the ties that bind & blind

A REPORT ON INTER-RACIAL AND INTER-RELIGIOUS RELATIONS IN SINGAPORE (2012)

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1. Introduction

1.1 Through 2007 and 2011, owing to the occurrence of several high-profile events involving race and religion coupled with greater discussions in the public sphere of these issues, it may be tempting to wonder if Singapore's multicultural harmony has possibly been destabilised. In an attempt to more systematically discern if such unease is justified, this study addresses two questions pertaining to the social fabric of Singapore:

a) Have Singapore's multicultural ties been resilient between 2007 and 2011?

b) Were Malays, Christians and the Chinese consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively between 2007 and 2011?

2. Have Singapore's multicultural ties been resilient between 2007 and 2011?

2.1 Multicultural resilience is defined as the ability of a multicultural society to maintain or strengthen its inter-racial or inter-religious ties in the event of challenges to social harmony. This study assesses Singapore's multicultural resilience by comparing and contrasting the strength of multicultural ties in 2007 and 2011. Singapore's multicultural ties can be said to be resilient if its strength is either maintained or increased over this period of time.

2.2 The strength of multicultural ties is measured with an *Inclusiveness Index*. The Inclusiveness Index measures the degree to which Singaporeans are civic multicultural in orientation. The term *civic multicultural Singaporean* refers to an individual who is receptive towards interacting with all the main three races (Chinese, Malays and Indians) and five religious groups (Buddhists/Taoists , Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Free-thinkers) across a range of contexts in the public sphere. Examples of contexts in the public sphere include one's choice of neighbour, Prime Minister and office colleague.

2.3 The definition of civic multicultural Singaporeans includes, but is not limited to, *idealised multicultural Singaporeans*. Idealised multicultural Singaporeans can be thought of as a subset of the larger category of civic multicultural Singaporeans. Idealised multicultural Singaporeans are receptive towards interacting with all the main races and religious groups across the full range of contexts in both the public and private spheres. Examples of contexts in the private sphere could include one's choice of spouse and close friends. Therefore while idealised multicultural Singaporeans are by definition civic multicultural Singaporeans, civic multicultural Singaporeans are not necessarily idealised multicultural Singaporeans.

2.4 While the findings on attitudes in the private sphere are interesting to the degree that it is arguably a good indicator of integration and trust as it often involves cultivating emotional and physical ties on a voluntary basis, the questions pertaining to interaction preferences in the public sphere would have far more policy-making implications due to legislative efficacy and political prudence.

2.5 Therefore Singapore can be said to possess multicultural resilience between 2007 and 2011 *if and only if* the Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans is maintained or increased over this period of time.

2.6 The Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans increased by 19.6% (±3.1%) from 47.5% (±2.4%) in 2007 to 67.1% (±2%) in 2011. Since the findings decisively indicated an increase in the Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans, it can be said that Singapore's multicultural ties have been resilient between 2007 and 2011.

3. Were Malays, Christians and the Chinese consistently less inclusive than the non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively between 2007 and 2011?

3.1 This study is also interested in the level of inclusiveness of three specific groups (as opposed to all others) – the Malays, Christians and Chinese. These three groups arguably have been involved in incidents pertaining to race and religion not just between 2007 and 2011 but also over the years in a manner such that their commitment towards multicultural harmony in Singapore may be called into question.

The specific rationales for choosing the three groups are as follows:

3.1.1 **The Malays**

3.1.1.1 Discussion was generated surrounding the desire of Muslims to integrate in Singapore owing to comments by former Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew in *Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going*.

3.1.1.2 As the majority of Muslims in Singapore are Malay, and it often appears that Malay Muslims are being referenced when Muslims are discussed in Singapore, this study seeks to contrast Malay inclusiveness against that of non-Malays.

3.1.1.3 Malays may be considered consistently less inclusive than non-Malays over this period of time *if and only if* the Inclusiveness Index for Malays is lower than that of non-Malays in both 2007 *and* 2011.

3.1.1.4 Malays were found to be more inclusive than non-Malays in 2007. This is because the Inclusiveness Index for Malays was 69.1% (±8.3%) whereas for non-Malays it was 45.2% (±6.2%) in 2007. As a result, Malays were 24% (±6.6%) more likely to be inclusive than non-Malays. However, there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether Malays were more or less inclusive than non-Malays in 2011. This is because the Inclusiveness Index indicates that Malays could have been between 5.7% *less* likely to 5.8% *more* likely than non-Malays to be inclusive. Hence, in 2011, the analysis is not emphatic as a Malay could either be more inclusive or less inclusive than a non-Malay.

3.1.1.5 Since the findings did not show Malays to be less inclusive than non-Malays in both 2007 and 2011, there is no basis to claim that Malays were consistently less inclusive in 2007 and 2011.

3.1.2 **The Christians**

3.1.2.1 It is possible to hold the view that Christians are less inclusive than non-Christians in Singapore owing to incidents such as the disparaging remarks made by Senior Pastor Rony Tan in 2010 and a Christian couple being found guilty of distributing seditious or objectionable material to Muslims and being in possession of seditious publications in 2009. This is because such incidents and actions may come across to non-Christians as non-inclusive in multi-religious Singapore. This study seeks to contrast Christian inclusiveness against that of non-Christians.

3.1.2.2 Christians may be considered consistently less inclusive than non-Christians over this period of time *if and only if* the Inclusiveness Index for Christians is lower than that of non-Christians in both 2007 *and* 2011.

3.1.2.3 According to the Inclusiveness Indices for Christians and non-Christians in 2007 and 2011, it remains inconclusive as to whether there is a difference in the level of inclusiveness between Christians and non-Christians in both 2007 and 2011. This is because the Inclusiveness Index (2007) suggests that Christians could have been between 6.6% *less* likely to 8.4% *more* likely than non-Christians in 2007 to be inclusive. In addition, the Inclusiveness Index (2011) shows that Christians could have been between 2.6% *less* likely to 8.4% *more* likely in 2011 than non-Christians to be so. Hence, in both 2007 and 2011, the analysis is not emphatic as a Christian could either be more inclusive or less inclusive than a non-Christian.

3.1.2.4 Since the findings did not show Christians to be less inclusive than non-Christians in both 2007 and 2011, there is no basis to claim that Christians were consistently less inclusive in 2007 and 2011.

3.1.3 **The Chinese**

3.1.3.1 Being an overwhelming majority in Singapore, the inclusiveness of the Chinese vis-à-vis the minority races is of interest as their absolute numbers would have a significant bearing on the manner in which the different races interact with one another in Singapore – especially with regards to the public sphere. This study seeks to contrast Chinese inclusiveness against that of the minority races.

3.1.3.2 The Chinese may be considered consistently less inclusive than non-Chinese over this period of time *if and only if* the Inclusiveness Index for the Chinese is lower than that of non-Chinese in both 2007 and 2011.

3.1.3.3 The Inclusiveness Index for the Chinese in 2007 was 40.2% (±8.4%) whereas that of non-Chinese was 85.1% (±7.6%). As a result, the Chinese were 44.9% (±7.1%) less inclusive than non-Chinese in 2007. However, there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether the Chinese were more or less inclusive than the non-Chinese in 2011. This is because the Inclusiveness Index suggested that the Chinese could have been between 11.6% *less* likely to 0.4% *more* inclusive than non-Chinese in 2011. Hence, in 2011, the analysis is not emphatic as a Chinese could either be more inclusive or less inclusive than a non-Chinese.

3.1.3.4 Since the findings did not show the Chinese to be less inclusive than the non-Chinese in both 2007 *and* 2011, there is no basis to claim that the Chinese were consistently less inclusive in 2007 and 2011.

4. Conclusion

4.1 The two fundamental questions this study has grappled with surrounds whether Singapore's multicultural ties have been resilient between 2007 and 2011 and whether Malays, Christians and the Chinese have been consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively in the same period.

4.2 Firstly, the findings show that Singapore's multicultural ties have been resilient between 2007 and 2011. The Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans shows an increase in the level of inclusiveness amongst Singaporeans in the same period.

