

DEFENSE BUDGET & SPENDING:

Alignment & Priorities (Philippine Defense Spending 2001 to 2012)

REVISITING THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT ON PEACE AND SECURITY



PREFACE

The National Security Policy (NSP) clarifies the sphere of the security interests of a state. A sound NSP guides the state and its people in asserting what it *needs* to survive and what it *wants* to achieve to improve its quality of life. In military parlance, it clarifies the *issues to die for* and the *issues to fight for*. The National Security Strategy (NSS) creates the roadmap on how to pursue the NSP. If NSP is the goal, the NSS is the means and approach to achieve it. The NSS guides the operational plan of internal and external defense and security. It is the crucial link that binds the internal and external security agenda; it allows for a seamless transition between internal security and external defense.

The National Security Strategy facilitates a sound external-territorial defense posture and a rational internal security program. It clarifies the *force structure* or the needed strength of both the armed forces for external defense and the civilian police for internal security. A clear security strategy allows the state to rationalize the *capability development as well as the material and weapons support* needed by both the armed forces and the police to be an effective deterrent against external aggressor and an effective civilian security force, respectively. In other words, the budget allocation and security spending can be systematically projected and programmed if there is clarity in security policy and alignment in internal-external security strategy.

This is obviously not the case in the Philippines.

There is weak 'long-term planning ethos' in the national bureaucracy due largely to the system of annual budget planning. Given the fact that appropriations is a yearly event in the Philippines, most of the political leaders are predisposed to think in the short-term rather than strategically. This has an adverse effect on security planning since security planning requires breadth, depth, and along-term view, subjecting it to the annual budget process compromises its strategic character and bars the system from developing a seamless internal-external security arrangement that can traverse the politically-induced yearly log frame. The absence of a clear policy and strategy has plagued the security terrain for quite some time. While (the first ever) NSP was introduced in 2011, there is still no NSS as of this writing. This, we believe, is a concern.

This publication attempts to analyze the scope of the problem of aligning security policy as well as security priorities and spending (using the period 2001 to 2012 as case study). It aims to surface concerns and present policy and program recommendations with the end view of setting the security stage in the right direction. Moreover, the authors believe that an inclusive and in-depth analysis of the security policy terrain can advance a sound and coherent security sector reform agenda.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFPMP	AFP Modernization Program
CAFGU	Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units
CBA-CPLA	Cordillera Bodong Administration - Cordillera People's Liberation Army
CLIP	Comprehensive Local Integration Program
CNN	Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/ National Democratic Front
CO	Capital Outlay
CPLA	Cordillera People's Liberation Army
DBM	Department of Budget Management
DFA	Department of Foreign Affairs
DILG	Department of the Interior and Local Government
DND	Department of National Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DR	Disaster Response
DSOM	Defense System of Management
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
E-NISP	Enhanced National Internal Security Plan
EO	Executive Order
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FPA	Final Peace Agreement
GA	General Arsenal
GAA	General Appropriations Act
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOCC	Government Owned and Controlled Corporation
IACPSP	Integrated Area Community Public Safety Plan
IDSE	International Defense and Security Engagement
IHPO	International Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Operations
IPSP	Internal Peace and Security Plan
ISO	Internal Security Operations
LGU	Local Government Unit

MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOOE	Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
NDCP	National Defense College of the Philippines
NDP	National Defense Plan
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NISP	National Internal Security Plan
NMS	National Military Strategy
NPA	New People's Army
NSC	National Security Council
NSP	National Security Policy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCD	Office of Civil Defense
OFW	Overseas Filipino Worker
OPAPP	Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Oplan	Operation Plan
PA	Philippine Army
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PAMANA	Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan
PAPP	Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
PDP	Philippine Development Plan
PDR	Philippine Defense Reform
PDT	Philippine Defense Transformation
PN	Philippine Navy
PNP	Philippine National Police
PS	Personnel Services
PVAO	Philippine Veterans Affairs Office
RA	Republic Act
RPM-P/RPA/ABB	Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/ Revolutionary Proletarian Army/Alex Boncayao Brigade
TD	Territorial Defense
TOR	Terms of Reference

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National security is a concept that formally entered the state's discourse when the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648—the treaty that ended the 30-years war in Europe, divided the entire globe among the colonizers, and officially introduced the concept of territorial borders. National security henceforth has been equated with protecting the interests of the state and its inhabitants, with the internationally recognized borders as the territorial demarcation. National security is therefore state-focused, with *state survival and sustainability* as its main preoccupation.

State survival and sustainability have in fact caused global-scale wars and inter-state conflicts over generations. National security has been used by governments to justify actions both legal-legitimate¹ and downright illegal or questionable. Territorial claims often boil down to control over resources, all of which are elements of national power.² The conflicts between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and of Israel and Palestine over the control of Jerusalem are examples of long-standing conflicts over territorial claims. The current tension involving several claimant countries in the South China Sea/ West Philippine Sea over the Spratlys Group of Islands is an impending powder keg if a diplomatic and mutually acceptable solution is not forged.

National security framing therefore, is a crucial step in asserting what the state and its people need to endure. This will clarify the interests 'to die for' and the interests 'to fight for.' Issues 'to die for' are those that are required for the people's and/or the state's survival, while issues 'to fight for' are those that would promote the people's quality of life. A clear *national security policy* will guide the state in asserting its claims and in defining the amount of resources and the means needed to push for said claims.

The government is constitutionally mandated to manage the state and attend to the welfare of its people. It is, therefore, its role to elucidate the national security agenda. Ideally, the government is supposed to consult with its people in defining collective national interest, and articulating the same into a *national security policy*. The national policy on security is meant to sum-up the disparate security interests of sectors and groups within the polity and bring these together into a cohesive, holistic, and inclusive framework.

1 Legal actions are those that are constitutionally mandated or are based on laws and jurisprudence. Legitimate acts are those that are considered ethical and acceptable by the people. Legitimate actions are sometimes contrary to laws and constitutions, but are considered 'right' by the population. It is ideal that social-political actions are both legal and legitimate, but this is not always the case.

2 Resources in politics can range from the *tangibles*, i.e., the fruits of the earth that can be used and consumed by the people, and the *intangibles*, i.e. values and stature that are considered important by the polity, e.g. honor, tradition, religious practices, national pride

From the national security policy flows the *national security strategy*. The strategy is meant to operationalize how the policy looks when it is implemented from the national government to the local units (vertical cascading), and from the central government to the different national government agencies (horizontal dissemination). The strategy is supposed to dictate the pace and level of intensity as regards the efforts of government units and social institutions in pursuing the national security policy. In the case of the Philippines, the national security strategy puts flesh to the ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of society’ approach to governance—approaches which are articulated in national policy documents and issuances.

From the national strategy flows the *internal security strategy* and *external defense strategy*. The process is thus inherently deductive and linear. From the general idea of a national strategy, the specifics of internal and external strategies are culled. The internal and external strategies clarify the interventions that need to be done to pursue the specific but complementary security agenda. And from the internal and external strategies, the relevant departments and units can devise their particular plans, all anchored on the over-all national security policy framework, but broken down into doable, implementable pieces. (Please refer to Figure 1)

This is the context and inspiration of this study. It is an attempt to generate a deeper understanding of how the government approaches national security planning and the succeeding strategic processes that necessarily flow from it.

The study argues that having a national security policy is crucial, but equally important is how this policy is pursued and the extent to which the different government agencies (and other social institutions involved) understand, appreciate, and actualize said policy.

The study employs a neo-institutionalist approach.

Briefly, neo-institutionalism believes that structures and agents directly impact on each other.³ *Structures* are created by individuals or groups (also referred herein as *agents*) to satisfy a social-political-economic need at a given time. These structures eventually develop their own rhythm and directly intervene in the behavior or actions of agents. Over time, structures evolve—either based on laws, policies, or on repeated patterns of behavior of people. In other words, structures are created and recreated by people to satisfy a need. (for more on neoinstitutionalism, see Douglas North; James March and Johan Olsen)

In governance, structures are created to standardize actions and to limit the space for possible abuses or excesses of agents. Good governance and institutional deepening, therefore, flourish when formal structures are rooted in people’s needs and widely respected. As creator of structures, agents have the power to intervene and re-orient or even re-create structures as they see fit. This structure-creation can happen abruptly or gradually.

3 On neoinstitutionalism, see Douglas North, James March and Johan Olsen.

This is the frame on which this study stands. It regards the national security policy as an attempt to create a structure to satisfy a need, that is, the need to articulate a national security agenda.

The study attempts to determine the extent to which the National Security Policy (NSP) has been institutionally embedded in government administration and its alignment with other key government policies. Consequently, the study also hopes to determine whether the NSP has been instilled in the understanding and appreciation of officials—and whether or not national agencies have aligned their plans along with this policy. The study believes that alignment of plans is the first step in consolidating and asserting national security interests.

The general intention of the study is to help policy makers to (a) define more clearly national security policies and plans and (b) to help them become more forward looking in regard to security planning.

The study employed documentary research of key national security documents and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with key security agencies, namely the National Security Council (NSC), Department of National Defense (DND), Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). These FGDs were conducted from June to October 2012.

⁴ For the DILG, only an interview with the late Secretary Jesse Robredo was conducted.

All national security policies and programs are anchored on the Constitution and other relevant laws. The 1987 Philippine Constitution lays down the state's policy on national security and oversight mechanisms over the security sector, especially the AFP.⁵ On the other hand, Commonwealth Act No. 1 or the National Defense Act of 1935, outlines the National Defense Policy and provides, among others the structure, membership, and oversight of the military organization.

In July 2011, a 'mother' document of the national security planning process, the National Security Policy (NSP) was issued, outlining the national security goals and objectives. The NSP is a strategic policy document that contains an articulation of national security goals and objectives, an assessment of both the internal and external security environment, and, the overall government policy or direction for the attainment of national security goals and objectives. From this, the National Security Strategy (NSS) is supposed to be drawn.⁶ The NSS identifies the ways and means by which different instruments of national power are to be utilized to attain national security interests and objectives.⁷ Both the NSP and the NSS are issued by the Chief Executive, upon the recommendation of the National Security Council.⁸ As of this writing, however, the NSS has yet to be issued.

Based on the NSP and NSS, what is expected is a clear delineation of roles that further spells out scenario-based strategies, particularly the National Defense Plan (NDP), the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the National Internal Security Plan (NISP).

The NDP articulates the government's plan in managing and responding to external threats as well as mitigating its effects, while the NDS⁹ outlines how government instrumentalities, especially those under the Department of National Defense¹⁰ are to be utilized to achieve the NDP and NSP.

5 Among the relevant provisions is Article II, on the Declaration of Principles and State Policies. Specifically, Section 2 or Article II provides that the state "renounces war as an instrument of national policy". Section 3 decrees the supremacy of civilian authority over the military at all times. The said Section likewise ordains the Armed Forces of the Philippines as the "protector of the people and the State" with the goal of securing the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.

6 Memorandum Order No. 6 dated 21 October 2010 directed the formulation of both the National Security Policy and National Security Strategy for 2010 to 2016.

7 The US Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary) defines National Security Strategy as "a document approved by the President (of the United States) for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve objectives that contribute to national security."

8 Memorandum Order No. 6 tasked the National Security Adviser/National Security Council-Director General to spearhead the formulation of the National Security Policy and National Security Strategy.

9 US DOD Dictionary defines the National Defense Strategy as a document approved by the Secretary of Defense for applying the Armed Forces (of the United States) in coordination with Department of Defense agencies and other instruments of national power.

10 In the Philippines, the Department of National Defense has the following attached bureaus: the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Defense College of the Philippines, the Government Arsenal, the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, and the Office of Civil Defense.

The NISP, meanwhile, is supposed to outline the government’s overall plan in addressing challenges to internal peace and security.¹¹ From these two documents—the National Defense Plan, and the National Internal Security Plan—the different government agencies are to draw their respective plans on how to perform the roles assigned to them.

In the case of the military institution, it crafts its National Military Strategy (NMS) based on the aforementioned national security policies. The NMS provides the strategic direction of the military. Following the NSS, the NMS serves as a guide for the application of the country’s military power towards the attainment of national goals and objectives.¹² Based on the NMS, the military comes up with its own scenario-based plans: the Unilateral Defense Plan (for ensuring external security) and its internal security campaign plan¹³. This process is illustrated below.



Figure 1. National Security Planning Process (Simplified)

The national security planning process is clearly and unequivocally linear and sequential. It follows a deductive process where one policy is anchored on another. One needs to craft a National Security Policy first before crafting the strategy on how to attain national security goals and objectives (the NSS). Likewise, the military’s plans, given that the military institution is an instrument of national policy, need to be anchored on the plans of the DND, and ultimately, on the NSP and NSS. This process of deduction ensures the alignment of policies. Alignment of policies is crucial especially in the context of reforming the security sector as it ensures synergy in the planning processes of all government agencies, guides the security forces or the instruments of policy (AFP and PNP) in developing the over-all strategy to address internal and external security concerns, and, informs the security planning process on the force structure, equipment, budget, best organizational set-up, and, oversight mechanisms necessary to uphold the security policy and strategy of the state.

11 The National Internal Security Plan (NISP) and later the Enhanced NISP (E-NISP) were issued during the term of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 2001 and 2007, respectively, laying down the government’s counter-insurgency strategy.

12 The US DOD Dictionary defines National Military Strategy as “a document approved by the Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy and national defense strategy objectives.”

13 The current internal security campaign plan of the Philippine military is the Internal Peace and Security Plan *Bayanihan*

Given the absence of a National Security Strategy, the security planning process in the Philippines is evidently challenging. A National Security Policy was issued for the first time in July 2011. The succeeding processes, as illustrated in Figure 1 remain absent. It is a matter of debate whether the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR)¹⁴ and Philippine Defense Transformation (PDT),¹⁵ issued on 2004 and 2012, respectively, may suffice as the National Defense Strategy. This paper's position, however, is that while PDR and PDT can be considered as important components of a National Defense Strategy, they still cannot suffice as a national strategy given that the two policies are focused on developing the DND's capabilities rather than providing the strategy for employing government instrumentalities, especially those under the DND in achieving national security objectives.

As for the military institution, a National Military Strategy was crafted in 2002 but has not been revised since. Ironically, it is the military—instead of the DND—that regularly updates and crafts its scenario-based plans for internal security.¹⁶ Ironical since the military is an instrument of policy, and the DND and the national government are the policy-makers. Logically, plans and policies crafted by the AFP should emanate from the DND and national government based on its reading of the security situation and the appropriate response needed from the government. The military's plans should simply be aligned with them. The reality however is that the 'higher policies' remain stagnant, sometimes even absent, requiring the military to use its own security assessment as the only basis of its plans.

What is even more irregular in the security planning process of the current Aquino administration is the fact that the military came up with its campaign plan a few months earlier than the National Security Policy. The Armed Forces of the Philippines' scenario-based campaign plan, dubbed the Internal Peace and Security Plan *Bayanihan* (AFP IPSP *Bayanihan*) was launched on December 21, 2010, and took effect on January 1, 2011. An even greater anomaly is the fact that under the present administration, the military—the unit that is supposed to handle external security affairs—has dipped not only a finger but its whole arm in internal security. (This development is further explained and elaborated below.) Note that while IPSP is a military plan, it invites other civilian government agencies to participate, invoking the principle of a 'whole of government approach.' This gives the implied message that the IPSP is the government's internal security plan, which obviously is not. In the absence, however, of a clear and articulated national internal security plan, the AFP's IPSP is misconstrued as such.

14 The Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) is a result of the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA), a review of Philippine defense capabilities. Concluded in 2003, the JDA identified 65 key and 207 ancillary areas of concern and rated the AFP as 'Partially Mission Capable.' The PDR was then crafted to address these JDA-identified deficiencies. For more on the PDR, visit <http://www.dnd.gov.ph/pdr-web/index.html>

15 The PDT is a White Paper entitled "Transforming the Department of National Defense to Effectively Meet the Defense and Security Challenges of the 21st Century." The PDT envisions a 'Fully Mission Capable' DND by 2028.

16 Over the years, the military has crafted various internal security operational plans, i.e. OPLAN Katatagan under the Martial Law, OPLAN Mamamayan under the Corazon Aquino administration, OPLAN Lambat Bitag in 1998, ISO Plan Makabayan in 1999, Campaign Plan Balangai in 2000, OPLAN Bantay Laya 1 and 2 under the Arroyo Administration, and the current Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan under the Benigno Aquino administration.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE 2011 NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

The series of coup d'état launched against the Cory Aquino government (1986-1992) culminated in the bloodiest and most serious attempt dubbed as the 'God Save the Queen' putsch. This particular coup attempt prompted the creation of the Davide Commission in December 1989, mandated to investigate and determine the culpability of those involved, and determine as well as the root causes of dissent in the military.¹⁷ The Commission's report presented issues within the military system and identified measures to professionalize the military and shield it from partisan politics.

Reforms were subsequently introduced using the Davide Report as basis. Despite the reform efforts, however, another coup attempt happened in 2001. Another commission was created to investigate this event—the Feliciano Commission of 2003. The Feliciano Commission looked at the extent of reforms done in the AFP based on the Davide Commission's recommendations¹⁸. It also investigated the continued political involvement of military officers despite efforts to depoliticize the military's ranks.

Apparently, a major factor why the discontent persisted was the failure of the government to fully implement the recommendations of the Davide Commission.

At the level of policy, the AFP Modernization Program or Republic Act (RA) 7898 was approved into law in 1995. It was meant to upgrade the capacity of the AFP to "uphold the sovereignty and preserve the patrimony of the Republic of the Philippines." RA 7898 is the continuation of the narrative started by the passage of Republic Act 6975 in 1990 which created the Philippine National Police (PNP).

RA 6975 or the PNP law clearly recognized that internal security is the turf of the police, while the military's turf is external security. RA 6975 and RA 7898, therefore, were meant to rectify the decades-long misalignment of roles and functions of the police and the military.

17 It was headed by then Commission on Election (COMELEC) Chairman Hilario Davide; hence the name 'Davide Commission'.

18 The recommendations of the Davide Commission were divided into three parts: damage control or short-term prescriptions, agenda for the remaining term of the Cory Aquino administration, and over the long-term. Among the short-term recommendations was administering a justice and rehabilitation program to military participants in coups; among the agenda for the rest of the Cory administration was the establishment of a special full-time commission to implement a post-insurgency program for the military that will modernize, professionalize, and bring it within the mainstream of national life; and, among the long-term recommendations was the full implementation of the citizen army concept and the designated role of a small, modernized, and professional military in a democratic society.

