

EDITOR

Ismail Hasani
Bonar Tigor Naipospos

Religion Radicalism and Its Implications on Assurance of
Religious/Belief Freedom in Jabodetabek and West Java

The Faces of Islam 'Defenders'



Pustaka
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The Faces of ISLAM ‘Defenders’

Religion Radicalism and Its Implications on Assurance of
Religious/Beliefs Freedom in Jabodetabek and West Java

December, 2010

150 mm x 210

vi+212 pages

ISBN: 978-602-99042-0-8

COMPILER	SETARA Institute team
EDITOR	Ismail Hasani & Bonar Tigor Naipospos
DESIGN	Titikoma-Jakarta (021-95254570)
PUBLISHER	Pustaka Masyarakat Setara

PREFACE

SETARA Institute is an organization which was established by 28 individuals whose goal is to realize equal community. One of its concerns is to actively ensure abolishment of religions/beliefs intolerance and discrimination in Indonesia.

Religious/beliefs freedom is national fundamental right that is recognized by the constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as well as by International Convention of Political and Civil Rights that has been ratified by Indonesia on Ordinance No. 12 the Year 2005. As human rights and constitutional rights, religions/beliefs freedom holds the government to account of ensuring the freedom and of punishing whoever tries to violate the freedom.

The nation's success level on ensuring the freedom is measured on two ways. Firstly, the government has to retain them selves from taking any measures that can aggravate individual's or group's rights execution (abstain). Thus, this mandatory principle is negative obligation. Secondly, the government protects human rights from any threats or actions by non-state organization. This is positive obligation. Discriminated parties, religious minority in particular, require the government to carry out this obligation. In general, the government has to assure that these rights are not violated by third parties.

However, the Indonesian government practically intervene religious matters. On the contrary, the government helplessly fails to present them selves at bringing those who are responsible of intolerance, discrimination, and violence to court. In addition,

through any legal products, the government sponsors the act of intolerance and discrimination instead. The government also keeps neglecting any act of violence on minority's freedom of religion.

The most obvious act of neglect is when the government keeps on giving impunity to radical Islamic organizations although it is clear that they involve in many violence cases. Not only does the government ignore the situation, but it constantly accommodates these organizations politicalwise.

SETARA Institute has done a research on religious radicalism in Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi (Jabodetabek) and West Java in order to reveal the faces of radical Islamic organizations that according to reports on condition of religion freedom or the research itself often violate the freedom of religion of other community.

By knowing these radical Islamic organizations, we hope that a number of actions can be taken by the government to eradicate religious intolerance and discrimination. Upholding the law against those who commit violence, intolerance and discrimination as well as de-radicalizing perspective, attitude and religious orientation through political and economic channels are the main recommendation of this research.

Finally, SETARA wishes this report research be used as a reference by parties of interest to realize equal community.

Jakarta, 22 February 2011

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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia within the last three years, 2007-2009, is still worrying. SETARA Institute recorded that in 2007, there were 185 types of actions in 135 incidents of violation against the freedom of religion/belief; in 2008 there were 367 actions in 265 incidents, and in 2009 there were 291 actions in 200 incidents. The violence act against the freedom of religion/belief is mostly related with the radical Islamic organizations and involving government authority.

Social tension and the most serious action of violation against the freedom of religion/belief relates to worship place of minority religion group, criminalization of Ahmadiyah sects belief, hate speech, including statement from government officials/public figure that condones the brutality; SETARA Institute classified these violation in intolerance category.

The groups that being targeted of persecution and suffer from the most serious violence act are the Christians and Ahmadiyah sect. This disturbing portray occurs during the last three years shows an escalating intolerance and that the government has failed in protecting the freedom of their citizen based on the constitution.

Parallel with the intensity of violation against the freedom of religion/belief, the radical Islamic organizations seems getting more aggressive in provoking the intolerance opinion and practice among community by carrying the issue of heretical sect, anti-

immoral, anti-apostasy/Christianization and enforcement of Islamic Law (*Syariah*). The issues raised are also expanding. The western countries, especially United States and neo-liberal economic system also becomes the target labeled as *kafir* (infidel). The issues are **capitalized** as a means to gain support from community and campaigned as (a way) to “protecting the community”. Several recent incidents clearly indicated the force link between the activities of some radical Islamic organizations with the persecution and violence incidents in the name of religion, morality and social order.

The SETARA Institute report shows that most of violations occurred within Jakarta and its suburban areas, such as: Bekasi, Tangerang, Depok, and Bogor and also in West Java areas in general. The radical Islamic organizations arise and grow in those areas where it becomes the main ‘preach’ zone. In West Java, the organizations grow and expand in Tasikmalaya, Garut, Cianjur and Cirebon. The urban and suburban areas have become the main operation arena of these movements.

Meanwhile, the government has not yet serious in proceeding against the perpetrators as well as in showing a comprehensive measure in pursuance of seizing violent act in the name of religion, intolerance and discrimination against religion/belief. Government responses are limited to sporadic and instant reaction. In certain matters, the government is even actively promoting intolerance and discrimination which often worsening the situation instead of creating piece in inter – religion life. This constellation is recently influence the condition of the freedom of religion in Indonesia.

The appearance phenomenon of various radical Islamic movements is not only in the suburban areas of Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi (Jabodetabek) and West Java, but in some other regions in Indonesia as well. For several last years, the development of radical Islamic organization has consumed so much attention from academicians, either from the Country or abroad academicians as well. Generally, various studies and scientific activities organized is aimed in the effort to disclose the history, ideology background, the growth, movement pattern, organizational structure, network

map and prospect of radical Islamic movement in Indonesia. Even though this is not a new thing, the study concerning the radical Islam grows massively after the September 11 2001 event, when the World Trade Center (WTC) twin tower in United States was bombarded by the terrorist. Different study and deepening study on the roles of terrorism network has become subject of studies in various forums. In Indonesia, these studies were rapidly growing after the event of Bali bombing on October 12 2002.

Even though many of people doubted it, various assaults, arrests, and legal proceeding of terrorism network members has proved that the actors of terrorism were those who associated in the Islamic Pilgrim (JI) network. Meanwhile, JI continues to spread its network in the countries where it is conducive for terrorism actions includes Indonesia. And so an amount of study is focusing on how JI works and gets public support, included its networks in transnational Islamic organizations that operated in Indonesia and radical Islamic organizations that grows in Indonesia.

Some important contributions of various studies are the acquaintance of quite comprehensive information in connection with the ideology/value promulgating patterns, genealogy roots, movement objective, and recruitment method to the spreading attempt in various regions in the country. Even though not all aspects are disclosed, however the studies that have been conducted by various parties have become important material for the development of similar studies.

Radical Islamic movement study is usually taking a picture of radical transnational organizations and relates it with terrorism network spread by JI, while studies about radical organizations that grow and develop locally are rarely taken. Besides, the character and profile of local society in which such radical Islamic movements are growing and developing gain less particular attention. Yet the attempt to disclose the society character in the context of study against radical Islamic movement has significant meaning. Through such study, at least we can find an illustration or information of how far the relationship is built between the society and the movement. Through the achievement of such information, this study will

indirectly get the projection regarding the question: does radical Islamic movement have any social carrying capacity and future, from the point of view of the society character aspect around them. Other than its relationship with the terrorism action, study about radical Islamic movement in the connection with the reinforcement of citizen's civil freedom guarantee, particularly the freedom to have religion/belief has not been performed that much.

As a human right organization that pays attention to how to realize an equal community, SETARA Institute thinks it is necessary to perform study against the character of various radical non-transnational Islamic movements and the response of urban and sub-urban society in connection with the phenomenon of radical Islamic movement appearance. This Study is mainly grounded by the unique phenomenon: as recorded by the SETARA Institute, the urban and sub-urban society has been involved in contact with various violence actions on the name of religion against other religion group/follower for the last few years. With other words, this study is mainly aimed to disclose the basic character of various radical non-transnational Islamic organization and society's religious behavior.

This Study consists of among other things: genealogy, ideology, organization profile, main activities, constituent basic and the network that they build. This study will trace also how far the issue cross cutting is occurred among the radical Islamic groups, included the identification of possible difference, competition and even conflict among them. This attempt is expected to be able to disclose the current situation and condition of an amount of radical Islamic organization. Consequently, this study will be aimed as well as an attempt of data and analysis updating against various study regarding the existence of radical Islamic organization, that ever been conducted in this last few years.

Meanwhile, study against the society consists of their perception towards some main issues that included: (1) social plurality, (2) violence in the name of religion, and (3) Islamic Shari'a application. Through this study that discloses the society character, it is expected that we can obtain any picture of how far their

religious radicalism grade or level is. This Study will trace whether there is any 'logical linkage' between the society character in one side and radical Islamic organization appearance in the other side. This study is based on this framework.

This research is particularly questioning key questions: *first*, how does the society see the radical Islamic organization existence? *Second*, why do radical Islamic organizations grow rapidly in Jabodetabek and West Java? *Third*, what are the profil, genealogy, doctrin, players, central issue, included recruitment and funding method of radical Islamic organization? And *fourth*, what is the implication of this radical organization existence against the freedom of having religion/belief guarantee?

B. OBJECTIVE

This research has their objectives. *First*, to gain knowledge of how does the urban society point of view or perception especially of those from middle to lower economic class against some issues that related to the tolerance. The priority is their point of view against the issue that carried by radical Islamic organization. *Second*, is to map the radical Islamic organizations in Jakarta and West Java; and *third*, to measure its implication against the freedom of having religion/belief guarantee.

C. METHODOLOGY

SETARA Institute considers that qualitative study combined with public opinion survey is relevant choice of methodology. Through this scientifically accountable selection of methodology, it is expected to gain more accurate (precise) and representative (approaching the actual social reality) picture. For study regarding various radical non-transnational Islamic organizations, study is conducted by means of qualitative method. This Study covered the regions of Tasimalaya, Garut, Cianjur, Cirebon and Jabodetabek, while the mapping of society character will be conducted by means of survey method. This survey is particularly performed on the urban

community in the regions of DKI Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi (Jabodetabek). For the society portrait of West Java, this study will be using a research data that was conducted by other party.

This research uses two approaches: quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative approach is conducted by means of survei in Jabodetabek, while qualitative approach uses interview and Focused Group Discussion with radical Islamic organization players and Human Rights and democracy activists in Jabodetabek, Cirebon, Tasikmalaya, Garut, and Cianjur.

1. QUALITATIVE APPROACH

In-depth Interview: This is performed to collect various information from selected or determined key informant through purposive sampling. With this purposive sampling method, the key informant determination is conducted by standing in the first instance on the study objective that combined with 'availability' of key informant in the research location. The basis of key informant determination started from his/her relevance and capacity aspect in connection with the formulated objective of activity. Such method allows a deeper exploration regarding topic that needs deeper exploration. The instrument used for in-depth interview is 'unstructured' interview guidelines developed from the thinking frame mentioned above.

Based on the objectives to be reached, the group that is deemed as relevant to be key informant is some resource persons that considered representing the elements of radical Islamic organization or other key informant that is considered to have sufficient knowledge regarding aspects to be studied. Therefore, the covert interview method is conducted upon the topic sensitivity grade and key informant position.

Covert In-depth Interview: Similar to work principle in the in-depth interview, covert interview is conducted with 'unstructured' interview method as well against an amount of key information order to explore their opinion. The determination is conducted by means

of purposive sampling as well. The different is that the key informant in covert interview is made unconscious with the interview. This method is selected considering that certain topics to be explored are potential not to be objective or it is difficult to gain information from the main key informant.

Selection of this method is aimed to close the lack of in-depth interview method. Covert interview is conducted with two main reasons. *First*, key informant is in difficult position to utter his opinion in connection with the possible ambiguity of the answers because of the positioning for the reason of interest (that might appear based on its social position, occupation, position, back ground, etc.). *Second*, this interview method is vital to explore topics that might be considered as sensitive that do not allow the key informant to state his attitude or opinion openly.

Focused Group Discussion (FGD): FGD is conducted by collecting an amount of key informant in a special and limited forum. This FGD activity will be performed two times: in Bandung and Jakarta. Each FGD activity involves about 15 participants that deemed to represent various elements of the groups to be studied.

In order to ensure that all opinions of various participants are disclosed and explored systematically/structurally, the implementation of FGD makes use of participative method. This method allows each participant to actively suggest their opinions. FGD activity is guided by one facilitator.

2. QUANTITATIVE APPROACH: SURVEY

Considering that in-depth interview and covert interview methods are generally less quantitative, particularly for certain topics that require a more quantitative explanation, to sharpen and strengthen such method, it is deemed necessary to conduct data/information exploration through quantitative survey. Several norms conducted on this kind of data collection are as follow:

1.1. REGIONAL SAMPLING

In order to gain a picture that represents society opinion

in each location, this survey activity will be based in two study regions. For each selected regions, an amount of villages will be taken/determined. The amount of villages in each region will be proportionally determined by referring to the amount of population. Village determination technique for each province to the household (family) level will be conducted by combining systematic and stratified random sampling. From each selected village two Community Associations will be taken/ determined, and two Neighborhood Associations will be determined/taken of each selected Community Association.

1.2. SAMPLING TECHNIQUE (RESPONDENT)

Total amount of all sampel in this survey are 1,200 respondents for entire study location. According to the proportion and ratio of the amount of adult population between the regions, below is the region-based respondent composition.

Respondents in this survey consist of 50% woman and 50% man. Respondent sampling framework in this survey is the list of community member which are citizens of the selected Neighborhood Association with certain age restriction, namely 17 years old or above. Meanwhile, the respondent determination for each selected household (family) is conducted by means of *Kish* grid method. This method is a technique to determine respondent randomly in accordance with the family (household) member composition with similar sex and ordered based on the age. The interview is conducted face to face with the selected respondent.

With the sampling amount and process above, this survey is predicted to have error margin of $\pm 2.2\%$ in level of confidence of 95%. It means that if this survey is conducted repeatedly, the value will be ranged $\pm 4.0\%$. For example: 57% of the society has opinion that the government has not assured the freedom of having religion for minority group yet. By considering the error margin or error in the sampling process, such percentage amount of community opinion is actually located in the interval of 54.8% - 59.2%.

3. SECONDARY DATA STUDY (LITERATURE STUDY)

In supporting and sharpening the data exploration conducted by means of qualitative method and field survey, this research conducts study against various literature sources that considered relevant with study's topic. Several traced data among other things are books about research result, institutional reports, organization's documents, newspapers and other periodical publishes. Several selected materials that have been collected and selected then categorized according to the objective and framework of this research analysis.

4. DATA ANALYSIS

The collected data through several data exploration method above were further processed. This data processing process is suited with the kind of data exploration. The data obtained through qualitative method is selected and categorized according to certain framework to facilitate the researcher in conducting further analysis. According to the objectives to be achieved, analysis framework, type of research and data exploration technique, analysis on the collected datas will be conducted by means of descriptive method (descriptive analysis). On this basis, the conclusion method in this research is aimed to gain general tendency (generalization), and therefore it is inductive of nature.

Meanwhile, for the data obtained from quantitative method will be statistically processed by means of supporting instrument in the form of SPSS (*Statistical Package for Social Sciences*) in order to produce frequency and crossed tabulation for several parameters. For example, to see the tendency of people's opinion based on the sub-population; for example, population according to education level, sex, household expense, etc.

D. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In the conceptual framework, this study report presents urban sociology study as a perspective to understand the

phenomenon of urban Muslim, particularly in connection with the survey in the region of Jabodetabek and other urban regions. Conceptual explanation regarding the updated condition of urban community is expected to be able to provide contribution as well in understanding why religious radicalism is growing in the urban regions, including in the cities of West Java. Furthermore, basic concepts on religious radicalism including puritanism terminology, intolerance, radicalism, fundamentalism, and freedom for having religion /belief will be presented also. This presentation refers to previous studies and is aimed as well to confirm the argumentation of concept selection used in this research.

This research bases its opinion on the assumption that social-economical condition of a region will impact the character and attitude of its inhabitants. From this assumption, the urban regions with all of its social relationship, economy and politic, impact the attitude of its citizens. Even though it is still possible that the impact emerged is not deterministic, direct and one-way of nature; however there is quite obvious relationship between the social-economical conditions of a city with its habitant's behavior.

As the largest urbanization central of Indonesia, what is happening to Jabodetabek district seems to be similar with other cities in the Developed Countries. Such cities in the developed countries are generally the central of development and modernization. Not like any region or other cities located in the back countries, capital city of a country is the first region that enters the metropolis stage. Generally, a city progress as part of the development and modernization grows fast. Differentiation and social stratification in the city inhabitants emerge as inevitably consequence of a modernization process.¹ This process often associated with migration flow from various regions towards the city's central, particularly those who come from rural district. Noticeable difference between the rapid progress in the city and heavy life pressure in rural area is the main factor that drives such

1 Dean K. Forbes, *Geografi Keterbelakangan: Sebuah Survey Kritis*, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1986, h. 102.

migration.²

Unfortunately, not all cities inhabitants are lucky in this process. Differentiation and social stratification in the group of city's inhabitants has given different influence when seen from the point of view of vertical mobility. City's progress and modernizations obviously does not offer many choices for its citizens. The opportunity to self development for city's citizen of the middle economical class – such as manager, professional, and business world who are supposed to be more promising and giving proper life assurance – is relatively limited. This condition has made large part of metropolitan area inhabitants gather in lower roles. Part of them becomes industrial labors and develops themselves in informal sector, while others are scattered about and enter into various kind of lower level jobs, from transportation service, lower level governmental officer, half jobless, to pander, street prostitution, and petty scoundrel. Those who are less lucky people are living as paupers and beggars. All of these social segments occupy the lowest level of urban society pyramid structure. It is almost certain that the amount of this segment's inhabitants is far higher than middle and upper segment.³

Contrarily with the middle and upper social segment which is generally occupies a more proper residence and supported with a quite proper public and social facility; lower social layer occupies dense half permanent residence and illegal huts in various city corner. Seems that it becomes an 'ordinary' in various cities in the Third World, including Jabodetabek, lower level residences are generally less supported by proper public and social facility.⁴

With such urban structural condition, how can we recognize the attitude and character of urban society in general, particularly those who are in the lower class? Is that structural condition gives certain impact to the attitude and character of lower class society

2 Gordon Temple, "Migrasi Ke Jakarta," in Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti (Ed.), *Kemiskinan Di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1986, p. 72.

3 Ian Rixborough, Refer also to Gustav Papanek and Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, *"Penduduk Miskin Jakarta"*, in Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti (Ed.), p. 207.

4 Temple, *op.cit.*, p. 73.

in the city? What kind of attitudes and characters that are the main character of such community typology? What kind of impact caused by such community attitude and character, particularly in social relationships? Some thinking perspectives will be presented below in an attempt to explain the attitude of city's community in the Third World.

Generally, the character of this community is illustrated as transitional phenomenon, at least because of two main reasons. *First*, different with the cities in the developed countries where the modernization process has reached the final point, the modernization process in rural regions of Southern part of the world remains to continue. *Second*, as the consequence of the first factor, the formation of urban community's character in the Third World is generally speaking remaining to continue as well. Therefore the urbanization process becomes a 'project' that remains to continue in developed countries. Such social change gives impact to the community's natures in urban area. This phenomenon is marked by a transition from tradition to modernization. The attitude of urban people in the Third World shows the powerful pulls of urban life with capability to 'force' individuals in becoming more rational in one side, and there is deposition of values that cannot be entirely vanished in other side.⁵

As described previously, such urban people are dominated by groups with lower productivity and income. This kind of society typology is often illustrated by sociologists as urban marginal group.⁶ Casted off from the vertical mobility process to gain various strategic resource access – particularly economical and political resource – has forced this group to frequently face hard life and they are very fragile in the same time, particularly when it relates to the impact of ups and downs of governmental development policy. This situation in turn will emerge certain opinion and political attitude.

Political opinion and attitude showed by this marginal group is illustrated as "vicious" and "reactive" – to borrow Roxborough's

5 Ian Roxborough, *Teori-teori Keterbelakangan*, Second Edition, Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990, p. 78.

6 *Ibid.*

saying.⁷ In this connection, Roxborough stated that the emergence of Nazism is basically a reaction against economical crisis and deterioration of urban society in Germany after World War I. Consequently, the marginal society in the city – particularly in uncertain critical moments – is supporting element of the appearance of right wing dictatorship. With other words, a distressed feeling caused by the crisis without certain solution is the driving factor for individuals to seek or at least imagine a total and full of certainty value system. Such situation is driving the emergence of various forms of identity-based ideology and anti-democracy.⁸

Reactions showed by the marginal society caused by the economical and political crisis are illustrated from the gap that appears between their expectation both from the status part and material achievement, with what they really achieve. Perception on the deviation in the form of this gap between expectation and capacity in turn will cause a sense of deprivation, frustration or alienation. Therefore, it is not a coincidence if this frustration manifestation then appears in such 'hard' attitude.

In the context of the Third World countries with a majority of Muslim including Indonesia, the religion seems to play vital role as catalisator for the frustration expression of marginal mass. As said by Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni: "For poor group and unfortunate people, economical and social-political crisis has grounded them.

7 *Ibid.* p.88

8 *Ibid*, p. 89 and 116-117. In accordance with this phenomenon, Franz Magnis Suseno stated: 'small people', about 40% of Indonesia and live with income less than 2 US\$ per day, are generally involved in the very hard survival for the fittest. Value excellences such as tolerance, self-aware, and paying attention to each other are some things that too expensive for them and moreover, in an irregular urban society. Modernization and development impacts could make one become 'hard', illiberal and become civilian or fall into fanatic ideology... fundamentalism does have certain point of interest. In case of fundamentalism in Islamic group, exclusive tendency is supported also by international situation that gives impression that they are in a defensive situation. This is reinforced with some wars recently, and surely with that Palestine matter that shows unfairness over there, indeed. *Prisma* (2010).

When the disappointment emerges, religion is the highest savior."⁹ More than that, they have an opinion,"people's tendency to return to the religion increases when they are situated in critical situation."¹⁰ This means that the frustration they are suffering is potential 'partner' for fundamentalism movements that acts on the name of Islam.¹¹

Therefore, the religion – in this case Islam – seems not to be the main factor that triggers the emergence of various forms of urban marginal society's social attitude that can be categorized as 'hard'.¹² The usage of 'hard' term here is aimed as an effort to illustrate the usage of Islam as manifestation of reactive attitude against various multidimensional crisis caused by secular economical-political design that becomes more global (read: 'Western'), that currently present in the form of globalization. Generally, this opinion and attitude is defined as 'fundamentalism'.¹³

Disappointment against the secular economical-political system that considered as fail in providing certainty, feel of

9 Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (Ed.), *Gerakan Salafî Radikal Di Indonesia*, Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 2004, p. 44.

10 *Ibid.*, p.43.

11 Refer to Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, *Jejak Kafilah: Pengaruh Radikalisme Timur Tengah Di Indonesia*, Bandung: Mizan collaborates with Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007, p. 51. Both writers taking an illustration of how Ikhwanul Muslimin – a radical Islamic movement organization in Egypt – can make an exploitation attempt of the governmental failure in providing main services too the poors in the country. This illustration gives a picture that Islamic fundamentalist movements are channel for the frustration and mass alienation of urban marginal group who are ignored by the government. Refer to *Manifesto Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*, Jakarta: 2009 as well, as cited in Syafuan Rozi Soebhan, "Potret Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Pro Kontra Khilafah dan Wacana Keindonesiaan," in Syafuan Rozi (Ed.), *Nasionalisme, Demokratisasi, dan Sentimen Primordial Di Indonesia: Problematika Identitas Keagamaan Versus Keindonesiaan*, Jakarta: Puslitpol LIPI, 2009. Manifesto Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia stated various legal products of Republic of Indonesia which are neo-liberalism programs. This state policy product for Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia is directed to the deterioration of Indonesian economy and people's life that si being oppressed. This manifestation confirmed that only Islam that can give a better alternative offer. Once again, this illustrates how economical problem that oppresses the marginal society as the consequence of governmental policy is potential mass for Islamic fundamentalist movement.

12 Lihat M. Zaki Mubarak, *Genealogi Islam Radikal Di Indonesia: Gerakan, Pemikiran dan Prosepek Demokrasi*, Jakarta: LP3ES, p. 24.

13 *Ibid.* Lihat juga Martin Kramer, "Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?," *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2003), p. 65–77.

safety and prosperity, main idea that contains in the Islamic fundamentalism thought corpus offers an alternative solution that is deemed to be able to guarantee the totality and certainty. The only way out from the confinement of Western secular system according to Islamic fundamentalism point of view, is to 'return' to the basic values of Islam, namely Al-Qur'an and Hadist, as central point to arrange the whole life aspects.¹⁴ Therefore, fundamentalist stated: various attempts are needed so that the basic values of Islam can be materialized in a concrete form. The way towards this dream can only be achieved when the currently applicable system is basically changed, even if it requires physical violence.¹⁵

Therefore, it is not a coincidence if the fundamentalist is characterized by a strong tendency on what they formulated or assumed as 'Western domination threat'.¹⁶ With a literal interpretation of Al-Quran and Hadist, the fundamentalists explicitly positioned their goals to totally change the secular economical-political system with a state matter and social system that to their perceptions are more Islamic. For the fundamentalists, Islam is not merely a religion that teaches personal ritual and devoutness. At this point, the fundamentalists consciously do not distinguish the political power (matters of state) with religion. Contrarily, the Islamic fundamentalism opinion exactly stands on the attempt to unite the country (read: political power) and the religion. However, such tendency needs to be carefully observed. This phenomenon is basically not the mainstream of Islamic community. Therefore, as made by analysis team from the International Crisis Group, it is deemed necessary to make a clear limitation between the tendency to make Islam as religious doctrine and Islam as the driver of fundamentalism.¹⁷

Implication of the concept and strategy of Islamic fundamentalist struggling seems to have wide impact. Entirely

14 Martin Kramer, *loc.cit.*

15 Martin Kramer, *op.cit.*

16 M. Zaki Mubarak, *op.cit.*

17 *Understanding Islamism*, Middle East/North Africa Report No. 37, 2 March 2005, International Crisis Group.

return to the basic values of Al-Quran and Hadist, as imagined by Islamic fundamentalists, is equal to ignore the entire life aspects that are considered as not Islamic, including various practices of original values and culture in a community. Therefore, Islamic fundamentalists generally characterized with several basic characteristic such as:¹⁸

(1) literally interpretation of Al-Quran and Hadist texts. Such interpretation method does not seem to consider that the holy verses they are interpreting — at least partly — have historical dimension, and therefore this allows the possibility to be more advanced and dynamic interpreted to be suited with age advancement, without leaving its basic principles. In such literal interpretation the Islamic fundamentalist sees current world situation as 'not being Islamic'.

(2) there is no separation between religious domain (private) and state domain (public). Islam doctrine is considered to not separating personal and public matters. Based on this opinion, they still cannot accept secular system which is one of the principles in the democracy.

(3) they have no space for religious freedom within their own group; not only against the phenomenon of faith conversion but also denial to 'God'. Such possibility should be denied and there is consequently legal sanction for those who violates.

(4) anything which is 'not being Islamic' needs to be immediately changed with a 'more Islamic' system. Therefore, this fundamentalist group has a struggling program to apply Islamic Shari'a in the national law (political issues). This attempt to reach their goal seems to be widely various, from 'soft' one through education and propaganda to the making use of physical violence.¹⁹

However, such 'hard' behavior is not immediately appeared in a vulgar form. The establishment process of this attitude generally takes place gradually. These patterns will be much depended on the objective situation and condition. With the escalation of economical and political crisis that oppressed the marginal groups,

18 *Ibid.*

19 Martin Kramer, *op.cit.*

the potential that their behavior and response are getting harder, is high. Even though what has been claimed by this group, namely today's global economical-political unfairness, could have a quite logical, reasonable grounds, yet the Islamic fundamentalists frequently cause other problem when offering the solution.

Undoubtedly is that the Islamic fundamentalists, even those who are not go for the physical violence, have quite strong intolerance and exclusivity tendency.²⁰ From this statement it can be concluded that there are several elements for Islamic fundamentalists that are not supporting violence. SETARA Institute distinguishes passive and active intolerance. Passive intolerance is only in the level of idea and puritanism, while active intolerance is translated into actions. Crisis escalation will determine whether passive nature becomes smoother or contrarily more active and even 'harder'.

If intolerance can be defined as 'passive violence' or 'lowest-level violence', then the crisis escalation will determine whether passive nature becomes smoother (passive intolerance) or contrarily 'harder'.

The researchers, observers, and Islamic movement experts associate various predicate to radical Islamic organizations among other things are Islamic fundamentalist, Islamic militant, radical Islamic, Islamic hard-line, Islamic extremist or Islamic scripturalist. Several terms above even frequently mentioned alternately. SETARA Institute prefers to use radical Islamic, with a reason that its main ideas and actions are threatening and desires to change the basic pillars of national life such as Pancasila, Constitution 1945 of Republic of Indonesia, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, and Unified State of Republic of Indonesia. SETARA Institute has an opinion that those four pillars are final historical agreement for foundation of national life and matters of state.

Cited from Khamami Zada in *Islam Radikal* (2004) it is said that Singapore senior statesman, Lee Kuan Yew used the term of Islamic militant movement, when he saw the global Islamic militancy

20 M. Zaki Mubarak, *op.cit.*

phenomenon that comes from countries such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Lee's comment is addressed in connection with the growth of Islamic society organizations that are ready to depart to Afghan for *Jihad*, such as FPI, KISDI, Majelis Mujahidin, and PPMI. This term is used also by the Prime Minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad by referring the Islamic militant group in Malaysia (PAS and Mujahidin).²¹

Adam Schwarz in his popular book *"A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia Search for Stability"*, (1999), used the term of Islamic militant when mentioning DDII and KISDI, as part of Islamic movement that supported the Soeharto regime in early 1990's. Schwarz mentioned that both groups have special character; (1) interpret the Islam law rigidly, (2) show anti-Western and Semitic Religion attitude, and (3) being critical against the Chinese ethnic and Christians, who are economically and politically more established than the Islamic militant group.²² Robert W. Hefner opined that the term usage of anti-liberalism Islam, much more specific to refer the Islamic organization that obviously attacks the Western liberalism. Hefner refers DDII and KISDI for example, as Islamic anti-liberalism group.²³

In an article titled *"Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Suatu Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam di Indonesia Masa Orde Baru"* (1998), William R. Liddle used the term of Islamic scripturalist to refer the Islamic group that considers themselves to get involved particularly in the intellectual activities that attempt to adopt the messages of Muhammad the Prophet and the meaning of Islam into current social condition. For them, the great part of messages and meanings are clearly embodied in the Al-Qur'an and Hadist, and only need to be applied in human's life. Therefore, they tend to be oriented to Shari'a.²⁴ This term is equal to the puritanism

21 Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 181, Refer to *Kompas*, 6 September 2001

22 Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia Search for Stability*, (Washing: Allen & Unwin, 1999), p. 330-331.

23 Robert W. Hefner, *Civil Islam: Islam dan Demokrasi di Indonesia*, Penerjemah: Ahmad Baso, Jakarta, ISAI, 2001 p. 196-197.

24 R. William Liddle, "Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Suatu Bentuk Pemikiran dan

that frequently used in referring groups that desire for Islamic doctrine purification. Such purification is character of the Islamic Puritanism.

Cited from Khamami Zada²⁵, the term of Islamic fundamentalist in the work of Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (1994) is aimed to call the Islamic movement oriented to Shari'a application that he referred to Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahrir, Jama'ati Islami and Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) movements.²⁶ According to Khamami, this category is completed by Joh L. Esposito, that fundamentalism is characterized by the nature of "return to the religious fundamental faith". In all life practices of Muslims, they are literally assuming on the Al-Qur'an and Sunnah. Yet this term feels more provocative for Esposito, and even pejorative as once associated to Christians as literalist, static and extremist group. In turn, the fundamentalism frequently referred to a group that refers to literalist and expected to return to old times. Furthermore, fundamentalism frequently treated as extremist, fanaticism, political activism, terrorism and anti-USA. Therefore, John L. Esposito prefers to use the term of Islamic revivalism or Islamic activism, with Islamic tradition root.²⁷

E. OPERATIONAL DEFINITION

SETARA Institute uses the term of passive intolerance as a terminology in referring to combination of fundamental idea, exclusiveness and intolerance without violence manifestation. Contrarily, active intolerance is a grade to refer to intolerant idea and point of view to become violent. In such grade, a group enters into radical category. Change level of this religious attitude

Aksi Politik Islam di Indonesia Masa Orde Baru", in Mark R. Woodward (ed), *Jalan Baru Islam, Memetakan Paradigma Mutakhir Islam Indonesia*, 1st ed., (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), p. 304

25 Khamami Zada, Op. Cit

26 Refer too to Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1994), p. 2-4.

27 John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality?*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 7-8.

can be illustrated from the lowest level namely puritanism to fundamentalism, radicalism, and terrorism.

Radical Islam organization as this study's focus is one that impedes the assurance of the freedom to have religion/faith by programming the issues of Islamic Shari'ah enforcement, combating immoral, anti apostasy, and combating aberrance. The type of organizations studied is different with salafi and transnational organizations that carry the Islamic caliphate concept and have international network such as Front Pembela Islam (FPI), Forum Umat Islam (FUI), Gerakan Islam Reformasi (GARIS), Tholiban, Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyah (FUI), and Front Anti Pemurtadan Bekasi (FAPB). They are generally locally based and not involved in Islamic caliphate idea which is the main program for other Islamic groups.

SETARA Institute refers these groups as radical Islamic organization considering that their main concepts and actions are threatening and willing the change on basic pillars of nation life such as Pancasila, Constitution 1945 of Republic of Indonesia, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and Unified State of Republic of Indonesia. Moreover, these groups often use violence as the way to force their desire. On behalf of majority, on behalf of Islam, various groups as their action target suffered persecution.

Constitution amendment in a country is justified and even recognized, yet without changing the pillars of nation life that has been established by the Indonesian's founding fathers Indonesia. Any idea to change these pillars especially Pancasila and Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, will tear the religious matters apart and threaten the nation integration.

Unified State of Republic of Indonesia with Pancasila principles is not a religious country but put the religion in the highest position as common morale in the nation life and state matters. In this definition, the universality or common point of view becomes the foundation of state organizing, and not the particularity and particularism of each citizen's religion. The first point of this principle, the Almighty Deity, is obviously not referring to any certain religion even though such religion is followed by the

great part of the people. The position of one religion with other religion is similar and equal. Therefore, the Nation should keep the distance and not giving any peculiarity to certain religion, either in compiling the legal product or state organizing practice.

Further, what is the implication of radical Islamic battle concept and strategy against the public life? And what is the implication to the democracy and human rights existence and future? In the countries where the most people are following Islam and practice a democracy system including Indonesia, this opinion of Islamic fundamentalist will certainly cause a serious and complicated problem. In this case, it can be said that the basic idea of Islamic fundamentalist is not compatible with the democracy principle. The democracy system is generally rested on the principle of separating religion as private matter with the nation as public field.

Furthermore, democracy system which is generally combined with Human Right principles gives assurance to the freedom of having religion/faith as individual's full authority without intervention from any party. Islamic fundamentalist groups is exactly denying this civil freedom of citizens. From this side, it can be said that the basic idea of Islamic fundamentalist is not compatible with the democracy system and human right principles, particularly with the freedom right to have religion/faith.²⁸ In such framework, basic principles of Human Right have placed the State as institution that is obligated to act fairly and not discriminative.

According to Human Right framework, the State or non-state groups are not allowed to do any limitation, harassment,

²⁸ In connection with the faith as inseparable part of private world of each individual, Article 18 of DUHAM stated: "Everyone is entitled to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion; in this case including the freedom to change religion or faith, and the freedom to state his/her religion or faith by teaching, practicing, performing religious service and adhering it, individually or collectively, in the public or when alone." Meanwhile, Human Right principles give restriction to discrimination actions including: sex; sexual orientation; skin color, ethnic and race; nationality origin; religion, faith, and political believe; as well social status, economical class.

or exception – directly or indirectly – based on the human differentiation on their religion, tribe, race, ethnic, group, class, social status, economical status, sex, language, political faith, that may cause reducing, deviation or elimination, recognition, implementation or utilization of human rights and basic freedom in individual or common life in the field of politic, economy, law, social, culture, and other life aspects.²⁹ Moreover, the right to have religion, to think and have faith, is absolute right that is non-deogable in any situation or condition.

Each religion is principally claimed that its doctrine is the ultimate truth, that there is no other safe way. Each religion is emphasizing as well that the follower should believe it integrally and have fundamental faith. Thus intolerance is something adhered to latent to each religion and its followers. It is not surprising if there is any ethnocentric tendency (a feel of more excellent than others) to certain religion followers in seeing other religion followers. However, in societal life and social relationship, when a faith to the religion is becoming one and only parameter to interpret the social reality, it will obviously cause a problem. Particularly in a plural society with so many diversities such as Indonesia, appreciating and respecting difference and social back ground becomes a necessity.

1. INTOLERANCE

SETARA Institute distinguishes passive and active intolerance. Passive intolerance is remainder of integral faith on religion and interpretation against its religion's doctrine as the one and only truth for one self as individual and social being. One believes cognitively its religion's doctrine, however as a consequence of social relationship with various parties with different back ground, she/he should accept the fact and adapt to it. Contrarily, active intolerance is not merely seeing its religion's doctrine as the one

29 DUHAM (Universal Declaration on Human Right) opening explicitly stated that ignoring and underestimate the human right has caused brutal actions that emerges angry of mankind, and the formation of a world where people can enjoy the bliss of freedom to talk and have religion as well the freedom to be freed from anxiety and shortcoming which has been stated as the highest goal of rakyat biasa.

and only truth but tends to see them with different interpretation as wrong and deviated. The most obvious difference between passive and active intolerance is the action. Those from active intolerance are not only expressing themselves with statements but also actions.

The difference between passive and active intolerance is the level of awareness. Both of them believe their religion's doctrine and their social expression is respecting other parties with different back ground. Yet tolerance starts from the awareness and personal willingness, while passive intolerance is forced by the social relation and structure where one lives.

2. PURITANISM

Puritanism is an opinion that sees one's religion to include space and time, and eternal. This opinion ignores the context, social structure and culture of the society where he lives. The religion is totality. It arranges every life aspects, both individual and organizational behaviors in a greater scope, which is nation wide.

3. RADICALISM

Radicalism in social sciences is defined as an opinion that desires essential change according to its interpretation against the social reality or the ideology that one follows. Radical and radicalism are actually neutral concept and not pejorative. Radical change can be achieved through peaceful and persuasive way, but through violence as well.

And in this case we need to distinguish physical violence with symbolic violence. Lots of parties tend to associate violence with physical actions such as: attach, hitting, devastation and many others, yet ignoring the symbolic violence. Provocation, labeling, stigmatization, or agitating oration including hate speech, condoning tends to be underestimated and no considered as a condition that allows physical violence escalation.

4. TERRORISM

This terminology is often being disputed, particularly regarding the player; whether it is the armed political group, independency fighter, or the state. It is actually irrelevant to question if the player is the state or political group, since both are possible to act as terrorist. It is obvious that the wide and massive use of physical violence to achieve goals is one of terrorism category. Violence is used to create terror and anxiety on political enemy and social environment around them, to make them powerless and submissive.

5. FREEDOM TO HAVE RELIGION

The main instrument of human rights that governs the freedom assurance to have religion/faith is International Covenant regarding Civil and Political Right (1966) particularly article 18 that consists of: (1) freedom to have religion or faith upon one's own choice; and freedom to individually and collectively in a public place or closed area materializing his/her religion or faith in a devotion activity, compliance, good deed and teaching; (2) without any force so that the freedom is impeded to follow or choose one's own religion/faith; (3) freedom to materialize one's religion/faith can only be limited by legal rule if necessary, to protect the safety, orderliness, society's health or moral, or basic rights and freedom of others; (4) the countries of this Covenant promise to respect the parent's freedom and admit a legal guardian to ensure that the religion and moral of their children are according to their own faith.