4.3 Secondly, Malays, Christians and the Chinese have been no less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively over the same period. Each group can be deemed consistently less inclusive *if and only if* they are less inclusive in both 2007 *and* 2011. To this end, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the three groups were consistently less inclusive than their respective out-groups in 2007 and 2011.

4.4 In conclusion, this report offers a good grade to what is effectively a scorecard of multicultural bonds in Singapore.

1. Introduction

O Tempora O Mores
- Cicero

A significant foundational element of the "Singapore Story", a euphemism for the official history of Singapore, holds that Singapore since independence in 1965 has successfully developed inter-communal harmony despite communal tensions at independence. However, when describing the condition of multicultural Singapore, that is, the manner in which the different races and religions in Singapore interact with one another, a common refrain is that though inter-communal harmony prevails, the harmony enjoyed today can unravel very quickly if it is not continually worked at. For example, this position was iterated by former Senior Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Zainul Abidin Rasheed who maintained that "Singapore's current level of harmony is not a natural state… it is always a work-in-progress".[1] Also, in his 2009 National Day rally speech where the customary issues addressed by the Prime Minister would be the state of the economy, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong took pains to stress that "the most visceral and dangerous fault line [for Singapore] is race and religion".[2]

Indeed, several events pertaining to race and religion occurred between 2007 and 2011 that could have impacted inter-racial and inter-religious ties in Singapore. They include (but are not limited to): a Christian couple being found guilty of distributing seditious or objectionable material to three Muslims and being in possession of seditious publications in 2009; Senior Pastor Rony Tan of the Lighthouse Evangelism church irking Buddhists and Taoists when disparaging remarks against their faiths made by him entered the public sphere in 2010; and, in January 2011, former Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew calling to question the desire of Muslims to integrate in Singapore in his third tome *Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going*. These incidents could have had an effect on racial and religious interaction as they may deepen negative stereotypes of particular groups, leading to unease over whether Singapore's multicultural harmony has been gravely destabilised.

Moreover, the intervening years has seen greater public discourse on the previously taboo subjects of race and religion. This shift in the out-of-bounds marker legitimating the discussion of race and religion in the public sphere is perhaps highlighted most clearly in 2006 with the establishment of the Community Engagement Programme (CEP) along with the expansion of Inter-racial Confidence Circles (IRCC) to inter-racial *and* inter-religious confidence circles in order to "foster friendships and build trust amongst people during peace time so that we can withstand challenges and strains on our social cohesion during crisis".[3] Furthermore, this shifting of the OB-marker on discussions on race and religion were further underscored in PM Lee Hsien Loong's National Day Rally speech in 2009 where he admitted that his rally was an "unusually serious and heavy subject for National Day Rally… [n]ormally, you talk about babies, hongbaos, bonuses" but there was a need to discuss race and religion "tactfully" and "honestly".[4]

Consequently, given the greater public awareness and debate on incidents and issues between racial and religious groups, multicultural ties in Singapore could conceivably have altered based on two differing positions. On the one hand, the liberal position holds that greater discussion may lead to greater understanding and improved relations between differing groups; and on the other hand, the conservative position errs on the side of caution, counseling less discussion owing to the fear of deepening differences.[5]

1. Zainul Abidin Rasheed, "Managing Social, Cultural and Religious Pluralism and Diversity - The Singapore Experience," 22 June, 2010. Available at http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/view_press.asp?post_id=6147 (accessed: 11 January 2011).

2. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's National Day Rally Speech 2009 on 16 August (Transcript). Available at http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterviews/primeminister/2009/August/national_day_rallyspeech2009part3racialreligiousharmony.html (accessed: 10 January 2011).

3. Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports , "Media Release : Re-naming of IRCCs to Include Inter-religious Dimension", September 6, 2007.

4. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's National Day Rally Speech 2009 on 16 August (Transcript). Available at http://www.pmo.gov.sg/content/pmosite/mediacentre/speechesninterviews/primeminister/2009/August/national_day_rallyspeech2009part3racialreligiousharmony.html (accessed: 10 January 2011).

5. For a clear exposition of both arguments for and against public discussion dubbed "Liberal" secularism and "Muscular" secularism, see Kumar Ramakrishna (2010) "'Muscular' versus 'Liberal' Secularism and the Religious Fundamentalist Challenge in Singapore", *RSIS Working Paper*, No 202. For arguments for greater public debate consider: Zakir Hussain, "Interaction among faiths crucial", *The Straits Times*, 3 January 2007; Tan Hui Yee, "Nothing like plain speaking: A little dialogue can do much to defuse conflict, says Don", *The Straits Times*, 26 May 2010; and Clarissa Oon, "Talk and let live; Inter-faith dialogue is necessary to prevent misunderstanding amid growing religiosity", *The Straits Times*, 23 February 2010. For arguments warning against public debate consider remarks made by Vivian Balakrishnan in Goh Chin Lian, "Religious leaders must speak up", *The Straits Times*, 7 March 2010; and by Prof S Jayakumar in Zakir Hussain, "Jaya: Don't take religious harmony for granted", *The Straits Times*, 24 July 2009.

With this backdrop, this study builds upon one conducted by the same authors in 2007 titled *The Ties that Bind and Blind: A Report on Inter-racial and Inter-religious Relations in Singapore*. By comparing data from 2007 and 2011, this iteration of the *Ties that Bind and Blind* addresses two questions pertaining to the social fabric of Singapore:

a) Have Singapore's multicultural ties been resilient between 2007 and 2011?

b) Were Malays, Christians and the Chinese consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively between 2007 and 2011?

1.1 Have Singapore's multicultural ties been resilient between 2007 and 2011?

1.1.1 Why multicultural resilience?

As noted above, Singapore is not immune to incidents that may lead to racial or religious tension. As such, the idea of ***multicultural resilience*** – *defined as the ability of a multicultural society to maintain or strengthen its inter-racial or inter-religious ties in the event of challenges to social harmony* – is particularly germane.[6]

Following from this, this study assesses Singapore's multicultural resilience by comparing and contrasting the strength of multicultural ties in 2007 and 2011. Singapore's multicultural ties can be said to be resilient if its strength is either maintained or increased over this period of time.

1.1.2 Measuring the strength of multicultural ties: The Inclusiveness Index

In this study, the strength of multicultural ties is measured with an **Inclusiveness Index**. [7]

The Inclusiveness Index measures the degree to which Singaporeans are ***civic multicultural*** in orientation. The term civic multicultural Singaporean refers to *an individual who is receptive towards interacting with all the main three races (Chinese, Malays and Indians) and five religious groups (Buddhists/ Taoists*[8]*, Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Free-thinkers) across a range of contexts in the public sphere*.[9]

Examples of contexts in the public sphere include one's choice of neighbour, Prime Minister and office colleague.[10]

The definition of ***civic multicultural Singaporeans*** includes, but is not limited to, ***idealised multicultural Singaporeans***.

Idealised multicultural Singaporeans can be thought of as a subset of the larger category of civic multicultural Singaporeans. Idealised multicultural Singaporeans are receptive towards interacting with all the main races and religious groups across the full range of contexts in both the public *and* private spheres. Examples of contexts in the private sphere could include one's choice of spouse and close friends.

6. The concept of multicultural resilience is built on the term resilience with its etymological roots in the Latin *resilire* – meaning to jump back or recoil. It was originally employed in physics to describe the ability of materials to return to their original shape or position after being exposed to external pressure. See for example, Norman Vasu (2007) "Social Resilience in Singapore: Reflections from the London Bombings", in Norman Vasu (ed.) *Social Resilience in Singapore: Reflections from the London Bombings* (Singapore: Select Publishing).

7. The term 'Inclusiveness Index' has been employed to capture different methodologies in studies on, for example, genetic distancing and intergovernmental voting in the European Union. While the methodology of this study is different, it is important to acknowledge the term is not new. See T. Lehmann, M. Licht, N. Elissa, B. T. A. Maega, J. M. Chimumbwa, F. T. Watsenga, C. S. Wondji, F. Simard and W. A. Hawley (2003) "Population Structure of *Anopheles Gambiae* in Africa", *Journal of Heredity*, Vol. 94, Issue 2: 133-147 as well as Konig and Thomas Brauwager (2001) "Decisiveness and Inclusiveness: Two of the Intergovernmental Choice of European Voting Rules", in Manfred J Holler and Guillermo Owen (eds) *Power Indices and Coalition Formation* (Boston: Kluver Academic Publisher).

