserted that at this stage, there was no definite answer to the question of whether China's rise and intent for economic regionalisation would be a catalyst or a hindrance for East Asian institutionalisation. However, what was clear was China's use of soft power as an initiative and drive for economic regionalisation in East Asia. Further, the roles of sovereign states and their responses towards internationalisation remained significant particularly in the case of East Asia, in which an inter-mix of bilateral relations continued to be important. Finally, she believed that China's pursuit of regional leverage in the name of soft power would continue to serve as a diplomatic tool for economic regionalisation in East Asia, in the midst of intra and extra-regional competition in the years to come.

#### Non-traditional security in China: Domestic politics and foreign policies

**Zhang Jiadong's** presentation focused on the role of non-traditional security (NTS) in contemporary China. First, Zhang analysed the NTS issue from the Chinese perspective, revealing that NTS was now a kind of sub-state; individual security, mainly including freedom from hunger, disease, fear, and others, and NTS was a part or individualisation of national security. Further, he pointed out the domestic-orientation of the NTS concept in China, showing that China's approach to NTS security was for sustainable development of its domestic situation.

Second, in the discussion about the role of NTS in China's domestic politics, Zhang talked about the transformation of Chinese military forces in response to NTS threat as well as the establishment of department-level agencies, together with the transformation of Chinese civil society. Third, talking about NTS' role in China's foreign policy, he pointed out that (i) China had also strengthened and promoted exchanges and cooperation internationally,



particularly with the neighboring countries, related regional organisations and international organisations such as the ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the East Asia Acid Rain Monitoring Network, etc. (ii) China had also established a number of semi-official organisations such as China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), China Environmental Protection Endowment (CEPF), and so on. (iii) In addition, military forces and police had also improved their relations with their overseas counterparts. Zhang then drew four main conclusions: NTS had become a more popular conception in China, the reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emission would be harder than a reduction of SO<sub>2</sub> emission, the game between the central government and local government: “warrant quota each region”, and the international cooperation in the region would grow fast.



Zhang concluded his presentation by three main points: (i) China would pay more attention and more investment to NTS, (ii) the government would be a more important actor than NGOs, and (iii) transformation of economic structures would be followed by a “thanking revolution”.

## China and East Asia's regional security architecture: the six-party talks as a model of Chinese regime-building?

**Ramon Pacheco Pardo** discussed how China was working to build a new regional security architecture in East Asia, and why Chinese leaders were seeking to create such an order. He asserted that even though it might seem contradictory, Chinese regional security policy prior to the establishment of the six-party talks was both passive and assertive. Besides, China displayed Cold War-style assertiveness when it came to dealing with issues that Chinese leaders thought of as central to the security of their country: Taiwan and the South China Sea. He claimed that it would not be until the six-party talks were established that Beijing would begin to see itself as a possible leader of security and confidence-building initiatives in the region.

In the discussion about the regime-building in Northeast Asia, Pardo pointed out that China had two primary objectives: The first one was confidence building among the three main powers in the region: Japan, South Korea and China itself. The second was to manage relations with the United States in a dual way: by building confidence with doves in Washington and soft

balancing American hawks. Besides, he also argued that the mechanism for China to construct a Northeast Asia-specific security regime was two-fold; the first mechanism was institutionalised multilateral dialogue and the second mechanism was institutionalised dialogue with Japan and South Korea through a trilateral summit.



Pardo also discussed China's security regime-building in East Asia, in which he made the caveats to Chinese wishes to replicate the success of the Northeast Asian experience at the regional level: (i) the presence of well-established institutions in East Asia and (ii) the multiplicity of players in East Asia and a different balance of power.

In conclusion, Pardo asserted that China had moved from passiveness to leadership in building a security regime in East Asia. Further, security regime building in Northeast Asia was serving China as a model for East Asia. Last but not least, China's security regime building sought to build confidence among regional and outside powers and to balance third party hawks.