Other human right instrument that rules the freedom assurance to have religion/faith is the Declaration on The Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief launched through the resolution of United Nation General Session No. 36/ 55 on November 25 1981. This Declaration is much more detailed in governing the freedom to have religion/faith compared to International Covenant regarding Civil and Political Rights. Yet due to its format as declaration, its nature is not binding the country members. However, this declaration reflects a wide consensus from the international community; therefore it has a

moral strength in the common international relationship practice. As the member of United Nation, Indonesia cannot ignore this declaration in implementing its obligation to meet the human right of its citizens.

Based on both human right instruments above, operational definition of freedom to have religion/faith consists of the freedom to follow a religion or faith of one's own choice, the freedom to perform religious service individually or collectively, and adhere, practice and teach openly or privately, including the freedom to convert the religion or faith, even for not following any religion or faith.³⁰

6. THE VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF HAVING RELIGION/ FAITH

Violation Of Right To Freedom Of Religion Or Belief is any form of state's failure or negligence in the implementation; for example, intervention on one's freedom to follow a religion, or not protecting one or group of people who becomes intolerance target or violence on the name of religion or faith.

Discrimination and dan intolerance on the name of religion,³¹ is form of violation to freedom of religion/faith as intended in Article 2 point 2 of the Declaration on The Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based On Religion Or Belief, namely, "each discrimination, negligence, restriction or favoritism

30 Article 18 of the Declaration of Universal Human Right (1948): "Everyone is entitled to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion; in this case including the freedom to change religion or faith, and freedom to state its religion or faith by means of teaching, practicing, performing religious service and adhere it, either individually or collectively with other people, in public or alone."

31 Article 1 of the UN Declaration regarding The Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based On Religion Or Belief (1981): "[1] Everyone is entitled to the freedom to think, have awareness and being religious. This right included the freedom to follow any religion or faith of one's own choice, and the freedom to individually or collectively, in closed area or openly, materialize their religion or faith in the form of religious service, ritual, practice and teaching; [2] No one can be forced so that it hinders one's freedom to follow religion or faith of his/her own choice; [3] One's freedom to practice his/her religion or faith can only be limited by legal stipulation and when it is considered as vital to protect the safety, serenity and public moral as well the fundamental right and freedom of others."

based on religion or faith, and its objectives or causes are to destroy or reduce the recognition, enjoyment or implementation of human rights and fundamental freedom upon equal reason," such as denying a group or state and expose hatred against other group based on the religion or faith difference.

CHAPTER II

A GENEALOGY OF RADICAL ISLAM IN INDONESIA

The fall of New Order in 1998 has given birth to a significant change. After being silenced by authoritative regime, the freedom is widely opened, the democracy grows and develops. One of the indicators is the appearance of political parties of various ideologies³². In the 1999 Election 48 political parties are competing. This is a large amount compared to previous regime that only allowed three parties: Golkar, PDI, and PPP.

The freedom offered by the democracy is properly utilized by Islam followers. Since 1998 the Islamic political aspiration enhanced and materialized in various kinds of articulation. The establishment of islamic parties became inevitable. There are recorded that 11 Islamic parties were competing in the 1999 Election, such as PBB (*Partai Bulan Bintang*), PK (*Partai Keadilan*), PKU (*Partai Kebangkitan Umat*), PNU (*Partai Nahdlatul Ummat*), PUI (*Partai Umat Islam*), Partai Masyumi Baru, PSII, PSII 1905, Masyumi (*Partai Politik Islam Masyumi*), PP (*Partai Persatuan*), and PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*). The appearance of Islamic parties seemed to illustrate the repetition of 1955 Election with same name and ideology, however they remained split up; for example, one certain political ideology consisted of two different political parties. PSII, Masyumi, NU who were contestants of 1955 Election are no longer within one political party in 1999 Election.

32 In 1955 Election, Lance Castle and Herbeth Feith divided political ideology into five ideologies: social democate, nationalism, communism, Java traditionalism, and Islam. Refer to Lance Castle in Lance Castle and Herbeth Feith, *Pemikiran Politik Indonesia (1945-1965)*, (Jakarta: LP3ES), p. iv

Paralel with the growth of Islamic political parties, an amount of Islamic community organization grows as well. It started with Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) established in 1998 in Jakarta, followed with other organizations such as *Gerakan Islam Reformis (GARIS)* in Cianjur in 1998, Tholiban in Tasikmalaya in 1999, *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*³³ in Yogyakarta in 2000, Forum Umat Islam (FUI) in Jakarta in 2005, LP3Syi in Garut in 2005, and *Geram* in Garut in 2010. Islamic transnational organizations grow as well. We can note Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunah Wal*Jamaah* (FKASWJ)³⁴ which then established Laskar Jihad (1999), Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir were getting established and stable. The appearance of Islamic organizations marked the new Islamic movement in Indonesia which is different with previous ones such as *Muhammadiyah*, Persatuan Islam (Persis), *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), Al-Irsyad, Jami'atul Khoir, etc.

Islamic redicalism is not appeared just like that. There is context as the back ground and not necessarily caused by one factor. There are lots of factors that influenced the appearance of radical Islamic organization in some districts. Political, social and economical dimension has become significant context in reading the radicalism movement in some regions. Political change that impacts the freedom to expres one self, prolonged economical crisis and the change of society values becomes one of the factors that caused the birth of radicalism, supported with religious, scripturalistic point of view.

The fall of New Order has brought significant change to the growth of Islamic movements. The transition process started at that time is giving a right moment for Islamic movement to stand up from its deterioration. Freedom for expression has become a drive for the growth of radical Islamic organization. This reality shows that regime fall is not only utilized by political elites that desire a change, it becomes a moment also for radical Islamic

33 Majelis Mujahidin is declared in Yogyakarta through Mujahidin Congress, on Monday 7 Jumadil Ula 1421 H, or Agust 7 2000 M.

34 Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Wal *Jamaah* (FKASWJ) is established on February 14 1999

movement.³⁵ Without expression freedom, they will find it hard to find its various forms. Freedom euphoria is utilized by these radical groups to express their Islamic aspiration in the public.

On behalf of the freedom, competitions among powers are taking place and dominate the public space in Indonesia. Competitions are occurred among groups that carry any ideology including religious, sociology, capitalism ideology, and many others. They meet in one public space they are fighting for. In a strong democracy climate, each ideology aspiration can easily become a vital discourse in the society. Islamic aspiration was difficult to enter into public space in the past, nowadays Islam is acceptable in any genre. No wonder that radical Islamic organizations are rapidly growing because the democracy has given them the freedom to do that.

The appearance of FPI, GARIS and Tholiban is a form of expression since the opening of public space in the democracy era. They use the moment of power change as strategic step to participate in voicing the Islamic aspiration.

Local political back ground influences the appearance of radical Islamic organization; it is mainly related to political dissatisfaction, political marginalization and alike. Unseriousness of local government in applying Islamical *Shariah* has giving birth to the tendency of radical protest movement. No wonder that the local political condition in Garut which is suspected to protect the existence of *Ahmadiyah* members in public positions in the government, is involved in establishing LP3Syi (2005) and GERAM (2010).

Economical crisis that hitted Indonesia has lead Muslim community to convert their religion. For poor class, economical and social-political crisis has cast them off. When the disappointment appears, religion is the highest savior.³⁶ Suitable religious pattern for those who live in the middle of poverty is literal-scriptural religion, without relying on complicated thought, analytic, and

35 Khamami Zada, *Islam Radikal: Pergulatan Ormas-ormas Islam Garis Keras di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 181

36 Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (ed.), *Gerakan Salafi Radikal di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Radja Grafindo Persada, 2004), p. 44

philosophical. They are not accustomed to think and discuss things. With this scriptural character, their point of view is aligned with various symbolic actions of radical Islamic organization. Street action to fight the immoral, wrong ideology, and other things has attracted the attention of those from middle and lower economical class. Such attraction has encouraged them to be more easier to be mobilized in doing similar actions.

Socially, the appearance of moral decadence in the society caused by secularization that keeps attacking religious values, causing social frustration to Muslim community. There is incapability of community protection system against the moral principles that have been guarded for long time as community's value system. For them, free relationship in modern life style has caused the moral decadence in the society. And so there appears such recall to change social system to a life direction which is more Islamic. This condition is enhanced by incapability of law enforcement in various problems and happenings. This moral decadence condition and incapable legal institutions has triggered the radical Islam.

A. GENEALOGY OF RADICAL ISLAM

Radical Islam³⁷ in Indonesia actually has gone through a continuing change process. Since the period of pre independency, radical Islamic organization has shown its significant appearance, accompanying other Islamic appearance.³⁸ The traces of radical Islam in the Islamic community in Indonesia are not something new at all. In the early 20th century, in attempt to enhance the

37 Oliver Roy mentioned that the Islamic doctrine essentially elaborated by Hassan al-Banna and Abul A'la Al-Maududi, Taqiyudin al-Nabhani, and becomes radical through Sayyid Quthb. Refer to Oliver Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1994), p. 2-4 and *Genealogi Islam Radikal*, (Yogyakarta: Genta Press, 2005), h. 26

38 Refer to Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960). Refer to R. William Liddle, "Skripturalisme Media Dakwah: Suatu Bentuk Pemikiran dan Aksi Politik Islam di Indonesia Masa Orde Baru", in Mark R. Woodward (ed), *Jalan Baru Islam, Memetakan Paradigma Mutakhir Islam Indonesia*, Cet. I, (Bandung: Mizan, 1999), h. 304. M. Syafi'i Anwar, *Pemikiran dan Aksi Islam Indonesia, Sebuah Study Politik Tentang Cendekiawan Muslim New Order*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), and Bahtiar Effendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1999).

nationalism spirit to fight the Dutch colonialism and getting worst economical deprivation in the indigenous community, radical Islam is showed off by local Sarekat Islam (SI) groups in the 'ideology' of Islam revivalism; Mahdiism or Ratu Adil; and anti-colonialism.³⁹

However, the quite strong, manifested radicalism root in Indonesia is actually in the *Masyumi*,⁴⁰ Darul Islam⁴¹, and DDII movements. Prohibited *Masyumi*⁴² exponents has established *Masyumi* again in the Election during New Order regime, and Darul Islam exponents were still tracked down by this regime, made them to gather again in one new organization namely Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII). The role of DDII supported by *Masyumi* and Darul Islam exponents has given birth to many hard-line Islamic organizations in Indonesia. This former *Masyumi* organization changed the direction of Islamic movement, not parliament and military track anymore, but missionary track. This new track has allowed Islamic movement to spread in various forms; from moderate wing to radical wing.

In DDII, these groups created radical character of Islam in Indonesia, particularly in responding and reacting on Christianization issues, Islamic nation, and Islamic *Shariah* packed in a theme of "Islamic resurrection". The combination of Salafi and Ikhwanul Muslimin thoughts adopted by DDII has changed the face of Islam in Indonesia in the period of 1970's and the outcome is now to see; reinforced Ikhwanul Muslimin that has given birth to Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (lead by Hilmi Aminudin, his father was DI member) and Salafi in various forms (Ja'far Umar Thalib and Abu Nida were LIPIA graduates facilitated by DDII).

39 Azyumardi Azra, "Muslimin Indonesia: Viabilitas "Garis Keras", in *Gatra* special edition 2000, h. 44. Imran movement, Warman, BCA and Borobudur Temple Bombing and Tanjung Priok case is a form of Muslim's struggling against the government that caused radicalism. Refer to Tempo Report, "Nil: Islam atau Negara Islam?", March 5 2000, p. 15.

40 Not all former DI and *Masyumi* members are associated to DDII, however there were some important exponents associated to DDII.

41 Refer to the explanation on Darul Islam of other version in Ken Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist Network*, (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), p. 1-9

42 *Masyumi* is dissolved as political party in Soekarno's era by Presidential Decree Number 7 of 1959

B. MASYUMI AND DARUL ISLAM

Masyumi is established in November 7 1945 in Yogyakarta. The aim was as Muslim's union party. *Masyumi* was initially consisted of various groups including NU and *Muhammadiyah*. On June 6 1947, *Masyumi* issued Political Statement that emphasized the importance of Islam-based State considering that majority of Indonesian people is Muslim, in the frame of Unified State of Republic of Indonesia.⁴³

This conception was actually clearly seen in the thinking line of *Masyumi* figures, such as Muhammad Natsir, Isa Anshari, Abu Hanifah, etc. Natsir for example, stated that Pancasila as Nation's philosophy is still unclear. Pancasila is considered to be powerless for *Muslims*. *Muslims* have strict ideology according Natsir, clear and comprehensive, and have been lived in the heart of Indonesian people for centuries. Natsir made comparison, when Muslim with Islamic ideology and then this ideology is changed into Pancasila, it is just like jumping from the earth where we stand to an empty space without air.⁴⁴ Isa Anshari has fought for Islamic Nation and not Pancasila Nation, considering that Islamic rules are not similar with Pancasila. Islamic ideology is different with Pancasila. Islam is much more comprehensive and perfect.⁴⁵

The struggling to become Islamic Nation by *Masyumi* has been done through parliament. *Masyumi* figures such as Muhammad Natsir, Isa Anshari, Kasman Singodimejo, etc. Have different opinion in fighting for this Islamic Nation with Darul Islam of Kartosuwiryo. *Masyumi* preferred to fight in the parliament. Kasman affirmed his obsession to fight for Islam through parliament in the Constituent Council Session

43 Compare with Lance Castle and Herbeth Feith, *Pemikiran Politik Indonesia (1945-1965)*, p. 211

44 Bahtiar Efendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. 108. Refer to Mohammad Natsir, *Islam sebagai Dasar Negara*, (Jakarta: DDII, 2000), p. 17-49

45 Suara *Masyumi*, June 10 1956

on November 13 1957.⁴⁶ *Suara Masyumi* has confirmed also that *Masyumi* has no relationship with DI movement of Kartosuwiryo. *Masyumi* chose the parliament way and not violence, and have no desire to make a Nation within Nation.⁴⁷

Different with *Masyumi*, DI/TII is radical Islamic organization by conducting rebellion against the Republic of Indonesia lead by Soekarno. DI was lead by Sekarmaji Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, a man from Cepu, border city of Central Java and East Java. In the history, Kartosuwiryo was once joined the Sarekat Islam and *Masyumi*. In *Masyumi*, he was appointed as member of executive board and then became commissioner for West Java region.⁴⁸ He led the armed force in West Java. Kartosuwiryo even trained the young men in *Suffah* institution in Malangboong, Garut.⁴⁹

His radical attitude has made him discharged from SI in the leadership period of Abikusno Tjokrosujoso.⁵⁰ This discharge was done after Kartosuwiryo issued a brochure regarding *hijra* that SI does not have to participate in the boards established by Dutch government. This showed non cooperative attitude against the Netherland.⁵¹ This attitude is continued when he joined *Masyumi*; he denied the RI agreement with the Netherland known as Roem-Royen Agreement.⁵² Dissatisfaction on this struggling line has made him taking military way in fighting for Islam in Indonesia. And so Darul Islam was born, proclaimed on August 17 1945. Several regions supported the DI movement; such as West Java, Central Java, Sumatera (Aceh), Kalimantan, and South Sulawesi. Powerful DI movement against RI is DI of Aceh led

46 Dwi Purwoko, *Islam Konstitusional VS Islam Radikal*, (Depok: Permata Artistika Kreasi, 2002), p. 24

47 Dwi Purwoko, *Islam Konstitusional VS Islam Radikal*, , p. 27

48 Bahtiar Efendy, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998), p. 96

49 Deliar Noer, *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), p. 190

50 Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia*, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994), p. 155

51 Dwi Purwoko, *Islam Konstitusional VS Islam Radikal*, p. 49

52 Dwi Purwoko, *Islam Konstitusional VS Islam Radikal*, p. 51

by M. Daud Beureuh and DI of South Sulawesi led by Kahar Muzakkar.

Genealogy of Kartosuwiryo's knowledge can be traced from to whom and where he learned Islam. Kartosuwiryo have studied Islam to several *kyai* in Priangan⁵³, particularly when he moved to Malangboong Garut and Tasikmalaya. He studied Islam with Kyai Jusuf Tauzi and Kyai Ardiwisastra, Kartosuwiryo's father in law (it is suspected that both *kyai* had old-fashioned and narrow religious comprehension),⁵⁴ Kyai Mustofa Kamil, and Kyai Ramli.⁵⁵

DI movement ended up after Kartosuwiryo was sentenced to death by Indonesian government, Soekarno as the president did not immediately demolished the Islam fight. The separated members continue the movement after they were chased and caught by the authority. Some of them attempted to do some moderation (DI Fillah) and other continued to perform underground radicalization (DI Fi Sabilillah). Some of them returned to the society, another established Islamic boarding school, and few did underground guerrilla. Many of them metamorphosed into Islamic organization, from moderate wing (PKS) to radical ones (JI).

Metamorphosed DI movement then penetrated into Islamic organizations in some regions, especially Jakarta, West Java, South Sulawesi, and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. Their three main bases are Islamic boarding school, mosques, and university. In an amount of Islamic boarding school, mosques, and university, DI movement still exists in a transformed formation. They started to accept the thoughts of other (transnational) movements such as Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizbut Tahir, and Salafi.

53 Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*, 7th ed, p. 166

54 Pingardi, *SM Kartosuwiryo*, (Jakarta: Aryaguna, 1964), p. 20

55 Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia*, p. 166

C. FROM DDII TO TRANSNATIONAL ISLAM AND LOCAL RADICAL ISLAM

Political change in the era of New Order did not brought any fresh wind to *Masyumi* figures in reestablishing the *Masyumi*. *Masyumi* rehabilitation failed due to involvement allegation of former *Masyumi* figures in PRRI/Permesta rebellion.⁵⁶ On April 7 1967 Partai Muslimin (Parmusi) was establish, indeed. However, former *Masyumi* figures did not allowed occupying Parmusi leadership. This political attitude of Soeharto disappointed former *Masyumi* figures, because they cannot play any role in the field of political party.

Masyumi figures finally established DDII in 1967 which operated in the field of missionary, not as political party. DDII became one of alternative facility for *Masyumi* after the failure to preach through political party.⁵⁷ Such vital role in DDII is clearly seen in various activities to develop and regenerate new generation of Islam in various patterns.

DDII became the first Islam institution that tried seriously and well-organized the sending of students to Middle East. Before this role is taken over by the Department of Religion, DDII became the main agent for scholarship distribution from Rabithah Alam Al-Islami whose funding is supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to study in Middle East. To facilitate the relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, DDII even opened an office in Riyadh in 1970's. Up to 2004, DDII has sent 500 students to Middle East and Pakistan. They are mostly recruited from the generation of modern Islamic organizations that structurally and culturally related to *Masyumi*. The graduates of Middle East become the prime actors in

⁵⁶ Deliar Noer recorded that lots of *Masyumi* figures got in jail due to their involvement in PRRI/Permesta rebellion, such as Mohammad Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Boerhanuddin Harahap, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Mohamad Roem, M. Yunan Nasution, E.Z. Muttaqien, Isa Anshari, Hamka, Ghazali Sjahlan, Jusuf Wibisono, Kasman Singodimejo, Kyai A. Mukti, S. Soemarsono, Djanamar Adjam, H.M. Sjaaf, Imron Rosjadi, etc. Refers to *Partai Islam di Pentas Nasional*, p. 446

⁵⁷ M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal: Transmisi Gerakan Revivalisme Islam ke Indonesia (1980-2002)*, (Jakarta: Erlangga, 2005), p. 83

spreading Islamic revivalism movement in Indonesia.⁵⁸

DDII became the initiator and mediator of the establishment of Islamic Science and Arabic Institution (LIPIA) which is affiliation of Islamic University Muhammad Ibnu Sa'ud in Riyadh. This institution has graduated thousands of graduates that became the movement agent of Salafi and vital actor in Tarbiyah society.⁵⁹ The attempt to open affiliation in Indonesia is started with the visit of Syekh Abdul Aziz Abdullah Al-Ammar, the student of Salafi's most important figure, namely Syekh Abdullah bin Baz, to Jakarta. By bin Baz, he was ordered to meet Mohammad Natsir. Natsir welcomed the idea to establish this institution and was willing to be mediator with Indonesian government. Furthermore, DDII played important role in recruiting students that were generally recruited from institutions related to DDII, namely Persis, *Muhammadiyah*, and Al-Irsyad.⁶⁰

Yusuf Usman Baisa is graduated from LIPIA and continued his study to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Afghan and Pakistan, in Islamic University Imam Muhammad Ibnu Saud in Riyadh. Thereafter, he established Al-Irsyad Islamic boarding school in Salatiga. Abu Nida was initially studied in NU Islamic school in Gresik to continue his study in *Akademi Pendidikan Muhammadiyah* in Gresik. In 1976, he studied in Karangasem Boarding School Paciran, Lamongan and followed DDII program in West Kalimantan for two years. He was selected to be DDII *mubalig* in Jakarta and received scholarship through DDII to study with Salafi teachers in Islamic University of Imam Muhammad Ibnu Saud in Riyadh. Through DDII in Riyadh, Abu Nida got in touch with Kuwait organization namely Jamiat Ihya Al-Turats Al-Isami. After graduated in 1985, he went to the border area of Pakistan-Afghan to join the Jamilur Rahman for three months. And then he returned to Indonesia to teach in the Ngruki Boarding School led by Abu Bakar Baasyir. In 1986 he married a Ngruki student and moved to Sleman Yogyakarta to teach in DDII

58 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 83

59 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 83-84

60 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 103-104

boarding school, namely Ibnul Qoyyim boarding school.⁶¹

Ja'far Umar Thalib, the leader of Laskar Jihad, went to Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan before graduated from under assistance of DDII scholarship in 1986. He was studied and taught by Jamilur Rahman in the border area of Pakistan-Afghan. After working as teacher in Al-Irsyad boarding school led by Yusuf Baisa for two years, he stayed in Yaman in 1991 to study with Salafi figure, Syekh Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadi in Dammaz.⁶²

DDII has indirect role in encouraging the translation of books of main thinker of Islamic revivalism movement in Middle East into Indonesian. This institution actively distributed the translated books of Hasan Al-Banna, Yusuf Al-Qardhawi, Sayyid Quthb, (Ihkwanul Muslimin) and Abul A'la Al-Maududi (Jama'ati Islami).⁶³ DDII published *Harian Abadi*⁶⁴ and *Media Dakwah* magazine as well as control against the authority.

The base camp of DDII movement is boarding schools, mosques, and universities. DDII gave contribution to the development of Gontor and Ngruki (Abu Bakar Ba'asyir) boarding school and facilitated the establishment of boarding school and managed the grants from Middle East to build mosques. These mosques were later managed by DDII activists and developed into the base camp of its missionary spreading. We should not ignore its contribution to the development of university mosque network in ITB, UI, UGM, and other state-owned universities.⁶⁵ DDII compiled training programs aimed for university instructors which were graduates of various Islamic student organizations. In 1974, DDII started its college-based attempt which was more systematic called *Bina Masjid Kampus*. Mujahid Dakwah training activity in Salman Mosque ITB was realization of DDII's attempt to make universities

61 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 106

62 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 105-16

63 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 84

64 *Harian Abadi* is newspaper once owned by *Masyumi* and competed with other political party's newspaper, *Harian Rakyat* owned by PKI, *Suluh Indonesia* for PNI and *Pedoman* owned by PSI. Refer to Lance Castle and Herbeth Feith, *Pemikiran Politik Indonesia (1945-1965)*, p. xxi-xxii

65 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 84

as their missionary's target.⁶⁶ During Natsir period, DDII assisted the development of Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque at UI Salemba as well and equipped it with library and missionary institutions.⁶⁷

For the boarding schools, people who were facilitated by DDII such as Yazid Jawas, established a missionary institution and Minhaj Al-Sunnah boarding school in Bogor. Along with Abdul Hakim, he takes care the regular Salafi recitation in DDII up to now and develops recitations in mosques, while Farid Okbah that becomes the director of Al-Irsyad and Ainul Haris established Nida' Al-Islam in Surabaya. Abu Bakar M. Altwat led the Al-Sofwah Foundation in Jakarta and Yusuf Usman Baisa established Al-Irsyad boarding school.⁶⁸

In the context of local Islamic movement that frequently performed violence, relation of radical Islamic figures and their organizations with DDII is still strong. DDII figures such as KH Husein Umar and Dr. Anwar Haryono initiated the establishment of Gerakan Reformis Islam (GARIS) led by H Chep Hernawan Dapet. In the organizational structure of GARIS, Abu Bakar Baasyir, KH Abdul Qodir Jaelani, Ahmad Sumargono, KH Kholil Ridwan which are DDII figures become *Dewan Syuro* of GARIS⁶⁹. In other organs, there is Masyhadi, one of former People's Representative Council of RI member from PKS, who was former secretary if Muhammad Roem and Mohammad Natsir, became the founder of Forum Umat Islam⁷⁰. Furthermore, the appearance of Bekasi Muslim Congress (KUIB) was started from the dialogue between DDII Leader of Bekasi City with Salimin Dani and Leader of As-Syam Shalih Missionary Institution, Mangara Sitompul. Included to other DDII of Bekasi City care takers, such as Bernard Abdul Jabbar, Agus Yuli, and Abdul Kadir AKA⁷¹. Strong penetration from DDII in an amount of regions has emerged lots of important figures from radical Islamic

66 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 88

67 Dwi Purwoko, *Islam Konstitusional VS Islam Radikal*, p. 43

68 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Arus Baru Islam Radikal*, p. 128

69 Wawancara dengan GARIS Cianjur November 2010

70 M. Imdadun Rahmat, *Ideologi Politik PKS: Dari Masjid Kampus ke Gedung Parlemen*, (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2008), p. 93

71 Interview in Bekasi November 2010

movement in Indonesia, such as GARIS, KUIB, and FUI.

D. THE EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION

The reformation is profited by the Islamic radical movement to enforce Islamic political view. The maneuver is apparent as a grand design of Islamic movement in facing uncertain political transition. The Islamic Radicalization post New Order is actually emerged in three main phases, which are 'inter-religion conflict'⁷² in Maluku and Poso; positivization project of Islamic Law (*Shariah*) in certain regions (Regional Government Regulations promulgated based on religion and morality aspects) and; the assault against a sect considered as heretical, (motivated) by the reason of anti – Christianization, and anti-immoral.

The first phase is inter – religion conflict in Maluku and Poso. Horizontal conflict of religion occurred in 1999 in Maluku and Poso which ended in 2002, took casualties, materials and crushed humanity and social order. The great lost of both material and immaterial from the Ambon and Poso conflict had torn human dignity.

The conflict of religion in Maluku and Poso had changed the perception of religion and (caused) social tension in Indonesia. The news concerning the conflict in Maluku and Poso broadcasted on television, internet and printed in media had raised the sentiment against other religion. Thus, *laskar* (paramilitary unit) was dispatched to the location of conflict as the manifestation of defense and assistance to other Muslims who were 'under attack'. *Laskar Jihad* and *Laskar Mujahidin* were involved in those conflicts and worsening the situation. The conflict in *Maluku* generated the same genre of conflict in Mataram on 17th January 2000, where they burnt churches after performing *Tabligh Akbar* (Mass Religious Meeting).

72 The conflict of Maluku at first was not an inter-religion conflict, but later on developed as a conflict between Islam and Christian, likewise the conflict in Poso. In these conflicts, it is the issue of religion that was come to the fore not the root cause of the conflict itself, moreover, the government was sat idly during the early times of the conflict. <o>

The second phase is positivisation of Islamic Law (*Shariah*) in several regions/provinces in a Regional Government Regulation structured based on religion and morality. Reformation had provoked polemic related to the politic of Islam during the amendment of the Constitution of 1945. The Jakarta Charter had invited public polemic between the pro and contra party that refuse it. The Jakarta Charter known with its 7 removed words, "with the obligation to live according to Islamic Law for Muslims", have opened the possibility for Islamization. Discussion concerning to Islam in the public is no longer taboo. They said, "This is the era of democracy, era for the freedom of expression. Every citizen has the right to speak out their aspiration."

Islamization fills in public spaces. Islamic politic enhanced and it changed Indonesian politic and cultural atmosphere which was restraint during the Old Order and New Order era. Islamic principles, law and guidance are now raising and affecting all aspects from fashion to politic. Islamic party and organization seems enthusiast promoting Islamic aspiration in public.

As a result, several laws were promulgated; Law concerning the management of *Zakat* in 1999; *Wakaf* in 2001; Management of Hajj in 2004; Religious Court in 2006 (revision of the previous laws); and the Law regarding Islamic Banking in 2008 passed by DPR RI. Moreover, even after a fierce agitation between social groups, the government legitimated the Law concerning Anti Pornography which was also as the manifestation from Islamic party and organizations struggles to show the existence of Islamic influence.

Table 1
Characteristic of the Islamic Law Implementation in National Laws

No.	Subject/Regulated Matter	Types of Laws
1.	Family Matters (Marriage, Divorce, and Inheritance)	Law No. 1/1974 concerning Marriage Law No. 7/1989 Concerning Religious Courts Presidential Instruction No. 1/1991 concerning Compilation of Islamic Law
2.	Economic and Finance Law	Law No. 7/1992 concerning Banking which amended by Law No. 10/1998 Law No. 38 /1999 concerning the Management of <i>Zakat (Alms giving)</i> Law No. 41/2004 concerning <i>Wakaf (Endowment)</i>
3.	Criminal Law	Regional Government Regulations based on Islamic Law in several regions (prostitution, gambling, alcohol, and public morality regulations)
4.	Religious Ritual Practice	Law No. /1999 concerning Hajj Management
5.	Religious symbols (the wearing of veils, Muslim cloths, <i>Al-Qur'an</i> recitation)	Regional Government Regulations based on Islamic Law in certain regions (Muslim cloth, <i>Al-Qur'an</i> recitation, etc)


Unfortunately, the Islamic movement arise post New Order era tends to be radical. The emergence of this movement often called as the emergence of radicalism. The main indicator is the appearance of extreme groups or organizations, who acts without compromise to accomplish certain agendas related to certain Muslim group;

or/and certain Islamic World view as a religion. The names and terminology used as the organization/groups names deliver the extreme image. For example, groups that called as *Jundullah (God's Army)*, *Laskar Jihad (Struggle)*, and *Hizbullah (God's Party)* or *Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front)*.⁷³

The Islamic radical movement oppressed other parties that are against Islam. The public sympathy for Islamic radical movement that have scripturalist – radical view is spreading out. The agenda of Islamic radical movement in Indonesia focus on the improvement of society, nation and country, either in economic, social, and politic with the formalistic approach to Islam. Usually they bring about political issues that are common for the politic climate in Indonesia. The issue of Islamic state and Islamic Law become a crucial debate about the relation of Islam and the country among the transition period.

The important movement from this phenomenon is the mainstreaming of Islamic Law (*Shariah*) enforcement. It began from the debate of the Constitution of 1945 amendment which was failed to pass on in the parliament, but then the effect spread out wide. PPP and PBB as an Islamic Party who fight to incorporate the Jakarta Charter into Constitution failed to convince all members of MPR RI (People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia).

Graphic 1:
Distribution of 154 Discriminative Policies per Year ⁷⁴



⁷³ Azyumardi Azra, "Muslim Indonesia: Viabilitas "Garis Keras" in *Gatra*, special edition 2000, h. 44.

⁷⁴ Table was cited from Kamala Chandrakirana, Andy Yentriyani, and Ismail Hasani, *Pelembaraan Diskriminasi dalam Tata Negara Bangsa*, Komnas Perempuan (National Commission on Violence Against Women), Jakarta 2009<0>

However, the struggle to enforce Islamic Law (*Shariah*) is still continued by using different strategies. They fight in Regional Government level, especially in Regency/Municipal level by interfering in the formulation of regional regulations. Since 2000-2009, various Regional Government Islamic Regulations that govern morality, such as Muslim cloth, skill/ability to recite Al-Qur'an, *khulwat* (*solitude*), alcohol, prostitution and gambling.

Table 2
The Classification of Discriminative Regional Government Regulations⁷⁵

No.	Category	Amount
1	Criminalization on women	38
2	Control on women body	21
3	Restriction on freedom of religion for <i>Ahmadiyah</i> community	9
4	Regulation on Religious life/practice	82
5	Regulation on migrant labor	4
Amount		154

The organizations that fight for Regional Government Islamic Regulations are not only radical Islamic organizations like FPI, HTI and MMI along with Islamic party, PPP and PBB but also prominent parties in national politics, Golkar (who won the second places in General Election in 1999), PKB and PAN. The reason is mainly because they do not want loose the votes for not supporting the enforcement of Islamic Law (*Shariah*) as the common goal of Muslims). The political parties are supporting the idea as they also take the political advantage from the implementation of Islamic Law (*Shariah*) in the regions. Politicization of Islamic Law occurs in

⁷⁵ Table was cited from Kamala Chandrakirana, Andy Yentriyani, and Ismail Hasani, *Pelembagaan Diskriminasi dalam Tatanan Negara Bangsa*, Komnas Perempuan (National Commission on Violence Against Women), Jakarta 2009<0}

public, the idea is, "If I support the practice of Islamic Law (*Shariah*), people will vote for me in the next General Election."

The tendency is used by the Regent and Mayor as political strategy to win people's vote. They are issuing an instruction or a decree about Islamic norms; such as the wearing of veils and Muslim cloth for Regional Government's employees for winning the next Regional General Election. Without any argument, the employees will obey this instruction.

Event the moderate Islamic mass organization such as NU and *Muhammadiyah* are also participating fighting for the implementation of Islamic Law Regional Government Regulations. Although in the official organizations regulation of NU and *Muhammadiyah* is not concerning the positivisation of Islamic Law (*Shariah*), but in the regional level, the two organizations could not refuse the Islamic Law Regional Government Regulations for avoiding the stigma as an Anti Islamic Law organization. This stigma definitely brings difficulty for NU and *Muhammadiyah*. Not to mention that regional leaders of NU and *Muhammadiyah* are tends to have similar opinion, which is formalizing Islam into government (public space).

The emergence of Islamic Law Regional Government Regulations basically accommodate the Islamic movement in politic. The accommodation is the deal to regulate morality in positive law. The political party could not pass all the agendas of Islamic radical organizations by totally (*kaffah – perfect*) enforcing Islamic Law (*Shariah*). Thus, they created the Regional Government Islamic Regulations that govern public morality using all means of democracy.

Formally, Regional Government Islamic Regulations is difficult to be disputed as majority minority arguments have been main consideration in taking political decision at local level. However, constitutionally, Islamic Regional Government Regulations can still be questioned as it formalized the discrimination against women and minority religion.

The result really is fascinating. Regions that bring into effect

the Regional Government Islamic Regulations are Aceh, Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur, Indramayu, Serang, Pandeglang, Tangerang, Bulukumba, Maros, Enrekang, Gowa, Sinjai, Takalar, Padang, Padang Pariaman, Solok, Banjarmasin, Banjarmasin, Sambas, Pamekasan, Jember, Gresik, Gorontalo, East Lombok, Mataram, Kupang, Jepara, Palembang, Lahat, Medan, Bengkulu, Way Kanan, Bandar Lampung, South Lampung, and Tulang Bawang.

The positivization project of Islamic Law in several regions is not as aggressive as in other regions which plan to continue creating the similar Regional Government Regulations. The National Government does nothing against this discriminative regulation. Some observers even consider it as a normal symptom, although the politicization of religion, women and minority group is clearly result discrimination.

The new phase of Islamic Radicalization movement is assault against groups that are considered as heretical, immoral and has Christianization agenda. The main targets are *Ahmadiyah* and other heretical sects (*Lia Eden*, *Mushaddiq*), Churches, bars and gambling which considered as immoral activity. The assault of Islamic radical group against *Ahmadiyah* sect in Parung, West Java was the first action that triggers subsequent actions in other areas such as Lombok, Kuningan, Majalengka, etc. The assaults took casualties, organization's assets like building, mosques and even the houses of *Ahmadiyah's* followers.

The heretical Fatwa against *Ahmadiyah* issued by Indonesian Ulama Council is approved by the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia; NU and *Muhammadiyah*. Psychologically and theologically, the *Muslims* are all considering *Ahmadiyah* as heretical. However, Indonesian Ulama Council, NU (Muslims Scholars) and *Muhammadiyah* are against the violent action. They are only elaborating the theology principle why the *Ahmadiyah* is appraised as heretical sect, and in official document, NU stated their disapproval against the violent action. Unfortunately, the joint agreement of Indonesian Ulama Council, NU and *Muhammadiyah* is used by the radical group to justify their violence.

During the same time with positivization of Islamic Law in

the regions, the assault against *Ahmadiyah* occurs everywhere, masterminded by the same actor. If the positivization of Islamic Law is performed with the support of moderate Islamic political party and mass organization, the assault against *Ahmadiyah* is conducted by allying with several radical Islamic organizations. FPI as the initial main actor of violence action had multiplied into other new different organizations, such as *Tholiban*, *KAMPU (Tasikmalaya)*, *LP3Syi*, *GERAM (Garut)*, *GARIS (Cianjur)*, *Aliansi Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan (AGAP)*, *Gerakan Anti Maksiat (GAMAS)*, *Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan and Aliran Sesat (GAPAS)*, *Forum Ulama dan Umat Islam (FUUI)*, *Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyah (FUI) (Cirebon)*, and *FUI (Jabodetabek)* that become the actor of violent action in the regions. Together with these organizations, FPI, MMI, HTI and JAT attack heretical sect. They build a collective power to fight for Islam. Due to negative stigma on FPI, this organization is not evolving in some regions; however those tactical alliance organizations are in the front line to fight for disbanding *Ahmadiyah*.

Ironically, this new movement also has affecting traditionalist Islamic group, especially *Ulema and Santri* in *pesantren (a short of Islamic boarding school)*. The mob which was consisted of various backgrounds of young men (unemployed, thugs, fanatics) now mingles with educated students organized by the elite (*Kyai/Ulema*). *Pesantren Irsyadiyah and Miftahul Huda* becomes the basis of Islamic radical movement in Tasikmalaya. It is followed by other *pesantren* such as *Pesantren Suci* organized by *Ajengan Qudsi Nawawi*, *Pesantren Cipanas in Garut* organized by *Ajengan Saeful Tamam*, ex- DI/TII and *Kyai Aan Mustofa*.

In the last decade (1998-2010), the dynamic of Islamic politic has been fluctuating, from national political issue (Jakarta Charter) to the enforcement of Islamic Law (*Shariah*) followed by disbandment of *Ahmadiyah* and refusal against the construction of places of worship (of other minority religion). The third phase of radicalization is supported by the government that issuing a discriminative policy against *Ahmadiyah* and other religion group . Political accommodation of government for those radical organizations confirms its alignment to the third phase of Islamic organization. It means that both government and citizen

participated in radical Islamic organization are intolerant.

These radical organizations are developing the following strategic points; (1) control the issue, (2) expand alignment from other Islamic group (although if they have different *ubidiyah* and political perception), and (3) influence the government in making policy. This is a new pattern that has never been used before by Islamic movement in Indonesia, and it is successfully generated a new 'Islamic politic'. At least government accommodation and state official alignment to the movement against *Ahmadiyah*, anti – Christianization, anti – apostasy, anti-immoral become part of their success story in fighting for Islam.

This pattern seems to be the best option. As if they insisted to transform Indonesia to an Islamic state, they would face a major problem. As they struggles in the Constitution Assembly in 1957 and amendment process of the Constitution of 1945 in People's Consultative Assembly already became a precious lesson learned in enforcing Islamic Law (*Shariah*).

E. THE ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION CONTEXT IN JAKARTA AND WEST JAVA

Historically, *Masyumi* is rapidly growing in West Java. In General Election 1955, *Masyumi* was surpassing the vote of PNI, with 1.844.442 votes while PNI got 1.541.927. However, PNI won the vote in East Java and Central Java with 2.251.069 and 3.019.568 respectively. Meanwhile *Masyumi* earned only 1.109.742 vote in East Java and 902.387 in Central Java. The separation of NU from *Masyumi* did not weaken its position in West Java, which gave NU with only 673.552 votes in that region; but NU earned 3.370.554 votes in East Java and 1.772.306 votes in Central Java. The large number of *Masyumi* voters in West Java became a unique character of Islamic politic of the Muslim community in this province.

West Java was the basis of Darul Islam (DI) Movement, a movement that was once trying to transform the state to be an Islamic State. The basis cities were Garut, Tasikmalaya, Cianjur and Ciamis. Darul Islam was growing in West Java because it was the

regions where Kartosuwiryo built its army and train the youth in *Suffah* organization, in Malangboong, Garut. Thus the characteristic of Islam in West Java would be influenced by the Movement of DI.

