PART I - STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
CHAPTER 1

STARTING POINTS

General Background
National Challenges
Regional Alliances
Global Strategy
National Overview
Types of Threats
Analysis of Threats
Scale of Threats

Circumstances determining Crises and Regional Conflicts

Timor-Leste in the Indian
Timor-Leste in the Pacific
1 - GENERAL BACKGROUND

A look at the current reality of the world, with the intention of interpreting the past and placing it in the present context of geo-political and geo-strategic interests, shows that nations, by excessive use and abuse of power, drag vulnerable countries into their economic dominion. This is the clear reality that is visible, even if inadmissible, to the eyes and consciences of each one of us.

In Timor-Leste, war after war, resistance grew to enormous proportions, a shared sense of peace emerged from its own vulnerability that was established pedagogically in the spirit of the people. This sentiment held the people together through the period of secular resistance, the wars of foreign occupation, the political conflicts of fratricidal violence and, later, the tragic military intervention and annexation of Timor-Leste by Indonesia, which led to a continuing and widespread deaths, destruction and suffering across all parts of society. It was in this historic framework that Timor-Leste gained its sovereignty for peace and liberty.

An unconditional refusal to repeat the events imposed in the past is a constant indicator that moulds the character of National Defence. We must instil, now and in the future, a convincing and overwhelming desire for peace and liberty in the exercise of national sovereignty, to bring about a durable independence that sees Timor-Leste reborn as a just and prosperous society.

Timor-Leste as an independent country is subject to threats in the same way as other nations on the international stage. As Timor-Leste progressively develops in the direction of these global changes, it is foreseeable that its needs will alter systematically and its strategic environment will adapt to the dynamic reality that exists. A similar development must occur in the Armed Forces with the objective of affirming them as a (professional, efficient and integrated) force indispensable for the defence of the nation.

2 - NATIONAL CHALLENGES

The dark shadows of the past show the vulnerability of Timor-Leste to other countries’ desire to impose their geo-political, economic and strategic interests. Future development must successfully integrate the exercise of a democratic State with the establishment of political balance in the national and international context. The dynamic concept of a modern economic system and the definition of the objectives of security in a holistic strategy of National Defence. As a foundation for these objectives, the State of Timor-Leste must, as a priority, establish a standard of national development, and be responsible for investment in the training of human resources as a priority for the State and for systematically strengthening the intellectual fabric, human capital, structural capital and institutional capital, as the principal objectives towards achieving national development. National Development must be guided by an integrated perspective of two concepts: the concept of a continental (territorial) orientation and the concept of a maritime orientation. Both must be balanced in the National Development Plan, given the geographic characteristics and circumstances of Timor-Leste, which is an archipelago nation with the potential maritime resources to guarantee its sustainable development.

The maritime vocation may be a political orientation of the State of the RDTL, taking on the role of a maritime State, considering the strategic aspects that may sustain and reinforce the instruments of
economic power of the nation: energy resources in the sea, fishing, maritime communication routes (SLOC - Sea Line of Communications), maritime transport and portage, maritime tourism, management of the sea (environment and marine resources), maritime security and defence, scientific research, and the development of a range of specialised human resource training measures in the maritime sector. The National Development Plan and the current development of the State do not reflect a balanced perception that would lead to a development paradigm integrating the concepts of maritime orientation and continental orientation.

As a recently born nation, the creation of intra-Timorese platforms for public discussion is suggested, in relation to the road map for national development.

In addition to the road map, human development is indispensable to harmonise the moral, spiritual, social and cultural condition of the population and the consequent reconstruction of national identity, which are them selves fundamental conditions for achieving these national development objectives. If not, the emotional state and the distorted mentality of the population, after the difficult process of liberation (during the various conflicts and wars of occupation) and the complex integration in the process of national independence (from the interventions to the imposition of peace in Timor-Leste), may come to constitute abundant and latent grounds for new internal conflict.

3 - REGIONAL ALLIANCES

The liberation of Timor-Leste was paid for by the people themselves with a very high toll of life. Its independence constituted the solemn commitment of the State of RDTL towards its people and before the international community. In this context, the national development and affirmation of Timor-Leste inevitably require global, integrated and participative involvement in the spirit of mutual understanding with immediately neighbouring countries, nearby countries, and the rest of the world. Through the establishment of multilateral and bilateral alliances and other partnerships of cooperation without geo-strategic restrictions, Timor-Leste will be able to conduct, permanently, the strategic exercise of conflict management by seeking suitable solutions to respond to the types of common military and non-military threats that may compromise national and/or international security.

Timor-Leste is a nation situated simultaneously in Asia and the Pacific, and for this reason it is justified in playing an active role in the councils of Asia and the South-East Pacific. ASEAN is an organisation that Timor-Leste must join to gain credentials and exclusive political and economic opportunities. As a member of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), Timor-Leste will obtain some guarantees of security from its immediate and near neighbours, from a perspective of future cooperation in common security. It is also necessary to consider the fact that participation in multilateral forums may lead to greater bilateral cooperation in questions related to security.

It is imperative for Timor-Leste to intensify cooperation with Indonesia and develop trilateral dialogue between Jakarta, Canberra and Dili. Timor-Leste has a crucial role to play in fostering a triangular partnership with Indonesia and Australia. The format of the Trilateral Ministerial Meeting between Australia, Indonesia and Timor-Leste is a specific organisation that must be considered within the scope of military cooperation, possibly starting with the conversations that will result, eventually, in the intensification of the process of training and, later, combined exercises.
The principal objectives of Timor-Leste’s regional security must be addressed through the creation of a cooperative external security environment, compatible with the dimension of economic growth, social development and national political stability. The best way of achieving these objectives is to strengthen relations with Indonesia and Australia, and to increase or enhance the nation's diplomatic influence, whenever possible, by joining regional organisations (mentioned above). Timor-Leste must actively cultivate links with other States with influence in the region, in particular China, Japan and India; and the ASEAN states such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines. Timor-Leste must intensify its security links with the USA as the world’s superpower.

A vital component in terms of Timor-Leste’s ability to guarantee its future security is to become involved in broad-based local alliances, and in other international and regional organisations with a view to creating an environment where questions of regional relations can be covered in a dynamic and significant way. Security is a fundamental component of international and regional involvement, and the focus of many regional and multilateral forums has been enlarged to include modern threats to security as well as establishing regional measures against these threats.

The overall stability and security situation in the region obliges Timor-Leste to develop and decisively engage in international cooperation and in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Thus, the involvement of Timor-Leste in a wide range of international forums, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, will be a priority. The contribution of Timor-Leste towards global peace and security will be provided in large measure by its strong engagement and active role within the scope of the UN and of other multilateral organisations, among which, the countries of the CPLP and other neighbouring countries and the region mentioned above will be especially important, as set out in the Constitution: “Timor-Leste will maintain privileged links with the countries that have Portuguese as their official language”¹ and “Timor-Leste will maintain special links of friendship and cooperation with neighbouring countries and those in the region”²

4 - GLOBAL STRATEGY

The threats and risks to national, regional and international security assume today a multi-faceted, unforeseeable and trans-national character as a result of the nature of a system characterised by interdependence, multi-polarity and heterogeneous political, cultural and social models. In this new security environment, to traditional threats and risks are added the risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the dangers arising from the inappropriate use of new technologies, those provoked by failure in the maintenance and control of nuclear, biological and chemical equipment and materials.

Using the concept of international concern - literally in the meaning of strategic concern about the new and complex sources of instability to security and world peace - the world powers have been developing broader concepts of security, as an essential means of managing, controlling and confronting the challenges tending to lead to crises and conflicts in the present climate. The concept

¹ Constitution of the RDTL, Article 8 no.3.
² Constitution of the RDTL, Article 8 no.4.
has ceased to be concerned with objectives solely centred on vital interests associated with the
defence of the territory and sovereignty of States, although they still persist, and is now more
exacting in terms of a philosophy of pro-active diplomacy and of a global vision of the growth of
focal points of international insecurity connected with the arms race and the crises that arise from it.
Good neighbourly relations between States seek to prevent the aggravation of crises that may be
provoked and/or imposed with international repercussions.

Timor-Leste experienced, throughout the process of liberation, various types of pro-active diplomacy
scenarios to strengthen the resistance. Following independence, Timor-Leste may constitute a
strategic paradigm for its immediate neighbours to develop political cooperation for the purposes of
the joint security of the countries on the international concern list. One way or another, Timor-Leste
may suffer an imposition of foreign forces in the security domain if it becomes a concern to the
pursuance of other States' own interests.

The supremacy of force (military power) demonstrated by world powers in the theatre of operations
reorients the strategic vision of States in terms of world security, by means of a policy of broad
cooperation in international organisations for collective defence. Timor-Leste must orientate its
National Defence Policy, and progressively adapt it to the circumstances and conditions of the
regional and world strategic environment to maximise its geo-political framework and make it
relevant to the new millennium.

5 - NATIONAL OVERVIEW

It is therefore within this geo-political and geo-strategic picture that the leaders of the State of
Timor-Leste will have to define and take the decisions that will best serve the national interests,
specifically on matters related to defence and national security. It is considered fundamental to
recognise and rigorously evaluate the vulnerabilities and permanent and constant potentialities that
explain the interests that may compromise the security of Timor-Leste, taking into account an
analysis of the geographic, demographic and economic factors, natural resources, political-
administrative factors, national identity, the political action of its leaders, the creation of elements of
consensus and participation, of mechanisms for national cohesion, and the circumstances and
fundamental values defined in the strategic environment of Timor-Leste.

5.1 Geography - Geographically, the island of Timor is located in Southeast Asia. It is around 480
Km long and 105 Km wide with a total surface area of 32,350 Km², around 430 Km from the
Australian continent to the south and, approximately, 1,000 Km from the island of Java to the north-
west. Historically, Timor-Leste is made up of the eastern part of the island of Timor; the western
part of the island is under Indonesian sovereignty. The frontiers are defined: to the north by the
straits of Ombai and Wetar (both important commercial routes); to the west by the province of Nusa
Tenggara Timur (Indonesia); to the east by the sea of Arafura and the island of Leti (Indonesia); and to
the south by the sea of Timor (which contains reserves of natural gas, oil and other abundant
marine resources).

The archipelago structure of Timor-Leste has a total surface area of 18,899Km²; distributed in the
following way: the principal territory with an area of around 17,900Km², the enclave of Oe-cusse
with an area of approximately 850Km², the island of Ataúro, measuring around 144Km² and the islet of Jaco, measuring around 5Km². It is approximately 265km long, and at its widest point is 92Km wide. The land borders with West Timor (Indonesia) total around 220Km, the coastlines 700km, territorial waters 16,000Km² and the EEZ around 75,000Km².

The geographical position of Timor-Leste may bring benefits if we consider its strategic relevance in the global context. To do so, we must address and focus on the following aspects:

a) The geo-strategic situation of Timor-Leste between the two great regional powers. One, to the West and the North, with high human potential, that accounts for the major share of the land and maritime borders. The other to the South-East, with high economic potential, the maritime frontier with which is still disputed. Both constitute situations of high vulnerability for Timor-Leste and constant attempts at strategic influence, from one or other of the regional powers;

b) Timor-Leste is situated in a critical geographic position, strategically compromised, and must therefore remain firm with a decisive and affirmative voice. The Great Sunrise agreements bring immediate benefits to the country, although they suspend the demarcation of the maritime border for 50 years as a reciprocal exchange with Australia, a fact that generates less lucrative impacts for Timor-Leste. These impacts are felt on at least two levels. The first impact directly affects the fishing sector, due to the freeze on the definition and legislation of the EEZ. The second impact is from an anticipated loss of (estimated) receipts from the maritime transport and ports sector and sea lanes (SLOC), if Indonesia demands a reciprocal exchange along the same lines;

c) The geographical position of Timor-Leste is a factor of crucial interest to its immediate neighbours. For Indonesia, due to its political and security situation, the process of democratisation and its economic development. Australia may, from the point of view of security, place Timor-Leste within one of its arcs of protection (chains of security), i.e. as security insurance in the context of its immediate defence. We must remember, at this point, the bitter experiences of the people of Timor-Leste during the Second World War. Currently, the strategic pretensions of both countries remain latent and continue to be relevant to the development of Timor-Leste;

d) In accordance with the archipelago features that define Timor-Leste as a maritime nation, a State-centric policy must be adopted in designing the National Defence Policy and in the Strategic Concept of National Defence;

e) The archipelago structure of the national territory makes Timor-Leste vulnerable to new threats by sea and by land. This fact requires the authorities of the State to update the capabilities of the Armed Forces, studying and defining a military defence capability that provides for the development of an adequate Light Naval Force and the restructuring of the Land Forces;

f) A new sophisticated and modern Light Naval Force must have the inter-operability capability to secure the maritime route through the straits of Ombai and Wetar (which constitutes an important commercial maritime passage for the world market), in particular for the escort and security of the tankers that transport crude oil through the sea of Timor and for other parties who use our territorial/jurisdictional waters; and exclusive capability for the high level of security required on oil extraction platforms;

g) In the interests, and for the development, of Timor-Leste, the opportunity to invest in the maritime sector must include the possibility of building ports of international calibre for
commercial goods transport (cargos and containers) and the transit of maritime fleets;

h) The importance of Ataúro to the security of territorial waters and the opportunity to establish the disposition of strategic arms of the world powers in the region;

i) The importance of Baucau airport for use as a point of support for in-depth aerial attack or as an advanced point of immediate or rearguard defence against other countries, constitutes a buffer zone that may well be an area of intelligence operations and permanent surveillance of immediate neighbours;

j) Having a pro-active capability along the land borders, maintaining the Armed Forces in a coverage zone to establish security inter-operability with immediate neighbours and maintaining permanent surveillance of territorial waters (coastal, oceanic and EEZ) and in the air and space;

k) Opportunely, the topographic land characteristics of Timor-Leste (the elevations of the north and south slopes) offer suitable conditions for the installation of radar and sensing equipment to intercept incursions into territorial waters and maintain strategic surveillance;

l) From the point of view of internal threats, the mountainous massif situated in the interior of the territory is difficult to access (with various parts of the territory becoming increasingly hazardous in the rainy season) and presents particular difficulty in terms of communications, and therefore may constitute an excellent refuge for future groups hostile to national stability. Equally, because the principal intra-district communications network passes through Dili (the capital), Baucau and Maliana, these population centres are all major targets for future actions by hostile groups;

m) We must establish strategic routes as alternatives for communications (suitable and integrated maritime and air transport) for the purposes of defence and security and, simultaneously, to cover public transport needs;

n) The surveying of detailed cartographic and population data using a GPS (Global System Positioning) communications system is a sophisticated contribution by external agencies to the efficiency of the work of the Government of the RDTL. However, from the point of view of National Defence, this constitutes a vulnerability for Timor-Leste, since the external agencies can access and manage detailed information about the geographic and cartographic coordinates of national territory to attain their own strategic objectives. Airspace, as well as being a strategic space of permanent national interest, must be legally protected before any management of usage rights (GPS, airlines, transmission frequencies, and others) is conceded.

5.2 Demography – Based on the data from the Census of Population and Housing of 2004, we can point out some characteristics that currently define the demographic profile of Timor-Leste. This young, rapidly growing population is heavily rural, poorly qualified educationally and professionally, and mostly living from subsistence activities whether in rural areas or urban areas, with the exception of Dili, the capital city where contractual and remunerated employment opportunities are concentrated, although this available employment still co-exists with a vast informal sector (commerce and supply of various services). As factors of social cohesion, at the national level, Catholicism and the Tétum language (among the immense diversity of national languages) stand out.

As a complement, a more detailed analysis shows that the generational factor reveals some elements of internal differentiation within the more generic demographic profile, showing in the
young and young adult generations, for example, a positive variation in rates of schooling and in linguistic ability in the official and working languages of the RDTL, and a strong tendency towards rural exodus in search of employment opportunities and advanced schooling. However, even within the young adult generation there is still a low level of qualification associated with a high rate of economic activity in the subsistence sector and in the informal sector, generating very low incomes, corresponding to a deficient standard of living that characterises the majority of the population. At the level of the principal factors of national cohesion – Tétum and Catholicism – both the older and younger generations remain its guardians.

Timor-Leste has a very young demographic profile, and a rapid growth trend. At present, the total population of Timor-Leste is approximately 1 million people (in 2004, there were 923,198 inhabitants) with an annual growth rate of 3.2%. In terms of age structure, people with an age below 15 represent 43% of the population of Timor, and the rest of the age structure is made up of the ages between 15-19 years representing 10% of the population, giving 53% of Timor's population below the age of 20, in contrast to 41% of the population with ages between 20-60 years and only 6% aged 60 or more, of whom only 3.5% are 65 or over. Contributing factors to this extremely young demographic profile are high fertility rates (an average of 7 children per woman) and a low average life expectancy (55.5 years).

The population is distributed in an unequal way across national territory, with the capital Dili being the principal economic and residential centre, with a population density of 483 inhabitants/Km². At the opposite extreme, the least densely populated districts are Covalima with 19 inhabitants/Km² and Viqueque with 35 inhabitants/Km², respectively.

There are twelve ethnic groups within the national territory, with differing idioms, of Austronesian and Papuan origin (nine Austronesian: Tétum, Mambai, Tokodede, Kemak, Galoli, Idate, Waimoa, Nauetii, Baikeno; and three Papuan: Bunak, Makasai, Fataluku). According to the Population Census 2004, around 32 languages and dialects are spoken in Timor-Leste. The most spoken mother tongues are, in decreasing order, Tétum-Praça (18% of Timor’s population), Mambai (17.7%), Makasai (12%), Kemak (6.9%), Bunak (6.8%), Tétum-Terik (6.2%), Tokodede (4.3%), Fataluku (3.9%), Baikenu (3.8%), Atoni (2.4%), Waimoa (2%) and the remaining languages and dialects, each of which had less than 2% of the Timorese population. In territorial terms, with the exception of Tétum, which became the language of national unity and cohesion during the struggle for national liberation, the languages of Timor-Leste have a clearly demarcated territorial expression. In Oecusse, the principal form of oral expression is Baikenu. Close to the frontier, in Covalima Tétum predominates and, in Bobonaro, Kemak and Bunak are mixed. In Liquiça the population speak Tokodede and in Dili, Tétum. In the mountainous interior Mambai predominates, as it also does in the districts of Ainaro and Manufahi. In Manatuto, Galoli and Tétum predominate. In the districts of Baucau and Viqueque, Makasai, Waimoa and Midiki are mostly spoken. In the extreme East, the district of Lautém is dominated overall by Fataluku.

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4 Idem (Table 1.01)
In terms of full linguistic ability (speaking, reading and writing) in the official languages (Tétum and Portuguese) and working languages (Bahasa Indonesia and English), enshrined in the Constitution of the RDTL (article 13), Tétum is known by 42% of the population of Timor-Leste (and spoken by around of 86% of the population), Bahasa Indonesian is known by 39% of the population (and spoken by 58.7%), Portuguese is known by 12% of the population (and spoken by 37%) and the English is known by 5% of the population (and spoken by 22%). Approximately 19% of Timor’s population declare that they know (although without full command) the 4 official and working languages, and 13% declare that they don’t speak any of these languages. Among the school-age and youngest generations, and educated young adult generations with a tendency towards exodus and emigration, the proportion of individuals with full linguistic ability is much higher than in the older populations, due, above all, to the high rate of illiteracy and early school leaving that predominates in these last groups, and their consequent lack of linguistic achievement.

In terms of religion, the Timorese population is strongly homogeneous with Catholicism being an important factor in national cohesion. The Catholic majority (96.5% of the population), cohabits with other minority faiths (Protestant 2.2%, Muslim 0.3%, Buddhist 0.07%, Hindu 0.03%, amongst others).

In regard to the educational profile of the population, in average terms, the rate of illiteracy is high (47% of the whole population) and the level of schooling of the population is low (only 15% of the population aged 18 or over has gained a high school diploma). The generation gap means that a lower level of illiteracy and longer school education can be observed in the generations up to 34 years old. However, the rates of illiteracy are still high among the younger generations (35% in the 10-14 age group, 20% in the 15-19 age group, 26% in the 20-24 age group, 31% in the 25-29 age group), and there is still a high rate of early school leaving at all educational levels. The average proportion of those with diplomas is low, whether at the level of secondary education (15.4% of the population aged 18 years or over) or higher education (1.7% of the population aged 25 or over), which in any case represents a positive variation and growth trend among the younger generations and young adults (the proportion of those with secondary education diplomas in the 20-34 age range is between 28% - 23%, and the proportion of those with higher education qualifications is between 3.9% - 3.2%).