## Discussion

**Jianwei Wang** summarised the presenters' view on China in the regional governance. From his observation, Park claimed that China was a problem for the regional order, while Ramon believed China was a solution for the regional security regime building, and Zhang argued that China was kept busy with its domestic security issues and was a non-player toward the outside order. He also agreed with the three presenters that there appeared to be a change in the Chinese approach to dealing with issues and stated that he thought China would gradually choose the multilateral approach instead of the bilateral one.

He also raised some concerns on each of the presentations. For Park, he asked her to elaborate more on the reasons for the pessimistic tone in her assessment of the future of the regional economic order in East Asia (Park's argument about confrontation, competitive triangle, etc). He argued that in fact, China did take action to facilitate the process of economic integration, reflected in China's moves in the ASEAN-China FTA. He also would like her to clarify the point about the U.S.-Japan-China competitive triangle, i.e. what terms the triangle was in: economic or security competition. In addition, Park should expand on the reasons regional economic mechanisms did not work as expected and why there was slow growth of regional economic regimes. He wondered whether the competing visions (ASEAN+3, TPP) in regional economic order building were competitive with or complementary to each other.

Wang argued that in the case of the ASEAN-China FTA, China was willing to make sacrifices in terms of the early harvests in public goods, and make concessions to some less developed countries in ASEAN. He wondered whether others were willing to do the same. Also, he sought clarification on what kind of soft power China was exercising in terms of regional economic

order to push its economic interests, as well as how China promoted its economic development model in the region.

On Zhang's paper: Wang claimed that the critical question was how to define the NTS, and whether it was non-military security across national borders. If so, the paper should not have included domestic issues (disaster relief, for example). He recommended the author delineate the different Chinese approaches towards traditional security issues and non-traditional security issues, as well as change the priority of his analysis (too much focus on Chinese domestic security issues and less on East Asian security issues).

On Pardo's paper, Wang felt that it was still premature to assert that China took the six-party talks as a positive experience. He also disagreed with the point that China's positive experience influenced China's thinking on the East Asia security regime, because China still seemed not to be interested in a regional security regime in East Asia. Wang also suggested adding two more points to the objectives of China supporting the six-party talks, (i) to bring North Korea into the regional system of nations and (ii) to use the talks as a multilateral approach to offset or counterbalance the bilateral security alliance between U.S. and Japan or between the U.S. and South Korea.

**One participant** raised concerns on why Washington became involved in TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), the implications of that move, as well as South Korea's attitude toward TPP.

**Another participant** suggested that Pardo elaborate more on the point concerning the change in China's role in building the security regime, from passiveness to activeness and what made that shift happen.

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the concluding session, conference participants were encouraged to express their opinions on the conference and its role. They agreed that the conference on China's role in the regional and global governance was timely and crucial for more understanding about a rising power.

According to **Gerald Chan**, observers needed to think conceptually about what could be achieved from the papers. Chan discerned the need for the world to admit that China had its own way of doing things; and that regional governance should be involved in global peacekeeping operations. He also took the opportunity to raise a question on whether the interactions among the big powers could be the way of dealing with issues. Finally, he emphasised that the analysis on China's norms and rules that experts shared with each other, would be very useful and could be applied to practice to contribute to international relations theories and make it more practical.

Sharing the same view with Chan, **Yale H. Ferguson** asserted that theories were merely a mindset and hence, it would be better for experts to take a practical look into what was really occurring in China that could influence regional and global governance. At the end of the day, all discussions were for the better.

Finally, **Katherine Morton** ended the session by reminding the participants of the importance of problem solving in addition to the study of global governance.

Participants also discussed the planned publication of the papers from the conference and agreed with Li Mingjiang's suggestion that all the papers be gathered together in a volume to be published sometime by the end of 2011.