People in West Java is known as a firm and religious community which was conducive for the emergence of Islamic organizations; not only national Islamic organizations such as *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), *Muhammadiyah*, and Persatuan Islam (Persis), but also other organizations that are born after the reformation era, like Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid* (JAT). In West Java, other tactical organizations are also growing, like LP3Syi, Gerakan Rakyat Anti *Ahmadiyah* (GERAM), Gerakan Reformasi Islam (GARIS), Tholiban, GAPAS, GAMAS, AGAP, and BAP.

Based on the observation performed by SETARA Institute concerning the Condition of Freedom of Religion/Belief, West Java comes on the first place as the region where the violent acts took place the most. There were 73 violence in 2008 and 57 in 2009. The high number of this violence has been confirmed not related with mainstream religious organizations such as NU and *Muhammadiyah*. An investigation would identify that the perpetrator of this violence is not the mainstream Islamic group.

A survey or initial research result performed by Malindo Institute indicated that some *pesantren* in West Java have the potential to grow as an extreme group. The research also showed that *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) the radical Islamic group which tries to establish khilafah (caliphate) in South East Asia also uses *pesantren* as their basis to develop their political ideology. The report of International Crisis Group (ICG) which base in Brussels titled *Jamaah Islamiyah's Current Status*, mentioned among others that JI is still trying to establish the Islamic State in Indonesia. The report also mentioned that JI power in various regions of Indonesia will be determined by several factors such as *pesantren* that affiliates with JI, the struggle history of Darul Islam in that region, business and family relation among its members, their success in recruiting new members from the campus, and also from the prison. Although it is believed that this organization had already dispersed

as the result of aggressive action of Special Detachment 88 INP in executing the raid and capturing the suspected terrorists affiliated with JI, the genealogy map explained earlier shown that there will always be possibility that new radical organizations grow in West Java.

Islamic radicalism that grow in West Java (especially in the east region of *Priangan (West Java)*) has its own uniqueness compare to other radicalism grow in other region. The violence occurred in Garut, Tasikmalaya and Cianjur was conducted by those who engage in *pesantren*. As known, West Java is a religious region where there are many *pesantren* with different characters that influence the Islamic movement pattern in West Java. *Pesantren* could not be separated from the life of community and its development, it becomes a conducive environment for Islamic movement in West Java.

The violence act against *Ahmadiyah*, sweeping in the bars and other places that are considered immoral, in the churches and demonstration against government policy are involving many *santri* (students) of *pesantren* who have close relation with their elite. *Pesantren* has turned to be the mass base of Islamic Radicalization movement in West Java.

Pesantren Al-Irsyadiyah led by *Ajengan Zenzen* and *pesantren Miftahul Huda* led by *KH. Asep Mausul* is two *pesantren* proven to be the base of violence action in Tasikmalaya. The *Pesantren Miftahul Huda* even has a sub-organization called Tasikmalaya Solidarity of Muslim (TSM) which organizes the *Resimen Santri – Student Regiment (RESAN)*, the paramilitary troop that dispatched in every sweeping action. *Pesantren Al-Irsadiyah* is actually a *pesantren* that is not affiliated with *Miftahul Huda*. *Pesantren Al-Irsadiyah* is always become the base for the mass from *pesantren students*, *majlis ta'lim* and others where they held a briefing before conducting the action to the designated location.

The involvement of *pesantren* in radicalism action is determined by its movement leader like *Ajengan Zenzen* and *KH. Asep Mausul* as *pesantren* caretaker. They are the key factor that transforms the *pesantren* as the basis of radicalism movement. However these

typical *pesantren* do not represent the characteristic of other three *pesantren* in Tasikmalaya that are dominated by the affiliation of Suralaya, Cipasung, and Gontor.

Meanwhile, in the suburban areas of Jakarta like Bekasi, Depok and Bogor, Islamic radicalism is based on the mass especially the *majlis taklim*, mosques where unemployed person or thugs are disguising in surplice and then yelling for *jihad*. Around Jakarta areas, the intensification of Islamic radicalism often triggered by the issues of urbanization, social gap (rich – poor), and religion sentiment which brings the focus issue to the construction of place of worship.

Historically, the political view of people in Jakarta is affiliated to *Masyumi*. In General Election 1955, *Masyumi* won 200.460 votes in Jakarta while PNI and NU is 152.031 and 120.667 votes respectively. The reason is because *Masyumi* is really religious; despite the fact that Betawi (the ethnic group in Jakarta) Muslim worship teaching is more similar to NU, like *tahlilan*, *Maulid Nabi*, *ratib*, *shalawat*, etc., they do not affiliate to NU.

People in Jakarta is very influenced by and honor the *Habib* (descendant of Prophet Muhammad), thus they regularly attend the *Majlis Ilmu* and *Majlis Dzikir* that held by the *Habib* until today. The Religious concept of Jakarta people is highly influenced by these *Majlis* and *Qur'an* recitation community. Long time ago, the name of *Guru Mugni*, *Guru Jembatan Lima* were very popular.

Today, as the center of government, various contestations occur in Jakarta and this city becomes the barometer of situation and condition of the country. Hence, all the dynamics that happened in Jakarta also becomes the national dynamic. During 2009, there were 38 violation against the freedom of religion/faith took place in Jakarta. The number is smaller than 2008 with 45 incidents all of which in general were carried out by FPI.

Actually, the heterogeneity in Jakarta reflects the real image of plurality of Indonesia where the mixture of various religion, ethnic groups and social classes live side by side. But some group had torn this diversity with violence and intolerance against

religion and faith. The cosmopolitanism of Jakarta is supposed to reunite the differences, but in contrary many violence happen in this capital city. The high number of violation against the freedom of religion/faith that took place in Jakarta indicates the fact that Jakarta as the biggest city in Indonesia had turned to a battle arena of ideology, politic, legitimacy and authority. Basically, Jakarta has no sufficient historical argument that would trigger the act of violence and intolerance against certain groups. But since the end of 1970, the movement of Urban Muslim group had take over the dispute arena of religious views in Jakarta , especially with the emergence of Islamic organization such as *DDII*, *KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam)*, , *PPMI (Persatuan Pekerja Muslim Indonesia)*, etc,. They had successfully creating a different performance of Islam and effectively incorporating their group into religious organizations, *majlis taklim*, mosques and campus.

CHAPTER III

A PORTRAIT OF RADICALISM IN THE CITIES

The respondent in *Jabodetabek* (*Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi*) participated in survey is representing a combination of typology; middle – low class and low – high class. It is shown from the: (1). Background of education, dominated by High School level or equivalent, and (2) Household/Family expenditure are under IDR 2 million per month. So in general, the social class of the respondent is not coming from middle class (urban professional), the respondent social characteristic in this survey most likely represents the social characteristic of *Jabodetabek* people in general.

70,8% of the respondent's age is 40 years old or less, 29,2% is 41 years old or more with 49,2% of them are women and 50,8% are men.

8,3% of the respondent lives in Central Jakarta, 12,5% in East Jakarta, 12,5% in North Jakarta, 16,7% in South Jakarta, 16,7% in West Jakarta and other respondents live in Bekasi, Bogor, Depok and Tangerang with 8,3% respectively.


The majority of respondent education is Senior High School/ equivalent (50,6%); followed by Junior High School with 16,8%, Elementary School 10,3%; there are 8,4% of respondent who hold bachelor degree or higher, Diploma/Academy and only 2% of them were never went to school/uneducated.

From 1200 of respondents, 89, 2% are *Muslims*; 5, 2% are Protestants; 3, 7% are Catholic; 0, 2% are Hindu; 1, 6% are Buddhist; and only 0, 1% are Konghucu. In the field of occupation, the majority is private employee with 44, 3% and housewife 26,9%.

The majority of respondent (45, 3%) expensed IDR 1.000.000 to 2.000.000 per month; while other (29%) expensed less than IDR 500.000; 15, 4% of the respondents expensed their budget between IDR 2 million – 3 million; and only 10,2% of the respondents has the expenses above IDR 3 million per month.


The respondent finds that the government performance is not satisfying. According to them, this institution is not working properly for manifesting public interest. The survey proves that most of people who lives in *Jabodetabek* stated that DPR RI (People's Representative Council of the Republic of Indonesia) is not defending the people. Only small part of them thinks that this Institution had functioned properly as the representative of people.

Graphic 1:
DPR RI Performance Assessment



Similar to DPR RI, the respondent also thinks that the political parties today is not showing their alignment to people interest. This is consistent with their opinion about DPR RI which is not surprising because members of DPR are basically engaged in political party.


Graphic 2:
DPR RI Performance Assessment



Based on formal – procedural, the political institutions exist nowadays is quite legitimate but this institution and its system has insufficient social support. The survey shows that there is an 'articulative (people's expression/aspiration) discontinuity' occurred between people's expectation in one side with political institution performance in other side.

People dissatisfaction is not only addressed to the political institutions but also to the law enforcement institutions and its performance. Only least of them think otherwise. It indicates that in general, people don't trust law enforcement efforts recently.

Graphic 3:
The Satisfaction Level towards the Law Enforcement




Contrast with the claim made by the public officials who often declare that the development is relatively well distributed and benefited by all classes of community; most of people who lives in *Jabodetabek* area who are assumed as the recipients of reasonable development outcomes, think that the development is not yet well distributed. Their opinion signs that the claim about the successful development should be seriously questioned.


In general, the economic condition recently is less favorable for the society. Most of the respondent declared that their household economic condition is worst than their condition five years ago which indicates that there has been an economic downturn. Only least of them think that their condition is the same or even better than five years ago. This finding signifies that Indonesian economic is not in a good progress, both the equality and household condition

of most people in lower class tend to worsening.

Graphic 4:
Assessment towards the Development Equality



Graphic 5:
Recent Economic Condition of the Respondent



This finding is an important indication that the external condition, especially the politic and economic, are still disappointing for most of people who live in *Jabodetabek*. The finding can be an outset benchmark for understanding and drawing the connecting line with other following findings, especially in relation with religious perspective and attitude of *Jabodetabek* community. It is mentioned previously in Introduction section that assessment and level of people's satisfaction towards the external situation and condition, especially economic and politic, will greatly determine the pattern and the tendency of religious attitude/behavior.

A. TOLERANCE VS INTOLERANCE

In religious behavior, particularly related to the religious

devotion, the respondents are divided into two relatively equal attitudes. In part of them confessed that they are obediently practice their religion while others said the contrary or just fairly practice it. The background of this tendency is the strong 'attraction' of urban life that capable to 'force' an individual to be more rational in one side and the 'remains' of tradition values that could not completely disappear.


The respondent tolerance is limited to the matters concerning social relation such as friendship, neighborhood, and social circle while for other private matters such as inter – religion marriage and religion conversion performed by a family member, the respondents tend to be intolerant . In general they are objection to any possibility like this.

The respondents are also objection with the existence of other religion place of worship near their residences which to them are still a sensitive matter. They also refuse the construction of place of worship of other religion. The respondents are quite intolerant towards *Ahmadiyah*, other official religions followers and atheists.

In social life especially in the neighborhood, the respondents are quite tolerant towards the differences. They have no issue for living next to a neighbor who has different religion or ethnic group.


[See Graphic 6]

Graphic 6:
Neighboring to Individual who has Different Religion
and Ethnic group




Concerning the social group, the respondents are tolerance towards religion and ethnic differences. They are quite open and tolerant in social intercourse; for the respondents, religion does not define the friendship, in other words, having a friend who has the same religion is not their main concern.

Graphic 7:
Joining a Group of Different Ethnic and Religion



Graphic 8:
Consideration of Ethnic and Religion in Making Friend




The respondents are less lenient when one of their family members is married with a person from different religion and ethnic background, a contrast attitude compare to their approach in social intercourse. In the case of inter – ethnic marriage performed by their close family relative, their opinion is split into two equal perspective; some are accepting the idea while other are refusing it.

Meanwhile in the case of inter – religion marriage performed by their close family relative, there a strong objection, way over

their refusal towards the inter - ethnic marriage. The survey result signify the respondent objection for the possibility of inter – religion marriage. **[See Graphic 9]**


Graphic 9:
Inter – Religion and Inter – Ethnic Marriage



Similar with the objection if a family member marries with a different religion individual, the respondent is also objection if a family member converts to another religion.


The survey finding shows that the respondents are tolerant in the matter of general social relation (organization, neighborhood, and friendship). However, for more personal relation that relates to belief (family members marry or convert to another religion) the respondent is less tolerant. **[See Graphic 10]**

Graphic 10:
Attitude towards Family Member who Converts to Another Religion (1)




Graphic 11:
Attitude towards Family Member who Converts
to Another Religion (2)

Attitude towards Family Member who Converts to Another Religion
Seeing from Respondent's Religion Background



Graphic: 11 shows that the level of refusal from Muslim respondent concerning a family member who converts to other religion is much higher than other respondent with 82, 6%; while 45,4% of non – Muslim respondent said that they could accept it because religion is a personal matter.

Graphic 12:
Perspective towards People Who Has No Religion




A part of religion conversion matter, the survey was also posing the question concerning individual who has no religion. Majority of the respondent responded negatively, and only 25, 2% of them

could accept this idea because to them religion is a personal matter. Respondents who are opposed that idea gave various responses, 17, 8% of them said that those individual should follow the same religion as theirs; 41, 7% said that those individual should choose one of official religion; 10,2% considered them as heretical person; while the remaining 5% did not answer. [See Graphic 12]

In short, there is no tolerance against individual who has no religion as it is still considered as taboo by respondents, urban people who lives in *Jabodetabek*, their characteristic is not refers to the urban characteristic according to the sociological definition.


Graphic 13:
Perspective towards People Who Has No Religion



Graphic: 13 shows that there are no significant differences between areas concerning an individual or a group of individual that has no religion. Respondents from almost all areas tend to refuse the phenomena, only those who live in East Jakarta show a little tolerance.


In the matter of other religion place of worship built in their neighborhood, the respondents are likely objection nevertheless there are quite number who can accept it. However, the percentage of those who refuse the existence of other religion place of worship reached 49,5%, a high number for a sociologically plural nation; 45% can accept it while the remaining 5% do not know/do not answer. It signifies that the tolerant respondent is overshadowed by those who don't. [See Graphic 14]

Graphic 14:
Approval towards the Existence of other Religion Place Of Worship
in Respondent Environment/Neighborhood



Based on respondent's domicile, the refusal or objection against the existence of other religion place of worship occurred in Tangerang, Bogor, Depok, Bekasi and Central Jakarta. Meanwhile, those who tend to accept the phenomena lives in West Jakarta, South Jakarta, North Jakarta, and East Jakarta. [See Graphic 15]


Graphic 15:
Perspective towards the Existence of Other Religion Place Of
Worship in Respondent Environment/Neighborhood (2) Cross
tabulation




In the matters of the construction of a place of worship, most of respondent considers that it is neither government exclusive responsibility nor religious leaders. The respondent considers that

the construction of a place of worship must be regulated based on an accord between the government and religious leaders (53, 4%). It is in line with the existence of The Interfaith of Communication Forum (FKUB) where the government and social elements joint to regulate the matters of the construction of place of worship. Even though the Ministerial Joint-Regulation about the construction of place of worship is legally discriminative, but it is capable to establish the tolerance. **[See Graphic 16]**

Graphic 16:
Authority for Constructing a Place of Worship



Graphic 17:
The Necessary Measures that Should be Taken by the Government Concerning *Ahmadiyah*




The majority of respondents tend to be intolerant concerning their perspective towards the definition of freedom of religion. There are two positives definitions about the freedom of religion


for the respondents which are: free to follow and practice any religion/belief. However these definitions do not means it is also free to build the place of worship.

The perspective about the construction of place of worship is consistent with the prior opinion where the respondent in general is objection with the existence of other religion place of worship and that they consider important for the religious leader and the government to have an accord regarding the construction of place of worship. [See Graphic 18]

Graphic 18:
The Meaning of Freedom of Religion/Belief (1)



Graphic 19:
The Meaning of Freedom of Religion/Belief (1) Cross Tabulation



The freedom of religion/belief is defined by most of respondent as the freedom for following and practicing any religion, but when it comes to the freedom for constructing a place of worship, most of Muslim respondents (56, 6%) have the objection. In the contrary, those who are agreed with this definition are also considerable, which is 37, 7%. To the non-Muslim respondent, the meaning of freedom of religion/belief is defined as free to build a place of worship (63, 8%); But 30, 8% said otherwise while the remaining 5, 4% did not respond. The configuration of respondent perspective may be refers to the difficulty for the non-Muslim to build their place of worship. **[See Graphic 19]**

This finding indicates the tendency of intolerant behavior of the respondent. To avoid the bias, it should be underlined that the tendency of tolerant in certain matters but intolerant in other matters as it shown in the finding of this survey, is still considered as the expression of intolerant. It is based on the definition of tolerance as the capability to fully accept all differences of other identities. Therefore, the failure to fully accept the differences of identity is considered as intolerant. Thus, the effort to differentiate is not using the terminology of tolerance but using the level or degree of intolerance.

The respondent is not only refusing the possibility of inter - religion marriage or conversion to another religion performed by their family member, but is also less tolerance towards the existence of *Ahmadiyah* as part of belief practiced by other people and the towards those who have no religion. This phenomenon shows the strong ties of identity as the basic perception in approaching or assessing plural reality. This strong expression basically is the representation of psychology aspect. A 'normal' situation and condition of the external community would not give the space for such expression which may be triggered by the feeling of beleaguered by unusual situation and condition. There is uncomfortable feeling towards this kind of condition.

Under this situation, the community (respondent) found Islam as their canal to express their frustration. Therefore, the religion – in this case – Islam, may be not the main motive


for the escalating expression of respondent religious identity . As half of them confess that they are not dutiful in practicing the ritual of their religion. It signifies that respondent perspective about the politic and economic situation as explained previously can't be separated from this part of finding.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that intolerant behavior has 'reasonable' structural causes, such perspective still considered as incompatible to democracy and human rights principles in Indonesia .

B. CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

Recent condition of inter – religion relation in Indonesia, is under a complicated situation where there is a relative equal attraction to dispute and harmony. This picture clearly describes a decline compare to the situation of inter – religion 5 years ago. Various recent incidents related to intolerance, discrimination, and violence in the name of religion are assumed to have a contribution in constructing public perception on assessing the recent situation of inter – religion relationship.


Graphic 19:
Perspective on the Condition of Inter – Religion Relationship



But for the next 5 years, it is believed that the condition of inter – religion relationship would be positive and raise a better hope, where attraction to dissension will be less strong than the attraction towards the harmony. Respondent answers about the future situation are the reflection of people's hope so that the government could take a firm action regarding the condition of freedom of religion/belief which has the potential to trigger contention nowadays. **[See Graphic 19]**

In perspective of the respondent, the awareness and needs of living in harmony between inter – religion community is the main key to establish the religious harmony. Only few of respondent think that the government has the key role in establishing the harmony, in other words, the respondents are less likely put their hope on the government to take part in establishing the inter – religion harmony. It seems related to the government performance that is considered slow, less consistent and uncertain in handling the contention of inter – religion nowadays. **[See Graphic 20]**

Graphic 20:
Most Affecting Factors to (Create) Harmony



The perspective confirms the viewpoint that harmony is not state design 'forced' to its citizen. The authentic harmony will emerge when awareness and the needs of harmony itself arise among the people. Respondent opinion is in line with the principle of human rights, where in the implementation of claiming the civilian rights should not intervene in the realization of that right.


According to the respondent, it is the Legislation Draft of Freedom of Religion/Belief that should be proposed instead of the Legislation Draft about the Religious Harmony as it proposed by the government. The authentic harmony could only be established by guaranteeing the freedom for every citizen to practice their religion, supported by the awareness of diversity and the needs to live in harmony.

Dispute or blasphemy between inter – religion community or within the same religion community is a sensitive matter and may trigger conflict, which is in line with the perspective about people's right of freedom of religion/belief. It is interesting that the respondent is not easy to be provoked by such thing.

Although they accept the phenomenon with reserve, most of them chooses inter - religion leaders forum to solve the problem instead of proceed it to the court.

This fact indicates the strong orientation of respondent towards the religious leaders for handling the case of blasphemy instead of legal prosecution. **[See Graphic 21]**


Graphic 21:
The Option for Solving the Religious Conflict



According to the respondent, the lack of knowledge/education about the practiced religion is the main factor of inter – religion contention (40, 2%). It is quite interesting that the provocation from religious leader is considered as the following factor by 21,5% of respondents.

The respondent does not convince that inter – religion contention is triggered by preaching from certain religion/ belief towards community who already practice one, such as Christianization or Islamization. Nonetheless, there are 5,1% of them still think likewise while others 9,2% considered the construction of place of worship as the factor, 12,2% believed that different religion as the factor and the remaining 11,9% did not respond. **[See Graphic 22]**


Graphic 22:
The Trigger of Inter – Religion Conflict/Contention




In the matters of the existence of radical organizations that fight for their goals by using violence, the majority of respondent is disagreed (87, 4%). However, 8, 5% of them are agreed, and even willing to join those organizations. The rest 4, 1% did not respond. Besides confirming the existence of these radical organizations, in general, the respondent affirmed their objection against this violence action. **[See Graphic 23]**

Contrary to the supporter of religious radical movement who claim that their actions are based on 'comprehensive religious understanding', most of respondent think that the violence action is precisely showing a shallow comprehension towards religious understanding. Implicitly, the respondent perspective could be interpreted that religion basically doesn't teach violence. **[See Graphic 24]**

Graphic 23:
Approval/Consent to Radical Organizations that Use Violence




Graphic 24:
Assessment towards Radical Organizations that Use Violence



Although most of respondent refuse the violence in fighting for religion, they are approving the action of certain organizations that disband 'heretical sect and immorality' (52, 1%). But, those who are disagree also significant (41, 4%). The remaining respondent who are also against heretical sect, are refusing vigilante action. For any reason, the respondent does not consider vigilantism as the right way. [See Graphic 25]

Graphic 25:
Approval for the Action to Disband Heretical Sect and Immorality




According to the respondent, the violence action in the name of religion, carried by the youth that occurred recently is not motivated by their own will but comes from external influence.

This finding is in line with prior finding concerning the socialization pattern of religious teaching usually performed in the family; and therefore constructing relatively moderate religious attitude. It means that socialization of religious values outside the mainstream 'method', according to the respondent, is potentially raising radicalism among the youth. This finding also affirms that the latter is being a target of radicalization by certain radical group/ organizations.

Compare to other Islamic organization, Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) is considered as the religious organization that conducts most of the violence. There are 61,9% of respondents who mentioned FPI as the main actor; followed by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) with 3,5%, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) with 2,6% and *Muhammadiyah* with 1,9%. Meanwhile 20,2% of respondents said none of these organizations conduct the violence, and 9% did not respond. Other organization is only mentioned by 0,9% of respondents. **[See Graphic 26]**


Even though HTI, NU, and *Muhammadiyah* are rarely conducted their own action, but their involvement in violence action might be because they joined Islamic Peoples Forum (FUI), a joint forum of Islamic mass organization.

Graphic 26:
Organization that Frequently Conducted Violence Actions



The respondent suggested that the government should restrict the regulation for establishing an organization as related to necessary measures against violent organization. Other measures are disbanding the organizations, arresting and prosecuting the perpetrators. **[See Graphic 27]**

Graphic 27:
Government Measure Against the Organization that Frequently Conducted Violence Actions



Despite of the tendency of intolerant in religious behavior, most of the respondent do not support any form of violence action

in the name of religion; they also do not easily provoked by religious dissension cases. Moreover, they consider the perpetrators as a band of people who do not understand the religion comprehensively. Then, what can be interpreted from this finding?

The finding shows that respondent intolerant attitude is not identical with violence, especially physical violence action. Their difficulty in economic and politic stated in previous finding, seems only 'able to raise' them to be passively intolerant.


The study performed by Malindo Institute about religion as the trigger of conflict and violence in 2008 also indicated similar phenomenon with this finding. The research on several elements of *pesantren* leaders in West Java showed that they did not consider physical violence action is necessary, despite of their sentiment towards the domination of United States and Western countries in the world. In other side, they support some Fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Council such as; disbanding *Ahmadiyah*, and refusing liberalism, pluralism and secularism which is known has the strong tendency of intolerant.

C. PANCASILA

Pancasila is considered by most of people as the state's principle but recently most of state's executive is disobeying the fifth principle of Pancasila. Although in the last 5 years, Pancasila is being revitalized and rejuvenated by certain parties, including MPR (People's Consultative Assembly) that socializes 4 pillars of National life: Pancasila, the Constitution of 1945, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia.


In related to Pancasila, the survey shows that majority of the respondent still believed that Pancasila is needed (75,4%), only 17,2% think the opposite, while the rest of them did not give any response. **[See Graphic 28]**

Graphic 28:
The Urgency of Pancasila



The respondent viewpoint towards the urgency of Pancasila might be triggered by their disenchantment to state's implementation that they considered as inappropriate to Pancasila. Although the majority of respondent still believe that Pancasila is still needed, there is a possibility that it is limited to as a symbol; because 68, 5% of them think that state's executive/official isn't seriously implementing Pancasila, while 21,2% think otherwise, and the remaining 10,3% did not respond. **[See Graphic 29]**

Graphic 29:
The State's Official's Seriousness in Implementing Pancasila



In contrary to their perspective towards state's official, the majority of respondent (50,2%) consider people's behavior towards Pancasila is 'normal', meaning that Pancasila is not the main reference for behaving but it is also not being neglected. There are 33,6% of respondent who considered that people's behavior is already fit with Pancasila, 11,4% said the contrary and the rest 4,8% claimed they don't know.


The crisis in obeying Pancasila among the State's Official or

among the community is happened because in general they do not understand how to implement Pancasila, at least 41, 97% of them think that way. As known, after 1998 Pancasila was blamed by the public for the New Order's government implementation. It is interesting to find that 34,31% of respondent think that the disobedient to Pancasila is caused by the lack of role model from state's officials. Besides, some respondent said the existence of other ideology has decreased the implementation of Pancasila (13,14%) while 10,58% did not respond.

D. TERRORISM

For most of respondents (41,9%) the main trigger for terrorism act in Indonesia in the last couple of years is not the goal to enforce the Islamic Law (Syariah), but it is triggered by the economic and political injustice. [See Graphic 30]

**Graphic 30:
The Causes**




The survey finding explicitly doubted various exposes of terrorism cases which often related to only the struggle for establishing Islamic State. However, those who think that the main cause is the motivation to establish the Islamic State are also significant (22,7%). The next cause is political injustice (20,7%) and the rest 10,8% is not responding.

Most of respondent give a negative statement concerning the relationship between terrorism and radical religious organization


in the country, in other words, most of them (39,7%) don't see any connection between terrorism and radical religious organization; but 27,8% said there is a connection; while 32,6% said they don't know. **[See Graphic 31]**

Even though there are more respondent answered that there is no direct connection between terrorism and religious radical organization, they do consider that both entities have the same objective. Moreover, a small percentage considers that the two entities are supporting one another. **[See Graphic 32]**

Graphic 31:
The Relationship between Radical Organizations and Terrorism



Graphic 32:
The Form of Relationship between Radical Organizations and Terrorism



E. SECULARISM VS ISLAMIC LAW (SYARIAH)


Indicated as intolerant, most of respondent (50,2%) however,

refuse the idea of bring into effect the Islamic Law (Syariah) as legal basis in Indonesia. They think the Islamic Law (Syariah) should not become the reference for national life, although some group is fighting for making it happen.

Nonetheless, the considerable numbers of respondents (35,3%) that are agree to the enforcement of Islamic Law (Syariah) can't be underestimated. It is a serious challenge for state's official who oblige to enforce Pancasila and the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia; meanwhile, 14,4% of respondent had no opinion. **[See Graphic 33]**


There is a possibility that respondent idea about the necessity of Islamic Law (Syariah) as state's principle is in line with their perception about government bad performance in implementing Pancasila. People's apathy towards national development and implementation in accordance with the aim of the nation founding fathers might have shaped respondent perspective in this survey.

Graphic 33:
Islamic Law (Syariah) as the Basic Principle of the Nation




The consequence of refusing the enforcement of Islamic Law (Syariah) as national basic principle is respondent rejection to the application of stoning law for the adultery in Indonesia. This indicates that respondent rejection to the application of Islamic Law (Syariah) means automatically rejects one of the concrete laws from Islamic Law (Syariah) (especially the Islamic Criminal Law). **[See Graphic 34]**

Graphic 34:
The Approval of Bringing Stoning Law into Force in Indonesia (1)



According to respondent domicile area, there is an interesting finding concerning their behavior towards the possibility of the application of stoning law for adultery. Those who live in West Jakarta, South Jakarta, Central Jakarta, North Jakarta, East Jakarta and Bekasi are refusing to bring this law into effect while those who live in Tangerang, Depok, Bogor and Bekasi (again??) are accepting it and even show a quite strong tendency. **[See Graphic 35]**

Graphic 35:
The Approval of Bringing Stoning Law into Force in Indonesia (2)



However, in the matter of worship and social relations (*muamalat*) most of respondents are agree if Muslim students are obliged to wear veils, this perception is contrast to prior perception regarding Islamic Criminal Law. It might because the obligation to wear veils is not the element of Islamic that could give great affect

to public life, It might only an expression to the needs of religious identity or confirmation to the latest fashion trend that put veils as parts of lifestyle; and therefore it has lack of Islamic fundamentalism. Thus, the idea concerning this matter can't be judged as an extreme or radical behavior.

The great support to the element of Islamic Law (Syariah) in the matter of worship and social relations is shown from the support of most respondents to Islamic banking in Indonesia and the label of *halal* on every food product.

F. DEMOCRACY VS *KHILAFAH*


Most respondents (49,2%) don't support the khilafah system (applied) in this country (global government -system- based on Islamic Law (Syariah) which is in accordance with the refusal of the application of Islamic Law to be state's basic principle. It is possible that the respondent might consider that there is a similar principle between Islamic Law at national scale and *khilafah* system at international scale.

But 34,6% of respondents are agree to the system of *khilafah* while 16,2% stated no response. Even though there is a significant number of those who are agree and those who are not, this finding proves that the idea of *khilafah* has been accepted by most of respondents. **[See Graphic 36]**

The refusal to the application of Islamic Law (Syariah) and *khilafah* could be an important signal for the groups that are fighting to establish the two systems as basic principle of the state; as indicated by the survey result, these systems have not yet obtain a 'wide market' in Indonesia, at least in *Jabodetabek*. However, the idea has begins to rise among the community.

If this survey is considered as a public test towards those two ideas, then the result has described the level of people's acceptance to Islamic Law (Syariah) and *Khilafah* systems recently. Thus, the claim for strong support to these systems by its supporter is real.


Graphic 36:
The Approval to *Khilafah* System (1)




Based on respondent domicile, the *Khilafah* system doesn't get enough support from community, but different tendency is shown in the areas of Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi where the numbers of support and refusal are relatively equal. [See Graphic 37]

The support for the idea of Islamic Law (Syariah) and *Khilafah* application seems strongly influence by respondent viewpoint that consider democracy system as western product (16,2%) however, 59,2% of respondent are disagree, while 24,5% didn't respond. [See Graphic 38]

Graphic 37:
The Approval to *Khilafah* System (2) Crosstabulation



Graphic 38:
Democracy (as) Western Product



A number of findings concerning the application of Islamic Law (Syariah) and khilafah system can have several interpretations which have already rejected by most of respondents. This finding, once again, has shown an interesting phenomenon to be reviewed furthermore. By considering the prior finding which showed the indication for intolerant in religious behavior, then the refusal to Islamic Law (Syariah) and khilafah system would raise a number of questions. This fact automatically concludes that intolerant behavior doesn't always means the acceptance to Islamic Law and khilafah system.

CHAPTER IV DIFFERENT FACES ONE VISION

Followers of the *Ahmadiyah* are now lying low. They have become outcast citizens in their own country even though this has been their home since before Indonesia gained its independence. According to the SETARA Institute record, from 2007 to August 2010, there have been approximately 268 cases of oppression and violence towards the *Ahmadiyah* followers ranging from banning of worship to burning their mosques and their houses. These cases most often occurred in West Java and Jakarta.⁷⁶

Similar cases are inflicted upon Christian followers who continuously experience discrimination by the country due to the discriminative and bureaucratic system in establishing religious temples. Like *Ahmadiyah* members, Christian followers have also experienced continuous violence by groups of people from various radical Islamic organizations. Similar cases are experienced by other minority beliefs / religious groups.

As a human rights violation, the state is subject to law by violating the guaranteed freedom of the members of *Ahmadiyah*, members of Christian, and other minority belief/religious groups. Meanwhile, the framework applied for violent acts of radical Islamic organizations is the state criminal law. Violent acts in its various forms are considered a valid criminal case to be proceeded to court.

⁷⁶ Ismail Hasani, et. all. "*Negara Harus Bersikap*", Three years of report on the condition of the freedom of religion/belief in Indonesia 2007-2009, Jakarta.

The SETARA Institute data shows that the persecutors of the violent acts are a number of radical Islamic groups/organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (*Front Pembela Islam / FPI*), Islamic Reform Movement (*Gerakan Reformis Islam / GARIS*), etc. These groups are referred to as radical because they often use violence in executing their actions. The disbanding of *Ahmadiyah* is not the only agenda of the radical Islamic group. They have various agendas, from rejecting democracy, enforcing the Islamic *Shariah*, eradicate immoral operations, to closing up churches.

These groups were formed post-reformation 1998. The political reformation has made Indonesia more democratic. One aspect is marked by the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of expression and organization. This momentum is manipulated by a number of Islamic hardliners such as Habib Rizieq Syihab, Chep Hernawan etc. to form various radical Islamic mass organizations that were impossible to form during the New Order era. In general, these religious figures flatly refuse the democratic system which they find to be *kafir*, but strangely, they have taken pleasure in it. The Indonesian democracy enables the formation of mass organizations such as FPI, GARIS, and Islamic People Forum (*Forum Umat Islam / FUI*) etc. that impose various agenda including the enforcement of the Islamic Syari'a in Indonesia. Even their actions have not been hindered by the security forces.

Unfortunately the democracy in Indonesia has not been consolidated. This is seen through the law enforcement that is not yet in line with the principle of democracy itself. Various law scandals after another performed by law enforcement figures such as judges, prosecutors, and the police are showcased in public. Moreover, the security forces do not have a strong enough power to maintain order in the society. Consequently, each day the public lose their trust in the law and the authorities. This situation creates anomaly, producing social chaos without legal norms caused by weak social order.

It is under this condition that the Islamic radical mass organizations intentionally chose an anarchic and radical option to pursue their goals. They chose this option because it is simple

and safe. It is simple because they just use threats and attacks to pursue their interest. It is safe because their violent acts hardly ever receive legal punishment. When they do, they are usually very light sentences. One example is the incidents concerning FPI and its members. No FPI members have been sentenced since 1998-2001, even though this organization has actively performed violent acts such as attacks towards entertainment venues. It was only on 2002 and 2008 that Habib Rizieq was sentenced to prison. But it was only for a couple of months; it does not compare to the negative impact that was caused. This provides an incentive condition for a number of radical Islamic groups to continuously repeat their violent actions, and use violence as a way to achieve their goals.

The democracy that has not been fully consolidated as well as the anomaly situation in the society caused by weak law enforcement is the social political contexts that have generated the radical mass organizations. However, every radical organization has its own backgrounds that have led to their foundation. For example FPI which was founded on 1998. According to Habib Rizieq, FPI emerged as a spontaneous response to the Islamic members that were concerned about the rampant immoral operations in Jakarta.⁷⁷ On the other hand, no Islamic organization has actively confronted those immoral acts.

For this reason, FPI tries to fill this absence and became an anti-immoral Islamic mass organization with a ferocious front, because their actions often use violence.⁷⁸

The rampant immoral operations have also caused the formation of Tholiban in Tasikmalaya in 1999. The number of gambling, drinking and prostitution in Tasikmalaya has made Ajengan Zenzen and Kyai Asep Mausul along with their comrades anxious. Finally in 1999 they formed the Tholiban movement and one of their agendas is eradicate immoral operations in

77 GATRA, Aneka Ragam Laskar Jalanan, 15 June 2006

78 Imam Tholkhah, Choirul Fuad (editor), *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi* (2002), Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, Jakarta hal

Tasikmalaya.⁷⁹

GARIS in Cianjur has another story. The radical mass organization formed by H. Chep Hernawan, a Cianjur businessman who is closely acquainted to the DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* / The Indonesian Council on Islamic Mission), was established due to their concern towards a number of mass organizations and political parties with communist traits post-reformation. As suggested by DDII figures namely Anwar Haryono and Husein Umar, Chep Hernawan formed GARIS in 1998. Initially GARIS aimed to fight against movements with communist traits.⁸⁰

Apart from the incidents mentioned above, there are a number of radical mass organizations that were formed due to cases of assumed apostasy by neo Pentecostal Christian fundamentalists, such as the formation of the FAPB (*Front Anti Pemurtadan Bekasi* / Bekasi Anti Apostasy Front) in 2008. This group was formed as a reaction towards the Bekasi Shares Happiness (Bekasi Berbagi Bahagia / B3) that was conducted by the Mahanaim Foundation, a neo Pentecostal group in Bekasi led by Reverend Iin Tjipto. The B3 event which took place on November 2008 was labelled as a social service event. This event received protests from various Islamic mass organizations because every participant, who is mostly Muslims, has to partake in baptisms by immersion. After the baptism, the participants are then given food and drink and a lottery coupon which main prizes include a car.⁸¹

After receiving protests from a number of Islamic mass organizations, finally the B3 event held by the Mahanaim Foundation that planned to be conducted three times was cancelled.⁸² Besides protests, a number of Islamic organizations in Bekasi feel threatened. They felt that there had been a form of

⁷⁹ Tasikmalaya Interview, October 2010

⁸⁰ Alhikmahonline.com, Garis Tegas H.aji Chep Hernawan,, 1 August 2008. <http://www.alhikmahonline.com/content/view/273/24/>

⁸¹ This baptism by immersion can also be seen in pictures among others in di http://fapbekasi.multiply.com/photos/album/8/Terperangkap_B3#photo=1

⁸² Bekasi Interview, November 2010

Christianization in Bekasi. Because of that, a number of Islamic mass organizations organized and formed the Bekasi Anti Apostasy Front, which has become a frontline group of Islamic radicals to fight against apostasy in Bekasi.

In addition there are other radical Islamic groups that were intentionally formed to counter Ahmadiyah. Such as GERAM (*Gerakan Rakyat Anti Ahmadiyah / Anti-Ahmadiyah Mass Movement*) that was formed in Garut in 2010. This organization was formed by local radical groups such as FPI Garut, LP3Syi (Lembaga Pengkajian Penegakan dan Penerapan Syariah Islam / Institute for the Assessment Enforcement and Application of the *Shariah* Islam) etc. because of their anger towards the Ahmadiyah followers in Garut that have not ceased to continue their activity.⁸³

By looking at the background of these radical Islamic mass organizations, it can be concluded that in general these mass organizations were formed spontaneously and were triggered by a number of incidents that were considered a threat to Islam and Islam followers. Nevertheless, according to the research on the persons involved it is apparent that these radical Islamic organizations have similar historical roots to the genealogy of the radical Islamic, as explained in the previous chapter.

A. THE ACTORS

In a radical Islamic movement, the leaders still hold a very significant role. These leaders become central figures who determine whether the organization is active or not. It is unlikely that GARIS Cianjur could be active without the role of H Chep Hernawan. Almost all operations by GARIS Cianjur were personally funded by this leader. Another example is FPI. When Habib Rizieq was held in prison from August 2002 to November 2003, FPI became non-active and weak. During that period FPI only conducted one operation.

The actors of these radical Islamic movements come from

83 Interview in Garut, November 2010

various groups and background. There are the *habaib* clerics that have been widely known as extreme *mubaligs* such as Habib Rizieq. There are also those from the NU group such KH Qudsi Nawawi in Garut. There are also those who come from a background of activists of the transnational Islamic movements such as Muhammad Al Khaththath, former leader of the HTI. In addition, there are also people like Chep Hernawan who were former activists of GPI (Gerakan Pemuda Islam / Islamic Youth Movement) and DDII (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia* / The Indonesian Council on Islamic Mission). To further elaborate these actors, some of the radical Islamic leaders are profiled as follows.