This educational profile points to the undeniable need to create various types of response in the short, medium and long term on the part of the State of Timor-Leste, to the level of training and skilling of the nation’s human resources.

In terms of the profile and structure of employment (principal occupation and sectors of economic activity), Timor-Leste is still predominantly country whose active population is mostly dependant on the subsistence sector, in which the high weighting towards subsistence agriculture (which occupies 78% of the national workforce) is notable. The remaining sectors are largely underdeveloped, although there is some employment growth (between 2% and 4% of the workforce) created by the

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6 Idem (Tables 2.05, 5.04 and 5.08)
7 Idem (Table 2.02)
8 National Board of Statistics, Timor-Leste Census of Population and Housing 2004. Priority Tables, ed. National Board of Statistics and the United Nation Fund for Population, April 2006. (Tables 5.01 and 5.03). Note: Table 5.01 must be interpreted with care. the data included in it must only be read as indicative data, since the rate of illiteracy of non-respondents is very high (42.3%).
formal sector in the area of education (public sector), commerce, supply of various poorly qualified services, in the UN agencies and NGOs, and in the various areas of Public Administration.9

Defining the appropriate dynamics and mechanisms to transform the current standard of economic activity that is dominated by the subsistence and informal sectors (subsistence agriculture and fishing, informal trade, labourers, civil construction, domestic services, etc) that occupy approximately 80% of the total workforce and dominate the national picture, versus only 20% of the workforce remunerated in the formal sector (i.e., fully-employed active population, whether for other people or themselves, and fully remunerated), is one of the principal challenges for the State's policies. This challenge, which is associated with growth in the private business sector and the educational and professional qualifications of the population, will be even greater if the current high rates of fertility (an average of 7 children per woman) are maintained, as these contribute not only to rapid growth in the active population in medium term, but also to maintaining the growth rate of the non-active population above the growth rate of the active population, and will cause strong pressure on the active population in the short term.

Analysing the relation between the age structure and the structure of economic activity of Timor's population, the Census of 2004 shows that among the active population, the age groups between 20-44 years contribute most to the actual workforce. Among these, it is in the age groups up to 40 years of age that the best educated and best qualified workforce is found and, therefore, the workforce that is absorbed by the formal employment sector (in which the principal employers are the Government, the NGOs, the UN agencies and the private sector). Strongly dependent on the workforce (whether qualified and employed in the formal sector, or unqualified and occupied in the informal and subsistence sectors) is the inactive Timorese population, which consists of the child population (0-15 years of age), the majority of the population between 15-19 years of age (although included in the “active population” category, only 1/5 of this group claim to be in work, and most of those are working in the informal and subsistence sectors), and the elderly population with an age of 65 or over (which represents only 3.5% of the national population). This demographic profile is characterised by a high economic dependency index on the part of the child population and a rate of growth of the non-active population higher than in the active population, facing very specific challenges at the level of education and professional training policies, and of conditions and mechanisms for the creation of real employment, principally in the private sector (whose current employment capacity is minimal) in the short and medium term, offering a diversity of formal and contracted economic activities to absorb this workforce in the near future. In terms of being an employer, the public sector is not expected to expand greatly. Its principal function must be to create the necessary conditions for the emergence of a favourable environment for the creation and growth of employment, combining this with strong investment in the areas of education, training and qualification of the nation’s human resources and in the institutional capabilities of the State.

The complex demographic profile of Timor-Leste (described above) is an important strategic factor for national development. Below, some critical elements that emerge from this type of demographic profile are set out, along with their impacts in terms of economic growth and national security:

a) How to absorb an active and rapidly-growing population and improve the levels of per capita income and family life and, simultaneously, train the new generations to respond to the future

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9 Idem (Tables 6.03 and 6.04).
challenges of sustainable growth and national development? This may constitute the most
critical population factor, to which we urge solutions in the short, medium and long term. The
State of Timor-Leste is responsible for finding answers, and facing the challenge of visualising
and creating scenarios, and defining effective strategies and policies, whether in rationalising
the framework and participation of the actual active population in real economic development,
or in investment in and preparation of the younger generations for the medium and long term
challenges in terms of sustainable growth and national development;

b) There will be multiple implications in terms of education, training and qualification, in the
creation of work opportunities decentralised by geographic area and by sector, improvement of
income levels, of increase in the quality and quantity of public services, to obtaining the
economic balance and security indispensable to overcoming the challenges of quality,
productivity and competitiveness that face Timor’s economy and society, and that will allow the
younger generations to integrate into the trends of internationalisation and globalisation;

c) Young people must be given priority in investment in active and productive training for the
development of the nation. There is a need to rejuvenate the institutions of the State with a
new dynamic in the framework of global development. The institutions of defence, specifically
the Armed Forces, must assume as one of their specific missions the patriotic training and
technical qualification par excellence of the citizens, in parallel with the other educational and
professional training institutions, becoming an employer that offers standards of
professionalism, ethics and technological progress that meet international standards;

d) Over roughly half a century there will be dramatic growth in the population of Timor-Leste if
effective mechanisms of demographic awareness are not adopted, with serious consequences
for the socio-economic framework in the strategic plan of national development;

e) The multi-ethnic origin of the population may constitute a vulnerability to influence by an
external factor provoking social breakdown or instability;

f) The diversity of languages spoken leads to less mutual understanding, which may facilitate the
emergence of internal conflicts and misunderstandings;

g) The fact that there are Timorese who speak similar languages on both sides of the land border
may facilitate infiltrations and the obtaining of support from the population;

h) The opposition between the "pros" and "antis" of the Indonesian occupation, principally in
terms of violence, may originate fractures in society, that by means of manipulation may cause
degeneration into violence and actual social breakdown;

i) In a society such as Timor, violence (or the spectre of violence) is one of the principal
motivating causes of disruptive internal migratory movements (relocation or temporary or
permanent abandonment of residences), causing the State diverse problems of security for the
population, socio-economic disruptions, family breakdown, abandonment of goods and
property, illegal occupation of property, emergency food and sanitation support, etc;

j) The growth and enlargement of martial arts groups is a phenomenon tending towards violence,
to which the State has delayed trying to find solutions and a strategic orientation to engage
young men in work, occupation and leisure activities. The State must define a strategic
orientation of a civic-patriotic, educational and socio-sporting character, in coordination with
governmental and non-governmental institutions, associations, the Catholic church and other
religious faiths, to instil inclusive participation of young people in national development.
5.3 National Identity – Liberty having been won, it is time to learn the lessons of an exemplary historical process, and also think about the enormous economic and social challenges that Timor-Leste has in front of it. Despite the terrible experience of the Indonesian transition, the largest questions for Timor-Leste are of an internal order. Only by guaranteeing Democracy to its citizens and defending the human rights will it preserve its international legitimacy and the attention and support of its partners.

Timor-Leste is an exemplary case due to the political action of its leaders. President Xanana Gusmão constantly maintains his allegiance to democracy, to human rights, to pardon, reconciliation, tolerance, unity and national cohesion.

The international campaigns in defence of the liberation of Timor-Leste resulted in the Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the co-laureates Dr. José Ramos Horta and Monsignor Dom Ximenes Belo, international recognition of the struggle of a people in the name of the values of resistance and Humanity. However, this international mobilisation would be of little value if the crisis and destruction that followed the referendum had not occurred at the moment of affirmation of the belief that the fundamental values of man are above the interests of the world powers, and as a result demand international intervention even when this presents dilemmas to the strategic interests of certain countries.

In the eyes of the international community, it was not in the name of sovereignty that Timor-Leste became independent, but in the name of the primacy of the rights of all men, even those that are not essential to stability in the world. As a result, the legitimacy of Timor-Leste resides in its leaders' respect for democracy and the rules of healthy coexistence. The identity of Timor-Leste is much more, today, the result of its struggle for liberty, than of its language, culture, religion or anything that would result from the definition of a supposed regional enemy. Timor-Leste must, above all, seek its unique place in the world community from a position of openness to the world.

The heritage accumulated during the national liberation process will be much greater than the capital that results from the exploration of oil or natural gas, which will ensure the future of Timor-Leste and guarantee that it will be heard and will have the support of the international community.

To build a truly democratic State, the convictions of the current leaders are not sufficient, however. Elements of consensus and participation need to be created, along with mechanisms for national cohesion, training and skilling the citizens and the functionaries of the State, and creating solid institutions appropriate to a Democratic State.

Building a national identity with the values of resistance, liberty, human rights, and democracy in the development of an ethical and patriotic consciousness constitutes a present challenge, in the national and international strategic context. Timor-Leste must create, and continue to develop, new elements of national identity that project its image to the world, specifically:

a) Create and project national icons in sport, music, art etc. (in all areas and spaces);

b) Participate in universal mechanisms to internationalise national symbols;

c) Invest in the development of industrial brands;

d) Preserve and socialise cultural characteristics in the scope of the national interest;

e) Preserve and develop the potential of the symbolic value of the Nobel Peace Prize and;
f) Contribute, by means of the participation of the Armed Forces, in peacekeeping missions of the UN and other international bodies.

5.4 Administrative Policy - The State of the RDTL has four organs of sovereignty (President of the Republic, National Parliament, Government and Judiciary) and various institutions that confer unity on it, subordinate to the fundamental law which is the Constitution of the RDTL (authority established in harmony with the law) and in accordance with international law.

The institutions of defence and security, as institutions of the State, must have a combination of characteristics accepted by the international community and be subject to the general legal principles enshrined in the Constitution, since they support the State, specifically, as an instrument of peace and an element of stabilisation of conflicts and tensions.

Timor-Leste, as an independent State in the third millennium, has become the 191st member of the UN, an affirmative global framework for its sovereignty. An inalienable sovereignty is merited by all independent States in the exercise of their internationally recognised legal power. This privilege of being sovereign has moved beyond the efforts of common feeling of the international community to converge on sovereignty of equality and of solidarity. The international community has systematically given Timor-Leste its support for development, has stimulated the strengthening of the systems of construction of the State, and the preservation of the values of liberty, fully attained by the supremacy of the national resistance struggle. A national resistance that, for 24 years, brandished its right to the independence that was denied to it and ignored by neighbouring States and by the international community.

The facets of the transactional historical process (i.e. the process of transformation from the bottom up) culminate with the achievement and construction of a free and sovereign Timor-Leste. We enjoy today our liberty in a new-born democratic State that we need to build, strengthen and make credible, to enable us to complete the systematic consolidation of our independence in a framework of global development, with clear definitions of our coexistence as a free and democratic, independent and sovereign nation among the other nations of the world. The development of the internal policy of Timor-Leste has a democratic destiny in light of the national interest. The tangible development of national cohesion poses, permanently, the political challenge of the construction and strengthening of the exercise of the Democratic State and of its institutions, of pluralism, of inclusiveness, dialogue and reconciliation, of representation and legitimacy, of credibility and transparency, of constitutionality, of respect for the rights, freedoms and guarantees of all citizens, of the supremacy of the common collective interest over individual, partisan and corporative interests.

The political system of Timor-Leste is founded on a semi-presidential regime, with power divided between the President of the Republic and the National Parliament. Although the President has the power to dissolve Parliament, in practice Executive Power is in the hands of the Prime Minister who takes decisions in the forum of the Council of Ministers. Simultaneously, the system promotes the coexistence of a Foreign Policy with preventative Diplomacy along national interest lines for the promotion and establishment of inter-State cooperation in a regional and international dimension in order to achieve the global objectives of development and lasting peace in Timor-Leste.
Timor-Leste is dedicated, constitutionally, to the principle of administrative decentralisation of its territory. Currently, it is divided into 13 districts, 65 sub-districts (councils) 498 "Sucos" (parishes) and 2336 villages. Each one of these districts has a capital and is made up, in its turn, by sub-districts (between 3 and 7) with an average of five. Of all the districts, Viqueque is largest in area (1884 Km²) and the district of the capital Dili has the smallest area (364 Km²). Each of the 67 sub-districts also has a capital and an administrative sub-division into parishes, varying between 2 and 18 per district. The largest sub-district is Lospalos in Lautém which has an area of 635 Km² and the smallest is Nain Feto in Dili which is 6 Km². The geographical division of the districts and sub-districts shows a trend towards greater administrative segmentation in the central and western zones of the territory.

The recent administrative division of national territory into four regions (under the stewardship of 4 secretaries of state) and a secretary of state in residence in Oe-cusse constitutes a new stage in the consolidation of decentralised administrative power. However, this objective will only be fully accomplished if it is transformed into a process of real political-administrative decentralisation, and accompanied by a decentralisation of productive capacity.

5.5 Natural Resources – Natural resources are one of the vital and strategic vectors sustaining the development of a country. However, natural resources are also subject to global dispute phenomena, providing opportunities for multi-dimensional conflicts characterised by strategic interest wars. Timor-Leste has been endowed by nature with various types of abundant natural resources, distributed as category A and B (vital and strategic) and category C (non-vital and non-strategic) minerals, oil, gas, and possibly hydro-energy. A list follows of the natural resources in Timor-Leste, defined by category:

a) Energy resources: oil and natural gas; hydro energy; solar energy; wind energy.

b) Minerals: Manganese; gold; silver; tin; chromium; phosphates; bentonite; marble; dolomite; wollastonite; gypsum; china clay (raw material for ceramics and porcelain); potassium deposits.

The Government of RDTL has prioritised the development of an energy economy centred on the petroleum sector. As a complement, the extraction and exploration of other types of energy resources and existing minerals may come to receive State investment, such as investment and development capital, and as reserves for the benefit of all the people.

5.6 Economy

As a result of the division of the receipts from extraction/exploration of oil and natural gas in Timor Gap, a strong petroleum sector has emerged that has strengthened the General State Budget and contributed to an encouraging growth in Gross National Product (PNB) in the 4-5 years of sovereignty, although without any direct (or indirect) corresponding creation of employment, income and improvement in the standards of living of the Timorese people.

As a result of the prioritisation of a petroleum sector economy, the current development of the economy of Timor-Leste presents a clear duality, with a petroleum sector and a non-petroleum sector clearly demarcated and unbalanced in terms of their contribution to economic growth and the structure of national employment. According to official analyses by the Government of the RDTL
presented in the General State Budget 2004-05 Document 10, the petroleum sector is solely responsible for strong growth in GDP, since in 2004-05 real petroleum GDP grew by 991%, contrasting with a growth in real non-petroleum GDP of only 1%. Inversely, the proportion of Timorese employed in the petroleum sector is minute (0.07%), according to the data in the Population Census 2004 11. The non-petroleum sector has a modest but stable contribution to growth in GDP, without the oscillations and volatility that characterise receipts from the petroleum sector. It has been estimated that non-petroleum GDP grew steadily by between 6% - 3% in the period between 2005 and 2009, respectively. However, when the structure of non-petroleum GDP is analysed, the reality that it is strongly dependent on the Governmental/ Public Administration and the food sector can be noted. The emerging private sector has an insignificant input in terms of growth in GDP, even though it presents a growing trend. In strong contrast, the subsistence sector (subsistence agriculture and fishing, and the informal sales sector, labouring / part-time activity) that occupies the majority of the Timorese population, represents 76% of the national workforce and generates very low levels of average income.

One of the major economic challenges for Timor-Leste will, of course, be the channelling of petroleum receipts towards dynamic real economic growth and development that will benefit all the Timorese population and reduce the duality and imbalance of current economic growth. The National Development Plan12 recognises the imperative need to “transform the economy from subsistence production to a market economy” (p.32). The General State Budget 2005-06 states that13 “the Government is engaged in further work to develop and implement policies with a view to increasing the rates of growth of non-petroleum GDP including GTS utilisation” (p.26), given that “large increases in petroleum GDP will not have a direct effect in terms of an increase in incomes, creation of employment and increase in the standard of living of the Timorese since the number of Timorese nationals who work in the petroleum sector is minimal. However, petroleum GDP will have a major indirect contribution to employment, incomes and the reduction in poverty in Timor-Leste, as it will generate large receipts for the Government. The funds from these petroleum receipts will create jobs and provide incomes to the Timorese people [indirect effect]” (p.25) “Primarily, the principal source of growth in the long term will be the private sector, and private investment in commercial agriculture and non-agricultural activity will be very important. (...) Secondly, the Government will try to generate employment next year and in the medium term by means of an increase in public construction activities.” (p.26)

In addition to development in the petroleum sector (sales of crude to the refining industry), the commercial agricultural-forestry sector (sandalwood, vanilla, coffee, pine, etc) and in the private infrastructure construction sector, it is imperative to develop and reinforce other strategic sectors in the economic structure of Timor-Leste, to establish balanced development of the national economy between the exploration of energy resources, the resources of the land, and the resources of the sea. Among others, one sector can be highlighted that has not had due attention paid to it (in the

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10 Government of the RDTL, General State Budget 2005-06, Budget Document no. 1, prepared by the Ministry of Planning and Finance of the RDTL, pp.22-35.
National Development Plan or in the Sector Investment Programme), but that has enormous potential - the maritime sector.
The territorially-based orientations and the maritime-based orientations must be balanced in national development. Even if external strategic interest influences seek to limit our vision to economic development exclusively based on agriculture and land infrastructure, the regional and global economies nevertheless face major ongoing challenges that we must interpret by not abandoning favourable opportunities related to the return from other resources that exist in the Permanent Strategic National Interest Space (EEINP). An integrated vision of the development of the maritime sector in national development aimed at maximising the economic potential of the routes and maritime resources could constitute an important complementary vector for the essential economic diversification of the national non-petroleum sector.

5.7 Developing the Maritime Economy

The State of Timor-Leste must, of course, commit to its new vocation and orientation of a maritime base in an integrated way, as a fundamental instrument for economic growth and national development.

A maritime economy opens up a field of opportunities, in relation to which we urge defining the aspects and strategic sectors that might be explored and assured so that Timor-Leste receives an appropriate income from rental or use of its maritime resources, currently inexistent due to unregulated exploitation of these sources. In addition, it must plan the development of industrial and service sectors within the maritime economy. Specifically:

a) The industrial fishing sector: the export of fresh/frozen and canned fish;
b) The maritime communication routes sector (SLOC): charges for maritime passage, risk and safety insurance, defence and security measures in the straits of Ombai and Wetar;
c) The maritime transport and portage sector: transport charges, imports and exports, mooring, international transit ports, and the transport of goods for economic, social and political ends;
d) Maritime tourism;
e) Scientific research (R & D).

We urge development and viability studies of the maritime sector to be carried out, looking at the potential and opportunities present in the vast sea off the north coast of Timor-Leste, and particularly, a study of the scenarios for sustainable receipts arising from utilisation of the straits of Ombai and Wetar and exploration of the maritime resources that exist there. Subsequently, it will be essential to define a policy of training and development of technical human resources, qualified and semi-qualified, that will professionalize the Timorese to be absorbed into the potential employment to be created by the diverse sub-sectors of the maritime economy. In this period, a plan of advanced and academic technical training must be set out for the various sectors of the maritime economy in Timor-Leste.

6 - TYPES OF THREATS

In the current situation, Timor-Leste is confronted with a diversity of threats to its security, of a military and non-military nature (economic, social, political and various types of criminality). Each type of non-military threat may be considered in isolation as a soft threat, but it is the combined
impact that is critical in an overall evaluation. The conventional (military) threats are latent, characterised in accordance with the degree of interests and the dimension of conflict among the States that border Timor-Leste. The trend towards non-conventional threats (terrorism) is common and global. The vulnerability of Timor-Leste varies according to the typology (the size, the scope, the category and the level) of internal threats with an international impact, but overall Timor-Leste is subject to any kind of imposition of collaboration with the immediate neighbours motivated by their own interests.

Below, the question of the land border is presented as the principal factor of vulnerability and with major visibility of threats, serving as a reference in addressing the type of threats.

