


2010

Thailand Burma Border Consortium



PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT & CHRONIC POVERTY IN EASTERN BURMA / MYANMAR

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2010

**PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT
AND CHRONIC POVERTY
IN EASTERN BURMA / MYANMAR**

With Field Assessments and Situation Updates by:

**Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
Karen Office of Relief and Development
Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
Mon Relief and Development Committee
Shan Relief and Development Committee**

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* 'Burma' and 'Myanmar' are used interchangeably in this report

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(The General Assembly) calls upon the Government of Myanmar to ensure timely, safe, full and unhindered access to all parts of Myanmar, including conflict and border areas, for the United Nations, international humanitarian organizations and their partners and to cooperate fully with those actors to ensure that humanitarian assistance is delivered to all persons in need throughout the country, including displaced persons”

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 64/238, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 24 December 2009, paragraph 22



Executive Summary

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Regardless of the outcomes in Burma's first elections for twenty years, the incoming government and international community cannot afford to ignore the deteriorating socio-economic conditions that plague the country any longer. The urgency is particularly acute in eastern Burma where protracted armed conflict and restrictions on humanitarian access have exacerbated the legacy of chronic poverty.

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document conditions in eastern Burma since 2002. This year, apart from updating information about displacement across six states and divisions, poverty assessments were also conducted in six townships. The poverty assessment was developed in consultation with humanitarian agencies based in Rangoon / Yangon as a contribution towards developing a credible, nation-wide database of indicators for household vulnerability.

Government statistics disguise the extent of suffering and suggest relatively low levels of poverty in eastern Burma. This is because surveys are not allowed in some areas and pockets of extreme vulnerability are not taken into account when data is only disaggregated to the State or Division level. However, the indicators for vulnerability in eastern Burma documented in this report are comparable to the worst findings that international agencies have reported anywhere in Burma. Impoverishment is particularly severe in the rural areas of Kyaukgyi Township where half of the sample population reported displacement, forced labour and restrictions on movement had caused shocks to livelihoods during the previous six months.

Analysis of the demographic structure in eastern Burma reveals high birth and child mortality rates as well as low life expectancy. There is a high degree of dependency on a relatively small working age population, and almost half of the population surveyed has no proof of citizenship. These characteristics are more comparable to the vulnerability experienced in northern Rakhine State than national averages.

Official figures suggest that poverty rates in Kachin State and Magway Division are amongst the worst in the nation. However, this survey indicates that basic living conditions, such as access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation facilities, are generally worse in eastern Burma. The lack of durable shelter resulting from protracted conflict in eastern Burma resembles conditions in the Irrawaddy Delta a year after Cyclone Nargis wreaked havoc.

Government statistics claim the average farming household owns 6 acres of land, but this survey found 64% of rural households have access to less than two acres of land and only 13% have access to irrigated fields. These seemingly contradictory figures reflect large inequalities with regards to land tenure in Burma. The labour intensive nature of agriculture is indicated by over 80% of farmers lacking farm machinery and being dependent on simple tools.

Official data suggests that northern Shan State suffers from food insecurity more than most regions in Burma, but this survey finds the situation in south eastern Burma is comparable. Three quarters of the households in south eastern Burma had experienced food shortages during the month prior to being surveyed, and a similar proportion were preparing for a gap in rice supply of at least three months prior to the next harvest. Food consumption analysis identifies that 60% of households surveyed have an inadequate diet, while acute malnutrition rates amongst children suggest a serious public health problem.

While numerous indicators reflect severe vulnerabilities in eastern Burma, there is also evidence that subsistence livelihoods are highly resilient. The main source of staple food for three quarters of households is either their own rice crop or social networks, while access to cash income is more limited than elsewhere in the country. The low dependence on trade and high degrees of self reliance are also reflected by a relatively low proportion of household expenditures on food. This would generally be considered an indicator for lower levels of poverty, but comparisons are distorted because of increased restrictions on movement and reduced access to markets in the conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma.

Impoverishment in eastern Burma is a bi-product of militarisation and a key factor contributing to displacement. During the past year, SPDC attempts to pressure ethnic ceasefire groups to transform into Border Guard Forces have increased insecurity in areas which were relatively stable. The main ceasefire parties have resisted the pressure and reiterated calls for a review of the 2008 Constitution and political dialogue to promote national reconciliation. In response, the Burmese Army has forcibly conscripted and extorted villagers to form ethnic militia units to act as proxy forces in case ceasefire agreements collapse.

This year's survey estimates at least 73,000 people were forced to leave their homes in eastern Burma between August 2009 and July 2010. The highest rates of displacement were reported in northern Karen areas, where over 26,000 villagers were forced from their homes by Burmese Army artillery attacks against civilians and by forced eviction orders. More than 8,000 villagers in southern Mon areas also fled from their homes as a result of instability and conflict induced by the Border Guard Force conversion orders and by forced relocations.

TBBC's partner agencies have documented the destruction, forced relocation or abandonment of more than 3,600 civilian settlements in eastern Burma since 1996, including 113 villages and hiding sites during the past year. Coercive practices by armed forces have also undermined livelihoods and contributed to at least 446,000 people being internally displaced in the rural areas of eastern Burma at the end of 2010. As this conservative estimate only covers 37 townships and discounts urban areas, it is likely that well over half a million internally displaced persons remain in eastern Burma.

Military appointees and proxy party representatives are expected to control government after the elections, and there is no indication that political indifference to human suffering will change in the immediate future. The political challenge remains to press and engage with the national authorities for a genuine process of national reconciliation and the rights-based rule of law.

However, there is an urgent need to scale up poverty alleviation and humanitarian relief efforts and there are capacities within Rangoon and border-based aid agencies to absorb additional funding immediately. The humanitarian and development challenge is to ensure that aid funding and programming are based on needs and vulnerabilities rather than political agendas.

CHAPTER 1

Food for Another Day, Mong Hsat, 2010 (SRDC)



Introduction

1.1 HUMANITARIAN FLUX IN BURMA / MYANMAR

“Our grandparents gave us this land. We grew up in this village. Our movements are restricted and it’s difficult to survive, but we will stay here. Some friends went to the border but they also faced difficulties. Wherever we live, there will be problems. But this is our home.”

Karen man, Thandaung Township, CIDKP interview, March 2010.

Chronic vulnerability is widespread across Burma, with even government figures estimating that 32% of the population live in poverty and are unable to cover their basic needs.¹ Decades of military rule has resulted in gross economic mismanagement, massive under-investment in social services and an environment where human rights are abused with impunity. These problems are exacerbated by protracted armed conflict in eastern Burma and the uncompromising attitude of the regime towards ceasefire and ethnic groups more generally.²

The response of humanitarian and development agencies has been constrained both by national authorities and foreign governments. Decades of self-imposed seclusion up until the late 1980s left national authorities deeply suspicious of foreign aid agencies. This is still reflected in severe restrictions on the provision of aid and lengthy bureaucratic delays. On the other hand, since the brutal suppression of democracy protestors in 1988, western governments have focused on promoting political change. Despite deteriorating socio-economic conditions in Burma, poverty alleviation has generally not been a foreign policy priority. This has resulted in a massive decrease in foreign aid and strict accountability and transparency regulations to ensure funds are not diverted to the military.

Official development assistance dropped from US\$435 million in 1988 to US\$175 million in 1989 and then down to \$US39 million in 1996. As humanitarian agencies proved their independence and the prospects for political change deteriorated, aid funding slightly rebounded back to US\$198 million by 2007. In the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, high-level diplomacy enabled a large-scale relief and reconstruction effort in the Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) Delta and contributed to foreign aid increasing to US\$533 million in 2008.³

However, the special monitoring mechanism involving the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United Nations (UN) has now expired and aid agencies are bracing for another decrease in funding.⁴ Discounting the exceptional response to Cyclone Nargis, the annual foreign aid budget remains around US\$4 per capita.

¹ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, p3

² Charles Petrie, 2008, “End of Mission Report : UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, UNDP Resident Representative for Myanmar 2003-2007”

³ World Bank, “World Development Indicators : Net Official Development Assistance Received”, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.CD> (Accessed 18/10/10).

⁴ IRIN, 30 July 2010, “Myanmar : NGOs cut programmes as government takes on recovery oversight”, UN OCHA, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?Reportid=90015> (accessed 18/10/10)

This is negligible compared to neighbouring countries with similar levels of poverty such as Bangladesh (US\$9 per capita) and Laos (US\$68 per capita).⁵

The impacts of the junta's counter-insurgency strategy on human security have been widely documented, and add to the vulnerabilities faced by communities in eastern Burma.⁶ Despite regular UN resolutions condemning ongoing and systematic violations of human rights and humanitarian law, the junta is unwilling to stop these abuses.⁷ In March 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar recommended the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate whether these violations constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes.⁸ Over ten governments have endorsed this recommendation which suggests that, just as access to humanitarian aid should not be held hostage by democratisation, neither should access to justice and humanitarian protection.

Although there has been an expansion of humanitarian space elsewhere in the country over the past decade, there has been no relaxation of restrictions for aid agencies in the conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma.⁹ Less than 4% of foreign aid to Burma reaches into these areas, most of which is channelled discreetly across national borders by community based organisations. Government statistics disguise the extent of suffering and suggest relatively low levels of poverty in eastern Burma. This is because household poverty assessments are not allowed in some areas and pockets of extreme vulnerability are not taken into account when data is only disaggregated to the state / division level.

In this context, aid policy advocates have called for funding to be scaled up to fully utilise the existing capacities in less sensitive areas of Burma.¹⁰ Such a strategic and incremental approach to expanding humanitarian space inside Burma is essential and should be supported by all who are interested in reducing poverty and promoting human rights. Meanwhile, to ensure that the needs of civilians affected by conflict are not further marginalised, funding for cross-border aid into eastern Burma will also need to be increased.

Rangoon and border-based aid agencies share a common mandate in responding to suffering and strengthening the coping strategies of villagers in Burma. Developing a credible database of indicators for household vulnerability is thus essential so

⁵ UNDP, *Human Development Report : 2009*, New York, Table E, page 160-161, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf (accessed 4/10/10)

⁶ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 29 January 2010, *Myanmar : Increasing Displacement and Fighting Resumes in the East*, www.internal-displacement.org (accessed 18/10/10)

⁷ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 64/238, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 24 December 2009, paragraph 1. http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=89 (accessed 18/10/10) ICRC, 29 June 2007, "Press Release: Myanmar – ICRC denounces major and repeated violations of international humanitarian law", Yangon / Geneva, (accessed 18/10/10) <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/myanmar-news-290607?opendocument>

⁸ Tomas Ojea Quintana, 10 March 2010, "Progress report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar", UN Human Rights Council, A/HRC/13/48, paragraphs 121 & 122 http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=89 (accessed 18/10/10)

⁹ Morten Pedersen, 8 May 2009, "Setting the scene: Lessons from 20 years of foreign aid", http://www.nbr.org/Downloads/pdfs/ETA/BMY_Conf09_Pedersen.pdf (accessed 18/10/10)

¹⁰ Richard Horsey, 8 May 2009, "Strategies and priorities in addressing the humanitarian situation in Burma", http://www.nbr.org/Downloads/pdfs/ETA/BMY_Conf09_Horsey.pdf (accessed 18/10/10)

that needs can be prioritized and resources allocated accordingly. This report will hopefully contribute to the compilation of a nation-wide poverty assessment, with data disaggregated to the township level, so that aid programming can be based on humanitarian, rather than political, considerations.

1.2 METHODOLOGY

“Because of the unstable ceasefire situation between NMSP and SPDC, we faced many difficulties and risks while conducting the household survey.”

Field worker, Mon Relief and Development Committee, August 2010

TBBC has been collaborating with ethnic community-based organisations to document the characteristics of internal displacement in eastern Burma since 2002.¹¹ Much of eastern Burma remains inaccessible to international observers and there are significant risks associated with collecting information from conflict-affected areas. Without the participating ethnic community-based organizations’ commitment and courage, neither this nor previous reports would have been possible.

While profiling internally displaced persons was relatively untested just a few years ago, TBBC’s experience has contributed to the development of methodological advice for humanitarian agencies around the world.¹² Apart from updating information about the scale and distribution of displacement across 6 states and divisions, this survey focuses on assessing poverty levels in 6 townships in eastern Burma.

Quantitative surveys of the scale and distribution of displacement and the impacts of militarisation and development have been based on interviews with key informants in 37 townships.¹³ Population estimates were compiled for people who, between August 2009 and July 2010, :

- fled from SPDC patrols and hide in the most militarily contested areas
- were forcibly evicted and are obliged to stay in SPDC relocation sites
- fled from human rights abuses and the effects of war, or have been forcibly relocated by non-state actors, or have returned from refugee camps in Thailand and reside in ethnic administered ceasefire areas.








As in previous years, it has not been possible to estimate the number of people obliged to leave their homes but remaining in a state of internal displacement in urban or mixed administration areas. Given the complexities in distinguishing between different location types as well as between displaced and resident populations, population figures are best estimates only.

¹¹ Previous surveys can be accessed from www.tbtc.org/resources/resources.htm (accessed 18/10/10)

¹² UN OCHA and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, April 2008, *Guidance on Profiling Internally Displaced Persons*, Geneva, www.internal-displacement.org (accessed 18/10/10)

¹³ The survey guidelines are reproduced in Appendix 5.