In RA 6975, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the PNP are mandated to handle internal security threats, removing the AFP from the *internal security* equation—at least in most areas of the country, especially in Luzon and Visayas.¹⁹ Prior to the passing of the PNP law, and during the entire 20 years of the Marcos dictatorship, the AFP was mandated by the political leadership to take charge of handling internal security operations (ISO). As an instrument of the state, it had to abide by the dictates of the political leadership. In other words, whatever actions the military does is and will always be under the command of the political leadership.

The decision to remove the ISO task from the AFP was prompted by the reported decrease in number of the New People's Army (NPA)—the armed component of the Communist Party of the Philippines—from 25,200 in 1987 to 11,920 in 1992 to 6,020 in 1995.²⁰

Freed from internal security operations (ISO), the AFP Modernization Act of 1995 attempted to imagine a strengthened AFP that was in a better position to manage external security or territorial defense, conduct disaster response, assist in the fulfilment of the government's international commitments, assist the PNP in law enforcement and internal security operations, and support national development.

In 1998, however, there was a reported increase in the number of NPAs—from 6,020 in 1995 to 8,950 in 1998²¹. Hence, Republic Act 8551 was passed into law, returning the ISO task to the AFP. Political leaders believed that the police was not yet fully capable to take care of internal security operations, and the military was again required to be in the front line of operations against the rebels. In other words, this decision was prompted primarily by the developments in the number of NPAs. It should be noted, though that in 1996, the administration of President Ramos had successfully forged the Final Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), thereby significantly reducing the threats posed by the erstwhile rebel group. Moreover, the number of NPAs, in fact, continued to rise, the number reported to be 12,000 in 2001.²² This gives credence to the assertion by some that politics and rivalry between the AFP and PNP are the reasons why ISO was transferred back to the AFP.²³

Republic Act 8551, Sec 12: ... The Department of the Interior and Local Government shall be relieved of the primary responsibility on matters involving the suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security. The Philippine National Police shall, through information gathering and performance of its ordinary

19 Internal security in most of Mindanao was still left under the purview of the AFP.

20 Quilop, Raymond et al. 2007. "Putting an end to Insurgency: An Assessment of the AFP's Internal Security Operations." Office of the Strategic and Special Studies Armed Forces of the Philippines. Quezon City: Cleofe Prints, pp 9-10.

21 Suerte, Lysander. 2010. "Philippines 2010 and Beyond: The Need for Institutional Peace Building." Center for Defense and Strategic Studies, Australian Defense College.

22 Suerte, 2010.

23 In a validation conference, it was raised by former DILG Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III that another side of the story points to politics and rivalry between the AFP and PNP as the main reason why ISO was transferred back to the AFP.

police functions support the Armed Forces of the Philippines on matters involving suppression of insurgency; except in cases where the President shall call on the PNP to support the AFP in combat operations.

The shift in focus caused by RA 8551 consequently refocused the priorities of the military institution in as far as modernization/ capability upgrade was concerned.

In 2007, “the government practically acknowledged that the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP) is still where it was 10 years ago—in square one...As of 2005, the total amount of money that had gone into the program stood at P11.8 billion...”²⁴ Unfortunately, “the modernization program, whose core component is capability, materiel and technology development, has turned into one of repair and refurbishment, with a huge chunk of the funds being spent on regular items like office supplies.”²⁵ To a large extent, this shift in spending was influenced by the turn of events in as far as the ISO task was concerned.

In 2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 21 to implement the National Internal Security Plan (NISP). The NISP was an attempt to put a cohesive policy agenda on counterinsurgency. The NISP document offers cogent arguments for stakeholders’ engagement in addressing security issues, both in the local and national level. This was dubbed as a ‘holistic approach’ to addressing security concerns.

*“(t)he NISP focuses on four areas or ‘lines of operations’: political/legal/diplomatic, socio-economic/ psychosocial, peace and order/ security, and information. The NISP mandates close coordination and integration of all government agencies at local and national levels, including partnership with non-government organisations.”*²⁶

Based on the NISP, the military’s *OPLAN Bantay Laya* (Operation Plan Freedom Watch) was crafted. But even prior to formulation of the NISP, the ‘holistic approach’ was already contained in the *OPLAN Lambat Bitag* (Operation Plan Net-Trap) in 1988.²⁷ While the NISP clearly articulates the holistic and multi-stakeholders’ approach, what caught the attention of civil society was the ‘counterinsurgency’ agenda of the plan.

In 2004, within the framework of counter-insurgency, the Enhanced National Internal Security Plan (E-NISP) was issued. The plan that was supposed to guide the entire government’s efforts for internal security until 2010. It should be

24 Chua, Yvonne and Rimban, Luz. 2007. “Special Report: Program Setbacks AFP modernization drive sputters.” Philippine Daily Inquirer, January 08. Available online. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20070108-42164/AFP_modernization_drive_sputters accessed May 13, 2011, cited in Oreta, Jennifer Santiago. 2012. “Democratizing the Philippine Military: Challenges and Paradoxes.” in Transformation : A Security Sector Reform Reader. Philippines: INCITEGov. p. 259

25 Chua and Rimban, 2007.

26 Suerte, 2010

27 Suerte, 2010

noted that the NISP (2001-2004) and E-NISP (2004-2010) were not anchored on a National Security Policy or a National Security Strategy. Nonetheless, there seemed to be no urgent need for such policy documents at that time as the NISP clearly defined the roles of relevant government agencies. The AFP's Operation Plans *Bantay Laya 1* and 2, which were the AFP's plans in operationalizing their role under NISP and E-NISP, were vilified by civil society for giving too much emphasis on 'defeating the enemy.'

Upon the assumption of President Benigno Simeon Aquino III, two key interrelated Presidential Directives were issued. On 02 September 2010, Memorandum Circular No. 3 was issued directing the National Economic and Development Authority to coordinate the formulation of the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan and the Medium-Term Public Investment Program for 2010-2016. A month after, on 21 October 2010, Memorandum Order No. 6 was issued, directing the National Security Adviser/National Security Council-Director General to spearhead the formulation of the National Security Policy and the National Security Strategy. Thus, the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016 and the National Security Policy 2011-2016 were released in May and July 2011, respectively. (The crucial connections between these two policies are discussed in the succeeding section.)

Since the AFP's campaign plan *Bantay Laya 2* ended in June of 2010, the AFP needed a new plan for its internal security operations.²⁸ An interim plan extending *Bantay Laya 2* until December 2010 was employed while the AFP undertook the process of crafting a new one. In the absence of a National Security Policy in June of 2010 when the AFP started its planning process, the AFP anchored its plan on the President's campaign agenda on national security as declared in his Inaugural Address and the Department of National Defense Policy Paper. The AFP released its Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) *Bayanihan* on 21 December 2010.

A look at the three documents (PDP, NSP, IPSP-*Bayanihan*) would show that the IPSP *Bayanihan* largely informed the crafting of the PDP and NSP, deviating from the ideal national security planning process. It has to be clarified, however, that the timing of the release of these documents, especially the NSP and the IPSP, was of no fault of any organization but a function of circumstances. The Memorandum Order for NSP, after all, was issued only in October 2010 during which time the AFP was already in the thick of crafting IPSP *Bayanihan*.

28 Note that as a military institution, and as an instrument of national policy, the AFP could not operate without a plan

THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 2011-2016 & THE PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2011-2016

The National Security Policy (NSP) clearly articulates that it is a companion document of the Philippine Development Plan (PDP). Hence, the two overarching policies of the Aquino Administration must be viewed together. The alignment of these two policies must be examined as well as issues of divergence and operationalization clarified.

The PDP lays down the overarching development strategy of the Philippines from 2011 to 2016. It envisions inclusive growth or growth that is shared by all. It is anchored on the President's 16-Point 'Social Contract with the Filipino People' and is guided by the overarching themes of good governance and anti-corruption. On the other hand, the National Security Policy intends to "create an enabling environment conducive for the successful implementation of the PDP." It contains a statement of principles that sets the strategic policy goals and objectives of the administration "to attain the condition where the national interests of the Philippines, the well-being of its people and institutions and its sovereignty and territorial integrity are protected and enhanced."

The PDP innately uses a development lens while the NSP uses a security lens. This is manifested in the articulated purposes of the two documents. The PDP's agenda/purpose is to ensure high and sustained economic growth that provides productive and decent employment opportunities, equal access to development opportunities thereby reducing poverty and to implement effective and responsive social safety nets to assist those who will not be able to catch up with rapid economic growth. For the NSP, its purpose is to "identify the strategic priorities to establish the correct balance in the 'guns or butter' debate for the allocation of scarce resources; and to establish the prioritization, among others, between internal and external defense." While there is recognition of symbiosis in terms of the relationship between development and security [NSP asserts that it is a companion document of PDP], what is lacking in these two documents is a clear nexus that locates the convergence of development and security plans. What seemingly appears in both documents is the *exclusivity of frames* that subsumes the other rather than *converging frames* that show the complementarity or the coming together of the development and security agenda. [This paper argues that these *converging frames* and can perhaps be addressed by a national security strategy. The NSS, in other words, can satisfy the seeming gap between these two documents.]

The framing used in the documents affects how each would regard 'concerns' as well as issues of security and development.

There are 10 areas of concern under the Philippine Development Plan, as outlined in its various chapters. These are 1) inclusive growth, 2) macroeconomic policy, 3) competitive industry and services systems, 4) competitive and sustainable agriculture and fisheries sector, 5) accelerating infrastructure and development, 6) towards a dynamic and resilient financial sector, 7) good governance and the

rule of law, 8) social development, 9) peace and security, and 10) conservation, protection and rehabilitation of the environment and natural resources towards sustainable development.

On the other hand, the fundamental mandate of the NSP is to serve the national interests of the Philippines, focusing on 4 key areas: governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction and sustainable development, and security sector reform. National Security, as a concept, has 7 components/ areas: 1) socio-political stability, 2) territorial integrity, 3) economic solidarity, 4) ecological balance, 5) cultural cohesiveness, 6) moral-spiritual consensus and 7) peace and harmony. The NSP further identified 13 strategic concerns. In the external environment, the concerns include global and regional geopolitical issues, overlapping territorial and maritime claims and other regional concerns, regional military build-up of weapons of mass destruction. Concerns affecting the internal environment are internal armed conflicts, terrorism, and weak institutions. Other strategic issues identified were overseas Filipino migrants and workers, transnational crimes, climate change and global warming, environmental degradation, disasters and crises, health concerns, and resource issues.

The PDP subsumes security under development, while in the NSP, aspects of nationhood, including economic solidarity all fall under the all-encompassing terrain of national security. The NSP embraces the principles of comprehensive security and human security, where security is not just focused on violent and armed conflict but on all aspects of the well-being of the state and its citizens. Thus, a wider security lens is used by the NSP.

A key concern about the NSP is the very process of its crafting. As discussed earlier in this paper, national security interest must be based on broad-based consultation with as many groups and sectors as possible. The consultative character is crucial in defining the national security interests since this is where national security policy is anchored on.

In the discussion with some members of the National Security Council (NSC), the institution in-charge of crafting the NSP, it was revealed that the consultation process was only able to involve mostly government employees because of time and resource constraints and pressure to immediately complete the document. This is most unfortunate since members of the bureaucracy obviously cannot fully represent the interests and desires of the diverse groups of peoples comprising the state.

This lack of representative-ness appears in the language of the text. For instance, listed as one of the seven component areas of national security is 'cultural cohesiveness,' a seeming insensitivity to the reality that the country is composed of ethno-national groups with distinct cultures and traditions, and hence, cultural *inclusivity* rather than *cohesiveness* would have been the more politically correct term. Such case, while seemingly trifle, has far-reaching implications considering that it is contained and asserted in the National Security Policy.

Alignment and Incongruence

Further analyzing the two documents, points of convergence and incongruence can be drawn. Convergence is most apparent in the symbiotic relationship between peace and security and development. The end-goal of the NSP is to provide the environment conducive to development. In the same light, the complementary track towards peace and security, as outlined in the PDP, underscores the need for social and development programs in support of peace efforts. In both documents, there is acknowledgement of the need to address the root causes of conflict rather than simply putting an end to conflict (which in the past was translated to counter-insurgency measures). Furthermore, there is a recognition that peace and security efforts and development efforts must build upon each other's gains.

Other key convergence points are on reforms and the peace process. In both documents, emphasis is given to the need for institutional strengthening. Both avow that reforms have to be done in the entire government bureaucracy including the security sector. The two documents are also aligned in terms of recognizing the peace process as the centerpiece of the government's peace and security agenda. Yet there are also perceptible differences: the PDP includes all peace tables (i.e. the peace process with the MILF, the NDF, and the closure agreements with the CPLA, RPA-ABB, MNLF) while the NSP only focuses on the "peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army/National Democratic Front (CNN)."

The two policies diverge in their differing definitions of "security." By virtue of the lenses used by the two policies, the NSP embraces a more comprehensive definition of security while the PDP looks at it in a more limited sense, focusing on ongoing or potential (internal) armed threats. The definition of security used has implications on the definition of *threats* to security. Naturally, a wider security lens sees more threats to security while a narrower lens identifies lesser threats.

The definition of threats has further implications on the identification of approaches and actors in addressing these threats. The approaches to security espoused in the two documents differ though not necessarily oppose each other. The PDP calls for a *Whole-of-Nation Approach*, similar with the AFP's IPSP *Bayanihan*, while the NSP focuses on government institutions (whole of government approach), particularly on the security sector. It is quite ironic that when it comes to the *approach to security*, the NSP is seemingly myopic despite the wider security lens it uses, while the PDP becomes more comprehensive and inclusive despite the limited security lens it has.

Furthermore, the approach to security informs who the actors should be, specifically in the delineation of roles and accountability. It is therefore unclear whether security concerns, under the NSP, should be the concern of the security sector agencies alone, or, under the PDP, should be addressed by the whole nation, including private stakeholders.

CHALLENGES TO TRANSLATING POLICIES TO ACTION

There are also several other challenges to ensuring that these policies, and their relationship as companion documents, translate into action.

Foremost among these challenges is the absence of a clear articulation of national interests. Without defined national interests, the process of prioritization among all the different concerns, security-related or otherwise, including in terms of budgetary allocation, cannot be undertaken. This is manifested in the NSP, which states that ‘butter’ should prevail over ‘guns’²⁹ at all times. While the rhetoric is clear, the document fails to clarify which should be done and addressed immediately. As the adage goes, there is a need to identify what concerns people are willing to ‘fight for’ and what issues are people willing to ‘die for’.

It must also be raised that the changing security environment calls for a re-examination of the PDP and the NSP. If the centerpiece of the government’s peace and security agenda is the *peace process*, and given the positive developments in the different peace tables—the Closure Agreements with the CBA-CPLA and the RPMP/RPA/ABB, the Implementation of the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) between the GPH and the MNLF, and the Framework Agreement between the GPH and the MILF—policies must be examined to determine whether there is a need to recalibrate national policies (i.e., the NSP and PDP). The developments in the peace tables require a plan on how government can harness its resources in the implementation of these agreements. Similarly, the increasing concern over territorial disputes in the West Philippine Sea signal a re-examination on how best to handle internal and external security demands.

An additional challenge is the fact that while the two policies are clear on the direction that each seek to take and what has to be achieved, their specifics—the ‘hows’—are ambiguous. The NSP and the PDP both lay down the “ends” (goals), while the “ways and means” (strategy) for achieving these ends are not articulated. Ideally, the ‘ways and means’ are to be articulated in a National Security Strategy (NSS).³⁰

Having an NSS could address another challenge, which is to clearly locate the nexus of development and security in national plans. If the NSP is the companion document of the PDP, then development planning should also refer to the NSP, and vice versa. However, this does not seem to be apparent.

29 ‘Butter’ and ‘guns’ represent the diverging set of priorities. ‘Butter’ is the metaphor used to describe the social and developmental services, while ‘guns’ represent the militaristic/ security-centered focus.

30 Recall that with the NISP there was no urgent need for an NSS as the NISP already clearly defines the approaches to take and the roles of the different government agencies. These, however, are absent in the NSP and the PDP, thus underscoring the need for an NSS.

There is also a need to align social and development programs with peace and security efforts.

Said alignment may also redound to the translation of policy down to the level of Local Government Units. To date, the Local Development Council is separate from the Local Peace and Order Council. Under the Local Government Code, the Local Chief Executive heads the two special bodies. In practice, however, not all Local Chief Executives convene the two special bodies regularly; much less ensure that the plans and programs of the two bodies are aligned. The Integrated Area Community Public Safety Plan (IACPSP) is a mechanism that attempts to bring together development and security concerns. In some LGUs, however, the crafting of the IACPSP is too dependent on the inputs of security forces, specifically the PNP and the AFP, and participation of civilian government and civil society in the planning process is minimal.

The AFP's IPSP attempts to define the appropriate and context-based approach, as well as identify the actors who should play a role to ensure internal security. The IPSP, however, is a plan of the military, an institution that is simply an instrument of national policy and *not* a policy-making agency. Moreover, the AFP is only one of the actors in the whole-of-nation approach to national security. While the IPSP is clearly the AFP's contribution to ensuring national security, there is a need for other actors to craft plans of their own and ensure that these plans are aligned with both the PDP and NSP.

Given the supposed overarching character of the PDP and NSP, it is logical to assume that key government agencies should align their plans and goals with these two documents. This was the context of the focus -group discussions (FGDs) held in the course of this study. The FGDs tried to ascertain if, despite the absence of an NSS, key government agencies involved in promoting/ensuring national security have align themselves with the direction of the NSP and PDP.

SYNERGY OR DISPARITY? KEY FINDINGS OF FGDs WITH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The key government institutions involved in the FGDs were the DND, DILG, DFA, DOJ, DSWD, OPAPP, AFP and PNP. Below are the overall findings.

A key finding is that there is no incongruence in the basic principles governing the plans and programs of the different government agencies and the NSP and PDP. All policies, plans and programs of the Aquino administration are anchored on the President's Inaugural Address and his Social Contract with the Filipino People. Differences emerge in the process of implementation.

During the FGDs, the agencies were asked *"which document should prevail if there is divergence between the NSP and PDP?"* A common answer was that the Philippine Development Plan must prevail over the NSP. Interestingly, this answer was given even without distinguishing whether the matter was primarily a security or developmental concern. It is thus apparent that the PDP is more ingrained in the consciousness of national government agencies while the NSP is still in their peripheral vision.