6.1 Threats of an economic nature - the two Indonesian provinces that border Timor-Leste (Nusa Tengara Timur - NTT and Maluku) have the lowest income per capita in Indonesia. The whole area is poor, and the population densities are relatively high (especially in NTT) in relation to the resources available and development in general is lower than in other areas in the region. In addition, during the decade of the 1990s the whole region, and Timor in particular, suffered long periods of drought provoked by El Niño, with the State being dependent on the supply of rice from Java. The development of the region is marked by a lack of infrastructure and by a seasonal cycle that limits activities during the periods of the heavy monsoon rains.

In general terms, the economic boom in Indonesia collapsed in 1997 and it is still on the road to recovery. Annual growth, which was in the order of 7%, is now around 2%. The financial system is still recovering, and international investment has still not totally returned to the country. Currently, Indonesia does not have the economic capacity to support adequately its poorest regions. Analysing this situation, to the extent that poverty is a factor that produces impacts on the stability of the political environment in the immediate neighbouring regions, Timor-Leste may be vulnerable to the impact of this economic instability, and if there was an economic collapse in Indonesia, Timor-Leste might suffer severe consequences due to its high dependency on products imported from Indonesia. To the south, Australia as an industrialised country has other perspectives of economic interest in the region. Timor-Leste still does not have the capacity to penetrate the Australian market. However, there is a factor of common interest (to Australia and Timor-Leste) - the dispute over energy resources in the sea of Timor - that directly affects the sovereignty of Timor-Leste in regard to demarcation of the maritime frontier and the damage deriving from the delay in developing important non-petroleum sectors of the maritime economy of Timor-Leste, such as, for example, fishing, maritime transport and ports, maritime communication routes (SLOC), etc.

6.2 Threats of a social nature - Timor-Leste is located in a region of wide social diversity. The linguistic and social diversity present in Timor-Leste reflects this regional norm. To this diversity must be added the variety of religious differences, which in recent years has fuelled tensions between different ethnic groups. Additionally, in recent decades, other ethnic groups have migrated to the region, disturbing the delicate balance that exists between specific groups. All these social elements together with economic crises tend to fuel ethnic tensions and open conflicts.

In the past, some of the most prominent immigrants in Timor-Leste were Bugi Muslim businessmen from the south of Sulawesi, who were particularly successful in dominating local markets and fishing. From the middle of the 1990s, the Timorese became active again in these areas, particularly
in markets. In Muslim circles, this reaction was considered an attack on Islam. This then moved on to Oe-cusse and Kupang where, in an explosive incident in 1998, the largest establishments were systematically burned. These attacks were also considered by Muslims to be directly aimed at Islam, and contributed to a wave of violence, during which churches were burned in other places.

In the eastern region of Indonesia, the fuse leading to discontent is very short and may ignite, and there are grave ethnic-religious conflicts with movements of refugees between islands. It may be that some of these refugees will try to find exile in Timor-Leste, thereby calling international attention to their cause. This situation might cause major pressure on the security of the frontier and on the development of appropriate immigration controls, as a preventive mechanism to free passage of refugee populations from Nusa Tenggara Timur to Timor-Leste that may have repercussions at social, economic, political and administrative levels.

In addition, the Indonesian Armed Forces and Police are an uncertain factor in these tensions, since there are indications that they will be affected in terms of their discipline and operations, and that together with the Preman reserves (an organised network of civil operations involved in illegal activities, well-organised and with connections to the military), and the ex-militias, they will be the principal reason for destabilisation in the region.

6.3 Threats of a political nature - The social tension that exists in the different regions of Indonesia is also a political factor related to the current interplay of political forces. Politically, Indonesia is unstable, with one of the major causes of this instability being the large differences that exist between political leaders. There are leaders who are determined to maintain local instability, so that they can achieve their objectives. These differences and uncertain policies make economic recovery difficult, which in turn affects the social conditions of the country. The probability of social agitation becoming uncontrollable opens the possibility of a return to military rule and to the disintegration of the State, in the worst case scenario, which would have consequences for regional security and, possibly in very visible forms, for Timor-Leste.

It is important to state that the Central Government is currently apparently powerless to halt the collaboration between elements of the TNI and the ex-militias, which persists in terms of actions (incursions) into Timor-Leste with the support of bases installed in West Timor.

The Government of Indonesia must focus its operations on the maintenance of national unity and on its leadership capacity for dealing with the internal problems related to politics, the economy, the separatist movements and religious conflicts. In addition, it must try to balance the need for internal support with the need for international support. In the political and diplomatic context, relations with Indonesia continue to be a crucial element that will affect the security of Timor-Leste. Knowing this, the political leaders of Timor-Leste have been extremely cautious in adopting an attitude of cooperation with its more powerful neighbour. The two countries have made progress in establishing the diplomatic representation necessary to maintain normal relations and increase cooperation. This includes the very successful visit of Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri to Jakarta in June 2003, and the implementation of a Joint Ministerial Commission, the signing of a cooperation agreement between the two countries and the regular official visits that the President of the Republic Xanana Gusmão has made to Indonesia for the purpose of strengthening the bilateral relationship between Dili and Jakarta.
There are no guarantees that the current closeness between the Government of Indonesia and Timor-Leste will continue post-UNOTIL. Political developments in Indonesia are unpredictable, even after the results of the presidential elections that take place with a new democratic dimension, initiating a conjuncture that will apparently be favourable to Timor-Leste. In any event, the possibility remains that their political leaders may come to adopt nationalist positions, and try to capture the military component that has still not lost its influence. Looking at the present and the future from a perspective of peace, the leaders of Timor-Leste intend to reconcile the harm perpetrated on the people of Timor-Leste by Indonesia and its direct collaborators (Australia and USA) in the past, transmitting a message of pardon, reconciliation and amnesty. Although a process of forgetting the past has taken place, as a sharing of interest in the future, the wounds perpetrated in past conflicts are always latent in older generations, and doubts also persist about the concrete solutions to the collective future challenges that, sometimes, result in divergent policies between States and that may lead to conflicts with serious dimensions.

7 - ANALYSIS OF THREATS

7.1 The threats to internal stability vary in dimension and are related to the following aspects:

a) Subversive actions against national identity and cohesion with political objectives contrary to constitutional order;

b) Internal wars (subversion, popular insurrection, coup d'états, military rebellions, and internal conflict with international repercussions);

c) Organised crime (drug trafficking, piracy, contraband, illegal immigration, money laundering, and others).

7.2 In addition, risks related to external threats to security based on the following must be considered:

a) Maritime organised crime activities (illegal fishing, pollution of territorial waters, drug-running by sea, piracy at sea, gun-running by sea, maritime illegal immigration networks, etc.)

b) A very probable continuation of the presence of ex-militias with politically subversive activities among the population of ex-refugees close to the frontier;

c) The strong possibility that these groups may intensify their operations along the frontier, at least those of a criminal nature, as long as there is no effective mechanism of management and control of the frontiers in force;

d) The possibility of the Government of Jakarta keeping its land frontiers with Timor-Leste militarised (with combat forces) for strategic reasons (DOM / “daerah operasi militer”);

e) Some degree of uncertainty about the objective capacity of the command of the TNI to impede such incursions effectively, or the possibility that at least some elements in the TNI may be encouraged by future external support, which would put in doubt the progress in diplomatic relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia;

f) A chance of external intervention that may arise at any moment, taking into account the risk of a threat of a global nature (terrorism, natural disasters, and others of a political-strategic character) that will engage the interest of the immediate and near neighbours, and surpass their capacities for management.
8 - SCALE OF THREATS

8.1 Land

General Situation - Reports about the movements of armed groups close to Timor-Leste's border reveal the occurrence of significant security incidents resulting from constant incursions along the frontier. It is important to note in studying the operational environment of the TNI on the land border, that the capability of the forces that may constitute a potential threat has changed in some aspects since the arrival of UN missions in Timor-Leste. The border has been defined as a combat zone, that is, a militarised frontier. With the withdrawal of the UN, a vacuum was created in the management of the frontier. Timor-Leste opted to demilitarise the frontier; however, the TNI remained along the land frontiers and has not removed nor disarmed the significant number of ex-militias and other Timorese associations with connections to them. The central question remains: what is the nature of the security of the frontier? What political indicators relate to the operational environment of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste on its frontiers?

The land border of Timor-Leste was defined as a combat zone by the UN, which provided a Peacekeeping Force (UN-PKF) combat detachment from the start of its intervention until its total withdrawal. The ministers of the RDTL opted to demilitarise the frontier and normalise it, with new mechanisms of political and diplomatic detente. Our political pre-evaluation of the situation along the frontier led us to a demilitarised frontier, and we assigned UPF/PNTL to control the frontier. The Government of Indonesia continues to place its combat forces along its land frontiers with the RDTL, a military operating area - *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM) according to its evaluation and definition of its *modus operandi* or order of battle, equivalent to the PKF force previously stationed on its borders. Consequently, it is natural that the TNI continues to feel uncomfortable about the fact that its Timor-Leste counterpart is not of the same nature i.e. military forces. In addition, the presence of the TNI on the land frontiers with the RDTL may be analysed from the point of view of strategic military defence as being the deployment of an advanced force for defence purposes in the areas of strategic interest to Indonesia itself.

According to information from the TNI, there are about 3000 ex-militias in the area. In operational terms, the organisational distinctions between Timorese ex-militias, TNI troops, MILSAS (Timorese who work for the TNI but have a lower status than the soldiers), probably continue not to be significantly practised. The term “militia” is used to refer to a large number of individuals, from illiterate adolescents to relatively well trained veterans of the most stable paramilitary groups. Despite the continuation of long but unproductive discussions and proposals, it is considered improbable that Indonesia will relocate away from West Timor any significant number of ex-refugees including ex-militias and other Timorese associated with the TNI. To the contrary, the TNI has announced plans to build permanent accommodation close to the frontier for around 800 to 900 MILSAS Timorese who are found there. The TNI does also not have any plans to leave or demilitarise the frontier. There is, for better or worse, a continued nexus between the elements of the ex-militias and the TNI that, according to the arguments of TNI officers, will allow them greater control over personnel. On the part of the RDTL, there have been various initiatives to encourage the remaining refugees to return to Timor-Leste, including the continued and tireless efforts made by President of the Republic Xanana Gusmão.
Attitudes of TNI - Since the incidents at the start of 2003, the threat to the UN Peacekeeping Force (UN-PKF) along the frontier has been constantly classified as low. It is clear that small TNI or ex-militia elements have the courage to provoke direct confrontations with that force. UN-PKF made considerable efforts to establish cooperative relations with the TNI, the fruits of which allowed incidents to be resolved in an effective way. However, it is uncertain if this type of relationship will continue in the post-UNOTIL period. The friendly relations that exist between the TNI and the forces of the UN missions in Timor-Leste are not necessarily indicative of the way in which the TNI and the Indonesian police will relate to their Timorese counterparts. There are indications that some of the officers of the TNI allegedly maintain their ideas about the events of 1999, considering the referendum (the consultation vote of 30th August 1999) to be a fraud perpetrated by the UN, and refusing to assume any TNI responsibility for the violence of 1999. Such sentiments are exacerbated by the continued incidence of serious crimes that are directly attributed to the TNI.

Possible Conventional Operations Scenarios – The fragility of the State of Timor-Leste constitutes a strategic interest vulnerability that may create opportunities for external interventions in terms of humanitarian or security operations by immediate neighbours, such as Australia. In regard to Indonesia, evaluating the possible diplomatic and economic consequences, it is improbable that the Government or the military leadership in Jakarta will openly promote destabilisation in Timor-Leste. However, in setting out the possible scenarios, it must be taken into account that the probability of political destabilisation may increase, considering that the current UN mission in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) has different characteristics from the previous missions. Elements of the TNI may, collectively or individually, encourage ex-militia elements to re-enter the territory and become involved in destabilising operations or, at least, close their eyes to such activities. Given that these elements have decreasing ideological motivation (assuming that there are no plans to reintegrate Timor-Leste into Indonesia), and that they continue to be motivated primarily by material incentives, it is improbable that these ex-militias can act as an unassisted force that could conduct large scale operations with clear political objectives. In accordance with the pattern already established, it is most probable that they will dedicate themselves to theft, illegal trafficking or making localised demands, provoking instability in certain border regions.

Even though these incursions may be limited to this type of activity, they may have a destabilising effect in Timor-Leste and there is a probability of more incidents like those of 19 September 2003 and 21 April 2005, in which an element of the UPF (BPU) fatally shot a prominent ex-militia leader and shot at a military leader of the TNI, wounding him, details of which are still not very clear. The incidents provoked in Oe-cusse since September 2005 and the flagrant act of sabotage on the water courses in the frontier areas of Motain, as well as in Memo according to recent reports by the Government of the RDTL, and subsequently the death of three ex-militia in the Malibaka river, fatally attacked by the BPU, something that occurs constantly, may develop into a trend and, consequently, increase the instability close to the frontier.

Psychological factors – At present, the ex-militias seem to have few bases of possible support in Timor-Leste, but this may change if the internal situation in Timor-Leste becomes unstable or if the
ex-militias acquire the capacity to intimidate the local populations close to the frontier. The regular carrying of arms (air powered) by the ex-militias is an act that demonstrates the lack of control of the Indonesian authorities over the ex-militias, and there are indications that they also have lethal firearms stored. Even during the presence of UNMISET, the local populations in the areas of the frontier showed that they were highly susceptible to rumours and continued to be afraid of the activities of the ex-militias. Some UN reports and our own non-official sources reveal the lack of confidence of our population in the capacity of our police forces to protect them, given the perception of the imbalance in the nature of the forces located on the two sides of the frontier. These psychological factors may act in favour of ex-militias infiltrating. The incursions at the start of 2003 demonstrate that relatively small groups of ex-militias with unclear objectives may, despite that, create a climate of insecurity across large areas.

8.2 Sea

It is important now to analyse the nature of the threats, taking into account the specifics of the maritime environment in Timor-Leste, which will allow evaluation of the risk related to this type of threats.

Considering the archipelago structure of Timor-Leste, the richness of the natural resources in its maritime base and the vital importance that these energy resources in the Sea of Timor have for national economic growth; and knowing that, in addition, there are other industries connected to the maritime sector with development potential and which are generators of growth in non-petroleum GDP (arising from the economic exploitation of the straits of Wetar and Ombai as the SLOC; and maritime and port transport, tourism and fishing), as mentioned above in the section on the Maritime Economy), justifies the imperative for the country to have adequate maritime legislation and maritime capacity to deny and dissuade any external attack and threat, as well as impeding illegal (and criminal) incursions.

The maritime environment of Timor-Leste is very specific, presenting unique challenges in terms of security and defence, specifically in regard to control of frontier and safeguarding economic aspects. Therefore, Timor-Leste has the right to claim the Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE) in accordance with UN Conventions and International Maritime Law, which includes the surface, sub-soil, and airspace. Timor-Leste must face up to the problems related to its territorial waters and the EEZ, while knowing that the level of threat is of low intensity and of a non-conventional nature, being related to incursions of illegal/criminal activities. As a result, the analyses of conventional threats do not exclude from the strategic environment the need to define the EEINP. In this context, it is important, and a determinant for the security of the country, that the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste have the effective naval capacity to impede and conduct operations against any type of threat, it being an imperative of national sovereignty to guarantee the protection of its sea borders. Without this capacity the Government of Timor-Leste will not be capable of contributing to regional and world security, disputing the argument of supremacy of force, contributing to decisions in partnership, and impeding illegal activities by ships in its territorial waters, which will consequently affect, directly or indirectly, national sovereignty.

In addition, the passage and transit of international shipping in the region is not always declared, and so there is a wide disparity between the routes declared and those used. The change of
sovereignty in Timor-Leste determines that the declaration of international routes must be altered, as must the type of ships that use the sea lanes of Timor-Leste, the status of the ships in transit in the enclave of Oe-cusse must be clarified in accordance with International Maritime Law and taking into account that the waters of Timor-Leste and that enclave are separated by the territorial waters of Indonesia. A country with these characteristics has to have the capacity to patrol its own waters and strong diplomatic links to guarantee that ships in transit respect the international legal order. Recently, there have been some incidents related to the violation by Indonesian fishing vessels of territorial waters and the EEZ claimed by Timor-Leste.

Finally, the increase in maritime traffic by small vessels may constitute an indication that contraband activities are about to increase. This indicates that the possibility of dangerous products (explosives and armaments) and drugs entering Timor-Leste has also increased.

It should be remembered that in the most recent threat assessment by UNMISET (May 2005), it was considered that, at the regional level, the risk of violation of territorial waters by conventional means was assessed as "medium". However, taking into account the intention of the conventional forces in the region, the risk related to the threat to stability by means of the maritime environment is very low. In this context, it is important to remember that the electronic warfare capability of the naval assets in the region is sufficient to cover large areas of Timor-Leste, although its capability for detailed analysis of the information collected is unknown.

The risk related to the capacity of the crews of fishing vessels and other commercial and foreign ships to illegally exploit the waters of Timor-Leste is assessed as "medium", taking into account the lack of patrols in its territorial waters and the EEZ. This level of threat means that Timor-Leste must maintain a more effective naval capacity, which will ensure the surveillance and protection of these territorial waters. Therefore, there is a high probability of incursions occurring, related to illegal activities along the sea coast. This being so, the risk related to an external threat to the stability of Timor-Leste provoked by small incursions of non-conventional character may be assessed as "medium".

8.3 Air
(To be developed in the next Strategic Blueprint for the Development of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste on Future Perspectives, 2020-2050)

8.4 Space
(To be developed in the next Strategic Blueprint for the Development of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste on Future Perspectives, 2050-2075)

8.5 Global and Transnational - Terrorism
Independently of its targets and objectives, terrorism, while a violent, clandestine and surprise action may be considered to be an instrument of policy of the weakest against the most powerful, using terror as a weapon, as a method of destabilisation and demoralisation, of discrediting and disparagement, as a means of pressure or simple desire for vengeance. The clandestine character, the toughness and radicalism, the mystery and unpredictability, the threat and fear that terrorism provokes strengthens its devastating and destabilising effects among its enemies.

In the world of terrorism there are no adversaries, but only enemies. Its targets are, preferably, people and, through them, political and social institutions, social and economic infrastructure and
the strategic networks and systems of defence, security, production, supply, communication and transport.

With new tactics, benefiting from globalisation and trans-nationality, the new terrorism is able to cross frontiers, attack potentially long-range targets, remotely activate its detonators installed in territory enemy, contact activists, reservists and material resources by electronic means, create a diffuse and tentacle-like structure, with ramifications in all parts of the world, bring together and take advantage of the transverse solidarities identified with the same hate and the same revolutionary motivation against the West and enjoy the impunity that it gains from its unpredictability, its clandestine nature, its distributed support, and the manifest inability to control this new international threat.

It is important, here, to evaluate this type of threat in Timor-Leste. Credible information received at the start of September 2002 indicated that a terrorist group known as Jesmaah Islamiah may be operational in Timor-Leste. The information also indicated that terrorists may try to detonate explosive devices in Dili. Despite this information, and subsequent reports of alleged terrorist activity in the territory, there is no evidence that proves that the Jesmaah Islamiah or any other group terrorist is operating in Timor-Leste.

The State of Timor-Leste and the UN mission are not likely targets. However, some of the nations that make up the UN mission are countries that are involved in the struggle against terrorism, and so if there is an active terrorist threat in the country the targets will probably be Australia, the USA or the United Kingdom (in that order of priority). If an attack occurs it is most probable that it will be against infrastructure rather than against personnel, despite one of the objectives of terrorist organisations in the past being to cause many deaths. Some targets may be: embassies, prominent national structures and other military infrastructures.

If a terrorist cell plans an attack in Timor-Leste it will probably need the support of third parties or support from inside the country Timor-Leste shares its entire land border with Indonesia and is in the same volatile zone as the Philippines. Those two countries both have radical Islamic groups. Indonesia has two principal groups known as Jesmaah Islamiah and Atskar Jihad. Jesmaah Islamiah, allegedly connected to Al-Qaeda, and is accused of being responsible for bombings throughout South-East Asia, including the devastating attack that occurred in Bali in October 2002. The Philippines has a group known as Abu Satyaf. The probability of these groups infiltrating into Timor-Leste is low, although they have the capacity to do so easily.