Household Survey Sample in Eastern Burma, 2010



The poverty assessment was based on a household survey which was developed in consultation with international agencies based in Rangoon. Questions asked by previous household surveys in other parts of Burma were compiled so that the data collected would be standardized. Input about sampling methods was solicited in order to increase confidence in the survey design. The findings from eastern Burma have been compared to the results from localized household surveys conducted by international agencies elsewhere in Burma. Full reports from these other surveys have been shared with TBBC, but have not been cited in this publication at the request of the concerned agencies based in Rangoon / Yangon.


TBBC's previous household surveys were based on a multi-stage cluster sampling method which aimed to ensure equal representation across six states and divisions and between hiding sites, ethnic ceasefire areas, SPDC relocation sites and mixed administration areas. While this was useful in identifying the different vulnerabilities facing households living in different types of places, the sample sizes for each state and division were too small for such large areas. This year's sampling method was thus changed to interview 200 households in each of six townships so that the results could be compared with other townships in Burma. The strategy for the next few years is to replicate this household survey in other townships of eastern Burma.

Given unreliable baseline data about the population in each township, a geographically based cluster sampling method was employed. Each township was divided into quadrants according to area, and survey teams strived to interview 50 households in the villages closest to the center of each quadrant as possible. This was not always possible due to the absence of settlements in some areas, while the surveys in Mong Ton and Pasaung / Hpasawng Township were particularly limited by security constraints. The field survey teams sought to interview one in every three households in clusters of no more than 25 households in one village. A total of 1,200 households representing 7,882 people were interviewed in 107 villages during May and June 2010 as represented by the Household Survey Sample map.

Whereas the population estimates specifically relate to internally displaced persons, the household survey was representative of the general population. As the Chart 1 indicates, there was a gender balance as well as ethnic and religious diversity amongst the survey respondents. The prominence of ethnic Sgaw Karen respondents reflects the survey's reach into Papun / Hpapun, Kyaukgyi / Kyaukkyi and Palaw Townships. The independence and representative nature of the sampling method is reflected by the majority of survey respondents not being beneficiaries of aid from the implementing partners during the previous year.

Most of the maps presented in this report use spatial data collected during field interviews and subsequently digitised by TBBC's five partner organizations. The locations of map features have been drawn to best approximations but some positions may not be accurate. However, a higher degree of accuracy was obtained for the Household Survey Sample map and some other features, as the locations of these features were recorded using Geographic Positioning System (GPS) units.

CHART 1 : Demographics of Household Survey Respondents



“The Human Rights Council... strongly calls upon the Government of Myanmar to take urgent measures to put an end to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including the targeting of persons belonging to particular ethnic groups, the targeting of civilians by military operations, including in the eastern part of Myanmar, and rape and other forms of sexual violence, and to end impunity for such acts without delay.”

United Nations Human Rights Council, 15 April 2010, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/HRC/Res/13/25, paragraph 14

CHAPTER 2

Displaced by Border Guard Force Tensions, Ye, 2010 (MRDC)

Militarisation & Displacement

2.1 MILITARISATION AND VULNERABILITY

“At first, we just hid under some trees as we thought the Burmese Army would only launch a few mortar shells. I counted the bombs one by one until the forty-first shell exploded. Then I heard gun shots and saw troops approaching the village. Someone cried out ‘the Burmese are coming’ and we ran away.”

Karen man, Papun Township, KORD interview, July 2010.

Through decades of low-intensity conflict, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and its predecessors have based their counter insurgency strategy on targeting the civilian population. The “Four Cuts” policy aims to undermine the armed opposition’s access to recruits, information, supplies and finances by forcibly relocating villagers from contested areas into government controlled areas. The policy aims to turn “black” opposition controlled areas into “brown” contested areas and ultimately into “white” areas controlled by Naypyitaw. Villagers who do not comply with forced relocation orders are considered sympathetic to the armed opposition. The subsequent targeting of these civilians by military patrols induces further displacement and is a violation of international humanitarian law which the State of Burma has formally ratified.¹⁴

The main threats to human security in eastern Burma are related to militarisation. Under the guise of state building, the Burmese army’s strength grew from 180,000 soldiers in 1988 to 370,000 troops by 1996,¹⁵ and it is generally assumed there are now over 400,000 soldiers. The number of battalions deployed across eastern Burma has approximately doubled since 1995.¹⁶ Armed opposition groups have identified there are currently 237 SPDC battalions based in eastern Burma. The distribution of these battalions, and their respective outposts as identified by field surveys, are represented on the adjacent page and documented in Appendix 4.

Indiscriminate artillery attacks, arson or the forced relocation of settlements and the deployment of landmines directly threaten the safety and security of civilians in areas of ongoing conflict. However, the Burmese Army’s self-reliance policy is a more widespread impact of militarisation. By withholding rations and paying meager salaries, the SPDC effectively compels frontline troops to extort food and confiscate fields from local villagers. Such coercive practices directly undermine civilian livelihoods, regardless of whether troops are deployed as part of counter-insurgency patrols or more generally to secure remote areas.

During the past year, SPDC attempts to pressure ethnic ceasefire groups to transform into Border Guard Forces have largely failed. The main ceasefire parties have instead reiterated calls for a review of the 2008 Constitution and political dialogue to promote national reconciliation. In response, the Burmese Army has forcibly conscripted and extorted villagers to form ethnic militia units to act as proxy forces in case ceasefire agreements collapse.

¹⁴ Geneva Conventions I-IV, 1949, Common Article 3, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/>

¹⁵ Mary Callahan, 2003, *Making Enemies: War and state building in Burma*, Cornell University Press, p211

¹⁶ Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 12 February 2007, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, UN Human Rights Council, UN doc. A/HRC/4/14, para 54.

Militarisation in Eastern Burma, 2010



By focusing on infrastructure development and commercial agriculture, the junta's Border Areas Development programme has done little to alleviate poverty in conflict affected areas. However, state-sponsored development initiatives frequently lead to the deployment of Burmese Army troops to secure control over the surrounding areas. There is often "a combination of coercive measures, such as forced labour, extortion and land confiscation, which drive down incomes to the point that the household incomes collapse and people have no choice but to leave their homes".¹⁷ The compulsory and unavoidable nature of these factors is distinct from the pull-factors more commonly associated with economic migration.¹⁸

The SPDC's Yadana natural gas project has generated billions of dollars for the junta, although the revenue is missing from Burma's national accounts.¹⁹ Evidence of ongoing human rights abuses associated with the project continue to be collected from the pipeline corridor.²⁰ Despite this context of corruption and abuse, the proposed Shwe Gas project and a 2,000 kilometer long pipeline from the Arakan / Rakhine State to China is continuing as planned.²¹ Surveys have also begun during the past year for the proposed multi-billion dollar construction of a deep-sea port and industrial estate in Tenasserim / Tanintharyi Division that is to be linked by rail and road to Thailand.²²

During the past year, thousands of acres of farming land have been confiscated for the construction of a railway in southern Shan State. Farmers' complaints have been dismissed with threats of imprisonment. The railway will facilitate SPDC troop deployment into contested areas and access to coal deposits near Mong Hsat, which Thai investors are planning to excavate and export to Thailand. The coal mining project and related road construction has been accompanied by the imposition of forced labour and displacement for villagers in surrounding areas.²³

Apart from the Burmese Army, ethnic armed forces have also plundered natural resources at the expense of local communities. During the past year, the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) have confiscated gold mining fields and restricted travel in the surrounding areas of northern Karen / Kayin State. Similarly, a Karenni militia group forcibly recruited labourers and threatened 30 villages with eviction to secure access to a mining project in southern Karenni / Kayah State.

Troop deployments and logging concessions associated with surveys for hydro-electric projects undermined livelihoods along the Salween River, and smaller rivers in Karen and Karenni state. Meanwhile, despite the completion of a small dam in eastern Pegu / Bago Division earlier this year, no compensation was offered to farmers whose agricultural fields were flooded by the reservoir.

¹⁷ Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 7 March 2008, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar*, A/HRC/7/18, para 75, http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=89

¹⁸ Andrew Bosson, May 2007, *Forced Migration / Internal Displacement in Burma: With an Emphasis on Government Controlled Areas*, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

¹⁹ International Monetary Fund, 7 January 2009, "Myanmar : Staff Report for the 2008 Article IV Consultation", unpublished report, p6

²⁰ Earthrights International, September 2009, *Total Impact: The Human Rights, Environmental and Financial Impacts of Total and Chevron's Yadana Gas Project in Military-Ruled Burma (Myanmar)*

²¹ Shwe Gas Movement, September 2009, *Corridor of Power: China's Trans-Burma Oil and Gas Pipelines*, www.shwe.org

²² Bangkok Post, 12 October 2010, "Deal struck on deep-sea port", <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/200870/deal-struck-on-deep-sea-port> (accessed 18/10/10)

²³ Shan Womens Action Network and Shan Human Rights Foundation, August 2010, "Burma Army Tracks Across Shan State", <http://www.shanwomen.org/files/> (accessed 18/10/10)

Development Projects Associated with Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Burma, 2010



2.2 SCALE AND DISTRIBUTION OF DISPLACEMENT


“The Burmese Army came to our village area every 2 or 3 months, and they always accused us of supporting the rebels. We were far away from other villages and afraid of them. So we ran away.”

Karenni man, Pasaung Township, KSWDC interview, April 2010.

TBBC's partner agencies have documented the destruction, forced relocation or abandonment of more than 3,600 civilian settlements in eastern Burma since 1996, including 113 villages and hiding sites during the past year. The number of villages displaced is comparable to the situation in Darfur and has been recognised as the strongest single indicator of crimes against humanity in eastern Burma.²⁴

Some of the field reports from previous years have independently been corroborated by high resolution commercial satellite imagery of villages before and after the displacement occurred. The images below contrast a village with 17 houses in Mawksmai Township in the year 2000 with a deserted site at the same location in 2007.²⁵ Just as this imagery verifies a field report which TBBC published in 2006 about the forced relocation of this village, new satellite imagery was acquired in the past year to continue the process.

Satellite imagery of a village before and after forced relocation in Shan State




(© 2007 GeoEye)

²⁴ International Human Rights Clinic, May 2009, *Crimes in Burma*, Harvard Law School, p. iii <http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Crimes-in-Burma.pdf> (accessed 18/10/10)

²⁵ Science and Human Rights Program, 2007, *High Resolution Satellite Imagery of the Conflict of Burma*, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington DC, <http://shr.aas.org/geotech/burma/burma.shtml> (accessed 18/10/10)

Displaced Villages in Eastern Burma, 1996-2010



This year's survey estimates at least 73,000 people were forced to leave their homes in eastern Burma between August 2009 and July 2010. Such a large scale of displacement is indicative of ongoing conflict and human rights abuses, and yet this is a conservative estimate as it only covers the rural areas of 37 townships most commonly affected by forced migration.

The highest rates of displacement during the past year were reported in northern Karen areas and in southern Mon communities. Over 26,000 Karen villagers have been forced from their homes in Kyaukgyi, Papun and Thandaung Townships as a result of Burmese Army attacks against civilians in upland areas and village relocations in low land areas. Similarly, more than 8,000 Mon villagers in Ye and Yebyu Townships either fled from instability and conflict associated with pressures on the New Mon State Party (NMSP) to transform into a Border Guard Force or were forcibly relocated by the Burmese Army.

Despite the ongoing displacement, the overall estimates for internally displaced persons in rural areas of eastern Burma have decreased by approximately 20,000 people compared to 2009. This is partly because many of those recently forced from their homes were already counted as internally displaced persons. The flight of displaced persons across the border into refugee and migrants communities in Thailand is another factor, while some displaced people may have returned to former villages or resettled elsewhere in Burma. However, the decrease is primarily related to the reduced authority of ethnic authorities to manage ceasefire areas and a corresponding decrease in capacities to estimate internally displaced populations.

At least 446,000 people are estimated to be internally displaced in the rural areas of eastern Burma alone. This assessment includes 206,000 people in the temporary settlements of ethnic ceasefire areas which are increasingly unstable and prone to collapse. A further 115,000 civilians are estimated to be hiding from the SPDC in remote areas that are most affected by military skirmishes. Approximately 125,000 other villagers have followed SPDC eviction orders and moved into designated relocation sites. However, if all areas of all townships were surveyed, the internally displaced population in eastern Burma would undoubtedly be well over half a million people.

Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma, 2010



“Given the gross and systematic nature of human rights violations in Myanmar over a period of many years, and the lack of accountability, there is an indication that those human rights violations are the result of a State policy that involves authorities in the executive, military and judiciary at all levels. According to consistent reports, the possibility exists that some of these human rights violations may entail categories of crimes against humanity or war crimes under the terms of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The mere existence of this possibility obliges the Government of Myanmar to take prompt and effective measures to investigate these facts. There have clearly been cases where it has been necessary to establish responsibility, but this has not been done. Given this lack of accountability, United Nations institutions may consider the possibility to establish a commission of inquiry with a specific fact-finding mandate to address the question of international crimes.”