A. HABIB RIZIEQ SYIHAB

Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab is the general leader of FPI (*Front Pembela Islam* / Islamic Defenders Front). In Jakarta, FPI is the most popular radical organization. FPI has repeatedly drawn the public's attention towards its anti-immoral acts and anti-Ahmadiyah operations. **Habib Rizieq was born in Jakarta on August 24, 1965.**⁸⁴ It is said that he comes from an Arab-Batavian family who are active in movements. His grandfather Muhammad Syihab is said to be a close friend of Pitung and that he married the niece of the said Batavian Warrior. Whereas, his father, Sayyid Husein, was the founder of the Pandu Arab Indonesia movement, a sort of scout movement. In that movement, his father encouraged the Arab youth to fight against the Dutch. As a result, according to the story, Sayyid Husein was captured by the Dutch and was sentenced to death. But Husein was able to escape from prison even though he was injured from a shot by the Dutch.⁸⁵ Rizieq was not acquainted with his father for too long. When he was 12 years old, his father died. Before he died, Sayyid Husein was able to leave a

84 Imam Tholkhah, Choirul Fuad (editor), *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi* (2002), Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, Jakarta hal

85 Alwi Syahab, *Pandu Arab Indonesia*, alwisyahab.wordpress.com, November 2009

message to his relatives that were passed on to Rizieq: "Ask my son this, when he grows up does he want to be a cleric or a fighter. If he wants to be a cleric, preach his religion well. If he wants to be a fighter, give him a machete."⁸⁶

Habib Rizieq apart from studying in a public school he also learned religion in madrasah Jami'at Khair, a school belonging to an Islamic mass organization which its members are mostly Arab descents. After high school, he studied the Arabic language in LIPIA Jakarta. Afterward, he continued his education majoring in Dirasah Islamiyah, Department of Tabiyah, King University, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. After finishing his studies In 1990 he taught in Riyadh for a year. In 1992 he returned to Indonesia and was an active *mubalig* in Jakarta. In 1993 he was able to continue his education in Universitas Antar Bangsa, Malaysia but was not able to complete it because the sponsorship he received was not enough to finance his himself and his family when they were in Malaysia. Since 1994 he was promoted as Head of Madrasah Aliyah Jami'at Khait.⁸⁷ Apart from teaching, he was also active as speaker in Islamic study groups. Rizieq is known as an extreme mubalig who criticizes the deviancies during the new order era.

After the downfall of Soeharto in 1998, Habib Rizieq along with his fellow extreme *mubalig* friends such as Haji Cecep Busthomi, Habib Idrus Jamalullail, KH Miftahul Anam etc. decides to from the Islamic Defenders Front. This new organization was designed as an anti-immoral acts movement. Under his leadership FPI is active in executing various anti-immoral acts and anti-cult operations.

As a result of his actions of attacking other members in the society through issues of anti-immoral acts and anti-cult operations, Habib Rizieq had to serve time in prison twice, In 2002-2003 he was convicted for insulting the state's authorities and involved

⁸⁶ Alwi Syahab, Pandu Arab Indonesia, alwisyahab.wordpress.com, November 2009

⁸⁷ Imam Tholkhah, Choirul Fuad (editor), Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi (2002), Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, Jakarta hal

in provoking the FPI followers to conduct violent operations targeting nightspots. Meanwhile in 2008 he was reconvicted as the accused mastermind of the 2008 Monas incident where the Islamic Defenders Troops were involved in attacking the AKKBB (*Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan* / The National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief) crowd.

B. MUHAMMAD AL KHATHHATH (*FORUM UMAT ISLAM* / ISLAMIC PEOPLE'S FORUM)

Muhamamad Al Khaththath is the leader of the FUI (Forum Umat Islam / The Islamic People's Forum). Formerly he held the position of general secretary of FUI, one of the radical Islamic groups that actively carry out a number of dissolutions of the Ahmadiyah and Islamic *Shariah* enforcement. This man whose real name is Gatot became an Islamic activist when he studied in IPB (*Institut Pertanian Bogor* / Agricultural Institute) in the 1980s. He became an activist of the IPB Al Ghifari mosque. When he was studying he met Abdurrahman Al Baghdadi, a Hizbut Tahrir activist from the Middle East who came to Bogor in early 1980s. Along with his friends he then studied religion from Al Baghdadi, who at the same time was teaching in Al Ghazali Pesantren, Bogor. Not only that, along with other students of Al Baghdadi like Ismail Yusanto, they spread the teachings of Hizbut Tahrir to a number of campus in Indonesia through the network of FSLDK (*Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus* / Kampus Missionary Friendship Forum). When HTI was officially founded in the 1990s, he was promoted as one of the leaders.⁸⁸ When he was the HTI leader, he also founded the FUI (*Forum Umat Islam* / Islamic People's Forum) in May 2005. FUI is a cross-organization of Islamic mass groups and political parties which members consist of more than 30 organizations coming from the hardliners such as FPI and GARIS, as well as moderate Islamic mass organizations such as NU and *Muhammadiyah*. FUI's operations often carry the ideas of enforcing the *Shariah* Islam and anti-cult.

88 Interview of HTI activist, Depok, November 2010

Al Khaththath is known as a expert in lobbying. When he was a leader of HTI and FUI he was able to build close relationship with MUI members so that in 2005 he succeeded to become MUI council along with another HTI activist namely Yusanto. Not only that, in late 2005 he was also promoted as a member of the Counter Terrorism Team formed by the Department of Religious Affairs and MUI. On the MUI National Conference VII in 2005 Al Khaththath was one of the people who were actively lobbying the MUI members to issue a *fatwa haram (forbidden)* against the liberal Islamic movement. In 2008, he resigned from HTI; one of his reasons is that he was not allowed to be active in the FUI. He chose to stay active in FUI and later formed a new movement called HDI (*Hizbu Dakwah Islam / Hizbu Islamic Mission*) that has the same goal as HTI, namely to uphold the *khilafah* Islamiyah.⁸⁹

C. CHEP HERNAWAN (GARIS)

H. Chep Hernawan is the leader of GARIS (Islamic Reformist Movement). GARIS is known with its action against heretical sect and apostasy. One of GARIS action was the disbandment of *Konferensi Tritunggal Mahakudus (KTM)*, which was planned to be attended by foreign and national Catholic priest, in *Lembah Karmel Desa Cikanyere, Kecamatan Sukaresmi, Cianjur Regency*, in mid 2007. In September 2005, GARIS attacked the *Ahmadiyah* village in Cianjur and conducting anarchist action, wounded the Ahmadis and burnt their mosque.

He's the first child of the late Haji Dapet, an entrepreneur in plastic recycle. He was born on 12th May 1956, and was active in PII (Indonesian Islamic Student) while he was in Senior High School in 1970-s. Chep Hernawan had studied in PTDI (Islamic Da'wah College) in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta where he began acquainted with radical Islamic ideas, as it is known that in 80-s, PTDI was popular as the reunion place of hardliner *mubaligh* in Jakarta, such as Abdul Kodir Jaelani, Yayan Hendrayana, and others. He was chased by the security force for his involvement in Tanjung

89 Interview of HTI activist, Depok, November 2010

Priok case but according to his confession, he bribed the security force to avoid prison. During his study, he was also active in GPI (Islamic Youth Movement) where he started to correspond with DDII leaders such as Muhammad Natsir, Anwar Haryono, Husein Umar and others.⁹⁰

His close relationship with DDII leaders continues until today, and it was Husein Umar and Anwar Haryono who suggested him to found GARIS. Moreover, Anwar Haryono also asked Chep Hernawan who often called as *Pak Haji* to involve in founding *Partai Bulan Bintang*, where he was once positioned as the party treasury but then quitted in 2001, disappointed by the pragmatism of the party. He continued to develop GARIS that he founded in 1998.⁹¹

Almost all of GARIS activities are financed using his personal fund. It is likely possible as Chep Hernawan inherits his father business in plastic recycle, he is now developing property and rice distribution businesses.⁹²

D. KH. QUDSI NAWAWI. (LP3SYI)

KH. Qudsi Nawawi is the leader of LP3Syi (Institute for Assessment Enforcement and Application of Shariah Islam). In Garut, this organization is known for its active campaign in enforcing Islamic Law (Syariah) and against the heretical sect, including *Ahmadiyah*. He also lead *Pesantren Suci* in the same town.

Qudsi Nawawi was born in Garut in 1936. He learnt Islam in *Pesanten Paledang*, Garut; in *Pesantren Cipanas*, Cianjur; and also in *pesantren Kaliwungu*, Boyolali. After finishing his study, Qudsy taught in *pesantren Suci*.⁹³

Ajengan Qudsi began actively involved in a movement for enforcing Islamic Law (Syariah) in 2000-s. It is assumed that he

90 Interview in Cirebon, November 2010

91 Interview in Cirebon, November 2010

92 Interview in Cirebon, November 2010

93 Interview in Garut, October 2010

was invited by his close friend, *KH. Endang Yusuf*, the leader of FPI Garut. Qudsi became a member of *Majelis Syuro* FPI. In 2005, *Kyai Qudsi* founded LP3Syi together with Endang Yusuf. This organization is the alliance of various Islamic mass organizations in Garut, from moderate to radical organizations, such as FPI, *Majelis Mujahidin*, *NU*, *Persis*, *Muhammadiyah*, etc. The organization's aim is enforcing Islamic Law (*Syariah*) in Garut through Regional Regulations.⁹⁴

Kyai Qudsi is also active in GERAM (*Gerakan Rakyat Anti Ahmadiyah*) and involves in the action for disbanding *Ahmadiyah*. He is also known as PPP politician (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) where he has several positions. In DPC (branch board) Garut, he holds the position as the Chief of Consideration Council; while in DPW (Regional Board) in West Java, he is the Deputy Chief of Consideration Council; and in DPP Pusat (National Board), he is a member of Islamic Law Council.⁹⁵

E. SALIM BADJRI

Salim Badjri is the Chairman of FUI (Islamic People's Forum) Cirebon; the most active Islamic radical mass organization in the town. FUI actions often draw public attention in Cirebon, from sweeping the 'anti-immorality', disbanding Church service to rejecting the performance of Anisa Bahar, a dangdut singer in Cirebon. He might be the only professor who leads a radical mass organization as he's teaching in STAIN Cirebon and well known as the *hadith* (narrations concerning the words and deeds of the [Islamic prophet Muhammad](#)) expert.⁹⁶

He is an Arab descendent, was born in Cirebon, on 10 February 1963. Active in *Al Irsyad Al Islamiyah*, an Islamic modern mass organization with most members are non - *Habaib* Arab descendents, since he was young. He was the Chief of *Al Irsyad*

94 Interview in Garut, October 2010

95 Interview in Garut, October 2010

96 Sabili, Tak Ada Kompromi Dengan Maksiat, No 18 Th. XII 24 March 2005

Cirebon for almost 15 tahun⁹⁷ and since mid 90-s he is known as hardliner *mubaligh* and often preaches in weekly *qur'an* recitation held by *Majlis Ta'lim Syarif Hidayatullah* located in Pasar Gunung Sari, Jl. Cipto Mangunkusumo, Cirebon (now in front of Grage Mall); the event often called as *pengajian (qur'an recitation) Yukeng* (the name of the organizer), who frequently invites other hardliners *mubaligh* such as Habib Idrus Jamalullail, Habib Riziq Shihab, A.M. Fatwa, Syarifin Maloko, including Prof. Dr. Salim Badjrie. This recitation event ended in 2001.⁹⁸

Before founding FUI, Salim Bajri has already active conducting sweeping to hotels, discotheques, brothels, etc., in Cirebon. FUI haven't been founded yet until 2004; the background of its foundation was to fight against immorality and Christianization performed by the neo – Pantekosta Christian group in Cirebon. FUI is an Islamic inters - mass organization, consists of FPI, Persis, GAMAS (Anti-Immoral Movement), etc. Under the lead of Salim Bajri, FUI soon becomes an Islamic Radical Mass Organization to be reckoned with in Cirebon.⁹⁹

Salim Bajri is known to have a broad relationship with many Islamic figures. He is closed to PKS, even PKS scouting group often guards his house. He also closes to MMI figures; he was one of the person who declaring (the foundation?) of MMI Cirebon in 2001, and once had the position as member of Board of Experts of *Mujahidin Council*¹⁰⁰. He also has good relationship with traditionalist *kyai*, he closes to KH. Mahtum Hanan from *pasantren Babakan, Ciwaringin*.¹⁰¹

Moreover, Salim Bajri has broad relationship with hardliners Islamic figures in some areas. In 2005, he managed to invite many *ulema* from almost all areas in West Java. Most of them are known as radical figures, such as Fauzan Al Anshari (was a lead figure of MMI), Kyai Qudsi Nawawi (Leader of LP3Syi Garut), and others. In

97 Sabili, Tak Ada Kompromi Dengan Maksiat, No 18 Th. XII 24 March 2005

98 Interview in Cirebon, November 2010

99 Interview in Cirebon, November 2010

100 Sabili, Tak Ada Kompromi Dengan Maksiat, No 18 Th. XII 24 March 2005

101 Interview in Cirebon, November 2010

that meeting, The Islamic People's Forum (FUI) of West Java was founded. At that time KH. Qudsi Nawawi was elected to be the Chief.¹⁰²

B. MASS BASE

One of mass base of radical mass organization is *pesantren*. This phenomenon often occurs in West Java, in Cianjur for example. GARIS is not only recruiting ex – thugs but also *santri* (student) from various *pesantren* in Cianjur, such as *pesantren Darul Alam* and *pesantren Ashabul Yamin*. The involvement of these *pesantrens* is because of the close relationship of its leaders with H. Chep Hernawan; for example *ustadz* Muhammad Hardiman Nawate, the leader of *Darul Aman*; and Dadin Jamaludin, one of the leaders of *Ashabul Yamin*, both are the caretaker of GARIS.¹⁰³ The leaders and students of these *pesantren* are also involved with the violence action carried by this organization (GARIS). In September 2010, *ustadz* Muhammad Hardiman and 34 of his students were arrested by the police for attacking *Ahmadiyah* village in Cianjur.¹⁰⁴

Similar case occurred in Tasikmalaya. *Pesantren Al-Irsyadiyah* and *pesantren Miftahul Huda* become the basis of Tholiban group. The involvement of students from these *pesantren* happened because its leaders, Ajengan Zenzen from *Al Irsyadiyah* and Ajengan Asep Mausul from *Miftahul Huda* are Tholiban leaders. It is understandable why *Miftahul Huda* becomes the base of radical group as its founder, KH. Choer Affandi was an ex – (paramilitary) troop of *Darul Islam (DI)*, one of main Islamic radical movements in West Java.

Pesantren also becomes one of the radical mass group bases in Garut. At least, there are two *pesantrens* that become the group mass base of LP3Syi (*Lembaga Pengkajian Penegakan dan Penerapan Syari'at Islam* / Institute for Assessment Enforcement

102 Pikiran Rakyat, Pemerintah Diminta Tegas Soal Maksiat, 5 May 2005

103 Interview in Garut, October 2010

104 12 Penyerang Mesjid Ahmadiyah Dibekuk, Harian Komentar 22 September 2005

and Application of Shariah Islam), they are, *pesantren* Cipanas and *pesantren* Suci. Considering the two figures of these mass organization are also the leaders of those two *pesantrens*. *Ajengan* Saeful Tamam was the leader of *pesantren* Cipanas in Garut, whereas *Ajengan* Qudsi Nawawi from *Pesantren* Suci.

The same as in West Java, there is also *pesantren* that becomes the radical group's base in Jakarta. Such as Al-Um *pesantren* in Ciputat, the *santris* of this *pesantren* were often involved in actions conducted by FPI. This is also because the leader of the *pesantren*, KH Misbahul Alam was the founding father of this Islamic organizational mass.

The other mass bases are majlis ta'lims organized by utadz or habaib who become radical mass groups' figures. For instance is majlis ta'lim Al Ishlah Mosque, Petamburan which becomes mass group of FPI. Twice a week, FPI members in Jakarta follows *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) which is led by FPI personages including Habib Rizieq Syihab. There is also majlis ta'lim Anwarul Hidayat led by Habib Muchsin Alatas that also becomes the mass base of FPI. This happened because Habib Muchsin himself was the chairman of missionary sector of FPI. The other majlis ta'lim is Mahabbaturrasul led by Habib Salim bin Umar Al Attas. Many members of its *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) were from hoodlum realms recruited by Habib Salim to become members of Laskar Aswajan who often followed demonstration movements of FUI and FPI.¹⁰⁵

C. RECRUITMENTS OF MEMBERS

There are similarities among radical mass organizations in recruiting members, particularly mass organizations which have individual membership such as FPI, GARIS, etc. Fundamentally, the recruiting process is relatively loose, everyone can become members. Procedures are also simple, the persons only need to join *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) which are held by those mass

105 Suara Islam, *Dakwah Merangkul Preman dan Pemabuk*, Edisi 46, 20 June-3 July 2008

organizations several times, and then they can become a member.¹⁰⁶

Take being a member of FPI for instance. Anybody who wants to be a member of FPI can directly follows events which are held by FPI, such as regular *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) held by Habib Rizieq in Jami Al Islah Mosque, Petamburan every Wednesday or *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) in Habib Rizieq's residence every Thursday night. Afterward, they only need to ask for recommendation from other committee member or activist of FPI so they can directly become members of FPI. Take Topik Hidayat as an example, FPI member from Cempaka Putih. This elementary school graduate admit that he became FPI member after following three *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) held by Habib Rizieq in Al Islah Mosque. After that on March 2008, he became an FPI member. Most of the recruitment processes in FPI take this kind of procedure.¹⁰⁷

Other than procedures mentioned above, occasionally, FPI also recruits members with formal procedure. Incidentally, FPI has an open recruitment. They send forms around mosques and majlis ta'lim. Applicants can fill an administration form and then given reciting Koranic verses test and interviews about their basic knowledge of Islam such as Islamic essential principle (rukun Islam), faith essential principle (rukun iman), and syahadat (Muslim declaration of belief in the oneness of God). These tests and interview are not selection tools but to find out a certain person's understanding and knowledge about Islam. However, these formal recruitment procedures are not held regularly. Sometimes, it occurs once a year, twice a year, but sometimes it doesn't occur at all.¹⁰⁸

Being a member of radical mass organizations is easy. Resigning from those organizations is also easy. The members can resign anytime and they do not need to tell the committee member. They who resign will not get any penalty. Basically, when a person

¹⁰⁶ Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010. Discussion with a member of FPI, Jakarta, October 2010

¹⁰⁷ Record of Interview (Investigation) Topik Hidayat bin Sanwani, Polda Metro Jaya, 8 June 2008

¹⁰⁸ Al Zastrouw Ng, Gerakan Islam Simbolik, 2006, LKI Yogyakarta.

is not active in the organization, then he/ she will no longer be considered as a member.¹⁰⁹

The recruitment model which happens in FPI is not much different with what happens in other mass organizations. For particular organizations which its mass base is *pesantren*, the *santris* automatically become members without having an administration process.

D. FUNDS

Islamic radical mass organizations have several fund sources. Some are coming from personal capital of the leader, some are contributed by outsiders and some are coming from business unit which was pioneered by the organization mass itself. GARIS case is an example; almost its entire operational fund is financed from personal capital of H Chep Hernawan and his family. This is possible because this leader of GARIS is a success entrepreneur in Garut. He has businesses in plastic bags, property and also Cianjur rice distribution. Tithe and *infaq* (charity) from his family are often used for GARIS' activity.¹¹⁰

Meanwhile, FPI often accepts donation from outsiders to finance their demonstration acts. As an example was when they conducted a demonstration act in front of American Embassy in Jakarta at October 2001. For two days FPI masses protested against America's strike to Afghanistan. FPI admitted that that action was also financed by the side other than FPI who approved this act agenda.¹¹¹ Moreover, FPI also tries to open up business institutions. For instance, FPI Pancoran Mas Depok branch opened up BMT Al Kautsar in Pancoran Mas area.¹¹² Meanwhile, some branches manage to get contribution fee from its members with amount around Rp 1000 every month. Other than that, FPI also gets income

109 Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010. Discussion with a member of FPI, Jakarta, October 2010

110 Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

111 Alip Purnomo, FPI Disalahpamai, 2003 Media Tama Indonesia, Jakarta hal 41.

112 Alip Purnomo, FPI Disalahpamai, 2003 Media Tama Indonesia, Jakarta hal 40.

from selling its uniforms and attributes.¹¹³

FUI have a different story. Other than getting donations from outsiders, this radical mass organization is seriously opening business units as organizational fund sources. There are few business units being developed. Among them are Suara Islam tabloid and Suara Islam online. The fund is coming from entrepreneurs who have sympathy for FUI like Tabrani Syabirin, who is also a member of DPR (Indonesian Legislative Committee) representatives of Gerindra Party. Beside the tabloid sell, they also get money from commercial advertisements. Both media start drawing out commercial advertisers. For instance, there are few products that put their advertisements such as *bio additive* Octane N and Es Pisang Hijau in new edition of Suara Islam No. 103 17 Desember- 7 Januari 2011. Suara Islam online also draws out some commercial advertisers like Es Pisang Hijau and Bakso Qolbu, an Java Tour & Travel. Moreover with Java Tour & Travel, FUI is collaborating partnership in implementing *umroh* and hajj services.¹¹⁴ Other than that, FUI also has *khilafah center* which sells many Islamic books.

DENOMINATIONS AND DOCTRINES OF THE TEACHINGS

A. AMONG TRADITIONALIST AND MODERNIST

All this time, there is a certain impression among people that radical Islamic people is identical with radical salafy followers or *neo Wahabi*. E.g. in a book entitled *Gerakan Salafy Radikal di Indonesia* (Salafy Radical Movement in Indonesia) who was written by PPIM (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat / Islamic and Society Assessment Center) UIN Jakarta put FPI in as salafy radical group.¹¹⁵ On the contrary, these days the traditionalists are often presumed as tolerant and moderate groups. These features are related to the achievement made by Gus Dur when developing NU image as

113 Alip Purnomo, FPI Disalahpahami, 2003 Media Tama Indonesia, Jakarta hal 41.

114 See <http://www.suara-islam.com/>

115 See Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (Penyunting), *Gerakan Salafy Radikal di Indonesia*, Raja Grafindo Persada, 2004.

a moderate group. Yet, this research finding shows another color. Radical Islamic movement actually is not only monopolized by modernists like salafy group. The traditionalists also become groups that actively do violent acts on behalf of religion. Take FPI for instance, sometimes is being misinterpreted as a radical salafy group.

FPI is the traditionalist follower. They support *mazhab* Syafii and sticks rigidly to Aswaja theorem (*Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah*). Their statute clarifies their place as an Aswaja follower. The general leader of FPI himself even writes his name as follows: Al Habib Muhammad Rizieq bin Husain Syihab Ba'alawi Al Husaini Al Syafii Al Suni Al Salafy Al Indunisi. Here it is obvious how he identifies himself with *mazhab* Syafii and Sunnism.¹¹⁶

It also appears in his religious practice. He is a follower of *thariqat* Allawiyah. It can be seen from regular *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) of FPI which is held every Friday night. This *pengajian* (*qur'an recitation*) is namely *ratiban*. In that event, there are two *wirids* enunciated, that is *wirid Al Latif* and *ratib al haddad*. These two *wirids* are very popular enunciated by *thariqat haddiyah* followers or also often called as *thariqat Allawiyah*.¹¹⁷

The similiar thing happens in West Java, such as in Garut. One of its radical Islamic figures is KH Qudsi Nawawi. *Pesantren* Suci which also becomes group mass base of LP3Syi is a traditional *pesantren*. *Pesantren* Miftahul Huda and *pesantren* Al Irsyadiyah are also traditional *pesantrens*.¹¹⁸

These findings actually come with no surprises. Most of the

116 Andri Rosadi, *Hitam Putih FPI*, 2008 Nun Publisher, Jakarta, hal 90

117 Imam Tholkhah, Choirul Fuad (editor), *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi* (2002), Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, Jakarta hal 3. This *Tariqat* (way/method) is the method among the *habaib*, which is different with other *tariqat* in general. The differences are lies on religious practice that more focuses on *amal* (deed), *akhlaq* (Islamic virtue/morality) and *wirid* (<http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy&hl=id&site=&source=hp&q=wirid&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&pbx=1&fp=f5273f74c63fi8do>) and *Dhikr* (Remembrance of God-<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dhikr>) instead of *riyadhoh* (special ritual) and *kezuhan*.

118 Interview (in) Garut, October 2010 and Interview in Tasikmalaya, October 2010

leaders of traditional *pesantrens* in West Java are intolerant. It was already seen in a survey that was held Malindo Institute to the leaders of *pesantrens* in West Java, where the majority respondents of the survey are traditional *pesantrens* which are affiliated to NU. To the amount of 81% *pesantren's* leaders showed intolerance behaviour. 91% respondents considered *Ahmadiyah* as a misleading sect, and 85% respondents agreed to dismiss *Ahmadiyah*. Meanwhile, in year 2007, it was revealed that most of the *pesantren's* leaders approve the violent act towards *Ahmadiyah*. 56,2% respondents considered "expelling and destroying jemaah *Ahmadiyah* are part of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*".¹¹⁹ Not only that, most of *pesantren's* leaders also agreed to anarchist acts like closing churches. There are 75% respondents agreed that "churches or religious places of Christian/Catholic people which was built without permission must be crashed or closed".¹²⁰

Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that all radical groups are traditional Islamic follower. There are also some Islamic radical groups that can be categorized as modern groups. Let's take Islamic People's Forum (FUI) Cirebon as an example. This group is led by DR. Salim Badjri, a figure from Al Irsyad Al Islamiyah, Cirebon.¹²¹ Al Irsyad is an Islamic mass organization. Their members are mostly Arabic *Masayaikh* or Arab non *Habaib* descent. This group is known as an anti *mazhab* and anti *bid'ah* group which is the feature of modern group. This group considers that some religious ceremony such as *ratib*, *tahlil* as *bid'ah*. FUI's religious view follows Salim Badjri's religious view. They refuse the traditionalist's religious ceremony.

B. TEACHING DOCTRINE

From the explanations above, we can sum that there are various religious sects inside Islamic radical group. Radical mass

¹¹⁹ Malindo Institute, Agama sebagai Potensi Konflik dan Kekerasan, Study of Pesantren leaders Point of View in Indramayu, Cirebon, Kuningan, Majalengka, Ciamis and Pangandaran about Jihad, Kekerasan dan Kekuasaan, Bandung, 2008.

¹²⁰ Ibid

¹²¹ Habib Muhammad Rizieq Shihab, Dialog Piagam Jakarta, Komite Penegakan Syariat Islam (2000) hal 31.

organization's religious views are traditional and there are also modern. Yet they all have the same teaching doctrine. There are at least three same teaching doctrine among the radical Islamic. The teachings are:

First, is the obligation to uphold Islamic Shariah. From radical groups' point of view, upholding Islamic Shariah are non-negotiable obligations. Made reference to the Koran surah Al Maidah verse 44: "Undoubtedly, We have sent down *Taurah*, wherein is the guidance and light. According to it the Jews were ordered by Our obedient prophets and men of reaming and, jurists for it was desired from them to preserve the Book of Allah and they were witnesses to it, then fear not people, but fear Me and do not accept mean price for Our Signs. And whoso judges not according to what Allah has sent down, they are the persons who are infidels." The radicals have a notion that upholding Islamic Shariah is not only an obligation by the Koran, but logically understandable. Habib Rizieq explains this with an analogy: "If a wealthy man builds a big company with his/her own personal capital, then we will agree that he/she have all the right to make the regulations in his/her company without neglecting his/her employees; the employees must obediently obey these regulations. What about Allah SWT? He creates human and the entire universe ... Doesn't He has the right to create regulations in His universe? Doesn't He have the right to decide the limits of human's norm, one of His creations? And doesn't human being must obediently obey the Creators regulations?"

¹²² From this perspective we can generalize that from the radicals' point of view that the highest authority in creating laws is in the hand of Allah, and Allah's law is written only in the Koran. That is the reason they refuse the idea of democracy, since the right to declare laws is taken over by the government and the peoples representatives.

Secondly, the *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* obligation. Radical mass organizations are highly inspired by Muh. hadist, one is the story about a village being wiped out even though there are virtuous people living there. That village was wiped out because the virtuous

¹²² Imam Tholkhah, Choirul Fuad (editor), Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi (2002), Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, Jakarta hal

people living there “underestimate and do nothing about rebellious acts against Allah Ta’ala. Another hadist mentioning “Those among you sees wickedness, he/she have to fix it with his/her hand, if he/she couldn’t do it he/she have to change it with his/her words, if he/she couldn’t do it, he/she have to change it with his/her heart, and this method is the weakest faith”¹²³

These radical groups don’t want to be considered as the weakest faith, which is why they try as hard as they could to change anything they consider as wickedness using their hands or physical strength. Note that evil are not only wickedness such as gambling, prostitution or drinking alcoholic liquors. Evil has been broadly define among the radicals, including misleading religious sect such as *Ahmadiyah* which is consider to desecrate Islam, also Liberal Islamic group that are considered to oppose the Shariah Islam obligation, etcetera.

Third, most Christians always have bad intention towards Moslems. One of the verse made as reference is Al Baqoroh verse 120: “And never the Jews and Christians will be pleased with you unless you follow their Din (creed). Say then! ‘The guidance of Allah is the only guidance’, (O listener who he may be) if you become follower of their desires, after the knowledge that has come to you, then no one will be your protector from Allah and no helper.” This is the most popular and constantly repeated verse among the radicals. They become more certain about the truth of it with Christianizing cases. From this point of view, it is understandable why they are really intolerant especially towards Christians.

F. ACTION AGENDA

Some of the Islamic radicals have many faces. Today they are against wickedness, tomorrow they are against *Ahmadiyah*. Their various faces are a result of different agendas and fight issues that they support. There are at least four fight agendas as an outcome of their religious doctrine’s translation: 1) upholding Islamic Shariah, 2) fighting against wickedness, 3) fighting against misleading

123 DPP FPI, Buku Putih FPI, 3 Juni 2008

religious sect such as *Ahmadiyah* and Liberal Islam, 4) anti apostasy.

1. UPHOLDING ISLAMIC SHARIAH

Almost every radical Islamic movement has upholding Islamic Shariah as their goal. This demand doesn't mean that every radical group openly wants to create an Islam nation. There are differences among them. Let's take FPI as an example. "We don't want an Islam nation; we just want an Islamic society. With an Islamic society we'll automatically get Islamic Shariah." Habib Rizieq said.¹²⁴

Meanwhile, FUI (Forum Umat Islam/ Islamic People Forum) clearly wanted to create an Islam nation, even *khilafah islamiyah*. It is written on FUI's five fight platform. The last platform mentions "fighting the unity of the Islamic world under one Islamic leadership or *khilafah Islamiyah*."¹²⁵

The biggest chance to fight for Islamic Shariah occurred on the year 2000. There was an amendment on the 1945 constitution. The radicals took this opportunity. FPI wanted to put the Piagam Jakarta (Jakarta Charter) back to the preamble of 1945 constitution. The Jakarta Charter has important statement for them which are: "obliging to uphold the Islamic Shariah for its believers." To avoid division of the citizen these words was omitted by the government when it was legalized on 18 august 1945. Their proposal was rejected.

Their struggle didn't stop there. On many occasions, the upholding of Islamic Shariah is always sounded. On 2005, Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia (KUII/ Indonesian Moslem's Congress) the demand to uphold Islamic Shariah also occurred. Usually before the general election this issue will re-appear. The radicals will offer political support and if the candidates win, he/she have to uphold Islamic Shariah. FUI and FPI did this on the general election year 2009. They supported JK-Wiranto whom didn't reject upholding

124 Imam Tholkhah, Choirul Fuad (editor), *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Era Reformasi* (2002), Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan Departemen Agama, Jakarta

125 Menyegarkan Kembali Khittah FUI, 12 November 2010, <http://suara-islam.com/news/muhasabah/komentar-mak/1412-menyegarkan-kembali-khittah-fui->

Islamic Shariah.¹²⁶

Similar act was performed by many radical groups in the regions. They uphold the Islamic Shariah through region regulations. This opportunity arrived after the legalization of the regions' autonomy through UU no.22/1999 modified into UU no.32/2004 about local government where they have the authority to create some regions' regulation.

The Tasikmalayan Tholiban, fight for Islamic Shariah for years. They performed many acts from demonstrating to collaborating with the local government candidates. Their final attempt was successful. On the election of Tasikmalaya's mayor on 2007, Tholiban led by Ajengan Zenzen gave political support to H Syarif Hidayat-H Dede Sudrajat. Their candidates won. The new mayor, who is also Thaliban's advisor declare *Regional Government Regulation* no.12/2009 about "Building the citizens' way of life based on Islamic religion and social norms of the people of Tasikmalaya." "¹²⁷

2. WICKEDNESS WIPE OUT

The radicals are often considered as a frightening group, especially for leisure business owner. Their fear is related to the radicals' act toward anything considered as wickedness, such as liquors, prostitution and gambling. From the radical point of view, wickedness is everywhere nowadays. Wickedness can corrupt the morale and Islamic people's *aqidah*.¹²⁸

They are often disappointed by the law enforcement's lack of involvement in disciplining those leisure places. That is the reason why these radical organizations became anti-wickedness mass organization trying to take over the authority of the law enforcement to maintain order.

Among some anti wickedness movements, FPI is well-known. However, other radical mass organizations in the region act similar

126 Piagam Umat Islam, FUI, 25 Juni 2009

127 Interview in Tasikmalaya, October 2010

128 FPI, Perspektif Organisasi, November 2007

to FPI. FUI (Islamic People's Forum) Cirebon, a radical mass organization founded by Salim Badjri, a lecturer of Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam (Islamic College) Cirebon on 2004. Their actions are similar to FPI's; this organization destroys places that are said to be the lair of wickedness.¹²⁹

Before performing their act, usually FUI send a letter to the police asking these lairs to be close. If their reports are ignored by the police, then Salim Badjri and his friends will attack that location. This is what happened on May 2006 when they close a machine gambling place on jalan Pasuketan, Cirebon. After their reports were ignored by the police, thousands mass from FUI attacked and closed that gambling place. It was one of the biggest actions done by FUI and its name become famous among Islamic mass organization on Cirebon.

There is also a big risk for these Islamic mass organizations as a result of their act against wickedness. Sometimes offended party will take revenge; the highest stakes are their life. Take Habib Soleh Alatas as an example, he was an advisor for FPI who was shot down in front of his house on Cempaka Putih July 23rd 2000. This shooting claimed to have a connection with FPI's sweeping act on Kemang region backed up by some law enforcer. The same fate happened to KH Cecep Bustomi, the leader of Front Hizbullah. July 24th 2000, he was shot down while driving his car on Serang. This shooting is presumable as an act of revenge by some Kopasus (Indonesian Special Force) toward Cecep Bustomi. Previous night, Front Hizbullah mass attacked a dangdut and jaipong show on a wedding celebration, resulting the dead of a member of Kopasus slashed by Cecep Bustomi's crew.¹³⁰

3. ERADICATION OF MISLEADING RELIGIOUS SECTS

From radical groups' perspective, differences in a matter of *furu'udin* or religious branch such as *fikih* are allowed. "Islamic people can be different with *furu'* not misleading and don't lead

129 GATRA, Aneka Laskar Jalanan, 15 Juni 2006

130 The chronology of the murder of KH. Cecep Bustomi, can be seen on <http://17romadon.blogspot.com/2010/09/kronologi-pembunuhan-kyai-cecep-bustomi.html>

to error, with one condition if there is a theorem that can be *syari*' responsible." Yet matters that are *ushuluddin* or point of religion such as *aqidah* are not allowed to be different. "Islamic people have to agree in *ushul* and cannot be different, differences on *ushul* is a deviation that leads to error."¹³¹

From this point of view, the radical groups define whether a religious sect is misleading or not. Take *Ahmadiyah*'s case for instance, they judge that *Ahmadiyah*'s taught is misleading. One of the reasons is because from *aqidah*, it's different from common Islamic people. As example, *Ahmadiyah* claim that there is another prophet after Muhammad which is Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. The radicals also claim that *Ahmadiyah* have their own holy book called *Tadzikrah* ¹³²

Violent acts toward *Ahmadiyah* happen a lot since 2005. On June 2005, around 5000 mass from Gerakan Umat Islam (Islamic People Movements) that contain FPI, LPII and LKII (Lembaga kajian Islam Indonesia/ Indonesia Islamic Study Association) attack the base of Indonesia *Ahmadiyah*.

Tens of people got injured because of this attack. ¹³³ This quantitatively numbers of violent acts to *Ahmadiyah* were related to a recommendation released by *Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat* PAKEM (Coordination Controlling Team of Societies Religion Sect) in May 2005 that clarified *Ahmadiyah* as a heretical sect and must be prohibited. Later on, this recommendation was also reinforced by a *fatwa* (instruction) released by MUI as a result of MUI National Conference 2005 that clarified *Ahmadiyah* as a heretical sect and deprave (MUI had instructed the deviation of *Ahmadiyah*). Since then, various violent acts against *Ahmadiyah* were conducted by various radical Islamic groups. In 2008, the Government released Joint Ministerial Decree, Minister of Religious Affairs No. 3 Year 2008, Attorney General Number Kep-

131 Habib Rizieq Syihab, *Mengadili Perjuangan pembubaran Ahmadiyah, Pledoi di Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat*, 20 Oktober 2008

132 See Habib Rizieq Syihab, *Mengadili Perjuangan pembubaran Ahmadiyah, Pledoi di Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Pusat*, 20 Oktober 2008

133 GATRA, *Marah Pada Yang Diberkahi*, 23 Juli 2005

033/A/JA/6/2006, and Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Number 199 Year 2008 concerning the A Warning and Order to the Follower, Members and/or Leading Members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyaah *Jama'at* (JAI) and to the General Public. This Joint decree became grounded persecution to *Ahmadiyah*.

It is not only communities of *Ahmadiyah* which are considered as heretical, but liberal Islamic group is also considered as heretical and apostate. Why? "The issue of *Qur'an* as The Holy Book which was descended by Allah SWT, both for its purposes and wording, and the issue of Islam as the only truthful religion and given *ridha* by Allah SWT, and the issue of *ma'sum* of Mohammed SAW are *ushul* issues which are very principle and fundamental. Hence, the *sephilis*' (secularism-pluralism and liberalism) statements of *Qur'an* was a historical and cultural product made by human, all religions are equal and truthful, and Mohammed SAW was a common man who was not perfect, could make mistake and should be criticized, considered to be a deviation against *Ushul Aqidah* (*belief system to Islam*) so that *sephilis* was heretical and out of Islam.¹³⁴

Although both sects were considered to be heretical, yet the fate of liberal Islamic group was not as bad as *Ahmadiyah*. Besides in Monas incident 2008, they did not get cruel treatment as happened to *Ahmadiyah* people. However, in 2005, liberal Islamic group got a hard knock because MUI released an instruction to forbid secularism-pluralism-liberalism religion.

4. ANTI APOSTASY

Besides *Ahmadiyah* case, other violation of *freedom of belief* cases also befall to Christian communities, particularly concerned with the existence of place of worship. Some of the actors are radical Islamic mass organizations. In some regions, those Islamic groups generally make a certain kind of Alliance of Anti-Apostasy (*Aliansi Anti Pemurtadan*). As it happens in Bekasi, they formed FAPB (*Front Anti Pemurtadan Bekasi/ Bekasi Anti Apostation Front*). In that

134 Habib Rizieq Syihab, *Mengadili Perjuangan Pembubaran Ahmadiyah*, In His Defence at District Court of Central Jakarta, Oktober 20, 2008

alliance, various radical Islamic groups were merged. For example, there are combinations of FPI Bekasi, FUI Bekasi, and others. The same thing happens in Cirebon, radical groups in this region formed an anti apostation alliance called GAPAS (*Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan dan Aliran Sesat/* Anti Apostasy and Heretical sect Movement) which in it FUI Cirebon, FPI Cirebon and others are merged.