Finally, Al-Qaeda openly criticised the UN for "separating Timor-Leste from Islamic Indonesia". This means that the successive UN missions may have been a target for potential terrorists who shared the same idea. Similarly, any aggression against an Islamic State, as happened with Iraq, executed by the United States and its allies, will be seen as an attack on Islam.

The possibility of a terrorist attack in Timor-Leste is not very high. There is a clear intention among terrorist groups to attack American and Australian targets and other western targets in Asia. Given
the types of western targets that exist in Dili and the uncertainty of the existence of a terrorist cell in Timor-Leste, the risk of terrorist attack in Dili can be considered "medium".

The professionalism of the Armed Forces and Police Forces of Timor-Leste will be a determining and decisive factor in facing these type of threats. The threats most frequently mentioned by the political leadership, related to the activity of internal groups with political or other motivations, and the occasional urban disturbance, appear to have been resolved passively. The key to success will be how the Armed Forces and the Police Forces (security forces) are led in such situations.

8.6 Specific Context
We do not see the case of the incidents/provocations that recently occurred along the land border as a factor that may cause a crisis between Timor-Leste and Indonesia. In this analysis, there is a distinction between two approaches, one diplomatic and the other tactical-operational.

First, we consider that the constant provocations on the frontier are “instruments of opportunity” that generate multiple impacts, with an important strategic dimension to the immediate neighbours, taking into account that the maritime border is still disputed with Australia, and the airspace is a question to be defined in the near future with the immediate neighbours. We must, then, focus our interest beyond the frontiers, by means of proactive diplomacy in the field of cooperation towards the objective of common security with the immediately neighbouring States and those nearby. (diplomatic effort)

Second, we consider that the actions of provocation on the frontier may be managed and controlled by the creation of effective management and control mechanisms on the frontier at the tactical and operational level, with a legal framework, to be defined bilaterally. The definition of these legal mechanisms of bilateral management and control, specifically the funneling of areas of access and control in certain identified inhabited areas, must allow the exercise of the sovereignty of each State without interference, with specific considerations related to the traditional aspects of both populations. (tactical-operational effort)

The management of the land and sea borders (definition and authority), improving the capability of the Armed Forces and security forces of Timor-Leste with suitable resources and the establishment of smooth transition mechanisms (time and preparation of resources required), are indispensable and demand input from the State of the RDTL.

We judge that the participation of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste is indispensable, whether in fulfilling its constitutional missions, or in assimilating the operational environment of both sides and, in particular, from a perspective of the strategic national development of Timor-Leste. Only by placing the Armed Forces in the framework of this process will it be possible for them to maintain an adequate level of readiness for any eventual operation, when it becomes imperative.

9 - CIRCUMSTANCES DETERMINING REGIONAL CRISIS AND CONFLICTS

9.1 Regional Strategic Environment
In view of the current context of international concern, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and crises provoked by natural disasters are the three circumstances in the world strategic environment that justify immediate and unilateral military interventions of a humanitarian character and the imposition of peace by the world powers as a response to their national interests. Although these interventions go beyond (the legitimate exercise of) the sovereignty of the States in question, they fall within the legal framework of the UN.

Recently, we have seen circumstances that determine a dynamic of alteration of the global and regional strategic environment. Specifically:

- The existence of terrorist networks in the Philippines (Abu Satyaf) has been identified. The USA withdrew from its military bases in the Philippines (Subic and Clarke). However, it initiated new methods of more precise action to combat terrorism in the Philippines;
- The case of Timor-Leste - the USA banned the supply of military armaments to Indonesia in 1991. Indonesia reoriented its military cooperation interest with other world powers. Australia exchanged its national interest with its intervention in Timor-Leste, in 1999;
- Indonesia was identified as one of the principal countries with terrorist activities; the two principal terrorists groups identified were: Jesmaah Islamiah and Atskar Jihad. The tragedy of Bali Bomb #1 (12.October 2002), 202 dead. The attack on civil buildings and strategic military points in the USA attributed to the terrorist network Al Qaeda (11.Set.2002), that caused more than 3000 deaths;
- The importance of the Straits of Malacca (Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) and the USA has demonstrated serious intentions and measures to control the Strait;
- The natural disaster in the region, the Tsunami (26th December.2004). The earthquake in Caxemira (Out 2005); world attention less in comparison with the tsunami.
- The intention of Indonesia to create a new naval base on the island of Wetar, an Indonesian island to the north of Timor-Leste (May 2005);
- Progress on resolution of the problem of Aceh represents an indicator of the process of emerging democracy in Indonesia;
- The creation of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CVA), in March 2005, is a bilateral understanding between the Indonesia and Timor-Leste from the perspective of the framework of the political future;
- The tragedy of Bali Bomb #2 (1st October 2005), that caused 26 deaths;
- The recent official visit of the President of Iran to Indonesia (May 2006) represents the new strategic regional challenges in terms of the development of political-religious interests.

9.2 Modernisation of the Armed Forces and the Regional Arms Race: trends and strategies

It is important to analyse, albeit in summary fashion, the rising trend in the arms race and military modernisation in the South-East Asia region and the implications for regional security.

During the decade of the 1990s, after the Cold War, the ASEAN States showed a consistent trend of increasing their national expenditure on the Defence sector, defining their armament procurement programmes to correspond to the imperatives of a self-sustaining reinforcement in the growing strategic uncertainty that characterised the post-Cold War period. This increase in expenditure on the Defence sector is inseparable from growth in national economic capacity, which created the opportunity to respond to the growing strategic concerns about regional and global security. In general terms, ASEAN demonstrated a positive correlation between economic growth and Defence
expenditure. On this topic, the countries with the highest rates of growth in GDP showed higher rates of growth in Defence expenditure, as was the case with Singapore and Malaysia. The countries with lower rates of economic growth also increased their spending in the sector, although at a slower growth rate, as was the case with Indonesia and the Philippines.

During the decade of the 1990s, and until the Asian financial crisis that occurred in the middle of 1997, the principal trends towards modernisation of the forces were the following: modernisation of the naval force; application of aerial force over the sea; development of conventional war capacity for regional armies; and development of National Defence industries.

The dynamic of modernisation of the naval forces of the ASEAN States led to the Navies increasing their operations in coastal areas to the outer limits of their EEZs and beyond their frontiers. Several Navies have developed three-dimensional capabilities with the introduction of high-end submarines, aerial combat and interception capability, and control and support capability for ground combat. The principal focus was the transition from coastal defence and law enforcement to the development of capabilities to patrol, escort and attack over a longer range. The principal elements acquired that characterise this modernisation of the naval force are: ocean patrol vessels, rapid assault ships equipped with SSM, corvettes, frigates, naval air capacity, ASW capacity and diesel submarines.

Indonesia updated its capability to control its maritime choke points, defence of maritime communication maritime routes (SLOC), and protection of deep-sea platforms (off-shore). The Philippines increased its naval budget to cover costs of maintenance, structural reforms and limited procurement of logistics support ships, rapid patrol boats, rapid assault boats, and minesweepers. The ASEAN Navies were also equipped with anti-ship missiles. All the States bought the Exocet. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore equipped their frigates, warships and FACs with Harpoon SSM. Indonesia acquired the Ikara ASW. Indonesia and Malaysia acquired anti-aircraft missiles for their frigates (SEACAT and ASPIDE). Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand developed maritime surveillance capabilities in their EEZs by means of the acquisition of Boeing 737-200 Surveillers and Lockheed C130s.

In regard to the modernisation of the ASEAN air forces, all the air forces of the ASEAN States were equipped with Sidewinder AIM-9 missiles in the 1990s. Electronic warfare capabilities and equipment were also introduced, and SAM and radars acquired. Singapore is the country that has the most sophisticated system of air defence, which operates in three dimensions: Rapier SAM and Blindfire radar covering low altitudes; Hawk SAM covering medium altitudes and Bloodhound Mark 2 SAM for high altitudes. Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia acquired the surface-to-air Rapier missile. Thailand acquired the Redeye, Blowpipe, ASPIDE and ADAT missiles.

In accordance with the latest developments in force modernisation, Indonesia demonstrated its intention to update its arms capability with the purchase of 48 Sukhois from Russia; Australia intends to buy 100 next-generation planes, the F-35 (Joint Strike Fighters). Malaysia, Singapore and China also intend to buy advanced jet aircraft. Indicators that may be considered in terms of an arms race in the region with the objective of protecting and surveillance of (disputed borders) strategic national interest spaces (EEIN).
Thayer (2000) synthesised the principal modernisation trends of the Armed Forces of the ASEAN States, during the decades of the 1980s and 1990s up to the Asian financial crisis:

1. The development of structures of more conventional land forces, including the introduction of armoured vehicles, heavy artillery and self-propelled artillery,

2. The introduction of new systems of armament in the land forces led to the formation of Rapid Deployment Forces with varying capabilities, in the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand;

3. The structuring of naval forces for surveillance of the EEZ and to patrol and protect the SLOC became possible with the acquisition of higher-capability ships – modern surface combatants – destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and ocean patrol vessels equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles. Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam acquired submarines; Thailand acquired light aircraft carriers;

4. The regional air forces acquired modern jets with multiple functions and the capability for air defence, maritime reconnaissance and maritime attack (F-16, FA-18, MiG-29, Su-27 and in the future Su-30);

5. The proliferation of missiles that can be launched by sea and from an aerial platform, such as the anti-ship Harpoon and Exocet SSM;

6. Strengthening of C4 (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence), electronic warfare (GE), and air defence capabilities. South-East Asia witnessed the introduction of EW systems including air transport capacity for electronic war; air defence radars (surveillance and fire control) at the level of national strategy and in the tactical intelligence system;

7. This modernisation of the Armed Forces increased and updated the capability to inflict remote attacks on the enemy with a high level of precision. However, there are still only a few countries in the region that have the appropriate platforms (jet fighter aircraft or surface combatants) in sufficient number to sustain an attack;

Some implications for regional security arise from this type of modernisation of the Armed Forces of ASEAN. Despite all the ASEAN States having the common objective of regional security, there is a lack of mutual cooperation in matters of military defence for collective understanding of common security, accentuating the tendency to define defence with a self-sustaining capability. That may create a security dilemma for some countries, leading to an “action and reaction” arms race. The constant growth in defence expenditure associated with the objective of modernising the Armed Forces, has led the ASEAN States to adopt offensive postures. Consequently, ASEAN may lose effective control of armament and the process of moulding a strategic posture. ASEAN showed a critical deficiency in terms of integrated logistics support, maintenance, support for the defence industry, combined forces operations and common doctrinal concepts (despite conducting joint exercises). For example, this deficiency was clearly shown by the incapacity of any of the ASEAN States to use their rapid intervention forces to conduct the operations with UN forces in Timor-Leste. ASEAN may come to pay a price because of its lack of commitment to the ARF. In its turn, the ARF (which includes Northeast Asia, South-East Asia, Australasia and some nations in the sub-regions of South Asia and the South Pacific) must go beyond phase 1 (confidence-building measures) and phase 2 (preventive diplomacy) to phase 3 (conflict resolution) in order to establish norms and
mechanisms to prevent the process of modernisation of forces and arms races destabilising common security in the Asian region.
CHAPTER 2

NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

Introduction
Background
Objectives
Permanent National Defence Values
The Nature of National Defence
Analysis of Concepts
Military Component
Non-Military Components
The Defence Spirit
National Consciousness

Estreito de Ombai
10 - INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

National Defence is characterised as being the activity undertaken by the State and its citizens to guarantee respect for its democratic institutions, national independence, the integrity of its territory, and the liberty and security of its population against any aggression or external threat.

National Defence Policy, which is exercised all the time and at any place, has a permanent character and consists of the coherent combination of principles, objectives, guidelines and measures adopted to ensure National Defence.

The character of the National Defence Policy also arises from permanent and fixed objectives that involve, amongst others, protection of the property of the population, of national heritage, the guarantee of freedom of action of its sovereign bodies, and the ability to carrying out the fundamental tasks of the State.

In the context of the strategic environment, the National Defence Policy must accommodate the overall objective of the State of Timor-Leste and take into account the circumstances that orientate the definition of National Defence, categorised in the following order:

1) Adoption of a Strategic Concept of National Defence with a State-Centric perspective covering the diverse internal and national (domestic) sectors;

2) Balance the 2 basic orientations of national development and establish strategic relations with various countries in terms of cooperation for the purposes of the defence and socio-economic development of Timor-Leste;

3) Categorise, for Timor-Leste, priority areas of interest, for the purposes of legislative definition of the Permanent Strategic National Interest Space (EEINP), in accordance with the evaluation of the international situation and the definition of national capacity;

4) Implement a preventative and proactive policy of neighbourly relations with the countries of ASEAN and ARF, SWPD, APEC and PIF as the strategic potential of Timor-Leste to dissuade conventional and non-conventional predominant threats in the region that may directly or indirectly reach the permanent strategic national interest space of Timor-Leste;

5) Contribute to combating any type of common threat that endangers humanity.

11 - BACKGROUND

Timor-Leste is a democratic and sovereign country, because it has legitimate powers, sovereign bodies and democratic governmental institutions that permit it, in normal conditions, to exercise its sovereignty in any part of its territory in the defence of the interests of the State and the Nation as set out in the Constitution of the RDTL. Therefore, it is able to assert and assume the power to judge its own conflicts, impose its own concept in relation to its rights, regulate its economic life and develop its international relations.

The institutions of National Defence must have a combination of characteristics accepted by the international community related to the general legal provisions that are enshrined in the Constitution, which support them, specifically, as instruments of peace and an element of stability in conflicts and tensions.
In terms of the national security objectives, which are expressed in the Constitution, the State has the legitimacy to sustain its sovereignty and design a system of security and National Defence with the effective capability to counter influences and threats, direct or indirect, that may arise in its territory and area of responsibility. As a sovereign State, it asserts the right to judge its own disputes, impose its laws, regulate its economic life and have its own National Defence Policy.

12 - OBJECTIVES

The National Defence Policy has as one of its objectives the defence of all national territory, which, in accordance with the Constitution, encompasses the land area, the maritime zone, air space, and the area delimited by national frontiers, which historically integrate the eastern part of the island of Timor, the enclave of Oe-cusse Ambeno, the island of Ataúro and the islet of Jaco, including the territorial waters, the contiguous marine depths, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the continental shelf (constituting all the permanent strategic national interest space – EEINP).

In order that the permanent objectives of National Defence can be exercised, the State of Timor-Leste must provide the Armed Forces with the Defence capabilities to respond to the following challenges:

a) Full execution, taking into account the fulfilment of its responsibility for the military defence of the RDTL. Guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the liberty and security of its population against any external aggression or threat to the constitutional order;

b) Develop a military defence structure with the capability for general reciprocal dissuasion in terms of national cohesion;

c) Dissuade, prevent and negate any type of internal conflict or war (subversion, popular insurrection, coup d'état, military revolt, civil war and/or internal conflict with international repercussions);

d) Participate in and contribute to combat against any type of non-military threat that compromises the defence and security of the country;

e) Define the military potential of Timor-Leste: establishment, nature of force, composition, integration of methods and operational deployment. Set out the framework and active participation the citizens in the defence of the nation i.e. establish a model for military service, taking into account that the people are the centre of gravity for the development of Timor-Leste.

The EEIN conjuncture arises from the evaluation of the international situation and the definition of national capacity, taking into account the priorities external policy and of defence, the parties present, and the various organisations that Timor-Leste will join.

The State will define in an appropriate (legislative) document, which are the priority areas with significant interest in the definition of the EEINP, in the current situation. In addition to those that the suitable documentation defines, any other zones must also be included in which, at a particular moment, the national interests might be at risk or events may take place that might affect them.

The first fundamental objective of the State is to defend the sovereignty of the country (Article 6 of the Constitution of the RDTL) and the defence strategy of Timor-Leste has a defensive posture based on diplomacy and dissuasion. Constitutionally, Timor-Leste will always opt to avoid conflict by
means of the peaceful resolution of disputes; however, it reserves the right to use the Armed Forces to defend itself from external threats. In accordance with the National Defence Policy and the objectives of security and Defence, to:

1. Guarantee the protection of the sovereignty of Timor-Leste by means of the preservation of territorial integrity;
2. Contribute to peace, security and regional and international stability.

Still in accordance with the content of this Document, to achieve these objectives, strategic defence planning must take into account the following aspects:

1. Sustainable capacity in rationalisation and achieving the potential of means and resources;
2. Contribution to National Security, by means of support to the civil authorities in public service and by strengthening relations with the population in the sphere of civil-military cooperation;
3. Construction of reciprocal defence relations in the international sphere, by means of international and regional organisations and the CPLP (in particular);
4. Permanent and continuing support to the personnel of the Armed Forces, aiming to turn them into members of professional and credible Armed Forces, well trained, disciplined, motivated and with team spirit, with the principal values and virtues of Honour, Loyalty, Honesty, Courage, Discipline and Respect.

13 - PERMANENT NATIONAL DEFENCE VALUES

The State must undertake to value the factors of national identity, paying respect to national symbols, providing prestige to the Armed Forces, and making reference to FALINTIL as a service to the nation, as a fundamental value of National Defence.

In defence of national cohesion the State, by means of political, diplomatic and, if necessary and possible, military methods, must be prepared to defend the lives and interests of the Timorese, at any moment and wherever required, in accordance with international law. Therefore, the State cannot avoid its responsibility to promote a suitable spirit of security and defence among the population of Timor and, as such, the articulation of the defence policy alongside the education policy must constitute a priority. The Armed Forces must, in this context, play a highly active role that will also involve increasing awareness among those that will enter its ranks.

14 - THE NATURE OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

To go to the nub of the character of National Defence, we must investigate the reasons behind National Defence. Timor-Leste, a nation that has emerged from a bloody war and the brutal occupation by Indonesia, has found today a sort of cautious peace in the region, a situation that sometimes appears to legitimise the question that is frequently posed today: will it still be necessary to have a defence for the country? Today, will National Defence have a determined function in the security policy of the State of the RDTL? Will this defence, which yesterday was indispensable to fortify the Timorese nation and ensure its territorial integrity, retain its validity and relevance?

If the State and the society that personify the nation stop representing to themselves and to the eyes of the world a combination of dignified values to be safeguarded, if the inheritance of these values transmitted by older generations is not valued or conserved and, consequently, not handed
on to later generations, if this inheritance, even when it remains as a nucleus and foundation for the national identity, why subject the nation to a sacrifice of such size if no threat can be seen on the horizon that will affect it?

We will hazard a response. If Timor-Leste preserves the right to the respect of others, it must protect its interests that ensure its sovereignty, the choice of its destiny in the world, and if we admit that it is not yet possible to exclude the chance of local, regional or world disturbances, and that there are clearly focal points of conflicts, dangers and threats, then we must conclude that the principle of National Defence remains, and will remain, fully valid and current, independently of the regional framework that may be apparent. To validate the presumptions and hypothesis, we must move towards a national consensus associated with the idea of defence.

It falls to each citizen of Timor-Leste to discover the values to defend, explore them, and evaluate their impact on day-to-day life. In the framework of national responsibilities, the National Parliament, Government, political parties and competent authorities must take on the task making the nation permanently aware of its defence, which includes the preservation of stability and the independence of the State. Without a nation there is no defence, much less National Defence; without National Defence there is no sovereign State. Consequently, the construction of the nation of Timor-Leste must necessarily include its National Defence. If this is the consensus, it is worth reflecting on the setting in which the idea of defence is developed.

André Malraux affirmed: "National Defence is the will to defend yourself". The idea is clear, but the problem appears to go beyond the foundation of the will to national survival. Increasingly frequent voices have advocated, in the face of neighbours as powerful as those of Timor-Leste, that this conviction is always present in the condition of the spirit of defence of the Timorese, as was demonstrated during twenty-four years of resistance. There is not, nor will there be, a cohesive society without community spirit and, consequently, without a common will to defend itself, since without this will national existence disappears.