A possible explanation for this is that the PDP is more embedded in the national planning process. It has been common practice that the crafting process automatically starts upon the assumption of a new administration. Resource requirements are already in place and there are existing mechanisms that ensure vertical and horizontal consultations. The government agencies thus are more 'used' to the PDP. Furthermore, between the PDP and the NSP, the PDP has clearer implications on the budget of each government agency so understandably more attention is given to it. During the 2013 *budget call* or the National Budget Memorandum No. 112 issued on December 29, 2011, for example, the various government agencies are instructed to take the PDP into consideration in the crafting of their plans. The budget process, however, is silent on the relevance of the NSP.

This may be due in part to the reality that it is the first time in Philippine history that a National Security Policy has been issued. There is thus no built in process yet and no institutionalized mechanism or template that the National Security Adviser and the National Security Council can immediately activate upon the assumption of a new President. The process of crafting is still in a continued stage of refinement and budgetary support does not necessarily follow immediately. It has to be further noted that the Memorandum Order for the crafting of an NSP and NSS came after the Memorandum Circular for the crafting of the PDP and Public Investment Program (PIP). The National Security Council, therefore, has to do advocacy work, to ensure that other government agencies are aware of the existence of an NSP.

Nonetheless, the fact remains that the NSP exists. All government agencies must be cognizant of it and must take the NSP into consideration in the crafting of their plans and programs. This raises the question of whether all national government agencies have their respective security agenda aligned with the NSP. Sections 4 and 5 of Memorandum Order No. 6 clearly articulates that all government departments, agencies and government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) shall consider the NSP and NSS in their respective plans and programs with national security dimension and that they should henceforth formulate and link their respective security-related programs closely with their development plans. Not all Departments, however, have an articulated security agenda. Although security may be included in their respective mandates/terms of reference (TOR), in practice, this becomes a secondary concern. For instance, there is not much articulation from DFA on its role in defense cooperation or as the first line of defense of the country. This may be borne out of the multitude of concerns already in the Department's plate, coupled with the overwhelming demand of OFWs in posts abroad. Similarly, for the DSWD, security is viewed as the concern of security providing institutions, specifically the DND, DILG, AFP and PNP, and it doesn't clearly locate itself as a participant in ensuring 'security.'

Each government agency/institution may also be accustomed to operating according to its primary mandate from which priority programs are identified. When government agencies are asked to consider another policy document in the crafting of their plans, a subtle power play ensues. Government agencies not traditionally involved in peace and security may not be too open to inserting peace and security-related activities in their plans. A case in point would be the Local Government Units (LGUs). Not all LGUs are willing to take the lead role in ensuring peace and security in their areas of jurisdiction.

Even those readily amenable to being involved in peace and security need to be 're-framed'. Each government agency brings with it its own perspective. For instance, the DND and the AFP hold a security frame, OPAPP a peace and conflict frame, DOJ a criminal justice frame, PNP a law enforcement frame, DSWD a social protection frame, and so on. The challenge therefore is to bring all these lenses together in coming up with a comprehensive and clearer 'big picture' in translating the nexus between development and security into practice.

In addition, each government agency 'lobbies' both inside and outside the government for the prioritization of their flagship programs, especially in terms of resource allocation.

All these can be addressed with a clear articulation of the 'ways and means' in the implementation of national policies and prioritization. In the absence of a national security strategy (NSS) this study looked at existing mechanisms that may bring together all of these programs and priorities.

MECHANISMS FOR DIRECTION, COORDINATION, ALIGNMENT AND ORCHESTRATION

Inter-agency Committees

There are a multitude of inter-agency committees being convened in the government bureaucracy. This mechanism is simple and allows for quick coordination and alignment. These committees, however, are convened on a per issue basis and are therefore *ad hoc*. Moreover, there is a need for clearer direction-setting and convergence among these inter-agency committees. These inter-agency committees, therefore, are not sufficient to ensure that the PDP and NSP, and their attendant relationship, are translated to practice.

Cabinet Cluster on Security, Justice and Peace

Executive Order No. 43, s. 2011 thematically re-organized the cabinet clusters. One of the resultant five (5) clusters is the Cabinet Cluster on Security, Justice and Peace. Its goals are 1) protecting our national territory and boundaries, 2) attaining a just and lasting peace, 3) ensuring the welfare of the Overseas Filipino Workers, 4) strengthening the rule of law, 5) institutionalizing the efficient and impartial justice system that delivers equal justice to the rich and the poor; and 6) advancing and protecting human rights. Its specific functions are to ensure the preservation of national sovereignty and the rule of law and to focus on the protection and promotion of human rights and the pursuit of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace. It is chaired by the Executive Secretary with the Secretaries of the DILG, DFA, DND, DOJ, the National Security Adviser and PAPP as members. The NSC acts as secretariat.

Theoretically, based on Section 4 (Functions) of EO No. 43, the Cabinet Cluster can be used as the mechanism to clearly define the roles of the various government agencies in ensuring peace and security, orchestrate and coordinate all government efforts, issue strategies for bringing together all stakeholders including non-government stakeholders, assess the situation, and, develop monitoring and evaluation metrics. Not all concerned government agencies, however, are members of the Cabinet Cluster on Security, Justice and Peace. For instance, the DSWD which implements PAMANA³¹ projects is not a member of the Cluster. This therefore puts into question how the Whole-of-Nation approach espoused in the PDP can be put into practice through the Cabinet Cluster on Security. The Cluster on Security, Justice and Peace is not the only Cabinet Cluster. There are four (4) other clusters³² and the Cabinet Cluster may not have the authority to oversee and orchestrate the implementation of projects by non-member departments and agencies, even in matters related to national security. In its current form, therefore, perhaps

31 PAMANA or Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan (Peaceful and Resilient Communities) is the government development program for conflict affected areas.

32 The four (4) other cabinet clusters are Good Governance and Anti-Corruption, Human Development and Poverty Reduction, Economic Development, and Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation.

the Cabinet Cluster is not the most appropriate mechanism to fill the absence of a NSS.

National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) was created on July 1, 1950 by virtue of Executive Order (EO) No. 330. EO No. 115 dated December 24, 1986 reorganized the NSC and defined its membership, functions and authority. As specifically stated therein, “the NSC shall be the lead agency of the government for coordinating the formulation of policies, relating to or with implications on national security.”³³

Section 8 of EO 115 lists the following duties of the NSC, in addition to such specific duties and responsibilities as the President may direct:

1. *to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, military, political, economic, social, and educational policies relating to the national security so as to enable all concerned ministries, departments, and agencies of the government to meet more effectively, problems and matters involving the national security;*
2. *to evaluate and analyze all informations, events, and incidents in terms of the risks they pose or implications upon and/or threats to the overall security and stability of the nation, for the purpose of recommending to the President appropriate responses thereto and/or action thereon;*
3. *to formulate and coordinate the implementation of policies on matters of common interest to the various ministries, departments, and agencies of the government concerned with the national security, and to make recommendations to the President in connection therewith;*
4. *to insure that policies adopted by the NSC on national security are effectively and efficiently implemented;*
5. *to make such recommendations and/or render such other reports as the President may from time to time direct.*

To date, no amendment to the NSC’s mandate and functions has been made. What has been amended rather is the composition of the NSC. On September 17, 2001, the membership of the NSC was reconstituted under Executive Order No. 34. The NSC is now composed of the (a) President as Chairperson, (b) the Vice-President, (c) Senate President, (d) Speaker of the House of

³³ Under EO 115, its members are the President, the Vice-President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Executive Secretary, Minister of National Defense, the Minister Justice, the Minister of Labor and Employment, the Minister of Local Government, the National Security Director, the Chief of Staff of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines, and such other government officials and private citizens as the President may designate from time to time. It shall have an Executive Committee composed of the President, the Vice-President and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Executive Secretary, the Minister of National Defense, the National Security Director, the Chief of Staff of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other members or advisers as the President may designate from time to time.

Representatives, (e) Senate President Pro-Tempore, (f) Deputy Speakers for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, (g) Majority Floor Leader of the Senate, (h) Majority Floor Leader of the House, (i) Minority Floor Leader of the Senate, (j) Minority Floor Leader of the House, (k) Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, (l) Chairperson of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, (m) Chairperson of the Senate Committee on Public Order and Illegal Drugs, (n) Chairperson of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, (o) Chairperson of the House Committee on National Defense, (p) Chairperson of the House Committee on Public Order and Security, (q) Executive Secretary, (r) National Security Adviser, (s) Secretary of Foreign Affairs, (t) Secretary of Justice, (u) Secretary of National Defense, (v) Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, (w) Secretary of Labor and Employment, (x) Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, (y) Presidential Spokesperson, (z) Head, Presidential Legislative Liaison Office, and (aa) Past Presidents of the Philippines. This membership remains in effect. Moreover, from time to time, the President may appoint or designate other government officials and private citizens as members of the NSC.

EO 34 also reconstituted the Executive Committee of the NSC to be composed of the (a) President as Chairperson, (b) the Vice-President, (c) Senate President or his representative, (d) Speaker of the House of Representatives or his representative, (e) Executive Secretary, (f) National Security Adviser, (g) Secretary of Foreign Affairs, (h) Secretary of Justice, (i) Secretary of National Defense, and (j) Secretary of the Interior and Local Government. Similar to the NSC-proper, the President may also designate other members or advisers from time to time. The Executive Committee was tasked to “review national issues and concerns and formulate positions or solutions for consideration by the NSC. It shall determine the agenda and order of business of the NSC, and shall ensure that decisions of the NSC are clearly communicated to agencies concerned. It shall advise the President on the implementation of decisions.”³⁴

Given all these, the NSC can be considered as the best existing mechanism to address the issues of disparity between the NSP and PDP as well as the implementation of the NSP as a companion document to the PDP. The NSC is given both the mandate to formulate and recommend policies to the President, advise the President as to the alignment of plans and programs of relevant government agencies that affect national security, and monitor the implementation of national security plans by the different government agencies concerned. Moreover, it is more representative than the first two mechanisms studied (Inter-agency Committees and the Cabinet Cluster on Peace, Justice and Security)—with members of the legislative branch of government included in the NSC. This theoretically ensures broader representation.

34 Note the distinction between the National Security Council (NSC) as an executive inter-agency body, and the NSC as the office that functions as secretariat to the NSC – inter-agency body. The NSC-office/secretariat is headed by the National Security Adviser (NSA), while the NSC-interagency is headed by the President.

The Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), however, is not a member of the NSC. This could pose a problem in the current administration's strategic policies since the peace process is the centerpiece of the government's peace and security agenda.³⁵

Another issue is that none of the Executive Orders defining the NSC's mandate, membership and functions specify or require regular meetings for the NSC. The utilization of the NSC as a mechanism for policy-making and coordination thus becomes ad hoc—upon the pleasure of the President. At present, the NSC can be considered under-utilized. The FGD with members of the NSC Secretariat revealed that the NSC has yet to be formally convened by the current administration.³⁶

35 This paper concedes, nonetheless, that the President may easily designate the PAPP as a member of both the NSC-Proper and its Executive Committee.

36 It must be noted that it was the National Security Adviser, and not the NSC as a whole, that was tasked to lead the formulation of the National Security Policy and the National Security Strategy.

QUESTIONS ON ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING AND EVALUATION

This raises the issue of ensuring accountability and monitoring and evaluation. At present, the NSC-office/ secretariat is yet to prepare a proposed National Security Strategy, for discussion and agreement of the NSC-interagency. The crafting of a NSS is mandated under Memorandum Order No. 6. At the moment, the NSC-office is working on a yearly Assessment of the NSP. This assessment brings together three components: a perception survey from stakeholders, an assessment card intended to determine whether different government agencies contribute in addressing the strategic security concerns outlined in the NSP, and foreign perception.

Attention must be given to the Assessment Card through which the NSC does an assessment of how each government agency contributes in addressing the strategic security concerns identified in the NSP. To avoid duplication of efforts, instead of requiring each government agency to submit separate reports to the NSC, the assessment is based on the reports already submitted by each government agency to the Department of Budget and Management. The NSC goes through each report and looks at the programs of various government agency. The NSC then assesses how and whether these programs contribute in addressing any of the security concerns. By identifying which government program addresses which security concern, the NSC can approximate how each government agency contributes to the attainment of national security goals and how much government effort is poured in addressing each of the 13 security concerns.

It must be emphasized, however, that there is a huge difference between doing an inventory of national programs versus a purposive delineation of roles and articulation of contributions to a national security strategy. The Assessment, obviously cannot take the place of a National Security Strategy. The Assessment, in fact, is being met by some criticism and/or resistance from other government agencies for its implicit attempt to monitor and evaluate their performance.

Without a clear delineation of roles among relevant government agencies in so far as security is concerned, oversight bodies and civil society may be hard pressed to draw *accountability lines*. It also remains unclear who monitors the implementation of the PDP and NSP and who brings these concerns together.

37 On April 8, 2012 a Philippine Navy surveillance plane spotted eight (8) Chinese fishing vessels anchored in the lagoon of Bajo de Masinloc or Scarborough Shoal of the municipality of Masinloc in Zambales. In response, BRP Gregorio del Pilar was deployed to Bajo de Masinloc; Philippine Navy men boarded the Chinese vessels and discovered large amounts of illegally collected corals, giant clams and live sharks. Later on, two Chinese maritime surveillance ships went to Bajo de Masinloc as well and positioned themselves in between the Philippine warship and the Chinese fishing vessels. This resulted in a 'stand-off' between the Philippine Navy (later on the Philippine Coast Guard) and the Chinese maritime surveillance ships. Early response from the government can be described as scattered, scrambling, and not centrally orchestrated.

As in the case of territorial integrity concerns, it is not clear who orchestrates government response to incidents such as that which recently transpired at Bajo de Masinloc in Zambales, which is clearly a national security concern.³⁷

The Case of the Peace Process

The Peace Process is in the intersection of ‘hard’ security concerns (e.g. escalation of violence) and ‘soft’ security concerns (e.g. complementary track to address roots of conflict, social protection). It has been clearly articulated that the peace process is the centerpiece of the peace and security agenda of the Aquino administration. It is unclear, however, whether OPAPP can ensure that the different government agencies adhere to the policy of the *primacy of the peace process* and if this policy is actually used as the organizing framework for the programs and projects of concerned government agencies. At present, OPAPP’s relationship with other government agencies is purely coordinative, thus the need for inter-agency committees. There is also much emphasis on advocacy, and the monitoring scheme has yet to be firmed up. As in the case of the implementation of the Comprehensive Local Integration Program (CLIP) for former rebels, the OPAPP has to do cascading rounds with the different LGUs to promote the program. It cannot ensure, however, that the LGU actually devotes funds to the program.

Moreover, it is unclear which government agency shall orchestrate and oversee the implementation of the various peace agreements forged by the government with erstwhile insurgent or secessionist groups. This leaves the question of whether OPAPP’s mandate be expanded to include program implementation or another cabinet-level body be created for this purpose.

The Case of the Transition

The AFP has a clear articulation of its intent to transition from internal security-focused to territorial defense within the timeframe of IPSP *Bayanihan*. While there seems to be no strong objection to this transition, there is no national policy, strategy, nor articulation for this transition. The PDP and NSP are both silent on this. It must be emphasized though that the transition will involve more than the AFP. It necessitates that other government agencies and instrumentalities that will be involved, such as the PNP and the LGUs, are adequately prepared and capacitated. The timing has to be seamless as well. Without a policy, there is no assurance that the other concerned government instrumentalities will be developing their parallel plans to effect the transition. There is likewise no assurance that funds will actually be apportioned for the capability development of all government instrumentalities concerned.

Given the reality that elections happen every three years in the country, the sustainability of peace and security interventions in both the national and local levels is a cause of concern. Having the NSP can somehow appease the anxiety regarding the need for a singularity of purpose. The absence of a National Security Strategy, however, is a cause of concern as there is no clear document that would ensure that the peace and security efforts—both in the national and local levels—will be consistent, nonpartisan, and free from the whims of political leaders.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Security Plan 2011 – 2016 is the first ever national security policy issued by the Philippine government. This is in stark contrast to the Philippine Development Plan or the medium-term Philippine development plan, which has long been institutionalized in the national planning process. The novelty of the National Security Plan translates to challenges in its implementation and in ensuring that it is ingrained in the consciousness of relevant government instrumentalities.

As ‘companion documents’, the NSP and the PDP must be taken together. The NSP and the PDP have points of convergence and divergence. In principle, the points of divergence are actually not insurmountable since the two documents are not opposed to each other. The challenge lies in ensuring that these policies are translated into practice. There are several barriers in this connection, foremost of which is the absence of a clearly articulated strategy on how to bring together the NSP and the PDP—an NSS that defines accountability lines, roles, coordination mechanisms, monitoring and evaluation schemes, budgeting and spending, and multi-stakeholder engagement.

Another significant challenge is that, in practice, there is an absence of a body that can recommend and/or craft a national security strategy, monitor and evaluate the implementation of the same, and ensure that the symbiotic relationship between development and security translates into government plans and programs.

Given these gaps, the study thus proposes the following interventions:

1. Clear articulation of national interests

There is a need to undergo the process of defining our interests as a nation. Only upon a clear articulation of national interests can appropriate policies be crafted and prioritization among varied concerns be identified. This, however, is a long-term process and must be done through the broadest possible consultation of all sectors of society.

It is suggested that the NSC create a systematic consultation process that can ensure broad-based consultations with different civilian groups, covering groups divided along vertical (e.g. economic class, age) and horizontal lines (educational background, geographic location, ethno-national grouping etc).

The NSC can also create a system to bring together key security agencies to craft a national security strategy and regularly assess the relevance and appropriateness of said strategy.

2. Institutionalization of the national security planning process

To ensure alignment of national security policies, it is imperative that the national security planning process is institutionalized in the medium-term. There are several gaps in the process and the process is not done sequentially. There is a need to put mechanisms in place, similar to the crafting of the PDP, to ensure that the national security planning process is activated upon the assumption of a new administration.

Moreover, there is no process that allows for review and recalibration of existing plans. Existing plans such as the National Military Strategy have to be reviewed to ensure that these are still aligned with the National Security Policy and other policies of the current administration. A process of review and recalibration will likewise ensure that policies and plans remain relevant and responsive to the current situation. There is, for example, a need to ensure that national policies are able to enhance the positive developments in the different peace tables.