A lot of the occlusion of churches acts is triggered by lack of information received by radical Islamic groups about Protestant rules and dynamics. They have less understanding that there are many denominations or sects in Protestant. Every denomination can only pray in their churches. They are not able to pray indifferent denomination churches. Therefore, many (different) churches were often built in one neighboring area. These church buildings installation were then assumed as attempts of Christianization, whereas there are various denominations of Protestant communities.¹³⁵

Also, those anti apostasy movements also arose as reactions to a provocative act that was conducted by neo Pantekosta group which known for its fundamentalism and militancy in spreading its religion. As happened in Bekasi on May 2010, a number of people from *Yayasan Mahanaim*, a neo Pantekosta group in Bekasi led by Iin Tjipto, participated in an anti narcotics parade and entered the yard of mosque. They made a cross formation with a stick and white sword. Besides, they also gave breads and sprinkled water to people inside the yard.¹³⁶ This act was caught on tape by a person who covered that parade, and then spread around Muslim in Bekasi. Above all, there was a case of insulting Islam and Muslim a month before in a blog site Belarminus, also in Bekasi. Within the website was written various degradations such as Mohammed was a crazy man and *Qur'an* is an abbreviation of indecent words and there were also pictures that displayed *Qur'an* being trampled and put in a water closet.¹³⁷

These acts caused fury to a variety of Islamic groups in Bekasi. FAPB then established tablig Akbar and: "*Bekasi dikepong*

135 Interview Bekasi, November 2010

136 Interview Bekasi, November 2010

137 Website Belarminus

gereja, pemurtadan merajalela dan penghinaan terhadap umat Islam makin menggila" (Bekasi is surrounded by churches, rampant heresy, and insults to Islam). The action was held on May 9, 2010 and result the *Deklarasi Umat Islam* (Declaration of Islamic community) which urged a severe punishment given to the actors of religion desecration. Yet, the issue even widen. Christian group which had nothing to do with that parade also affected. This Declaration also provided a demand to repel all churches building in Bekasi.¹³⁸

G. TACTIC AND STRATEGY

This research shows that radical Islamic groups start to arrange more sophisticated strategy and tactic. Strategy meant here is a long period planning, while tactic is the conduct of the strategy through various acts. Take *Ahmadiyah* disbandment for instance, radical groups have strategy to get supports to non radical Islamic groups like the clergies, *habaibs* and mass organizations as NU and *Muhammadiyah*. Tactic they are used is campaigning issues on how dangerous *Ahmadiyah* is to *aqidah*, so that non radical figures or groups approve an enjoinder to *Ahmadiyah* and would fight together with radical Islamic groups.

For another example, they develop strategy to gain government's support for disbanding *Ahmadiyah*. On behalf on that account, they develop a politic alliance tactic, which is radical groups support a certain of politic figure and in return, if the figure is in command, he/ she must disband *Ahmadiyah*.

At least there are five strategies which have been developed by radical groups. *First*, obtain political support from politicians and rulers. *Second*, wide spreading support from ulema institutions such as MUI. *Third*, wide spreading support from Islamic figures as ulema, *habaib*, and also Islamic mass organization. *Fourth*, use litigation advocating and non litigation strategies. *Fifth*, enforce action networks among radical groups.

138 Interview Bekasi, November 2010

1. POLITICAL ALLIANCE

Radical groups realize that they need strategy to build political support. They realized that without political support, what they fight for all this time would be useless. Like the never-ending-Amadiyah case, the government failed to release a strict rule to *Ahmadiyah*. Therefore, they develop political alliance tactic. This usually happens while there are important political events happened such as *Pemilu (General Election)* or *Pilkada (Regional General Election)*. At that time of events, both parties need each other. Political organizations and politicians need vote from radical groups, while radical groups hope their agendas will be accomplished by the candidate if he/ she win the election. There is a mutualism symbiosis formed.

As it happened in 2009 election, FUI (*Forum Umat Islam/ Islamic People Forum*) gave support to JK-Wiranto as both of them were considered pro to FUI objective which stated in *Piagam Umat Islam (Islamic People Charter)*. The Charter provides five points, which are: guarding Islamic people's *aqidah*; fighting for the application of Islamic *Shariah*; building *shariah* economical system; fighting for the escalation of Islamic people's prosperity; and opposing foreign intervention. This support was given after FUI met Jusuf Kalla at June 10th, 2009. In that meeting, Kalla clarified his commitment to protect Islamic people's *aqidah* by disbanding *heretical* sects which are deemed to stigmatize Islam, as *Ahmadiyah*. However, to other agendas, JK actually did not refuse, yet also did not give his agreement. JK also refused to sign political contract because this pair only wanted to sign political contract with political parties.¹³⁹

FUI seemed to be satisfied with JK-Wiranto commitment to disband *Ahmadiyah*. At June 25, 2009, FUI officially gave their support to the pair through an advertisement in *Republika* daily newspaper. The advertisement which had a topic of *Piagam Umat Islam (Islamic People Charter)* was signed by Muhammad Al Khaththath, and clearly mentioned FUI support and "Entrusted Islamic People Mandate to Candidate President HM Jusuf Kalla and

¹³⁹ Muhammad Al Khaththath, Menitip Amanat Kepada JK, *Suara Islam*, Edisi 70, 3-17 Juli 2009

Candidate Vice-President H Wiranto.”¹⁴⁰

A similar demeanor was also taken by FPI. JK-Wiranto pair attitude showed their commitment to disband *Ahmadiyah* made this Islamic mass organization which led by Habib Rizieq to release a declaration to support this pair. They released a support declaration to entrust a mandate which sounded as Jakarta Charter and anti *Ahmadiyah*: “The assurance of freedom to perform the religious service and *shariah* for every religions which are appropriate with each religion perceptions and prohibition to every kind of religion desecration and disgrace.”¹⁴¹

These supporting acts in election actually seemed odd, since most of radical Islamic groups perceptions look democracy as something forbidden. If they follow this point of view, the attitude taken by these radical Islamic groups should be *abstained (golput)*. Yet, it seems that these radical groups understand the political reality in Indonesia is not simple. Because of this anti-democracy can not only be applied off hand. The use and benefit consideration for their struggle must always be their top priorities. Muhammad Al Khaththath explained about this consideration: “If being *golput* can generate a *kaffah* (comprehensive) Islamic governance, which is a certainty of *'ala minhajin nubuwwah*, then it is a right decision, even it might be the only choice to Islamic people. (...) If being a *golput* turns out to close a ruler who has the closest relation with Islam and Islamic people chances to appear, it may even becomes a direct highway for a neolib regime supported by foreigners to rule and continue economical and educational colonization in this country, while declaring independence against colonization is an obligatory, then *golput* will not be a good choice for Islamic community.”¹⁴²

2. SPREADING SUPPORT FROM NON RADICAL ISLAMIC FIGURES AND MASS ORGANIZATIONS

The radical Islamic groups now more convince that they cannot

140 DPP FPI, Maklumat FPI about Indonesia presidential election 2009, 23 Juni 2009

141 DPP FPI, Maklumat FPI about Indonesia presidential election 2009, 23 Juni 2009

142 Muhammad Al Khaththath, *Menitip Amanat Kepada JK, Suara Islam*, 70th editions, 3-17 Juli 2009

fight only on their own. They seem realize that their numbers are not enough. Hence, these various Islamic groups of anti religious freedom develop spreading support from non radical Islamic figures and mass organizations strategy. Among the strategy is actively lobbying Islamic figures and *habaibs* and also various Islamic mass organizations to fight together with them. In lobbying these clergies, they commonly brings non-controversial issues and easy to accept by non radical figures and mass organizations. Anti *Ahmadiyah* issue, anti liberal Islamic and the maintenance of Islamic *Shariah* are relatively easily acceptable issues.

As it did by FUI (Islamic People Forum), at June 2008 FUI succeed to assemble about 200 clergies and *habaibs* around Indonesia in Darunnajah *Pesantren*, South Jakarta. Among them are KH Ahmad Baidhowi (NU figures from Lasem), KH Badruddin Subqy (PUI/ BKSPPI), KH Irfianda Abidin (West Sumatra Islamic *Shariah* Enforcement Committee), H Abu Bakar (MUI Fakfak, Wet Papua), *Habib* Muhammad Ali Abdurrahman Assegaf (The Honorary Committe of Indonesian Clergies), *Habib* Muchsin Alatas (Anwarul Hidayah *Ta'lim* Committee, Jakarta), Ismail Yusanto (Spokesman of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), KH Muhammad Soleh (Lombok), KH Muhammad Ma'mun (Darul Falah *Pesantren*, Serang), *Habib* Salim Al Attas (Laskar Aswaja), KH Shihabuddin (Lampung) and other figures. They were invited in term to form Dewan Kesatuan Ulama (Haiah Ittihadul al Ulama/ The Council of The Ulema Unity) Islamic people Forum.¹⁴³

In the declaration of the Council of the Ulema Unity, they made a few recommendations to the clergies and the government. They asked clergies to keep their support to the struggle of Islamic *Shariah* and also to refuse secularism, pluralism, and liberalism. While among recommendations for the government, there is : "To stop and erase immediately any secularism, liberalism, and capitalism which have clearly destroyed Indonesia and replace them with Islamic system" and "Seriously keep Muslim *aqidah* by means of releasing *Keputusan Presiden* (Presidential Decree) to disband *Ahmadiyah* and other *heretical* sects and their supporters

¹⁴³ *Suara Islam*, 27 Juni 2008 Deklarasi Dewan Kesatuan Ulama (Haiah Ittihad al-Ulama') Forum Umat Islam

(such as AKKBB)."¹⁴⁴

Besides, FUI more intensively spread its network to Islamic figures and *habaibs* with frequently visits them. This effort looks promising. FUI starts to be able to implant their influence in *habaib* realm. For example is Muhammad al Khaththath now routinely fills in books recite *Dirasat Fil Fikri Al Islami (Studi Dasar Pemikiran Islam/ Basic Study of Islamic Thought)* event every Tuesday morning in Wadi FM Radio. A Radio which its motto is *da'wah* radio with *ahlus sunah wal jamaah* (Aswaja) principle is owned by *habaib* group in Bogor.¹⁴⁵

Besides, the relationship between FUI and the *habaibs* who regularly manage *ta'lim* committee and have a lot of mass is good. For instance, FUI now close to *Habib* Salim bin Umar Al Attas, the leader of Mahabbaturrasul *ta'lim* committee which centered in Tebet, Jakarta. This *ta'lim* committee which has 18 branches in Jakarta district has *Jemaah pengajian* at around 10 thousand people. Since 2005, *Habib* Salim also has been leading a militia called *jamaah* Aswaja. This militia was intentionally formed by Indonesian *habaibs* in order to hold *Aswaja* perception (Ahlus sunah wal jamaah) which is threatened by the existence of neo *Wahabi* Group. *Laskar Aswaja* has also joined the FUI.¹⁴⁶

3. MUI (INDONESIAN ULEMA COUNCIL) INFILTRATION

Since 2005, radical groups began to see that they need the support of the ulema institution that has the supreme authority, which is MUI. They learned from experience that the various efforts to disband *Ahmadiyah* and Liberal Islamic are going nowhere. One of them is because these religious groups have less significant effect. Therefore, they develop strategies to influence the MUI.

In addition, in 2005 MUI has an increasingly strong role as the "purity of faith" institutional guardian of the Moslems. Strengthening

144 FUI, Rekomendasi Deklarasi Dewan Kesatuan Ulama (Haiah Ittihad al-Ulama') Forum Umat Islam, Jakarta, 26 Juni 2008

145 Interview with HTI member, Depok, Oktober 2010

146 Interview with HTI member, Depok, Oktober 2010

the influence cannot be separated from wider role given by the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In a speech Yudhoyono said: "We open the door of our heart and mind every time we accept the views, recommendations and *fatwas* of the MUI as well as from the ulema, either directly to me, to the Minister of Religious Affairs, or to the ranks of government to another. We want to put the MUI the central role of the Islamic faith, so we clearly differentiate which one is a state or a government territory, and when the government or the state should listen to the MUI fatwa and the ulema. "

Lack of religious authority organized by radical groups and the effect of strengthening the MUI is what make the radical Islamic groups such as the DDII, HTI and LPII and others to develop strategies to influence the MUI. Tactic used was to go into the MUI and impose their agenda on behalf of the MUI.¹⁴⁷

This tactic was first implemented in January 2005. Djamaludin Amin, chairman LPII, institutions that conduct research on the schools and the evil cult of Islam, was appointed to the MUI in a marathon meeting of *Tim Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat* (PAKEM/ Coordination Controlling Team of Societies Religion Sect) from January to May 2005. This meeting is to discuss the breakaway religious sect such as *Ahmadiyah*, Falun Gong and others. The meeting was also attended by representatives from the *Badan Intelijen Negara* (BIN/ State Intelligence Agency), Police, Religious Affairs, Ministry of the Interior; the Attorney General had reached a consensus to set the *Ahmadiyah* as a *heretical* religious sect. On May 12th, 2005 PAKEM recommendation was submitted to the President. The contents of the recommendation which states: "... We recommend to the government and the President of the Republic of Indonesia that the organization, activities, teachings and books of the Indonesian *Ahmadiyah* (*Ahmadiyah* Qadiyan) and the Indonesian *Ahmadiyah* Movement (*Ahmadiyya* Lahore) to be prohibited in all regions in Indonesia through a presidential decree."

¹⁴⁸ In this case the role of Amin Djamaludin is very big. This can

¹⁴⁷ Interview Jakarta Oktober 2010

¹⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, Implicationa of *Ahmadiyah* Decree, Update Briefing, 7 Juli 2008

be seen from considerations inside the 10-pages recommendation; many part of it referring to LPPI research, an institution led by Amin Djamaludin.¹⁴⁹

Efforts to include HTI's, LPPI's, and DDII's agenda inside MUI, s agenda also happened on the KUII (*Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia/ Indonesian Moslem Congress*) held in April 2005. During that congress, K.H Cholil Ridwan of DDII, Ismail Yusanto, Mohammed Al Khaththat from HTI, Amin Djamaludin and the others succeeded in pushing the agenda of the Islamic Syari'ah as one of the recommendations of the congress. In addition they also succeeded in positioning liberal Islamic as a latent danger and a common enemy. In the court of actual religious affairs KUII, K.H Cholil Ridwan and Prof. Ali Mustafa Yaqub called JIL (*Jaringan Islam Liberal/ Liberal Islam Network*) as the Devil Liberal Network. There is another: Satan *La'natullah* Network. This term describes a high resistance to the spread of liberal Islamic thought.¹⁵⁰

The peak of their action was on the *Munas (National Congress)* MUI the VII in July 2005. Kholil Ridwan and friends from day one has been heating the atmosphere of meetings that lasted three days. They are pushing the agenda of banning *Ahmadiyah*, liberalism and women priests in the discussion about current *fatwa* issues. Their struggle is successful, eventually the MUI issued a *fatwa haram* against pluralism, liberalism, secularism, religion and fatwa on *Ahmadiyah* which is considered "out of Islam, misguided and *heretical*, and those who follow it are apostates (out of Islam)."¹⁵¹

Not only that, DDII and friends also try to go into the formation of the body which will determine the management of MUI 2005-2010. The position they seek is the quota of four members of the formation of organizational elements. They succeeded. KH Cholil Ridwan became one of the members of the formation. There are three others, Fuad Amsyari (ICMI), Yunahar Ilyas (*Muhammadiyah*) and Amrullah Ahmad (SI). The best thing was these people are that

149 International Crisis Group, Implicationa of *Ahmadiyah* Decree, Update Briefing, 7 Juli 2008

150 GATRA, Tapal Batas Tafsir Bebas, 6 Agustus 2005

151 Fatwa Tentang Aliran *Ahmadiyah*. Munas MUI ke VII, Jakarta, 26-29 Juli 2005

they are related to DDII and close to radical groups. For example, Fuad Amsyari of ICMI is the DPP board the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (Crescent Star Party). As is known, Dr. Ahmad Amrullah of SI is an FUI (Forum umat Islam/ Islamic People Forum) activist and Yunahar Ilyas from *Muhammadiyah* is also active in the FUI. Furthermore, through a vote they could get rid of NU candidates. This is the first time NU's representative do not have a place on the formation of the body.¹⁵² Through this establishment Kholil Ridwan and his friends could make the leaders of radical organizations such as HTI and LPII to sit as a board of MUI. For example Amin Djamaludin LPPI activists, together with Ismail Yusanto succeeded in becoming a member of the research commission of MUI. Meanwhile, Mohamed Al Khaththath, a HTI figure managed to become deputy secretary of the commission of preaching of the MUI. Meanwhile KH Kholil Ridwan himself was elected as one of the chairman of the MUI.¹⁵³

But lately between MUI internal there are resistances to take a distance with radical groups which were visible on the *Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia* (Indonesian Muslim Congress 2010 a MUI's celebration every five years where FPI and HTI which were invited in the prior event, were not invited. FPI was once a bit furious and protested.

4. LEGAL ACTION AND FIELD ACTION

In recent years radical groups are developing advocacy strategies that integrate non-litigation advocacy with advocacy litigation. They seem to realize that without the support of a legal product it's hard for them to succeed. But they also realize that in order to establish a legal product that pro with the agenda it's necessary to take actions on the street that aim to push the force of law and government. Hence this litigation advocacy tactics are often done by various anti-freedom religious organizations.

As happened in Bekasi, April 2010. At the time residents were shocked with the emergence of Belarminus blog site blaspheming

152 GATRA, Interupsi Jelang Sukses, 6 Agustus 2005

153 Jakarta Interview, Oktober 2010

Islamic content. That blog also stated GMI (*Gerakan Membasmi Islam/ Exterminating Islamic Movement*), also displays photos insulting Islam. There is a photo of Al Quran is inserted into a toilet, there are also photos of a teenager stepped on Al Quran and others.

¹⁵⁴ Later it was revealed that the man in the photograph is Abraham Felix Tampubolon Gradi, a high school student of SMA 5 Bekasi. The photo was made in February 2005 with his friend Yohanes aka Joy who also an alumni of Belarminus Junior High School. The photos were then uploaded on that website. ¹⁵⁵

The emergence of the websites made a immediate reaction of the Islamic group. One night the Belarminus School was attacked by unknown persons. Fortunately, there was no further violence that occurred. Islamic groups in Bekasi agreed to take legal action and prosecute the perpetrators to the police. Not only that, to put pressure on government and law enforcement agencies to seriously deal with this case, they also do demonstrations. In May 2010 thousands of Muslims from various radical groups like FPI Bekasi, *Front anti pemurtadan* (Front Anti-Apostasy) and Bekasi's FUI came to the mayor's office. They demanded that the perpetrators will be prosecuted and punished severely. Strategy that combines legal and field/street action was relatively successful. In September 2010, the perpetrator, Abraham Felix was eventually sentenced to one year by Bekasi District Court.

Not only in Bekasi, legal action also taken by several other radical groups, such as FPI. For example, in July 2010 FPI reported Tjiptaning Ripka, Member of the Parliament from PDIP and Ulil Abshar Abdalla of JIL faction to the police, complaints for defamation of FPI. Meanwhile, in October 2010, FPI reported the Gay Film Festival organizer to the police with the accusation of disseminating pornography.

Taking legal tactics cannot be separated from the influence of TPM (Tim Pembela Muslim/ Muslim Defenders Team). TPM was established in 2002, defend many members of radical groups

¹⁵⁴ Belarminus Website

¹⁵⁵ Bekasi Interview, Oktober 2010

who were arrested, they provide education to radical groups that violence is not the only way of struggle. Legal battle could be an alternative. In the case of the previous examples Bekasi, the one who gives an understanding to the Islamic groups to take legal action is Mangara Sitompul Salih, a member of the TPM Bekasi.

On one hand, taking legal action is actually to relatively prevent violence or vigilante action carried out by radical Islamic groups, as happened in the above case. Various radical groups almost make reprisals against Christian groups. Call of jihad that has raised these groups. But the action plan can be muted. They can be convinced that violence does not solve the problem. "We provide an understanding that in order to settle the case we must adhere to the principle of solving problems without causing new problems of inter-religious violence. That is why the choice of goes to legal channels." Said Salih Mangara Sitompul, a TPM lawyer and the secretary general of *Kongres Umat Islam Bekasi* (The Moslem Congress Bekasi).¹⁵⁶

5. ACTION NETWORK BETWEEN CITIES

For a while the old radical group has been developing a strategy to build a network of action. They tried for every action of the group to be supported by other groups. The aim is to publish a stronger fighting echo, and agenda of common struggle. They think, increasingly echoed their actions and more struggle means a greater chance for success. Therefore, they developed tactics action network between cities.

For example, the action network between GARIS Cianjur with FPI. The two organizations have agreed to support each other. If there's action of FPI in Jakarta, then as much as possible GARIS will also be involved in the action. Conversely, if there's action of GARIS in West Java, FPI will also be involved in backing up this action. In between the two groups there is agreement: "If there is a FPI action in Jakarta, the FPI will be ring one and GARIS will be the ring

156 Bekasi Interview, Oktober 2010

two.¹⁵⁷ Conversely, if there is action in West Java, GARIS will be in the ring one and FPI in ring two.” It can be seen when FPI were escorting Habib Rizieq Syihab and Munarman that were ensnared on Monas incident on June 1, 2008. In each experiment, GARIS sent fifty members to regularly join the FPI actions held at the Central Jakarta District Court. This went on for several months.¹⁵⁸

Similar network of action were drawn up between the various extremist groups in West Java. For example, the case of *Ahmadiyah's* An Nur mosque in the village of Manis Lor Jalaksana, Kuningan area in July 2010. This action, led by GAPAS (Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan dan Aliran Sesat/ Anti-apostasy and anti-heretical sect movement) from Cirebon includes various radical Islamic groups from Kuningan, Cirebon, Tasikmalaya, Sindanglaut, Majalengka, Sukabumi and Cianjur. Including GARIS, who send a lot of its member to Kuningan.¹⁵⁹

H. THE DYNAMICS OF SEPARATION

Don't imagine that radical Islamic organizations are a solid organization. While they agree with the terms of the organization's vision and mission, but it is still vulnerable to disintegration. Political factors, is one of the causes of disunity. This usually happens when different political elites have different political views.

Take FPI for instance. In 1999, there is a big separation. K.H. Manarul Hidayat was out of FPI because of political affiliation with the PKB, and this action is not liked by other elites. KH Cecep Bustomi also resigned of the FPI because he chose to become an active PPP candidate. The resignation of Cecep Bustomi and Manarul Hidayat from the FPI were followed by their followers from the FPI. Cecep Bustomi even formed a new organization called Front Hizbullah.¹⁶⁰

Differences of political preferences that trigger the split also

157 Interview Cianjur, Oktober 2010

158 Interview Cianjur, Oktober 2010

159 Interview Cianjur, October 2010

160 Interview FPI Jakarta, October 2010

occurred in FUI. During the presidential election in 2009 FUI openly supported JK- Wiranto pair. One reason was this couple is willing to disband the *Ahmadiyah*. This FUI support is then conveyed to the public in the form of advertisements in the *Republika* newspaper by stating the name of FUI, including PKS; which makes PKS angry, considering from the beginning it has declared themselves as SBY party supporters. They protested, as they never joined the support meetings. PKS finally declared themselves out of FUI.¹⁶¹

At the end of 2010 FUI was once again on the verge of disintegration. FUI relationship with *Muhammadiyah* is worsening. It's not about politics, but a "slander" by the *Suara Islam* tabloid against Buya Syafii Maarif, former general chairman of *Muhammadiyah*. FUI-owned tabloid show that Buya Syafii has received a luxury apartment worth 2 Billion IDR from Bakri: "In the midst of hostility, controversy, and rejection by a man of letters to the scholar on the bestowal of Bakrie Award, the last name is Ahmad Syafii Maarif, a scholar and founder of Maarif Institute, Syafii Maarif tend to clam up ..., no longer critical after receiving a luxury apartment worth 2 billion IDR from Bakrie."¹⁶²

This accusation makes Buya Syafii instantly furious. He denied that he had received an apartment from Bakrie, he sent a summation to the *Suara Islam*, to apologize. However, this claim was rejected by the *Suara Islam*. "We print the news in the corridor of true journalism law. *Suara Islam* delivered the news using a question mark (?). Further note "according on the sources of the *Suara Islam*", as well as an efforts to take a confirmation from Syafii Maarif but he refused ", printed *Suara Islam* in their response about Buya Syafii's summation.¹⁶³ This situation damages the relationship between to FUI with *Muhammadiyah*.

161 Interview Jakarta, Oktober 2010

162 *Suara Islam*, *Multi Accident Award*, 19 November-3 December 2010

163 *Suara Islam*, *Inilah tanggapan Suara Islam atas Keberatan Syafii Maarif*, 9 Desember 2010 see <http://www.suara-islam.com/news/berita/nasional/1561-inilah-tanggapan-suara-islam-atas-keberatan-syafii-maarif>

CHAPTER V THE FACES OF THE ISLAM 'DEFENDERS'

A. FUI (ISLAMIC PEOPLE'S FORUM)

Islamic People's Forum is often called as the parent organization of Islamic radical organization because various organizations such as FPI, GARIS, MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) are joining together under it. FUI is active in carrying out intolerant actions against Ahmadiyah and *Jaringan Islam Liberal (Islamic Liberal Network)*. Although it was recently founded, but within five years, FUI is rapidly growing in many areas in Indonesia and now it has 15 branches, among others are South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, North Sumatra, South Kalimantan, etc.

Apparently, the foundation of FUI was triggered by a short article on *Newsweek* (edition of 9 May 2005) that reported *Al-Qur'an* desecration by prison officers in Guantanamo. The quarter page article wrote that the desecration was performed before the prisoner who was suspected as *Al Qaeda* member and that the investigators are often put *Al Qur'an* in the toilet; even flushing it to the toilet. The scandal raises outrage and criticism from all Muslims in the world.

In Jakarta, three activists of DDII, KH. Cholil Badawi, KH. Kholil Ridwan, Mashadi and Muhammad Al Khaththath from Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia initiated to gather Islamic mass organization and political parties to respond the desecration. After the gathering, they agreed to establish Islamic People's Forum, inters - mass organization and Islamic party. The objective is to defend Islam.

The joined mass organization and political parties, among others are as follows; DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia), KISDI, HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), Muhammadiyah, NU (Nahdlatul Ulama), Al Irsyad, Persis, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang), etc. On 23 May 2005, thousands of people were demonstrating to protest the reported *Qur'an desecration*. That was the first action of FUI.¹⁶⁴

1. ANTI ISLAM LIBERAL

After the action on May 2005, there was no news about FUI until the 5th August 2005 where they gathered the mass, demanding for disbandment of Ahmadiyah and prohibition of *Islamic Liberal Network (JIL)*. This action was aimed to defend Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) which at that time was in dispute with many Islamic Liberal groups. The trigger was MUI fatwa and recommendation about prohibition on pluralism, liberalism, secularism and its explanation about the fatwa on disbandment of Ahmadiyah¹⁶⁵; all of which were considered as violation against the freedom of religion. These decision were issued by MUI on its seventh National Conference on 32-29 July 2005.

Strong reaction against those decisions came from Ulil Abshar Abdalla, KH Abdurrahman Wahid, Dawam Rahardjo and others. Gus Dur, the Chief of *Shura (Consultation)* Council of PKB, strongly rejects the disbandment against Ahmadiyah. "This is not an Islamic State. This is a rational state," he said, "It is rational law not Islamic Law that is in effect." The loudest statement came from Dawam Rahardjo. "I say, it is the Ulema Council that is heretical," he said, "The Ulema Council is a heretical sect because they made unreasonable Fatwa."¹⁶⁶

FUI considered the reaction from Gus Dur cs was way across the

164 Discussion with HTI activist, Jakarta, November 2010

165 Fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Council about Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism of Religion, 28 July 2005 and Explanation about the Fatwa on Ahmadiyah Sect. The 7th National Conference of MUI, Jakarta, 26-29 July 2005. This explanation concerns the heresy of Ahmadiyah which was already issued on the 2nd National Conference of MUI in 1980.

166 GATRA, 6 August 2005

line. "(They) have tarnished the dignity of Islam and the Ulema, as it said by Ulil Abshar that the Fatwa of MUI is stupid and absurd.¹⁶⁷" The outrage from FUI against the liberal group was clearly shown on the Mass Religious Meeting of FUI on 5 August, where they not only assailed Ahmadiyah and Islamic Liberal group but also intended to attack Islamic Liberal Network (JIL) office in Utan Kayu, East Jakarta. Half of the Meeting participants were already reached Salemba area on their way to Utan Kayu when they finally cancelled the plan because the office was guarded by hundreds of police and outnumbered them.¹⁶⁸

2. VARIOUS ACTIONS OF FUI

FUI is not only anti Islamic Liberal but also anti Ahmadiyah. FUI often performed demonstrations, urging for the disbandment of Ahmadiyah; one of the biggest was the Rally of A Million Muslims for Disbanding Ahmadiyah, on 20 April 2008 where FUI managed to gather 100 thousands of people in Istiqlal Mosque and carried out demonstration in front of Istana Negara (State Palace). The action was considered as the biggest demonstration against Ahmadiyah in history.

Compare to other radical mass organization, FUI doesn't do much field action, but do many lobby instead, which generated many surprising success; such as the issue of MUI Fatwa concerning the prohibition of Islamic Liberal.

Since 2005, the leading figures of FUI like Kholil Ridwan, Muhammad Al Khathath, Ismail Yusanto were successful to persuade several MUI important figures, such as Ma'ruf Amin to fight against Islamic liberal group. On the periode 2005-2010 FUI was able to place/position their members in MUI; for example, Kholil Ridwan successfully became one of MUI Chairman; and Muhammad Al

167 FUI, Joint Statement of Islamic People's Forum regarding the Fatwa of Indonesian Ulama Council about the Prohibition Of Liberalism, Secularism, Pluralism, Ahmadiyah, Etc, In Order To Protect The Community. 5 August 2005

168 *Komunitas Utan Kayu*, the chronology of attack plans to *Komunitas Utan Kayu*, 5 August 2005

Khaththath became Deputy Secretary of *Da'wah (the preaching of Islam)* Commission. During the National Conference of MUI in 2005 they were actively participating to promulgate the Fatwa about the heresy of Liberal Islam. The Fatwa received no objection, even from NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) that often assumed pro Liberal Islamic movement.¹⁶⁹

This was quite absurd as we know that the idea of liberalism of Islam was frequently campaigned by Abdurrahman Wahid alias Gus Dur, a very influential figure of NU; Not to mention that there are many liberal figures were came from NU community, such as Ulil Abshar Abdalla and Ahmad Suaedy, both of them are young activists of NU.

The phenomenon was closely related to the lobbies performed by FUI figures that were successful to persuade Hasyim Muzadi, the Leader of NU at that time, to fight against Islamic Liberal group¹⁷⁰. They are also very smart in analyzing internal dynamic in NU, they knew that in 2004, the relationship between liberal Islamic movement and NU was worsening at the same time when conflict between Gus Dur and Hasyim Muzadi occurred. The worsening relation between the two NU figures was apparent on Presidential General Election in 2004. At that time Hasyim Muzadi, the Chairman of NU, was willing to be the Vice President candidate partnered with Megawati. Gus Dur was furious not only because Hasyim would cause NU get into practical politic but also because Hasyim ran for 2004 general election without asking permission from Gus Dur. Moreover, Salahudin Wahid, Gus Dur younger brother, was also running for vice president candidate partnered with Wiranto in the same year general election. The Liberal group in NU defended for Gus Dur, but the dispute continued to NU Congress in Boyolali in the end of 2004. Gus Dur refused Hasyim Muzadi second round candidacy as NU Chairman, while Hasyim Muzadi still wanted to continue his tenure as the first man in NU. Then Gus Dur and Islamic Liberal Group in NU performed a campaign *Asal Bukan Hasyim* (as long as it is not Hasyim), they proposed KH. Mustofa Bisri, father in-

169 Discussion of HTI member, Jakarta, November 2010

170 Discussion of HTI member, Jakarta, November 2010

law of Ulil Abshar Abdala, as the candidate of NU Chairman.

In the final, Hasyim Muzadi won and he continued his tenure as the chairman. The lost cost a lot for the Liberal Islamic movement because it means that they lost their 'shelter'¹⁷¹. FUI took a good advantage from this situation; they managed to persuade Hasyim Muzadi to fight together against Liberal Islam. Hasyim Muzadi agreed as he already had a plan to clear NU from liberal group, which always goes against him. That was why in National Congress of MUI in 2005, NU was also supporting the fatwa concerning the heresy of Liberal Islam.¹⁷²

But recently relationship between Hasyim Muzadi and FUI is worsening, because FUI is controlled by HTI people while Hasyim Muzadi is clearly against the trans-nationalist Islamic group, which is considered as a dangerous group. NU Mosques were also being took over by the activists of HTI, which made Hasyim Muzadi furious.

Besides the lobbying and demonstration, FUI also perform political alliance, as it happened in 2009 General Election. FUI endorsed the presidential candidate mates Jusuf Kalla – Wiranto because both of them were agreed with the Islamic People Charter drafted by FUI. This political choice indicated the consistency of FUI to organization's vision, enforcing the Islamic Law (Syariah). Endorsement from various political figures reinforced FUI, which also has close relations with politician from Gerindra. Tabrani Sabirin, Fadli Zon, and Amran Nasution are organizing and funding FUI's media, *Suara Islam (Voice of Islam)*. However in 2009 General Election, FUI did not endorse Prabowo because he refused the Islamic People Charter.

3. FUI AND HTI

At the beginning, HTI has a strong influence in FUI. Although after its foundation on May 2005, FUI Chairman was Mashadi

171 Discussion with HTI activist, Jakarta, November 2010

172 Discussion with HTI activist, Jakarta, November 2010

from DDII, but it was Muhammad Al Khaththath, FUI General Secretary, who was also the leader of HTI at that time, who has the active role in managing the organization; as it is general secretary responsibility to carry on daily task of FUI. Mashadi was too busy between completing his duty as DDII caretaker and as journalist for a magazine, called *Saksi* and a website *eramuslim.com*.

It is the great role of Al Khaththath that makes HTI very influential in FUI. Among other members, it is HTI that is actively support FUI while others are busy with their affairs. HTI acknowledged that the forum of inters - mass organization and political parties is very strategic for reinforcing the organization mission to establish *khilafah*. HTI believed that Infonesia is a potential country for enforcing *khilafah*; one of its reasons is Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world. There is hope that *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* would be successful to reinstate *khilafah* or *Darul Islam* in Malay region (Indonesia).¹⁷³ Therefore they need support from Islamic mass organization and political party in Indonesia, which at time are already joining FUI. HTI acknowledge this opportunity that through FUI they could promote the idea about *khilafah*.¹⁷⁴

Due to the strategic position of FUI then HTI allows Muhammad Al Khaththath, who was HTI Chairman at that time to have an active role in FUI. Furthermore HTI also funds FUI activities, from demonstration to routine discussion (like) *Forum Kajian Sosial Kemasyarakatan* (FKSK).¹⁷⁵ Because of the great influence of HTI, many people called that the organizer of FUI is actually HTI.¹⁷⁶

HTI influence is really obvious during the National Conference of FUI at Sentul in 2007 where FUI outlined the organization vision as: "A trustworthy Forum in synergizing all Islamic movement to establish *ukhuwah* (unity) for the establishment of Da'wah

173 Prof. Dr. Hasan Ko Nakata, *Posisi Hizbut Tahrir di Tengah Umat Islam* see <http://khilafahislam.multiply.com/journal/item/105>. Hasan Ko Nakata, is an expert about Islam from Japan, who supports HTI and Khilafah.

174 See Prof. Dr. Hasan Ko Nakata, *Posisi Hizbut Tahrir di Tengah Umat Islam* see <http://khilafahislam.multiply.com/journal/item/105>

175 Discussion with HTI member, Jakarta, November 2010

176 Prof. Dr. Hasan Ko Nakata, *Posisi Hizbut Tahrir di Tengah Umat Islam* see <http://khilafahislam.multiply.com/journal/item/105>

(the preaching of Islam) in pursuance of an Islamic way of life perfectly (*kaffah*) based on Islamic law¹⁷⁷. Meanwhile FUI mission among others are: Building the common awareness that the duty to establish Islamic way of life and reinstate *khairu ummah* in 21 century is the duty of all Muslims; Building the Islamic political awareness of the people towards an Islamic community through development, education, and building the image of Islam".¹⁷⁸

FUI elaborated this vision and mission into five basic principles, which have strong influence from HTI. *First*, Islam is the ideology. *Second*, there is only one law; it's Islamic Law (Syariah). *Third*, Islam is the only problem solving. *Fourth* is fight together to enforce Islamic Law. *Fifth*, fighting to defend and unite Islam under one Islamic leadership or *khilafah Islamiyah*.¹⁷⁹

4. THE RUPTURE IN FUI

As an organization which composes of various mass organizations and political parties, FUI always has the potency to disunity. The differences in religious understanding might be put aside but differences in strategy and political preferences might cause disunity. In August 2008, after failing to disband Ahmadiyah, FUI itself was on the point of break up due to sudden dismissal of HTI from FUI.

The decision to disjoin from FUI was actually not made by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, it was made by Hizbut Tahrir Base in Middle East. On 11th August 2008, they issued an order that command HTI to separate from FUI, with the consideration that (the joining of HTI to FUI) has violated the general guidance of Hizbut Tahrir regarding its public activity. What is it (in the guidance)? In general, the guidance stated that all FUI activities should be on the name of HTI, not the other way around. It is mentioned in the document that

177 Menyegarkan Kembali Khittah FUI, 12 November 2010, <http://suara-islam.com/news/muhasabah/komentar-mak/1412-menyegarkan-kembali-khitthah-fui->

178 Menyegarkan Kembali Khittah FUI, 12 November 2010, <http://suara-islam.com/news/muhasabah/komentar-mak/1412-menyegarkan-kembali-khitthah-fui->

179 Menyegarkan Kembali Khittah FUI, 12 November 2010, <http://suara-islam.com/news/muhasabah/komentar-mak/1412-menyegarkan-kembali-khitthah-fui->

"We must command others on our name; it should be our right to organize the action, conference or seminar on our name; and when we declare a decision, we declare it with our name." It is also stated that HTI is prohibited to join an inter – mass organization such as FUI and to involve in any public activity unless: "We lead it using our name, if we are not yet capable to do so, then we will not join with others." ¹⁸⁰

This decision raised questions: Why the restriction is issued after HTI joined FUI for three years? Why it didn't issue from the first place, as the general guidance concerning HTI public activity already exist from the beginning? The reason was because HTI consideration that FUI possesses strategic value to endorse the enforcing of *khilafah Islamiyah* in Indonesia. This consideration made HTI to support FUI in the beginning.

But the internal party of Hizbut Tahrir is anxious seeing the rapid grow of FUI, and HTI name is slowly sank. The public is more familiar with FUI than HTI, not to mention many HTI figures are using the identity of FUI in many of its activities; including Muhammad Al Khathath, the leader of HTI. Such condition seem to be reason of anxiety of Hizbut Tahrir Base, which in the end, generated decision for HTI separation from FUI. ¹⁸¹

However, many members of HTI are disobeying the instruction, including Muhammad Al Khathath. He was against the decision that he considered influenced by *ashobiyah*, meaning group fanaticism whereas according to a *hadith*, *ashobiyah* is prohibited in Islam.