To validate the reason for National Defence in the form of a national consensus, it must be accepted that defence is fundamental and basic, that there must be something to defend, and an evaluation of how to defend it and with what measures. The measures referred to must be minimally compatible with the National Defence Policy that they intend to follow, since without means there is no policy, much less a National Defence Policy. Therefore, the national consensus for the construction of National Defence must be exclusively a matter of dogma, and not of politics. The Government, National Parliament, political parties and other authorities are responsible for promoting dialogue with the citizens about National Defence. This may seem to be an obsolete subject, but is preferable for a nation to be sufficiently strong in tradition and have men courageous enough to admit their mistakes, without ever forgetting the reasons to be proud of itself. After these first years of independence, Timor-Leste may be proud of having defended and preserved national independence; to negate this would be to negate all.

The foregoing discussion raises a synthesis, affirming that National Defence has the general purpose of security, which translates into the preservation of independence. To be independent, one must first of all have an autonomous capacity for National Defence, since the independence of a people
can never be assured by another party. This affirmation does not deny recognition of the (in)existence of total independence, and that this reality concurs with those texts that seek to present collective mechanisms of regional defence and others as legitimate substitutes that make National Defence unnecessary or impossible. We must not disregard the steps required in the direction of this collective defence; however, we must not lose the self-confidence that the resistance taught us. Timor-Leste must fight to take a partner's role, and not that of a subordinate, in the various collective mechanisms of defence. When National Defence underlines the individual affirmation of nations, it is not intended to diminish the role of the systems of collective security (such as the UN and others that exist or may come into being) but to affirm its character of interdependence and advocate its character of co-responsibility.

We make this digression about guardian of international actions, because we take the view that the concept of National Defence, whatever view we may have of defence in terms of States or nations, is also related to the issue of international relations, and the reality of defence and national security interests is also related to the internal environment. With the disappearance of the bi-polar world system, the heterogeneous cultures of economic development, political regimes and forms of power of the 191 sovereign States that belong to the UN, are coming together and are in permanent dialogue with each other, generating either sources of agreement and mutual enrichment or sources of conflict and misunderstandings.

The accelerated dynamic of these changes and the effect of globalisation multiplies dependencies and interdependencies as well as multiplying the opportunities for conflict of interests, whether at the regional level or on a world scale. Consequently, the old ideal of independence based on autarchy with its traditional support of neutrality that was isolationism, is today a mere theoretical abstraction. It is the combination of all these situations that results in the weakening of Governmental control over the life of a society being replaced by complex forms of exercising power within international relations.

The combination of reasons and situations set out above means that war and peace will continue to coexist, as they have always unfortunately done throughout the history of humanity. A few new characteristics arise, since both war and peace alter the civilisations and cultures that practise them..

In terms of National Defence, there is an interaction today between the interior and the exterior, between internal and external policies, between the world within the borders and the outside world, and no interaction that ever existed has been so open, to the point that, sometimes, it appears almost indistinct. Therefore it is important in this context to state that the ultimate objective of any State is the security of its citizens. Security that protects people and goods is internal security. Social security and civil protection against natural events - fires, floods, and seismic events. However, it is only when the threat is seen as coming from outside other communities, other agents of the international community, that one can speak strictly about security and National Defence.

It is equally opportune to ask the question: what is National Defence? What phenomena does it cover? There is no unanimous agreement about the concept, or even about the principle of National Defence and national security. However, all accept that the objective of National Defence, after independence, is the territorial integrity of the country. Others include national cohesion, and/or the
Constitution and/or the lives of the population. Others also include the political regime. In the definitions of different schools and authors, one common element can be found - the conservation of the state/community as such, i.e. as a distinct entity - sovereign over its territory and people, with its own political power – imposing itself decisively involved on the parts that compose it and making it respected by the other entities that make up the international community.

The National Defence Policy for Timor-Leste cannot be interpreted simply as the combination of the definitions of internal and external defence. Constitutionally, external Defence is not restricted to the complete and exclusive (action and dissuasion) capability of the diplomatic sphere under the guidance of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and in diplomatic and historical figures. Similarly, internal defence cannot be limited in its definition of responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, turning the National Police into an apparatus for safeguarding the internal political structure.

The permanent character of National Defence must not, therefore, be politically interpreted in terms of internal and external defence, but must be categorised in military and non-military terms, in accordance with the threats. We must dismiss any attempt to mortgage the sovereignty of Timor-Leste with geo-strategic interest commitments assumed in the past.

15 - ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTS

Below, we present a systematic analysis of the relations and concepts of National Defence identified previously. The differences between the various concepts of National Defence are centred on two principal questions, which may be dealt with in terms of breadth and the semantic context. In regard to breadth, the diverse concepts and definitions fall into two and/or three groups: a restricted concept and enlarged and/or integrated concepts.

The restricted concept considers National Defence as equating to military defence or centralised on it, and to which the other aspects (economic, social, sometimes even political) are subordinate. Under this concept, the threats to consider are only external threats, in the form of the military might of other States. This restricted concept of National Defence corresponds to a vision that has been definitively inadequate since the end of the Second World War.

The enlarged concept and/or integrated concept (some authors do not make a distinction between the two), consider that National Defence, as well as national security, not only cannot be exclusively assured by military defence, but also in time of peace, may be challenged and need to resort to non-military means. That is, starting from the characterisation of the system of international relations and the perception of the inter-penetration of the internal and external factors, it may be concluded that the actual survival of States may brought into question in sectors such as the economic, cultural, psycho-social, and political. This concept is also considered to be modern because it reflects the actual notion of independence, and admits the possibility, which is relatively recent in human history, that the political-social system of a State may be attacked without first destroying its military force, partly due to the complexity of societies and the openness of States.
According to this school of thought, the threats and the risks to survival of communities/states may arise in almost all sectors and activities of national life, given that a military response has clearly been insufficient or even completely inadequate in certain situations. Still within the area of breadth, it is important to emphasise that there is a nexus of logical necessity between the adoption of the enlarged concept of National Defence and inclusion within the scope of internal threats, where these may be directly or indirectly related to external agents or interests. This is intended to underline that the limitation of National Defence to the exclusive consideration of external threats only makes sense within the former concept of defence carried out along the borders by military forces, and would only be effective in a world in which the only way of defeating a nation would be by force of arms. When the issue is viewed in this way, the Timorese concept must also take into account internal threats, at least, in given circumstances and determined forms.

It is important and necessary to encourage discussion at a national level about the type of concept of National Defence that is of real importance to Timor-Leste, which after approval by the competent bodies must be clearly defined in the National Defence and Armed Forces Law (LDNFA).

In relation to the variation in the concept of National Defence in semantic terms, i.e. in the choice of the most suitable terms to designate the concept, two widely published currents of thought stand out.

The first current of thought, preferred by the Anglo-Saxons and Brazilians, employs the term National Defence to refer to an essentially military defence, and is still connected to the restricted concept, while the term national security encompasses the aspects covered in the modern concept of National Defence.

The second current of thought, preferred by the Spanish and Portuguese, uses the term National Defence in the developed sense of the concept, in which military defence is the restricted concept of National Defence and a component part of the enlarged concept.

It should be stated that opting for the solution of the enlarged concept or restricted concept, brings with it the problem of knowing what is important, or not, what is relevant or not, to National Defence. The enlarged concept implies a plurality of activities, situations and events, whose nexus with defence is still not established, and which are often difficult to establish. With the influence of globalisation, whether on Defence or on threats, double relations are multiplied; with implications both for Defence and for economic development, or on culture, internal administration, or social questions, amongst others.

There is one further pertinent question: how do we distinguish what is of legitimate importance to National Defence? This is a new dialogue that must be pursued by us, in Timor-Leste. The criterion must now be that related to the ultimate purpose of National Defence, since almost everything is a defence interest, in the enlarged concept, and the nature of the facts ceases to be relevant.

In addition, and also as a consequence of the changes that have taken place, it is imperative that National Defence is exercised in time of peace as well as war, which combine to require high levels of readiness to be maintained. This permanent character of National Defence is another aspect added to its recent global character. This permanence implies that National Defence consists of three modes of action:

a) Prevention, or anticipatory action;
b) Dissuasion, persuasion, intimidation or virtual action;
c) Combat, reaction, retaliation or actual action.

Winston Churchill wrote "the need to prepare defence does not mean that war is imminent. On the contrary, if war is imminent, preparation of defence has come too late". In fact, Defence is no longer useful if it is limited to combating actual or imminent aggression. We can synthesise this incursion into the theory of National Defence by affirming that Defence has not taken place if not in relation to the threats or risks, whose possibility arises from the emergence of conflicts of interests. Therefore, the reality of interest to the studies of National Defence can be organised into three main themes: communities, independence and conflicts.

In view of the points set out above, it can be affirmed that the LDNFA should characterise National Defence as being:
a) A duty and honour for all Timorese citizens;
b) Permanent - exercising it all the time and in any place;
c) Global - encompassing all sectors of national life;
d) Inter-ministerial - involving the different ministerial sectors in ensuring the conditions that are indispensable for its execution;
e) Composed of two components: one military, and the other civil (non-military components).

The National Defence Policy must be divided into Military Defence and Non-Military Defence. Both must try to find an overall political balance of national security to best apply national resources in prosecution of the objectives defined for national development.
The framework of the military component of National Defence has a dissuasive dimension in the definition of the global strategy of security, as a definition of an affirmative political posture for the development of the nation.

16 - MILITARY COMPONENT
As set out above, the enlarged concept of National Defence encompasses military and non-military components.
The military component of defence refers specifically to military defence, the responsibility of the Armed Forces, which in general are orientated to face an external threat. In addition, missions of intervention in the internal order may occur, in special circumstances and of an exceptional character, which must have a suitable legal framework, whether in the Constitution or in the LDNFA. Military defence consists in the readiness of forces and resources and the conduct of military operations (aspects that will be covered in the chapter on the missions of the Armed Forces, later).
However, it should be stated here that, in general terms, that the main principle of its mission in society is to serve its current and future aspirations, within the idea that its role is not to promote war but keep the peace by means of suitable organisation and preparation. In time of war and in peace, its mission is to advise on the use of military might without advocating its use.

17 - NON-MILITARY COMPONENTS
In doctrinal terms, the fundamental sectors where tasks, activities or services comprising the non-military component of Defence may be grouped are, in general:

a) External policy, in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation;
b) Governmental and administrative political action;
c) Internal security and public order;
d) Survival of the population and safeguarding of property, cultural, social and other assets;
e) Public information and reinforcement of the collective will for defence;
f) Supplying the population;
g) Public Health;
h) System of national alarms and prevention of natural disasters;
i) Telecommunications.

It is important to underline that this combination of vectors set out, the combination of measures necessary for the defence of the country, whose nature is clearly civil, are nonetheless closely connected to military defence and may unequivocally contribute to it, under the heading of Civil Defence.

Overall, it may be said that, the non-military components of National Defence - Civil Defence - consist of a combination of prepared measures and/or activities, to be executed or simply coordinated by the civil authorities to face emergencies - whether these are accidents, calamities or catastrophes; national or international crises; bellicose conflict - and that make it possible to act promptly to avoid chaos and disorder and save resources.

These are, as can be recognised, actions of an eminently civil character, even when they may contribute directly to military defence, and that are equally important for National Defence. There is a mutual dependency between military defence and Civil Defence, whether in time of peace, crisis or war, that imposes an irrefutable need for cooperation and coordination between them. Without discharging the tasks of Civil Defence it is not possible to complete the task inherent in military defence and vice-versa, since they are complementary.

It is important to underline that the non-military components of defence are a mesh of responsibilities and demands whose structuring and coordination are of great complexity, and that other Ministries, as well as the Ministry of Defence, are responsible for that part of the execution of these components that falls within their brief. For this reason, the LDNFA must clearly refer to the inter-ministerial character of National Defence, establishing the basis for a solid and cooperative contribution to the common objective that is National Defence.

18 - THE DEFENCE SPIRIT

The National Defence Policy cannot be reduced to aspects of a material order. We must also consider the psychological and moral factors that confer expression on the collective will of the citizens to engage in the military activity of the State, whatever the perceived threat. There is no purpose in acquiring and accumulating armaments, if those who may be called on to use them shrink from fulfilling their mission, because they do not have a strong spirit of defence.
Deliberate involvement in military conflict launches a supreme challenge to the will of any political entity: is the risk of death worthwhile in the defence of territory, resources or other national interests that might be threatened? It is in these circumstances that the old axiom of "liberty or death" assumes its literal, concrete and genuinely tragic sense. Because of this, in order that the political decision does not incline towards capitulation, the employment of the Armed Forces must be supported by an unshakeable collective determination. Therefore, how can a political entity find the necessary courage to assume, consciously, the risk of war?

In Timor-Leste, during the 24 years of resistance against the Indonesia invasion, the crucial words for national mobilisation were "My Country or Death", "To Resist is to Win", "The Struggle Continues". Some political and military analysts showed great surprise at the unanimity of the guiding and mobilising will for the struggle conducted by the Armed Front (FALINTIL) in the defence of the national sovereignty of Timor-Leste. Some of them were convinced that the political and ideological fractures, which were seen among the elites and between them and the people, would not allow the nation to resist, militarily, for more than a few months. They were totally wrong, because the Timorese, during that period, were imbued with the most important value of the spirit of defence - patriotism - and, consequently, a growing will to defend the sovereignty of the country until death. However, the threats that currently exist do not appear to support similar conviction and it is necessary to take into account the eventual division of Timorese public opinion in relation to the large questions of external policy. Whether in regard to membership of regional security and cooperation organisations, to bilateral and multilateral relations, or the attitude in relation to Indonesia, to Australia, to the countries of South-East Asia and the CPLP, different points of view and fault lines imbue the political parties, which have different concepts of the spirit of defence, since its expression and content depend on the system of ideological references that each of them adopts. It may be thought that, in the event of concrete and clearly recognised danger, a suitable broad national consensus would be re-established. Historical tradition merely confirms this possibility in the face of threats of great seriousness and after they have passed; in other situations, the divergences persist. A country that is considered by some as a close ally is thought by others to be a potential aggressor. In addition, future participation in peace operations under the aegis of the UN may give rise to public debate. In the future, the legitimacy of these interventions may be contested and argued against. As a result, mobilising national efforts in response to any distant danger, when the adversary is liable to change its face and name according to ideological beliefs or political trends, is an onerous task for any Government, in the absence of a suitable spirit of defence.

In the current state of international relations and Timorese public opinion, the notion of a threat has lost a significant part of its traditional acuity. The independence gained by Timor-Leste and the current strategic environment have removed the perspective of armed aggression directly and in the short term threatening national territory. The intervention of the UN and the international community in the independence process fin 2002 minimised or eliminated the spectre of an Indonesian invasion. Consequently, the threat may not be seen in classic terms: a powerful military nation that attempts to impose its hegemonistic ambitions. The conceivable forms of aggression to the country today are multiple (see the detailed analysis in the previous chapter about the typology, characterisation and dimension of threats), varying between the virtual aspects of the armed struggle, economic attack, social disturbance or clandestine political action in national territory. In
addition, for Timor-Leste, the military defence of liberty and independence may be conceived only in terms of the Armed Forces. This is necessarily connected to responsible participation in a supranational security system, duly integrated, whatever structures may materialise. It follows that the old notion of a frontier, so profoundly instilled in the spirit of the vast majority of people, has lost a substantial part of its rigid, absolute and almost sacred character. Due to all of this, it is difficult to take a full account of the moral and psychological factors linked to defence of the territory to supply a suitable spirit of defence.

In view of this situation, it would be highly advantageous to the international affirmation of Timor-Leste for the government programme to include measures that allow an educational and informative action of an innovative character, which raise the level of comprehension and acceptance of the Timorese about the legitimacy of the supreme sacrifice to which they may be subject. Such abnegation implies that the fundamental values that will be demanded from those who fight should be clearly defined and divulged. Without doubt, the persistent adherence to the sentiment of patriotism and the values of FALINTIL will always constitute, for a nation like Timor-Leste, a powerful psychological and moral factor of resistance and cohesion. In any event, it is clear that the current conditions of its interiorisation, expression and manifestation are significantly distinct from those seen in the past. It is equally important to reflect on the actions that will allow the adhesion of all Timorese to the forms of collective life that it is desired should be defended and to adequately position them in the current context. It is, therefore, in the context of education, information and civic duty that we must today, in Timor-Leste, place the problem of the development of a defence spirit.

19 - THE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The national conscience must be considered as a component of the defence strategy of political regimes that are extremely vulnerable to internal social phenomena. This fact is due to the influence that the beliefs, values and traditions common to a society - the actual factors that make up the national conscience - have on one of power’s components - national will. This is the reason why strategic action associated to disputes over conflicting interests between States initially focuses on psychological coercion, to provide a desirable influence and to discredit or demoralize the hostile government, specific groups within the State and public opinion in general.

Even though strategic action based on psychological coercion has been moulded and modernized by wars fought due to Marxist inclination and for freedom from colonialism, the definitive and paradoxical demonstration that perceived physical violence never inhibits strategic action was provided by the nuclear option. Strategic action, as a result, became more sophisticated, more indirect and less demanding in terms of material, and thus, more frequent and more accessible to all actors on the international political stage.

Subsequently, a defence strategy that exclusively pursues objectives aimed at safeguarding or achieving a position of material superiority, capable of dissuading war, ensuring an easy victory or destroying the opposing forces does not possess the same validity or importance nowadays as it did before. Modern defence strategies also aim to strengthen national conscience, which by lucidly, determinedly and cohesively permitting the pursuit of national interests, contributes in a decisive manner to the consolidation of institutions that organise civil society and govern the exercise of power. Accordingly, States reduce the possibility of success of counter-strategies that seek to win
over a society through the exploitation and manipulation of socioeconomic tension or ideologically related dissent, by using propaganda and indoctrination techniques in carefully chosen subject areas and stimulating pacifism or carrying out intimidation-causing terrorist action.

Defence strategies are not, however, all occupied with strengthening national conscience, since this may be devalued by a technological advance or ideological outbreak, and on its own it is insufficient in the event of an armed conflict. Considerable effort is likewise required to build and sustain the material action resources, which make up the other component of power - national capacity. These are the resources that permit the direct employment of force, to either protect or achieve specific interests of the nation of Timor-Leste or to contribute to initiatives to defend the common interests of a number of States. The scope of such contributions includes military action aimed, for example, at forcing compliance with international law, supporting the pacific resolution of conflicts, promoting regional stability, enforcing the respect for human rights, guaranteeing the non-proliferation of weapons and free access to natural resources essential to the economic development of all States.

States tend to associate into collective defence organisations, the effectiveness of which is based on solid and sustained relations of interdependence, since, as previously referred to, the idea of exclusively autonomous defence without sovereignty-related limiting factors has been resigned to the past. These organisations are characterised by co-responsibility for strategic work, which obviously provides a sharing out of losses and gains, no matter what the force status and hierarchical position of a State in relation to its allies.

One of the most significant gains is credibility. Moreover, in a world characterised by the sophisticated exercise of political influence and power, credibility, especially that resulting from the effective and responsible participation of the State in collective defence activities, is of the utmost importance to the State so that it may not only emanate a positive image and reputation but also possess the moral and political legitimacy that is necessary to conduct foreign policy adjusted to the defence of national interests.

Moral and political legitimacy seems to be a determining factor in Timor-Leste making its own mark in the international and regional arena. It is associated to the fact that Timor-Leste is a defender of human rights, of minority rights, democratic values and the rule of law, and in order to maintain a coherent stance, it cannot remain indifferent to the violations occurring as a result of the new climate of conflict and which may affect regional and international security. As a member of the UN, and fully aware that the role of that international organization is irreplaceable in maintaining world security to preserve the responsible State’s credibility, Timor-Leste cannot fail to assume the perspective related to the need to employ military force in operations aimed at promoting peace and general international stability, either in Asia or, in particular, in the region Timor-Leste forms part of.
CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTS

National Defence Policy
Legislative and Conceptual Framework
National Defence Issues - Necessary Decisions
Strategic Planning
Roles of the Armed Forces
Ministry of National Defence
Military Defence
Ministerial Directive on National Defence
20 - NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

In the current world climate, Timor-Leste as a sovereign State holds one vote in any world scenario. So that this vote is relevant and has an impact in the development of the world’s strategic environment, Timor-Leste must commit itself to new requirements in regard to decisions concerning its development. This need will re-establish the required structural elements in the drafting of the Concept of National Defence, serving as an illustration of a vote of confidence for the international community. The role of FALINTIL in the past and current history of Liberation functions as a guiding framework for the process of formulating the national defence strategy. We must exhaustively consider the capacities and limitations acquired during the process of liberation, in particular in relation to the strategic assessments and strategies that direct designs for the defence of Timor-Leste and its national objectives. The driving forces of the Resistance to mobilize and raise the awareness of the general public’s opinion, using an innovative strategy for winning the war based on morality, steered a collective desire of the people of Timor-Leste, who decided to dedicate their own lives to the struggle, expressing it through the end objective of victory for the independence of Timor-Leste, in 1999.