8. This category includes those who practice other traditional Chinese beliefs.

9. The probability of civic multicultural Singaporeans is based on the sample proportions.

10. For a full list of the questions from the survey that captures issues in the public sphere, see Table 2.1.

Therefore while idealised multicultural Singaporeans are by definition civic multicultural Singaporeans, civic multicultural Singaporeans are not necessarily idealised multicultural Singaporeans.

Finally, all Singaporeans who are not civic multicultural in orientation are by definition non-civic multiculturalists.[11]

For a pictorial representation of idealised multicultural Singaporeans, civic multicultural Singaporeans, non- civic multicultural Singaporeans, see Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1

Idealised Multicultural, Civic Multicultural and non- Civic Multicultural Singaporeans



1.1.2.1 Why only the specific races and religious groups?

Admittedly, it is arguable that a truly inclusive Singaporean would be receptive to all racial and religious groups beyond those identified. However, this report excludes the respondents' attitudes towards those racially classified as 'Others' and also those whose religious persuasion is classified as 'Other religion' (that is, they are neither Buddhist/Taoist, Muslim, Christian, Hindu or Free-thinkers). This is because the two categories of 'Other' race and 'Other religion' each comprises of too diverse a group and are therefore analytically inefficient for the purpose of this specific study.

1.1.2.2 Why only the public sphere?

This study is concerned with the attitudes to interaction in the public sphere, regardless of those in the private sphere. *The **public sphere** refers to a domain of social interaction where an individual's autonomy may experience governmental intervention of varying degrees where the intervention is more often than not justified for the greater good*. For example, modern labour law would prevent hiring practices based on race or religion. *The **private sphere** refers to a domain of social interaction where an individual enjoys a degree of autonomy largely unhampered by governmental intervention*. For example, the race or religion of one's spouse would be a personal decision free of government intervention.

11. Possible permutations of non-civic multicultural Singaporeans include (but are not limited to) individuals who are (1) not receptive towards interacting with all the main races and religious groups across the full range of contexts in both the public *and* private spheres; (2) not receptive towards interacting with all the main races and religious groups across the full range of contexts in the public sphere; and (3) receptive towards interacting with some but not all the main races and religious groups across the full range of contexts in the public sphere.

While the findings on attitudes in the private sphere are interesting to the degree that it is arguably a good indicator of integration and trust as it often involves cultivating emotional and physical ties on a voluntary basis, the questions pertaining to interaction preferences in the public sphere would have far more direct policy-making implications. This stems from two reasons – legislative efficacy and political prudence. Firstly, with regard to legislative efficacy, the modern state, while possibly interested and concerned with attitudes in the private sphere, has more room for legislative manoeuvre for issues pertaining to the public sphere. For example, it would be far more straightforward for a state to ensure that minorities are represented in Parliament than it would be for the state to ensure that different racial groups are willing to marry each other. Secondly, with regard to political prudence, justifying intervention in the public sphere with legislation would conceivably be far more palatable to the general public where intervention may be defended with the argument that private autonomy has to be often balanced with the greater public good. Conversely, even in the context of Singapore where the government has often been charged with being often too willing to intervene in private sphere choices, resistance from the general public can be overwhelming.[12] Hence, while modern states do attempt to some degree to legislate the mores and predilections of its people[13], the energies of government in a world competing for its attention and resources would arguably be best directed at public sphere issues.

In sum, while there may be an interest in the interaction patterns revealed in the private sphere, this study acts as a guide for future legislation as it delimits its analysis to attitudes in the public sphere. The goal then for public policy is to steer non-civic multicultural Singaporeans into becoming civic multicultural Singaporeans. If such policy does steer individuals into becoming idealised multicultural Singaporeans, this outcome should be viewed as an unintended albeit welcome consequence of public policy.

1.1.3 Determining multicultural resilience

This study has defined multicultural resilience as the ability of a multicultural society to maintain or strengthen its inter-racial or inter-religious ties in the event of challenges to social harmony. Conversely, if the strength of its inter-racial and inter-religious ties were to weaken under stress, it can be said that the society did not possess multicultural resilience.

Following from this, the study concludes that Singapore lacked multicultural resilience between 2007 and 2011 if and only if the Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans decisively indicates a dip over this period of time.

Therefore Singapore can be said to possess multicultural resilience between 2007 and 2011 if and only if the Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans is maintained or increases over this period of time.

1.2 Were Malays, Christians and the Chinese consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively between 2007 and 2011?

Besides trying to understand the resilience of Singapore's multicultural ties, this study is also interested in the level of inclusiveness of three specific groups (as opposed to all others) – Malays, Christians and the Chinese. These

12. For an example of the limits to government intervention in the private sphere, consider the public outcry and eventual removal of schemes in Singapore such as the Graduate Mothers Scheme where university-educated mothers were encouraged to have more children via instruments such as tax incentives as well as the scheme to incentivize low income non-graduate mothers with four or more children to sterilize themselves in 1984. For an analysis of the extensive political fallout from these schemes, see Jon S. T. Quah (1985) "Singapore in 1984: Leadership Transition in an Election Year", *Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 2: 220-231.

13. Consider as examples taxation on smoking as well as seatbelt laws.

three groups arguably have been involved in incidents pertaining to race and religion not just between 2007 and 2011 but also over the years in a manner such that their commitment towards multicultural harmony in Singapore may be called into question.

The specific rationales for choosing the three groups are as follows:

1.2.1 The Malays

In January 2011, former Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew's third tome *Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going* was published and comments contained within it called into question the desire of Muslims to integrate in Singapore. In the book, Mr. Lee maintained that "[Singapore was] progressing very nicely until the surge of Islam came and if you asked me for my observations, the other communities have easier integration – friends, inter-marriages and so on, Indians with Chinese, Chinese with Indians – than Muslims."[14] These comments brought forth a flurry of critical responses. These ranged from the Prime Minister, the Association of Muslim Professionals and even the mainstream media.[15] Former MM Lee later admitted that his original position may be out of date after having discussions with current Ministers and Member of Parliaments – both Malay and non-Malay.

Hence, rather than rely on anecdotal evidence to support either position, and as the majority of Muslims in Singapore are Malay, and it often appears that Malay Muslims are being referenced when Muslims are discussed in Singapore, this study seeks to provide empirical data to resolve the question surrounding Malay inclusiveness *contra* non-Malays.

1.2.2 The Christians

It is possible to hold the view that Christians are less inclusive than non-Christians in Singapore owing to incidents such as the disparaging remarks made by Senior Pastor Rony Tan about Buddhists and Taoists in 2010 and the Christian couple being found guilty of distributing seditious or objectionable material to Muslims and being in possession of seditious publications in 2009 coupled with the accusations of aggressive proselytisation by Christians since the mid-1980s to the present.[16] After all, such incidents and actions may come across to non-Christians as non-inclusive in multi-religious Singapore.

Hence, in order to gain an appreciation of the inclusiveness of Christian Singaporeans, this question seeks to contrast their inclusiveness against non-Christians.

1.2.3 The Chinese

In an Institute of Policy Studies survey in 2002, it was found amongst those polled that the Chinese were less supportive (78%) of a "multi-racial society in Singapore" than Malays and Indians (88% and 83% respectively).[17] Being an overwhelming majority in Singapore, the inclusiveness of the Chinese vis-à-vis the minority races is of interest as their absolute numbers would have a significant bearing on the manner in which the different races interact with one another in Singapore – especially with regards to the public sphere. For example, the concerns of the political elite towards the relative vulnerability of the racial minorities in relation to the Chinese majority is reflected in the implementation of the Group Representation Constituencies (GRC) which guarantees minority representation in parliament in the event of a "freak election" when Singaporeans vote along racial lines. In addition, as noted by then-Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in 1988 and former Minister S. Dhanabalan in 2007, Chinese Singaporeans may not be ready to support a non-Chinese Prime Minister.[18] S. Dhanabalan maintained that he was "not saying it's not possible, but I think it will take some time".[19]

14. Han Fook Kwang, Zuraidah Ibrahim, Chua Mui Hoong, Lydia Lim, Ignatius Low, Rachel Lin and Robin Chan (eds) (2010) *Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going* (Singapore: Straits Times Press), p. 228.