Shortly after that, FUI had another problem. In the end of 2008, Mashadi resigned from his position as the Chairman of FUI and from his position as the editor in chief of *Suara Islam*. ¹⁸²

5. FROM HTI TO HDI

After Muhammad Al Khathath resigned from HTI and chose

180 The explanation letter from HTI about its withdrawal from FUI, August 2010

181 Discussion with HTI member, Jakarta, November 2010

182 Discussion with HTI member, Jakarta, November 2010

to remain active in FUI, he formed a new Islamic mass organization called HDI (*Hizbut Dakwah Islam*) where he himself becomes the *amir (leader)* of HDI. This organization was founded on September 2008 and named itself as “*An Islamic Party that fight for enforcing khilafah Islamiyyah ‘ala Manhajin Nubuwwah and mobilize the unity of all Muslim to establish Khilafah Islamiyyah.*”

Actually HDI is similar to HTI; it has the same objective and until now, HDI is still using the books wrote by HTI *Ulema*, such as Abdul Kadir Zalum, Taqiyudin Al Bani, as the manual to develop the cadres of HDI. Furthermore, HDI is also taking over HTI roles.¹⁸³

FUI was once organized by HTI, but now is organized by HDI. Muhammad Al Khaththath now becomes the Chairman of FUI after Mashadi is resigning. The role of the chairman is changing; during the tenure of Mashadi, the role of General Secretary is dominant, because it manages daily activity of the organizations, but today the responsibility is directly under the chairman, which means under command of Al Khaththath. Moreover, the position of Head of Regeneration Department of FUI and *Komando Laskar Islam (Islamic Paramilitary Troop Command)* are now belongs to *ustad HM Mursalin*. For other activities FUI cooperates with HDI; for example the study of FKSK which cooperated with HTI now cooperates with HDI. The Tabloid of *Suara Islam* is also controlled by HDI and Al Khaththath is the editor in chief; while HM Mursalin becomes the senior editor and Bernard Abdul Jabar, one of DPP HDI leader is in charge as advertising manager. Another leader of DPD HDI, *ustad Abu Saad*, is regularly writing for the Khutbah column in *Suara Islam*.¹⁸⁴

FUI has successfully expanded to several regions in Indonesia. Right now, there are 15 branches which among others are located in South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, North Sumatera, South Kalimantan, West Java, Bogor, and Bekasi. An interesting fact is the regional FUI are led by HDI people/members. For instance, FUI Bekasi is led by Bernard Abdul Jabar while FUI Pasuruan is led by Rochmat

183 Discussion with HTI member, Jakarta, November 2010

184 Interview with HTI activist, Jakarta, November 2010

Aminudin, Head of HDI Pasuruan.¹⁸⁵

6. THE POWER OF FUI NETWORK

One of the strength of FUI is its network, between FUI figures like Muhammad Al Khathath with other Islamic figures, either from radical group or not. This network is often used to get facilities or performed lobbying and demonstrations. For example, due to FUI close relations with DDII figures, FUI benefited an office space from DDII in its Dakwah Building on Jalan Kramat Raya. FUI relationship with KH Mahrus Amin, the leader of *pesantren Darunnajah*, Jakarta, also enables FUI to carry out its activities at the *pesantren*. For instance to held *muzakarah (discussion) of Ulema* that generated *Dewan Kesatuan Ulam (Haiah Ittuhadul al Ulama')*, the Islamic People's Forum was using *pesantren Darunnajah*.¹⁸⁶

FUI also has close relations with KH Syukron Ma'mun, leader of *pesantren Daarul Rahman* and KH Abdul Rasyid Abdullah Syafi'i, leader of *pesantren As Syafiyyah*. Both of them are regularly writing for the rubric *Titian Wahyu* in *Suara Islam*, FUI tabloid. Not to mention FUI good association with MUI leaders, among others are Ma'ruf Amin, Kholil Ridwan and KH Amrullah Ahmad, which allow FUI, as a radical mass organization to participate in the Indonesian Islamic People's Congress 2010, held by MUI. Whereas FPI and HTI who were invited in the same congress in 2005, were no longer invited because both organization are considered as radical.¹⁸⁷

FUI association with H Chep Hernawan, leader of GARIS and FPI leader, Habib Rizieq, facilitates FUI to assemble the mass for conducting demonstration. Almost in every demonstration, FUI is mobilizing the mass from GARIS and FPI.

These associations with many figures have allowed FUI in implementing many activities including the lobbying to develop FUI network, for instance to build network among the *habaib group*; FUI

185 Interview with HTI activist, Jakarta, November 2010

186 Interview with HTI activist, Jakarta, November 2010

187 Interview with HTI activist, Jakarta, November 2010

was supported by Habib Rizieq and now it has developed relations with Habib Salim bin Umar Al Attas, leader of *Majelis Taklim Mahabbaturrasul* who is also the leader of *Laskar Aswaja* which now is joining FUI. Due to its relationship with *habaib*, Muhammad Al Khatthath has a regular show on Wadi FM radio, which belongs to *habaib* group in Bogor; the motto of this *da'wah* radio is based on *ahlus sunah wal jamaah* (Aswaja).

B. ISLAMIC DEFENDERS FRONT (FPI)

Who doesn't know FPI? This is the biggest Islamic radical mass organization, led by Habib Rizieq Syihab with branches in 28 provinces and claimed to have four million members.¹⁸⁸ Maybe because of its brutality in performing the raid of anti-immoral and Ahmadiyah, the actions of FPI have always drawn mass media and public attention.

The violent character of FPI is influenced by its founders. There are 20 of them which among others are Habib Rizieq, KH Misbahul Anam, KH Cecep Bustomi, and Habib Idrus Jamalullail, all of whom are extreme *mubalig* in Jakarta. For example, Idrus Jamalullail and Cecep Bustomi were in prison during the New Order in the mid 80-s because of their *da'wah criticism* against the government of President Suharto. On 17th August 1998, these *Mubalig* gathered at *Pesantren Al Um*, Kampung Utan, Ciputat, South Jakarta where they declared the National Movement of Anti-Immoral and established a new organization called Islamic Defenders Front with Habib Rizieq as the leader.

FPI was founded only three months after the fall of Soeharto on May 1998. While other community elements called for political, economic or legal reformation, FPI called for moral reformation. "The crisis of this nation is started from the moral crisis," said the leader of FPI, Habib Rizieq.¹⁸⁹

188 <http://sorot.vivanews.com/news/read/161961--liberalisme-dan-komunisme-itu-satu-paket->

189 GATRA, No 5 Thn 7, 15 December 2000

1. FIGHTING THE INJUSTICE (KEMUNGKARAN) WITH HANDS

FPI mission is to perform *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* (spread the righteousness and prevent injustice). The reason is because: FPI the rampant of immorality like prostitution, gambling and alcohol in Jakarta; all of which are considered harmful to the moral and *aqidah* of the Muslims. However, the law enforcement after reformation is weak and unable to handle those immoralities. Thus, FPI was founded as the anti-immoral organization that tries to take over the authority of legal officers in maintaining order.

FPI main inspiration is Prophet *hadith* that says, "if (you) saw the injustice, fight it by your hand, if (you) can't, do it by your words, and if (you) still unable, do it by your heart, but it is the weakest (form) of faith." FPI doesn't want to be considered as having the weakest faith, therefore it choose to fight the injustice by hands or physical strength.

However, FPI actually sees and confess that the fighting against the injustice is only a strategy to reach a higher goal which is enforcing the Islamic Law (Syariah). There are other strategies but they chose the first one because, "when FPI was established in 1998, there wasn't an Islamic mass organization that enforce *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar* in a concrete and firm manner."¹⁹⁰

2. LASKAR PEMBELA ISLAM (ISLAMIC DEFENDERS PARAMILITARY TROOP)

FPI front liner in carrying the action against the injustice is Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI) that carries the physical pressure in their activity. LPI performed many violence action such as raid to 'immoral' places and assault against the group which was considered heretical and desecrate Islam, such as Ahmadiyah.¹⁹¹

¹⁹⁰ DPP FPI, Profile of Islamic Defenders Front, 12 July 2008. See on <http://fpjakpus.blogdetik.com/2008/07/12/front-pembela-islam-fpi-merupakan-pressure-group-bagi-para-pengelola-negara-agar-berinisiatif-menerapkan-nilai-nilai-islam-dalam-kehidupan-sosial-dan-bernegara/>

¹⁹¹ But after the Tsunami in Aceh in 2004, the paramilitary troop

LPI is a part of FPI, each *jundi* (name for *laskar* member which means troop), is FPI member, but not all of FPI members are LPI members. Each level of FPI management has its own *laskar* (paramilitary troop) with different rank level. In DPP (Base), LPI is commanded by a commander while LPI at the level of DPD province is led by a regional commander. Meanwhile in DPW Regency/City, the *laskar* are led by a *wali*, and at DPC District level, the *jundi* is commanded by a *qoit*. The lowest level is a command post that led by an *amir*.¹⁹²

Don't imagine LPI organized as a professional military organization; Even the Member Card has not being managed yet." I joined LPI around the end of 2006, but I haven't got any member card, but I can be called as a member because I always present in the *pengajian* (*Qur'an Recitation*)." It is also easy to leave LPI, if one is no longer active and rarely participate in an activity held by the organization, one can be considered as quitting. There is no sanction for those who quit. Another example is unclear procedure on the transfer of a *Laskar* member from branch to base/HQ level. A member in the level DPC may easily transfer to be a member of LPI DPP only changing the *pengajian*, from *pengajian* DPC to one of Habib Rizieq in FPI HQ in Petamburan; if one is active in the HQ, one could automatically becomes the member of the *laskar* of FPI HQ.¹⁹³

How could someone join the *laskar* member? It's not difficult, one should only be the member of FPI, after that follow three days of semi military training and education which is usually held in *Bumi Perkemahan Karang Fitri Bekasi*. There are considerable numbers of participants, around 200 people, trained by 10 coaches¹⁹⁴. In this training, the candidates are trained for physical skill, martial art and religion understanding, after finishing the training, the candidates must declare a *baiat* (pledge), "ready to leave immorality, defend

of FPI is not only involved in physical confrontation but it began to be deployed to disaster areas as volunteers.

192 Record of Interview (Investigation) of Raflin alias Opin, Polda Metro Jaya, 8 June 2008.

193 Record of Interview (Investigation) Sunarto bin Wagiman alias Syamsudin, Polda Metro Jaya, 8 June 2008.

194 Record of Interview (Investigation) of Sudirah bin Sobri alias Abdul Halim, Polda Metro Jaya, 8 June 2008

the oppressed Muslim, and die *syahid*, in the name of Allah.”¹⁹⁵

But in the practice, a *laskar* is not mandatory to participate in the training; the policy often depends on the management. For example is Sunarto, a taxi driver from Cileungsi who joined without following the training. He was offered by the Head of DPC to join as *laskar* and he accepted, after that he declare the pledge, and filled in a form followed shortly by receiving a member card signed by the Head of DPC Cileungsi.¹⁹⁶

3. VARIOUS SOCIAL GROUP

There are many kinds of groups assembled, from *ulema and habaib* to general public, to be more specific, there are at least four social group assembled in FPI and each has its own roles.

First group is the elite, *ulama* and *habaib*, they occupy high positions and have authority to develop the organization agenda.¹⁹⁷ This group holds the position in *Majelis* (council) *Syuro*, or occupies daily administration position in DPP FPI, such as chairman, general secretary, and section head. Those who are parts of these elite are KH Abdul Hamid Baidhowi, the leader of *pesantren* Al Wahdah, Lasem becomes the head of *Majelis Syuro*, Habib Rizieq Syihab becomes the chairman, KH Ahmad Sobri Lubis as the general secretary of FPI. KH Misbahul Anam, the leader of *pesantren Al Um* is now the secretary of *majelis syuro*, and Habib Muhsin Alatas, the leader of *majelis taklim Anwarul Hidayah* becomes the section head of Da'wah (the preaching of Islam).¹⁹⁸

The second class consists of the intellectuals of FPI who mostly university graduates, students, or campus activists. They joined FPI because they have high *ghiroh* of Islam and feel that FPI is the Islamic organization that defends and care with Islam and

195 Record of Interview (Investigation) Sunarto bin Wagiman alias Syamsudin, Polda Metro Jaya, 8 June 2008.

196 Record of Interview (Investigation) Sunarto bin Wagiman alias Syamsudin, Polda Metro Jaya, 8 June 2008.

197 Al Zastrouw Ng, Gerakan Islam Simbolik, 2006, LKI Yogyakarta.

198 Discussion with FPI member, Jakarta, October, 2010

its community so then they feel necessary to be actively involved in it¹⁹⁹. Usually they involve in the departments that do not handle religion matters, such as in communication, economic and finance department.²⁰⁰

The third group is the *lascar* (*paramilitary troop*); most of whom comes from lower social class with low education background. Some of them are ex – thugs who are particularly developed by FPI. “Religion is not only for those who already have faith, who only active in the mosque and recite the *qur'an*. Hence, we invite thugs and street children to be actively involved in FPI, to be developed and directed based on their talents and characteristics.²⁰¹” FPI uses one of their talents (capacity) as *Laskar Pembela Islam* (*Islamic Defenders Troop*).

The last group is the low class society such as small entrepreneur, low class employees, etc, who usually called as ordinary member of FPI²⁰². They interested to join because they interested with the preaching given by FPI figures, and with the *habaib*; one of them said that, “*Karena ane Betawi, ya ane tertarik bergabung dengan FPI karena dipimpin oleh habaib, keturunan Nabi, ya langsung percaya aja, gitu—* because I’m betawinese, I’m interested to join with FPI, because it was led by the *habaib*, the descendant of the Prophet, that’s all—”²⁰³

Among the fourth classes, it is the first social class, with very few numbers of *habaib* and the *ulema* that lead organization agenda. Their subordinates will always follow their instruction because it is considered for the sake of the religions and for protecting the honor and dignity of Islam and the Muslims.

This situation makes FPI vulnerable to be used; due to personnel relations between the elite of FPI with certain party who has political or economic interest, FPI often endorsed this certain party. For example is the relation between Habib Rizieq with

199 Al Zastrouw Ng, Gerakan Islam Simbolik, 2006, LKI Yogyakarta.

200 Discussion with FPI member, Jakarta, October, 2010

201 Al Zastrouw Ng, Gerakan Islam Simbolik, 2006, LKI Yogyakarta.

202 Al Zastrouw Ng, Gerakan Islam Simbolik, 2006, LKI Yogyakarta.

203 Alip Purnomo, FPI Disalahfahami (2003), Mediatama Indonesia, Jakarta.

ex – generals such as Jaja Suparman and Wiranto. In 2000, when Wiranto was going to be investigated by National Commission for Human Rights (Komnas HAM) on the case of human rights violation in East Timor, the FPI mob besieged Komnas HAM office.²⁰⁴ Again, in General Election 2004, FPI endorsed Wiranto and mobilized its *da'i* (missionary) in the regions to discredit SBY, who they considered as the strongest political opponent of Wiranto.²⁰⁵

FPI is not only vulnerable to be used but also to disintegration when the few numbers of *ulema and habaib* have their own political or economic agenda. For instance, KH Cecep Bustomi, the founder of FPI, who resigned from the organization he founded because he wanted to be active in PPP; it caused disputes between other *ulema and habaib* who have different political agenda. Cecep Bustomi was followed by his members and they formed a new group called Front Hizbullah.²⁰⁶

4. THE ANTI-IMMORAL MOVEMENT

In the beginning, FPI was known as an anti-immoral movement; conducted sweeping and raid bars, gambling and prostitution places. During 1998-2002, FPI performed dozen of *sweeping* to night clubs, which mostly conducted during the *Ramadhan*. There was 20 sweeping during Ramadhan carried out by FPI in 2002.²⁰⁷ But lately, the intensity of its violence is decreasing and FPI showed its new image as anti – freedom of religion movement; they performed more action against Ahmadiyah or Christian than attacking night clubs or brothel.

As FPI considered that the violence action against anti-immoral was too risky; one of it was horizontal conflict against the society who refused such actions. Some members of FPI confessed that the sweeping performed in the areas of Bongkaran, Tanah Abang, Tanjung Priok and Senen were resisted by the locals.²⁰⁸

204 Discussion with FPI member, Jakarta, October, 2010

205 Discussion with FPI member, Jakarta, October, 2010

206 Discussion with FPI member, Jakarta, October, 2010

207 Andri Rosadi, Hitam Putih FPI, 2008 Nun Publisher, Jakarta, hal 90

208 Andri Rosadi, Hitam Putih FPI, 2008 Nun Publisher, Jakarta, hal 90

Not to mention that the violence action risked their lives or imprisonment like what had happened to FPI advisor, Habib Soleh Alatas; who was shot and killed after the *sweeping*.²⁰⁹ There is also legal risk, in 2002 there were many FPI members got arrested including Habib Rizieq, in the mid of October 2002. The formal accusation was based on his instruction to destroy the places and slander to state officials in a TV Interview by stating "the Governor is deaf, DPRD (People's Representative Council) is stone deaf, and the cops are null".²¹⁰

The arrest of Habib Rizieq was also related to Bali Bombing I on 12 October 2002. This brutal action had made the government lost their tolerance against radical group like FPI, not to mention international pressure to Indonesian government which forced them to take serious action against radical group. Therefore, Habib Rizieq was arrested, only four days after the Bali bombing incident.²¹¹

The latter incidents led to the suspension on FPI activities. On November 2002, the management of DPP FPI at last issued the dissolution of *Laskar Pembela Islam*. During the suspension period, FPI performed the improvement which one of it is the policy for not conducting any action unless the locals ask them to. In 2003 and 2004 there were few *sweeping* conducted by FPI. There were two in 2004, where FPI performed the *sweeping*, around the Senayan area assumed as a casino and at a bar in Kemang area.²¹² FPI carried out more demonstrations with various issues ; supporting Tempo that was in dispute against Tommy Winata in 2003, rejecting the visit of President Bush to Indonesia in 2004. And started on the end of 2004 until mid 2005 FPI had more activities in Aceh where they deployed volunteers to assist corpse evacuation of Tsunami's victim.²¹³

209 Discussion with FPI member, Jakarta, October, 2010

210 http://www.gatra.com/2003-08-04/versi_cetak.php?id=30345

211 See Ian Wilson, *The Changing Contours of Organised Violence in Post New Order Indonesia*, February 2005, Asia Research Centre Murdoch University, Australia

212 FPI, *Sejarah Perjuangan FPI dan LPI, 1998-2008*, Juni 2008

213 FPI, *Sejarah Perjuangan FPI dan LPI, 1998-2008*, Juni 2008

5. BECOMES ANTI AHMADIYAH

In August 2005, FPI displayed its new imaged; an anti-immoral movement and anti – freedom of religion group. FPI joined Islamic People's Forum (FUI) and started the actions anti - Ahmadiyah and anti liberal Islam. This changes is related with the recommendation of Attorney General concerning the heresy of Ahmadiyah in the early 2005, followed by the Fatwa and Indonesian Ulama Council recommendation concerning the heresy of Ahmadiyah and Liberal Islam on July 2005.

FPI is broaden the definition of injustice beyond the matters of alcohol, gambling, or prostitution but applies also to denomination/ sect considered as heretical and desecrate Islam like Ahmadiyah. On July 2005, the FPI mass assembled with the *Gerakan Umat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic People's Movement)* forcibly shutdown the base of Ahmadiyah in *Mubarak* campus, Parung, Bogor. Early on August 2005, hundreds of *laskar FPI* that assembled with FUI, once planned to attack the base of liberal Islam in Utan Kayu, but failed.

In 2006-2007, the image of FPI as anti-immoral movement reappeared; it was related with the publishing of Playboy magazine Indonesia and the argument on Legislation Draft regarding anti – pornography and pornactions. Temporarily the matters concerning Ahmadiyah and other heretical sects were abandoned until the end of 2007. The trigger was the 12 points of explanation from Ahmadiyah Indonesia about their teachings which did not satisfy Indonesian Ulama Council and other radical groups, including FPI, which remained with their judgment that Ahmadiyah must be disbanded.

To fulfill this demand, the government formed an observation team of Ahmadiyah for ensuring whether those 12 points of explanation were performed or not; but it was still dissatisfying for FPI cs, and the latter continue its action to disband Ahmadiyah. On February 2008, during a Mass Religious Meeting in Banjar, KH Shobri Lubis, manager of DPP FPI declared war against Ahmadiyah. "We declare war to Ahmadiyah, kill Ahmadis, wherever they are, kill

Ahmadis, kill Ahmadis!!”²¹⁴

The situation was worsening after on April 2008, the Coordinating Body for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakorpakem) issued the statement that JAI had not performed the twelfth points in a “consistent and responsible”, way and had “performed a deviate activities and religious interpretation from the principles of Islamic teachings applied in Indonesia, and had cause social disturbance and conflict”²¹⁵. Bakorpakem meeting result also recommended government to issue a Joint Decree in accordance with Law No. 1 PNPS Year 1965 concerning religion desecration, warned JAI to stop its activity and if it disobeys the order and warning, JAI will be disbanded.

The recommendation from Bakorpakem motivated FPI and other groups; the actions on the street organized by radical groups were escalating and on 20 April 2008 *Laskar Pembela Islam (LPI)* assembled with thousands of FUI people to held mass rally with the slogan “Disband Ahmadiyah! At all costs!”

But the action received resistance and on 10 May 2008, The National Alliance for the Freedom of Faith and Religion (AKKBB) published one full page of statement in several newspapers in Jakarta, “Indonesia guarantees the freedom of religion for its citizen. The right is guaranteed by the Constitution. It is also the base of national principle *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). However, recently there are groups of people who try to expunge this right and threat the unity. They also spread hatred and fear among society. They even used violence, as it occurred against the Ahmadis who already exists since 1925 in Indonesia and live side by side with other people (...) Let’s protect our republic. Let’s preserve the rights. Let’s restore the unity.”²¹⁶ The statement was signed by Muslim intellectuals, journalist, members of People’s Representative Council, Human Rights activists including liberal Islam figures such as, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Gus Dur and many more.

²¹⁴ “Khotbah Yang Mencoreng Citra Islam”, <http://youtube.com/watch?v=U7RLCXNdKF4>.

²¹⁵ ICG, Indonesia: Implication of Ahmadiyah Decree, 7 July 2008

²¹⁶ AKKBB, Mari Pertahankan Indonesia Kita, 20 May 2008

FPI was furious against the statement issued by AKKBB; Munarman, FUI activists who was also former Head of YLBHI (Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation) said that: "What AKKBB did was a provocation to confront Islam!" The dispute between AKKBB and FPI reached the climax in the bloody incident at Monas on 1st June 2008. The mass of AAKBB who were protesting against Joint Decree concerning Ahmadiyah were attacked by the *Komando Laskar Islam* and LPI; there are dozens of casualties from AKKBB most of whom were mothers and children.

It fired back to FPI and its allies; Habib Rizieq Shihab was arrested along with Munarman as the commander of *Komando Laskar Islam*. On October 2008, the Judges in Central Jakarta District Court passed 1,5 years of sentenced for the two of them.

6. PARTAI REVOLUSI ISLAM (ISLAMIC REVOLUTION PARTY)

Few days after the incident in Monas, the government promulgated the Joint Decree concerning Ahmadiyah which not ordered disbandment on Ahmadiyah but more like a warning, "Warned and ordered all followers and caretakers of *Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI)* as long as they are Muslims, to stop all of activities that deviate from Islamic Teachings, like acknowledging another (last) Prophet other than Muhammad SAW."²¹⁷ FPI was frustrated. "The Joint Decree issued by the government was null!!" yelled Habib Rizieq.²¹⁸ The frustration to government was escalating as he himself was imprisoned for masterminding Monas incident.

FPI was also disappointed by the Islamic party that doesn't do much. How could they enforce Islamic Law (*Shariah*) if they can't press the government to disband Ahmadiyah.²¹⁹ The disenchantment was obviously expressed in National Conference II FPI on December 2008 in Bogor. "It is *Haraam (forbidden)* to elect a political party,

217 Joint Decree of Minister of Religious Affairs, Attorney General and Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia Number 3 Year 2008, Number: Kep-033/A/JA/6/2008, Number:199 Year 2008, about Government Warning to the Follower, Member and or Lead Member of Indonesian Ahmadiis (JAI) and the Public, Jakarta, 9 June 2008

218 Suara Islam, Edisi 46, 20 June-3 July 2008

219 Discussion with FPI member, Jakarta, October, 2010

legislative (senator), president or vice president candidates, who don't support the disbandment of Ahmadiyah or (groups) who oriented in secularism, pluralism, and liberalism (*sepilis*), including SBY – JK, if they won't disband Ahmadiyah or continue to let the *sepilis* desecrate and tarnish Islam," exclaimed Habib Rizieq from the prison. Based on this disenchantment, the conference issued a recommendation, "Reviewing the establishment of Islamic Party under FPI control, with main objective is implementing Islamic Law perfectly in Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia."²²⁰

The longing to found a political party was escalating after Islamic parties had bad performance in the 2009 General Election. It obtained not more than 29 percent of votes and not even abled to propose any president and vice president candidates; but what made FPI so furious was the Islamic parties like PPP and PKS that endorsed SBY. "Low and despicable! Very disgusting!" exclaimed Habib Rizieq.²²¹ This condition motivates FPI to seriously review the development of a political party; according to the plan, the party will be named as *Partai Revolusi Islam (PRI) – Islamic Revolution Party*.

C. GARIS (ISLAMIC REFORMIST MOVEMENT)

This is the radical Islamic mass organization *made in* Cianjur; founded by H. Chep Hernawan, originally from and reside in Cianjur. The party has branches in some cities in West Java, like Bandung, Garut, Sukabumi etc. GARIS claims to have thousands members. They claimed to have 28 thousands members in Cianjur and 5 thousands in Sukabumi.²²² Many violence conducted by this organization had raised its name as one of radical groups in West Java. The last action was on 4th December 2010, when they dispersed the National Workshop (*Mukernas*) of Ahmadiyah in Hotel Setia, Cipanas, Cianjur.

²²⁰ FPI, Statement to the Press about the 2nd National Conference of FPI, Jakarta 11 December 2008

²²¹ Suara Islam, Edisi 70, 3 June-17 July 2009

²²² Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

GARIS was founded under the bustle of reformation era in 1998. After the fall of Soeharto, various (orientation) political parties that were banned during the regime of Soeharto began to go public including party with communist ideology. For instance PRD (Democratic People's Party) that was banned under the regime of New Order, is officially acknowledged as political party by the government in reformation era. This condition is worrying for some Muslims figures such as Anwar Haryono and Husein Umar, both from DDII (*Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation*); they asked Chep Hernawan, the businessman from Cianjur, an ex – activist of GPI (Youth Islamic Movement) to establish a new Islamic mass organization which was accepted by Chep Hernawan. He later founded GARIS in Cianjur.²²³

But for some years the organization was inactive because Chep Hernawan was busy in Jakarta, managing *Partai Bulan Bintang* together with Yusril Ihza Mahendra and MS Kaban; often called as *Pak Haji*, Chep Hernawan was one of the key figures in this party, as he held the position as treasury. In 2000, along with the party, he fought for incorporating Jakarta Charter to the amendment of the Constitution of 1945. But it failed and in 2001 he resigned from PBB, one of his reason was his disappointment towards Yusril Ihza Mahendra, who was managed to be Minister of Justice and Human Rights, but instead of fighting for enforcing Islamic Law (*Shariah*), he was assumed for conducting corruption. Then, Chep Hernawan preferred to managed GARIS.²²⁴

1. GARIS AND GERBANG MARHAMAH

In 2001, the local politic situation in Cianjur was very advantageous for Islamic mass organization like GARIS, because at that time, Wasidi Swastomo, the disciple of Kyai Dadun Kohar, became the new Regent of Cianjur. Kyai Dadun Kohar is a figure of *Persatuan Islam (Persis)* in Sukabumi, known for his viewpoint about the purification of religion. His influence on Wasidi was

223 Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

224 Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

obvious when the latter issued policy that prohibits the spectacle of *kuda kosong* and visiting ritual to ancestor grave or sacred places, because it considered as *musyrik*.²²⁵ Wasidi also proposed the implementation of Islamic Law (*Shariah*) by developing the *akhlaq* (Islamic virtue/morality) which is known as "*Gerbang Marhamah*" an acronym from 'Development of a Noble Society'. *Gerbang Marhamah* is used as political campaign tool for obtaining support from Islamic groups which was immediately welcomed, including by GARIS. On 26th March 2001, these Islamic mass organization declared a pledge, one of the points are, "Supporting the noble will from the Regent of Cianjur, period 2001-2006 to enforce Islamic Law in the Regency of Cianjur."²²⁶

The Pledge was responded by the Regent by forming the Islamic Research and Study Institute (LPPI) through the Decree of Cianjur Regent No. 34/2001. The institute has full authority in interpreting the ideas of *Gerbang Marhamah* into the set of technical regulation that would become the reference for Provincial Government and People's Representative Council in legislation process. In 2002, the result from LPPI research becomes strategic plan and uses as the official guideline for the government of Cianjur Regency in enforcing Islamic social regulation in Cianjur.²²⁷

This local politic situation motivated Chep Hernawan to 'reactivate' GARIS, after failing to enforce the Islamic Law (*Shariah*) in Jakarta, he saw the opportunity in his own hometown. *Gerbang Marhamah* is used by GARIS to justify the anti-immoral action in Cianjur in the name of *akhlaq* (Islamic virtue/morality). That was why in the early mid 2000-s GARIS image was similar to FPI, as the anti-immoral group.

225 Amin Muzakir, *Politik Muslim dan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Kasus Cianjur dan Tasikmalaya*. This article was represented on the 9th International Seminar of Yayasan Percik, "Politik Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, dan Ruang/Space dalam Dinamika Politik Lokal di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara, Salatiga, 15-18 July 2008

226 Joint Declaration of Muslim Community in Cianjur Regency, 26 March 2001, read by KH. R. Abdul Halim, Chief of MUI Cianjur on behalf of Cianjur Muslim Community.

227 Amin Muzakir, *Politik Muslim dan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Kasus Cianjur dan Tasikmalaya*. This article was represented on the 9th International Seminar of Yayasan Percik, "Politik Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, dan Ruang/Space dalam Dinamika Politik Lokal di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara, Salatiga, 15-18 July 2008

2. THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHAIRMAN AND FRATERNITY ORGANIZATION

The policy of GARIS is made by H. Chep Hernawan as the chairman; it is understandable as he is the founder of this mass organization, he also finances its daily operation due to his capacity as the businessman of property and plastic (recycle). GARIS HQ located in Chep Hernawan resident on Jl. Ariawiratanudatar No. 4-6 Cianjur.

His full authority as the chairman is obviously reflected from the organization structure of GARIS. All of its daily caretakers are friends of Chep Hernawan. No wonder if this organization is called as fraternity organization. Yayan Hendrayana, the deputy chairman, who was an ex – political prisoner of Tanjung Priok case is an old friend of Chep Hernawan in PTDI (Islamic Da'wah (the preaching of Islam) College) in Tanjung Priok, likewise Sugianto, who occupies the public relation of GARIS, is also Chep Hernawan friend in PTDI.

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The fraternity atmosphere is also reflected in *Dewan Syuro (High Council)* which its members includes Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abdul Kadir Djaelani, Ahmad Sumargono and Kholil Ridwan who are all old friends of Chep Hernawan. Abdul Kadir Djaelani, is Chep Hernawan mentor in GPI Jakarta in 80-s. When Chep Hernawan was active in GPI, he often visited DDII where he met Ahmad Sumargono and Kholil Ridwan.²²⁹

Chep Hernawan is known as faithful and compassionate to his friends; for example, he was upset to Yayan Hendrayana, who reconciled with Try Sutrisno in Tanjung Priok case and received IDR 400 million, which he used to remarry again two years later. However, Chep Hernawan couldn't see Yayan lived in misery, so he supported Yayan economically and invited him to be active in GARIS.

228 Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

229 Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

Chep also gave his place in DPR in 1999 to his ex – mentor, Abdul Kadir Djaelani because the latter did not get enough votes from the Muslim in the General Election despite the fact that he had fought and sentenced to prison several times. Actually as the treasury and the third figures after Yusril and MS Kaban in the party, it was Chep who merited for replacing Yusril as the member of DPR RI in 1999.²³⁰

GARIS is not an ordinary mass organization. Usually, an organization held a congress to elect new lead members but in GARIS, such mechanism is not applied. A person can be a lead member forever as long as he doesn't deviate from Islamic Law (*Shariah*), Chep Hernawan himself is the Chairman of GARIS for life.²³¹

3. ANTI AHMADIYAH AND CHRISTIAN

GARIS is also popular as an anti Ahmadiyah and anti Kristen organization. "Ahmadiyah and unofficial Church are our 'food,'" said Chep Hernawan.²³² GARIS declared itself as anti freedom organizations in 2005. On 19 September 2005, hundreds of people of GARIS attacked four villages of Ahmadi in Cianjur which are Panyairan, Cicakra, Neglasari and Ciparay. Around 43 houses, four mosques, three *madrasah (school)*, five stalls and stores were destroyed including the chicken stall. The action against Ahmadiyah hit its momentum in 2005 after at the end of July that year, Indonesian Ulama Council issued the Fatwa about the heresy of Ahmadiyah.

The local politic situation in Cianjur at that time was conducive for performing action against Ahmadiyah because Wasidi, the Regent of Cianjur who was known for his extreme religious viewpoint, was going to run again for regional general election 2006 in Cianjur. He needed political endorsement from Islamic groups that in majority are anti Ahmadiyah, thus, ten days after the assault and demolition

²³⁰ Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

²³¹ Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

²³² Suara Islam Edisi 103, 17 December-7 January 2011

to the Ahmadis properties, Wasidi promulgated a Joint Decree that ban the activity of Ahmadiyah in Cianjur. Wasidi claimed that the decree was drafted after having a meeting with Indonesian Ulama Council and with around 40 Islamic organizations in Cianjur.²³³

After attacking Ahmadiyah, GARIS attacked the Christians; the most popular action was the assault to *Lembah Karmel* in Babakan Hilir, Cianjur on July 2007. *Lembah Karmel* is a religious tourist site, one of a location of hermitage for one of Catholic Order. This radical mass organization mobilized thousands of people to disperse the international conference and reunion of *Tritunggal Mahakudus* community, which was planned to be attended by 2.500 and held by the end of July. This vigilant action was successfully cancelled the conference. The assault was triggered by a rumor that *Lembah Karmel* is a place for a secret organization that plan to Christianize Indonesia. The rumor was "The target is christianizing 75 percent of Indonesians."²³⁴

Intolerant approach of GARIS is influenced by its leader who has close relations with DDII figures such as, Kholil Ridwan cs who also has an intolerant viewpoint. Since its establishment in 1967, DDII is actively campaigning about the danger of Christianization. DDII has also initiated the campaign of disbandment of Ahmadiyah a long time ago. The mass organization that was founded by M. Natsir, organized an international conference with LPPI on August 2002, with the theme "The Heresy of Ahmadiyah and its dangerous". It was attended by several foreign *Ulema* such as, Hasan Audah from Britain and Hafidz Abdur Rasyid Azhar from Pakistan. Kholil Ridwan, the figure of DDII who later becomes a member of *Dewan Syuro* of GARIS read the recommendation drafted in that conference; one of the points stated that Ahmadiyah is heretical sect and deviates from *aqidah*; urged the government to shutdown all Ahmadis places of worship and seized its assets.²³⁵

233 Amin Muzakir, Politik Muslim dan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Kasus Cianjur dan Tasikmalaya. This article was represented on the 9th International Seminar of Yayasan Percik, "Politik Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, dan Ruang/Space dalam Dinamika Politik Lokal di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara, Salatiga, 15-18 July 2008

234 Sabili edisi 24 tahun XIV, 14 June 2007

235 Sabili edisi 04 tahun X 5 September 2002

4. TRAINS MEMBERS TO BE LIKE IMAM SAMUDERA

If there was a competition for the most extreme radical mass organization, GARIS would become the winner; whereas most of radical mass organization opposed terrorism, GARIS sympathized for it. In 2008, Chep Hernawan granting his lands for burying three perpetrators of Bali Bombing I, Imam Samudera, Amrozi and Ali Ghufron. The one hectare land in Bobojong village will be a cemetery for people like Imam Samudera cs, who were considered by Chep as *mujahid (strugglers)* instead of terrorist.²³⁶

GARIS is obviously showing its support for terrorist group. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who is often accused as the leader of *Jamaah Islamiyah*, one of the biggest terrorist groups in Indonesia, is even gave the position in *Dewan Syuro of GARIS*. GARIS openly declares that one of its bases is *pesantren Ashabul Yamin*, in Cianjur, the same place where the brothers accused for terrorism case, Hambali and Gugun Rusman Gunawan, profounded Islamic teaching. Moreover, GARIS members had also been trained by Abdul Rahim alias Abu Husna, one of JI figures who were captured by police in 2008. The Chairman of GARIS showed his defense for Abu Husna by dispatching dozen of his members every week to the trial of Abu Husna in Central Jakarta District Court, and also providing two lawyers to defend Abu Husna at the end of 2008.²³⁷ GARIS mission is to traine a cadre like Imam Samudera cs. "Doesn't need to be a lot, three or four like them would be enough," said a member of GARIS repeating Chep Hernawan.²³⁸

5. GARIS, FPI AND FUI

GARIS has close association with FUI and FPI; despites the fact that FUI was founded recently, but it is acknowledged, including by GARIS, as the parent organization of radical organization. GARIS is a member of Islamic People's Forum, and always participates in

²³⁶ Pikiran Rakyat, Tanah Wakaf 1 Ha di Cianjur untuk Makam Amrozi Cs, 24 August 2008

²³⁷ Discussion with TPM (Muslim Lawyers Team) member, Jakarta, October 2010

²³⁸ Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

dispatching people in every FUI actions. Many members of FUI are also member of *Laskar Komando Islam*, paramilitary troop of FUI.

GARIS is closely related to FPI, it shares vision and action strategy, the similarity is more than 100 percent; both organizations have well coordination. For example is the case of National Workshop of Ahmadiyah on early December 2010. The workshop supposed to be held in Al Hidayah mosque, Kebayoran Lama, South Jakarta. GARIS that initially got the information contacted the General Secretary of FPI, Shobri Lubis. Later on, it was FPI that carried out the action to that mosque. Threatened, the Ahmadis moved the event to Hotel Setia, in Cipanas, Cianjur, it was a fatal mistake, like out of the frying pan into a burning flame. In Cianjur, the mass from GARIS proceeded to Cipanas and dispersed the workshop.²³⁹

Mass organization incorporated in FUI have an accord in performing their actions; not only exchanging information but also the mass, if FPI demonstrates in Jakarta, the mass of GARIS will be commanded under FPI and if GARIS conducted an action in West Java, then the mass of FPI will be directed under the GARIS command.²⁴⁰

D. FAPB (BEKASI ANTI APOSTASY FRONT)

This Islamic mass organization has only one objective, which is against the apostasy. Most of their actions are shutdown and sealed the Churches. On 5 February 2010, Bekasi Anti Apostasy Front along with other Islamic mass organization like FPI, Youth Islamic Movement, Persis, Muhammadiyah, Religious Harmony Community Forum, forced to shutdown religious activity in the Church in *Perumahan Taman Galaxy*, Jaka Setia, Bekasi. Their reason was that the existence of Galilea Church among the Muslim community had raised anxiety among the community.

FAPB was born as the reaction on apostasy case conducted by the fundamentalist Christian group in Bekasi on November 2008.

239 Suara Islam Edisi 103, 17 December-7 January 2011

240 Interview with a member of GARIS, Cianjur, October 2010

The Mahanaim Foundation, a neo Pantekosta foundation, led by a pastor named Iin Tjipto, organized a Social Service namely *Bekasi Berbagi Bahagia (B3 - Bekasi Share the Happiness)*. In this event, they baptized the attendees who were mostly Muslim in order to get the door prize coupon; this action enraged Islamic mass organization.