Tomas Quintana, 10 March 2010, “Progress report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar”, United Nations Human Rights Council, A/HRC/13/48, paragraphs 121 & 122

CHAPTER 3

Temporary shelter, Thandaung, 2010 (CIDKP)



Chronic Poverty

3.1 DEMOGRAPHIC PRESSURES


“We were surprised because they had never come to give people in remote areas an Identity Card before. They normally just accuse us of supporting the rebels. But this time, all the family members had to register for an Identity Card and people over 18 years had to fill in a form for USDA.”

Karenni male, Loikaw Township, KSWDC interview, 2010

Chart 2 compares the population’s age structure as found in eastern Burma with the findings from household surveys conducted by two international agencies in northern Rakhine State and the Dry Zone. Whereas 37% of the sample population in the Dry Zone is aged under 15 years or over 60 years, this proportion increases to 46% in Eastern Burma and 50% in northern Rakhine State. While data from the Dry Zone is comparable to national averages, the findings in eastern Burma and northern Rakhine State represent high levels of dependence on a relatively small working age population as well as low life expectancy.

The proportion of the population in eastern Burma and northern Rakhine State is comparable in the under 5 years and 15-29 year categories. However, it is significantly higher in northern Rakhine State for the 5-14 year olds. This reflects high birth rates in both areas but suggests higher child mortality rates in eastern Burma.

Chart 2 : Age Structures in Selected Areas of Burma



While this survey indicates that 50.7% of the population in eastern Burma is female, this proportion increased to 51.7% in the 15-44 year age group. The high proportion of women in the working-age bracket is associated with the consequences of conflict, such as men being conscripted into one of the armed forces, becoming a casualty of war, or migrating in search of income for their families.


Findings for the population structures disaggregated to the township level are presented in Table 1. Townships with the highest proportion of children aged under 15 years and elderly aged over 60 years were Pasaung, Papun and Palaw. Exceptionally low percentages of children under 15 were recorded in Mong Ton Township, although this may reflect temporary movements of dependents away from harm's way when pressures for UWSA to transform into a Border Guard Force were high. The larger than average household size in Kyaukgyi Township is likely to reflect a higher proportion of families sharing shelter in hiding sites.

Table 1 : Sample Population by Age and Sex in Eastern Burma

	Mong Ton		Pasaung		Papun		Kyaukgyi		Ye		Palaw		Overall	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Under 5	10%	5%	18%	19%	17%	18%	11%	10%	11%	10%	19%	17%	15%	14%
5-14	15%	20%	33%	32%	30%	26%	22%	24%	23%	24%	29%	27%	26%	26%
15-29	25%	26%	15%	20%	24%	23%	23%	21%	25%	26%	22%	23%	22%	23%
30-44	23%	23%	17%	20%	13%	18%	22%	20%	17%	16%	17%	19%	18%	19%
45-59	18%	16%	13%	6%	10%	9%	18%	17%	19%	18%	8%	9%	14%	13%
Over 60	9%	9%	3%	3%	6%	6%	4%	7%	6%	6%	4%	6%	5%	6%
total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Sample	421	404	629	660	642	646	1016	1071	550	563	624	656	3,882	4,000

National registration cards are essential for proof of identity and long distance travel for all adults in Burma. However, decades of conflict in eastern Burma and discrimination against the Rohingyas in northern Rakhine State have resulted in low levels of legal security. This survey found just 56% of respondents in eastern Burma had proof of citizenship, with a wide variation between the highest rates recorded in Ye and Mong Ton Townships and the lowest rates reported from Papun and Kyaukgyi Townships.

Chart 3 : Access to Citizenship in Eastern Burma



A recent survey in northern Rakhine State also found that only 50% of the adult population had either a national registration card or a temporary registration card. This hides an even greater degree of statelessness in northern Rakhine State, as the temporary cards do not constitute recognition of citizenship. The main substitute for citizenship amongst Karen villagers in Papun and Kyaukgyi is to purchase identity papers from local authorities or village leaders. In the context of these results, the SPDC's decision not to hold elections in many of the village tracts in northern Karen areas may reflect a fundamental suspicion about the loyalties of civilians in these areas.

3.2 HOUSING, WATER AND SANITATION CONDITIONS


"We don't dare go and repair our pipes, so we can't use water from the hills. Instead, we have to use water from Bilin River which is dirty with mud and engine oil as DKBA are mining gold upstream."

Karen man, Bilin Township, KORD interview, March 2010

Nationwide, 61% of roofing in rural areas is primarily constructed with thatched leaves or grass while 31% of houses mostly use corrugated galvanized iron (CGI). 57% of dwellings in rural areas nationally have been reported as mostly having bamboo walls.²⁶

In comparison, this survey found that 91% of houses in rural areas of eastern Burma mainly used bamboo or thatch for roofing and only 9% primarily used tin or CGI, while bamboo or leafing thatch are the primary materials used for walls in 82% of houses. Chart 4 illustrates that this lack of durable shelter is more comparable to conditions to the Irrawaddy Delta a year after Cyclone Nargis or the chronic poverty of northern Rakhine State than to national averages for rural areas.

Chart 4 : Main Housing Materials in Selected Areas of Burma



²⁶ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar, p13


Table 2 disaggregates the data for eastern Burma by township, and suggests negligible rates of durable construction materials in all areas except Ye and Mong Ton Townships. The high dependence on bamboo in Pasaung Township for walls and roofing reflects cultural practices where bamboo plantations are passed on as an inheritance from one generation to the next as well as a scarcity of suitable leaf and grass thatch in the area.

Table 2 : Main Housing Materials in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton
Thatch/Leaf roofing	92%	100%	72%	0%	86%	64%
Bamboo roofing	8%	0%	28%	95%	1%	0%
Tin / CGI roofing	0%	0%	1%	5%	13%	34%
Thatch/Leaf walls	3%	18%	3%	0%	13%	1%
Bamboo walls	88%	74%	89%	100%	58%	46%
Rudimentary Wood walls	1%	3%	8%	0%	26%	49%

While 55% of households in rural areas of Burma have been reported as having access to safe drinking water,²⁷ this survey found just 32% of dwellings in rural eastern Burma could access protected wells, springs, ponds or rainwater tanks. This may be understated as 11% of respondents identified water pipes or wells, and it was not verified whether these sources were protected or not. Regardless, as Chart 5 indicates, the dependence on rivers, streams and other unprotected sources for drinking water appears higher in eastern Burma than independent surveys have recorded in northern Rakhine State, Kachin State and Magway Division.

Chart 5 : Drinking Water Sources in Selected Areas of Burma



²⁷ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, p14


Survey results are disaggregated by township in Table 3 and suggest that access to safe drinking water sources are most limited in Papun and Pasaung Townships. The difficulty in determining whether pipes provide safe drinking water is exemplified by significant responses in Papun and Ye. Responses from the former are likely to represent bamboo pipes from mountain springs, whereas data from Ye includes references to PVC pipes from government sources.

Table 3 : Drinking Water Sources in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton
Protected wells and sources	49%	18%	4%	0%	17%	20%
Rivers and unprotected sources	50%	79%	77%	100%	42%	79%
Variables : pipes and wells	1%	3%	19%	0%	42%	1%

Risks associated with limited access to safe drinking water are exacerbated in areas where there is a lack of sanitary means for disposing of human faeces. While official statistics suggest that 64% of households in Burma's rural areas have access to improved sanitation²⁸, this survey in eastern Burma found just 45%. Access to improved sanitation is classified as including households with a flush toilet, a wet surface latrine or a covered and fly proof pit latrine. Recent surveys in northern Rakhine State, Kachin State and Magway Division similarly found low levels of sanitation, although the proportion of households without even a designated pit for excreta was highest in eastern Burma.

Chart 6 : Access to Improved Sanitation in Selected Areas of Burma



When the data for eastern Burma is disaggregated by township, the conditions in Mong Ton and Ye are again found to be favourable. This is likely to reflect greater access to public health awareness which has been facilitated in Ye by the ceasefire agreement and access to government services and in Mong Ton by proximity to a major transit road.

²⁸ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, p14

Table 4 : Access to Improved Sanitation in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton
Wet surface latrine	1%	12%	12%	1%	54%	36%
Covered, dry Pit / fly proof	0%	61%	2%	3%	35%	56%
Uncovered Pit / Direct Pit	45%	14%	9%	1%	1%	1%
No Latrine / No Pit	54%	14%	78%	97%	11%	7%

3.3 EDUCATION AND MALNUTRITION STATUS OF CHILDREN

"I have 4 brothers and sisters, but only my youngest sister went to school. The rest of us had to help my parents look for food day by day. Even my youngest sister could only study up to third standard."

Karen woman, Kyaukgyi Township, CIDKP interview, October 2009

Government statistics suggest that the net enrolment rate at primary school in rural areas is 84%,²⁹ but localized surveys indicate significantly lower retention rates. Amongst the households surveyed in eastern Burma, less than half (48%) of children aged between 5 years and 13 years were attending school regularly. These rates of enrolment and attendance are even lower than an international agency based in Rangoon recently recorded amongst children in the Kokang Special region and northern Rakhine States (59% and 64% respectively).

When data for eastern Burma is disaggregated by township, the highest retention rates are found in Papun. Given the relative lack of government services in Papun, this finding suggests a significant proportion of children are educated by ethnic nationality education systems.


Table 5 : Primary School Attendance Rates in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton
% 5-13 year olds attending school regularly	10%	57%	73%	35%	67%	63%

As Chart 7 illustrates, school fees, distance or transport costs, and pressures to work represented the reasons for over 80% of children leaving primary school in the Dry Zone, Kachin State and Chin State. In comparison, these reasons were cited by 61% of dropouts in eastern Burma. Whereas insecurity has not been reported as a significant reason elsewhere, 23% of children who had stopped attending school in eastern Burma identified insecurity as the primary reason.

²⁹ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, p19

Chart 7 : Reasons for Primary School Dropouts in Selected Areas of Burma



The highest dropout rates recorded in eastern Burma were in Kyaukgyi Township, and Table 6 indicates this was primarily because of insecurity. Low retention rates were also reported from Pasaung Township, but this was mostly due to the cost of school fees and transport to distant schools. Other reasons provided for dropping out of school in eastern Burma included sickness, absent or unqualified teachers, and a general lack of interest.

Table 6 : Reasons for Primary School Drop Outs in Eastern Burma


	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton
School fees	16%	29%	62%	37%	6%	21%
Distance / transport costs	0%	23%	0%	42%	24%	0%
Insecurity	50%	5%	0%	2%	33%	0%
Required to work	33%	14%	8%	3%	11%	57%
Other	1%	30%	31%	16%	26%	22%

Measuring acute malnutrition levels amongst children as a proxy for the wider population is widely accepted practice. However, there is a striking absence of credible data available in Burma. Most of the surveys undertaken have utilised indicators of chronic malnutrition (or stunting) associated with long term growth factors rather than acute malnutrition (or wasting) which captures more recent weight loss. The generally preferred tool for measuring acute malnutrition is to record weight-for-height status of children. However, Mid upper Arm Circumference (MUAC) surveys offer a rapid assessment alternative which is easier to conduct in complex emergencies. MUAC tests are targeted at children aged between one and five years, with results categorized according to standard cut-off rates.³⁰

³⁰ SPHERE, 2004, *Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*, pp 108 & 183.

Chart 8 compares the results of three recent MUAC assessments of acute malnutrition that have been conducted in eastern Burma and northern Rakhine State. The survey in northern Rakhine State had the smallest sample, while the Backpack Health Workers Team and associates in eastern Burma tested the largest number of children. According to standard indicators of acute malnutrition amongst children,³¹ these preliminary findings suggest a 'critical' situation in northern Rakhine State and public health conditions which are at least 'poor' and probably 'serious' in eastern Burma.

Chart 8 : Acute child malnutrition in Eastern Burma & Northern Rakhine State³²



Discrepancies between the two surveys in eastern Burma reflect the importance of securing humanitarian access so that Weight-for-Height tests can be conducted and the severity of acute malnutrition clarified. Weight-for-Height assessments in Thailand's refugee camps found 9.3% of recently arrived children had moderate or severe wasting,³³ which suggests the actual prevalence in eastern Burma may be in between the findings of these two surveys. It should also be noted that malnutrition data has not been presented at the township level because the sample sizes of children between one and five years of age become too small to offer any confidence when disaggregated.

³¹ World Health Organisation, 2000, *The Management of Nutrition in Major Emergencies*, Geneva, p39-40

³² BMA, BPHWT, NHEC, et al, 2010, *Diagnosis Critical : Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma*, <http://www.backpackteam.org/?p=730> (accessed 19/10/10)

³³ TBBC, 2010 Programme Report : January to June, p97 <http://www.tbtc.org/resources/resources.htm>

3.4 AGRICULTURAL ASSETS


“There are no more places left that are far from the Burmese Army camps and patrols. All of our paddy fields have been found, and we dare not return as the soldiers keep coming back. Even if the Burmese soldiers don’t destroy our crops, the paddy goes rotten anyway.”

Karen man, Papun township, KORD interview, November 2009

Government statistics claim that the average size of farming land nation-wide is approximately 6 acres per agricultural household.³⁴ However, as represented in Chart 9, independent field research has found that around 60% of rural households in diverse areas across Burma have either no access to, or are limited to less than 2 acres of, agricultural land. These seemingly contradictory figures reflect large inequalities with regards to access and ownership of land in Burma.