15. Zakir Hussain , "Muslims have helped strengthen integration: PM," 31 January 2011, Association of Muslim Professionals, "Media Release: Response to PM Lee's Statement on Integration", 31 January 2011; Zakir Hussain, "Malays get 'A' for efforts to integrate", *The Straits Times*, 8 March 2011.

16. For reports of accusations of aggressive Christian proselytisation, see Kumar Ramakrishna (2010) "'Muscular' versus 'Liberal' Secularism and the Religious Fundamentalist Challenge in Singapore", p. 8; Li Xue Ying and Ken Kwek, "Say aaah… men", *The Straits Times*, 15 October 2005; Li Xue Ying, "Talking about God in schools, hospitals", *The Straits Times*, 15 October 2005; and Lydia Rahman, "Proselytising behind closed doors more insidious", *The Straits Times*, 18 April 2008.

17. Ooi G. L., Tan E. S. and Soh K. C. (2002) *The Study of Ethnicity, National Identity and Sense of Rootedness in Singapore* (Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies), p. 4.

18. Chua Mui Hoong, "S'poreans not ready for non-Chinese PM", *The Straits Times*, 26 Nov 2007.

19. *Ibid.*

Hence, in order to gain an appreciation of the inclusiveness of Chinese Singaporeans, this question seeks to contrast their inclusiveness against that of the minority races.

1.2.4 Determining if Malays, Christians and the Chinese were consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively between 2007 and 2011

Each referent group may be considered consistently less inclusive than their respective out-group over this period of time if and only if the Inclusive Index for the referent group is decisively lower than that for members of the out-group in both 2007 and 2011.

For instance, the Chinese may be considered consistently less inclusive over this period of time if and only if the Inclusiveness Indices for a Chinese is decisively lower than that the Inclusiveness Indices for a non-Chinese in both 2007 and 2011.

2. Methodology

2.1 Questionnaire

The survey instrument is a questionnaire consisting of two parts.

The first part pertains to the attitude of the respondents towards interacting with a member of the identified racial (Chinese, Malay, Indian and 'Others') and religious (Buddhists/Taoists,[20] Muslims, Hindu, Christians, 'Other religion' and Free-thinkers) groups for 15 different scenarios pertaining to interaction in the public sphere. Interviewees were asked to respond as though they had a choice and not according to their actual interaction patterns in a given scenario. For instance, for a question such as "Would you mind if your next-door neighbour were a Chinese?", respondents were asked to indicate their choice ("yes" or "no") regardless of whether their next-door neighbour is a Chinese. There are two reasons for requiring respondents to answer the questions in this way. Firstly, this approach eliminates the possibility that a negative response is due to a lack of opportunity to interact. Secondly, it is not reasonable to expect respondents to be able to discern the religion of everyone they interact with in the public sphere.

The 15 scenarios can be sub-divided into the social, political and security domains, the work place and majority-minority status. The questions pertaining to each sub-category of interaction are listed in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1

Survey questions on willingness to interact with different races and religious groups in the public sphere[21]

Social
Would you mind if your next-door neighbour were a _____?
Would you mind if your teacher were a _____?
Would you mind being treated by a doctor who is a _____?
On the bus or MRT, would you sit next to a _____?
When you need help in a public place, would you approach a _____?
Political
Would you vote for a _____ MP (member of parliament)?
Would you mind if Singapore's Prime Minister were a _____?
Would you vote for a _____ President of Singapore?
Security
Would you mind being helped by a policeman who is a _____?
Would you trust a _____ soldier to protect you?
Work place
Would you mind if your boss were a _____?
Would you mind if your co-worker were a _____?
If you were a boss, would you hire a worker who is a _____?
Majority-minority status
Would you feel uneasy in a place full of _____?
Would you feel uneasy if the majority of the people in Singapore were _____?

20. This category includes those who practice other traditional Chinese beliefs.

21. For each scenario, interviewees were asked to indicate either a "yes" or "no" in response to each of the identified race and religious groups.

The second part of the survey questionnaire comprised demographic variables such as race, religion, housing type, education, age and gender.

The questionnaire was piloted, refined and then back-translated into Chinese, Malay and Tamil.

2.2 Sampling

Both 2007 and 2011 samples were obtained from a random sample of household listing provided by the Department of Statistics (DOS). Potential households were selected based on quota sampling by race with the minority races were oversampled to ensure sufficient minority respondents for statistical analysis. The "last birthday" method was used to select a random respondent from a household with multiple valid target respondents (that is, Singaporean citizens who are aged 15 years and above). In this selection procedure, the valid member of the household who last celebrated his/her birthday will be chosen for the interview. Twenty percent of the interviewees were contacted for verification and quality control purposes after the survey was completed.

The analysis of this report excludes respondents who were racially classified as 'Others' and also those whose religious persuasion is not the following – Buddhism/Taoism, Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and no religion. This is because the two categories of 'Other' race and 'Other' religion each comprises of too diverse a group and are therefore analytically inefficient for the purpose of this specific study. The reported findings are based on a weighted sample that reflects the composition of the resident population by race, age and gender according to the 2006 and 2010 censuses for the Chinese, Malays and Indians.

2.3 Fieldwork

Face-to-face interviews were conducted by market research firms who deployed surveyors matched to the respondents by race for the Chinese, Malay and Indian respondents. The data was collected between December 2006 and January 2007 for the 2007 survey and between January and March 2011 for the 2011 survey. The response rate was 83.6% in 2007 and 82.5% in 2011. The summary statistics of the 2007 and 2011 samples used in this study are provided in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2

Summary statistics of 2007 and 2011 samples (weighted)

Variable	2007		2011	
	%	S.D.	%	S.D.
Sample size (counts)	1,763		2,111	
Race				
Chinese	78.6	0.410	78.1	0.414
Malay	12.8	0.334	12.9	0.335
Indian	8.6	0.281	9.0	0.286
Religion				
Buddhist/Taoist[22]	55.5	0.497	45.5	0.498
Muslim	13.1	0.338	13.9	0.346
Hindu	8.1	0.273	6.9	0.254
Christian	12.0	0.325	17.3	0.378
Free-thinker	11.3	0.317	16.4	0.370
Education				
Primary or less	32.4	0.468	21.5	0.411
Secondary	40.8	0.492	50.1	0.500
Tertiary	26.8	0.443	28.3	0.451
Age				
15-19 yrs old	8.6	0.281	8.6	0.281
20-29 yrs old	16.5	0.372	16.8	0.374
30-39 yrs old	20.8	0.406	19.6	0.397
40-49 yrs old	22.3	0.417	20.6	0.405
50-59 yrs old	17.0	0.375	17.7	0.382
60 yrs old and above	14.8	0.355	16.6	0.372
Gender				
Female	50.9	0.500	50.9	0.500
Male	49.1	0.500	49.1	0.500
Housing type				
HDB				
1-2 room HDB	1.1	0.106	4.6	0.209
3 room HDB	29.1	0.454	27.7	0.448
4 room HDB	38.2	0.486	38.0	0.486
5 room HDB and Executive	22.0	0.414	20.1	0.401
Non-HDB				
Private apartment	4.8	0.213	6.0	0.237
Landed property	4.8	0.215	3.66	0.186

22. This category includes those who practice other traditional Chinese beliefs.

3. Analysis

This study addresses two questions pertaining to the social fabric of Singapore:

a) Have Singapore's multicultural ties been resilient between 2007 and 2011?
b) Were Malays, Christians and Chinese consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese between 2007 and 2011?

3.1 Have Singapore's multicultural ties been resilient between 2007 and 2011?

As noted earlier, this study has defined multicultural resilience as the ability of a multicultural society to maintain or strengthen its inter-racial or inter-religious ties in the event of challenges to social harmony. Conversely, if the strength of its inter-racial and inter-religious ties were to weaken under stress, it can be said that the society did not possess multicultural resilience. Given that between 2007 and 2011, several events pertaining to race and religion occurred coupled with a liberalisation of public discourse on these issues, there have been concerns that Singapore's multicultural harmony may have been gravely destabilised and proven not to be resilient.