## Conference Programme

### China's Role in Global and Regional Governance

RSIS, NTU Singapore  
March 10-11, 2011

#### March 9

Arrival of foreign participants

All Day:

Welcome Dinner

6:30 pm

Keynote speech by *Prof. David Shambaugh*

#### March 10: Day 1

9:00 am - 9:20 am

Welcome remarks by *Ambassador and Dean Barry Desker*

Chair: *Li Mingjiang*

#### SESSION 1

9:20 am - 10:30 am

(15 minutes for each presentation, 10 minutes commentary, 15 minutes free discussion)

*Lai-Ha Chan* (China's vision of global governance: a new world order in the making?)

#### China's Vision And Strategy For Global And Regional Governance

*Alan M. Wachman* (Beijing's battle for moral supremacy and influence on global governance)

*Dajin Peng* (China's role in regional governance in East Asia)

Discussant: *Yawei Liu*

10:30 am - 10:50 am

Coffee break

Chair: *James Manicom*

## SESSION 2

10:30 am - 12:00 pm

(15 minutes for each presentation, 10 minutes commentary, 20 minutes free discussion)

### China's Changing Role In Global Economic/ Financial Institutions

*Gerald Chan* (China's approach to global economic governance: from follower to challenger?)

*Xiaojun Li* (China's experience with the WTO dispute settlement system)

*Li Wei* (Coping with dollar hegemony)

*Yale H. Ferguson* (the politics and economics of the yuan-dollar relationship)

Discussant: *Henry Gao*

12:00 pm - 1:30 pm

Lunch

Chair: *Alan M. Wachman*

## SESSION 3

1:30 pm - 2:40 pm

(15 minutes for each presentation, 10 minutes commentary, 15 minutes free discussion)

### China's And Global Energy And Environment

*Jieli Li* (China's geopolitical drive in search for geoeconomic space in world's energy market)

*ZhongXiang Xiang* (Breaking the impasse in international climate negotiations: a new direction for currently flawed negotiations and roadmap for China to 2050)

*Katherine Morton* (China and climate security in High Asia: Lessons for regional governance)

Discussant: *Lai-Ha Chan*

Chair: *Yale H. Ferguson*

## SESSION 4

2:40 pm - 3:30 pm

(15 minutes for each presentation, 10 minutes commentary, 10 minutes free discussion)

### China And Global Development

*Yawei Liu* (Assistance of Chinese characteristics: China's aid programme in Africa and its consequences)

*Bryony Lau* (China and refugee regime in Asia)

Discussant: *Zhang Jiadong*

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12:00 pm - 1:30 pm

Coffee break

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Chair: *Jieli Li*

## SESSION 4A

3:50 pm - 5:10 pm

(15 minutes for each presentation, 10 minutes commentary, 25 minutes free discussion)

### China's And Global Security

*David Fouquet* (Cyber warfare or arms control: options for the Chinese defence establishment)

*Jianwei Wang* (China's conceptual and practical evolution on UN peace-keeping operations)

*Tong Zhao* (China's approach to global nuclear security architecture and its implications)

Discussant: *Bryony Lau*



## March 11: Day 2

Chair: *Lee Dongmin*

### SESSION 4B

9:00 am - 10:10 am

(20 minutes for each presentation, 10 minutes commentary, 20 minutes free discussion)

*Allesio Patalano* (From “imperial systems” to “interdependent nationalism”: seapower, regional order and China's evolving approach to the South China Sea)

### China And Asian Maritime Security

*James Manicom* (China's jurisdictional challenges to East Asia's maritime order)

Discussant: *Li Mingjiang*

12:00 pm - 1:30 pm

Coffee break

Chair: *Gerald Chan*

### SESSION 5

10:30 am - 12:00 pm

(15 minutes for each presentation, 20 minutes commentary, 25 minutes free discussion)

*June Park* (China's initiatives and dilemmas for East Asian free trade)

### China's And Global Energy And Environment

*Zhang Jiadong* (China and East Asian non-traditional security)

*Ramon Pacheco Pardo* (China and East Asia's security architecture: six-party talk)

Discussant: *Jianwei Wang*

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

12:00 pm - 12:20 pm

Chair: *Li Mingjiang*

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