3. Crafting of an NSS, as mandated in Memorandum Order No. 6

A more immediate recommendation is a need for a clearer articulation of how to operationalize and bring together the National Security Policy and Philippine Development Plan. This could take the form of a National Security Strategy, as mandated under Memorandum Order No. 6. The crafting of this strategy would impinge on the delineation of roles, accountability and oversight, sharing of information and expertise, prioritization, definition of timeframes and milestones, monitoring and evaluation, budgeting and spending, and the gathering of all stakeholders.

4. Convening of an Oversight Body

Relatedly, there is a need for the convening of an oversight body to orchestrate, direct, coordinate, and monitor the implementation of the National Security Strategy. This body can be an expanded or strengthened version of the existing mechanisms or it may follow the model of the Cabinet Oversight Committee on Internal Security under the NISP. This can also take the form of existing mechanisms such as the National Security Council, which by all intents and purpose, could perform the required oversight and policy-making function.

(Philippine Defense Spending 2001 to 2012)

A collage featuring the Philippine flag, a calculator, and a document with financial data. The Philippine flag is prominently displayed in the upper left, with its blue, white, and red horizontal stripes and three yellow stars. Below the flag, a silver calculator is visible, showing the plus and equals keys. In the background, a document with financial data is partially visible, including a list of numbers and a total sum. The overall theme suggests financial analysis or budgeting related to the Philippines.

DEFENSE BUDGET AND SPENDING: ALIGNMENT AND PRIORITIES (PHILIPPINE DEFENSE SPENDING 2001 TO 2012)

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The present study looks at patterns of defense spending of the Philippine government through allocations made to the Department of National Defense (DND) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) as reflected in the General Appropriations Acts of 2001 to 2012.

The analysis is contextualized in the political environment of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's years as president from 2001 to 2010 and of the Aquino Administration from 2011 to 2012. Focused on the budget shares and growth rates of units and offices between the two distinct administrations, the analysis looks at the dominant actors or organizations, their shares in the budget and the implications of their budgetary choices.

The priorities of the Armed Forces in terms of the mission thrusts are highlighted from 2007 with the introduction of the Defense System of Management (DSOM).

By underscoring on the AFP's mission thrusts, the findings reveal the agency's notion and conceptualization of security as well the role of actors particularly the soldiers that make up the military bureau of the DND—the AFP and Service Units: the Army, Navy and Air Force.

In 2011, the AFP launched the Internal Peace and Security Plan *Bayanihan* with the broad aim of framing and advancing a post conflict scenario for the country. The plan articulates the support role of the AFP in internal security¹ and directs major shifts in security and defense policy in the following areas:

- a. shift from internal security to territorial defense
- b. return from non-traditional to traditional military role of the AFP
- c. recognition of non-traditional threats to security

These developments have required a redirection of the priorities of the state in terms of resource allocation. To analyze whether these new priorities have been reflected in defense spending, this study examines how resource allocation for 2011 and 2012 responded to the more recent executive agenda and AFP initiatives.

The study employed mainly archival research of primary documents such as the Official Gazettes and the General Appropriations Act from 2001 to 2012. Findings have been presented in three validation exercises with concerned government offices and funding agencies last October 14–15, November 7 and December 14, 2012.

1 Under IPSP *Bayanihan*, the AFP's Mission for Internal Peace and Security was to conduct "support operations to 'Win the Peace' in order to help the Filipino nation create an environment conducive for sustainable development and a just and lasting peace.

PART 1: THE CONTEXT

When Benigno S. Aquino III assumed the Presidency in June 2010, internal security remained at the core of the operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines thereby continuing to pose tensions to the proposed advancement to territorial defense, end of conflict and the constitutional role of the military.

Largely a consequence of the Westphalian² doctrine that defines state borders and territories, the military's fundamental function in a democracy is to ensure territorial sovereignty and independence. The primary responsibility of the military is to address external aggressors that undermine the territorial independence of the state and freedoms of the people. The context of the *enemy-centeredness* of the military's training and doctrine, this particular ethos of the military is geared towards neutralizing the enemy, a mandate given to the military as *protector of the people and the state*.

Military operations, against the very people it is supposed to defend, thus creates a problematic scenario where the military traverses a tight rope, and violation of people's rights becomes common.³ Involving the military in internal security concerns politicizes the ranks, necessitates that military officers and enlisted personnel engage with the local political leadership and entangles the soldiers in local, parochial and political concerns of communities.

The state's monopoly of the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1919)⁴ supports the depoliticization of the military and its disengagement from the internal political dynamics of the state. Given all the means it has to usurp power from the political leadership, there is but no singular unit of the state other than the military that has the capacity to take over the government.

Finer (1975) argues that the ability of the military to usurp political power is a fact. Thus, shielding the armed forces from partisan political engagement is not only beneficial to the civilian leadership, but more importantly, in maintaining democratic control over the organization, and in preserving its professional ethos. The apparent tension between the powers of the military and its role in societal affairs rationalizes why it is supposed to handle external defense as opposed to the internal affairs of the state.

In the Philippine case, much is still desired in terms of carving the ideal security forces—both the military and the police. The experience of martial law and dictatorship has corrupted the security institutions and ruined their institutional

2 Signed in 1648, the Treaty of Westphalia reifies the notion of territorial integrity and independence. The state, officially represented by the government, is the primary agent in advancing the national interest

3 For instance, entering a community –without doing anything – already puts the safety of the community in jeopardy since the military can be attacked, placing the safety of the entire community in peril. This is already tantamount to violation of rights – even without doing anything!

4 Weber. 1919. Politics as a Vocation. Lecture given to Free Students' Union of Munich University

blueprints. The police—a civilian unit—was heavily militarized, while the military—a territorial defense force—became heavily involved in internal security operations and was used by the dictator to sow terror and extract obedience from the people.

Theoretically speaking, the division of labor between the armed and civilian forces should be seen in the involvement of the police in internal security and the military in external security. However, given the guerrilla warfare waged by the rebel groups, the fire power that they possess, and the reality that the police has limited capacity (in terms of materiel) and capability (in terms of skills and training) to handle these threat groups, has necessitated the military to take center stage in neutralizing these groups.

The AFP's involvement in ISO reframed the focus of the entire organization. The army/ ground troops burgeoned to a size not proportional to the rest of the armed forces while the navy/ marines and the air force, the service units that are arguably relevant in territorial defense for an archipelago like the Philippines, fared poorly in terms of number and materiel. Infantry Divisions were created and permanently situated in geographical areas, disregarding the doctrine that provided for the transient nature of the army as a force as opposed to a permanent fixture in an area.⁵

The prolonged stay of the military in internal operations has created a number of interweaving issues:

- a. *Politicization of the ranks.* Staying in communities has necessitated that AFP officers and enlisted personnel engaged the local political leadership. This has embroiled the soldiers in the very parochial and political concerns of localities.
- b. *Dependency of the community on the military.* It made the communities dependent on the military in terms of peace and security concerns rather than develop self-help efforts or strengthen the police force.
- c. *Militarization of communities.* The presence of the military in communities has desensitized the civilians to the abnormality of military presence in civilian neighborhoods. If continually done, this 'abnormality' creates an image of normalcy.
- d. *'Deactivation' of the local government unit (LGU).* It has de-motivated the LGU and the police to step-up and take-on a more active role in internal security. Since the military satisfies the need for peace and security patrol duties—a function apparently of the police and the Barangay Tanods⁶—there has been no compelling motivation for civilian authorities to takeover this particular law enforcement function.
- e. *Redirection of the mandated role of the military in territorial defense to the sidelines.* It has clipped the wings of the military from taking on more roles both in territorial defense and in non-traditional security

5 This enumeration is part of the IPSP assessment report (2011) conducted by the Working Group on Security Sector Reform (WG-SSR), Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University.

6 Barangay Tanods or Village patrols are civilian volunteers who help in patrolling the streets/ communities. They are given a small honorarium, the amount of which is determined by the Barangay Council (village leadership).

threats (e.g., disaster mitigation and preparedness, regional security, border security, local and international peacekeeping operations).

The modernization of the military, meant to position the AFP institution to address more territorial and non-traditional security threats, has been compromised by the focus on internal security operations (ISO). Primary preoccupation in the ISO has also necessitated a big army with implications on budget/ resource allocation. The budget allotted for the modernization and professionalization of the AFP covers mostly the needs of internal security⁷ to the detriment of the airforce and the navy.

It involves the military in matters outside of its core competence. In its efforts to address insurgency, the military is forced to take on roles other than war. In far-flung areas, it is not uncommon for a soldier to also be the teacher, the doctor, the engineer. Where there is no functioning local government structure, the military becomes, de facto, the face of the government. This reinforces the dependence of the LGU and communities on the military for the delivery of some basic services.

The ISO, thus is the biggest block that prevents the military from improving on its other mission areas. With too prominent role of the military, the role ‘traps’ the military institution to the antiquated Cold War doctrine of communism versus democracy as much it causes civilian institutions to rely heavily on the military.

For as long as the military is committed to be at the forefront of ISO, it cannot be effective in its other mission areas. A major casualty of this is the Modernization Plan of the AFP.

It is thus crucial for the military to take the *support* role rather than the *lead* role in ISO. The Philippine government’s logical security sector reform (SSR) agenda, therefore, is to clarify the internal security role of the military (rather than assigning the entire ISO responsibility to it), to rein in the AFP’s ISO function and push the institution to transform and become a modern defense force befitting a democratic society. This obviously has implications with the other security agencies such as the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the local government units (LGUs), which must step up⁸ to handle ISO work in the event that the military fully transitions to territorial defense.

Historical antecedents of the AFP’s involvement in ISO

The US Administration established the Philippine Constabulary as a mobile

7 The Philippines is regarded as the weakest link in the border-defense triad of Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines (Ian Storey, 2007. The Triborder Sea Area: Maritime Southeast Asia’s Ungoverned Space, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 5 Issue: 19. The Jamestown Foundation, October 24. Available online http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4465 accessed 29 April 2011; also see Gomez, Jim. 2008. “Philippine Military Chief Says Armed Forces Not Strong Enough.” The Irrawaddy, June 4. Available online http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=12490 accessed 29 April 2011.

8 Capacitating measures must be done to prepare the LGU and PNP to be effective in handling the ISO role. The equipage of both LGU and PNP must also be reviewed if they can effectively support the ISO function that will be passed on to said institutions.

police force in July 1901. The Constabulary were “deployed in small, localized units like police but armed with rifles like soldiers”. (McCoy 1999, 18) The officer corps, however, remained overwhelmingly dominated by American Army officers.

During the Commonwealth period, President Manuel L. Quezon under the National Defense Act of 1935, “committed a quarter of the budget to building a national army that would, by independence in 1945, have ten thousand regular soldiers backed by reserves of four hundred thousand”. (Ibid 23) Under the same National Defense Act, all 20-year olds were conscripted as soldiers and college graduates were trained as officers.

During the Second World War, the Philippine Army was integrated to a single command—the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFEF). The Japanese occupying forces also created a constabulary called the Bureau of Constabulary. After the war, the Constabulary and Armed Forces were merged into one major command, tasked primarily to neutralize the HUKBALAHAP movement.⁹

The roots of the police and the military were thus inextricably connected during the pre and post-war era. This intertwined identity of the police and the military continued and was even strengthened during the Marcos dictatorship era (1972 – 1986).

Under Marcos, the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP) was established by virtue of Presidential Decree 765. The PC continued to service the Armed Forces in performing ISO, and the INP served as the local police force. The military and the police became heavily politicized and were accused of numerous human rights violations.

The martial law experience of the Philippines under President Marcos (1972-1986) severely weakened the state-political institutions, in particular the oversight function, justice system, and rule of law bodies, and inversely, strengthened state security actors in the Philippines. For more than 20 years, Marcos re-fashioned the state establishment to suit his personal ambition and agenda, corrupting the entire bureaucracy in the process. Given the need to enforce its political authority by force, the Marcos administration was heavily dependent on the coercive organs of the state—the police and the military. Heavily politicized and corrupted, it is no surprise therefore that both institutions stand accused to have grossly violated the human rights of activists as well as common folk.

Post Martial law: The Democratization Project

When President Corazon Aquino assumed power (1986-1992), she engaged the

⁹ The Hukbalahap (Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon) was created as a resistance movement against the Japanese colonizers. After the war, it morphed into a revolutionary movement pushing for the interests of the peasants. This group would later on plant the seeds for the establishment of the communist groups in the Philippines.

nation to continue the 1986 people power¹⁰ project of reclaiming democracy. While the Aquino administration re-institutionalized the democratic infrastructure (e.g. elections, Congress), established human rights mechanisms, pursued the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies¹¹, and expanded the democratic space of the people, “the Aquino administration failed to address four primary institutional obstacles to justice: the army, the police, the judiciary, and the civilian bureaucracy”. (Plantilla, 1997) This failure proved to be fatal as attested by the coup d’état attempts against her administration.

Seven coup d’état attempts were made against the Aquino administration, the bloodiest of which was in December 1989. While these were serious attempts at a power grab, the perpetrators were never brought to justice. Needless to say, Aquino failed to exact the loyalty and support of the military top brass. The fact that she was a woman was in itself a reason especially for the military and police to suspect her of weakness.¹² Fidel Ramos, a former general appointed as Secretary of Defense and regarded as among the ‘heroes’ (leaders) of the 1986 EDSA, was literally and figuratively her savior against discontented forces in the military.

Ironically, the threats coming from disgruntled segments of the military somehow forced Aquino to depend also on the military for her administration’s political survival. This move facilitated the seeming re-claiming of the military institution of its political influence as more and more retired generals got cabinet appointments. This move affected the gains to strengthen and further institutionalize human rights in the Aquino administration as policies began to shift from democratization and broadening of democratic space to re-militarization and increasing repression especially against opposition to the Aquino administration.

This was the context when Republic Act 6975 was passed into law, creating the Philippine National Police and placing it under the Department of the Interior and Local Government. The significance of this move is the ‘civilianization’ of the police force, and distinguishing its character from that of the military. Its mandate was “to enforce the law, prevent and control crimes, maintain peace and order, and ensure public safety and internal security with the active support of the community.” (PNP V-M-G)

While maintaining a civilian character, however, the PNP continued to provide support to the AFP in terms of suppression of insurgency and other serious threats to national security and during times of national emergency.

10 A botched coup (largely prompted by the massive cheating in the 1986 snap elections) by then Defense Secretary Enrile and Ramos led to the historic EDSA or the 1986 people power uprising. When this power grab attempt was discovered by Marcos, Enrile phoned the late Cardinal Sin for help and the latter subsequently made a public appeal over Radio Veritas. Sin asked the people to go to EDSA—the main highway between Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo—and form a human barricade to protect those involved in the attempted coup against the minions of Marcos. What ensued was the swarming of people to EDSA who stayed vigilant for four days until Marcos caved in and escaped to Hawaii on February 25, 1986. This event is popularly referred to as the 1986 EDSA or People Power.

11 The PCGG or the Presidential Commission on Good Government was created specifically to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their cronies. Aquino also released the political prisoners of Marcos and re-institutionalized a number of human rights of the people.

12 The security arena is still heavily dominated by men; women are still perceived to be at the receiving end of security (that is, to be protected rather than as equal partners in determining the security agenda and demands of the state.

Expectedly, President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), a former General and Secretary of Defense commanded the respect of the military. His administration enjoyed considerable political stability as compared to the administration of President Corazon Aquino, and thus, he was able to concentrate on the economic performance of the state.

During the time of Ramos, the AFP Modernization Act was passed. The focus of this reform agenda can be summed up in five major areas:

- a. Developing closer ties with the community
- b. Professionalizing the ranks (including institutionalizing transparency, accountability, merit system)
- c. Capability upgrade (of both human resource in terms of training and logistics in terms of equipment)
- d. Systematizing the processes (information management system)
- e. Revenue generation and mobilization

Ramos also pursued peace talks with the Moro insurgents, primarily with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and what ensued was the 1996 historic signing of the peace accord (Final Peace Agreement, FPA) between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MNLF, with the corresponding legislation RA 9054¹². It was during Ramos's time that Mindanao experienced an extended period of ceasefire between the insurgents (MNLF) and the government forces. Successful peace talks enticed local and international development agencies to pour aid to help rehabilitate and develop Mindanao, in particular the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which was, at the time, placed under the stewardship of MNLF leaders.

Within the ranks of the MNLF, however, emerged division based on disagreements on politics and strategy—Nur Misuari and his allies advanced a secular-nationalist line while Hashim Salamat and allies emphasized Islamic orientation. Some analysts, though, claim that the division was more rooted in the historical, ethno-linguistic divides of the personalities and factions within the original MNLF. In March 1984, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front was formally declared as a separate organization with Hashim Salamat as the Chair. (Jubair 1999, 149-157)¹⁴ The MILF did not subscribe to the FPA signed by the MNLF and continued with the armed rebellion against the government.

In the 1990s, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) also rose to prominence. While originally established as a fundamentalist group aiming to establish an Islamic state, the ASG has slid to kidnap for ransom and banditry when its founder

13 A caveat, however, is in order: The Peace Accord with the MNLF has no provision for DDR (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration) which is essential in a peace agreement.

14 The MNLF was founded in 1969 by Manila-based Moros. In 1972, the Central Committee was established with Nur Misuari as chairman. Its founding was triggered by a chain of events that highlighted the policy of oppression and marginalization of the Moros, perhaps the most publicized was the so called Jabitah massacre. Said case involved young soldiers, mostly Muslims, trained allegedly to invade Sabah. When the soldiers refused, they were massacred, save for one who was able to tell their story. For more discussion on the Muslim history of dissent, see Jubair, Salah. 1999. *Bangsamoro A nation under endless tyranny*. 3rd edition. IQ Marin SDN BHD, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 131-143; also see Rodil, B.R. 2003. *A Story of Mindanao in Question and Answer*. Davao City: MINCODE; Majul, Cesar Adib. 1999. *Muslims in the Philippines*. (2nd Printing); Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press; Diaz, Patricio. 2003. *Understanding Mindanao Conflict*. Davao City: Mindanews.

Khadaffy Janjalani was killed in an armed encounter with the government forces in 2006.

Hence, towards the end of the Ramos administration, were pockets of armed confrontations between the government forces and the MILF and the ASG. By the time Estrada was elected President, the conflict had escalated. The Estrada administration (1998-2001) launched an all-out war in the midst of the deemed failure of the MNLF-led Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the resurgence of conflict in the area. While Estrada officially declared his desire for peace, his actions made it crystal clear that he favored armed engagement against the rebels. His administration witnessed the bloodiest conflict in the post-martial law era.