Following from this, we can conclude that Singapore lacked multicultural resilience between 2007 and 2011 if and only if the Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans[23] has decisively decreased over this period of time.

To this end, rather than a decrease, the Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans has increased by 19.6% (±3.1%) from 47.5% (±2.4%) in 2007 to 67.1% (±2%) in 2011 (Figure 3.1). This suggests that there is no basis to claim that Singapore lacked multicultural resilience over this period.

Since the findings decisively indicated an increase in the Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans, it can be said that Singapore's multicultural ties have been resilient between 2007 and 2011.

23. The Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans refers to the probability of Singaporeans being civic multiculturalists (based on the estimated proportions) – individuals who are receptive towards interacting with all the main three races (Chinese, Malays and Indians) and five religious groups (Buddhists/Taoists, Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Free-thinkers) across a range of contexts in the public sphere. The Buddhist/Taoist category includes those who practice other traditional Chinese beliefs. For a full list of the questions from the survey that captures issues in the public sphere, see Table 2.1.

Figure 3.1

Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans (2007 and 2011). The bars represent the estimated probabilities while the box represents the 95% confidence intervals.**



* The difference is calculated via a t-test
** The probabilities are based on the weighted sample proportions of civic multicultural Singaporeans

3.2 Were Malays, Christians and Chinese consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively between 2007 and 2011?

As noted earlier, the commitment of the Malays, Christians and Chinese to multicultural harmony have, for differing reasons, been come under question over this time. Hence, in order to gain an appreciation of the inclusiveness of each of these three referent groups, this section seeks to contrast their inclusiveness against those of their respective out-groups.

3.2.1 Were Malays consistently less inclusive than non-Malays in 2007 and 2011?

Malays may be considered consistently less inclusive than non-Malays over this period of time if and only if the Inclusiveness Index for Malays is decisively lower than that of non-Malays in both 2007 and 2011.

To this end, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Malays were consistently less inclusive than non-Malays in 2007 and 2011.

In fact, Malays were found to be more inclusive than non-Malays in 2007. This is because the Inclusiveness Index for Malays was 69.1% (±8.3%) whereas for non-Malays it was 45.2% (±6.2%) in 2007 (Figure 3.2). As a result, Malays were 24% (±6.6%) more likely to be inclusive than non-Malays (Figure 3.2).

Figure 3.2

Inclusiveness Index for Malays and non-Malays (2007). The bars represent the estimated probabilities while the box represents the 95% confidence intervals.[24]



However, there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether Malays were more or less inclusive than non-Malays in 2011. This is because the Inclusiveness Index indicates that Malays could have been between 5.7% *less* likely to 5.8% *more* likely than non-Malays to be inclusive (Figure 3.3). Hence, in 2011, the analysis is not emphatic as a Malay could either be more inclusive or less inclusive than a non-Malay.

Figure 3.3

Inclusiveness Index for Malays and non-Malays (2011). The bars represent the estimated probabilities while the box represents the 95% confidence intervals.[25]



24. The predicted probabilities compares Malays and non-Malays who are non-Christians, tertiary-educated, of the post-65 generation, having completed NS, lives in a HDB flat and who have at least one good friend who is of a different race and/or religion as themselves. Refer to Appendix for details of the regression analysis.

25. *Ibid.*

In conclusion, since the findings did not show Malays to be decisively less inclusive than non-Malays in both 2007 and 2011, there is no basis to claim that Malays were consistently less inclusive in 2007 and 2011.

3.2.2 Were Christians consistently less inclusive in the public sphere than the non-Christians?

Christians may be considered consistently less inclusive than non-Christians over this period of time if and only if the Inclusiveness Index for Christians is decisively lower than that of non-Christians in both 2007 and 2011.

To this end, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Christians were consistently less inclusive than non-Christians in 2007 and 2011.

According to the Inclusiveness Indices for Christians and non-Christians in 2007 and 2011, it remains inconclusive as to whether there is a difference in the level of inclusiveness between Christians and non-Christians in both 2007 and 2011. This is because the Inclusiveness Index (2007) suggests that Christians could have been between 6.6% *less* likely to 8.4% *more* likely than non-Christians in 2007 (Figure 3.4) to be inclusive. In addition, the Inclusiveness Index (2011) shows that Christians could have been between 2.6% *less* likely to 8.4% *more* likely in 2011 than non-Christians to be so (Figure 3.5). Hence, in both 2007 and 2011, the analysis is not emphatic as a Christian could either be more inclusive or less inclusive than a non-Christian.

Figure 3.4

Inclusiveness Index for Christians and non-Christians (2007). The bars represent the estimated probabilities while the box represents the 95% confidence intervals.[26]



26. The predicted probabilities compares Christians and non-Christians who are Chinese, tertiary-educated, of the post-65 generation, having completed NS, lives in a HDB flat and who have at least one good friend who is of a different race and/or religion as themselves. Refer to Appendix for details of the regression analysis.

Figure 3.5

Inclusiveness Index for Christians and non-Christians (2011). The bars represent the estimated probabilities while the box represents the 95% confidence intervals.[27]



In conclusion, since the findings did not show Christians to be decisively less inclusive than non-Christians in both 2007 and 2011, there is no basis to claim that Christians were consistently less inclusive in 2007 and 2011.

3.2.3 Were the Chinese majority consistently less inclusive than the minority races in 2007 and 2011?

The Chinese may be considered consistently less inclusive than non-Chinese over this period of time if and only if the Inclusiveness Index for the Chinese is decisively lower than that of non-Chinese in both 2007 and 2011.

To this end, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the Chinese were consistently less inclusive than the non-Chinese in 2007 and 2011.

This is because while the evidence suggests that the Chinese were less inclusive in the public sphere than the non-Chinese in 2007, it is inconclusive as to whether this is the case in 2011. The Inclusiveness Index for the Chinese in 2007 was 40.2% (±8.4%) whereas that of non-Chinese was 85.1% (±7.6%) (Figure 3.6). As a result, the Chinese were 44.9% (±7.1%) less inclusive than non-Chinese in 2007 (Figure 3.7).

27. *Ibid.*

Figure 3.6

Inclusiveness Index for Chinese and non-Chinese (2007). The bars represent the estimated probabilities while the box represents the 95% confidence intervals. [28]



However, there was insufficient evidence to conclude whether the Chinese were more or less inclusive than the non-Chinese in 2011. This is because the Inclusiveness Index suggested that the Chinese could have been between 11.6% *less* likely to 0.4% *more* inclusive than non-Chinese in 2011 (Figure 3.7). Hence, in 2011, the analysis is not emphatic as a Chinese could either be more inclusive or less inclusive than a non-Chinese.

Figure 3.7

Inclusiveness Index for Chinese and non-Chinese (2011). The bars represent the estimated probabilities while the box represents the 95% confidence intervals.[29]



In conclusion, since the findings did not show the Chinese to be decisively less inclusive than the non-Chinese in both 2007 *and* 2011, there is no basis to claim that the Chinese were consistently less inclusive in 2007 and 2011.

28. The predicted probabilities compares Chinese and non-Chinese who are Christians, tertiary-educated, of the post-65 generation, having completed NS, lives in a HDB flat and who have at least one good friend who is of a different race and/or religion as themselves. Refer to Appendix for details of the regression analysis.

29. *Ibid.*

4. Conclusion

Through 2007 and 2011, owing to the occurrence of several high-profile events involving race and religion coupled with greater discussions in the public sphere of these issues, it may be tempting to wonder if Singapore's multicultural harmony has possibly been destabilised. In an attempt to more systematically discern if such unease is justified, the two fundamental questions this study has grappled with surrounds whether Singapore's multicultural ties have been resilient between 2007 and 2011 and whether Malays, Christians and the Chinese have been consistently less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively in the same period.

Simply put, the study concludes that the unease is unjustified for two reasons.

Firstly, the findings show that Singapore's multicultural ties have been resilient between 2007 and 2011. The Inclusiveness Index for Singaporeans (Figure 3.1) shows an increase in the level of inclusiveness amongst Singaporeans in the same period.