Ordinarily, the National Defence Strategy forecasts and plans the development of potential – psychological, diplomatic, political, economic and military – for the purpose of guaranteeing the achievement of national objectives, not only during peace time but also during war. National Defence Strategy options must cover the following:

1. Develop proactive diplomacy guided by the higher interests of Timor-Leste.
2. Adopt a military strategy embodying a defensive and dissuasive (proactive) stance, with the future perspectives of developing offensive and dissuasive capacity in the future.
3. Define the operational scope of the armed forces according to the strategic environment.
4. Construct and acquire reciprocal dissuasive power elements.
5. Establish the use of resources and integrated means.

The Strategy Concept of National Defence (CEDN), which will have to be a classified document due to its specific nature (along with the Military Strategy Concept - CEM), must be preceded by a public and institutional debate on the subject, and be based on proposals presented by the Government and/or by parliamentary groups of the National Parliament. The approval of the CEDN must not only possess national and institutional consensus on the lines of action for national security, but, in particular, sufficiently clear guidelines on the primary tasks and principal priorities of the armed forces. This will mean a commitment from those approving the CEDN so that a coherent defence policy is effectively pursued over time.

A body composed of specialists in the different areas of the State that contribute to security should exist in order to ensure that all studies of security proposals are appropriately implemented. The inclusion of members of the information services is essential. During the period that the State does not possess such a body, an interdisciplinary group should be appointed and led by the Prime Minister to carry out this task.

It should be noted that the definition of the referred to concepts is not, for a number of reasons, an easy task:
Firstly, there does not exist anywhere a safe and uniform doctrine on national defence, particularly in relation to the use of military means.

Secondly, even after establishing a doctrine its practical implementation is almost always improbable due to economic reasons, which are only surpassed with great difficulty in peace time. This almost always leads to a Reduced Forces System (with risks), in proportion to the Necessary Force System. As Eric Muraise wrote: "when a doctrine can be effectively implemented, everything is not resolved, for there will always be discussion between those demanding the necessary means to meet the doctrine and those that support the doctrine of possible means".

These factors must be taken into account, though they do not hamper the need to define the basic concepts through which the national defence policy should be projected in strategic terms, correctly defining the armed forces, their missions and supplying them with the suitable means to fulfil those same missions. Without such definition, even of only temporary, no organised armed forces will be able to survive in view of the mobility of existing data. The commencement of this task is therefore a pressing need, even if these concepts have to undergo later review and amendment.

Doctrine is not pacific in relation to the underlying pillars of the Strategic Concept of National Defence (or National Security Concept). There are those that believe it should be a static concept repeatedly or didactically establishing the permanent and historic objectives of the country, by which successive governments must be bound. And there are those that, on the contrary, uphold a dynamic concept that puts into practice the defence policy of the Government’s programs in the strategic area, in addition to upholding the country’s highest values.

It is often said that the difference between policy and strategy resides in the fact that the former determines "what to do" and the latter "how to do it", based on which it is commonly said that “strategy should be governed by policy and not policy by strategy”.

The National Defence and Armed Forces Law (LDNFA) must establish the Strategic Concept of National Defence in general terms. This may be composed as follows (for example):

“(...) The definition of the fundamental aspects of the State’s global strategy for implementing the objectives of the national defence policy(...)”. This text expresses a broadened concept, within the modern conception of national defence policy that is the global responsibility of all sectors of the State and of citizens in general.

This notion must undoubtedly be in strict harmony with the Government’s program and the respective legislation must establish the following, for example:

“(...) The Government intends to pursue a policy of national defence that defines this as a global strategy of the State in the political, economic, social, cultural and foreign relations’ fields, as well as in a purely military context, with the end objective of guaranteeing national independence and the territorial integrity of Timor-Leste, as well as the freedom, security and assets of the population and nation in general, against any outside threat and aggression (...)

In this context, the Strategic Concept of National Defence (CEDN) must consider all related sectoral environments and provide useful meaning to them, transforming them into the general practice of the administration and the community, under the supervision of the Government through its
program for the country. The main pillars of defence (the main options) must be approved by the national Parliament.

The following level is that of establishing the Military Strategic Concept (CEM). This can be represented as the breakdown of the Strategic Concept of National Defence for the military field. Thus, the terms of the CEM must also be expressed in the National Defence and Armed Forces Law, which may be worded as follows (for example):

“(...) The military strategic concept is composed of the set of measures that take into consideration the execution of the military component of national defence, according to the strategic concept of national defence (...).”

The Military Strategic Strategy must accordingly also not be static in nature. It must, on the contrary, evolve according to the circumstances, adapting to the rate of changes occurring in the national and international environment it forms part of, so that it is possible to constantly optimize the conditions in place to face threats.

Nowadays more than ever, military strategy needs to be constantly updated, due, at the very least, to the rapid and profound alterations that the correlation of forces in the military and threat ambit have undergone.

The low level of flexibility and immobility that strategic concepts are often tackled with and the entire resulting system is due to a predominantly ideological and not operational stance. But the desirable definition and update of both concepts does not imply that this is done in an imprudent fashion.

It can be acknowledged that the threats have been strongly lessened and diluted, but there has still not been sufficient time to find a balance. We are currently in an interlude that may even produce greater power sharing, which up to now has been centred on two blocks. Disarmament, reduced tension and promises of the creation of a new world order favouring peace are all very positive, but the international climate continues to be less than comforting and so all these alterations must be looked on with great care.

History tells us that times of euphoria following on from lessened threats do not always result in peace. Therefore, the current strategic environment must not cease to be of concern to Timor-Leste (which is a small, recently independent country with very limited resources and one of whose major vulnerabilities is its strong dependence on the exterior), where the national defence sector is still not conveniently structured and organized and defence planning still has significant limitations.

The basic end purpose of the armed forces is to guarantee the military defence of the country on the occurrence of external threats or aggression. The manner in which this defence will be performed will be defined through the concepts established in the Military Strategic Concept. Thus, this will be the fundamental element based on which the strategic decision may be implemented, permitting the drafting of one or more General Military Defence Plans, in conformity with the hypothetical threats considered.

The General Military Defence Plans correspond to an operational strategy limited in time, in other words, they need to contain systems of force that are not immediately available but which may be achievable in due time, as the result of suitable planning of forces and an effective mobilisation system.
Based on the attempt to define the development of the armed forces in the National Strategic Development Plan, Defence Dialogues were undertaken (1st DD 2004 and 2nd DD 2005), by means of which we aimed to promote understanding of the importance of national defence to the development of Timor-Leste and establish the necessary mutual and synergic relations between ministries, given that it would be in the interest of all the State’s bodies to maintain conceptual alignment in security and national defence strategies by means of a guiding framework for national development. Some significant critical reference points were obtained from these Dialogues, and these steered us afterwards to the need to produce an integrated Strategic Defence Plan, which defined the objectives of the military component in the pursuit of the total strategy i.e. the national objectives.

21 - LEGISLATIVE AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The Permanent Objectives of National Defence are not clearly defined in the constitution of the RDTL. These may, however, be established in the LDNFA, thereby requiring that the sovereign bodies of the State and the armed forces themselves provide coherent, up-to-date and effective strategic planning. It is the time to update concepts, redesign the security and well-being binomial, to substantively weigh up the options, assess the respective consequences and, principally, make decisions.

The production of the legislative and conceptual framework for the National Defence and Armed Forces of Timor-Leste is fundamental to the consolidation of the current restructuring proposal and to contextualizing its development in the future. The inclusion of the legislative component of National Defence was deemed suitable in the current Strategic Framework - highlighting the hierarchy of laws, the structural concepts and entities responsible for proposing, appraising, approving and implementing items in the area -, which allowed the Starting point of the organization and the missions of the armed forces to be tackled in detailed manner and in the context of the new planning of forces.

The legal and conceptual documents comprising the Legislative Framework of National Defence can be placed in the following hierarchy:

1. National Defence and Armed Forces Law (LDNFA), defining:
   1.1. a set of conceptual documents:
      a. Strategic Concept of National Defence (CEDN)
      b. Military Strategic Concept (CEM)
      c. Specific Missions of the Armed Forces
      d. National Forces System (SFN)
      e. Forces Apparatus
   1.2. and Organic Laws:
      a. Armed Forces Organic Law (LOBOFA)
      b. Ministry of National Defence Organic Law

2. Military Service Law (LSM), which establishes the rules and regulations concerning the status, career and recruitment of military personnel:
   2.1 Military Statutes
   2.2 Statutes of Military Personnel of the Armed Forces and Veterans (EMFAV)
2.3 Organic Personnel Framework

3. Military Programming Law (LPM), which establishes personnel plans (force personnel), armaments, infrastructures and finance. Serves as the basis for the drafting or review of the forces development project, in accordance with the SFN. This project constitutes the new Forces Proposal, which is drafted in a Biannual Cycle of Forces Planning (CBPF).

Lastly, it is important to note that the drafting of the legislative hierarchy of all these levels of national defence cannot be immediate, but it must be successive, coherent and complete, given that each level is dependent on the previous ones.

22 - NATIONAL DEFENCE ISSUES - NECESSARY DECISIONS

The immediate priority is for the High Council for Defence and Security (CSDS) to propose the Legislative Framework of National Defence to the National Parliament (PN) and approve it. This will consequently permit the creation of the LDNFA, which establishes the Strategic Concept of National Defence (CEDN) and defines the objectives of national defence policy, according to the State’s global strategy, and establishes concrete guidelines for the general strategies, compartmentalized in the external and internal political plane, in the abovementioned sectoral policies, including the military plane.

The hierarchical matrix of the LDNFA will allow the mission to be analysed and any situation to be studied, in accordance with the new strategic environment, the transformation of which translates as an important evolutionary element, from which strategic planning factors must be drawn for the redimensioning, adjustment and restructuring of the armed forces, so that these can wholly fulfil the objectives set down under national defence policy.

The definition of a national policy is deemed urgent. This would steer global strategy and make it possible to guarantee the systematic and continuous coordination and control in the drafting and implementation of national defence policy. In practice, the definition of national policy implies the subsequent sequence of drafting the CEDN, integrated planning (of budgets for integrated programs) and the cohesion of the activities that contribute, in each ministry, to the implementation of national defence strategy.

The subsequent definition of military defence strategy will comprise the establishment of military objectives, military potential, the type of forces, the national force system and the concept of operations that, in turn, defines force readiness, the concept of employment, the sustenance of means and other military objectives.

23 - STRATEGIC PLANNING

The LDNFA must set down a structure and establish a methodology that meets its end purpose, in other words, the definition of missions and the SFN and the human and material resources required by these forces to fulfil those missions. After the necessary debate of the main options of the CEDN by the national parliament, the CSDS provides its opinion, which is then approved by the Government. Next, the LDNFA must forecast that the Governmental National Defence Directive and
the directives of the different ministries, namely the Ministerial Directive on Military Defence (DMDM) of the Ministry of National Defence, are approved. Next, this Minister approves the CEM proposed by the CEMGFA. The Minister then proposes and the CSDS defines the missions and SFN, based on the grounds stated in the CEM. *(see the Concepts diagram at the start of the chapter).*

It is only possible to set down a basic idea of how to maintain the security of a country over a certain timeframe (10 to 15 years) after performing an in depth study of the actual strategic environment (threats to be met and interests to be preserved) as regards the principal objectives with the longest terms contained in the Constitution and other fundamental laws (influenced, therefore, by prevailing political causes) and taking into consideration the means that can possibly be made available (the priorities assigned the different areas of the State). Only then will the conditions be in place to indicate the measures to be taken, through the establishment of the CEDN.

The existence of the armed forces is intimately connected to the essence of the State and to the concept of sovereignty and national independence. The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste states that the primary and core mission of the armed forces is the military defence of the Republic (Article 146), in order to guarantee “national independence”, “territorial integrity” and the “freedom and security of the population against any external aggression or threat”.

a) The concepts of external ‘aggression’ and ‘threat’ are indeterminate concepts that cannot be excluded from updated integration to encompass new forms of external action that are likely to affect the legal assets that constitute the object of the concept of national defence as expressed in the Constitution;

b) On the occurrence of an external threat or aggression, which, due to its significance and scope, seriously and profoundly impacts on the legal assets that are the object of the national defence concept, as established in the Constitution, military defence may involve an external component, characterised by the exercise of the right of legitimate defence, within the ambit of international commitments, and an internal component, orientated towards the strict protection, within the physical space comprising national territory, of the same legal assets against external threats (there must be liaison between the Constitution and LDNFA - legitimate defence);

c) Military defence against external threats to the operating capability of the manufacturing, food, industrial, energy, transport and communications sectors, given that these constitute vital interests to the well-being and security of the general public (it must be supported by the Constitution and LDNFA).

The armed forces may be assigned other missions in addition to the primary mission attributed by the Constitution. These may be internal (civil-military cooperation and missions in the public interest) or external, resulting from international commitments to humanitarian and peacekeeping missions under the UN or regional cooperation and security organizations. Such initiatives provide the nation with prestige, guaranteeing that Timor-Leste plays its part in the international arena. The armed forces can and must support missions of public interest inside the country, which result from extraordinary occurrences that require their intervention and which, in all cases, meet the population’s needs.
On the organizational front, the armed forces are organized into a National Forces System (SFN). The SFN must be primarily composed of modular units, the characteristics of which can be subsequently made more appropriate in the theatre of operations, prepared for integrated action in joint and/or combined forces, namely in situations of partnership with allied forces. These forces must have high-level capacity in terms of mobility and self-sufficiency, and be skilled to intervene in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, such as primary missions of national sovereignty distributed throughout the territory.

An analysis of the current organizational structure of the armed forces indicates that the ratio of operational to support component is not duly dimensioned and there is the primary need to converge all means towards the objectives to be achieved and that these means must all be operational in nature, given that this is the main task: preparing forces. The operational modules and structural levels must be standardised according to a benchmark doctrine. It is essential that increased efficiency and effectiveness be guaranteed in their operation. The current structure must be restructured at all levels of command.

Advancement to the following stage can only occur after all of these definitions have been formulated. The following stage will encompass more practical and incisive issues, such as the number of full-time personnel and total personnel numbers as well as the establishment of military material planning. It is obviously extremely thoughtless and haphazard affair to establish the organizational structure of the armed forces, as has occurred with the current structure of the armed forces (the general staff - special forces - units - personnel - material, equipment and uniforms), or plan public investment in re-equipping the military or in defence infrastructures, without advance knowledge of the size of these armed forces. And this size should only be quantified within the ambit of the referred to concepts. It has become necessary to readjust and resize the current organizational structure of the armed forces, in full awareness of the conditions that led to the creation of the armed forces in 2001 and which influenced the options taken, and taking into account the characteristics required for the SFN to be established, the role of the different forces’ components - Naval, Land, Support and Service (Air component), Instruction and Training and Command as well as the necessary joint action of the armed forces. It is important to define the legal framework of the force's structure and applicability through LOBOFA, given that the current Armed Forces Organic Law solely refers to the structure and mechanisms of institutional liaison in general terms, but does not effectively establish the general bases for the organization, duties and attributes of the armed forces, leaving this instead to governmental legislation (which does still not exist).

The restructuring of the armed forces must be directed toward the constant requirement to modernize and the streamlined use of available means. Despite the fact that the human factor’s value as the main motor for the development and transformation of organizational structures was recognised in the twentieth century, this resource, which is the principal agent of change, was not given priority. Military recruitment in many countries during the twentieth century was based on the compulsory military conscription model, which always allowed the military to be supplied with the necessary quantity of personnel. However, restructuring that was carried out, including the
consequent reduction of numbers, meant that military conscription was no longer universal and it was even wholly opposed in some countries, particularly by political actors in positions of government. This fact led to its reduced use and timeframe for its complete termination, often supported by decisions not fully justified with due grounds.

The process of approving the Military Conscription Law (LSM) must include the assessment of whether military conscription is of interest to Timor-Leste, for specific reasons in FALINTIL’s past related to the need to guarantee an effective national identity through a greater and more improved link to the general public; or whether professional military service is better suited to national interests. It should be noted that the professionalization of the military, meaning that all military personnel will be volunteers, will mean greater emphasis on results in addition to increased technological and financial requirements.

In the current climate, in which the benchmark framework is profoundly altered and the need to adapt to new requirements is imperative, all action must be thoroughly, lucidly, honestly and courageously undertaken to introduce the structural alterations that will allow these challenges to be conquered. The necessary objectives are to make the causes motivational and provide the guarantee to the nation that the armed forces are capable of carrying out their role of fulfilling the missions assigned them. The State of Timor-Leste must supply the armed forces with the defence capability to ensure that the permanent objectives are exercised and to meet the following challenges:

1) Full performance of duties, with the view to fulfil the responsibility of the military defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the general population against any external threat or aggression, in full compliance with constitutional system;
2) Develop the capacity for generalized reciprocal dissuasion under the scope of national cohesion;
3) Prevent, dissuade and negate any type of internal war or conflict (subversive war, people’s insurrection, coup, military revolt, civil war and/or internal conflict with international repercussions);
4) Observe and participate in the fight against any type of non-military threat that aims to compromise the country’s defence and security;
5) Define Timor-Leste’s military potential (from force numbers and types to the composition, integration of means and operational employment) and liaise the contextualisation and active participation of citizens in the defence of the nation (i.e. establish a military service model taking into consideration the fact that the general public is the hub of Timor-Lesteeese development);

And to also take various fundamental aspects into consideration: the global strategy of the State to implement the objectives of the national defence policy established in the CEDN; the characterising aspects of the military and limiting factors of the missions of the armed forces set down in the CEM; and lastly, the national and international duties and responsibilities of the armed forces related to the specific missions assigned them.
24 - ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES

24.1 Introduction

In view of the above-described and taking into consideration the definition of Timor-Leste’s strategic environment, there may currently exist more doubts than certainties regarding the missions to be assigned to the armed forces in the areas of the security and national defence. Only a national effort based on an intelligent and prudent convergence will thus provide the responses that meet the profoundest and most legitimate national interests.

The current Strategic Orientation blueprint contributes to that debate. Firstly, a critical analysis of the current constitutional and legal framework is deemed to be important in order to comprehend the need for a comprehensive review of the organic law of FALINTIL-FDTL in force, and adopt the contextualization of other missions of public interest under the scope of the missions of the armed forces (namely: military-civil cooperation and first-class citizen-military instruction). Secondly, the organisation and categorisation of the armed forces’ missions and the detailing of the underlying assumptions is proposed. Thirdly, these are adapted through the analysis of CEMGFA’s missions in a forces planning context. Finally, the detailed description of the constitutional concept of national defence and the constitutional model for the armed forces is proposed, thereby contributing to the review of the constitutional statute of national defence, internal security and the armed forces.

24.2 Current Legal and Constitutional Framework

Defence and national security is tackled by Part V of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. Article 146 of the Constitution establishes, relative to the armed forces:

1. The armed forces of Timor-Leste, FALINTIL-FDTL, exclusively composed of Timorese nationals, are responsible for the military defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and its organization is uniform and covers the whole of the country.

2. FALINTIL-FDTL guarantees national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the general population against any external threat or aggression, in full compliance with constitutional system.

3. FALINTIL-FDTL has no political party allegiance and must obey the competent sovereign bodies, pursuant to the Constitution and laws. They are not permitted to intervene in the political sphere in any capacity.

From Article 146 of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, the legislator adapted the somewhat limited range of the missions of the armed forces established in Article 3 of the FALINTIL-FDTL Organic Law (Law no. 7/2004, of 4 May).

1. The basic mission of FALINTIL-FDTL is:
   a) Implement the military defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste against any external threat or aggression.
   b) Guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the general population against any kind of external threat or aggression.