The Arroyo administration (2001-2004; 2004 to 2010)¹⁵ straddled between peace negotiations and all-out-war. The problematic rise to power of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in 2001 via EDSA 2,¹⁶ and the fraud charges levied on the 2004 Presidential elections predicated the political legitimacy crisis of Arroyo. The reform agenda (that civil society groups banked on at the beginning of her term in 2001) remained a rhetoric that was drummed up only when Arroyo needed to score or improve her popularity ratings. (Lao, Oreta 2009)

This turbulent political terrain of the country, post martial law, framed the security paradigm of the country. Complicating the discourse was the flawed security institutions that failed to address the demands and expectations of the people, during and after the martial law period.

The Present Context: The Aquino Administration (2010-2016)

Change in administration usually ushers in change in direction. The Armed Forces of the Philippines' Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) *Bayanihan* came at a time when a new administration assumed office and the old AFP plan was at its twilight. Unlike past practices, however, where old plans are rehashed and renamed, the IPSP took a new, unprecedented route.

The AFP convened a series of consultations in September 2010, bringing in military officers from the three service units, and, unexpectedly, the consultation process invited new players—civil society groups, academe, and representatives from the civilian bureaucracy—that had not been too friendly with the military in the past.

15 The 1987 Constitution prohibits an incumbent President to seek re election. Because Arroyo's presidency in 2001-2004, however, was deemed a result of the succession process when President Estrada was unseated in 2001, Arroyo was legally allowed to run for President in 2004.

16 The expression EDSA II indicates the popular uprisings of 17-21 January 2001 that led to the peaceful overthrow of President Estrada. A crucial role in the eruption of the uprisings was played by the collaboration of spontaneous popular demonstrations and organized civil society which reacted to attempts to railroad the impeachment case against President Estrada. EDSA II was widely regarded as the Filipino people's assertion for good governance. In the aftermath of the uprising, Estrada was charged with corruption, plunder, and culpable violation of the constitution.

For keen observers, this seemingly unprecedented move by the AFP was the logical conclusion of small, measured steps that had been gestating in different localities. Engagements, albeit project-based, between military units and civil society groups, academic institutions, and local government units had been happening and this increasingly fostered closer partnerships at the local level.

On the other hand, at the General Headquarters (GHQ) level, a series of small roundtable discussions¹⁷ (RTDs) started in June 2010 and continued hence every month, gathering military officers, civil society organizations (CSOs), and convened by an academic institution, the Ateneo de Manila University-Department of Political Science. The RTDs created a ‘dialogue space’ that allowed historically hostile groups to come face-to-face for the academic exercise of discussing and problematizing issues of security, peace, and the military. The non-threatening atmosphere of the RTD allowed for very frank, candid exchange of ideas and perceptions, creating confidence that had not been present in past dialogue between erstwhile antagonistic groups.

These small processes thus strengthened the belief that working together can actually produce better results. The IPSP formulation process somehow continues from these confidence-building efforts.

Related developments. The timing of the AFP strategic planning process was also affected by some significant external challenges. It was done when tension was escalating in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) among claimants of the oil-rich Spratlys Group of Islands. The diplomatic rift on the Spratlys, accompanied by the flexing of military muscles of claimant countries highlighted the dire state of the territorial defense capacity of the Philippine armed forces, a function that had been neglected, albeit unintentionally, by the armed forces (especially in terms of materiel development) and by the national government due to its preoccupation on internal armed rebellion.

Politically, the Aquino administration renewed peace talks with the rebel groups, necessitating the ‘side-stepping’ of the security sector forces in as far as the *military approach* was concerned to allow the peace talks to take center stage. The renewal of talks sparked internal discussions among military officers on whether or not the old paradigm of ‘enemy-centered’ strategy was still the best and most effective approach to ‘neutralize’ the armed rebellion. This internal discernment was significant due to the timing and the context—the old plan, Operation Plan (OPLAN) *Bantay Laya 2*, has run its course and needs to be renewed, re-cast or changed altogether.

The Security Reform Agenda

A. Reforming the Armed Forces

During the martial law period, the military allowed itself to be used by the

¹⁷ Initiated and convened by the Ateneo de Manila University-Dept of Political Science. This initiative eventually paved the way for the creation of the Department’s “Working Group on Security Sector Reform,” the group that carried-on the present research.

dictator for his selfish motives. Alfred McCoy (1999) in his book “Closer than Brothers” alleged that the PMA Class 1971 was responsible for most of the tortures and human rights abuses done during the Marcos regime. In the accounting made by McCoy there were 3,257 extra-judicial killings, 35,000 tortured, and 70,000 incarcerated. Hundreds remained *desaparecidos*.

Professionalizing and de-politicizing the ranks proved to be difficult, especially in the early years of the post-Marcos era. To date, the military and defense department—especially the reform oriented officers and civilian leaders—have painstakingly instituted incremental steps to strengthen the professional ethos of the armed forces, with particular emphasis on the principle of ‘democratic control over the armed forces.’

The abusive officers of the martial law period, unfortunately, remained unpunished and worse, were able to wrestle back power. This reality has further strengthened the notion that justice in the country is lopsided in favor of those who have access to power. This to a large extent is the crux of the reform agenda of the AFP.

At present, the reform agenda of the AFP and the Department of National Defense (DND) focuses on the following:

- a. Implement the Philippine Defense Reform Program (PDR)
- b. Upgrade the Capability of the AFP
- c. Support the Peace Process; and
- d. Enhance the ability to fight terrorism.

The aim of this reform agenda is to improve the professional character of the military as an institution within a democratic government and consequently its respect for the rule of law, constitution, and civilian authority. The agenda, however, does not problematize the presence of the military in internal security operations.

Philippine Defense Reform. A thorough assessment of the defense and military establishment was done during the Arroyo administration and was concluded in 2003. This produced the Philippine Defense Reform (PDR) agenda that provided the framework for a comprehensive reform package. Some of the major features of the PDR that impinge on SSR include:

- a. Improvement of the AFP’s operational and training capacity (for commanders, non commissioned officers and units)
- b. Staff development
- c. Programming and implementation of a multi-year capability upgrade program
- d. Improvement of management controls (to improve accountability and transparency)
- e. Improvement of logistics capacity (reliability rates for all platform and weapons system)
- f. Enhancement of the AFP’s capability to conduct Civil Military Relations
- g. Development of baseline data on critical AFP functional areas

Still, the AFP direly needs upgrade to improve its land mobility, command and communication, firepower, force protection and combat life support, airlift, air-strike, surveillance, ground support, and medical evacuation capability.

In an interview, former DND Secretary Avelino Cruz (ANC's "The Big Picture", 11 Sept 2008), disclosed that the AFP was short of about 5,000 trucks, and 12,000 hand-held radios, and needs about P10 billion for mission essential equipment. Moreover, Cruz said that the AFP only has one C-130 aircraft. In 2008, Yabes of Newsbreak contended that over P40 billion is needed to bring the military back to a decent standard of capability. In the same year, P10 billion had been approved for release by the Office of the President for the capability upgrade plan.

The release of this money is slow, but is finally happening.

At present, the Aquino administration has released funds to address some of these deficiencies but the AFP is still far from completing its required capability upgrade.

B. Reforming the Philippine National Police

The common denominator of the reform agenda is the funding requirement. To date, the PNP is faced with numerous challenges especially when it comes to budget allocation.

In 2008, the PNP budget totalled P40.711 billion. Items that were not considered in the budget are the following (based on discussion with former Dir. Rodolfo Tor, Sept 2008):¹⁸

1. Personnel

- a. Increase in salary. There are 128,893 PNP uniformed personnel, and the amount needed (to bridge the gap between an public school teacher's salary and that of the police) was a total P3,906.710M¹⁹
- b. Hospitalization expense (P 180 M)
- c. Deficiency in Replacement Clothing Allowance (P 591.578 M) and Initial Clothing Allowance (P 95.652 M) pursuant to NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 2007-182
- d. Provision for Occupational Specialty Pay of 1,000 Internal Affairs Service Uniformed Personnel (P 93.716 M)
- e. Provision for overseas allowance (P 68.960 M)
- f. Provision for other lump sum – field training program (P 90.625M)
- g. Provision for terminal leave and retirement gratuity of 2,055 compulsory and 231 attrition (P 3,574.690 M)
- h. Deficiency in pension fund requirement (P 290.429 M)

¹⁸ Note, though, that interventions have already been made to address some of these program gaps, but the intention here is to show the enormity of the deficiency that confronts the police force.

¹⁹ Based on NBC No. 468 dated March 21, 2000, which requires a 10% increase; NBC No. 474 dated June 15, 2001, requiring 5% increase; and NBC No. 511 dated June 18, 2007, requiring 10% increase.

2. Operations

- i. Payment of utilities (electricity & water) (P 16.097 M)
- j. Additional logistical requirement for supplies & materials, ammo, fidelity bond, transportation services, traveling expenses, insurance premium, rents & titling (P 182.933 M)
- k. Additional support to Internal Security Operations & anti-terrorism activities (Human Security Act) (P 90.300 M)
- l. Provision to support Cyber Crime Investigation (P 70 M)
- m. Additional provision for the existing four (4) police attaches Washington-USA, Islamabad-Pakistan, Kuala Lumpur-Malaysia and Beijing-China (P 157.029 M)
- n. Additional support to the operations of different Internal Affairs Service offices nationwide (P 33.694 M)
- o. Support to additional projected four (4) OPA posts in West Coast (SFO)-USA, Saudi Arabia, Bangkok-Thailand and Jakarta, Indonesia (P 30.958 M)

3. Capital Outlay

- p. Construction of 52 police stations (P 247.845 M)
- q. Construction of dialysis center (P 15 M)
- r. Procurement of 414 units patrol cars, 429 units patrol jeeps (4x2) and 25 units (200cc) motorcycles (P 913.683 M)
- s. Procurement of 8,750 units 9mm pistols (P 332.550 M)
- t. Procurement of 1,276 units VHF handheld radios (P 68.974 M)

According to the Report of the PNP Commission, “The inadequacy of funds encompasses all other problems in the PNP. For any police force to operate effectively, it must be adequately supported with logistics, well-trained personnel, and operational requirements, all of which entail financial support.” Unfortunately, the reform measures being undertaken by the PNP remain under-funded.

PART 2: DEFENSE SPENDING AND SECURITY PRIORITIES (GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS 2001-2012)

I. DEFINING EVENTS: ARROYO THROUGH AQUINO

Arroyo Administration 2001 to 2010

With heightened armed threat from various groups, the government under Arroyo stepped up anti-insurgency efforts. A crucial event was the signing of RA 8551 which transferred (back) the role of anti-insurgency from the police to the Armed Forces, thereby politicizing the AFP and enmeshing it further in the work of civilian and internal security.

The National Security Plan based on Executive Order no. 21 (s 2001) and the AFP's 2002 to 2006 Internal Security Operations Plan or OPLAN *Bantay Laya* provided for an arguably holistic and inter-governmental framework of anti-insurgency that converged with the AFP's 'clear, hold, consolidate and develop' operational methodology.

Deep in domestic battle, the capacity for external defense of the Armed Forces was questioned in the 2003 Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) of the military by the US and Philippine governments.

Driven by the 2003 JDA, the Philippine Defense Reform program aimed at professionalizing and modernizing the Armed Forces for territorial defense. The resulting 2006 Capability Upgrade Program operationalized a framework that called for an enhancement of ISO in 2006 until the end of the second term of Arroyo in 2010 when a transition to territorial defense would have been paved from 2012 to 2018. The plan envisioned an Armed Forces dedicated to the external defense of the country and involved in regional and global peacekeeping beginning 2019 to 2024.

The Benigno S. Aquino III Administration 2011 to 2012

The decision of President Benigno S. Aquino III to end decades old internal conflict and to modernize the defense system was externally shaped by a changing balance of power in the South China Sea region. The post Cold War geo-strategic reconfiguration of capabilities in favor of an emergent China was demonstrated by a confrontation of Philippine and Chinese civilian vessels in the Reed Bank in 2011 and the standoff that ensued in Scarborough shoal in 2012. With these events as cues, Aquino signed the New AFP Modernization Act on December 11, 2012. The defense program provides for a seventy five billion peso (P75 billion) modernization fund in the next five (5) years.

Internally, declining communist forces have driven the Aquino administration

to pursue peace negotiations at several fronts and to frame a post conflict scenario anchored on capability upgrade and modernization and security sector reform and development.

Mirroring executive efforts to win the peace, the Armed Forces launched the Internal Peace and Security Plan in 2011. The IPSP which re-states the approach of the military in dealing with the armed threat groups is differentiated by its characteristically consultative and multi-stakeholder approach to the process of plan formulation. In addition, the plan reiterates the military's traditional and constitutional role based on external defense but it also recognizes the military role in development, disaster response, environment and other non-traditional security concerns.

II. 2011 TO 2012 DEFENSE PRIORITIES

The Aquino administration has set the context for AFP modernization and prioritization for national defense in the first two budget years of his administration in 2011 and 2012.

In his budget messages to Congress, Aquino spoke of “enhanced security” for “national defense”²⁰ and put forward the country's claim of territories in the South China Sea through capability upgrades and modernization of the Navy and the Air Force. His statement “what is ours is ours; setting foot on Recto Bank is no different from setting foot on Recto Avenue”²¹ contextualized the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to be sourced from domestic as well as external budget sources of the US-assisted Defense Capability Upgrade, Sustainment of Equipment Program of the AFP and Coast Watch.

Consistent with the executive's security agenda, in 2011, the Department of National Defense (DND) budget of 104.5 billion pesos soared by 81 per cent rising from the 57.6 billion peso allocation in 2010.

By 2012, DND budget of 106.9 billion pesos from the previous year doubled the government's allocation for defense from an average of about 55 billion pesos during Arroyo's second term (2005 to 2010)²² to over a hundred billion pesos during the first two years of the Aquino administration.


The spikes in the 2011 to 2012 DND budgets were determined by the surge drawn from pension worth 24 billion pesos allocated for retirees and a five (5) billion modernization fund budgeted in the AFP's General Headquarters (GHQ) budget in 2011, a 13 billion peso pension appropriated for war veterans

20 2011 State of Nation Address of Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III. Philippine Congress, Republic of the Philippines.

21 2012 State of Nation Address of Philippine President Benigno S. Aquino III. Philippine Congress, Republic of the Philippines.

22 The average budget for national defense in 2001 to 2004 was 52.3 billion pesos.


Chart 1. Growth Rate of AFP and Other Civilian Bureaus Budget (2001-2012)



under the Philippine Veteran’s Affairs Office (PVAO) budget in the same year²³ and a billion peso disaster response budget allocated in the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) in 2012.²⁴ (Please refer to Chart 1.)

The ascendancy of the AFP is evident in the DND budget, with the former taking up an average share of 87 per cent of DND appropriation. In 2011 to 2012, this registered 89.7 billion pesos out of the total of 104.5 billion pesos. (Please refer to Chart 2.)

Chart 2. Percentage Share of AFP and other Civilian Bureaus Budget from the Total DND Budget Appropriation (2001-2012)



23 This rise of the PVAO’s average budget share from 6 per cent in 2001 to 10 per cent in the first two budget years under Aquino was derived from the infusion of 13 billion pesos worth of pension for war veterans, a 1,257 per cent change from the 308 million peso allocation in 2010.


24 A billion peso budget for the OCD led to the 1,244 per cent change of the budget for disaster response in 2012.

Historically, the AFP’s dominant budgetary position in the DND appropriation has been reflected in the allocations made for the civilian bureaus:

In 2001 to 2010, each received insignificant shares in the DND budget: PVAO, an average of 6 per cent; DND Proper, .77 per cent; General Arsenal, .54 per cent; the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD), .17 per cent and the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP) at .10 per cent of the total DND. (Please refer to Chart 3)

The apportionment of the DND budget among the civilian bureaus and the AFP continued under the Aquino administration, with some changes in the balance between the AFP, the PVAO and OCD in the incipient years of the Aquino administration.

Chart 3. Average Percentage Share of AFP and other DND Civilian Bureaus Budget from Total DND Budget



Programs and Projects

The Defense System of Management (DSOM), aimed at executing a more effective resource allocation process for the AFP, was introduced in 2007. Influenced by the findings of the JDA Assessment of 2003 and the 2006 Philippine Defense Reform, DSOM provided for a multi-year planning based on a strategic, capability driven, logical and integrated approach to national security resource assessment and allocation.²⁵

Prior to DSOM, the functional differentiation of the AFPs’ operations based on (i) combat operations (ii) military intelligence (iii) logistical services and (iv) civil military operations informed earlier budgets. The emphasis on the military “functions” that combined focused military operations with intelligence

25 Republic of the Philippines. Department of National Defense Circular No. 11 (July 1, 2011)

gathering and civic action in threatened communities operationalized the “left and right hand” development approach to anti-insurgency.²⁶


DSOM thus was a movement away from a functionally differentiated approach to military operations towards a mission-thrust orientation, which in budgetary terms streamlined resource allocation items based on the broad missions of the three Major Services: (i) internal security operations (ii) support to national development (iii) territorial defense (iv) disaster response (v) international defense and security engagement (vi) international humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping.

The AFP budgets: Aquino Administration 2011 and 2012

Indicative of the Aquino government’s budget pronouncements for modern national defense and security, the AFP posted a current budget of 96 billion pesos in 2012 representing a 6.99 per cent increase from the previous budget of 89.8 billion (Please refer to Annexes 11 & 12).

Compared to other Major Services, the Army has had the biggest share in the budget of the AFP, receiving 35.4 billion pesos in 2012 compared to the Navy which received 12.1 billion pesos and the Air Force which received 10.5 billion pesos. A “trend” since the first budget year under Aquino in 2011, the Army’s budget of 33.5 billion pesos in 2011 was three times the size of the budgets of the Air Force and the Navy in 2012. (Please refer to Chart 4)

Chart 4. Average Percentage Share of AFP Units from Total AFP Budget (2011 -2012)



26 The ‘triad/synergy concept’ of the security and development approach to insurgency which constituted the earlier AFP plan *Katatagan* was premised on the intersection of combat operations and intelligence on one hand and civil military operations on the other. (Source: Oliveros, Alfredo S. (1998) *The Development Role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: A Policy Option Paper*. Quezon City: National Defense College of the Philippines).