Secondly, Malays, Christians and the Chinese have been no less inclusive than non-Malays, non-Christians and non-Chinese respectively over the same period. Any of these three groups can be deemed consistently less inclusive if and only if they are decisively less inclusive in both 2007 and 2011. To this end, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the three groups were consistently less inclusive than their respective out-groups in 2007 and 2011 owing to statistically inconclusive results in certain instances.

Sceptics may disagree with this interpretation of statistically inconclusive results. Instead, they may hold that statistically inconclusive results do not absolve the three groups of the charge of being less inclusive as it merely suggests there is insufficient evidence to decisively prove so. As a result, the study's conclusion has chosen to gloss over possible evidences of intolerance.

Admittedly, this appears to be a reasonable point. The glass here indeed appears to be either half empty or half full. However, precisely because race and religion in Singapore is viewed as a "visceral and dangerous fault line", the consequences of acting and thinking on indecisive data will have serious implications for members of those communities as well as the nation as a whole. Members of those communities will possibly be regarded with suspicion and distrust by the rest of society. This in turn may deplete the current reservoir of inter-communal goodwill that Singaporeans so painstakingly accumulated over the years. As such, it is prudent to view the glass as half full as statistically inconclusive results are not damning enough to decisively prove that any of these three groups are less inclusive beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Beyond the manner in which statistically inconclusive results are interpreted, others may argue that the study's interest in civic multicultural Singaporeans who are inclusive in the public sphere is misplaced. Society should instead be interested in nurturing ideal citizens with regards to multicultural relations – what this study has termed idealised multicultural Singaporeans – who are both inclusive in the public and private spheres.

While the goal of a society comprised of idealised multicultural Singaporeans would be laudable, it is quixotic to assume that public policy can ensure such an end. As noted in the introduction, public policy has its limitations in steering attitudes for two reasons. Firstly, public policy is arguably an inefficient means to steer private mores and predilections. Secondly, any attempt to steer private mores and predilections with such policy is likely to meet resistance from the ground.[30] As such, should public policy steer individuals into becoming idealised multicultural Singaporeans, this outcome should be viewed as an unintended albeit welcome consequence of public policy.

In conclusion, it would be arguably naïve to either expect that Singapore will not experience continued incidents involving race and religion or not have emotionally-charged debates surrounding such matters. As such, rather than be swept away by such moments, this study has sought to survey Singaporean attitudes to inclusiveness from a higher vista unencumbered by the persuasiveness of the lived moment – a lived moment that may be influenced by the anecdotal and emotive rather than the representative and dispassionate. This report offers a good grade to what is effectively a scorecard of multicultural bonds in Singapore.

30. For a more detailed discussion of the two reasons, see Section 1.1.2.2.

Appendix

Regression Analysis

This study employs multivariate logistic regression analysis to evaluate the level of inclusiveness in the public sphere of the Chinese, Malays and Christians. The dependent variable is civic multiculturalist[31] and the independent variables of interests are Chinese, Malay and Christians.

Several control variables were included. First, education was included as many have argued that higher education leads to greater empathy and acceptance of diversity and difference.[32] Education especially at tertiary level permits students to interact with greater diversity which can broaden established viewpoints while the improvement of critical thinking skills facilitates an understanding of the negative impact of prejudice.

Secondly, the post-1965 generation of Singaporeans may possibly be more culturally inclusive than their pre-1965 counterparts. Not only are the post-65ers spared memories of racial strife of the 1960s, they also grew up in an environment where public discourses touching on race and religion were taboo while at the same time policies were deliberately implemented to ensure that Singaporeans of all racial and religious backgrounds interacted with each other and co-existed peacefully.[33] Consequently, they may be more likely than the pre-65ers to be culturally integrated.

Third, participation in National Service (NS) is included as it not only contributes to the defence of the state but also serves as a unifying force that cuts across socio-economic and cultural lines. According to the Singaporean Ministry of Defence, "there is nothing like sharing tough times to bond people" and "NS [is] an important Singapore cultural icon, social glue, and lifestyle… [c]ohort after cohort of National Servicemen of all races describe… their discovery of commonality among men of different backgrounds and races".[34]

Fourth, housing type may have an impact on civic multiculturalism, namely between those under the purview of the Housing Development Board (HDB) and private property, owing to government policy to build social bonds and community spirit in HDB housing estates. Of note is the Ethnic Integration Policy implemented to promote racial integration "by ensuring a balanced ethnic mix among the various ethnic communities living in public housing estates."[35]

Fifth, interracial and interreligious friendships may have a positive impact on attitudes towards cultural diversity.[36] Intergroup friendships may serve to strengthen intercultural bonds through identification with cultural groups that are different from one's own and also by dispelling prejudices and negative stereotypes.

Race is also included as a control variable in the analysis for Christians while religion is included in the analyses for the Chinese and Malays.

31. A civic multiculturalist refers to respondents who were inclusive (that is, receptive towards interacting with all the main three races – Chinese, Malays and Indians – and five religious groups – Buddhists/Taoists, Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Free-thinkers) across all 15 contexts in the public sphere and with regard to majority-minority status. The Buddhists/Taoists category includes those who practice other traditional Chinese beliefs.

32. Ronald Inglehart (1987) "Value Change in Industrialized Societies", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 81, No. 4: 1289-1303; Ilsa L Lottes and Peter J Kuriloff (1994) "The Impact of College Experience on Political and Social Attitudes", *Sex Roles*, Vol. 3, No.1-2: 31-54; Robert Andersen and Tina Fetner (2008) "Economic Inequality and Intolerance: Attitudes toward Homosexuality in 35 Democracies", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 52, No. 4, October: 942-958.

33. For an overview of Singapore's multicultural policies, see Sharon Siddique (1989) "Singaporean Identity" in Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley (eds) *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies); Raj Vasil (1995) *Asianising Singapore: The PAP's Management of Ethnicity* (Singapore: Heinemann Asia); Lai Ah Eng (ed.) (2004) *Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and Social Cohesion in Singapore* (Singapore: Eastern University Press); and Daniel P.S. Goh (2010) "Multiculturalism and the Problem of Solidarity" in Terrence Chong (ed.) *Management of Success: Singapore Revisited* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).

34. Koh Boon Pin (2002) *Shoulder to Shoulder: Our National Service Journal: Commemorating 35 Years of National Service* (Singapore: Ministry of Defence), p. 15.

35. The Housing Development Board website: http://www.hdb.gov.sg/fi10/fi10322p.nsf/w/SellFlatEthnicIntegrationPolicy_EIP?OpenDocument (accessed: 14 November 2011).

36. Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp (2008) "How Does Intergroup Contact Reduce Prejudice? Meta-analytic Tests of Three Mediators", *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 38: 922-934; Shana Levin, Colette van Laar and Jim Sidanius (2003) "The Effects of Ingroup and Outgroup Friendships on Ethnic Attitudes in College: A Longitudinal Study", *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 6: 77-92; Thomas F. Pettigrew (1997) "Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23: 173-185.

The variables and their codes are listed on Table A.

Table A

Variables and their codes for the logistic regression analysis

Variable	2007	2011
Civic multiculturalist	CV	0 = non-civic multiculturalist 1 = civic multiculturalist
Race	Chinese	0 = non-Chinese 1 = Chinese
	Malay	0 = non-Malay 1 = Chinese
Religion	Muslim	0 = non-Muslim 1 = Muslim
	Christian	0 = non-Christian 1 = Christian
Education	Secondary[37]	0 = non-secondary 1 = secondary
	Tertiary[38]	0 = non-tertiary 1 = tertiary
Generation	Post-65[39]	0 = Born before 1965 1 = Born after 1965
National Service (NS)	NS[40]	0 = did not complete NS 1 = completed NS
Housing type	Non-HDB	0 = HDB 1 = private property
Inclusive friendship	Inclusive friendship	0 = only has close friends they tell their personal problems to who are of the same race and religion as oneself 1 = has at least one close friend they can tell their personal problems to who is of a different race and/or religion as oneself

37. Secondary refers to respondents whose highest educational qualification is either ITE/NTC, GCE 'O' Levels, GCE 'A' Levels or GCE 'N' Levels.

38. Tertiary refers to respondents whose highest educational qualification is a Polytechnic diploma, undergraduate degree or post-graduate degree.