While population density contributes to limited access to agricultural land in areas of central Burma such as Magway Division, the mountainous terrain is a common constraint in ethnic states and special regions. Restrictions on access related to the conflict are an additional limitation in many areas of eastern Burma. With the exception of Wa Special Region, the vast majority of farmers surveyed elsewhere had no access to irrigation and thus are vulnerable to unseasonal rains. In the mountainous areas of eastern Burma and Kachin State, low levels of irrigation also reflect dependence on shifting cultivation. This is only sustainable if there is enough land to rotate cultivation over a period of years so that secondary vegetation can regenerate nutrients in the soil prior to the next round of ‘slash and burn’.

Chart 9 : Access to Agricultural Land in Selected Areas of Burma



³⁴ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, Yangon, p8


Access to agricultural land in eastern Burma was relatively similar across the six townships surveyed. The greatest access to land was recorded in Palaw and Pasaung, which reflects the importance of betel nut and cardamom plantations respectively, as well as shifting cultivation in general. Access to irrigated fields was only significant in Mong Ton, Papun and Ye Townships, where water is diverted from streams into low land paddy fields.

Table 7 : Household Access to Agricultural Land in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
No access to agricultural land	23%	7%	36%	8%	30%	18%	20%
Access to less than 2 acres	73%	33%	46%	30%	23%	68%	44%
Access to between 2-5 acres	3%	50%	14%	61%	37%	13%	31%
Access to over 5 acres	1%	10%	4%	1%	10%	1%	5%
Access to irrigated fields	3%	0%	26%	1%	17%	40%	13%

Government estimates suggest that, on average, 16% of rural households in Burma own motorized or mechanical agricultural equipment.³⁵ While recent surveys conducted in Irrawaddy Division and Kachin State found significantly higher rates of ownership for farm machinery and hand tractors, comparably low results have been detected in eastern Burma. Even lower rates of ownership have been recorded in northern Rakhine State, which is consistent with casual labour making a significantly higher contribution to household income compared to agriculture. The lack of capital assets and dependence on simple tools such as hoes and animal drawn equipment reflects the labour intensive nature of agriculture in eastern Burma.

Chart 10 : Ownership of Agricultural Assets in Selected Areas of Burma



³⁵ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, Yangon, p16


Apart from the widespread ownership of simple agricultural tools, the distribution of productive assets varied widely between townships in eastern Burma. Farm machinery was most prominent in Papun and Mong Ton which is consistent with higher rates of access to irrigated fields. There is also significant ownership of backstrap weaving looms in Papun and Kyaukgyi but nowhere else, which reflects the cultural heritage of the northern Karen. Villagers in Mong Ton have greater access to markets, and cheap Chinese products in particular, which may explain the high rates of motorbike ownership in that township.

Table 8 : Household Ownership of Productive Assets in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
Farm Machinery (eg tractors)	0%	20%	40%	0%	14%	36%	18%
Agricultural Tools	98%	87%	81%	99%	68%	83%	86%
Weaving loom / backstrap	33%	0%	56%	0%	0%	0%	15%
Motorbike	0%	5%	2%	0%	14%	28%	8%

On average, the government estimates that 67% of rural households in Burma own draft animals, while 28% own poultry and 16% own at least one pig.³⁶ However, as presented in Chart 11, surveys from both central Burma and the ethnic states suggest that at least the national averages for working animals are exaggerated. By far the lowest rates for household ownership of draft animals appear to be in Chin State and eastern Burma.

Chart 11 : Ownership of Draft Animals in Selected Areas of Burma



The findings in relation to livestock are relatively consistent across the surveyed townships in eastern Burma. Households in Papun Township recorded significantly higher rates of buffalo ownership, which is consistent with greater access to irrigated fields. Villagers in the remote hills of Papun, Pasaung and Kyaukgyi were more likely

³⁶ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, Yangon, p15

to breed animals such as pigs, goats and poultry compared to the other townships. This reflects the cultural importance of small animals as food for social events amongst Karen and Karenni communities. In contrast, many farmers in Mong Ton have sold their buffalos, which were the traditional symbol of wealth, and bought hand tractors in recent years.

Table 9 : Household Ownership of Livestock in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
Buffalo	6%	10%	49%	17%	3%	6%	15%
Cow	3%	30%	17%	3%	16%	9%	13%
Pig	71%	47%	91%	84%	15%	48%	59%
Goat	9%	2%	21%	34%	2%	1%	11%
Poultry	81%	74%	83%	80%	47%	75%	73%

3.5 HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND EXPENDITURES


“Our coconut, betel nut and durian trees did nothing wrong to the DKBA and SPDC troops, but they cut and burnt it all down. The orchards were planted when I was ten years old, and now I am 45. It will take a long time to grow and get income again from a new plantation.”

Karen woman, Myawaddy Township, CIDKP interview, June 2010.

When asked to identify the main source of cash income during the previous month, half of the households surveyed in Eastern Burma identified either casual labour or collecting and selling forest products. A quarter of respondents reported that they had not earned any cash income at all during the previous month. Only 12% of households indicated that the sale of agricultural crops or livestock was their main income earning activity. These indicators reflect the extent to which restrictions on movement and trade limit access to cash income in the rural areas of eastern Burma. The dependence on subsistence livelihoods suggests a high degree of vulnerability, and resilience, to shocks.

The small contribution of agriculture, employment and petty trade to household income in eastern Burma is demonstrated by comparisons to other ethnic areas, and Kachin State in particular. Only 50% of households in eastern Burma identified these more reliable sources as their main income generating activity, compared to over 63% in northern Shan and northern Rakhine States and 86% in Kachin State. In contrast, households in eastern Burma are much more likely to be dependent on sales from collecting forest products and firewood than any of the other impoverished areas.

Chart 12 : Main Sources of Cash Income in Selected Areas of Burma



Income generating opportunities appear most limited in Pasaung, where 90% of households recorded no cash income, and Kyaukgyi, where 91% of households reported primary dependence on the collection and sale of forest products. In contrast, agricultural crops and livestock in Papun are sufficient not only for domestic consumption but also for a quarter of households to earn income from sales. Daily wages from casual labour are the main income generating activity for households in Mong Ton, Ye and Palaw which reflect less restrictions on movement and more significant levels of commercial agriculture.

Table 10 : Main Sources of Household Income in Eastern Burma


	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
Casual labour	8%	32%	18%	1%	52%	59%	28%
Agricultural crops	0%	2%	16%	3%	18%	8%	8%
Petty Trade	0%	18%	15%	1%	7%	18%	10%
Collect Firewood/Forest Products	91%	16%	1%	0%	9%	9%	21%
Sale of livestock	0%	9%	10%	5%	0%	1%	4%
Remittances	1%	2%	1%	0%	6%	2%	2%
No Cash Income (in past month)	0%	18%	40%	90%	3%	1%	25%

Households were also asked to estimate the proportion of expenditures that had been allocated to food and other common items during the previous month. Government statistics suggest that the average family in rural Burma assigns 72% of the household budget to expenditures on food.³⁷ This survey in eastern Burma found that typically 50% of household expenditures were used to buy food. The average household spent a further 14% of the monthly budget on health care and 12% on household goods such as soap and candles.

³⁷ Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 2007, *Poverty Profile : Integrated Households Living Conditions Survey in Myanmar*, Yangon, p7

A low dependence on trade and high degree of self reliance is reflected by a relatively low proportion of household expenditures on food, as represented in Chart 13. A high level of rice cultivation and a low dependence on trade for food consumption in eastern Burma is also reflected in Chart 14. Given the limited access to cash income, this suggests that subsistence livelihoods are highly resilient. Indeed, this would generally be considered an indicator for lower levels of poverty, but comparisons are distorted because of increased restrictions on movement and reduced access to markets in the conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma.

Chart 13 : Main Household Expenditures in Selected Areas of Burma



The proportion of expenses allocated to food in eastern Burma was highest (80%) amongst the sample population in Kyaukgyi Township, which is consistent with the high rates of displacement experienced there in 2010. A typical household in Mong Ton spent 24% of their monthly income on household goods, which represents access to more disposable income than elsewhere. Otherwise, the distribution of expenses was relatively consistent across the six townships surveyed.

Table 11 : Main Household Expenditures in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
Food	80%	47%	39%	45%	50%	40%	50%
Health Care	5%	12%	21%	20%	13%	13%	14%
Household goods	0%	9%	14%	13%	12%	24%	12%
Clothing or Shelter	0%	5%	11%	12%	3%	6%	6%
Debt Repayment	9%	3%	8%	2%	9%	9%	7%
Education	1%	8%	4%	6%	5%	6%	5%

3.6 FOOD SECURITY


“This year, I’m farming a narrow field on the hillside where the soil nutrition is poor. There’s good soil close to the SPDC camp, but I don’t dare to go and farm there. I don’t know how to sustain our livelihood in the future.”

Karen man, Kyaukgyi Township, CIDKP interview, April 2010

The surveyors asked household representatives what their main source of rice had been during the previous month. Almost half of the respondents reported predominately consuming their own rice crops, whereas 28% of households had bought most of their rice. The remaining 24% of households had primarily borrowed, bartered or been given rice supplies, which reflects a relatively high dependence on social networks in eastern Burma for access to staple food. While such social capital is vital for coping strategies, it is an insufficient basis for long-term food security.

As illustrated in Chart 14, subsistence cultivation for rice consumption is relatively high in Eastern Burma compared to other parts of Burma. This is consistent with the findings that 80% of households in eastern Burma have at least some access to agricultural land. Findings from Kachin State suggest an even higher level of subsistence productivity, but that survey was conducted immediately after the main harvest season. It can safely be assumed that indicators of self-reliance in eastern Burma and northern Shan State would have been even higher if the surveys had similarly been conducted after the wet season rather than before it. The high dependence on purchasing rice supplies in northern Rakhine State and Magway Division reflects restricted access to agricultural land, low productivity and the impacts of drought.

Chart 14 : Main Source of Rice in Selected Areas of Burma



The nature of subsistence agriculture is illustrated by findings in Pasaung Township where 95% of households reported mostly consuming the rice they cultivated, and yet only 3% of households indicated selling any surplus. While aid dependency was generally negligible, half of the households in Kyaukgyi were reliant on aid from community based organizations. This primarily reflects cross-border humanitarian relief to large scale displacement and livelihood shocks in Kyaukgyi during the first half of 2010. Dependence on the procurement of rice was highest in Ye, which is consistent with the greater access to markets and the indicator that 30% of households do not have access to agricultural land.

Table 12 : Main Household Sources of Rice in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
Own Rice Crop	9%	36%	62%	95%	28%	58%	48%
Purchased with Cash	3%	45%	23%	4%	60%	35%	28%
Aid or Gift	52%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	9%
Borrowed & must repay	23%	5%	13%	1%	6%	0%	8%
Barter exchange	14%	12%	2%	1%	6%	5%	7%

As this survey was conducted during May and June and the main rice crop harvest is around November, subsistence farmers required at least six months of rice supplies in order to be self-reliant until the harvest. Only 11% of households reported sufficient rice stocks to last until the harvest, while 73% of households were preparing for a gap in rice supplies for at least three months. Self-sufficiency was greatest in Pasaung and Papun Townships, which reflects relatively high access to agricultural land and irrigated fields respectively. Food shortages were most acute in Kyaukgyi which corresponds to high rates of forced labour and displacement recently. The lack of rice stocks in Ye does not necessarily reflect severe food insecurity as these households have greater access to employment and markets.

Table 13 : Household Rice Stocks in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
None	20%	7%	23%	1%	21%	1%	12%
less than 7 days	24%	26%	6%	0%	22%	15%	15%
7-30 days	9%	31%	16%	4%	30%	26%	19%
1-3 months	48%	19%	28%	8%	18%	43%	27%
4-6 months	1%	8%	15%	60%	5%	7%	16%
over 6 months	1%	10%	13%	28%	5%	10%	11%

Households were also asked about the number of days different types of food had been eaten during the previous week. The subsequent analysis of dietary diversity, food frequency and nutritional value followed standard guidelines in order to categorise households into different food consumption groups.³⁸ The survey found that 40% of

³⁸ World Food Program, 2008, Food Consumption Analysis : Calculation and the use of food consumption score in food security analysis, Technical Guidance Sheet, Rome


households in eastern Burma can be classified as having an acceptable diet while 60% have inadequate food consumption patterns. More specifically, 8% were categorized as clearly having a poor diet and 52% were considered inadequate but borderline. The average number of days that each food was consumed during the previous week is represented in Table 14, and suggests that rice and vegetables are the only items eaten with any regularity.