The Army's ascendant budgetary position has been historical. Reinforced by the pervasive National Security Doctrine of the Cold War and re-appropriated under Marcos' authoritarian regime, the Army's privileged position has reflected the size of its personnel and share in the budget of the Armed Forces. (Please refer to Annexes 1-12)

Under the Aquino administration (2011 to 2012), the Army maintained a 40 per cent share in the total AFP budget, albeit a slight departure from its coverage of fifty per cent share representative of its budgetary position vis-a-vis other Services during the Arroyo years in 2005 to 2010. (Please refer to Annex 13)

In terms of the size of personnel²⁷, the Army's allocation of 29.1 billion pesos for personnel services in 2011 to 2012 covered as much as 85 per cent of the Army's total budget, about six times the size of the Air Force's allocation of 6.1 billion pesos and four times the size of the Navy's budget of 7.9 billion pesos for personnel services during the same period. (Please refer to Annexes 11 & 12)

Operations and Mission Thrusts of the AFP: 2011 to 2012

Under the Aquino administration, internal security operations (ISO) constituted about three-fourths of the Army's total appropriation and over 90 per cent of its operations budget.

This administration's prioritization for ISO thus continues and retains the budgetary priorities of the Arroyo presidency from 2007 to 2010, when the appropriation for the mission thrusts converged around ISO as part of a more aggressive policy and strategy to arrest insurgency.

This development persists today and is reflected in the years 2011 and 2012, against the policy background that prepares the military for an end of conflict scenario, shift to territorial defense and a return to the traditional external defense role of the military.

The current 2011 to 2012 budgetary allocations for the Services Units' mission thrusts are configured to the distribution of priorities/definition of priority missions during the Arroyo years from 2007 to 2010.

The features of the budget thus are:

- a. The primacy of internal security operations in the budget, coupled by the development thrust, albeit a second priority thrust of the Services
- b. Under-prioritization of disaster response, international defense and security engagement and international assistance and peacekeeping

²⁷ In 2012, the Army maintains 10 infantry divisions and 9 combat support units (army.mil.ph) against the Navy's 7 naval operations command and 5 naval support commands (navy.mil.ph) and the Air Force's 6 attack squadrons (airforce.mil.ph).

- c. Historically bigger budget shares for disaster response and territorial defense in the Air Force budgets

Outside of the mission thrusts of the Army, Navy and the Air Force, however, the GHQ has, since 2011 released 10 billion pesos of modernization fund that aimed to re-direct the priorities of the AFP to territorial defense.

Table 1. Allocations for the Services according to Mission Thrusts, 2012 (in PhP)

2012	Army	Air Force	Navy
Total PS&MOOE CO	35.4 billion 158.6 million	10.5 billion 180 million	12.1 billion
Internal security operations	26.1 billion operations and maintenance of combat units, intelligence, and subsistence allowance for CAFGUs	6.3 billion CO 125.4 million	7.1 billion 117 million for ground, intelligence and surface operations
Territorial defense	1 billion operations and maintenance of reserve units and reservist affairs	861 million CO 3.3 million	195 million surface combatant ships, operationalization of Coast Watch South, Support to Retirees and Reservist affairs
Disaster Response	7.6 million operations and maintenance of units engaged in DR	241.7 million CO 7 million	586 thousand disaster response and relief
Support to National Development	1.6 billion	469.5 million CO 8.5 million	365 million
International Defense and Security Engagement	137 million joint training and exchange programs	8.7 million	16.6 million bilateral exercise and international affairs
International Humanitarian Assistance Peacekeeping	11.4 million peacekeeping	31.5 million	28.2 million international assistance and peacekeeping

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act, 2012

Table 2. Allocations for the Services according to Mission Thrusts, 2011 (in PhP)

2011	Army	Air Force	Navy
Total PS&MOOE CO	33.5 billion 20 million	10.1 billion	11.3 billion
Internal security operations	26.8 billion operations and maintenance of combat units, intelligence, subsistence allowance for CAFGUs	4.6 billion	6.4 billion
Territorial Defense	658 million operations and maintenance of reserve units and reservist affairs	903 million	188 million
Disaster Response	7 million operations and maintenance of units engaged in DR	159 million	586 thousand
Support to National Development	1.6 billion	159.6 million	360.6 million
International Defense and Security Engagement	131 million joint training and exchange programs	372 million	16.6 million bilateral exercise and international affairs
International Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping	11.4 million peacekeeping	34 million	28.2 million international assistance and peacekeeping

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act, 2011

Internal Security Operations

ISO is the Army's and the rest of the Services' biggest allocation in the budget.

The Army's average budget for ISO in 2011 and 2012 was 26 billion pesos, indicative of its major share in the budget that amounted to 34 billion pesos in 2012 and 33.5 billion pesos in 2011. (Please refer to Annex 13)

A top priority operation and mission thrust, the Army's budget for ISO for 2011 to 2012 was four times the allocation for the Navy (7 billion in 2012 and 6.4 billion in 2011) and the Air Force (6.3 billion in 2012 and 4.6 billion in 2011).

In 2012, ISO budget for the Army funded the operations and maintenance of combat units and intelligence. It included a 22.2 billion peso compensation and payment for the separation of benefits of deactivated Citizen Armed Formed Geographical Unit (CAFGU)²⁸ and a provision for 2 billion pesos

²⁸ DND Circular No. 4 (October 27, 2005); The CAFGU program of the government receive personal service allocations due to deactivated members as part of the Army's internal security operations.

worth of subsistence allowance. Aside from personnel services, capital outlay amounting to 148.4 million²⁹ was included in the allocation for ISO. (Please refer to Annex 13)

The Aquino government budgeted nearly the same amount of monies for ISO in 2011.

The Navy, on the one hand, appropriated an average of 6.7 billion pesos for ground, intelligence and surface operations in 2011 and 2012. In 2012 naval ISO allocations included a capital outlay³⁰ worth 117 million pesos. (Please refer to Annexes 11 & 12)

The Air Force budgeted 6.3 billion pesos (including a 125.4 million peso capital outlay) for air and ground combat services, base defense and security services and combat support services in 2012, a 37 per cent increase from its previous year's allocation of 4.6 billion pesos.

Relative to the allocations made by the other Services for ISO, the Air Force's budget has by far the least allocation for internal security in 2012. (Please refer to Annexes 11 & 12)

In addition to the size of appropriation made for ISO, capital outlays for the years 2011 and 2012 have been dedicated to ISO:

- a. Capital outlay (CO) worth 148.4 million pesos allocated for the Army's ISO operations and maintenance of combat services (CAFGU-related) in 2012 and 20.7 million for the same purpose in 2011
- b. 125.4 million pesos CO for ISO of the Air Force in 2012
- c. 117.4 million pesos CO for ISO (ground operations, intelligence and surface operations) of the Navy in 2012

Other Mission Thrusts

Support to National Development

In support of the internal security thrust is development. "Support to national development" has justified allocations intended for the infrastructure and engineering work of the Services.

A second priority mission of the AFP Major Services, it received a range of 5 to 6 per cent share in the total operations budget of the Services, the second highest budgetary allocation in operations after ISO, amounting to an average of 1.6 billion peso allocation in the Army in 2011 to 2012.

On the other hand, the Navy's development allocation was pegged at an

²⁹ furniture, fixture , buildings and structures, office equipment, transportation and machineries; Source: GAA 2012, www.dbm.gov.ph.

³⁰ Land and improvements outlay, furniture, fixture , buildings and structures, office equipment, transportation and machineries and public infrastructures. Source GAA 2012. www.dbm.gov.ph

average of about 360 million pesos for “port harbor services and ground mobility operations and maintenance and research”. Support to national development of the Air Force received an allocation of 469.5 million pesos including capital outlay³¹ worth 8.5 million in 2012. This was an increase of the Air Force’s allocation of 372.3 million pesos of the previous year.

Territorial Defense

Territorial defense, considered as the AFP’s traditional role and constitutional mandate received a budget of only 1 billion from the Army,³² 861 million from the Air Force and 195 million pesos from the Navy, thereby relegating it to a secondary position in the hierarchy of missions during the first two budget years of the Aquino administration (Please refer to Annexes 11 & 12).

Its budget share in the total operations budget of the Services in 2011-2012 has been about 3 per cent share in the Army’s and Navy’s budgets and 13 per cent share in the budget of the Air Forces³³.

In 2012, the Army appropriated a budget of 1 billion pesos, twenty-six times smaller than the size of its ISO budget for the “operation and maintenance of reserve units and reservist affairs” to operationalize territorial defense. On the one hand, the budget posted an increase from the previous year’s allocation of 658 million pesos. (Please refer to Annexes 11 & 12)

Compared to the billion peso allocation for ISO, the Navy’s territorial defense average allocation for 2011 to 2012 which measured at 191.6 million pesos (without capital outlay) was geared towards the provision and maintenance of surface combatant ships, the Coast Watch South and support for retirees and reservists.

The Air Forces’ appropriation for territorial defense accorded it a level of importance. After ISO, this mission thrust received the higher budgetary allocation than development. The Air Force also appropriated a much higher budget share for territorial defense than did the Army and the Navy.

As opposed to the importance given by the Army and the Navy to the development thrust, the Air Force budgeted a much higher allocation for territorial defense that included a 3.3 million peso capital outlay in 2012 and 903 million pesos in the previous year,³⁴ assigning it an average budget share of 13 per cent in 2011 to 2012. This was distinct from the Army and the Navy’s allocation of 3 per cent share for territorial defense for the same period.

Capital outlays for territorial defense in 2012 were obtained from the 6.8 million peso fund for the territorial defense operations (reserve and reservist units)

31 For Buildings and Structures Outlay, Transportation Equipment, and Machineries and Equipment

32 Reservists receive funding under the territorial defense budget item of the Army.

33 The Air Force allotted the bigger share for territorial defense (13 per cent) of the three Major Services in 2011 and 2012.

34

of the Army and the 3.3 million pesos for the Air Force's territorial defense mission.

AFP Modernization

The AFP Modernization fund infused in the GHQ budgets in 2011 and 2012 also aligned to territorial defense. Worth five billion pesos for the years 2011 and 2012, it inflated the budget of General Headquarters³⁵ to 39 per cent share of the AFP budget from 10 per cent during the latter years of the Arroyo administration from 2007 to 2010. With the modernization fund in place, GHQ budget rose by 283 per cent in 2011 to 2012. (Please refer to Annex 16)

Disaster response³⁶

Disaster response received the least priority among the six mission thrusts of the Major Services, replicating the low level of prioritization it received during the Arroyo presidency.

For the years 2011 and 2012, the Navy appropriated an average of 586,000 pesos for disaster response, the lowest budgetary allocation compared to all other mission thrusts.

The more sizeable Air Force's appropriation of 241 million pesos for disaster response and relief services included a 7 million capital outlay. The 2012 budget was 57 per cent higher than the previous year's appropriation of 159 million pesos.

On the other hand, the Army's disaster response budget for the same period compared to the size of the Air Force's capital outlay of 7 million pesos.³⁷ (Please refer to Annexes 13,14, & 15)

External Relations and Military Diplomacy

In 2011 to 2012, international defense and security engagement (IDSE)³⁷ and international humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping (IHAP) obtained less than one per cent share in the budgets of the Army and the Navy. This is with exception to the Air Force which allocated 3 per cent share of its operations budget for disaster response(Please refer to Chart 5 and Annexes 13, 14, & 15).


35 President Benigno S. Aquino III ordered Special Allotment Releases Orders of 5 billion pesos for the 2011 budget and another 5 billion for the 2010 appropriations as he announced the signing of the New AFP Modernization Act last December 11, 2012. Secretary of Department of Budget Management, Florencio Abad stated that planned purchases and procurement will be made for the Army, Navy and the Air Force from the 2010 budget. The modernization fund from the 2011 Budget will be used to finance civil military operations, health service and disaster response activities. (Source: <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/81913/president-aquino-orders-release-of-p10-billion-for-afp-modernization-program>, retrieved December 25, 2012).

36 The historically insignificant share of disaster response in the Operations budgets of the Service Units has been shared by two other mission thrusts of the AFP: the international defense and security engagement and international assistance and peacekeeping.

37 Disaster response received a lower allocation than international defense and security engagement which received 137 million budget for "joint training and exchange programs".

38 Exercise *Balikatan* (US and PH bilateral military exercises) through joint exercises continue to receive budgetary allocation under the international defense and security engagements operations of the Major Services of the AFP.

Chart 5. Average Percentage Share of the Operations Budget of the 3 Major Services (2007-2010)



AFP budgets and Mission Thrusts under Arroyo

The second term of Arroyo as president was defined by a re-assertion of the counter-insurgency program, anchoring the military's internal security operations on the state's and society's development goals. Heightened ISO, however, was intended to eventually re-direct the military to external defense.

The Primacy of ISO from 2007 to 2010

The AFP's average budget from 2007 to 2010 was 63.7 billion pesos. As in the Aquino budget, ISO held the primacy of resource allocation (Please refer to Annexes 7–10), constituting 92 per cent of the total operations budget of the Army and the Navy and about 83 per cent of the total operations budget of the Air Force.

In 2007 to 2010, the ISO allocations of 21.4 billion pesos of the Army, 5.7 billion pesos budget of the Navy and 5.3 billion pesos of the Air Force underscored the hegemony of land based Armed Forces and the pivotal domestic security role of the military.

Yearly growth rates of the AFP budgets were driven mainly by increasing amounts of ISO-related capital outlays appropriated by the Major Service Units (Please refer to Annexes 7 – 10).

In 2007, a four per cent increase in the AFP budget to 47.4 billion pesos was attributed to an increase in capital outlay for the Army's ISO operations from 10 million pesos to 94 million pesos. The AFP budget was inflated by an increase in capital outlay allocations of 28.2 million pesos (from 10 million pesos previously) for the operations ISO and in addition, territorial defense, disaster response and development thrusts of the Air Force. During the same period, the Navy received infusions of capital outlays for general administration and support and ISO operations from 10 million pesos of the previous year to 88.5 million pesos. The GHQ appropriated 130 million pesos for administration and support to operations, ISO and in addition, territorial defense operations.

A 3.4 per cent increase from the previous budget to 49 billion pesos in 2008 was attributed mainly from capital outlay worth 1 billion pesos earmarked by General Headquarters (GHQ) for the ISO oriented *Kalayaan Barangays* Program in 2008.

The AFP's budget of 54.4 billion pesos, 11 per cent higher than the previous budget was attributed to a 41 million peso Veterans Medical Center budget earmarked in 2009 for the hospitalization and medical treatment of soldiers. About 30 million pesos of capital outlay as payment for the acquisition of real estate properties in Barrio Canigaran, Wescom Road, Puerto Princesa City in Palawan was appropriated by the Navy. In addition, the budget indicated a 25 million peso appropriation for planning, command, and management of joint military operations of the GHQ. In 2010, the Navy budgeted 105 million pesos for the construction of a naval base at Casiguran, Aurora for the Philippine Navy.

Other Mission Thrusts

The Army and the Navy funded the development thrust with respective average allocations of 1.2 billion pesos and 357 million pesos in 2007 to 2010.

On the other hand, the Army's average allocation for disaster response of 273.6 million constituted only 1 per cent of its operations budget for 2007 to 2010.

Air Force's disaster response budget was at the same level as the Army's while the Navy's negligible budget of half a million pesos for disaster response, registering .01 per cent share in the Navy's operations, was reflective of the AFP's under prioritization for this mission.

Interestingly, the Army's budget of 169 million pesos for disaster response was higher than the allocation made for territorial defense in the same period. It also mirrored the budgetary direction of the Navy for external and territorial defense.

The Air Force's 531.5 million peso appropriation for territorial defense out budgeted the two Service Units in 2007 to 2010.

It was the Army, on the one hand that budgeted almost 50 million pesos, the biggest appropriation for international security (or .09 per cent of its operations budget) among the Services, while maintaining the smallest peacekeeping budget at an average of 18.5 million pesos compared to the Navy and the Air Force with respective allocations of 27 million and 28 million pesos (or .43 to .44 per cent shares in their operations).

Operations of the Service Units: Pre-DSOM years (2001 to 2006)

Reinforced by the fight against insurgency, the Army's biggest spending in the pre-DSOM years was in combat operations with emphasis on the personnel service requirements for directing and maintaining the land forces. Spending for combat operations averaged 90 per cent share of the entire operations budget.

Only one per cent of this share went to finance the MOOE requirements of land operations.

The Navy’s and Air Force’s biggest operations spending went to the repair and maintenance of equipment. The other half of its operations budget financed actual operations.

The Air Force, as in the Army, used almost two-thirds of its total operations budget for actual operations. The other third was spent to finance logistical services.

Ironically, intelligence and civil-military operations which were crucial features that informed the AFP’s *OPLAN Bantay Laya* military strategy for 2002 to 2006 did not receive budgetary priority³⁹ across the Services (Please refer to Charts 6-8).

Chart 6. Average Percentage Share of Army’s Operations Budget against Total Army Operations Budget by Expenditure category






Chart 7. Average Percentage Share of Air Force’s Operations Budget against Total Air Force Operations Budget by Expenditure category



³⁹ The Service units did not prioritize intelligence during the DSOM budget years, from 2007 till the end of the Arroyo years in 2010. Intelligence had an average share of about less than one per cent of the total budget of the Army and the Air Force. It has a relatively higher average 0.2 per cent share in the Navy’s budget and 0.8 per cent of the GHQ’s budget.

Chart 8. Average Percentage Share of Navy's Operations Budget against Total Navy Operations Budget by Expenditure category



Before the institutionalization of DSOM in 2007, the earlier budgets of the AFP included the following itemized programs, each of which received insignificant AFP budget shares relative to the budgets of the Service Units:⁴⁰

- Presidential Security Group (1 per cent of the total AFP budget)
- Philippine Military Academy (1 per cent)
- AFP Medical Center (1 per cent)
- Retirees and Reservist Affair Program
- Exercise *Balikatan*⁴¹
- Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units⁴² (2 per cent)
- Self Reliant Defense Posture Program⁴³
- Cordillera People's Liberation Army Integration Program
- Moro National Liberation Army Integration Program
- AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund (6 per cent)
- On Base Housing Program

While some of these programs such as the CPLA and MNLF Integration programs have expired, some have continued to receive funding in the current budgets of the Services.⁴⁴ (Please refer to Chart 9)

⁴⁰ The percentages are the budget shares of each of the program prior to the implementation of DSOM in 2007.