39. For the 2007 sample, respondents who were 40 years old and above as of December 2006 were categorised as 'born before 1965' while 'born after 1965' refers to those between 15 and 39 years old. For the 2011 sample, respondents who were 50 years old and above were categorised as 'born before 1965' while 'born after 1965' refers to those between 15 and 49 years old.

40. For both samples, all males aged 20 to 39 years old were categorised as having completed NS while all other respondents were categorised as "did not complete NS".

Were the Malays less inclusive than the non-Malays in 2007 and 2011?

While the evidence suggests that Malays were more inclusive than non-Malays in 2007, it is inconclusive as to whether this is the case in 2011.

Based on the regression analysis for 2007, the Malay coefficient was found to be robust as it was consistently statistically significant at the 95% confidence level for various models, namely the univariate model, models with the Malay variable and each of the control variables, and the full model (Table B1). Moreover, the coefficient is positive, suggesting that the Malays were more likely than the non-Malays to be civic multiculturalists in 2007.

However, in 2011, the differences in the probability of being inclusive between the Malays and non-Malays are consistently statistically insignificant for the same models in 2011 (Table B2). Hence we are not able to conclude if the Malays were more or less inclusive than the non-Malays.

The estimated probabilities of Figures 3.2-3.3 of Section 3.2.1 are calculated based on Model 8 for both 2007 and 2011. The predicted probabilities are derived through simulating the statistical results using the programme, *Clarify*.[41]

Table B1

Select results of logistic regression analysis of civic multiculturalism between Malays and non-Malays in 2007

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Malay	0.995*** (0.152)	0.974*** (0.153)	0.989*** (0.153)	0.998*** (0.152)	0.995*** (0.152)	1.027*** (0.153)	0.987*** (0.153)	1.011*** (0.156)
Christian[42]		-0.152 (0.150)						-0.124 (0.155)
Education								
Secondary			0.007 (0.114)					0.004 (0.122)
Tertiary			-0.081 (0.126)					-0.160 (0.154)
Post-65				-0.054 (0.097)				-0.134 (0.125)
NS					0.198 (0.125)			0.298* (0.151)
HDB						-0.340* (0.163)		-0.355* (0.174)
Inclusive friendship							-0.064 (0.122)	0.009 (0.125)
Constant	-0.225*** (0.051)	-0.204*** (0.055)	-0.205* (0.126)	-0.201** (0.067)	-0.261*** (0.056)	0.077 (0.154)	-0.173 (0.112)	0.149 (0.200)
-2 Log Likelihood	2393. 55	2392.52	2392.93	2393.24	2391.04	2389.22	2393.27	2382.55
Area under ROC curve	0.5536	0.5604	0.5638	0.5606	0.5660	0.5669	0.5591	0.5867

*** p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001**

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

41. For details on *Clarify*, see Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King (2003) CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results, Version 2.1. Stanford University, University of Wisconsin and Harvard University, 5 January. Available at http://gking.harvard.edu/ (accessed: 8 February 2012); Gary King, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg (2000) "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation", *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 2: 347-61.

42. Due to the problem of collinearity between the variables Malay and Muslim, the religion variable for this analysis only compares Christians and non-Christians.

Table B2

Select results of logistic regression analysis of civic multiculturalism between Malays and non-Malays in 2011

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Malay	-0.016 (0.713)	0.020 (0.140)	-0.000 (0.140)	-0.028 (0.138)	-0.017 (0.138)	0.009 (0.138)	-0.016 (0.138)	0.022 (0.142)
Christian[43]		0.195 (0.127)						0.128 (0.131)
Education								
Secondary			0.360** (0.116)					0.331** (0.122)
Tertiary			0.445** (0.131)					0.331* (0.156)
Post-65				0.161 (0.097)				0.027 (0.111)
NS					0.174 (0.124)			0.074 (0.133)
HDB						-0.327 (0.137)		-0.220 (0.180)
Inclusive friendship							0.016 (0.141)	-0.039 (0.143)
Constant	0.713*** (0.050)	0.675*** (0.055)	0.409*** (0.098)	0.609*** (0.079)	0.683*** (0.054)	1.077*** (0.159)	0.698 (0.134)	0.634 (0.244)
-2 Log Likelihood Area under ROC curve	2675.80 0.5009	2673.41 0.5147	2662.72 0.5420	2673.05 0.5192	2673.79 0.5145	2671.82 0.5140	2675.79 0.5012	2659.67 0.5500

*** p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001**

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

Are the Christians less inclusive than the non-Christians in 2007 and 2011?

The findings are inconclusive as to whether there is a difference in the level of inclusiveness between the Christians and non-Christians in both 2007 and 2011.

This is because the difference in the probability of being inclusive between the Christians and non-Christians were statistically insignificant for both years at the 95% confidence level for various models, namely the univariate model, models with the Christian variable and each of the control variables, and the full model (Tables B1 and B2). As a result, we are unable to conclude if the Christians have been more or less inclusive than the non-Christians.

The estimated probabilities of Figures 3.4-3.5 of Section 3.2.2 are calculated based on Model 8 for both 2007 and 2011. The predicted probabilities are derived through simulating the statistical results using the programme, *Clarify*.[44]

43. *Ibid.*

44. For details on *Clarify*, see Footnote 41.

Table C1

Select results of logistic regression analysis of civic multiculturalism between Christians and non-Christians in 2007

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Christian	-0.289 (0.149)	0.009 (0.153)	-0.273 (0.152)	-0.288 (0.149)	-0.292 (0.149)	-0.302* (0.149)	-0.273 (0.150)	0.046 (0.158)
Race								
Chinese		-2.117*** (0.150)						-2.223*** (0.237)
Malay		-0.970*** (0.267)						-0.938*** (0.268)
Education								
Secondary			0.086 (0.112)					-0.127 (0.126)
Tertiary			-0.031 (0.127)					-0.322* (0.161)
Post-65				-0.024 (0.096)				-0.168 (0.130)
NS					0.201 (0.124)			0.313* (0.157)
HDB						-0.238 (0.162)		-0.479** (0.181)
Inclusive friendship							-0.122 (0.120)	0.245 (0.134)
Constant	-0.067 (0.051)	1.710*** (0.225)	-0.906 (0.084)	-0.057 (0.067)	-0.104 (0.056)	0.150 (0.156)	0.028 (0.107)	2.183*** (0.305)
-2 Log Likelihood Area under ROC curve	2435.67 0.5151	2276.41 0.6225	2434.55 0.5259	2435.61 0.5244	2433.05 0.5260	2433.52 0.5219	2434.64 0.5250	2259.88 0.6581

*** p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001**

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

Table C2

Select results of logistic regression analysis of civic multiculturalism between Christians and non-Christians in 2011

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Christian	0.192 (0.125)	0.215 (0.128)	0.129 (0.128)	0.195 (0.126)	0.193 (0.126)	0.160 (0.127)	0.192 (0.126)	0.145 (0.131)
Race								
Chinese		-0.301 (0.171)						-0.269 (0.172)
Malay		-0.248 (0.207)						-0.216 (0.208)
Education								
Secondary			0.353** (0.117)					0.326** (0.122)
Tertiary			0.419** (0.133)					-0.329* (0.156)
Post-65				0.163 (0.097)				-0.020 (0.112)
NS					0.175 (0.124)			0.069 (0.134)
HDB						-0.296 (0.168)		-0.218 (0.180)
Inclusive friendship							0.012 (0.141)	-0.039 (0.143)
Constant	0.678*** (0.051)	0.943*** (0.162)	0.398*** (0.096)	0.572*** (0.081)	0.648*** (0.055)	0.953*** (0.165)	0.668*** (0.133)	0.879** (0.291)
-2 Log Likelihood Area under ROC curve	2673.43 0.5134	2670.20 0.5264	2661.71 0.5466	2670.63 0.5307	2671.41 0.5244	2670.22 0.5248	2673.43 0.5136	2657.14 0.5563

*** p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001**

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

Were the Chinese majority less inclusive than the minority races in 2007 and 2011?

While the evidence suggests that the Chinese were less inclusive than the non-Chinese in 2007, it is inconclusive as to whether this is the case in 2011.