Table 14 : Mean Food Consumption Scores in Eastern Burma

Food Type	Acceptable Diet	Inadequate diet : borderline	Inadequate diet : poor	Entire Sample
Rice	7.0	6.9	5.3	6.8
Other Cereal	1.4	1.5	0.5	1.3
Vegetables	5.8	5.9	4.1	5.7
Eggs	1.4	1.1	0.3	1.2
Fish	2.9	1.3	0.6	1.9
Fruit	2.8	2.0	0.8	2.2
Milk	2.1	0.6	0.0	1.1
Poultry (chicken, duck)	1.2	1.0	0.5	1.1
Pulses (beans, nuts, tofu)	1.1	1.1	0.3	1.0
Red meat	1.3	1.0	0.7	1.1
Roots / tubers	1.2	1.1	1.0	1.2
Sugar	2.4	1.9	0.8	2.0
Oil / fat	3.5	2.8	1.3	3.0

In comparative context, as illustrated in Chart 15, this proxy indicator for food security suggests the communities in eastern Burma are amongst the most vulnerable in Burma. Despite chronic poverty in northern Rakhine State and Kachin State and the devastation inflicted by Cyclone Nargis in the Irrawaddy Delta, food consumption patterns are significantly worse in the conflict-affected areas of eastern Burma. Low food consumption scores are consistent with tight restrictions on humanitarian and market access in conflict-affected areas. The patterns in south eastern Burma are more comparable with those recorded in the remote Wa Special Region and northern Shan State.

Chart 15 : Food Consumption Patterns in Selected Areas of Burma



There is a wide divergence between the townships surveyed in eastern Burma, with food consumption patterns considerably better in Mong Ton and Ye. 87% of households in Mong Ton have an acceptable diet, which reflects the relatively good access to irrigated fields, high degree of self-reliance for rice consumption, significant income derived from casual labour, and low levels of household expenditure spent on food. In contrast, 21% of households in Palaw have a poor diet, which is consistent with indicators of negligible access to irrigated fields and low levels of self reliance for rice consumption.

Table 15 : Food Consumption Patterns in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
Poor Diet	9%	21%	12%	4%	3%	0%	8%
Borderline Diet	91%	36%	55%	81%	34%	13%	52%
Acceptable Diet	1%	43%	33%	15%	63%	87%	40%


3.7 LIVELIHOOD SHOCKS, DEBT AND COPING STRATEGIES

“They ordered my husband to either join the militia force, or pay 6,000 kyat per month to the militia fund. Since we couldn’t afford to pay, and we didn’t dare to stay in the village, we fled to here. We have nothing to eat, but have borrowed some food from other villagers.

Mon woman, Yebyu Township, MRDC interview, February 2010

Respondents were asked to identify the two main livelihood shocks or difficulties experienced by their households during the past six months. The most commonly reported shocks were rising food prices (33% of households) and sickness to a family member (31%). Sickness and the loss of purchasing power were also identified as the most common shocks to livelihoods in other parts of Burma, although in the Irrawaddy Delta and northern Rakhine State the latter was induced by a loss of income rather than rising food prices. Crop loss due to pests was a significant cause of difficulty in eastern Burma and Kachin State but data was not available for this factor elsewhere.

Chart 16 : Main Livelihood Shocks in Selected Areas of Burma




There are a number of shocks to livelihoods which are significant causes of poverty in eastern Burma but have not been reported as affecting communities elsewhere. Armed conflict or the deployment of military patrols into rural areas was identified as a major obstacle to livelihoods in Palaw, Pasaung and Ye. This may be understated, as the high rates of pests damaging crops in Papun may also be related to farmers staying away from their fields during military patrols into the vicinity. Restrictions on travel imposed by the SPDC as a counter-insurgency strategy were also a significant barrier for farmers in Kyaukgyi, Pasaung and Ye. The imposition of forced labour, which denies villagers opportunities to tend for their own families, and forced displacement, which removes people from their agricultural fields, were also particularly damaging to livelihoods in Kyaukgyi Township in the months preceding the survey.

Table 16 : Main Livelihood Shocks in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
Rising food prices	0%	7%	2%	84%	23%	86%	33%
Sickness/ Health costs	1%	57%	19%	13%	43%	52%	31%
Pests damaged crops	3%	30%	56%	17%	6%	19%	22%
Armed Conflict/ military patrols	0%	48%	0%	20%	28%	0%	16%
Restrictions on travel	47%	5%	3%	22%	18%	1%	16%
Floods/ unseasonal rains/ drought	2%	13%	14%	56%	1%	3%	14%
Forced Labour	47%	2%	4%	1%	3%	1%	9%
Forced Displacement	49%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	8%

A relatively small proportion of households in eastern Burma reported having an outstanding debt in comparison with other areas of Burma, as indicated in Chart 17. This reflects limited access to financial credit in conflict-affected areas, which is consistent with indicators suggesting a high degree of self-reliance, restrictions on movement and limited access to markets. The primary reasons for borrowing are to cover food shortages and health care expenses, which is common with impoverished rural communities across Burma. However, only 9% of the sample population in eastern Burma took loans for other reasons, such as education expenses and investments in agricultural inputs, which are more common in other areas of Burma.

Chart 17 : Household Debt in Selected Areas of Burma



The highest prevalence of household borrowing in this survey was measured in Kyaukgyi Township where 95% of households were in debt, primarily due to food shortages. Conversely, the lowest rates of indebtedness were identified in Pasaung and Mong Ton which corresponds with a relatively high degree of self reliance for rice and low expenditures on food in these townships. Debts induced by the cost of health care and education were proportionately high in Ye and Palaw, suggesting limited access to social services provided by the government and cross-border aid groups in these southern townships.

Table 17 : Household Debt in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
No Debts	5%	22%	38%	61%	23%	57%	34%
Food related debt	92%	39%	38%	20%	32%	25%	41%
Health related debt	1%	23%	17%	14%	34%	11%	16%
Education related debt	1%	9%	3%	4%	1%	3%	3%

Households were asked whether they had experienced food shortages during the previous month and, if so, how they had coped. 75% of households reported recent food shortages, which is comparable to the proportion of households preparing for a gap in rice supply of at least three months prior to the harvest. Buying food on credit, purchasing cheaper and poorer quality food, and depending on help from family and friends were the main methods used to cope with these food shortages. However, 22% of households resorted to extreme coping strategies such as reducing food consumption amongst adults and skipping entire days without eating.

As the township level, 94% of households in Pasaung reported experiencing food shortages during the past month even though 88% of households have at least 4 months supply of rice. This reflects the restrictions on access to markets for food other than rice and is consistent with the finding that only 15% of households in Pasaung have an adequate diet. Extreme coping strategies were most prominent in Kyaukgyi Township, which reinforces other indicators in this survey that vulnerability and food insecurity are most severe in this township.

Table 18 : Household Coping Strategies for Food Shortages in Eastern Burma

	Kyaukgyi	Palaw	Papun	Pasaung	Ye	Mong Ton	Overall
No Food Shortage in Past Month	2%	30%	58%	6%	32%	23%	25%
Bought Food on Credit	5%	49%	23%	27%	49%	22%	29%
Bought Cheaper, Poor Quality Food	33%	20%	6%	24%	22%	67%	28%
Support from Family & Friends	7%	28%	16%	94%	9%	18%	28%
Reduced consumption	92%	20%	2%	1%	0%	1%	19%
Sold Assets	2%	8%	4%	12%	5%	1%	5%
Skipped entire days without eating	13%	2%	0%	3%	0%	0%	3%

“The Security Council... stresses the need for the Government of Myanmar to create the necessary conditions for genuine dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all concerned parties and ethnic groups, in order to achieve an inclusive national reconciliation with the direct support of the United Nations.”

United Nations Security Council, Presidential Statement, 11 October 2007, S/PRST/2007/37

CHAPTER 4

Drinking Water Source, Pasaung, 2010, (KSWDC)

Eastern Burma / Myanmar Situation Update

4.1 SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

“Most farmers can only keep one quarter of their harvest, because a quarter goes to the military in taxes, a quarter is for hiring workers and buffalo, and a quarter is spent on inputs like fertilisers and seedlings.”

Shan male, Laikha Township, SRDC interview, August 2010

The Burmese Army's plan to transform ceasefire groups into Border Guard Forces has increased instability in southern Shan State during the past year. West of the Salween River, the Shan State Army-North's (SSA-N's) battalion in Kehsi is resisting the change, although its counterpart in Kunhing has agreed. The United Wa State Army (UWSA) is also refusing to obey the command along both the China border in eastern Shan State and the southern Thailand border. Some villagers in Mong Ton and Mong Hsat have already sold property and livestock in preparation for conflict.

The Burmese Army is increasingly using ethnic militia units as proxy forces to control local communities as well. Extortion and the imposition of forced labour by a Shan militia group in Laikha and Mong Kung has been a major obstacle for villagers who were forcibly relocated in 2009 to re-establish their livelihoods. The PaO National Organisation (PNO) has similarly been conducting joint patrols under Burmese Army command in Loilem and Mawmai and is expected to transform into a local militia or police force. Pressure is also being exerted on Lahu militias to conscript more soldiers and prepare to fight against both the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) and the UWSA along the Thailand border.


The construction of a 361 kilometer long railway between Mong Nai in southern Shan State and Keng Tung in eastern Shan State will also help the Burmese Army to transport its troops and isolate ethnic opposition groups. Thousands of acres of farming land have already been confiscated, including approximately 13% of the lowland fields cultivated around Mong Nai. While farmers have already lost approximately 25 million kyat (US\$25,000) from the dry season soy bean crop in 2010, their complaints have been met with threats of imprisonment.³⁹

In previous years, the main livelihood problems for farmers have been the loss of income while doing forced labour, restrictions on travelling to fields, and extortion by various armed groups. However, the past year has been even more difficult throughout southern Shan State because of the worst drought in decades which has caused water levels in Inle Lake and major rivers to fall dramatically. With poor irrigation systems, the lack of rain for paddy fields will have a huge impact on the food security of rural villagers and rice prices for townspeople alike.

In this climate of instability, over 29,000 people are estimated to have been displaced from their homes during the past year. Over 128,000 internally displaced persons are estimated to remain in southern Shan State, which represents a slight decrease compared to last year. This is primarily because restrictions on movement in government controlled relocation sites have proved unsustainable and villagers have drifted away.

³⁹ Shan Women's Action Network and the Shan Human Rights Foundation, August 2010, "Burma army Tracks Across Shan State"

Southern Shan State



4.2 KARENNI / KAYAH STATE

“Most of our community expect a major Tatmadaw operation to clean the rural areas after the elections. They will search and destroy everything in front of them, so we have already escaped to the forests.

Karenni woman, Pruso Township, KSWDC interview, June 2010

SPDC's order for ceasefire groups to transform into Border Guard Forces specified that each battalion had to consist of over 300 troops. The Karenni Nationalities People's Liberation front (KNPLF) and the smaller Karenni National Democratic Party (aka Naga group) thus combined and have divided into two brigades based in Mae Set and Bawlake townships. For local villagers, the immediate impact has been an increased imposition of forced labour to construct the new military camps.

While some foot soldiers defected after the introduction of sixty SPDC officers into each brigade, the ethnic leaders of the Border Guard Forces have continued focusing on their logging and mining concessions. However, the ethnic leaders' authority over tax revenue from cross-border trade was reduced in August 2010 which suggests other business opportunities may also diminish.


The Karenni National Solidarity Organisation (KNSO) is not big enough to form a Border Guard Force, but has been operating as a militia group under SPDC command in Pruso and Pasaung. To reconstruct the Mawchit-Taungoo road and secure access to a mining concession, SPDC/KNSO joint patrols have restricted travel, forcibly recruited labourers and threatened eviction in 30 villages. KNSO have also been extorting funds and conscripting villagers to increase strength in the hope of becoming a Border Guard Force.

Extortion and restrictions on movement have been widespread and directly imposed by Burmese Army troops in Shadaw and Loikaw townships. Apart from demands for rations related to the SPDC's 'self reliance' policy, the Light Infantry Battalion #517 and Infantry Battalion #72 have also been extorting goods from villagers in retaliation against attacks by Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) troops.

The Lawpita hydro-power station on the Baluchaung River confiscated land from local villages decades ago and has denied them a share of the electricity generated ever since. The national authorities are now planning joint-ventures with Chinese investors to construct more hydro-electric dams on the Salween River and at the junction of the Pawn and Baluchaung Rivers. Although surveys only began in January 2010, SPDC has already deployed additional troops and offered logging concessions to secure and clear the surrounding areas. Just as villages along the Salween River in Pasaung township will be flooded if dam construction in Karen State proceeds, this development threatens the survival of villages upstream.

Estimates of the internally displaced population in Karenni State have decreased significantly compared to the 2009 survey. This is mostly because areas under the authority of ceasefire parties have decreased since the formation of Border Guard Forces. It does not necessarily reflect increased opportunities for displaced villagers to return to their homes or resettle elsewhere, but rather the limitations of current methods for estimating the internally displaced population.

Karenni State



4.3 NORTHERN KAREN / KAYIN AREAS

"The Burmese Army came to our village, destroyed our homes and crops and left landmines all over the place. So I don't dare to return. Unless I can find food before my stocks run out, I will go to the refugee camp."

Karen man, Papun Township, KORD interview, November 2009

The mountainous region of northern Karen / Kayin State and eastern Pegu / Bago Division is arguably the most militarily contested area in Burma. SPDC's Election Commission announced in September that over half of the village tracts in Papun and Thandaung Townships will not even be allowed to vote in the upcoming elections. Instead, the Burmese Army's counter insurgency strategy continues to violate international humanitarian law and target civilians to undermine the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA).