⁴¹ In 2007 the budget for bilateral exercises was split among allotments for International Defense and Security Engagements (IDSE). As a separate program of the AFP it served the operational requirements of military personnel participating in the 'conduct of bilateral exercises.' The item appeared as a specific program of the AFP as well as programs of the Major Services: As 'Joint Training Exercises and Exchange Programs' of the Philippine Army; as 'IDSE' of the Philippine Air Force and as 'Bilateral exercises' program of the Philippine Navy. From 2008 until 2012, AFP's IDSE program was incorporated into the budget of the GHQ as 'support to operations – joint forces preparedness – Exercise *Balikatan*' in 2008 to 2009 and as 'support to operations – joint forces preparedness-bilateral engagements' in 2010 to 2012. In addition to this, each of the Service Units of the AFP made allocations for IDSE in their Operations budget.

⁴² The CAFGU program functioned from 2001 to 2006. In the 2008 budget, a special provision for the CAFGUs provided that the amount appropriated under A3a1 or ISO operations of the Army shall be used for the compensation of CAFGUs including payment of separation benefits not exceeding one year subsistence allowance for members who will be deactivated.

⁴³ Since 2007, the program has served as a project of the Office of Secretary of National Defense (DND Proper).

⁴⁴ Self-reliant defense posture program has received funding from the Office of the DND Secretary.

Chart 9. Average Percentage Share of AFP Bureaus and Programs Budget against Total AFP Budget (2001 - 2012)



The 2011 and 2012 defense allocations of the Aquino administration reflect a slow transitioning of the government to a post-conflict scenario where the AFP departs from internal security operations and shifts to its constitutionally mandated role of defending the national territory from external threats. Except for the appropriations made to realize the AFP Modernization Program, the most recent budgets of 2011 and 2012 have continued to advance the highly contested Philippine Army's role in domestic security provision.

However, it is the AFP's implementation of the Internal Peace and Security Plan *Bayanihan*, and the current administration's peace and security agenda that have created openings for re-examining the implications of the future shift in budgetary priorities from internal security to territorial defense on the role of the Armed Forces and on national security policy. At the same time, this movement needs to take into consideration the evolving geostrategic background defined by the challenge of a stronger China and the emergence of non-traditional security threats of piracy, smuggling, human and drug trafficking and terrorism.

The interplay of internal and external environments for AFP modernization, however needs to be couched on our overall development goals and priorities. In addition are the normative questions of how the Philippine society will seek to restructure and appropriate a more democratic role for the Armed Forces after insurgency given historical and current socio-economic factors.

Hence policy debates should not alone be limited to the return of the AFP to its traditional role of external defense and the return of ISO to the Philippine National Police. Instead the debate should also seek to explore the operational boundaries of the missions of territorial / external defense and internal security as a way of revisiting the ideal of a modern and professional armed forces. Defining and framing territorial and external defense should also be informed by social and economic imperatives that will ultimately structure public choice and resource allocation priorities.

This is an opportunity for the Philippine society to create a repertoire or a combination of mission roles for the military outside of the current confines of the traditional and non-traditional roles of external and internal defense. After all, the history by which the state has re-structured the role of the Philippine Armed Forces has already challenged traditional role expectations. In other words, the non-traditional military role based on internal security and development that defined the mission of the AFP since Marcos's years has already been a critique to the traditionally expected external defense-based role of the military, a role that civil and military scholars, such as Samuel Huntington laid out for

developed societies but modelled by post-colonial societies with different trajectories of civil and military operations. Indeed, given that the prevalent role of the military in post-colonial and democratizing societies such as the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia has revolved around internal security and development, for the host of democratizing and transitioning societies in ASEAN, the non-traditional norm has evolved as the “new normal”. Hence it may be more productive discursively to examine the imperatives and the conditions for a post conflict military role and to deepen discourse based on democratic control of the military.

Military modernization to advance territorial defense anchored on deterrence⁴⁵ will require massive infusion of capital and financial resources that is extractive and financially draining for a modernizing and developing state as much as it distracts the state from meeting the goals of human security, diplomacy and development. On the other hand, the modernization of the Philippine Armed Forces through the development of peacekeeping / international humanitarian and / or international security capabilities will entail force modernization but it will not be particularly built on deterrence and hence is not aimed at a particular revisionist state but at the maintenance of peace through international peacekeeping and international humanitarian assistance. Based on the principle and ideal of cooperative security, it will require the development of able domestic armed forces with the capability for distant and instant deployment abroad.⁴⁶

The model based on expeditionary peacekeeping or on international defense and alliance engagements has evolved among the armed forces in democratizing states of Europe.⁴⁷ Anchored on regional cooperative security, it will require the modernization of capability and forces but is less likely to pressure the state to meet the time bound goals of deterrence or to embroil it in a competitive build up of arms.⁴⁸ Pursuing this goal will re-orient the state's conduct of military diplomacy abroad and of external relations. Given that the armed forces is not being positioned to confront or fight another state, the mission will compel the development of public diplomatic channels that will drive the foreign office at home to take a lead role in addressing territorial contests.

The quest for a more democratic role of the armed forces should include the space to recast traditional notions of security and of external threat. Ideas of internal security have been anchored on armed threat which tend to downplay threats to the environment, disease, disaster and terrorism.

45 Lamentillo, Anna Mae Yu (June 20, 2012) Philippinr Navy takes steps toward national defense. Philippine Daily Inquirer. Retrieved from <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/262592/news/nation/phl-navy-takes-steps-towards-national-defense>

46 For an in depth discussion of military roles as they are constructed and practiced in Europe, see Edmunds, Timothy. (2006). What are armed forces for? The changing nature of military roles in Europe. *International Affairs*, 82, 6, 1059-1075. For cases in Asia, see Alagappa, Muthiah. (2001). *Military professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and empirical perspectives*. Honolulu: HI: East-West Center.

47 Ibid.

48 A critique of the Aquino administration defense policy and of the AFP emanates from their vague operationalization of “modest deterrence” which is proposed in response to the intrusions by Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea and to Chinese revisionist polices in these waters.

A careful consideration of these forces in resource allocation will dovetail to a reprioritization for disaster response. This may have an impact on how resources which have been mainly allocated for ISO are to be re-appropriated, considering the changing complexion of threats to security at home.

As we anchor these considerations on the larger human security and development priorities and the current socio-economic imperatives, the Philippine state is called to strike a balance between traditional and non-traditional military missions and construct a post conflict military role that is more aligned with the ideal of democratic control of armed forces. This calls for a re-assessment of the priorities for military diplomatic roles such as international humanitarian assistance / peacekeeping and international defense and security arrangements and for disaster risk management.

ANNEX 1: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2001)				
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	61,561,000	280,883,000	30,400,000	372,844,000
B. Government Arsenal	129,738,000	116,739,000	19,400,000	265,877,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	26,939,000	39,145,000	6,077,000	72,161,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	40,831,000	47,324,000	49,306,000	137,461,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	11,331,557,000	292,563,000	30,000,000	11,654,120,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	7,122,000	13,967,000	5,500,000	26,589,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	277,581,000	251,555,000	40,000,000	569,136,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	11,441,950,000	1,709,484,000	40,000,000	13,191,434,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	3,507,957,000	1,964,119,000	47,249,000	5,519,325,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	3,983,090,000	2,006,101,000	25,000,000	6,014,191,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	2,630,027,000	1,582,121,000		4,212,148,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group	226,064,000	95,114,000		321,178,000
F.6 Philippine Military Academy	382,361,000	102,349,000	20,000,000	504,710,000
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center	315,130,000	424,848,000	3,000,000	742,978,000
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program		85,861,000		85,861,000
F.9 Exercise Balikatan				-
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units	848,026,000	19,546,000		867,572,000
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program		25,528,000		25,528,000
F.12 CPLA Integration Program				-
F.13 MNLF Integration Program	744,595,000	383,547,000		1,128,142,000
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund	8,304,119,000	50,000,000		8,354,119,000
F.15 On-Base Housing Program			38,556,000	38,556,000
TOTAL	44,258,648,000	9,490,794,000	354,488,000	54,103,930,000

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act (2000); RA9137- Supplemental Appropriation for FY 2001

ANNEX 2: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2002)				
XVII. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	87,096,000	239,790,000	9,910,000	336,796,000
B. Government Arsenal	142,567,000	96,213,000	200,000	238,980,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	20,948,000	22,692,000	5,000,000	48,640,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	52,117,000	23,162,000		75,279,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	12,527,887,000	212,339,000	5,445,000	12,745,671,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	8,165,000	7,723,000	1,000,000	16,888,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	302,039,000	240,962,000	2,100,000	545,101,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	13,651,262,000	2,089,567,000	151,395,000	15,892,224,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	3,818,816,000	2,192,063,000		6,010,879,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	4,770,261,000	2,075,513,000	37,140,000	6,882,914,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	2,985,662,000	1,396,792,000	10,000,000	4,392,454,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group	248,094,000	95,330,000		343,424,000
F.6 Philippine Military Academy	406,328,000	83,516,000	10,000,000	499,844,000
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center	384,423,000	366,087,000		750,510,000
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program		70,406,000		70,406,000
F.9 Exercise Balikatan		96,295,000		96,295,000
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units	1,369,484,000	65,314,000		1,434,798,000
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program		20,933,000		20,933,000
F.12 CPLA Integration Program	42,451,000	43,549,000		86,000,000
F.13 MNLF Integration Program	439,335,000	218,534,000		657,869,000
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund	9,098,476,000			9,098,476,000
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	50,355,411,000	9,656,780,000	232,190,000	60,244,381,000

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act (2002)

ANNEX 3: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2003)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	80,666,000	179,942,000		260,608,000
B. Government Arsenal	139,686,000	72,257,000	200,000	212,143,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	20,399,000	17,051,000		37,450,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	48,587,000	17,633,000		66,220,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	77,100,000	159,411,000		236,511,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	8,523,000	5,798,000		14,321,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	300,929,000	251,006,000	5,000,000	556,935,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	16,255,679,000	1,908,403,000	27,500,000	18,191,582,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	4,187,567,000	1,652,927,000		5,840,494,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	5,268,849,000	1,556,657,000	840,000	6,826,346,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	3,233,586,000	1,110,162,000	5,000,000	4,348,748,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group	275,096,000	78,998,000		354,094,000
F.6 Philippine Military Academy	444,469,000	62,675,000	7,000,000	514,144,000
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center	400,002,000	366,087,000		766,089,000
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program		52,805,000		52,805,000
F.9 Exercise Balikatan		72,221,000		72,221,000
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units	1,369,484,000	48,986,000		1,418,470,000
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program		15,700,000	35,000,000	50,700,000
F.12 CPLA Integration Program	47,451,000	32,662,000		80,113,000
F.13 MNLF Integration Program	110,683,000	27,864,000		138,547,000
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				-
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				-
TOTAL	32,268,756,000	7,689,245,000	80,540,000	40,038,541,000

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act (2003)

ANNEX 4: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2004)				
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	80,666,000	179,942,000		260,608,000
B. Government Arsenal	139,686,000	72,257,000	200,000	212,143,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	20,399,000	17,051,000		37,450,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	48,587,000	17,633,000		66,220,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	77,100,000	159,411,000		236,511,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	8,523,000	5,798,000		14,321,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	300,929,000	251,006,000	5,000,000	556,935,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	16,255,679,000	1,908,403,000	27,500,000	18,191,582,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	4,187,567,000	1,652,927,000		5,840,494,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	5,268,849,000	1,556,657,000	840,000	6,826,346,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	3,233,586,000	1,110,162,000	5,000,000	4,348,748,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group	275,096,000	78,998,000		354,094,000
F.6 Philippine Military Academy	444,469,000	62,675,000	7,000,000	514,144,000
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center	400,002,000	366,087,000		766,089,000
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program		52,805,000		52,805,000
F.9 Exercise Balikatan		72,221,000		72,221,000
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units	1,369,484,000	48,986,000		1,418,470,000
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program		15,700,000	35,000,000	50,700,000
F.12 CPLA Integration Program	47,451,000	32,662,000		80,113,000
F.13 MNLF Integration Program	110,683,000	27,864,000		138,547,000
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				-
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				-
TOTAL	32,268,756,000	7,689,245,000	80,540,000	40,038,541,000

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act (2003)

ANNEX5: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2005)				
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	80,111,000	208,475,000	10,000	288,596,000
B. Government Arsenal	137,891,000	116,332,000	10,000	254,233,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	20,864,000	17,659,000	10,000	38,533,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	52,388,000	23,500,000	10,000	75,898,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	78,420,000	195,975,000	10,000	274,405,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	8,930,000	7,720,000	10,000	16,660,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	300,948,000	233,421,000	10,000	534,379,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	18,656,673,000	2,695,670,000	10,000,000	21,362,343,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	4,573,804,000	2,201,536,000	10,000,000	6,785,340,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	5,799,681,000	2,135,542,000	10,000,000	7,945,223,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	3,489,590,000	1,477,882,000	10,000,000	4,977,472,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group	303,287,000	106,138,000	3,000,000	412,425,000
F.6 Philippine Military Academy	484,604,000	83,556,000	10,000	568,170,000
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center	418,183,000	366,077,000	10,000	784,270,000
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program		70,406,000		70,406,000
F.9 Exercise Balikatan		96,295,000		96,295,000
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units	1,369,484,000	65,314,000		1,434,798,000
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program		20,933,000		20,933,000
F.12 CPLA Integration Program	53,007,000	43,549,000		96,556,000
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	35,827,865,000	10,165,980,000	43,090,000	46,036,935,000

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act (2005)

ANNEX6: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2006)				
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	80,111,000	208,475,000	10,000	288,596,000
B. Government Arsenal	137,891,000	116,332,000	10,000	254,233,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	20,864,000	17,659,000	10,000	38,533,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	52,388,000	23,500,000	10,000	75,898,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	1,280,420,000	195,975,000	10,000	1,476,405,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	8,930,000	7,720,000	10,000	16,660,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	300,948,000	233,421,000	10,000	534,379,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	18,656,673,000	2,695,670,000	10,000,000	21,362,343,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	4,573,804,000	2,201,536,000	10,000,000	6,785,340,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	5,799,681,000	2,135,542,000	10,000,000	7,945,223,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	3,489,590,000	1,477,882,000	10,000,000	4,977,472,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group	303,287,000	106,138,000	3,000,000	412,425,000
F.6 Philippine Military Academy	484,604,000	83,556,000	10,000	568,170,000
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center	418,183,000	366,077,000	10,000	784,270,000
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program		70,406,000		70,406,000
F.9 Exercise Balikatan		96,295,000		96,295,000
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units	1,369,484,000	65,314,000		1,434,798,000
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program		20,933,000		20,933,000
F.12 CPLA Integration Program	53,007,000	43,549,000		96,556,000
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				-
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				-
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	37,029,865,000	10,165,980,000	43,090,000	47,238,935,000

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act (2005); RA9358 – Supplemental Appropriation for FY 2006

ANNEX7: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2007)

XVII. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	83,189,000	490,000,000	3,354,000	576,543,000
B. Government Arsenal	142,961,000	132,440,000	2,337,000	277,738,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	22,131,000	20,050,000	11,253,000	53,434,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	58,384,000	25,174,000	10,000	83,568,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	80,596,000	209,933,000	80,000	290,609,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	9,998,000	8,270,000	164,000	18,432,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	317,903,000	302,644,000	10,000	620,557,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	21,927,657,000	3,594,197,000	94,103,000	25,615,957,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	4,892,390,000	3,057,991,000	28,213,000	7,978,594,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	6,147,023,000	2,951,353,000	88,505,000	9,186,881,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	1,853,285,000	1,676,099,000	130,792,000	3,660,176,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group	6,206,000	109,950,000	7,697,000	123,853,000
F.6 Philippine Military Academy	57,445,000	109,955,000	16,455,000	183,855,000
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center	185,426,000	385,278,000	3,699,000	574,403,000
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program		54,381,000		54,381,000
F.9 Exercise Balikatan		42,740,000		42,740,000
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units				
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program				
F.12 CPLA Integration Program				
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	35,784,594,000	13,170,455,000	386,672,000	49,341,721,000

Source: Official Gazette, General Appropriation Act (2007)

Annex 8: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2008)				
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	84,137,000	436,194,000		520,331,000
B. Government Arsenal	143,322,000	134,555,000		277,877,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	22,196,000	25,902,000	16,117,000	64,215,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	58,644,000	25,306,000		83,950,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	80,850,000	216,816,000	80,000	297,746,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	10,021,000	10,246,000	164,000	20,431,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	319,819,000	309,515,000		629,334,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	22,158,170,000	3,936,469,000		26,094,639,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	4,893,357,000	3,187,025,000		8,080,382,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	6,147,386,000	3,081,152,000		9,228,538,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	2,111,875,000	2,500,287,000	1,017,522,000	5,629,684,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group				
F.6 Philippine Military Academy				
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center				
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program				
F.9 Exercise Balikatan				
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units				
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program				
F.12 CPLA Integration Program				
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	36,029,777,000	13,863,467,000	1,033,883,000	50,927,127,000

Source: Department of Budget and Management, General Appropriation Act (2008)

ANNEX 9: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2009)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	82,553,000	443,895,000		526,448,000
B. Government Arsenal	152,412,000	207,545,000	1,640,000	361,597,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	24,951,000	28,682,000		53,633,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	63,407,000	26,081,000		89,488,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	84,219,000	222,515,000		306,734,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	11,494,000	11,839,000	2,700,000	26,033,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	358,566,000	318,857,000	41,000,000	718,423,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	25,533,110,000	4,320,892,000		29,854,002,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	5,482,206,000	3,466,001,000		8,948,207,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	6,977,875,000	3,464,887,000	30,000,000	10,472,762,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	2,397,374,000	2,703,427,000	25,000,000	5,125,801,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group				
F.6 Philippine Military Academy				
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center				
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program				
F.9 Exercise Balikatan				
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units				
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program				
F.12 CPLA Integration Program				
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	41,168,167,000	15,214,621,000	100,340,000	56,483,128,000

Source: Department of Budget and Management, General Appropriation Act (2009)

ANNEX 10: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2010)				
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	81,174,000.00	382,948,000.00		464,122,000
B. Government Arsenal	147,555,000	214,983,000		362,538,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	25,237,000	27,445,000	12,115,000	64,797,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	58,930,000	26,598,000		85,528,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	83,157,000	225,152,000		308,309,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	11,147,000	12,098,000		23,245,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	360,799,000	328,644,000		689,443,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	25,580,251,000	4,931,858,000		30,512,109,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	5,499,717,000	3,762,628,000		9,262,345,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	6,996,451,000	3,518,911,000	105,000,000	10,620,362,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	2,408,914,000	2,838,542,000	30,000,000	5,277,456,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group				
F.6 Philippine Military Academy				
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center				
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program				
F.9 Exercise Balikatan				
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units				
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program				
F.12 CPLA Integration Program				
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	41,253,332,000	16,269,807,000	147,115,000	57,670,254,000