Based on the regression analysis for 2007, the Chinese coefficient was found to be robust as it was consistently statistically significant at the 95% confidence level for various models, namely the univariate model, models with the Chinese variable and each of the control variables, and the full model (Table D1). Moreover, the coefficient is negative, suggesting that the Chinese were less likely than the non-Chinese to be civic multiculturalists in 2007.

However, in 2011, the differences in the probability of being inclusive between the Chinese and non-Chinese are consistently statistically insignificant for the same models in 2011 (Table D2). Hence we are not able to conclude if the Chinese were more or less inclusive than the non-Chinese.

The estimated probabilities of Figures 3.6-3.7 of Section 3.2.3 are calculated based on Model 8 for both 2007 and 2011. The predicted probabilities are derived through simulating the statistical results using the programme, *Clarify*.[45]

Table D1

Results of logistic regression analysis of civic multiculturalism between Chinese and non-Chinese in 2007

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Chinese	-1.500*** (0.131)	-2.064*** (0.229)	-1.513*** (0.132)	-1.508*** (0.131)	-1.498*** (0.131)	-1.528*** (0.131)	-1.523*** (0.133)	-2.172*** (0.234)
Religion								
Muslim		-0.855** (0.263)						-0.856** (0.264)
Christian		0.009 (0.153)						0.046 (0.158)
Education								
Secondary			-0.105 (0.118)					-0.131 (0.126)
Tertiary			-0.151 (0.130)					-0.328* (0.161)
Post-65				-0.101 (0.100)				-0.163 (0.130)
NS					0.178 (0.129)			0.310* (0.157)
HDB						-0.408* (0.167)		-0.482** (0.181)
Inclusive friendship							0.123 (0.128)	0.247 (0.134)
Constant	1.094*** (0.119)	1.657*** (0.222)	1.188*** (0.145)	1.146*** (0.130)	1.060*** (0.121)	1.485*** (0.167)	1.013*** (0.145)	2.135*** (0.303)
-2 Log Likelihood	2289.00	2278.46	2288.41	2288.89	2288.00	2283.90	2288.99	2261.85
Area under ROC curve	0.6179	0.6216	0.6311	0.6261	0.6263	0.6298	0.6248	0.6571

*** p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001**

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

45. For details on *Clarify*, see Footnote 41.

Table D2

Results of logistic regression analysis of civic multiculturalism between Chinese and non-Chinese in 2011

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Chinese	-0.117 (0.113)	-0.339 (0.171)	-0.119 (0.114)	-0.103 (0.114)	-0.111 (0.133)	-0.132 (0.114)	-0.117 (0.113)	-0.314 (0.172)
Religion								
Muslim		-0.296 (0.201)						-0.282 (0.202)
Christian		0.210 (0.128)						0.140 (0.131)
Education								
Secondary			0.353** (0.117)					0.327** (0.122)
Tertiary			0.450** (0.131)					0.328* (0.156)
Post-65				0.153 (0.097)				0.024 (0.112)
NS					0.170 (0.124)			0.063 (0.134)
HDB						-0.338* (0.167)		-0.222 (0.180)
Inclusive friendship							0.020 (0.141)	-0.036 (0.143)
Constant	0.802*** (0.101)	0.980*** (0.164)	0.504*** (0.133)	0.691*** (0.122)	0.769*** (0.103)	1.122*** (0.188)	0.785*** (0.158)	0.927** (0.293)
-2 Log Likelihood Area under ROC curve	2674.75 0.5099	2669.45 0.5276	2661.64 0.5388	2672.27 0.5227	2672.84 0.5175	2670.47 0.5234	2674.73 0.5101	2656.26 0.5568

*** p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001**

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses

About CENS

What is CENS?

The Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS) is a research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Established on 1 April 2006, CENS is devoted to rigorous policy-relevant analysis of a range of national security issues. The CENS team is multinational in composition, comprising both Singaporean and foreign analysts who are specialists in various aspects of national and homeland security affairs.

Why CENS?

In August 2004 the Strategic Framework for National Security outlined the key structures, security measures and capability development programmes that would help Singapore deal with transnational terrorism in the near and long term.

However, strategising national security policies requires greater research and understanding of the evolving security landscape. This is why CENS was established to increase the intellectual capital invested in strategising national security. To this end, CENS works closely with not just other RSIS research programmes, but also national security agencies such as the National Security Coordination Secretariat within the Prime Minister's Office.

What research does CENS do?

CENS aspires to be an international research leader in the multi-disciplinary study of the concept of resilience in all its aspects, and in the policy-relevant application of such research in order to promote security within and beyond Singapore. To this end, CENS conducts research in three main domains:

- *Radicalisation Studies*
  The multi-disciplinary study of the indicators and causes of violent radicalisation, the promotion of community immunity to extremist ideas and best practices in individual rehabilitation.

- *Social Resilience*
  The inter-disciplinary study of the various constitutive elements of social resilience such as multiculturalism, citizenship, immigration and class. The core focus of this programme is understanding how globalised, multicultural societies can withstand and overcome security crises such as diseases and terrorist strikes.

- *Homeland Defence*
  A broad domain researching key nodes of the national security ecosystem. Areas of particular interest include the study of strategic and crisis communication, cyber security and public attitudes to national security issues.

How does CENS help influence National Security Policy?

Through policy-oriented analytical commentaries and other research output directed at the national security policy community in Singapore and beyond, CENS staff members promote greater awareness of emerging threats as well as global best practices in responding to those threats. In addition, CENS organises courses, seminars and workshops for local and foreign national security officials to facilitate networking and exposure to leading-edge thinking on the prevention of, and response to, national and homeland security threats.

How does CENS help raise public awareness of National Security issues?

To educate the wider public, CENS staff members regularly author articles in a number of security and intelligence-related publications, as well as write op-ed analyses in leading newspapers. Radio and television interviews have allowed CENS staff to participate in and shape the public debate on critical issues such as radicalisation and counter-terrorism, multiculturalism and social resilience, as well as crisis and strategic communication.

How does CENS keep abreast of cutting edge National Security research?

The lean organisational structure of CENS permits a constant and regular influx of Visiting Fellows of international calibre through the Distinguished CENS Visitors Programme. This enables CENS to keep abreast of cutting edge global trends in national security research.

About RSIS

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) was established in January 2007 as an autonomous School within the Nanyang Technological University. Known earlier as the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies when it was established in July 1996, RSIS' mission is to be a leading research and graduate teaching institution in strategic and international affairs in the Asia Pacific. To accomplish this mission, it will:

- Provide a rigorous professional graduate education with a strong practical emphasis,
- Conduct policy-relevant research in defence, national security, international relations, strategic studies and diplomacy,
- Foster a global network of like-minded professional schools.

Graduate Education in International Affairs

RSIS offers a challenging graduate education in international affairs, taught by an international faculty of leading thinkers and practitioners. The Master of Science (M.Sc.) degree programmes in Strategic Studies, International Relations and International Political Economy are distinguished by their focus on the Asia Pacific, the professional practice of international affairs, and the cultivation of academic depth. Thus far, students from more than 50 countries have successfully completed one of these programmes. In 2010, a Double Masters Programme with Warwick University was also launched, with students required to spend the first year at Warwick and the second year at RSIS.

A small but select Ph.D. programme caters to advanced students who are supervised by faculty members with matching interests.

Research

Research takes place within RSIS' six components: the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS, 1996), the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR, 2004), the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS, 2006), the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies (Centre for NTS Studies, 2008); the Temasek Foundation Centre for Trade & Negotiations (TFCTN, 2008); and the recently established Centre for Multilateralism Studies (CMS, 2011). The focus of research is on issues relating to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region and their implications for Singapore and other countries in the region.

The school has four professorships that bring distinguished scholars and practitioners to teach and to conduct research at the school. They are the S. Rajaratnam Professorship in Strategic Studies, the Ngee Ann Kongsi Professorship in International Relations, the NTUC Professorship in International Economic Relations and the Bakrie Professorship in Southeast Asia Policy.

International Collaboration

Collaboration with other professional schools of international affairs to form a global network of excellence is a RSIS priority. RSIS maintains links with other like-minded schools so as to enrich its research and teaching activities as well as adopt the best practices of successful schools.

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