Over 28,000 people are estimated to have been displaced in Papun, Thandaung, Kyaukgyi and Shweyin Townships between August 2009 and July 2010. At least 95 villages or hiding sites were completely burnt down, forcibly relocated or abandoned as Burmese Army patrols approached during this period. The majority of this displacement occurred in remote hills and forests, where over 69,000 people are estimated to be hiding and at least 13 civilians have been killed by the Burmese Army in the first half of 2010. SPDC military operations searching for civilian settlements and destroying the means of livelihoods were particularly devastating in upland areas east of Kyaukgyi and north of Thandaung during the past dry season.

In the low land areas, villagers are in closer proximity to SPDC authorities and consequently are subjected to more routine human rights abuses. Villages are generally obliged to provide 2-8 labourers each day to send messages, carry rations, repair the barracks or other menial tasks for local military outposts. Along the Sittang River, 1,500 kyat is also extorted from each household on a monthly basis to support the rations of local SPDC troops. Restrictions on trade have been most severe along the Taungoo to Bawgaligy / Klerlah road where 13 checkpoints extort up to 200,000 kyat from each truck transporting goods between the lowlands and uplands. Meanwhile, the forced relocation of 7,000 people into the government controlled area of Aye Neh near Kyaukgyi has increased the number of displaced persons in relocation sites across these four townships to over 29,000 people.

In southern Papun township, gold mines previously excavated by local villagers were taken over by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Karen Army (DKBA) in November 2009. DKBA subsequently set up new outposts, constructed access roads, laid landmines and imposed restrictions on movement to secure the surrounding areas. As a result, villagers have not only lost access to the gold mines but also to 50 paddy fields and irrigation canals.

While the proposed hydro-electric dams along the Salween River remain a threat to future generations, the Kyauknagar Dam on the Shwegyin River was completed early in 2010. The reservoir has already flooded more than 760 acres of agricultural lands upstream and no compensation has been offered. Similarly, plans to build a dam on the Day Lo / Thauk Ye Kha River caused the additional deployment of SPDC troops, road construction and logging projects which have already undermined livelihoods.

Northern Karen Areas



4.4 CENTRAL KAREN / KAYIN STATE

“After fighting broke out between SPDC and KNLA near our village, the SPDC troops ordered us to move or they would burn everything. So we scattered to other villages and the forests. Some people tried to return, but they were forced to leave again.”

Karen woman, Kawkareik Township, CIDKP interview, June 2010

The elections and pressure on ceasefire groups to transform into Border Guard Forces may have inadvertently strengthened alliances between various Karen political actors. The key political parties registered to contest the elections have agreed not to compete in the same constituencies. Meanwhile, the KNU/KNLA Peace Council and a key faction of the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) have refused orders to submit to SPDC's commands and instead strengthened links with the Karen National Union (KNU).


The DKBA splintered in response to the Border Guard Force with Brigade #999 north of Myawaddy agreeing to the transformation while Brigade #5 south of Myawaddy rejected the change. Business interests may have influenced the decisions of the northern leaders, but regardless they have followed SPDC military orders. Whenever DKBA troops deserted their units or there were skirmishes with KNLA, DKBA and SPDC retaliated against villagers in order to consolidate their control in the area. Together with SPDC troops, DKBA #999 forcibly evicted two villages in Kawkareik Township during March 2010, and then burnt down houses in three villages in Hlaingbwe Township at the end of May. As a result of the joint DKBA/SPDC operations and the unusual lack of rain, villagers had to abandon their paddy fields and orchards.

While 1,000 villagers are estimated to have been displaced in Hlaingbwe Township during the past year, another 2,000 people were repatriated from temporary shelters in Thailand during February and March 2010. These returnees were amongst a group of 4,000 refugees who had fled into Thailand from DKBA attacks in June 2009. When pressured to vacate the temporary shelters by Thai authorities, approximately half of the refugees moved into an official camp or integrated illegally into Thai villages and the other half returned to insecurity in Hlaingbwe Township.

In Myawaddy and Kawkareik Townships, the fear of conflict between SPDC and DKBA Brigade #5 caused villagers to abandon their homes in advance. South of Myawaddy, around 1,000 villagers moved away from the insecurity towards the border at the end of July 2010. In the panic of displacement, three young children drowned after an accident during their journey by boat on a flooded river. Most of those who sought protection in Thailand did not feel welcome, and returned to wait and see whether conflict would erupt in the forests of Myawaddy Township. Similarly, around 5,000 civilians living near the KNU/KNLA Peace Council's headquarters in Kawkareik Township were warned in September of potential conflict and are preparing to flee to refugee camps in Thailand.

Even without armed conflict, the political instability results in increased restrictions on movement and confusion about the location of landmines. Villagers face more difficulties accessing their farms which will cause more food security problems for the year ahead.

Central Karen State



4.5 MON AREAS

“When the Burmese Army troops hear the Mon splinter group is around, they block us from leaving the village for at least a month. Sometimes, we can leave between 6am and 5pm but we aren’t allowed to take any food or stay out overnight. Since we can’t work, there is nothing to eat.”

Mon woman, Ye Township, MRDC interview, May 2010

Since the end of 2009, SPDC’s Southeast Command has pressured the New Mon State Party’s (NMSP’s) political wing to contest in the elections and its armed wing to transform into a Border Guard Force. NMSP rejected both proposals and instead called for a review of the 2008 Constitution and political dialogue between the regime, democratic parties and ethnic opposition. Tensions escalated in April 2010 when a deadline passed and NMSP closed its liaison offices in the towns of Moulmein / Mawlamyine, Ye and Thanbyuzayat.


Fearing a breakdown of the ceasefire agreement, about 600 villagers from Ye Township fled towards the border near Three Pagodas Pass while another 400 people in Yebyu Township also fled to hiding sites further south. The Burmese Army deployed more troops around the NMSP ceasefire areas, demanded more porters to carry food and ammunition on military patrols, and increased restrictions on movement and trade. Tensions did not escalate into armed conflict and the vast majority of displaced villagers returned to their homes by the end of May. However, the restrictions on livelihoods and threats to security remain severe.

In this context, a group of retired NMSP soldiers formed the Mon National Defense Army (MNDA) in 2009 and have resumed armed resistance against the SPDC. While other Mon splinter groups have reverted to banditry and abused local communities, this group has targeted Burmese Army troops and infrastructure in southern Ye Township and Yebyu Township near the Yadana gas pipeline area. Skirmishes have occurred regularly and caused the Burmese Army to send in reinforcements from four battalions. While this has not undermined MNDA, additional restrictions on movement meant that villagers were not able to harvest their durian plantations in May and June.

The Burmese Army has ordered the formation of numerous village militia forces to patrol local areas, collect intelligence, and attack armed opposition groups during the past year. Each militia force has between 10-30 para-troopers, depending on the village size, and reports directly to the local SPDC battalion. Each household has to either provide a family member to attend basic military training and join the militia, or pay up to 6,000 kyat per month towards the local militia fund which covers stipends and general expenses.

Estimates for the internally displaced population in Ye and Yebyu have increased by approximately 12,000 people compared to 2009. This is primarily due to the forced relocation of civilians from the periphery of villages into the center as part of the Burmese Army’s efforts to increase control and restrict movements. It also reflects the instability caused by fears the ceasefire agreement will collapse. However, it is also related to a more comprehensive survey of relocation sites and consolidated villages in 2010 which suggests previous estimates were conservative.

Mon Areas



4.6 TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI DIVISION

"The Burmese troops suspected my husband of supporting the rebels and arrested him. I asked to see him but was not allowed. They tortured and killed him."

Mon woman, Yebyu Township, MRDC interview, February 2010

SPDC's military reach stretches out all over Tenasserim Division, from the towns to strategic points along the border with Thailand. The formation of militia units, fire-fighting groups, women's affairs committees and the Union Solidarity Development Association (USDA) at the village tract level help to control all aspects of public affairs. Consistently high estimates for the internally displaced population in relocation sites reflect this degree of control and the lack of opportunity for return to former homes or resettlement elsewhere.

The imposition of forced labour continues to undermine livelihoods. In the 2010 dry season, villages along the lower Tenasserim river bank were forced to provide porters and boats to transport military supplies to the Burmese Army's military camps adjacent to the Thailand border. Similarly, Kamonethwe villagers in Tavoy / Dawei Township were forced to provide cars, bullock carts and elephants to transport military supplies to border outposts. Then in August 2010, SPDC's District and Township authorities instructed every village to cultivate an acre of pepper, rubber, castor oil (*jatropha*) and cashew nut plantations for the State.


Land is still being confiscated and redistributed to the Army's business partners for commercial agriculture. Thousands of acres of land have been confiscated during the past twelve months by the Burmese Army and their joint venture business partners east of Mergui / Myeik, throughout Tenasserim Township and north of Palaw. Even land ownership certificates were confiscated so villagers have no recourse to reclaim their land.

Leaders of the Burmese Army continue to order attacks against civilians rather than targeting the armed opposition. In particular, the SPDC's Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) #594 commander has been directly associated with summary executions during 2010. Under his instruction, troops reportedly shot and killed a Karen villager in Tavoy / Dawei Township in February and then murdered another civilian in Tenasserim / Tanintharyi Township in similar circumstances during April.

Despite such contempt for the rule of law, the Thai government signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Burmese counterparts in 2008 for investors to build a deep-sea port and industrial estate in Tavoy / Dawei linked by road and railway with Kanchanaburi. Given the ongoing imposition of forced labour, land confiscation, extortion and restrictions on movement associated with the Yadana gas pipeline, the proposed multi-billion construction is likely to bring more human rights abuses rather than alleviate poverty.

In preparation for the elections, the SPDC instructed local military commanders to register eligible voters and arrange for the transformation of USDA into the Union Solidarity and Development party (USDP). The intimidation of opposition parties has been such that only a few candidates are willing to contest against the USDP in Tenasserim Division.

Tenasserim Division



“The General Assembly... calls upon the Government of Myanmar to undertake a transparent, inclusive and comprehensive review of compliance of the Constitution and all national legislation with international human rights law, while fully engaging with democratic opposition and ethnic groups, while recalling that the procedures established for the drafting of the Constitution resulted in a de facto exclusion of the opposition from the process...”

United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 64/238, Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, 24 December 2009, paragraph 8



Appendices

APPENDIX 1 : INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION ESTIMATES (2010)

States, Divisions, and Townships	Population displaced in past 12 months	IDPs in Hiding Sites	IDPs in Relocation Sites	IDPs in Ceasefire Areas	Total IDPs
SHAN STATE	29,400	23,900	16,650	88,200	128,750
Mawk Mai	4,000	1,700	1,300	0	3,000
Mong Kung / Mongkaung	1,800	2,500	1,000	0	3,500
Laikha / Laihkha	3,000	6,000	5,000	6,500	17,500
Loilem / Loilen	1,500	1,000	600	600	2,200
Nam Zarng / Nansang	3,500	2,000	3,500	1,600	7,100
Kun Hing	3,900	3,500	0	5,500	9,000
Mong Hsat	1,500	1,000	0	32,000	33,000
Mong Ton	2,800	1,300	0	29,000	30,300
Mong Pan	1,800	1,600	1,750	1,300	4,650
Kehsi / Kyethi	2,000	1,300	0	11,200	12,500
Langkher / Langkho	1,600	600	1,000	500	2,100
Mong Nai	2,000	1,400	2,500	0	3,900
KARENNI / KAYAH STATE	1,820	7,400	3,900	23,000	34,300
Shadaw	250	30	1,140	0	1,170
Loikaw	100	0	1,400	2,000	3,400
Demawso / Demoso	100	0	0	9,500	9,500
Pruso / Hpruso	250	1,600	0	3,700	5,300
Bawlake / Bawlakhe	600	530	1,240	0	1,770
Pasaung / Hpasawng	500	5,240	120	3,300	8,660
Mehset / Mese	20	0	0	4,500	4,500
PEGU / BAGO DIVISION	18,850	21,600	22,150	0	43,750
Taungoo	0	0	1,300	0	1,300
Kyaukgyi / Kyaukkyi	17,000	12,300	20,150	0	32,450
Shwegyin	1,850	9,300	700	0	10,000
KAREN / KAYIN STATE	14,360	52,500	12,700	48,300	113,500
Thandaung	3,100	9,800	6,100	0	15,900
Papun / Hpapun	6,160	38,700	2,300	0	41,000
Hlaing Bwe	1,100	0	0	7,000	7,000
Myawaddy	1,500	3,000	500	5,000	8,000
Kawkareik	1,000	0	0	2,300	2,300
Kyain Seikgyi	1,500	1,000	3,800	34,000	38,800
MON STATE	1,780	1,550	7,500	40,000	49,050
Bilin	80	50	0	0	50
Ye	2,500	1,500	7,500	40,000	49,000
TENASSERIM DIVISION	6,790	8,050	62,100	6,500	76,650
Yebyu	6,000	4,100	16,200	6,500	26,800
Tavoy / Dawei	270	570	7,100	0	7,670
Thayetchaung	0	0	4,100	0	4,100
Palaw	0	1,480	12,550	0	14,030
Mergui / Myeik	450	140	7,500	0	7,640
Tenasserim / Tanintharyi	50	1,240	12,000	0	13,240
Bokpyin	20	520	2,650	0	3,170
TOTALS	73,000	115,000	125,000	206,000	446,000