Source: Department of Budget and Management, General Appropriation Act (2010)

ANNEX 11: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2011)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	86,918,000	223,497,000		310,415,000
B. Government Arsenal	138,097,000	272,846,000	10,000,000	420,943,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	26,752,000	29,792,000		56,544,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	63,395,000	27,495,000		90,890,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	12,763,067,000	249,769,000		13,012,836,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services	11,515,000	12,402,000		23,917,000
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	395,562,000	371,589,000	53,000,000	820,151,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	28,436,815,000	5,130,454,000	20,752,000	33,588,021,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	6,096,703,000	4,038,242,000		10,134,945,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	7,682,113,000	3,672,259,000		11,354,372,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	26,634,650,000	3,055,237,000	5,002,000,000	34,691,887,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group				
F.6 Philippine Military Academy				
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center				
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program				
F.9 Exercise Balikatan				
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units				
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program				
F.12 CPLA Integration Program				
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	82,335,587,000	17,083,582,000	5,085,752,000	104,504,921,000

Source: Department of Budget and Management, General Appropriation Act (2011)

ANNEX 12: Summary of Department of National Defense Budget according to Expenditure (2012)				
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE	PERSONNEL SERVICES	MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING EXPENSES	CAPITAL OUTLAYS	TOTAL APPROPRIATION
A. DND Proper (Office of the Secretary)	99,612,000	350,703,000	232,500,000	682,815,000
B. Government Arsenal	150,710,000	468,583,000	26,367,000	645,660,000
C. National Defense College of the Philippines	20,996,000	30,511,000		51,507,000
D. Office of Civil Defense	72,254,000	1,149,305,000		1,221,559,000
E.1 Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (Proper)	7,188,125,000	265,972,000		7,454,097,000
E.2 Military Shrines Services				-
E.3 Veterans Memorial Medical Center	389,574,000	386,294,000	33,000,000	808,868,000
F.1 Philippine Army (Land Forces)	29,923,780,000	5,331,087,000	158,670,000	35,413,537,000
F.2 Philippine Air Force (Air Forces)	6,280,925,000	4,094,263,000	180,250,000	10,555,438,000
F.3 Philippine Navy (Maritime Forces)	8,122,188,000	3,845,402,000	156,848,000	12,124,438,000
F.4 General Headquarters (Proper)	29,671,196,000	3,204,664,000	5,071,243,000	37,947,103,000
F.5 Philippine Security Group				
F.6 Philippine Military Academy				
F.7 Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center				
F.8 Retirees and Reservist Affair Program				
F.9 Exercise Balikatan				
F.10 Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units				
F.11 Self-Reliant Defense Posture Program				
F.12 CPLA Integration Program				
F.13 MNLF Integration Program				
F.14 AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund				
F.15 On-Base Housing Program				
TOTAL	81,919,360,000	19,126,784,000	5,858,878,000	106,905,022,000

Source: Department of Budget and Management, General Appropriation Act (2012)

ANNEX 13: Total Budget Summary of AFP – ARMY from 2001 - 2012

AFP - ARMY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
A. PROGRAMS												
I. General Administration and Support												
a. General Administration and Support Services	170,444,000	546,965,000	243,189,000	243,189,000	295,968,000	295,968,000						
b. Force-level, Central Command and Control							3,190,941,000	3,016,967,000	3,513,679,000	3,529,038,000	1,727,171,000	1,741,926,000
Sub-total, General Administration and Support	170,444,000	546,965,000	243,189,000	243,189,000	295,968,000	295,968,000	3,190,941,000	3,016,967,000	3,513,679,000	3,529,038,000	1,727,171,000	1,741,926,000
II. Support to Operations												
a. Command and Management Services	71,613,000	80,038,000	169,961,000	169,961,000	178,581,000	178,581,000						
b. Health Services	138,648,000	142,294,000	119,626,000	119,626,000	160,440,000	160,440,000						
c. Logistical Services	10,759,000	10,780,000	8,085,000	8,085,000	10,780,000	10,780,000						
d. Strategic Planning and Int'l Commitments	7,658,000	7,453,000	5,590,000	5,590,000	7,453,000	7,453,000						
e. Education and Training Services	130,582,000	129,669,000	99,357,000	99,357,000	169,604,000	169,604,000						
f. Force Level, Training							511,819,000	339,450,000	386,278,000	388,870,000	645,634,000	657,972,000

AFP - ARMY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
g. Force Level, Support							750,729,000	1,019,972,000	1,191,408,000	1,207,383,000	1,968,479,000	2,020,024,000
Sub-total, Support to Operations	359,260,000	370,234,000	402,619,000	402,619,000	526,858,000	526,858,000	1,262,548,000	1,359,422,000	1,577,686,000	1,596,253,000	2,614,113,000	2,677,996,000
III. Operations												
a. Operations Services	11,330,845,000	13,199,299,000	16,322,295,000	16,322,295,000	18,787,725,000	18,787,725,000						
b. Military Intelligence Services	89,995,000	110,197,000	82,648,000	82,648,000	110,197,000	110,197,000						
c. Logistical Services	1,135,789,000	1,438,354,000	1,083,996,000	1,083,996,000	1,565,815,000	1,565,815,000						
d. Civil-Military Operations	65,101,000	75,780,000	56,835,000	56,835,000	75,780,000	75,780,000						
e. Internal Security Operations							19,552,286,000	19,732,786,000	22,961,709,000	23,578,559,000	26,829,660,000	28,185,256,000
f. Territorial Defense							302,360,000	3,087,000	3,087,000	371,307,000	658,760,000	1,043,446,000
g. Disaster Response Management							25,397,000	696,242,000	369,921,000	3,185,000	7,016,000	7,811,000
h. Support to National Development							1,197,836,000	1,197,606,000	1,377,596,000	1,382,450,000	1,608,666,000	1,607,903,000
i. International Defense and Security Engagements							49,630,000	49,574,000	49,574,000	50,543,000	131,198,000	137,894,000
j. International Humanitarian Assistance & Peacekeeping Operations							34,959,000	38,955,000	750,000	774,000	11,437,000	11,405,000

AFP - ARMY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Sub-total , Operations	12,621,730,000	14,823,630,000	17,545,774,000	17,545,774,000	20,539,517,000	20,539,517,000	21,162,468,000	21,718,250,000	24,762,637,000	25,386,818,000	29,246,737,000	30,993,715,000
Total Programs	13,151,434,000	15,740,829,000	18,191,582,000	18,191,582,000	21,362,343,000	21,362,343,000	25,615,957,000	26,094,639,000	29,854,002,000	20,512,109,000	33,588,021,000	35,413,637,000
B. PROJECT(S)												
I. Locally-Funded Project(s)												
a. Improvement of the Libingan ng mga Bayani	2,500,000											
b. Construction of Training Facilities	2,500,000											
c. Construction of Training Gymnasium	30,000,000											
d. Acquisition of Tactical Communication Equipment	5,000,000											
e. Acquisition of snap on tools equipment, communications equipments and information technology equipment		151,395,000										
Sub-total , Projects	40,000,000	151,395,000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	13,191,434,000	15,892,224,000	18,191,582,000	18,191,582,000	21,362,343,000	21,362,343,000	25,615,957,000	26,094,639,000	29,854,002,000	30,512,109,000	3,588,021,000	35,413,637,000

ANNEX 14: Total Budget Summary of AFP – Navy from 2001 - 2012

AFP - NAVY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
A. PROGRAMS												
I. General Administration and Support												
a. General Administration and Support Services	94,965,000	258,481,000	9,772,000	9,772,000	12,967,000	12,967,000						
b. Force-level, Central Command and Control							1,465,715,000	1,432,035,000	2,244,233,000	2,264,190,000	2,651,544,000	2,596,389,000
Sub Total, General Administration and Support	94,965,000	258,481,000	9,772,000	9,772,000	12,967,000	12,967,000	1,465,715,000	1,432,035,000	2,244,233,000	2,264,190,000	2,651,544,000	2,596,389,000
II. Support to Operations												
a. Command and Management Services	3,902,191,000	4,485,932,000	856,484,000	856,484,000	407,232,000	407,232,000						
b. Health Services	50,840,000	53,787,000	154,499,000	154,499,000	180,305,000	180,305,000						
c. Strategic Planning and International Commitment	3,692,000	3,692,000	2,769,000	2,769,000	3,692,000	3,692,000						
d. Education and Training Services	30,012,000	29,929,000	180,965,000	180,965,000	215,624,000	215,624,000						
e. Force Level, Training Services							538,204,000	553,857,000	774,731,000	778,350,000	699,105,000	726,660,000

AFP - NAVY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
f. Force Level, Support to Administrative Services							1,027,409,000	1,034,377,000	898,534,000	894,750,000	985,049,000	1,062,215,000
Subtotal, Support to Operations	3,986,735,000	4,573,340,000	1,194,717,000	1,194,717,000	806,853,000	806,853,000	1,565,613,000	1,588,234,000	1,673,265,000	1,673,100,000	1,684,154,000	1,788,875,000
III. Operations												
a. Direction of Naval Operations	180,457,000	183,726,000	3,625,291,000	3,625,291,000	4,530,851,000	4,530,851,000						
b. Military Intelligence Services	9,928,000	14,928,000	152,960,000	152,960,000	176,437,000	176,437,000						
c. Logistics Services	1,707,133,000	1,805,326,000	1,836,126,000	1,836,126,000	2,408,142,000	2,408,142,000						
d. Civil-Military Operations	9,973,000	9,973,000	7,480,000	7,480,000	9,973,000	9,973,000						
e. Internal Security Operations							5,639,511,000	5,645,892,000	5,925,444,000	5,968,252,000	6,424,529,000	7,102,429,000
f. Territorial Defense							149,950,000	166,167,000	176,148,000	191,148,000	188,020,000	195,380,000
g. Disaster Response Management							500,000	509,000	586,000	586,000	586,000	586,000
h. Support to National Development							323,277,000	352,288,000	377,610,000	77,610,000	360,675,000	365,915,000
i. International Defense and Security Engagements							16,609,000	16,609,000	16,609,000	16,609,000	16,609,000	6,609,000
j. International Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations							25,706,000	26,804,000	28,867,000	8,867,000	28,255,000	8,255,000

AFP - NAVY	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Sub-total , Operations	1,907,491,000	2,013,953,000	5,621,857,000	5,621,857,000	7,125,403,000	7,125,403,000	6,155,553,000	6,208,269,000	6,525,264,000	6,583,072,000	7,018,674,000	7,709,174,000
Total PRO-GRAMS	5,989,191,000	6,845,774,000	6,826,346,000	6,826,346,000	7,945,223,000	7,945,223,000	9,186,881,000	9,228,538,000	10,442,762,000	10,520,362,000	11,354,372,000	12,094,438,000
B. PROJECT(S)												
I. Locally-Fund- ed Project(s)												
a. Acquisition of Night Vision Goggles and Other Equipment for the Philip- pine Marines	20,000,000											
b. Acquisition of Equipment for Naval Special Warfare Group	5,000,000											
c. Acquisition of navigational communication equipment		36,300,000										
d. Acquisition of information technology equipment		840,000										
e. Payment for the Acquisition of Real Estate Properties in Barrio Canigaran, Wescom Road, Puerto Princesa, Palawan									30,000,000			30,000,000

AFP - AIRFORCE	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
a. General Administration and Support Services	97,993,000	180,728,000	61,306,000	61,306,000	66,748,000	66,748,000						
b. Force-Level, Central Command and Control							868,708,000	1,085,707,000	1,295,709,000	1,640,022,000	1,802,486,000	1,382,244,000
Sub Total, General Administration and Support	97,993,000	180,728,000	61,306,000	61,306,000	66,748,000	6,748,000	868,708,000	1,085,707,000	1,295,709,000	1,640,022,000	1,802,486,000	1,382,244,000
II. Support to Operations												
a. Command and Management Services	59,979,000	66,465,000	59,043,000	59,043,000	62,960,000	62,960,000						
b. Health Services	56,059,000	77,471,000	72,056,000	72,056,000	79,181,000	79,181,000						
c. Strategic Planning and International Commitment	8,284,000	8,534,000	7,342,000	7,342,000	8,963,000	8,963,000						
d. Education and Training Services	56,379,000	57,159,000	52,206,000	52,206,000	58,940,000	58,940,000						
e. Force Level, Training and Support							962,547,000	788,129,000	929,867,000	736,167,000	2,163,559,000	1,190,937,000
Subtotal, Support to Operations	180,701,000	209,629,000	190,647,000	190,647,000	210,044,000	210,044,000	962,547,000	788,129,000	929,867,000	736,167,000	2,163,559,000	1,190,937,000
III. Operations												
a. Operations Services	3,254,189,000	3,460,401,000	3,942,232,000	3,942,232,000	4,327,029,000	4,327,029,000						
b. Military Intelligence Services	55,958,000	55,915,000	45,360,000	45,360,000	56,399,000	56,399,000						

[illegible]

AFP - AIRFORCE	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
a. Anortization Payment of Agusta II Contract	46,749,000											
b. Procurement of Computer- based Training Simulators	500,000											
c. Simulator Training for C-130 Crews for the 220th Airlift Wing			5,000,000	5,000,000								
Sub-total , Project(s)	47,249,000	-	5,000,000	5,000,000								
TOTAL	5,519,325,000	6,010,879,000	5,840,494,000	5,840,494,000	6,785,340,000	6,785,340,000	7,978,594,000	8,080,382,000	8,948,207,000	9,262,345,000	10,134,945,000	10,555,438,000

ANNEX 16: Total Budget Summary of AFP – General Headquarters from 2001 – 2012

AFP - GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
A. PROGRAMS												
I. General Administration and Support												
a. General Administration and Support Services	379,485,000	159,520,000	5,004,000	225,004,000	257,695,000	257,695,000		620,411,000	680,543,000	796,801,000	24,889,855,000	28,076,138,000
b. Force-Level Central Command and Control						1,047,000,000	2,041,274,000					
Sub Total, General Administration and Support	379,485,000	159,520,000	225,004,000	225,004,000	257,695,000	1,304,695,000	2,041,274,000	620,411,000	680,543,000	796,801,000	24,889,855,000	28,076,138,000
II. Support to Operations												
a. Command and Management Services	1,348,424,000	2,031,710,000	2,436,749,000	2,436,749,000	2,609,134,000	2,609,134,000						
b. Health Services	225,972,000	177,396,000	155,687,000	155,687,000	191,279,000	191,279,000						
c. Operations Services	58,797,000	63,675,000	53,982,000	53,982,000	68,432,000	68,432,000						
d. Strategic Planning and International Commitment	32,751,000	22,876,000	17,157,000	17,157,000	22,876,000	22,876,000						
e. Education and Training Services	126,129,000	96,085,000	85,678,000	85,678,000	104,612,000	104,612,000						
f. Force-Level, Training							353,260,000					

AFP - GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
g. Force-Level, Support							558,153,000					
f. Delivering Frontline Capability								383,653,000	504,220,000	354,863,000	365,084,000	355,511,000
g. Pre-Com-mission Officer Training (PMA)								491,044,000	537,721,000	543,559,000	602,858,000	620,335,000
h. Tertiary Health Care (AFQMC)								713,339,000	850,099,000	923,534,000	1,091,493,000	1,098,104,000
Sub-total, Support to Operations	1,792,073,000	2,391,742,000	2,749,253,000	2,749,253,000	2,996,333,000	2,996,333,000	911,413,000	1,588,036,000	1,892,040,000	1,821,956,000	2,059,435,000	2,073,950,000
III. Operations												
a. Operations Services	394,087,000	371,131,000	339,808,000	339,808,000	408,154,000	408,154,000						
b. Military Intelligence Services	384,203,000	357,527,000	212,852,000	212,852,000	265,004,000	265,004,000						
c. Civil Military Operations	219,372,000	162,783,000	143,080,000	143,080,000	174,535,000	174,535,000						
d. Logistical Services	719,610,000	667,226,000	525,739,000	525,739,000	691,545,000	691,545,000						
e. Communication-Electronic Service	323,318,000	272,525,000	148,012,000	148,012,000	184,206,000	184,206,000						
e. Internal Security Operations							604,008,000					
f. Territorial Defense							57,231,000					
h. Support to National Development							36,155,000					

AFP - GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
i. International Defense and Security Engagements							4,010,000					
j. International Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations							6,085,000					
AFP - GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
k. Planning, Command, and Management of Joint Military Operations								2,263,863,000	2,391,079,000	2,462,274,000	2,568,225,000	2,604,936,000
l. Presidential Security (PSG)								149,374,000	162,139,000	166,425,000	174,372,000	192,079,000
Sub-total , Operations	2,040,590,000	1,831,192,000	1,369,491,000	1,369,491,000	1,723,444,000	1,723,444,000	707,489,000	2,413,237,000	2,553,218,000	2,628,699,000	2,742,597,000	2,797,015,000
Total , PRO-GRAMS	4,212,148,000	4,382,454,000	4,343,748,000	4,343,748,000	4,977,472,000	6,024,472,000	3,660,176,000	4,621,684,000	5,125,801,000	5,247,456,000	29,691,887,000	32,947,103,000
B. PROJECT (S)												
l. Locally - funded Project (s)												
a. On-Base Housing Program		10,000,000										
b. Upgrading of the ISAFP Intelligence Network			5,000,000	5,000,000								
c. Kalayaan Barangay Program								1,000,000,000				

AFP - GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
d. Construction of Training Hall for the AFP Dental Service including the acquisition equipment amounting to 2M								8,000,000				
e. Construction of a New Emergency Room, Recuperating Areas, Operating Room and Other Facilities for Soldiers at Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center										30,000,000		
f. AFP Modernization Program											5,000,000,000	5,000,000,000
Sub-total, Locally-Funded Project(s)	-	10,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	1,008,000,000	-	30,000,000	5,000,000,000	5,000,000,000
Total, PROJECT(s)	-	10,000,000	5,000,000	5,000,000	-	-	-	1,008,000,000	-	30,000,000	5,000,000,000	5,000,000,000
TOTAL	4,212,148,000	4,392,454,000	4,348,748,000	4,348,748,000	4,977,472,000	6,024,472,000	3,660,176,000	5,629,684,000	5,125,801,000	5,277,456,000	34,691,887,000	37,947,103,000

Source: Department of Budget and Management, General Appropriation Act (2001 – 2012)

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