2. FALINTIL-FDTL, in addition to be generic mission referred to in the previous paragraph, can also legally:
   a) Collaborate with the PNTL in the event of a strike or generalised disturbance of public order, which does not justify the immediate declaration of martial law or a state of emergency, thereby preventing the consequent suspension of the exercise of basic civil rights;
b) Provide assistance to the civil population when so requested by the Government, collaborating with administrative authorities on protection and aid missions to the general public in the event of catastrophes or calamities of natural or man-made cause, which do not justify the immediate declaration of a state of emergency, thereby preventing the consequent suspension of the exercise of basic civil rights.

3. The employment conditions of the armed forces on the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency are established in specific laws governing any situation of martial law or a state of emergency.

4. Falintil-FDTL can also be tasked, under the terms of legislation, with participating in technical-military cooperation action implemented under a national cooperation policy and in conformity with international commitments that have been undertaken.

Despite the fact that there still isn’t a National Defence and Armed Forces Law (LDNFA), but taking into consideration the FALINTIL-FDTL Organic Law and that the activity of any government essentially though not exclusively comprises the defence of the collective population in its broadest sense. This end purpose, governed over by the principle of predicting the possibility of an attempt to stifle independence, demands, in the context of the integral strategy of the State and in line with other structural action, the maintenance of the armed forces to guarantee the military defence using its own means or via prospective alliances.

These are the facts by which the armed forces embody the visible statement of the will of the people of Timor-Leste to remain a free and sovereign nation. This is the reason why the Constitution and FALINTIL-FDTL Organic Law assign to the armed forces the generic mission of guaranteeing the military defence against any external threats or aggression, but the specific missions of which should be duly detailed in a suitable legislative instrument still to be drafted - LDNFA. In addition to the main missions, the armed forces of Timor-Leste, like those of any other country, are increasingly assigned missions in the public interest. This fact makes its institutionalization increasingly more necessary in today’s world.

Another field of equal importance is that of meeting international commitments that have or will be undertaken in a worldwide and regional political context. As already referred to, the major transformation registered in the international political system had an impact of the stance and missions assigned the armed forces, obliging in depth reforms that naturally expanded their field of action. The armed forces were arranged, under the legitimising governance of the mandates issued by international organizations, into joint and combined forces in order to perform the missions relative to the management and control of international crises, the provision of support to ensure peace is kept, humanitarian and cooperation missions, which are executed outside of Timor-Leste’s borders. These are commonly known as Other Missions (or new missions), and they constitute a powerful instrument of support to the State’s foreign policy. These missions will certainly imply adjustments to the armed forces’ training and re-equipment programs and they are generally extremely well supported by the general public, providing an impulse to all subsequent initiatives of the Government in the implementation of its foreign policy objectives.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that even though Other Missions (new missions) have earned particular exposure in the media and are currently gaining increasingly more importance, they should be implemented without jeopardising that which is the traditional and principal mission of the armed forces - defending national territory against any external threat or aggression. The planning of forces must constantly equate that possibility in accordance with the National Defence policy and the Strategic Concept on National Defence. These missions are legitimized by the conventions and treaties that Timor-Leste enters into as a member of such international organizations and alliances. They must, nevertheless, be well justified and possess appropriate legal and regulatory grounds. The armed forces have to be prepared for armed conflict but above all, they must serve to guarantee peace, contributing to national and international development and cooperation.

24.3 Organization and Classification of the Armed Forces Roles
An up-to-date reading of the organization of the missions of the armed forces of Timor-Leste, based on Article 146 of the Constitution and on the review of Article 3 of the FALINTIL-FDTL Organic Law, provides the following categorization proposal:

1). The **Generic Mission** of the Armed Forces:

   “Guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the general population against any external threat or aggression, in full compliance with constitutional system.”

A review of Article 3 of the organic law of FALINTIL-FDTL proposes the organization of missions as follows:

2). **Specific Missions** of the Armed Forces
   a) **Main Mission** - The national defence of Timor-Leste:
      i. Take on (Guarantee) the military defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste against any external threat or aggression;
      ii. Guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the general population against any kind of external threat or aggression.

The armed forces may even be used in other missions of public interest other than those related to civil protection. Tasks related to meeting the basic needs of the population may be assigned, even though these are not yet set down in legislation. However, since this subject is quite sensitive, it is important that the law specify the terms of performance of the armed forces so that the main mission may not be jeopardized in any shape or form.

b) **Missions in the Public Interest**:
   i. Providing support to civil authorities - Collaborate with the PNTL in the event of a strike or generalised disturbance of public order, which does not justify the immediate declaration of martial law or a state of emergency, thereby preventing the consequent suspension of the exercise of basic civil rights;
   ii. Providing civil protection - Provide assistance to the civil population when so requested by the Government, collaborating with administrative authorities on protection and aid missions to the general public in the event of catastrophes or calamities of natural or man-
made cause, which do not justify the immediate declaration of a state of emergency, thereby preventing the consequent suspension of the exercise of basic civil rights;

iii. In the event of martial law or a state of emergency - The employment conditions of the armed forces on the declaration of martial law or a state of emergency are established in specific laws governing any situation of martial law or a state of emergency;

iv. Providing Civil-Military Cooperation – The armed forces develop civil-military activities for the implementation of the State’s final objective, i.e. security and national development (proposed sub-paragraph);

v. Training – The armed forces serve, in accordance with the law, as a centre of training of citizens par excellence (proposed sub-paragraph).

c) Other Missions - Regional and global security

- Falintil-FDTL can also be tasked, under the terms of legislation, with participating in technical-military cooperation activities implemented under a national cooperation policy and in conformity with international commitments that have been undertaken (Article 3, paragraph no. 4 of FALINTIL-FDTL Organic Law - current version in force).

- (Proposed wording) - The armed forces of Timor-Leste can also be tasked, under the terms of legislation, with participating in technical-military cooperation, security and military defence, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peace-building activities, in order to achieve the objectives of national defence policy and in conformity with international commitments that have been undertaken.

In schematic terms, the generic mission of the armed forces is sub-divided into specific missions, missions in the public interest and other missions, which must be specified in the Strategic Concept on National Defence. In turn, the National Defence and Armed Forces Law (LDNFA) must define the organizational bases for the fulfilment of those missions.

The full and effective implementation of the abovementioned missions requires the increased organization and discipline of the armed forces of Timor-Leste as well as a scope and management appropriate to the human and material resources. It has become necessary, in the context of reorganization and restructuring of the armed forces, to provide the same with a credible capacity to defend the land and sea borders, principally by means of a defensive posture and proactive dissuasion.

Moreover, the reorganization of the armed forces of Timor-Leste must be based on coherent legislation that underpins the newly adopted concepts and should have the end purpose of conferring an eminently operational dimension that equips the armed forces to possess a high standard of operational effectiveness in fulfilling the different tasks and responsibilities attributed it, in both national and international arenas.
24.4 Contribution to Forces Planning by CEMGFA

The General Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces (CEMGFA) is responsible for analyzing the missions and the military situation relative to the forces planning procedures of the military component of national defence. This task comprises:

i. an assessment of the threats, risks and challenges forecast for the short and medium terms; and

ii. detailing the evolution of the armed forces’ own potential and vulnerabilities as well as those of its allies, in order to update the military-strategic situation of Timor-Leste.

It should be noted that this planning occurs under the scope of the already mentioned Strategic Planning of National Defence, which provides for the intervention of the different sovereign bodies, in particular the President of Timor-Leste, National Parliament, the High Council on Defence and Security, the Government and CEMGFA. The procedures must be established in LDNFA.

The missions of the armed forces, on their own, if we just consider those currently described in the different manuals of doctrine, add little or nothing to the definition of the forces systems that Timor-Leste must possess in order to face up to the threats that may develop and to defend the country’s interests, after the legitimate political power has defined the threat that must be met and the interests that must be defended using military means, which must have a specific capacity.

The missions of the armed forces detailed in the Constitution can be established in another fundamental law - LDNFA. These missions reflect options related to the political regime and they embody general objectives that are applicable to a great range of strategic scenarios. The predominating fact of these missions is the political motives that originated them.

An analysis of the missions of the armed forces for the purpose of forces planning is focused on the specific missions of the armed forces, i.e. the concrete missions to give the armed forces in a certain strategic context in time, which give rise to the corresponding Forces’ System. These must be kept constantly up-to-date in relation to the associated strategic situation, even though significant changes to the same only occur when marked changes occur in the related strategic environment, namely the type of threats to contain, the level of interests to defend and the specifications of the means that the armed forces possess (existing technology and qualified human resources).

The timeframe normally used is 10-15 years, which is a period of time that is compatible with the reasonable probability that the main parameters defining the respective strategic situation remain unchanged.

These specific missions are further demarcated by two main limits: the global objectives that the State intends to achieve using the armed forces, and on the other hand, the human and material resources that it decides to make available (almost all of which depend on the assigned funds). In other words, taking into consideration that which is usually called the interconnection between a strategy of end purposes (objectives) and a strategy of means (resources).

Thus, based on all that stated above, the establishment (and constant update) of an up-to-date strategic concept is proven to be indispensable - the Strategic Concept on National Defence (CEDN) or the Strategic Concept on National Security (this is deemed to be more comprehensive according
to some authors). This will result in the Military Strategic Concept (CEM), the specific missions of
the armed forces and the Forces' Systems to be produced in order to fulfil these missions, as already
mentioned.

In summary, the CEDN will indicate the actual missions to fulfil by each national strategic vector
(foreign policy, economy and finance, culture and media, homeland policy, transport etc.) so that
security is obtained (the maximum freedom of action compatible with the reality that limits our
activities). For the proposed end purposes, those related to the defence vector, and therefore to be
implemented by the armed forces - the concrete missions of the armed forces for the time period -
should be highlighted. The CEM, resulting from the CEDN, moulds these missions to the rules and
characteristics of the military means and the respective use and it indicates the concrete missions
for the time period, i.e. the specific missions of the armed forces.

24.5 Co-Operation between the Security Forces

In this context, it is important to note that the circumstances surrounding the attack on civilian
buildings and strategic military points on 11 September 2001 in the USA brought to the fore the fact
that any State can be the object of an act of aggression, that places at risk freedom, integrity and
the security of people and assets at risk, at any time and anywhere. Even if these forms of
aggression worry the majority of States, in Timor-Leste’s specific case it is faced with the question
of knowing whether it has the legal and constitutional mechanisms in place that would allow it to
find the best way of preventing the risks of occurrence of such events and of finding the most
effective response to such concerns.

The following case study is accordingly presented:

“The armed forces may be assigned to take part in missions aimed at preventing collective risks and
supporting or reinforcing security measures at sites where significant installations of sectors deemed
essential to the nation are located, namely on borders and important industrial premises in the
energy, oil refinery and telecommunications sectors and even shipping ports and airports, etc., in
the event of external aggression or threats”.

Before moving on to the analysis phase we must set down the following assumptions:

The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste states that the primary and core mission
of the armed forces is the military defence of the Republic (Article 146), in order to guarantee
“national independence”, “territorial integrity” and the “freedom and security of the population
against any external aggression or threat”.

a) The concepts of external ‘aggression’ and ‘threat’ are indeterminate concepts that cannot be
excluded from any update to encompass new forms of external action that are likely to affect
the legal assets that constitute the object of the concept of national defence as expressed in
the Constitution;

b) On the occurrence of an external threat or aggression, which, due to its significance and
scope, seriously and profoundly impacts on the legal assets that are the object of the national
defence concept, as established in the Constitution, military defence may involve an external
component, characterised by the exercise of the right of legitimate defence, within the ambit
of international commitments, and an internal component, orientated towards the strict
protection, within the physical space comprising national territory, of the same legal assets
against external threats (there must be liaison between the Constitution and LDNFA - legitimate defence); c) Military defence against external threats to the operating capability of the manufacturing, food, industrial, energy, transport and communications sectors, given that these constitute vital interests to the well-being and security of the general public (it must be supported by the Constitution and LDNFA).

The stated case initially refers to "missions aimed at preventing collective risks and supporting or reinforcing security measures", which seems to indicate non-military intervention by the armed forces, performing duties that do not imply the use of armed means. However, the reference in the final part to "in the event of external aggression or threats" seems to indicate verification of the underlying principles for a military defence reaction.

The armed forces’ mission as suggested in the case study is analysed taking into consideration the text and the context in which it is formulated.

24.6 Contribution to the review of the Constitutional Status of National Defence and of the Armed Forces

It was deemed appropriate to start by analysing, even if briefly, the existing legislative framework in order to correctly handle the issue. This purpose of this brief legislative analysis would be to provide input to the adjustment of the constitutional status of national defence, internal security and the armed forces.

a) Current constitutional law possesses a quite limited range of missions for the armed forces (Article 146), associated to a more restrictive concept of national defence, which is still not constitutionally established. Nonetheless, the Constitution (Article 147) assigns to the police the role of "defending democratic law and guaranteeing the internal security of citizens".

b) In reality, the legislator adopted a more restrictive definition of national defence, which was essentially designed as an instrument that would guarantee the components of the State ("national independence", "territorial integrity" and "the general public") and would be exclusively externally directed, providing it with exclusively military responsibility.

The fundamental concern of the abovementioned principles was to separate national defence from the defence of internal order (internal security) and to establish the constitutional model of the armed forces, in conformity with that in force in the democratic constitutions of the West, via unequivocal and full submission to political power.

The core vector of the constitutional concept of national defence (not stated) is safeguarding the country against external threat or aggression, via the armed forces. This is separated from the defence of internal order, which is constitutionally assigned to the police.

National defence should be expressly referred to in the constitution as one of the tasks and responsibilities of the State that results from the very duty of guaranteeing national independence. The legislative framework should also detail the parameters that must be complied with and the end purpose to be pursued by national defence, for example:
“The objective of national defence is to guarantee the democratic institutions and international agreements, national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the general population against any external threat or aggression, in full compliance with constitutional system.”

A concept adopting the middle ground should be assessed when the Constitution is next reviewed. This intermediate concept should restrict the concept of national defence to the protection from external threats, but state that as a result national defence has to take on a global and inter-ministerial posture, and cannot be solely confined to the military plane. This concept must be in conformity with the concept of national defence proper, given that the “policy of national defence is global in nature, comprising a military component and a non-military component”. Also, the “policy of national defence has inter-ministerial scope, and all bodies and departments of the State are responsible for fostering the conditions that are essential to its execution” as indicated above.

Though military defence is an essential component of national defence it continues to exclusively belong to the armed forces (as defined in the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, and should be appropriately liaised with LDNFA).

This fundamental law establishes the possible use of the armed forces in exceptional or extraordinary situations of public necessity, such as in a situation of martial law or a state of emergency, as is the general case amongst pluralist democracies. This is established in the FALINTIL-FDTL Organic Law and in complementary legislation as yet unpublished. These are exceptional circumstances in which the armed forces can be called on to carry out security missions inside the country, which are consequently not within the ambit of national defence.

In addition to the general mission (primary and specific) of the armed forces as defined in the Constitution and the FALINTIL-FDTL Organic Law, there is no provision for their use in missions in the public interest, which would allow the armed forces to collaborate “in tasks related to meeting basic needs and improving the quality of life of the general public”. Article 3 of the Organic Law provides for support to internal security forces and assistance under the scope of civil protection. Nevertheless, the Constitution should pave the way for government-level law-makers to assign missions in the public interest to the armed forces, which have nothing to do with the use of armed means and which should be included in the LDNFA. The Constitution could, for example, have a provision worded as follows:

“The armed forces can be ordered, pursuant to law, to collaborate in civil protection missions, in tasks related to meeting basic needs and improving the quality of life of the general public (…).”

25 - MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

The development of a Ministry of National Defence with the decision making capacity to handle issues related to national defence is essential. The approval of the Organic Law of the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff of the Armed Forces is necessary in order to define the structural framework of the military component of national defence. This organic law will also establish the integrated duties for the implementation of military strategy in order to prepare and make the forces battle-ready.
The CEMGFA is responsible through the Minister of National Defence to the Government for implementing the operational strategy, which the Minister’s task is to draft and execute national defence policy, and the same is also responsible for planning and steering military strategy, particularly in relation to the development of the force.

The CEMGFA exercises the operational command of the armed forces, and therefore commands the land, air and sea components of the same. Thus, each component will be responsible for the readiness of its forces, and their preparation and training. All operational units will be dependent on the components operational command.

The Minister of National Defence is politically responsible, via duties inherent to the post, for the drafting and implementation of the military component of national defence. The current Ministry of Defence should improve the institutional liaison capacity with the General Staff of the Armed Forces relative to the drafting of strategic and political guidelines and directives for CEMGFA’s Forces Planning process. A structural review of the human and material resources of the Ministry of Defence should be performed, which includes the international BILATERAL and INUTIL consultants and which could effectively contribute to the so-called capacity building of national human resources, building the institutional nature of the armed forces and transform the Ministry into a functional and competent governing body, in accordance with the objective vision of the State of Timor-Leste.14

All other ministries, besides the Ministry of National Defence, are politically responsible for implementing the non-military components of national defence policy in the fields within their ambit. Thus, each Minister is especially responsible for coordinating and contributing, within the scope of their areas, to the drafting of the Strategic National Defence Concept, to managing the activities of their Ministry that impact in any manner of the execution of the national defence policy and to be answerable for the preparation and use of the means dependent on their Ministry in the national defence tasks assigned them.

26 - MILITARY DEFENCE

The aim of this strategic document is to provide a vision that lays down the strategic guidelines that are of use to the armed forces in better designing the strategic plan, while including considerations on the subject of national defence and the military defence component in particular. In order to achieve this, the security of Timor-Leste should be analysed from a global perspective that is expanded from a historic past, a legacy that we currently bear. Strategies that define the best way forward must be assessed, taking into account the possible compromising scenarios open to the country. In relation to the full and total withdrawal of the UN military component, we have dedicated a few critical words to the vacuum left in the transition period to the Government of Timor-Leste taking over control of security.

14 “COGNITIONAL DEVELOPMENT FOR TIMOR LESTE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (MOD) AND FALINTIL-FDTL” e “TRAINING NEEDS ANALYSIS OF FALINTIL-FDTL - A WAY FORWARD TO DEVELOP TRAINING POLICIES AND DIRECTIVES FOR FALINTIL-FDTL”, two papers solely authored by CHANDRABALAN SINGADURAI, UNOTIL Policy Advisor & focal point GE F2020. (See “Supporting Documents “ in Annex)
The military defence component must therefore embody an essential pillar of the sovereign state of Timor-Leste. We must contextualise the strategic options for the future development of the armed forces of Timor-Leste, in compliance with the constitutionally established mission, with the country’s history. In the past we had “to defeat Timor-Leste is to knock over the mountains, the invincible spirit of its nature” while in the future we shall have “it’s on the mountains’ the sea’s horizon; to protect and defend the sea is to make Timor-Leste independent”. Today, it is a sovereign nation. It has its independence in front of it and the national objectives to be achieved. The abundance of its natural resources in the sea mark out the path for the future. It is thus vital that strategies defining the sea as the source of development and prosperity are established.

Defence in the broadest sense is a pillar of the affirmation of sovereignty which, fundamentally, establishes the equilibrium for the development of the State. If the country has an appropriate defence posture, its stability will be guaranteed. The nation’s most important missions are assigned to national defence, which is the institution representing the sovereignty of the State. Military and non-military tasks and responsibilities are deposited in it to defend national interests.

Defence arose in the country’s historic past and it is nowadays a new embryo of conventional defence. On one hand, it constituted a factor of internal stability within the geographical boundaries of the country and, on the other, it sought out new horizons by looking beyond its sovereign borders to better preserve and defend it in a strategic manner.

FALINTIL have left a legacy for an independent Timor-Leste that is immeasurable in terms of wisdom capital and experience for the defence of the Nation. The values of FALINTIL - translated into a legacy of sacrifice and dedication, of honour and pride, of glory and victory, of unity and cohesion, of the liberation and independence of Timor-Leste – constitute an unalliable legacy to be transmitted to future generations.