APPENDIX 2 : DESTROYED, RELOCATED OR ABANDONED VILLAGES (AUGUST 2009 – JULY 2010)

SHAN STATE

MongNai Township	Langkher / Langkho Township	Namzarng / Nansang Township
Wan Nong Len	Wan Loi Paw	Wan Kong Hom
Wan Nong Hsai		Ton Hong Hailai
		Wan Kar Sang
		Nam Mor Som

KARENNI / KAYAH STATE

Pasaung / Hpasawng Township	Shadaw Township
Doh Phoe	Lya Du Ker

PEGU / BAGO DIVISION

Kyaukgyi / Kyaukkyi Township			
Mu Khee	Wa Mi Lu	Neh Yu	Saw Kha Der
Doh Daw Khee	Pa Ya Hser Der	Weh La Byin	Klaw Khee
Twee The Yu Khee	Ler Klah	Pa Na Ner	Thay Nwe Khee
Mu Li Khee	Ta wa Pu	Ma Taw Koo	Pa Kaw Khee
HteeNyaPaTay Khee	Htee Kho	Paw Lu Kho	Ta Kaw Der
Doo Baw Lu	Saw Khee	Kyauk Pya	Thaw Nge Der
Na Khee	Mi Ya Ta	Ka Pha Hta	
Ter Ner Lu	Nwa Htee	Tae Na Hta	Shwegyin Township
Khaw Htaw Khee	Ter Mu Khee	Htee Htaw Khee	Htee Blah
Kheh Der	Nwa Hta	Saw Tay Der	Hsaw Oh Khee
Ler Taw Lu	Thay Khay Lu	Kheh Mo Der	Doo Pa Hleh
Saw Khee Per	Nwa Lay Kho	Yaw Khee	Khaw Hta
Day Baw Khee	Taw Poe Khee	Nya Mu Khee	Ta Say Der
Kho Lu	Hleh Lah Koo	Ler Kwah	Ka Hee Day
Htee Law Khee	Auk Chin Gone	Ler Htaw Der	Hsaw Oh Hta

KAREN / KAYIN STATE

Papun / Hpapun Township

Baw Lay Der	Sho Per Kho
Ta Kheh Der	Khay Pu
Ta May Khee	Si Day
Phloe Khee	Khu Ler Der
Bo Na Der	Leh Khee
Ta Yu Plaw	Ku Gaw Der
Ta Yu Khee	Htee Po Lo
Kaw Hter Der	Beh Thaw Lo
Taw Kho Mu Der	Gae Yu Der
Thay Thoo Khee	

Thandaung Township

Ler Ker Der Tha	Saw Law Kho
Pa Weh	Ka Tar Khee
Kay Law Khee	Ka Mu Doh
Ler Ker Der Kho	Wee Lar Khaw
Mar Wa Khaw	Pha Der Kar
Ler Ker Der Kar	Htee Thee Pu Der Kar
Thay Ya Yu	Htee Thee Pu Der Kho
Thaw Khaw Saw	
Khaw Mee Kho	Kawkareik township
Di Dar Kho	Au Kraw
Mar Pweh Kho	Ta Nay Moo

TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI DIVISION

Yebyu Township

Tow-lewi	Wae-nhok
Weng-neik	Krone-beng
Jao-done	Pnan-peung

Mergui / Myeik Township

Berbawlor

APPENDIX 3 : RELOCATION SITES (2010)

SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

Mong Pan Township Sop Hue Nong Bar Mon HoPai Mawk Zam	Laikha Township Wan Mark Lang Bang Pon	Langkher / Langkho Township Wan Zit
Mong Nai Township Nar Khan Wan Mark Lung	Mong Kung/ Mongkaung Township Tong Loa	Bang Long Township Wan Nong Leng
	Mawk Mai Township Nam Lot Kan Do Long	NamZarng/Nansang Township Kart Ray Wan Phue

KARENNI / KAYAH STATE

Loikaw Township Nwa Laboe	Bawlake Township Nam Hpe Bawlake Ywa Thit	Shadaw Township Shadaw Pon Chaung
Pasaung / Hpasawng Township Doe Hta		

PEGU / BAGO DIVISION

	Kyaukgyi / Kyaukkyi Township		Taungoo township
Ko Ni	Kyweh Chan	Ta Kaw Pwah	Ye Zin Gone
Kyaung Pya	Sa Leh	Peh Thaw	Nar Gar Mauk
Maw Lay	Nant Than Gwin	Mu Thay	
Ooh Shin Khin	P'Deh Gaw	Thit Cha Seik	Shwegyin Township
Ya Myo Aung	Klaw Maw	Aye Net	Pahn Aye
Aung So Moe	Ma La Daw		

KAREN / KAYIN STATE

Kyain Seikgyi Township Anankwin Myaing Thayar	Myawaddy Township Mae K'neh	Thandaung township Teik Pu Thangdaung Gyi
	Papun / Hpapun Township Ta Per Phar	Baw Gali Gyi

MON STATE

Ye Township

Khaw-za
Koe-mile
Mann-Ong

TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI DIVISION

Tenasserim / Tanintharyi Township

Natthami
ThebawU
Sarawachaungwa
Sinmagyon
Pagwin
Shoutgone
Kyaukpea
Sanpe
Kinigyon
Tamu
Konthaya
Pawutchaung
Kawet
Tharabwechaungpya
Pyindaung
Peinchaung
Kyauktaung
Talaında
Tharabwe
Ananchaung
Yekanchaung
Ngayaein
Dugyo
Tonbyaw
Taungbein
Kanankwin
Kalaeak
Kamalaing
Melaungkwin
Anen
Taungma
Aingwai
Laeseit
Thebyu
Poemen
Thinbonechaung
Moro
Theinkone

Theyetchaung

Thinbonchaung
Padaukgyi
Padaukgae
Pe
Milaunggyaung

Palaw Township

Immagyi
Bayektaung
Madaw
Wazwinoak
Kabyupyin
Yebu
Pyicha
Taminmasan
Myitchinsut
Shandot
Sarke
Paw
Migyaungthaik
Kyauklaik
Minwin
Yinshan
Kamaungla
Duyinbinshaung
Gyini
Zadiwin
Kabya
Pawut
Pettaut
Kawblen
Letpanbyin
Tapo
Michaungpyu
Thayagon

Mergui / Myeik Township

Bok
Yazapa
Kaungki
Wunehchaungpya
Kyetmaoh
Wunehchaung
Banmade
Alechaung
Pathwi
Tanyat
Mazaw
Thagan
Papyin

Yebyu Township

Lot-tine
Yebu Ywathit
Koh-Hlaing
Myinzoung
Kyaukkadin
Kywetalin
Alae-sakan
Paukpinkwin
Kinbon
Natkyizin
Hlar-chaungphar
Kyaukayan
Mayan
Mayanchaung
Zinba
Yinbon
60 miles

Bokpyin

Manoro
Lanphonnga
Kenchaung
Nantaung
Kaukbauk
Hengrai
Yoday
Chaungmon
Sadien
Ngaboakchaung

Tavoy / Dawei Township

Nyaungdon
Pyinthadaw
Taungthonlone
Myitta
Budayu
Kyaikpelaung
Paungdaw
Thebyuchaung
Nantayok

APPENDIX 4: SPDC MILITARY COMMAND IN EASTERN BURMA / MYANMAR (2010)

REGIONAL MILITARY COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Triangle Area Command	-Keng Tong, Shan State	South East Command	-Moulmein, Mon State
Eastern Command	-Taunggyi, Shan State	Coastal Command	-Mergui, Tenasserim Division
Southern Command	-Taungoo, Pegu Division		

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS (LIDs)

LID - 11	-Rangoon, Rangoon Division	LID - 55	-Kalaw, Shan State
LID - 22	-Pa-an, Karen State	LID - 77	-Pegu, Pegu Division
LID - 44	-Thaton, Mon State	LID - 99	-Meiktila, Mandalay Division

REGIONAL & MILITARY OPERATIONAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS (ROC's & MOC's)

Mong Pyat ROC	-Mong Pyat, Shan State	MOC - 12	-Kawkareik, Karen State
Loikaw ROC	-Loikaw, Karenni State	MOC - 13	-Bokepyin, Tenasserim Division
MOC - 2	-Mong Naung, Shan State	MOC - 14	-Mong Hsat, Shan State
MOC - 6	-Pyinmana, Mandalay Division	MOC - 17	-Mong Pan, Shan State
MOC - 7	-Pekon, Shan State	MOC - 19	-Ye, Mon State
MOC - 8	-Tavoy, Tenasserim Division	MOC - 20	-Kauthaung, Tenasserim Division

BATTALION HEADQUARTERS BY STATES AND DIVISIONS

(IB : Infantry Battalion; LIB : Light Infantry Battalion; AB : Artillery Battalion)

SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

Mong Nai Township	Langkher Township	Mong Ton Township	Mawk Mai Township
IB-248	IB-99	IB-65	IB-132
LIB-576	LIB-525	IB-133	Nam Zarng Township
LIB-518	LIB-578	IB-277	IB-247
LIB-569	Mong Hsat Township	IB-225	IB-66
LIB-574	IB-49	LIB-519	AB-359
AB-336	IB-278	AB-386	LIB-516
Kunhing Township	LIB-527	Laikha Township	Hsi Hseng Township
IB-246	LIB-579	IB-64	LIB-423
IB-296	LIB-580	LIB-515	LIB-424
LIB-524	LIB-333	Loilem Township	LIB-425
AB-335	Kehsi & Mong Kung	IB-9	Mong Pyat Township
Mong Pan Township	IB-132	IB-12	IB-221
IB-294	LIB-514	LIB-513	LIB-329
IB-295	IB-286	Taunggyi Township	LIB-330
LIB-575	IB-287	IB-94	LIB-335
LIB-332	Pekon Township	LIB-510	LIB-570
LIB-520	LIB-336	Pinlaung Township	Yatsauk Township
LIB-517	LIB-421	IB-249	IB-292
LIB-598	LIB-422	LIB-511	LIB-508
LIB-577	Mong Yawn Township	LIB-512	LIB-509
Kalaw Township	LIB-311	Tachileik Township	Mong Khet Township
IB-3	LIB-334	LIB-331	IB-227
IB-7	LIB-573	LIB-359	LIB-327
LIB-18	LIB-553	LIB-526	LIB-328
LIB-112	Mong PingTownship	LIB-529	Keng Tong Township
LIB-117	IB-43		IB-244
	LIB-360		IB-245
	LIB-528		LIB-314

KARENNI / KAYAH STATE

Loikaw Township	Pruso Township	Bawlakeh Township	Deemawso Township
IB-54	LIB-428	LIB-337	IB-102
IB-72	LIB-531	LIB-429	LIB-427
IB-261	Pasaung Township	LIB-430	
IB-250	IB-134		
LIB-530	IB-135		
AB-360			

KAREN / KAYIN STATE

Papun Township	Hlaingbwe Township	Kyain Seikgyi Township	Kawkareik Township
LIB-19	IB-28	IB-32	IB-97
LIB-340	LIB-338	IB-283	IB-230
LIB-341	LIB-339	IB-284	IB-231
LIB-434	Myawaddy Township	LIB-202	LIB-545
Thandaung Township	IB-275	Pa-an Township	LIB-546
IB-124	LIB-355	LIB-201	LIB-548
IB-603	LIB-356	LIB-203	LIB-549
	LIB-357	LIB-204	
	LIB-547	LIB-205	
		LIB-310	

EASTERN PEGU / BAGO DIVISION

Taungoo Township	Shwegyin Township	Kyaukgyi Township	Phyu Township
IB-26	IB-57	IB-60	IB-35
IB-39	LIB-350	LIB-599	Pegu Township
Tantabin Township	LIB-349	LIB-590	IB-30
IB-73	LIB-589	LIB-351	LIB-440

MON STATE

Thaton Township	Kyaikhto Township	Ye Township	Thanbyuzayat Township
IB-24	LIB-2	IB-31	IB-62
LIB-1	LIB-207	IB-61	LIB-209
LIB-9	LIB-208	IB-106	Mudon Township
LIB-118	Moulmein Township	LIB-583	LIB-210
LIB-206	IB-81	LIB-586	LIB-202
Bilin Township	LIB-102	LIB-587	
IB-2	LIB-104	LIB-343	
IB-8		LIB-591	
IB-96		LIB-299	
LIB-3		LIB-588	
		AB-316	

TENASSERIM / TANINTHARYI DIVISION

Yebyu Township	Tenasserim Township	Tavoy Township	Bokpyin Township	Kauthaung Township
IB-273	LIB-556	IB-25	IB-224	IB-288
IB-282	LIB-557	LIB-402	LIB-585	IB-262
LIB-410	LIB-558	LIB-401	LIB-559	LIB-597
LIB-408	LIB-561	AB-302	LIB-560	LIB-594
LIB-409	AB-306	Mergui Township	LIB-358	LIB-595
LIB-406	Theyetchaung Township	IB-17	LIB-432	LIB-596
LIB-407	LIB-403	IB-103	LIB-581	LIB-342
LIB-498	LIB-404	IB-101	LIB-593	LIB-431
AB-304	LIB-405	IB-265	LIB-555	LIB-582
AB-307	AB-201	LIB-433	LIB-592	AB-303
Palaw Township	Launglon Township	AB-301	LIB-584	AB-305
IB-280	IB-104	AB-401	LIB-308	
IB-285	IB-267	LIB-482	AB-501	
AB-309				

APPENDIX 5 : 2010 SURVEY GUIDELINES

POPULATION SURVEY

The objective is to assess the scale and distribution of internal displacement and the impacts of militarization and development.