Responding that case, DDII Bekasi had an initiative to invite Islamic mass organizations and there were 10 of mass organizations came; some were radical like FPI Bekasi, MMI (Indonesian Mujahedeen Council), FUI Bekasi and some were non – radical such as Muhammadiyah and Persis, including Religious Harmony Community Forum. The meeting generated an accord to form sort of alliance of Islamic organization to encounter apostasy action in Bekasi, the alliance is called *Front Anti Pemurtadan Bekasi (FAPB - Bekasi Anti Apostasy Front)*. Ustad Abu Al Izz from MMI becomes the chairman, while Nazirul Gobi from FPI becomes the deputy chairman. Although this organization seems anti Christians, but its activists affirmed that they are not against the Christians, they are only against apostasy action. “That is why it is called Anti Apostasy Front, not Anti Christian Front,” said an activists of FAPB.²⁴¹

1. THE RELIGION TENSION IN BEKASI

The case of *Bekasi Berbagi Bahagia (B3)* was not the only one; for a long time, Islamic mass organization in Bekasi are anxious with many apostasy action performed by militant Christians from neo Pantekosta denomination. Other case that drew public attention was the case of *Yayasan Kaki Dian Emas*, organized by Pastor Edy Sapto. In 2006, the Muslim community was shocked by the spread/distribution of *Midrash Talmiddin*. A bulletin published using Arab language but not operated by Islamic organization or Islamic foundation. It published by *Yayasan Dian Kaki Emas*, organized by Edi Sapto, a neo Pantekosta pastor from Madura and Pastor Yoshua from Lamongan. The bulletin is not only discredited Islam, such as stating that Allah, in Al Quran, has misled people, but also contained information about Christianization in Madura. The Christianization

241 Interview with FAPB activist, Bekasi, November 2010

is part of graduation program in Theology School *Kaki Dian Emas*, which stated that the requirement of graduation is Christianize five Muslims. The foundation also releases DC and cassette of *qasidah* in Arab but containing the Christian teachings.²⁴²

It enraged FPI, DDII and other Islamic mass organizations; they reported Edy Sapto to the police, while Pastor Yoshua fled to Bandung. But the latter was chased by Sultan Qolbi, an *ustad* originated from Madura who stays in Palembang and once lived in Bekasi; he wanted to kill the Pastor, he was failed though he successfully beat the pastor head using a hammer, but the pastor remain alive and the *ustadz* was arrested by police.²⁴³

Since the case of Kaki Dian Emas the Islamic mass organization in Bekasi becomes more alerted. In the end of 2007, Islamic mass organizations like FPI and DDII got furious after receiving a report that there are new modus of apostasy through a social service event, combined with entertainment and free medical treatment. On 1st December 2007, the Tiberias church, a neo pantekosta church held a music concert, integrated with *sembako* (*nine basic commodities*) give away, and free medical treatment on the field in front of *Perumahan Pondok Mitra Lestari*, Bekasi. The concert was presented by band and choir that sang church songs. More over, in the healing session, the pastor put his hand on top of people's head who came from various places like Cikarang and Muara Gembon, by yelling the name of Jesus.²⁴⁴

On the same day but different place, Mahanaim foundation also held the similar event. The event that presented dance, music and fireworks party along with cheap *sembako* bazaar was held on the field in *Taman Puri Indah, Pekayon*, Bekasi. The pastors Mahanaim like Iin Tjipto, Yusak Tjipto and others, also held the healing session with similar way, touching patient's head while yelling Jesus name.

However, these Islamic groups couldn't do much as they

242 Interview in Bekasi, October 2010. For the case of Edy Sapto can be seen on http://islamic.xtgem.com/islamic_download/islamic_book/zislami3/aksi_pdt_radikal.txt

243 See also http://islamic.xtgem.com/islamic_download/islamic_book/zislami3/aksi_pdt_radikal.txt

244 Interview in Bekasi, November 2010

received the report after the events, and there were not enough evidence like photos or videos. Thus, they made new strategy which is infiltrating to social service event held by neo Pantekosta Christian foundations.

Towards the Christmas in 2008, several Islamic mass organizations read an announcement that Mahanaim foundation will held a social service called *Bekasi Berbagi Bahagia* (B3); the prize offered in its poster was a Daihatsu Car. Later on, the Muslim activists tried to infiltrate to B3 event that would be held in several sub - districts, started by the end of October 2008. They were surprised to found out that the event proceeded baptism in the pool, where the visitors were baptised inside the pool before receiving their coupons. The activists managed to take the pictures and videos of this event which spread out among the Muslims in Bekasi.²⁴⁵ This tense situation in Bekasi triggered the establishment of Bekasi Anti Apostasy Front.

2. FAPB'S FIGURES

FAPB led by Abu Al Izz. He was born in Pandeglang, Banten on July 15th, 1976 and his real name is Wawan Arwani, Lc. The name of Al-izz was taken by his first child's childhood name. He was an alumnus of *shariah* major in University of Cairo, Egypt. After graduated from college on 2003, he settled at Tambun, Bekasi. In the progress, he then formed Ar Risalah, an association for *clergy* in Tambun. Else, he also actively fills in some *pengajian* in various places. In mid 2000 he joined MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia/ Indonesian Mujahedeen Committee*).²⁴⁶

To understand the matter of *apostasy*, He learned a lot from few senior *clergy* in Bekasi, among those *clergys* are Salimin Dani (Head of DDII Bekasi), Murhali Barda (Head of FPI Bekasi), and Bernard Abdul Jabar (Head of FUI Bekasi).²⁴⁷ Who are those men?

²⁴⁵ About the baptism underwater can also be seen from the photos on http://fapbekasi.multiply.com/photos/album/8/Terperangkap_B3#photo=1

²⁴⁶ Interview with FAPB activist, Bekasi, November 2010

²⁴⁷ Interview with FAPB activist, Bekasi, November 2010

Salimin Dani is one of the most important Islamic figures in Bekasi. He leads DDII Bekasi. He also facilitated the birth of many radical mass organizations in Bekasi such as FPI and FUI Bekasi. This Bekasi native man was graduated from Al Azhar University, Egypt. Now, in addition to manage DDII, he also frequently fills in *pengajian* in various *ta'lim* committee and routinely fills in *pengajian*(*Qur'an Recitation*) shows in Dakta FM radio, Bekasi.²⁴⁸

Meanwhile, Murhali Barda is a former leader of FPI Bekasi, who was ceased from the head of FPI position because the police caught him in charge of involvement in Ciketing incident case. He was a graduate of Gontor *Pesantren*, Ponorogo. After graduated, he became a *clergy/ulema* who frequently filled in *pengajian* in Bekasi. In the mid of 2000 he joined FPI and had sufficient time to become a member of *Laskar Pembela Islam* (Islam Defender Paramilitary Troops) and involved in Monas incident case, July, 2008. After Monas incident, he then became the head of FPI Bekasi.

The third important figure is Bernard Abdul Jabar. His background was not obviously clear. He often claims to be a *muallaf/reverts* and was infiltrated into Islamic political parties as a spy. In his confession, while spying several of Islamic political parties he got *hidayah/guidance* and then decided to take his believe on Islam.²⁴⁹ In order that he is a *muallaf*, he is trusted as a christologer in several of radical Islamic groups' realm even though sometimes his information seem disorganize. For instance, he once mentioned that radical Christian groups had formed a force called *Pasukan Iblis Merah* (Red Devil Force) which led by Hendrik Sirait.²⁵⁰ It seemed so ridiculous, beside the resemblance of its name within a comic story, that accusation also seemed inconceivable. How come the Christians who want to build a God kingdom on Earth would make a force with a name of devil, which is actually the enemy of God. Apart from the

248 Interview with DDII activist, Bekasi, Oktober 2010

249 <http://www.manifest-2010.co.cc/2010/11/mewaspadai-ancaman-kristenisasi.html>

250 <http://www.manifest-2010.co.cc/2010/11/mewaspadai-ancaman-kristenisasi.html>

fact of the existence of that force, because of his closeness with Muhammad Al Khatthath, the head of FUI (Islamic People's Forum), Bernard is now the head of FUI Bekasi and one of the heads of *Hizbu Dakwah Islam* (HDI), a HTI fragment radical mass organization.

3. FAPB VARIOUS ACTS

Before conducting an act, at first FAPB generally makes investigations. As in B3 case, Wisma Asri housing, North Bekasi, they tried to collect a lot of evidences to show that there was a Christianization effort. They intruded into the event and then took pictures and made a video tape. They succeed to make a documentation of the *immersion* baptism event, where children and parents who wanted to get lottery coupons must entered to an artificial pool and got their bodies wet by committeemen.²⁵¹

FAPB also succeed to get into a free wedding event which was held by Mahanaim Foundation at one of the churches in the area of Kemang Pratama, Bekasi. There were 153 moslem pairs married there. FAPB team succeeds to get the names of the pairs who got wed.²⁵²

With these evidences, FAPB pressed the district government of Bekasi to revoke the Bekasi Berbagi Bahagia event permit. They got what they demanded for; the district government of Bekasi revokes the permit. FAPB then got those 153 pairs remarried in an event held at Dakta FM Radio Bekasi.²⁵³ This Mahanaim case seemed radicalize FAPB. They tend to be too wary and paranoid. They looked every Christianity things as a Christianization effort. As in HKBP case at Bekasi, Batak Protestant people who wanted to pray was banned and accused to do a Christianization effort. This befell upon *jemaat* of HKBP church Pondok Timur on February, 2010. This accusation was so uneven because HKBP is a tribal church where there were only Bataknese who could pray there. So, in order to be

251 Interview with FAPB activist, Bekasi, Oktober 2010

252 Interview with FAPB activist, Bekasi, Oktober 2010

253 Interview with FAPB activist, Bekasi, Oktober 2010

part of HKBP *jemaat*, the first condition is being a Bataknese. Thus it is impossible for HKBP trying to Christianize Bekasi people which majority is Betawinese. It is impossible to transform Betawinese becomes Bataknese.

FAPB radicalism got even worse after Bekasi Islamic people, on April 2010 were shocked by a website www.bellarminus-bekasi.blogspot.com which was on behalf to Gerakan Membasmi Islam (Islam Annihilation Movement). This website displayed blasphemies to Islam and pictures that showed *Qur'an* was put into a water closet. The acts were not stopped there, yet on May 2, 2010, suddenly Mahanaim Foundation once again made a conspicuous act. They joined an anti narcotics parade and came into Al Barkah mosque, then, they made a cross formation in the yard of the mosque. Their motive was unknown. However, those acts triggered Islamic people and mass organizations furriness. "Bekasi is surrounded by churches, rampant by deviation, and insults to Islam. The infidels were proven to declare war to Bekasi Muslims".²⁵⁴

The fury was obviously shown in Islamic people demonstration act on May 8, 2010 at Al Barkah Great Mosque. The demo act that was packed by *tablig akbar* (great meeting) event represented a various number of local and national Islamic figures, including Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. In this event, they released the Bekasi Islamic People Declaration (*Deklarasi Umat Islam Bekasi*) which was signed by around 60s Islamic figures and the contents provided demand for *qishas* (hard punishment) to Islam *desecration* actors, fight against *apostasy* and forbid the building of churches in Bekasi.²⁵⁵

3. RADICALISM CAUSED BY APOSTASY

These various *apostasy* acts did not only radicalize mass organizations that have already been radical, but also made moderate Islamic figures in Bekasi become radical. Take Murhali Barda case for instance. Before joining FPI, Murhali Barda was only

254 FAPB, Pernyataan Sikap Tim Investigasi Pengkajian Informasi dan Data FAPB, Bekasi, May 3, 2010.

255 Islamic People Declaratin, Bekasi, May 8, 2010

a common *clergy*. He became radical after seeing a lot of *apostasy* cases in Bekasi and then decided to join with FPI.²⁵⁶

That was not the only case. Other case was happened in FKUB (*Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama/ Religious Harmony Community Forum*) Bekasi. One of the Bekasi Anti *Apostasy* Front initiators was *clergy* Badrizaman Busyairi, a member of FKUB Bekasi. The name of FAPB was also taken from his suggestion. FKUB has also sealed and banned the building of churches. FKUB was also involved in sealing Galilea church case in Taman Galaxi. This thing looked very uneven, considering FKUB was an organization to build harmony among inter-religion communities instead of sealing churches and creating strain situation among religions.

Besides, these apostasy cases also radicalized SMP (junior high school) and SMU (senior high school) Muslims students. In a gathering of Muslim students on June 2010, a declaration called GPAP (*Gerakan Pelajar Anti Pemurtadan/ Anti Apostasy Students Movement*) was released. One of the aims of the movement was to prevent *apostasy* acts in students' realm. The reason was some of the actors of Islam *desecration* were Christian students. Take Abraham Felix for an example, a religion *desecration* actor which his pictures emerged at Belarminus website was a student of SMA 5 Bekasi. In addition to that, some of Mahanaim party who made a cross formation in Al Barkah mosque were also students. GPAP then officially became a part of Bekasi Anti *Apostasy* Front (FAPB), became a kind of rightist of FAPB.²⁵⁷

E. FUI (FORUM UKHUWAH ISLAMIYAH/ ISLAMIC FRATERNITY FORUM) CIREBON

The name can be bemusing. People might incorrectly presume this forum as *Forum Umat Islam* considering by the abbreviation of both parties. Moreover, both parties are radical Islamic groups. People are only able to differentiate these parties when their names

256 <http://majalah.hidayatullah.com/?p=1000>

257 Interview Bekasi, October 2010

are mentioned completely. Islamic Fraternity Forum (FUI) Cirebon is a radical mass organization that frequently belabors immoral places, seals churches and also disbands heretical sects. These acts against everything which are considered as ignorance things are only strategies to accomplish the real FUI aspiration, which is upholding Islamic Shariah in Indonesia.²⁵⁸

FUI was built on 2004. The reason of the birth of this Islamic mass organization was there were a lot of *immorality* and Christianization acts happened in Cirebon. At that time, some Islamic figures were very disturbed with various immoralities in Cirebon, such as gambling and prostitutions. For a public figure as Salim Bajri, those things should not appropriately happen in a city which is called Kota Wali/ patron (*Wali* City). Beside, many Islamic figures were furious to Christian neo Pantekosta group activity which performing apostasy act covered with a social service activity. For example: "the *Nashara* (Christian people) held a free medical treatment by having a priest to come from Semarang. Yet, everyone who got treatment must say 'Demi Yesus Aku Sembuh' (In the name of Jesus, I am cured). We were unaware there. There were 5.000 people who got treatment. Finally, Cirebon clergies were gathered," said Salim Bajri.²⁵⁹

In order to his anxiousness, Salim Bajri then had an initiative to assemble mass organization figures from FPI, Persis, Muhammadiyah, MMI and others on 2004. Then, they agreed to form a coordinating institution which was named FUI (*Forum Ukhuwah Islamiyah*/ Islamic Fraternity Forum) Cirebon to fight against *apostasy* and *immorality*. Salim Bajri who was also a member of Dewan Syuro (*Syuro* Council) MMI Cirebon was chosen to be the leader. This new mass organization was declared on March 7, 2004, in a *tablig akbar* (great meeting) in At Taqwa Mosque, Cirebon.

At short notice, FUI became an important Islamic mass organization in Cirebon for their frequent actions on the street. This religion attribute mass organization willingly belabored

258 Interview Cirebon, December 2010

259 Sabili No 18 Thn. XII March 24, 2005

places deemed to be *immoral* nest. Gambling houses smashed, street prostitutes' raid. However, the act that lifted this radical mass organization name was the aggression to the biggest gambling games machine center in Cirebon at Jalan Pasuketan 18 on May 2005. FUI mass sealed that gambling location and destroyed various gambling machines.²⁶⁰

1. THE ORIGIN OF RADICALISM IN CIREBON

One of the origins of Islamic radicalism in Cirebon was Haji Yukeng *ta'lim* committee rostrum. This Chinese-descendant man was a *muallaf* who had his believe on Islam on the period of 1980s. After changing his religion, he then donated some of his wealth to do missionary endeavor. He established Majelis Taklim Hidayatullah (Hidayatullah *Ta'lim* Committee), a *pengajian* which is centered in Pasar Gunung Sari area, Jalan Cipto Mangunkusumo, Cirebon. At first, this *pengajian* was only followed by around 70 *jema'ah*/members. However, as days and years went by, the number of its *jema'ah* increases to thousands. The attractive power of this *pengajian* is the frequency of presence of hardliner *mubalig* from Jakarta such as *Habib* Idrus Jamalullail, Syarifin Maloko, Abdul Qodir Djaelani, Anton Medan, AM. Fatwa, *Habib* Rizieq and others. Meanwhile, one of the local *mubalig* who often gives speech is Salim Bajri. Besides organizing *pengajian* in Cirebon, Haji Yukeng also frequently sends *mubalig* to certain places such as Indramayu, Majalengka, and Kuningan.²⁶¹

In this Hidayatullah *ta'lim* Committee, the radicalization process has occurred. These hard-line *mubalig* had succeed to plant radicalism in *pengajian jema'ah* through their speeches, which its contents are opposing every ignorance and criticizing the government. This *ta'lim* committee also has made local *mubalig* like Salim Bajri became more radical because of his intimate consort with hard-line speaker from Jakarta.

This *pengajian jema'ah* then became members and activists of

²⁶⁰ GATRA, Nomor 31, June 15, 2006

²⁶¹ Cirebon Discussion, December 2010

radical Islamic mass organizations which were founded by Cirebon *mubalig* who often filled in *pengajian* at this *ta'lim* committee. Take the founding of MMI Cirebon on 2001 for instance. The figure behind this founding was Salim Bajri who then took a position as a member of *Syuro* Council of MMI. Meanwhile, most of MMI members are Yukeng *ta'lim* committee Alumni. So it was when Salim Bajri founded FUI on 2004. The mass was once more taken from Yukeng former *jema'ah*.²⁶²

2. STRENGTH OF FUI AND ITS NETWORKS

One of the strength of FUI lies in Salim Bajri figure. At this time, he has some important positions, and with those positions, he can use it for FUI interest. For instance, other than being a member of MUI board committee, he is also a high council of Islamic Center Cirebon. Hence, Salim Bajri easily utilizes At Taqwa Great Mosque and Islamic Center for every FUI activities, includes forbidding every activities FUI dislikes. Like the prohibition of 10 Muharram commemoration event on January, 2009. The plan was that the event which was held by PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*/ Indonesian Islamic College Student Movement) Cirebon and *Forum Komunikasi Muslimin* (Moslems Communication Forum) would be held in Islamic Center Cirebon. Yet, the ICC board did not approve. The board also demanded the law enforcement to ban this event which was considered to spread *Syi'ah* perception. When it was being moved to another place, FUI and MMI tried to disband the event and they succeed. The event failed to be held because police met FUI, MMI and Islamic Center side demand, which was to forbid the event.²⁶³

Beside, this Professor of STAIN (*Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri*/ District Islamic Institute) Cirebon also has a strong relation with *clergies* in west Java. He is now the general secretary of FUI (*Forum Umat Islam*/ Islamic People Forum) West Java. Whereas the

262 Cirebon Discussion, December 2010

263 Cirebon Discussion, December 2010

head of FUI is KH Qudsi Nawawi, an LP3Syi figure Garut.²⁶⁴

This Arab-descendant man formed many Islamic organizations which then becomes the foundation of FUI strength. Before forming FUI, he founded MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia/ Indonesian Mujahedeen Committee*) Cirebon on 2001. After founding FUI on 2004, he also founded GAPAS (*Gerakan Anti Pemurtadan dan Aliran Sesat/ Anti Apostasy and Heretical Sects Movement*) on 2005 and it is now led by Andi Mulya who is also the head of *Laskar* (paramilitary troops) FUI. Salim Bajri did not only form radical mass organizations, he also formed various numbers of general education and religion institutions under the FUI structure such as SDIT and TKIT Takhfizul Qur'an Al-Fallah Harjamukti, Cirebon City. There are more, like Al-Mutaqin *Pesantren*, Beber, Regency of Cirebon, and Nurul-Hadid *Pesantren* Subdistrict Sedong, Regency of Cirebon, and also As-Shobirin *Pesantren* Regency of Cirebon. Salim Bajri also founded As-Syafi'iyah *Ta'lim* Committee, Cirebon City.²⁶⁵

FUI becomes more muscular because this organization has a strong network with various local Islamic mass organizations as FPI Cirebon, Al Irsyad Al Islamiyah mass organization where Salim Bajri had opportunity to lead for 15 years, and also with Islamic political party as PKS. He has a close relation with Ahmad Azrul Zuniarto, a PKS figure in Cirebon. Even PKS scouting patrol often guards Salim Bajri residence at Pesayangan Cirebon area. The reason is that he is often threatened by parties who are not fond of FUI acts.²⁶⁶

By means of this Salim Bajri figure, FUI builds networks to traditional clergies who have great influences in Cirebon and its surroundings. For example on November 2009, he succeeds to assemble clergies in KH Makhtum Hanan residence, the elder of Masyariqul Anwar Babakan *pesantren* Ciwaringin. Clergies who were present like KH Makhtum Hanan, KH Dabas (Plered), KH Hasan bin Abu Bakar (Benda Kerep), KH Affandi (Indramayu),

264 Pikiran Rakyat, Pemerintah Diminta Tegas Soal Maksiat, May 5, 2005

265 Cirebon Discussion, December 2010

266 Sabili No 18 Thn. XII March 24, 2005

KH Jamhuri (Majalengka) formed Forum Ulama Cirebon (Cirebon Clergies Forum) which the forum's objectives were to build *amar ma'ruf* (ordering goodness) and *nahi mungkar* (prevent badness) power, and to make Cirebon and its surroundings as an Islamic territory.²⁶⁷

These traditionalist clergies also participate in demonstration acts which are coordinated by Salim Bajri and friends. For example on 2008, when they held a demo act to demand an enjoinderment of Cahaya TV, KH Hasan bin Abubakar and KH Ismail bin Muhtadi from Benda Kerep *pesantren*, KH Abdullah Mu'in and KH Ma'dun from Cibogo, and KH Ali bin Badri from Kenduruan went along to demand this local TV to be occluded.²⁶⁸

3. FUI VS MAHANAIM NETWORK

In addition to anti-immorality, FUI in Cirebon is also known to act anti-*apostasy*. For example, from April to May 2006, together with the FUI and GAPAS mass (Anti-Apostasy Movement and Heretical Sect) perform various actions to shut down the broadcasts of Suara Gratia Radio accused of spreading Christianity. Not only that, the FUI with Islamic organizations mobilized thousands of Muslims to take action to close the Cahaya TV in Cirebon in July 2008. They demanded that the demolition and the revocation of this local TV. FUI and friends accuse the station of broadcasting Christian's shows such as Gospel Comptemp, New Edge, *Cahaya Kasih*, and the Mountain Stage in Cirebon a region where the majority is Islamic citizen. FUI and friends were even more furious about the location of Cahaya TV. It's located on Argasunya village where 99 percent of the population is Muslims and there are three *pesantren* built hundreds of years ago.²⁶⁹ Still in the same year, September 2008 this Islamic mass organization also sealed Gratia meeting building on Jl. Dr Sudarsono, Cirebon, which served as a place of worship.

267 <http://matahari199.wordpress.com/2009/11/24/ulama-wilayah-iii-cirebon-satukan-tekad-untuk-amar-ma%E2%80%99ruf-nahi-munkar/>

268 <http://antarajawabarat.com/media.php?module=detailberita&id=311>

269 <http://fuui.wordpress.com/2008/07/10/acara-gospel-di-kota-wali/>

From actions mentioned above there are something interesting. The entire FUI targets belong to Ecclesia-Gratia Church led by Reverend Nani Susanti. For example, Suara Gratia Radio owned by Gideon Soedirgo while Cahaya TV Soedirgo Nicodemus, son of Gideon Soedirgo. Gideon Soedirgo is one of the top leaders of the Ecclesia-Gratia Church. Gratia meeting building also belongs to this group. Even more interesting, this church belongs to the same network of Mahanaim Foundation Bekasi which encountered many problems with radical organizations in Bekasi.

Ecclesia-Gratia Church, Cirebon and Mahanaim Foundation Bekasi are a network of family church under the leadership of Reverend Yusak Tjipto. A neo-Pentecostal preacher who was also a dentist, he built a network of churches in various cities. In Cirebon Ecclesia-Gratia Church was led by his sister Reverend Nani Susanti. In Bekasi, Iin Tjipto who is the daughter of Yusak Tjipto made the Mahanaim Foundation. While in Bandung, his other son, Daniel Cipto makes the Ark of Christ prayer group, and in Semarang his other son, Peter Agung Purnomo led the JKI Injil Kerajaan Church.²⁷⁰

As Mahanaim in Bekasi are actively engaged in Christianization mission, the same thing was done by the Ecclesia-Gratia Church. The difference was Mahanaim targeting street children (homeless/beggars), this group of Cirebon's neo-Pentecostal often make transsexuals as targets. For example on Wednesday night, at the Gratia Meetinghouse often gathered transvestites from Cirebon area. Art event was held there and then filled with religious advices from Reverend Nani Susanti. Gratia Parties also provide venture capital assistance to start the participants business, such as opening a salon/ beauty parlor. In addition, transvestites who can invite friends to come to this event will also receive cash incentives.²⁷¹

For Bajri Salim, Nani Susanti is his old nemesis. In 1984 Salim Bajri and his friends protested Nani, who was starting the Ecclesia prayer group. Salim Bajri was angry because the Nani Susanti's house in Jalan kesambi was often used as a place for devotional

270 Diskusi dengan aktivis Gereja Karismatik, Jakarta, September 2010

271 <http://www.bumicirebon.com/?p=575>

prayer. Bajri pointed the house as an illegal church and asked the government to close it.²⁷²

4. AGAINST ISLAM PLURALISM AND LIBERALISM

While many parties are terrified by the various acts of radical mass organizations such as the FPI and FUI, Fahmina was apparently not afraid of them. For example, when they tried to close Radio Suara Gratia FUI, this NGO oppose it. Salim accused this organization were broadcasting thoughts that are contrary to Islam, insulting the *Qur'an* and even funded by Jews.²⁷³ Fahmina deserved to be hated by the leaders of radical organizations. Because the NGO led by KH Hussein Muhammad, chairman of Dar Al-Tawheed Al-Islami Cirebon often bring ideas of pluralism and liberalism, ideas that was hated by Bajri. Remarkably Fahmina ideas can spread to the community, one via Friday bulletin Warkah Al Basyar mosque of spread in Cirebon.

Circulations of the biweekly newsletter that can reach 14 thousand copies were often hampered by Salim Bajri and friends. For example Salim Bajri warned DKM Pertamina Mosque for circulating this bulletin. This incident is only one similar case in several mosques in Cirebon.²⁷⁴

FUI expressed their dislike to Fahmina by sealing the office of that NGO. On 21st May 2006, dozens of FUI people surrounded Fahmina office. There were no incidents of violence, because the office was closed. FUI mass carried signs containing criticisms of this institution. Those poster, which reads: "The Fahmina Asia Foundation NGO is poisonous", "Fahmina is a foreign puppet", and "sealed for selling the Signs of Allah with a very low price." Unable to meet the manager, FUI mass then sealed the office. 'Stamp on behalf of Muslims who support the bill APP'.²⁷⁵

272 <http://www.bumicirebon.com/?p=575>

273 The Wahid Institute, Ragam Ekspresi Islam Nusantara (2008), Wahid Institute hal 51.

274 *ibid*

275 <http://www.vhrmedia.net/home/index.php?id=print&aid=836&cid=4&lang=>

Fahmina sealing case possibly was associated with Fahmina's defense against FUI banning effort toward Suara Gratia Radio and others. In addition, they pointed Fahmina didn't support The Bill design against Pornography and Porn action

But recently, radical social organizations in Cirebon are hesitant to disturb Fahmina. Especially after the Monas incident on 1 June 2008, FPI Cirebon was attacked by some NU mass. This action was revenge to the beating of KH Maman Imanulhaq action which is also a Fahmina's and PKB's administrator.²⁷⁶ These attacks gave a lesson to radical organizations in Cirebon for not attacking people randomly.

F. THOLIBAN

This is one of the most prominent radical organizations in Tasikmalaya. Anti-immoral actions such as sweeping gambling and prostitution areas attract the attention of people there. It was May 3rd 2010 in Tasikmalaya south region. After attending the *Tablig akbar* event in Nurul Jaza *pesantren* in the village of Hegarmanah Bantarkalong district, hundred Tholiban mass swept of liquor in the Bantarkalong and Karangnunggal area, South Tasikmalaya. In this sweeping they confiscated bottles of liquor and gambling lotteries sold in stalls.²⁷⁷

Tholiban now headed by Ajengan Zenzen from Al Irsyadiyah *Pesantren*, Tasikmalaya who is also good at playing politics. They did not doubt a coalition with prospective regents or *regents* to goal *Shariah regional* regulations. As happened in the town of Tasikmalaya in 2007 elections. Tholiban supports Sharif Hidayat to become *regent*. This support is paid by the *regent* to issue a regulation No. 12/2009 about: Building the citizens' way of life based on Islamic religion and social norms of the people of

²⁷⁶ <http://www.fahmina.or.id/artikel-a-berita/berita/306-santri-nu-serbu-markas-fpi-di-cirebon.html>

²⁷⁷ http://www.radartasikmalaya.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2591:tholiban-sweeping-tasela&catid=30:the-community

Tasikmalaya²⁷⁸

Tholiban was born because of concerns over immorality rampant in post-reform era on the town of Tasikmalaya in 1998. Various blatant defiance shows even near the place of worship. For example, in the area of the Great Mosque Tasikmalaya was often used as an arena of prostitution and a place to get drunk. In response to this situation, Ajengan Zenzen together with KH Asep Mousul Affandi gathered *Ajengans* and scholars from various Islamic organizations. They agreed to form a gathering of Muslims Forum Tasikmalaya. This is the organization that became the forerunner of the Tholiban which was established a year later, in 1999.²⁷⁹ Immediately, Tholiban also proved itself as an Islamic anti-immorality organization in Tasikmalaya. They diligently attack various immoral activities' such as gambling, prostitution and liquor circulation.

1. FAVORABLE LOCAL POLITICS

Tholiban organization is not only but also anti- immoral Islamic mass organization but they also struggle to uphold the Islamic *Shariah*. When the organization was incorporated, the political situation in Tasikmalaya is very beneficial; especially to promote the Islamic law agenda becomes regional regulations. It's called profitable since the 1999 elections, the Islamic parties won a big result. For instance PKB got five seats, the PAN three seats, PBB two seats and the PPP won 11 seats as well as the winner of the election in Tasikmalaya.

The victory of Islamic parties was used by Tholiban to apply local regulations with the nuances of Islamic law. Moreover Tholiban figures and other radical organizations such as the FPI have a special affinity with the Islamic parties there. Suppose KH Asep Mousul Affandi who also led Miftahul Huda *Pesantren* is from the PPP. Even now he is a Member of Parliament from the party.

278 Interview with a member of Tholiban, Tasikmalaya, Oktober 2010

279 Interview Tholiban member, Tasikmalaya, Oktober 2010

There is another Ajengan Mubin, FPI figures are close to the PBB.²⁸⁰

Islamic law enforcement effort were open wider after Tatang Farhanul Hakim, chairman of the PPP Tasikmalaya was elected as *regent* of Tasikmalaya in 2001. This opportunity is not wasted by the Tholiban and FPI. Tasikmalaya Strategic Plan became their first project. The preparation of this strategic plan was urgent because, according to PP. 108/2000 each district or city must have a strategic plan as a reference in the development.²⁸¹

Tholiban with other Islamic organizations and Islamic parties impose the ideas of Islamic law into that strategic plan. This effort was successful. In Tasikmalaya District Strategic Plan 2001-2005 as set forth in Regulation No. 13/2001 states that the vision of Tasikmalaya District as a district «a religion / Islam as a center of growth in East Priangan and able to put itself as an advanced district in West Java in 2010.»

As the realization of the vision of religious/Islamic Tasikmalaya, the *Regent* of Tasikmalaya Tatang Farhanul Hakim, also issued various circular with the nuances of Islamic *Shariah*. For example is the Circular No. 451/SE/Sos/2001 about the efforts for developing the quality of faith and piety. In 2003, this vision has been revised by Regulation No 13/2003 in which the vision was changed into «The religious/Islamic Tasikmalaya, a developed, prosperous and competitive district in agribusiness sector in West Java 2010.»

2. AJENGAN BENDO AND MIFTAHUL HUDA

The birth of radical mass organizations such as the FPI or Tholiban cannot be separated from the presence of characters that are often invoked as a group Ajengan Bendo. Most of them have a relationship with Miftahul Huda *Pesantren* or often referred

280 Interview Tholiban member, Tasikmalaya, Oktober 2010

281 Amin Muzakir, *Politik Muslim and Ahmadiyah di Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Kasus Cianjur dan Tasikmalaya*. Artikel ini dipresentasikan di Seminar Internasional IX, Yayasan Percik,, "Politik Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, dan Ruang/Space dalam Dinamika Politik Lokal di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara, Salatiga, 15-18 Juli 2008

to as Manonjaya *pesantren*. The figures include Ajengan Zenzen *pesantren* Al Irsyadiyah, Asep Ajengan Mausul of Miftahul Huda *pesantren* and Ajengan Mubin an alumni of Manonjaya *pesantren*.²⁸²

Manonjaya *pesantren* is special. Although the orientation of their religion is traditionalist Islam, but the idea of Islamic Law enforcement has long been developed in this *pesantren*. It is understandable considering the *pesantren* was founded by KH Khoer Affandi, ex-DI (Darul Islam) in Tasikmalaya. No wonder that many leaders and alumni becomes the actor in enforcing Islamic law. KH Asep Mousul and Ajengan Mubin, they are not only involved in the struggle at local level, but also at national level. Both co-founded the Indonesian Mujahidin Council in August 2000. What Asep Mousuln and friends were doing is also exemplary of *pesantren* alumni in some areas. For example, in Cianjur, the alumni who join the Alumni Association Miftahul Huda (Hamida) contribute in preparing the Islamic strategic plan, called the Gate of Marhamah.²⁸³

Ajengan Bendo circles began to get public's attention after Tasikmalaya riots 1996. Although not directly involved, they are obtaining immediately public sympathy to portray themselves as the observer of the New Order. They are also affiliated with several Islamic parties. For example, Asep Mausul was PPP activist, Ajengan Mubin was the activist of PBB (Crescent Star Party), while Tholiban, FPI along with other Islamic organizations and then tried to apply the *regional* rules with the nuance of Islamic *Shariah*.²⁸⁴

3. THOLIBAN MEMBER AND BASE

Number of Tholiban members nowadays is around 3000

282 Interview Tholiban and FPI member Tasikmalaya, Oktober 2010

283 Interview Cianjur, Oktober 2010

284 Amin Muzakir, *Politik Muslim dan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia Pasca Soeharto: Kasus Cianjur dan Tasikmalaya*. Artikel ini dipresentasikan di Seminar Internasional IX, Yayasan Percik,, "Politik Identitas: Agama, Etnisitas, dan Ruang/Space dalam Dinamika Politik Lokal di Indonesia dan Asia Tenggara, Salatiga, 15-18 Juli 2008

people. Most members come from the students of Miftahul Huda *pesantren*, Al Irsyadiyah and network such as the Nurul Jaza *Pesantren* in the South Tasikmalaya. In the case of Miftahul Huda, disciples who joined the Santri Regiment (RESAN) and the Tasikmalaya Solidarity of the Muslim (TSM) are often involved in a sweeping action by Tholiban. This *pesantren* is also a mass base of this radical organization.

Moreover, common people can join Tholiban. Officially, there was never were a special recruitment. People who want to join can participate in *pengajian* (*Qur'an Recitation*) on Thursday nights at Al Irsyadiyah *Pesantren* or some directly involved in the action carried out by Tholiban. Usually they are invited by friends. Mostly joined with ex-thug who already *insyaf* (repent and forswear). Their courage is often useful for Tholiban violence.

Motivation of people joining these organizations also varies. Some really want to do *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*. But some has other intentions like popularity or want to hide behind Tholiban greatness, and some also want to take advantage of Ajengan Zenzen and Asep Mousul.

Regardless of motivation, its members routinely receive spiritual guidance. They are required to follow *pengajian*. There are *pengajian* (*Qur'an Recitation*) every Thursday night at the Al Irsyadiyah *pesantren*, there is also a monthly *pengajian* held at the Tholiban branches. Teaching is directly handled by Ajengan Zenzen. Besides spiritual training, members of radical organizations also receive physical training such as martial arts and karate training.²⁸⁵

4. NOT ANTI-AHMADIYAH

Unlike other radical organizations in Tasikmalaya, Tholiban do not like to attack the Ahmadiyya community. There are almost no cases of attacks against the Ahmadis committed by this organization. In contrast to the FPI in Tasikmalaya and Ciamis, who did not hesitate to commit violence against sects that are

285 Interview Tholiban member, Tasikmalaya, Oktober 2010

considered as heretical. Like the incident December 9th, 2010 in which the mass of the FPI attacked Kautsar Hasanah **Ahmadiis** Orphanage in Cicariang, Kawalu, Tasikmalaya. In addition, the FPI has threatened to set fire to that orphanage, but later canceled it because of the heavy rain.²⁸⁶

This different approach between Tholiban and FPI happened due to the established communication between Ahmadiyah and the leaders of Tholiban, Ajengan Zenzen and Miftahul Huda *pesantren* leaders such as KH Affandi Aziz, brother of KH Asep Mousul. Although both of them are still considered Ahmadiyah as heretical, but they opposed violence acts. That's why there was a rumor that Ajengan Zenzen is the protector of Ahmadiyah.²⁸⁷

But the rumor is addressed coldly by both of them. They feel that there is nothing wrong with building good relations with Ahmadiyah on humanity basis. For them, the mind of Ahmadiyah should be destroyed but their people should not be hurt. Tholiban also remind FPI not to bring Tholiban name in anti-Ahmadiyah acts.²⁸⁸

THE STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH SHARIAH REGIONAL RULE

In 2009 the Tasikmalaya city government issued regulation No. 12/2009 concerning: Building the citizens' way of life based on Islamic religion and social norms of the people of Tasikmalaya." The release of this law marks the victory of Tholiban and other radical mass organizations such as FPI. But from this case we can learn how Tholiban and FPI and other organizations struggling to establish Islamic rules in the newly municipality formed Tasikmalaya in 2006.

After separation from the County and City of Tasikmalaya in 2006, then Tholiban with other Islamic organizations continue the

286 <http://news.okezone.com/read/2010/12/09/337/401517/panti-asuhan-di-tasikmalaya-diancam-dibakar-fpi>

287 Interview Tholiban member, Tasikmalaya, Oktober 2010

288 Interview Tholiban member and Ahmadiyah member, Tasikmalaya, Oktober 2010

struggle for the enforcement of *Shariah* in the town of Tasikmalaya. Their struggle began in the election of legislators Tasikmalaya. Tholiban and FPI managed to “smuggle” their friends to the various parties, including non-Islamic parties such as PDI-P. In the elections of local parliamentary of majority 21 members was pro-Islamic law. After that when the election of *regent* and deputy occurred in 2007, Tholiban with Islamic organizations directly supported Sharif Hidayat of PAN who is also a Tholiban adviser. Their efforts were not in vain, supported figures managed to become *regent* and vice *regent* of Tasikmalaya period 2007-2012.²⁸⁹

Automatically Sharif Hidayat's victory paved the way of enforcing of Islamic *law* there. “Islamic mass organizations then collected 1233 signatures of support from clergies (ulema) and public figures urging the implementation of Islamic *law* in Tasikmalaya. This letter of support then taken to DPRD, so then they can enforce the policy concerning Islamic *law*, base on the argumentation that the majority of Tasikmalaya population are Muslims. “

The proposal was welcomed by the DPRD with Islamic organizations requesting the regional regulation draft of sharia. Tholiban, FPI and friends then formed the Presidium of the Preparatory Committee Enforcement of Islamic *law* (Presidium Komite Persiapan Penegakan *Shariaht* Islam /FKPPSI) Tasikmalaya. The team drafted the Islamic regional regulation plan brought to the *Regent* and the DPRD. After the discussion was held, in Ramadan 2009 the *Regional* rules No. 12/2009 concerning the development of social norms based on Islamic virtues and social norms of Tasikmalaya people was issued.²⁹⁰ This event marked the victory of radical mass struggle.

289 Interview with Tholiban member and FPI member, Oktober 2010

290 Interview with Tholiban member and FPI member, Oktober 2010

CHAPTER VI FOR FREEDOM OF RELIGION/BELIEF

The last part of this research report will elaborate the answers to research question proposed in the introduction. Some recommendations will be developed based on this answer of this research. There are four main findings presented in this chapter, which are: *first*, about the religious portrait of urban community including its perspective towards the presence of radical Islamic organization. *Second*, is presentation of argumentation why radical Islamic organization grows in Jakarta and West Java. The findings will complete the survey finding and genealogy of radical Islamic movement. *Third*, is the profile of radical Islamic organization; and *fourth*, is its implication on the assurance of freedom of religion/belief.