Township name (on maps of Burma) :

Background about key informants :

.....

1. How many villages have been completely destroyed, relocated or abandoned during the past 12 months? Where were these villages?

(Please indicate on the table and map)

2. How many people have fled or been forced to leave their homes and moved elsewhere due to war or human rights abuses during the past 12 months?

(Please indicate on the table)

3. How many SPDC “relocation sites” (including consolidated villages) currently remain populated by force? Where are these relocation sites?

(Please indicate on the map)

4. How many people are currently obliged to live in SPDC relocation sites (including consolidated villages)?

(Please indicate on the table)

5. Where are any “hiding areas” in which people conceal themselves from SPDC patrols, including opposition controlled areas?

(Please indicate on the map)

6. How many people currently hide from, or do not show themselves to, SPDC patrols?

(Please indicate on the table)

7. Where are any special regions or “ceasefire areas” in which the ethnic nationality authorities have limited autonomy and guarantees against SPDC attack?

(Please indicate on the map)

8. How many displaced people currently live in ethnic “ceasefire areas”?

(Please indicate on the table)

9. Where are development projects which have caused human rights abuses during the past 12 months?

(Please indicate relevant roads, agricultural plantations, mines, logging areas, dams and gas pipelines on the map)

(Please also indicate where forced labour, forced relocations or land confiscation was imposed on the map)

10. Where are current locations of SPDC outposts, battalion headquarters, Light Infantry Divisions (LID), Operational Control Headquarters (OCH) and Regional Commands?

(Please indicate the location and type of army camp on the map provided)

HOUSEHOLD POVERTY SURVEY

Field staff's name & organisation :

State or Division :

Township :

Village :

"Hello, my name is _____. I work for _____. My organization would like to learn more about how your household is surviving by asking you some questions. I do not need to know your name, and all of your specific responses will be kept confidential. You will not be paid for participating in this survey, and there are no promises that you will receive aid in the future. Please be completely honest with your answers. Are you willing to take some time to answer these questions today?"

1. Sex?

- ☐ 1. Male ☐ 2. Female

2. What is your religion?

- ☐ 1. Animist ☐ 2. Buddhist
- ☐ 4. Moslem ☐ 5. None

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 3. Christian
- ☐ 6. Other

3. What is your ethnic group?

- ☐ 1. Sgaw Karen ☐ 2. Pwo Karen
- ☐ 4. Kayaw ☐ 5. Paku
- ☐ 7. Shan ☐ 8. Palaung
- ☐ 10. Lahu ☐ 11. Mon
- ☐ 13. Other:.....

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 3. Kayah
- ☐ 6. Kayan
- ☐ 9. Pa-O
- ☐ 12. Burman

4. Please record the number of people currently living in your household according to age and sex.
(Insert numbers in all relevant boxes)

Age	Male	Female
Under 5 years		
5 – 14 years		
15 – 29 years		
30 – 44 years		
45 – 59 years		
Over 60 years		

5. How can you prove you are a citizen of Burma?

(Mark all relevant boxes)

- ☐ 1. Birth registration documents ☐ 2. Valid Burmese Identity card
- ☐ 3. Out of date Burmese Identity card ☐ 4. Letter from local authorities
- ☐ 5. Identity papers from village leaders ☐ 6. Family and friends
- ☐ 7. No proof ☐ 8. Other (specify)

6. Has your household received cash or food aid from my organization during the past 12 months?

- ☐ 1. Yes ☐ 2. No

7. What is the main source of water used by your household for drinking?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. Public piped water ☐ 2. Tube well
- ☐ 3. Protected well / pond / spring / tank ☐ 4. Unprotected well / pond / spring / tank
- ☐ 5. River / Stream ☐ 6. Other (specify)

8. What are the main construction materials currently used for your house's roofing?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. Thatch / leaf ☐ 2. bamboo ☐ 3. Tarpaulin
- ☐ 4. wooden tiled roofing ☐ 5. Tin, corrugated iron ☐ 6. No roof
- ☐ 7. Other (please specify)

9. What are the main construction materials currently used for your house's external walls?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. Thatch / leaf
 ☐ 2. Bamboo
 ☐ 3. tarpaulin
☐ 4. wood
 ☐ 5. brick or stone walls
 ☐ 6. No walls
☐ 7. Other (please specify).....

10. What type of latrine does your household normally use?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. Wet latrine
 ☐ 2. Covered pit, dry latrine
☐ 3. Uncovered pit, dry latrine
 ☐ 4. No latrine
☐ 5. Other (Specify)

11. If your household includes children between 5 years and 13 years old who are not regularly attending school, what is the main reason?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. no children under 13
 ☐ 2. children attend school regularly
☐ 3. illness or handicap
 ☐ 4. cannot pay fees for school
☐ 5. can not pay transportation costs / too far away
 ☐ 6. Early marriage
☐ 7. teacher absent / poor quality
 ☐ 8. security situation is not safe
☐ 9. child needed for domestic chores
 ☐ 10. child works for cash or food
☐ 11. child not interested in school
 ☐ 12. other (please specify)

12. If children between 12 months and 5 years old are present, conduct a MUAC test and record the results.

	Normal (green), $X > 13.5\text{cm}$	Mild malnutrition (yellow) $13.5 < X < 12.5\text{cm}$	Moderate malnutrition (orange) $12.5 > X < 11.0\text{cm}$	Severe malnutrition (red) $X < 11.0\text{cm}$
Number of children				

13. What kind of agricultural land does your household use for cultivation?

(Mark all relevant boxes)

- ☐ 1. No access to land for farming
 ☐ 2. small kitchen garden only
☐ 3. less than 2 acres, with no irrigation
 ☐ 4. less than 2 acres, irrigated
☐ 5. between 2 and 5 acres, with no irrigation
 ☐ 6. between 2 & 5 acres, irrigated
☐ 7. between 5 and 10 acres, with no irrigation
 ☐ 8. between 5 & 10 acres, irrigated
☐ 9. over 10 acres, with no irrigation
 ☐ 10. over 10 acres of irrigated land

14. Does your household currently own any of these productive assets?

(Mark all relevant boxes)

- ☐ 1. Farm machinery (ploughs, oxcarts etc)
 ☐ 2. tractor / mini-tractor
☐ 3. Agricultural tools (machete, hoe, etc)
 ☐ 4. sewing machine
☐ 5. weaving loom
 ☐ 6. boat with engine
☐ 7. boat without engine
 ☐ 8. car
☐ 9. draught animals (cows, buffalos)
 ☐ 10. Motorbike
☐ 11. No assets owned
 ☐ 12. other (please specify)

15. How many animals does your family currently own?

(indicate number in boxes)

- ☐ 1. buffalo or Ox
 ☐ 2. Cow
☐ 3. horse or mule
 ☐ 4. Pig
☐ 5. goat
 ☐ 6. chicken, duck or other poultry
☐ 7. fish, prawn or crab farm
 ☐ 8. other (Please specify).....

16. Where has most of the rice your household has consumed during the past month come from?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. own rice crop
 ☐ 2. purchased with cash
☐ 3. borrowed and need to repay
 ☐ 4. gift from family or friends
☐ 5. exchanged for labour
 ☐ 6. exchanged with other goods
☐ 7. aid from an organization
 ☐ 8. other (Please specify).....

17. What was your household's main source of cash income during the past month?

(Mark one box only)

- | | |
|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. Daily wages (casual labour) | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. salary job |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. slash and burn rice farming | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. wet rice paddy farming |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. petty trade / small retail store | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. fishing / hunting |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. collecting firewood or forest products | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. breeding small animals |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. remittances | <input type="checkbox"/> 10. no cash income in past month |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 11. Other (please specify) | |

18. In the past month, approximately what proportion of your total expenditures has been on food and other basic needs?

(Identify all expenditures, then use 10 stones to estimate proportions)

Expenditures	% expenses
No expenditures at all.	
Food	
Clothing & shelter	
Household goods (soap, kerosene, candles, etc)	
Health care / medicine	
Education	
Transport	
Farming / business investments	
Debt Repayment	
Other (specify)	
Total	100%

19. What have been the main difficulties or shocks to your livelihood during the past six months?

(prioritise no more than two boxes)

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1. loss of employment / reduced salary or wages | <input type="checkbox"/> 2. floods / heavy rains / drought |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3. rats / pests damaged crops | <input type="checkbox"/> 4. Army damaged / stole crops |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5. sickness or death / medical or funeral costs | <input type="checkbox"/> 6. commodity price increases |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7. restrictions on travel to fields or markets | <input type="checkbox"/> 8. limited availability of land |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 9. landmines | <input type="checkbox"/> 10. Conflict or military patrols |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 11. forced labour | <input type="checkbox"/> 12. Extortion or arbitrary taxation |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 13. forced displacement | <input type="checkbox"/> 14. Other (please specify) |

20. During the past week, how many days have each of these types of food been eaten in your household?

(Write the number of days each food was eaten)

Food item	# days eaten in past 7 days
Rice	
Other cereals (eg bread / maize / wheat noodles)	
Roots / tubers (eg potatoes)	
Pulses, beans, lentils, nuts, tofu	
Fish (excluding fish paste)	
Eggs	
Red meat (cow, goat, pig)	
Poultry (chicken, duck)	
Vegetable oil, fats	
Milk, cheese, yoghurt	
Vegetables (including leaves)	
Fruits	
Sweets, sugar	
Condiments (salt, chilli, fish paste)	
Other (describe)	

21. How long will your current rice stocks last?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. No rice stocks remaining
- ☐ 3. 2 -7 days
- ☐ 5. one to three months
- ☐ 7. over six months

- ☐ 2. 1 day
- ☐ 4. More than a week, but less than a month
- ☐ 6. four to six months

22. If you currently have an outstanding debt to repay, what was the main reason for borrowing?

(Mark one box only)

- ☐ 1. No debts outstanding
- ☐ 3. to cover health expenses or medicine
- ☐ 5. to invest in agriculture or business
- ☐ 7. to pay for social events / ceremonies
- ☐ 9. Other (please specify)

- ☐ 2. to buy food
- ☐ 4. to pay school fees
- ☐ 6. to buy or rent land or housing
- ☐ 8. to pay taxes or fines

23. If your household has had food shortages during the past month, how has your household coped with food shortages?

(Mark all relevant boxes)

- ☐ 1. No food shortages in past month
- ☐ 3. eat rice soup / reduce meal portions
- ☐ 5. rely of help from friends and relatives
- ☐ 7. sold assets
- ☐ 9. migrated in search of income

- ☐ 2. buy cheaper food
- ☐ 4. skip entire days without eating
- ☐ 6. buy food on credit / incur debt
- ☐ 8. received aid from charities
- ☐ 10. Other (please specify)

APPENDIX 6 : ACRONYMS AND PLACE NAMES

ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CIDKP	Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People
DKBA	Democratic Karen Buddhist Army
IB	Infantry Battalion
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	internally displaced person
KNLP	Kayan New Lands Party
KNPLF	Karenni National People's Liberation Front
KNPP	Karenni National Progressive Party
KNSO	Karenni National Solidarity Organisation
KNU	Karen National Union
KNLA	Karen National Liberation Army
KNU/KNLA-PC	KNU / KNLA Peace Council
KORD	Karen Office of Relief and Development
KPF	Karen Peace Front
KSWDC	Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre
LIB	Light Infantry Battalion
LID	Light Infantry Division
MRDC	Mon Relief and Development Committee
NGO	non government organisation
NMSP	New Mon State Party
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PNO	PaO National Organisation
PNLO	PaO National Liberation Organisation
PNDO	PaO National Development Organisation
SPDC	State Peace and Development Council
SSA-S	Shan State Army – South
SSA-N	Shan State Army - North
SSNA	Shan State National Army
SNPLO	Shan Nationalities People's Liberation Organisation
SRDC	Shan Relief and Development Committee
TBBC	Thailand Burma Border Consortium
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UWSA	United Wa State Army

BURMA PLACE NAMES

Irrawaddy Division
Karenni State
Karen State
Kyaukgyi
Moulmein
Mergui
Paan
Papun
Pasaung
Pegu Division
Salween River
Sittaung River
Tavoy
Tenasserim Division
Taungoo
Rangoon

MYANMAR PLACE NAMES

Ayeyarwady Division
Kayah State
Kayin State
Kyaukkyi
Mawlamyine
Myeik
Hpa-an
Hpapun
Hpasawng
Bago Division
Thanlwin River
Sittoung River
Dawei
Tanintharyi Division
Toungoo
Yangon



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Thailand Burma Border Consortium

Working with displaced people of Burma

26 YEARS

Mission

The Thailand Burma Border Consortium, a non-profit, non-governmental humanitarian relief and development agency, is an alliance of NGOs, working together with displaced people of Burma, to respond to humanitarian needs, strengthen self-reliance and promote appropriate and lasting solutions in pursuit of their dignity, justice and peace.