A. PASSIVE INTOLERANCE

In general, the attitude and religious perspective of *Jabodetabek* (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok< Tangerang and Bekasi Area) community, based on the survey finding is considerably intolerance. Considering the urban social environment, such attitude or perspective can be categorized as 'unique', it is contrast to general assumption that common character of urban community is rational and tolerant.

However, this attitude or religious perspective can't be or can't be categorized yet as fundamentalist. Despite that the intolerance of

community is considerably high, the survey shows the community is not fundamentalist/radical, or even supportive to violence actions performed in the name of religion. At least, until now, using violence in fighting for religion virtue is beyond its consideration.

The radicalism of religious attitude is the next stage of various intolerance forms. In other words, intolerant attitude only needs one step to be categorized as radical/fundamentalist. But the intolerant attitude of *Jabodetabek* community is actually potential to escalate into 'higher' step. The tendency to reject violence and positivization of Islamic Law (Syariah) as national legal basis could be changed along with the changes of external factor.

It must be noted that the main influence of community intolerance is not coming from radical organizations which often use violence, as its support to this radical Islamic organization is not significant, the majority of community even reject violence. The main influence comes from social frustration and alienation due to people dissatisfaction towards the distribution of development and economic. Under such situation, the presence of radical Islamic organization becomes one of factors that radicalize society to be intolerant.

The external factor like politic and economic injustice, the 'incubator' for the presence of terrorism or violence in the name of religion, can be applied to respondent; as it explained above, that respondent in general, showed their disenchantment against political institutions, law enforcement and economic condition. If this tendency is combined with the average revenue of respondent household (in general under two million rupiah per month) then, what they stated as 'economic injustice can raise terrorism' means that they (who represents the low class in social pyramid structure) is actually also under an 'ideal' condition to go 'beyond' intolerant perspective. The field to transform intolerant perspective to other 'form' is sufficiently provided.

The presence of 'economic and politic injustice as the trigger of terrorism on behalf of religion' perspective is clearly a matter that goes beyond *Jabodetabek* community. The two domains are under state control. It means that the effect of economic and politic

policy on community will highly determine the possibility for the emergence of various forms of violence in behalf of religion. The household revenue under two million rupiah per month is clearly vulnerable to the fluctuation of macroeconomic.

The uncertainty of political situation in Indonesia could be an important factor that may raise society dissatisfaction against the presence of political institutions, which may lead society tendency to look for another alternative of economic and politic system.

Due to the difficulty of modern urban life, the low class society in *Jabodetabek* (as represent by respondent characteristic in this survey) often has to adapt with the disadvantageous situation as it normally occurs in similar urban city in many Third World countries. Modernization and urban development is generally difficult to be favored by the lower class in social pyramid.

They who in generally don't have the access to strategic resources, especially economic and politic resource, have been forced to see the luxurious life of high class society as both of these communities live side by side in *Jabodetabek* areas. All forms of economic and politic gap, in certain time, may bring low class society into long period of 'alienation' and social frustration. The indication is they are easy to be incited and mobilized.

This situation is favorable for the presence of various ideologies of identity and anti – democracy basis and the intolerant tendency of respondent has been in half encouraged this situation, provided the cause that would later be highly determined by the factors of economic and politic dynamic.

B. LAYERS OF TRIGGERING FACTOR

The argument why radical Islamic organization emerges and grows in Jakarta and West Java can be explained from the conclusion of survey result, part of this research. Although it was only conducted in Jakarta, the tendency applies in almost all urban

areas. Especially the radical Islamic organization network which benefits the alienation and social frustration condition of urban community to assemble in religion sanctuary: Islam.

Among the void of transformative ideology brought by New Order, alienation and frustration of lower class urban community in *Jabodetabek* finally found Islam as the answer that apparently could provide an assurance, despite the fact that they, or at least some of them, are not obedient to the ritual. It proves that intolerant attitude is not directly relevant with the level of obedience in practicing the religion's ritual.

The results of this survey finding signify that Islam is not the main factor of intolerant attitude, consider the assumption is right, and then Islam is only the catalyst, that could be the canal of frustration for people in lower society.

The radical Islamic group is not concentrating in theological arguments in developing its legitimacy basis among society. They see the crisis in economic and political order and they offer the solution. This illustrates that social frustration, especially in lower level, is the potential ally for various radical movements.

Along with the above conclusion, based on Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni, "For the *unfortunate people*, the economic and social politic has frustrated them, and when it comes, religion becomes the only savior."²⁹¹ Despite the tendency to be intolerant, the urban society in *Jabodetabek* and other urban areas still reject fundamentalism, violence in behalf of religion and formalization of Islamic Law (Syariah). However, if this external condition, especially economic and politic doesn't change or worsening, there is possibility that the intolerance could lead to 'ready-to-mobilized' mass by the Islamic radical movement.²⁹²

Genealogically, the growth and development of radical Islamic organization in *Jabodetabek* is not as strong as the one in West Java. (Meanwhile) Jakarta is much influent by *habaib*, respected highly by society who attended by most of *majlis ilmu* and *majlis dzikir*

²⁹¹ Jamhari and Jajang Jahroni (ed.), *op.cit.*

²⁹² Greg Fealy and Anthony Bubalo, *op.cit*

held by *habaib*. The religious perspective of Jakarta society is much influenced by *majlis taklim and pengajian (Qur'an recitation)*. The Muslim is busy recitating *Qur'an* and attending *majlis taklim*.

The high number of violation against the freedom of religion/faith that took place in Jakarta indicates the fact that Jakarta as the biggest city in Indonesia had turned to a battle arena of ideology, politic, legitimacy and authority. Basically, Jakarta has no sufficient historical argument that would trigger the act of violence and intolerance against certain groups. But since the end of 1970, the movement of Urban Muslim group had take over the dispute arena of religious views in Jakarta, especially with the emergence of Islamic organization such as DDII, KISDI (Indonesian Committee for World Muslim Solidarity), PPMI (The Association of Indonesian Muslim Workers), etc.. They had successfully creating a different performance of Islam and effectively incorporating their group into religious organizations, *majlis taklim*, mosques and campus.

It is contrary to West Java where Islamic radical movement has strong genealogy that could clearly be traced. West Java has a vast diversity, one of the areas that had been the base of *Darul Islam* Movement to take over the power and establish Islamic State. Politic – historically, West Java was base of Masyumi. The defeat of Masyumi figures entering the political area in early times of New Order had led them formed DDII in 1967, oriented in Da'wah (the preaching of Islam) instead of political party. The active role of DDII is indicated by various activities in developing new Muslim generation. The network described in the genealogy of radical Islam in chapter II showed its strategic role in taking the space and religious authority in West Java.

The basis movement of DDII is *pesantren*, mosque and campus. It has significant contribution in producing future leaders. It also contributed to the development of mosque network in ITB, UI, UGM and in other public campus. It developed the training program designated by university instructors, alumni from various Islamic student organizations. In 1974, DDII began to develop a systematic effort base in campus, called *Bina Masjid Kampus*, one of its realizations to target the campus for da'wah, *Kegiatan latihan*

Mujahid Da'wah in Salman Mosque ITB². During the (tenure) of Natsir, DDII helped the development of Masjid Arif Rahman Hakim in UI Salemba, equipped it with library and Da'wah institution.³

Besides the factor of social, political, economic and its emerging context, the social religious condition of society in Jakarta and West Java has become an opportunity and collect supportive resource for the radical Islamic organizations existence in these areas. This research not only found that the radical Islamic organizations in Jakarta and West Java have genealogy with past radicalism, but also traced the connection between one organization with another; one actor with another, and also its similar tactical – strategy. It could not be concluded yet that this phenomenon is the collective grand design of radical Islamic group, but it shows similarity in perspective, orientation and action organizations domains.

Despite the differences in local context, the radical Islamic organizations were born spontaneously, triggered by the threatening incidents towards Islam and Muslims. However, according to its founders, these radical Islamic organizations have similarity with the radical Islam genealogy in the past, which was enforcing Islamic Law in Indonesia using various medium and issues.

C. DIFFERENT FACES ONE VISION

The research of SETARA Institute is focused to radical Islamic organizations, local basis which threatened the assurance of freedom of religion/belief. In Jakarta, there are Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Islamic People's Forum (FUI). In Bekasi, the biggest one is Bekasi Anti Apostasy Front (FAPB). Although FAPB seems like a tactical organization, but it has extreme Islamic figures. In, Cianjur, there is Islamic Reformist Movement (GARIS) while in Tasikmalaya there is Tholiban; and in Cirebon there is *Forum Ukhruwwah Islamiyah* (FUI).

The main actors portrayed specifically in this research are Habib Rizieq Syihab (Islamic Defenders Front), Muhamad Al Khathath (Islamic People's Forum), H Chep Hernawan (Islamic Reformist Movement), KH Qudsi Nawawi (LP3Syi), and Salim Badjri

(*Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyah*). They are all linked to many radical organizations, either transnational or local organizations.

The SETARA Institute research found that the perception about radical Islamic organization came from the modernist, especially the *neo wahabi*, is not completely right. In West Java, the tradition *Pesantren*, has given support and become the mass base of radical Islamic organization due to its leaders involvement, for example the pesantren *Ashabul Yamin dan Darul Aman (Cianjur)*, *Pesantren Al Irsyadiyah*, *Miftahul Huda (Tasikmalaya)*, *Pesantren Cipana*, *Pesantren Suci (Garut)* and *Pesantren Al Um (Ciputat)*. The Mass base of this organization also comes from *Majelis Taklim*.

The funding of radical Islamic organization comes from various sources; besides private source like H. Chep Hernawan (GARIS) it also comes from *infaq jamaah*, community charity and independent effort.

The principle of radical Islamic organization focuses on three doctrines, which are the duty to follow on Allah laws, duty to fight the injustice, and suspicion and hatred to expansive Christianity. Based on daily worship practices, except *Forum Ukhuwwah Islamiyah*, most of these organizations are identified as *ahlussunah wal jamaah* (Aswaja) and traditionalist. This research proved that radical organizations also grow and develop from and in traditionalist Islam community.

The radical Islamic organizations (based on SETARA Institute genealogy mapping, is in phase III) have 4 main agendas; enforcement of Islamic Law, eradication of immorality, heretical sects and anti apostasy/Christianization. These agendas could possibly be intermediary target from the main ideas of these radical organizations in establishing Islamic Law in Indonesia.

These Islamic organizations have updated strategy and tactic; they regularly develop politic alliances with political party/figures, expand support from moderate Islamic organization, infiltrate/radicalize Indonesian Ulema Council, combine field action with legal action, and building intercity action network.

D. IMPLICATIONS AND THE FUTURE

Since 1998, the end of Soeharto regime had changed political form. Everyone could have or enjoy the political freedom like expressing opinion, assembling people either for reunion or organization, establishing a political party and take part in the new political form. It also indicated by the number of new press media, television and radio, not to mention the internet that could be easily access from anywhere. the freedom of press has gone beyond the previous authoritarian period.

The freedom of politic also indicated by the numbers of political parties participated in General Election every five years. Many mass organizations emerged, such as labor union, farmers union, student organization, advocacy group or union, regional organization, hobby club, and religious organization. Some of it is affiliated with a party but others are independent, some are tactical organizations while some others are on ad hoc basis, especially when taking a part in extra parliamentary role.

One of the emerged mass organizations is religious organization, especially the fundamentalist Islam or radical Islam,⁸ such as FPI, GARIS, FUI, and some others located in Jakarta and West Java. Although they against the presence of freedom of politic, which is actually represent the pluralism, they benefited this condition to express their opinion and action on behalf of Islam towards other groups in order to be accorded.

The examination of the emergence of these fundamentalist Islamic organizations would be more advantageous if it linked with a practical implication about the assurance of freedom of religion/belief. Is the emergence of those organizations strengthening or threatening the right to freedom of religion/belief? In this regard, will state give an effective assurance to respect and protect the freedom of religion/belief without discrimination?

1. THE STATE OBLIGATION TO PROTECT THE FREEDOM

Before discussing the implication from the emergence of

radical Islamic organizations, it is important to relate and impose the freedom of religion/belief in the principle of state obligations in accordance with the framework of human rights.⁸ Every citizen has the right to have the freedom, whatever their origin and background is, in other side, the state has the obligation to respect and protect the freedom of religion/belief of its citizen.

Human body consists of nervous system, brain and heart; human not only connects with its internal organ but also with its social and natural environment. It is not only a form of interaction one another but also a form of its freedom, its creative process in formulating ideas, following a religion or belief. This freedom is in effect generally, when the state is involved in it.

The concept of human rights places those three freedoms as the *fundamental freedom* as it is natural and attach *in itself*, so it becomes part of a *non-derogable* rights, therefore freedom is absolute and free from *limitation* or *restriction*, even under a war or emergency state. These three freedoms are stated in the Article 18 of *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* – UDHR):

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance

These three freedoms are not only stated in the declaration but also in international convention. Article 18 Paragraph 1 of *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* – ICCPR stated the following:

Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.

In *international human rights law* – according to its nature – only binds the state.⁹ This binding gives the state the *generic obligation*; *obligation to respect*, *obligation to protect* and *obligation*

to fulfill the human rights. In contrary, because the legal subject of human rights is the state, then it's not binding any individual or private legal entity because they are not members or participants/ party in human rights covenant or law.


The following table provides description concerning the relation between human rights and state obligation on those rights. When should the state respect without interfering the rights and when it should actively involve protecting and fulfilling human rights with economic – social and education program.

Table 3: State Obligations on Human Rights			
Nature	Respect	Protect	Fulfill
Entitlement	The state do not perform illegal action or against the norms and standard of human rights.	In particular, the state protects certain prone group (children, tribes community, labor) or discriminated group (women, minorities, foreigners)	The State takes programmatic measures necessary for establishing the human rights
Freedom	The state do not intervene (abstain) in the freedom of rights	In general, the state guarantee the rights and fundamental freedom from the violation of third party (through legal and judicial)	The state takes educative measures to socialize the fundamental freedom

Source: Harry Wibowo, 2006

State obligation to respect means that the state must refrain or does not take any actions (abstain) that may disrupt the implementation of right of someone or some group, thus the principle of this obligation is negative (negative obligation). The state also obliges to protect human rights from the threat or action of the third party (non-state) also known as positive obligation. The obligation to protect needs state's role that specifically designated for discriminated groups, which are the minority religion/belief group, but in general to ensure that the freedom of these group will not be violated by the third party.

Apart from the obligation to respect that is more *private*, the state obliges to protect as the reality lies on social space (*public*) where the interaction between groups with various perspective, religion or belief and even interest take place. The intervention of state is limited to protect the prone group – in the context of minority religion/belief group – from discrimination and intolerance. The limit of state intervention towards violation incidents is prosecuting the perpetrator according to the law and judicial process as it shown below.



Picture 1:
Human Rights, Freedom, Eligibility and State Obligation

Source: Harry Wibowo, 2006

The principle of obligation to respect aim to ensure the freedom/liberty applies to all. State intervention may disrupt this freedom/liberty, in contrary, the obligation to protect aim to ensure the accomplishment of justice/equality. State intervention is needed to protect people's freedom from the threat of other party; it is also needed when violation against the law, or criminal acts occurs, in order to enforce the justice without discrimination.

Why the obligation to protect is necessary? *First*, is because there is prone and discriminated group among society that could be the target and victim of exploitation, discrimination or intolerance. Protect means that the state prevents it from happening. Second is in certain actions, someone with certain interests or perspectives may conduct legal violation; thus the state must prosecute the perpetrator based on law and judicial process. The obligation to protect the freedom of all citizens is important, as it is assumed that there might be a threat from third party causing the horizontal effects of the human rights if the state doesn't prevent it, or prosecute legal violation.²⁹³

The violation against freedom of religion/belief as the horizontal effect may happen if a perspective or denominations of certain religion group doesn't respect, or motivated or provoked to refuse the norms of Human Rights. The below table explains perspective differences between human rights agreed by UN members countries with the expressed perspective of some radical Islamic organization.

Table 4: the Perspective of Human Rights and Radical Islam concerning the Freedom of Religion/Belief			
No	Element	Perspective of Human Rights	Perspective of Radical Islam
1	Legal framework	Natural liberty, attach in itself and absolute	The enforcement of Islamic Law to purify and protect the <i>aqidah</i> from other influences

293 Gavin Phillipson, "The Human Rights Act, 'Horizontal Effect' and the Common Law: A Bang or a Whimper?" *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 62, No. 6, November 1999, hal. 824-849.

Table 4: the Perspective of Human Rights and Radical Islam concerning the Freedom of Religion/Belief

No	Element	Perspective of Human Rights	Perspective of Radical Islam
2	Choose/ practice a religion or belief	One could not be forced to choose a religion or belief	Apart of its denomination, considered as heretical and should be convert/revert to Islam
3	The limitation of freedom	It is public, may impose to limitation by law to protect the security, health and general moral, or protect others rights	<i>Aqidah</i> is being threatened, certain action is needed
4	Equality	One could not be the target of discrimination	The group identity which represent the majority, has the "rights" to intervene or override other group
5	Legislation and regulation	The state must obliterate discrimination, revoke discriminative laws and policies, and prohibit discrimination in any forms	Impose Laws, Policies and Regional Government Regulations that are in accordance with Islamic Law
6	Place of Worship	May be establish for worship purpose or gather, charity, humanity, maintain object and material for ritual or custom, teaching, spreading a writings, collect donation, communication, train and elect future leader	Established in Muslim community environment or less in number, other religion community is rejected because it is considered as apostasy

Table 4: the Perspective of Human Rights and Radical Islam concerning the Freedom of Religion/Belief

No	Element	Perspective of Human Rights	Perspective of Radical Islam
7	Children Protection	The best importance for the children based on their hopes is protected from any kinds of discrimination on religion or belief basis	Children is consider as the 'object' of apostasy
8	Children education	Has the right to religion or belief education, can't be forced to practice any religion or belief that contest with the hope of their parents and legal guardians.	Force religion teaching to be an obedient with <i>akhlaq (Islamic virtue/morality) personality</i>

Source: Documentation of SETARA Institute

2. PLURALISM AND INTOLERANCE

SETARA Institute performed its research based on plurality in social reality; plural in ethnic, nationality, religion, or belief, skin color and genders or sexual orientation, status or social class, political perspective or orientation and ideology. Pluralism describes that there is various elements in the family and group among society, which is natural, genetic or social.

In reality, there are many kinds of religions and beliefs practiced among society.²⁹⁴ Religion followed by Indonesians doesn't only come from Middle East like Jews, Christian, Catholic and Islam but also from Asia like Hindu, Buddhist, Konghucu, or belief from China like Falun Gong. The ethnic group in Indonesia also has their own belief or ritual system like, *Sunda Wiwitan* (among community in West Java and Banten), *Kejawen* (Central Java

²⁹⁴ Frans Magnis-Suseno SJ, *Menjadi Saksi Kristus di Tengah Masyarakat Majemuk*, Jakarta: Obor, 2004.

and East Java), *Parmalim* (Batak Toba), *Tonaas Walian* (Minahasa, North Sulawesi), Tolottang (South Sulawesi), *Wetu Telu* (Lombok, West Nusa Tenggara), *Naurus* (Pulau Seram, Maluku).²⁹⁵ There is also local ritual practiced by some community in Mentawai Arat Bulungan²⁹⁶ and Pangureikan;²⁹⁷ The Papuanese especially those who lives in the hinterland has their own particular ritual and cultural tradition.

Moreover, in one religion exists different theological denomination, in Islam, there are two main denominations, Sunni and Syiah.²⁹⁸ The Syiah emerged due to leadership succession after the Prophet (Muhammad) died in the 7th century.²⁹⁹ The *imamah* system is used in the Islamic Republic of Iran after the fall of the Monarchy of Shah Iran, replaced by Imam Khomeni in 1978-1979.³⁰⁰

There are also various denominations in Christianity; such as the reformation of Protestants in German, led by Martin Luther in the 15th century.³⁰¹ Half of Christians are divided in some

295 See http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agama_Aslu_Nusantara. Data from the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2003) shows that from 245 denominations registered, total number of its followers is predicted reaching more than 400 people.

296 See Koentjaraningrat, et.al., *Masyarakat Terasing di Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gramedia, 1993.

297 See "Menjaga Mentawai dengan Pangureikan," *Liputan6.com*, 24 August 2001 12:22.

298 Ramli Abdul Wahid, "Akar-akar Aliran Dalam Islam," *waspada.co.id*, Friday, 09 November 2007 07:42. According to Sunni, which also known as *Ahlus Sunnah*, there are two major denominations, which are *Salaf* or *Salafi* and *Khalaf*. The concept of *Salaf* is represented by Imam Ahmad ibn Hambal (w.241 H), Abu al Hasan al Asy'ari (w. 330 H) and Syekh Ibn Taimiyah (w. 728 H), while the concept of *Khalaf* is represented by al Baqillani (w.403 H) and al Juwaini (w. 478 H). Likewise to Syiah which means "defenders", believes on imamate, consists of several denominations like *Syiah Zaidiyah* and *Syiah Ismailiyah* along with other sects.

299 See "Sejarah Syiah dan Sunni di Era Kekhalifahan," <http://www.anneahira.com/sejarah-syiah-dan-sunni.htm>. Dispute continued between Ali bin Abi Thalib who was the third Caliph at that time, with Muawiyah bin Abi Sufyan who claimed (himself) as Caliph. Half of *Khawarij* that at first supported Ali was betraying, while the remaining who stayed loyal to Ali is known as Syiah follower. In its political history, there was a long contention between (Syiah) and the elite politic of Sunni.

300 See "Revolusi Islam Iran," http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolusi_Islam_Iran.

301 See the Biography of one of the reformation figures of Protestant, Erik Erickson, *The Young Luther*, New York: WW Norton, 1958.

sects and denominations related to their Church.³⁰² Likewise the Catholic, Anglican is mostly practiced in Great Britain, while Catholic Orthodox is practiced by most of people in Greece and Eastern Europe, to differentiate with most of (Catholics) led by the Pope in Vatican, Rome.³⁰³

In order to create conducive condition of democracy, human rights and peace, as the principles of social development, the people should be tolerant and respect each other religion or belief, so they can live side by side in diversity.³⁰⁴ Without tolerance, openness and respect between one another, the pluralism will be in danger, which lead people in conflict and violence; destroying democracy that has been developed based on constitution.³⁰⁵

Because pluralism means allowing anyone or any group to follow any religion or belief then it doesn't matter where it (religion/belief) comes from; either from Middle East, India, China or local. At this point, the freedom of religion/belief is absolute and non-derogable; including the activities performed among their group, as long as it doesn't cause any threat to the safety of its follower, then they have the rights to freedom of religion/belief without intervention and discrimination.

The rights for freedom of religion/belief are universal or non-discriminative, it means it not only allows some theological perspective but also allows other perspective, thus believing in any religion/belief should not be a matter. Nonetheless, no one could be forced to practice any religion/belief; therefore, an intervention to force religion/belief that contests one's faith is prohibited.

The limitation on freedom doesn't base on religion or belief but it would be applied when the religious activities endanger the safety,

302 See "Gerakan Karismatik," http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gerakan_Karismatik.

303 See "Mazhab Gereja England," http://ms.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mazhab_Gereja_England; "Gereja_Ortodoks," http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gereja_Ortodoks; and "Katolik," <http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Katolik>.

304 Hendarli, "Keberagaman dan Masa Depan Demokrasi," *Kompas*, Tuesday, 15 May 2007.

305 See, Nuruddin Hady, *Teori Konstitusi & Negara Demokrasi: Paham Konstitusionalisme Demokrasi Pasca Amandemen UUD 1945*, Malang: Setara Press, 2010.

order, social moral, or other's rights and freedom.³⁰⁶ According to *siracusa principles*, the limitation is justified only under a situation where an individual or group activity had seriously jeopardizes social safety, order, and moral; the limitation should be performed based on the law.³⁰⁷ Although the state may apply this limitation, it could not revoke the freedom of religion/belief.

SETARA Institute noted that the ignorance, violation and inflammation of hatred towards other group and against human rights and fundamental freedom, specifically the rights of thoughts, conscience, religion or any belief had either directly or not, cause the suffering of humankind. It is very disturbing, that manifestation of disharmony and discrimination conducted on behalf of religion had occurred in several regions in Indonesia. Many had suffered from it, not only they couldn't worship in their mosques and Churches but they were also evicted from their houses and lands that they owned for many years.^{308 309}

It is clear that certain religious/belief perspective may be exclusive and intolerant to other groups, where they could blame each other and become intolerance and discriminative towards other religion group. At theocratic level, a debate may end up in an accusation of apostasy, or even violence action,³¹⁰ which is often manifested by the majority of religion group that assembled in an organization towards the followers of other religion/belief.

Based on the research on perspective or opinion, SETARA Institute identified four (intolerant) doctrines applied by radical

306 Article 18, Paragraph 3, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

307 See, UN Economic and Social Council, *The Siracusa Principles on The Limitation and Derogation Provisions In The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, E/CN.4/1985/4. Limitation by state or government should not be conducted arbitrarily.

308 See "Perusakan Gereja, Bupati Asahan Minta Maaf," *harian-global.com*, Tuesday, 24 August 2010 06:15.

309 See "Ahmadiyah: Nasib Pengungsi Sama Saja," *gatra.com*, 10 June 2008 10:18. The Ahmadis in Mataram has been neglected for 28 months in the shelter at Kompleks Transito, after being evicted from their houses and lands.

310 Rocky Gerung, "Politik, HAM, Kultur," paper presented in the *Diskusi Tantangan-tantangan Mutakhir dalam Penegakan HaM di Indonesia – Discussion on Recent Challenges in Enforcing Human Rights in Indonesia*, organized by Yayasan Tifa, on 8 December 2010 in Jakarta.

Islamic organizations which led to the insult on the assurance of freedom of religion/belief. *First*, is doctrine about the obligation to enforce Islamic Law for organizing social life in accordance with *Al – Qur'an and Hadith*. Second, doctrine that obliges to fight apostasy by spreading the prejudice of Christians. Third, is doctrine as the messenger of truth, (by accusing other denominations or theological perspective as heretical). Four, is doctrine to wage war against immorality by performing *amar ma'ruf nahi mungkar* like (war) against gambling, alcohol business and prostitution.

The practical implication of those doctrines are intolerant behavior and discriminative in society in its relations with freedom of religion/belief. Some people who assembled in radical Islamic organization and other group express their intolerant and discriminative behavior in public space by exclaiming the statement of heresy, urging the disbandment of heretical sect, protesting the construction or existence of a place of worship, forcing religion conversion, closing road access, sealing the place of worship, damaging and burning the place of worship, forbidding religious activity, threatening and intimidating followers of certain religion/belief, damaging houses of a community, persecution, discrimination in worship, marriage, jobs, and at school.³¹¹

Some radical Islamic organization like FPI, Garis, Tholiban, Geram, FUI, FUUI, LP3SI, AGAP, GAPAS, and FAPB have taken part in promoting the perspective and intolerant attitude towards other groups, they also assembled mass to carry out and to support their ideas; they express their principle against immorality³¹² by dispersing people who were gambling, eliminating alcohol and sealing or closing prostitution.³¹³ FPI even challenges the

311 See the published report of SETARA Institute concerning the freedom of religion/belief; *Tunduk pada Penghakiman Massa* (2007); *Berpihak dan Bertindak Intoleran* (2008); *Toleransi dalam Pasungan* (2008); *Negara Harus Bersikap* (2009); and *Toleransi Sosial Masyarakat Perkotaan* (2010).

312 See "Jelang Ramadan FPI perangi kemaksiatan," *wawasandigital.com*, Thursday, 28 August 2008; and "Persepsi Sama tentang Kemaksiatan, FPI Bandung Dukung Dada," *bandung.detik.com*, Saturday, 28 June 2008 10:45 WIB. The statement from FPI Bandung was declared towards the election of the mayor.

313 See "Sisi yang Tidak Diekspos Media Tentang FPI," *fpi.or.id*, Wednesday, 11 June 2008 | 18:52 WIB. It means that the courage of FPI to raid immoral locations is serious; they

government concerning the anti-immoral campaign.³¹⁴ In other campaign they accused some Christian group was practicing apostasy (maybe the text means converting the Muslims to be Christians?).³¹⁵ Some of these radical groups also accusing certain mass organization and political party as communist and therefore should be banned.³¹⁶

In general, there are three communities that become the victim of their intolerance; *First* is the Christian minority community as the implication from the doctrine to eradicate apostasy (maybe the text means missionary?). Second, those who are accused as the follower of heretical sect, or deviates from Islam; third, parties that organize clubs, bars, shops and stalls that sell alcohol, or allow people to gamble and place that provide prostitutes.

Further implication from this intolerant doctrine is forcing, violence and criminal actions. They seem want to manifest their capability in using 'words and actions' in handling anything that against the doctrine.

3. NEGLECTFUL STATE: HORIZONTAL EFFECT

The implementation of religious and belief freedom that includes the freedom of worship and the like, creates a double obligation for the state, namely to respect (not interfere) and to protect (limited interference). In relation to the actions launched by

attack brothel houses, gambling places, including the "Playboy" Magazine in Jakarta. The actions of FPI become the headlines for the press media, radio and television. Unfortunately, it is only the violence of FPI that is being exposed by the media, which is (assumed) under the influence of liberal and pro – immorality group.

314 See "FPI Bubarkan Diri Jika Pemerintah Mampu Berantas Kemaksiatan," *eramuslim.com*, Sunday, 08 June 2008 07:07 WIB.

315 See "AGAP Beberkan Bukti Pemurtadan," *Republika*, Thursday, 12 April 2007; "Besok Jumat Muslim Bekasi Demo Melawan Pemurtadan dan Pelecehan Islam," *voa-islam.com*, Thursday, 13 May 2010; and "Terdapat 90 Titik Pemurtadan di Bandung," *republika.co.id*, Monday, 29 November 2010 at 07:53:00. On 28 November 2010, the leader of Indonesian People's Ulema Forum (Forum Ulama Umat Indonesia - (FUUI)) Athian Ali said, (they) had found 90 places of apostasy in Bandung.

316 See "Garis Tegas Haji Chep Hernawan," *alhikmahonline.com*, Friday, 01 August 2008; "Hadang Papernas, FPI & FBR Kepung Tugu Proklamasi," *detiknews.com*, Thursday, 29/03/2007 11:00 WIB; and "FPI Ingatkan Kebangkitan Komunisme," *antaranews.com*, Monday, 05 July 2010 18:36.

a number of radical Islamic organizations carrying four doctrines or agenda towards the religious and belief minority groups, the state is therefore responsible to protect the rights and the freedom of the groups that have been and will be victims of intolerance, violence, and/or criminal actions in the name of religion.

By implementing the principle of non-discrimination and equality before the law, the state should eliminate and prevent discriminative practices and actions in order that every individual or group should respect each other. Moreover, differences in religious/belief views or sect should not encourage people to behave and act intolerantly and discriminate other individuals or groups. Every individual or group is entitled to have any religious or belief views. They are also allowed to express their religion or belief as long as it is performed peacefully.³¹⁷

However, in some instances, the state does not interfere in that freedom and unfortunately it fails to protect, and instead it supports disrespect. In this intervention, the state behaves discriminatively as reflected by maintaining to apply to Law No. 1/PNPS/165,³¹⁸ the state even approve of other laws following pressures from a religious group, creating the Joint Ministerial Regulation (*Peraturan Bersama Menteri / PBM*) regarding the establishment of *places of worship*,³¹⁹ the formation and operation of The Coordinating Body for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakorpakem),³²⁰ abiding to the MUI *fatwa* concerning cults to issue a Joint Decree (SKB),³²¹

317 This limitation of freedom refers to the Article 18 Verse 3 that aims to protect the safety, order, health or the public moral or the rights and freedom of others.

318 The judges of the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung / MK) – despite a dissenting opinion – in the judicial review forwarded by a number of parties decide to preserve this law.

319 See “Pemerintah Sempurnakan Aturan Pendirian Tempat Ibadah,” *TEMPO Interaktif*, Wednesday, 07 September 2005 | 17:30 WIB.

320 See “Awasi Aliran-aliran Sesat Bakor Pakem Diefektifkan Kembali,” *jurnalbogor.com*, 3 April 2009; “Bakor Pakem Merekomendasikan Pelarangan Al-Qiyadah,” *metrotvnews.com*, Thursday, 08 November 2007 6:05 WIB. Bakorpakem was formed during the Soeharto regime era, based on the Attorney General Decree No. Kep.004/J.A/01/1994. The elements sitting in this body is the Department of Religion, Department of Internal Affairs, Police Headquarters of the Republic of Indonesia, the Department of Education, besides the element of the Supreme Court.

321 See “Bakor Pakem Minta SKB Stop Ahmadiyah Segera Diterbitkan,” *detiknews.com*, Wednesday, 16/04/2008 15:23 WIB; “Komnas Perempuan Surati SBY, Tolak SKB Ahmadiyah,” *kompas.com*, Thursday, 12 June 2008 | 14:29 WIB; “AKKBB Akan Gugat SKB

as well as to comply to the pressures from a group that impose the doctrine of upholding the shariah through Regional Regulation (*Peraturan Daerah / Perda*).³²² This law and policy also contradicts the rights and freedom of citizens, because it is discriminative against a certain religion or belief, opposes the establishment of *places* of worship, the law is even used to judge individuals from a minority group.

As previously stated, religious/belief views or sect can be inclusive or exclusive. Those who hold views of religious purification tend to be exclusive. With their exclamations and spreading their views in persisting the shariah, provoking the threats and danger of apostasy and of sects that are considered deviant, and the crackdown of immoral acts that have been taking place in public, therefore the public sphere has been characterized by hatred shown towards minority religious/belief groups as well as parties who conduct their business in the fields that are considered immoral.

The views of this group that are spread and formulated with hatred is the seed of intolerance and discrimination. If these views are repeatedly exclaimed, with even more violent provocative acts, then this matter will become a conditioning to conduct intolerance, violence and crime. At this point the state should perform its duty to protect the rights and freedom of human beings. *First*, the duty to prevent intolerant acts that disturb and threaten the freedom of others. *Second*, if a violation occurs, the state is obliged to process the perpetrators according to the law and give appropriate sanctions.

The acts of intolerance, violence and crime performed by a certain religious group could indirectly cause violations, which serves a horizontal effect, if the state does not carry out actions of prevention to protect other groups. If the state still does not process the perpetrator by law, then the state's negligence towards

Ahmadiyah," *inilah.com*, 10/06/2008 - 07:55; "SKB Ahmadiyah Wajah Buruk SBY-JK," *kompas.com*, Thursday, 12 June 2008 | 21:41 WIB; "PPP, PAN and PKS: SKB Ahmadiyah Kebijakan Arif," *albahar.wordpress.com*, 10 June 2008.

322 See Bahtiar Effendy, "Duduk Soal Perda Syariah," *okezone.com*, Thursday, 4 September 2008 - 10:08 wib; "MUI dan Ormas Islam Tolak Pencabutan Perda Syariah," *TEMPO Interaktif*, Wednesday, 21 June 2006 | 17:09 WIB; and "Syafii Ma'arif: Perda Syariah Tak Perlu," *TEMPO Interaktif*, Monday, 19 June 2006 | 16:45 WIB.

the victims of violations is complete: the state has failed to protect its citizens...

The practice and acts of intolerance, violence and crime that are done by an individual or a group of people implicate a number of human rights violations. The SETARA Institute has identified some violations of human rights as the effects of various actions performed the radical Islamic organizations:

First, disruption of religious activities or worship of minority groups that have been the targeted victims.

Second, difficulties to access *places* of religious worship caused by the sealings, closures, destructions and burning of *places* of worship.

Third, destructive actions and burning of houses, and other possessions in certain religious/belief communities, as well as the destruction of business groups have caused a number of people to lose their rights of housing and suffer the loss of properties.

Fourth, the mob attacks and harrassments have destroyed the right to personal integrity such as suffering from wounds to death (the right to live).

Fifth, a certain religious or belief community that has been evicted or forced to move from their settlement, are forced to live in an asylum.

Sixth, some actions that forces an individual to convert to another religion or belief are serious violations.

Seventh, a series of immoral crackdowns have caused a number people that earn their living from those business places to lose their jobs and their income.

Eight, without sufficient protection, it will not only cause fear for certain religious or belief groups, but also cause concerns for some people to express their freedom of opinion.

Ninth, it gives a strong impression that the groups conducting the intolerant acts in fact gain authority and right from the state to act as "moral police" or "religion police".

The negligence of several violations of religious freedom/belief in Indonesia has created a bad precedent for the law institution. The state's negligence combined with an intolerant social condition, plus the emergence and growth of radical Islamic organizations have opened an opportunity for the continued violation against the freedom of religion/belief. Support from the political elites on the national and regional level towards the radical Islamic groups in the form of accomodating the politic of negligence towards criminal acts, enforcing the Islamic *Shariah* through regional laws, the issuance of restrictive laws in the national level, and the development of a political network between the two, will make this organization more solid and gain wide support from the public. Moreover if this intolerant condition in the society continue to be radicalized.

E. FURTHER STEPS BY THE STATE

This research recommends the government to take constructive steps in deradicalization in the society level and to cut the institutionalization of impunity towards a number of violations against the freedom of religion/belief that are done by radical Islamic organizations, with the following steps.

1. **Enforcing the law for every violent action in the name of religion:** A strict enforcement of the law will be able to recover the society's trust towards the law enforcement authorities and to realize a positive precedent that violent actions in the name of religion or anything else is a law violation. As part of the right to freedom of expression and organization, the existence of radical Islamic groups is still justifiable as long as they do not express intolerant behavior that violates human rights and create violence towards other parties. If violence has become their choice of actions, then the state has to take action and process the action according to the law.
2. **Formulate a comprehensive strategy for deradicalization by creating a pollitical channel for the elites and an economic channel for the members:** Perform the

deradicalization step by moderating the religious views and transformation of the members to become more moderate. For the radical Islamic organization's elites, the moderation can be made by forming new political channels to create a more compromising meeting point for the opposing views in the framework of democracy. The democracy mechanism is highly possible to moderate radical views. Meanwhile the economical channel is aimed for the members of the radical organizations who are mostly at the grassroot level with a low level of welfare. The economic channel will answer the anxieties of the society at the grassroot level that have all this time experience economic backwardness.

3. **Increase the citizen's education and pluralism:** This step is a long-term and simultaneous effort to ensure the transformation of moral education for students from an early age. The radicalization in the urban society is currently straying to teenagers even from the lowest school level, i.e. kindergarten and elementary school.
4. **Review and/or take out some discriminantive regulations in the law:** A number legislation that is clearly totally discriminative must be taken out. Their existence do not only threaten minority groups but also serve as a foundation and give legitimation for violent actions
5. **Create a law that guarantees the freedom of religion/belief:** Creating a new law that guarantees the freedom of religion/belief is a rational choice and has a strong sociological foundation amidst the threats against the guaranteed freedom of religion/belief. Creating a new law is also a constitutional mandate, because the constitutional norms on the freedom of religion/belief have not been translated in the law. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, in the evaluation of the Law No. 1/ PNPS/ 1965 implicitly mandates that the government and the DPR RI create a new law that is more conducive.
6. **Terminate political accomodation towards the radical Islamic groups:** The political accomodations from the state

and the political infidelities between state elites and radical Islamic groups must be terminated, in order to guarantee the freedom of religion/belief. The politicization of religious identities for the intention to gain political support is not a smart way of modern politics, because the impacts create discrimination, intolerance, and violence for other groups.

7. **Provide a holistic protection towards minority groups:** Minority groups are groups that should be protected by the state. In fact the guarantee of special protection for the minority groups is an order from the 1945 State Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia (UUD Negara RI 1945). However, until now the government does not yet have a holistic protection mechanism, especially a mechanism to recover the rights of the victims of violations against the freedom of religion/belief. Creating a protection policy and a mechanism to recover the rights of the victims is a rational choice in a pluralistic and democratic country.

Reaffirm the four pillars of a national living in various forms of legislations, policies, and nation behaviors: Pancasila, UUD Negara RI 1945, *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, and NKRI are the four pillars of a national living that have become a political agreement amongst the founders of the nation, and until now it is still maintained. The organizers of the state are required to confirm that the four principles are not merely a slogan or a jargon but should be manifested in various forms of legislation, policies and behavior of the state apparatus and society.

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