The transition effort from UN responsibility in defence and security matters was systematically orientated, as well as prioritised and exclusively steered, towards the PNTL. This imbalance, which was created by the low proportionality assigned to the performance of FALINTIL–FDTL is probably due to the UN’s lack of experience in creating and developing armed forces and also to the unconvincing commitment taken on by the multilateral mission to support the creation and development of the armed forces of Timor-Leste. This lack of guidance and endeavour by the UN left independent Timor-Leste with the challenge of gaining experience, testing its capacity to define its strategic panorama, to define and steer the partnerships while it makes use of its sovereignty to establish bilateral relations according to national interest.

The theories on how to defend Timor-Leste, which have been imported by a number of individuals and organizations connected to Timor-Lesteese institutions, solely serve as benchmarks for the development of any strategic document on Timor-Leste, because it is up to the Timorese to define their own path for the future, and nobody better then them is able to select the best way of defending their country. This capacity has already been demonstrated in the past, when FALANTIL were deemed to be a group of fugitives and rebels against the occupying Indonesian power and its allies, and there were a number of attempts to extinguish FALANTIL and the people of Timor-Leste.
It is well known that the armed forces of Timor-Leste were created from an embryo known as FALANTIL and left in conditions less than suitable for them to take up operational duty. However, once the F-FDTL was created it was not provided the capacity to develop, with clear indications on the transition of tasks and responsibilities adapted to the real situation in Timor-Leste. There was, on the contrary, reluctance to defend the strategic interests of Timor-Leste.

There existed, and there still exists, a lack of coherent and sufficient multilateral endeavour to assist in defence and prepare the formulation of plans for the development of the armed forces of Timor-Leste. The armed forces may become deadweight to the nation due to the lack of structural and functional military defence mechanisms - technical military, equipment and material resources, infrastructures and financial resources established for the armed forces in conformity with the interests of Timor-Leste. We believe a multilateral contribution in line with the commitments made in the various donor conferences on defence would aid in minimizing and overcoming the real deficiencies existent in the armed forces. But, as we have found out to the contrary, the external influence of donors tends to convert our national interests into their strategic interests.

27 - MINISTRIAL DIRECTIVE ON MILITARY DEFENCE (DMDM)

While the establishment of the Strategic National Defence Concept is in the drafting process, the approval of a directive from the executive, in the person of the Minister of Defence - namely the Ministerial Directive on Military Defence - is imperative. This directive may, in the future, originate the analysis of the Military Strategic Concept by the CEMGFA and establish the guidelines for the CEMGFA’s Forces Planning Directives. The objective of said directive is to establish the guidelines of forces planning so that there may be a progressive adaptation to the new operational environment and to the Nation’s strategic needs.
PART II - CAPABILITIES
CHAPTER 4

STRATEGIES

Current State of Development of the Armed Forces

Planning of Military Defence

Development of the Armed Forces

Investment in Military Defence
28 - CURRENT DEVELOPMENT STATUS OF THE ARMED FORCES

The famous Office for Defence Force Development (ODFD) of the United Nations, which has been closed down in the meantime, left an uncertain future for military defence, after various attempts to assess force status and its development. Option 3 of the King’s College study comprised a learning process in strategic defence matters for all Timorese associated to the military defence of Timor-Leste. Currently, after 5 years of force development experience, and in spite of notable advances, there still remain various strategic issues that have not been solved nor had any decision taken with regard to them. There is a need to move past these proposals, models and studies based on imported concepts.15

It is important to have the Force Development Plan (PDF - 2004) and the terms of reference contained in the same as a benchmark in order to assess the Operational State of the Force. However, the PDFs were never fully implemented, with the monitoring cycle and concise assessment of the force development strategy.

The growth of Timor-Leste’s armed forces over these last five years is deemed to have been positive, despite the range of difficulties that it has faced. This growth has simultaneously weakened its reputation amongst the national and international general public, through constant incidents provoked by persons and groups of people not as disposed to military life, and who joined the institution through co-option, volunteering or simply by means of the sympathy forged for the good of the Nation. This fact has consequently contributed to making the institution vulnerable to any external interest with regard to the strategic factors.

According to the PDF – 2005, which analyzes the Force’s current organisational structure, the level of readiness is close to 80%, taking the following parameters into account: Personnel, armament, equipment, uniforms and vehicles. Thus, we must deem the PDF - 2005 Revision to be just a document for discussion taking into consideration the consolidation proposal relative to the current structure which sets out a process to restructure and resize the armed forces. A number of strategic definitions in this regard are essential.

The development of the armed forces provides immediate impact in the growth of the institution. The strategic growth of the institution requires its immediate insertion into legislation, the political alignment of national defence, integrated means and resources and a planning process, so that the various structural challenges can discover new driving forces. Some constraints that directly or indirectly affect the operational status of the Force result from the (non-conventional) historical legacy that continues to be a reference mark in moulding the structural nature of the institution. The regulatory clarification of that legacy is essential, in order to clearly and coherently define the

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current nature of the institution, in order to cultivate the homogeneity of intra-institutional cohesion (within the military services) in each member of the armed forces.

The problems that have occurred in the military units have become a mark on the conscience of modern military personnel due, on one hand, to the lack of solutions that would definitively eliminate non-military circumstantial behaviour that has installed itself at the heart of the institution, and on the other hand, the lack of doctrinal elements and specific means that, through training, may mould the new institutional character. A number of issues that may have a negative impact on the development of the Force have been identified:

a) The isolation of military personnel from national and world development;  
b) A lack of understanding regarding the role of the military in the national development process;  
c) The feeling of neglect amongst military personnel, caused by the lack of attention to the institutional development proper of the armed forces by those in government (neglect, postponement, absence from the list of institutional and national development priorities);  
d) The warped climate (political and military) acquired and existing in the units;  
e) Administrative failings at the different hierarchical levels of the military command structure;  
f) Lack of communication at the strategic (political), operational and tactical command level;  
g) The lack of welfare assistance, well-being, protection and security for military personnel;  
h) The mentality of military acculturation, a leftover of the Indonesian occupation;  
i) Political inertia in steering the phasing out process and special assistance to veterans still active in the armed forces;  
j) The growing trend amongst military personnel to desert due to an uncertain future.

It has become necessary, taking into consideration the scarce material resources, the available means and those means that are legitimately expected within a certain period of time, to organize, equip, instruct with doctrine and train the units of the armed forces, in order to provide them the professional standard for the necessary readiness for foreseeable commitment and, at the same time, provide greater employment flexibility in view of the range of missions that may be defined through suitable legislation. It has also become necessary to define rules with the assignment of areas of responsibility to the force’s operational units (the land force component and the light naval force component).

The immediate objective would be to equip the operational units with the following capacity:

a) A flexible organization allowing adaptation to each specific mission;  
b) An integrated command, control and communications (transmissions) system;  
c) Mobility corresponding to Timor-Leste’s geographical situation;  
d) The organization of the force into small units in order to be more manoeuvrable in the field;  
e) Preparation for night-time combat, combat in built-up areas and equipped with anti-armoured car weapons.  
f) Apply maximum combat potential in a short timeframe and at a chosen location;  
g) Equip the naval component with operational requirements and capacity and create detachments of marines, turning the naval component into a light naval force;
h) Versatility and training to perform various tasks intrinsic to the specific operational environment, for example: form a contingent for the humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping mission of the United Nations (UN-PKO);

i) Design the method of combined logistics administration and support with other security institutions;

j) Adapt the traditional logic of logistics supply for long periods of time through links with the general public.

29 – PLANNING MILITARY DEFENCE

The Ministerial Military Defence Directive (DMDM) steers the analysis of the Military Strategic Concept by CEMGFA in order to make its forces’ planning possible, taking into consideration the harmonisation with national defence policy, which establishes the operational objectives and the standard of readiness to be achieved in military defence. On one hand, weighing up the national limiting factors that exist and following the guidelines of the Strategic Planning of National Development document including military defence forces’ planning, which encompasses the military budget, upkeep and real investment. On the other hand, taking into consideration the requirements and demands of the general public, related to the values of democracy, stability, justice, peace and development and even operational and intervention opportunities.

As Timor-Leste is a new country in this third millennium it possesses a vulnerability caused by the excessive speed of social mutation in this age of globalization, the prospective brutal increase in national economic, social and political burdens and even the incapacity of those in government to respond to the new and constant needs for change. Therefore, a clear strategic path is required from Timor-Leste’s leaders in order to modulate national policy toward quickly overtaking the fissures and competition between States in the regional and international arenas, the transactional realignment of political forces, and the economic interests of neighbours, so that the millennium objectives from a global strategic standpoint are collectively achieved.

29.1 Military Strategy is oriented towards planning and defining military potential, the objectives, the operational type and employment, namely:

a) National Forces System (SFN)

1) The restructuring and resizing of the current Force structure, in conformity with a new National Strategic Development driving force;

2) The strategic projection of current personnel in quantitative and qualitative terms;

3) Suitable re-equipping according to operational and uniform requirements;

4) Strengthening the allocation of material (transport and infrastructures) and funding resources;

5) Technical training to ensure harmonisation with the new combat capacities;

6) Create the Theatre of Operations Command with combat, humanitarian and peacekeeping capabilities.

b) Reformulate the doctrine according to the cognitive standards of Timor-Leste

1) Mobile (maximum mobility);

2) Flexible (greater flexibility);
3) Contactable (secure and efficient communications)
4) Versatile (adaptation to any circumstances);
5) Adaptable to the activities of CIMIC;
6) Have the capacity for amplified combat according to the required circumstances;
7) Increase the firepower according to the circumstances of the strategic environment;
8) Strengthen the capacity and size of the military intelligence service;
9) Acquire standardised capacity to contribute to UN peacekeeping forces;
10) Take part in support operations and exercises requested at the regional and international level.

c) **Instruction and Training** – Review of the training syllabus (introduction of patriotic ethic) and of other training and readiness directives in the fields of:

1) Basic Training - established in accordance with the compulsory conscription system for regular units and volunteers for special units;
2) Elementary Training - civil protection and support to civil authority training package (policing, various fire-fighting specialities, medical assistance or first aid, environmental protection etc.);
3) Training of Staff Personnel - established according to the definition of military career policy;
4) Specialised Training - will be performed according to the definition of the SFN for the fulfilment of assigned missions;
5) Operational Training - the operational combat units and territorial defence units perform operational training according to the annual program to be established;
6) Permanent Operations’ Instruction - the operational combat units and territorial defence units perform operational training according to the annual program to be established;
7) Combined and Joint Exercises - the command of the theatre of operations studies and analyzes the exercise mission, defines an order of battle and plans the establishment of forces that will form the required structure for participation in the exercise, with due operational readiness preparation for the fulfilment of the mission. In parallel, the operational combat units and territorial defence units with specialized capacities may be posted to perform the missions established in the respective exercise and the bilaterally designed program or the established alliance agreements;
8) Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping Operations - the command of the theatre of operations, on receiving the mission, studies and analyzes the same, defines a program and plans the establishment of forces that will comprise the national contingent (combined Task Force), with due operational readiness preparation for the fulfilment of the mission.
9) Others

d) **Principles of War**

1) C4IRS (adequate investment in this area for integrated use);
2) Defensive (principal posture of the military defence strategy);
3) Security (oversee the security of military personnel);
4) CIMIC persuasive (military-civil cooperation will be a constant operation of military personnel).
5) Simplicity;
6) Dispersal;
7) Surprise;
8) Guerrilla.

(A) Political Orientation

29.2 General Principles of Military Defence

The Forces’ Development Plan (PDF) in progress has basically served as the Ministerial Directive for Military Defence for the purposes of military strategic planning. Nevertheless, after 5 years of Force development, we have managed to put into place new perspectives to develop our Force based on the experience of FALINTIL i.e. possess a light, flexible and versatile structure with the capacity to establish controlled hubs of action and combat throughout the country. This is a factor that boosts forces and national cohesion, and is preferentially orientated toward the defence of the sea as a dissuasive factor and one in the national interest.

The PDF in force provides some conventional indications that clearly indicate the operational tasks assigned the structures of the armed forces, designed according to the doctrine and system strategically attributed to Timor-Leste, restricting the immediate dimensions of the defence of the sea. This PDF simply aims to turn the armed forces of Timor-Leste into a symbolic force, into a force to guard or secure strategic points in order to consolidate the regional strategic defence of other countries, including world powers, using the dominant doctrine in order to achieve its strategic interests. We deem this stance to be problematic and compromising, the aim of which is to blackmail the future of the people of Timor-Leste, who fought, sacrificed and died for that future, for their own freedom and independence.

Efforts to re-establish neighbourly relations with Indonesia are along the lines of harmonizing relations between Timor-Leste and Indonesia, as two sovereign and neighbouring countries, and a mutual understanding of direct security and defence. In this vein, we must guarantee and develop the capacity of the armed forces in order to implement combined operations or interoperability (between Indonesia, Australia and Timor-Leste) or, on another level, with the end purpose of near and extended defence according to the definition given the national strategic defence concept.

29.3 Objective of Military Defence

In the abovementioned guideline, the objectives in the military component of national defence are as follows:

a) Modularly create and develop (module system) a military institution that incorporates the historic value of FALINTIL, that represents the sovereignty of Timor-Leste, that turns the defence of the Homeland into a professional, credible and force-empowering factor, that possesses efficiency and effectiveness capacity and raised levels of readiness and flexibility, that is capable of meeting the needs of national defence and ready to support and participate in international peacekeeping commitments;
b) Maximize the productivity of the armed forces in relation to the national interest, namely through their involvement in national development with professional performance parameters for the assigned missions, the constant preparation for institutional professionalism and as a top-level civic behaviour training centre;

c) Deploy the armed forces throughout the country (national territory on the archipelago) in order to maintain constant contact with the local populations and the resources of permanent national interest; Organize land forces in a decentralized manner (in sector commands) and lightly equipped at the combined intervention company level; And with the light naval force acting in the marine operational environment through patrol boats and marines; In this manner, the armed forces may be able to systematically develop dissuasive capacity in conflict prevention action, as well as be able to serve as a factor of national cohesion;

d) Develop and employ exclusively military capacity in the light naval force (from the coast to ZEE) with the broadened participation of other bodies that possess administrative authority in the ambit of the defence and security of the maritime area of permanent interest to Timor-Leste. (in a format where the civil authority shares the military means in combined activities);

e) The constant affirmation of Timor-Leste in the world, as a sovereign nation and a democratic State governed by the rule of law, steering international relations through the clear pursuit of national values and interests and through endeavour fully respecting international law and human rights and based on the ideals of peace, security and cooperation;

f) Prevent any attempt to impose a secondary strategic commitment on the armed forces. This would prevent the armed forces from becoming a simply symbolic second grade force or a conventional mercenary force that is funded to defend the strategic interests of others;

g) Participate in actions, along the lines of reciprocal, in the near future, in particular with ASEAN, APEC, PIF and CPLP countries, as well as China, India, Japan, Australia, Russia, USA and others, in a manner in line with national capacity and interest, taking into consideration the geostrategic position of Timor-Leste;

Take part in international organizations in the near future, such as the UN, ARF and other security and defence organizations (in the effort for peace, to pacify, and to increase transparency, trust and stability), and collaborate in renewed efforts for dialogue and cooperation;

i) Keep in line with international developments, in the sense of contributing to prevent, limit or manage tension generating situations, which may threaten global and regional stability and security, identifying the areas previously cited in the strategic environment of Timor-Leste as bearing priority;

The aim of DMDM in the area of strategic planning is to obtain the operational commitment of the forces according to the specific and generic missions attributed under the armed forces organic law.
It takes into consideration the non-existence of a legislative framework for national defence which, in turn, defines the strategic concepts of national defence, military defence and the use of forces and subsequently sets down operational requirements.

Military planning, or force planning (to be developed) in other words, may subsequently provide a global view related to the new panorama of the operational environment of Timor-Leste and its integration into the general background for national development. Military planning liaises with short and medium-term objectives in fulfilling constitutionally assigned missions, related to the current climate of development of the armed forces.

Military defence is applicable in the coverage zone or zone of probable combat. The armed forces are guided in peace time or war time by an (AO) area of responsibility that is militarily defined to establish institutional integration and develop concentrated pro-active activities within the context of the objectives established according to the operational environment.

29.4 Conditioning Factors
A number of limiting factors to the development of the armed forces of Timor-Leste were found and identified. These factors limit its capacity to achieve the above-defined objectives. Outstanding amongst these factors is the economic and financial aspect, which, based on the country’s real situation, require that the allocation of means and resources to the annual military defence budgets be carefully weighed up. Nonetheless, we must be guided by an overall and integrated perspective of the State, where defence is a public sector that deserves strategic investment that contributes to the country’s sustainability.

Timor-Leste’s armed forces are currently in a precarious situation in regard to the effective and conventional fulfilment of their mission. This fact is due to the lack of legislative structure, military planning, material resources, equipment, infrastructures and technical military resources. It is also due to the readjustment of the doctrine and, fundamentally, at the operational level, where there is difficulty in obtaining coherent bilateral consultancy to draw up military programs orientated towards military defence objectives in the operational context of Timor-Leste.

Further influencing and compromising factors are: the political stance of the State, the decisions that need to be taken and the willingness categorically demonstrated in the multilateral partnership models for the necessary development of the military defence sector. Some analyses, which were simplistic and indicative of underlying political and strategic interests, were transmitted through the Force Development Plan, in which the logical conclusion was reached that Timor-Leste can only have a Force with a limited number of men and weapons (1500 regular personnel divided into 2 light infantry battalions and supported by 2 coastal patrol boats) and without any other necessary capacity for conventional dissuasion, given the unfeasible economic situation in the country.

(B) Specific Orientation
The specific orientations are aimed at contextualizing and detailing the particular aspects of planning in the areas described below:
29.5 Forces
In order to maintain continuity in the development of the Force, in modules, the forces system, the missions and forces deployment, the number of personnel actually authorized versus the decrease and/or increase of personnel that the Force restructuring and resizing process implies must be re-discussed and re-orientated by the authority of the State. The current PDF continues to be the force planning reference in some areas of the force’s upper echelons, though the CEDN may foster a definition of the CEM and the adjustment of the abovementioned requirements.

The issue of national financial constraints may be the determining factor in the definition of the forces system. However, a systematic effort to streamline the forces system would allow the full use of existing structures to fulfil some of the specific and fundamental missions of the military defence of national territory and the surveillance of the Permanent Strategic National Interest Space (EEINP).

In this context, an operational force defined as land force and light naval force should be urgently organised and be ready to intervene from 2007 to 2010. The characteristics of this force will include a high level of readiness, a size that is appropriate to the country’s real situation and it should be capable of being projected outside of the country in Task Force modules on peacekeeping missions, if so requested.

29.6 Armaments and Equipment
It is essential, bearing in mind the principle of institutional interoperability and the probable combined operations for security purposes, that the armed forces think about making maximum use of the means already allocated and apply for new means according to force planning needs and operational requirements so as to:

1. Adapt the operational units to the potential and use of night-fighting equipment, fighting in built-up areas, update firepower with sniper weapons, anti-armoured vehicle weapons, heavy and semi-heavy machine guns, light patrol vehicles (Land Rover), top quality integrated tactical, operational and strategic transmission (communication) system, armoured personnel carriers and armoured assault vehicles (APC M113) with suitable combat support weaponry;
2. Adapt the capacity of territorial defence units to perform civil-military operations and provide modern engineering means and a mobile medical unit;
3. Adapt the task force units (UN-PKO) that will integrate peacekeeping missions with interoperability capacity in terms of weaponry and equipment, according to mission characteristics;
4. Adapt and provide the light naval force with the necessary and appropriate naval means to fulfil its mission;
5. Increase technologically-orientated initiatives, in the fields of information technology, transmissions and telecommunications, sensors, modelling and simulation, in order to improve C4IRS capacity;
6. Optimize military information operations in the field of reconnaissance, surveillance and electronic protection, using, in as much as possible, transmission (communications) capacity
in its multiple applicational facets, in joint or combined operations and in foreign operations or intervention;

7. In the tactical component, provide the armed forces with integrated, secure and effective transmission (communications) equipment for use at the tactical and strategic levels. Use top of the range VHF and mobile retransmitters/repeaters at operations tactical command posts, in the tactical component. In the strategic component, establish communications means, a satellite transmission system exclusively for military use from the land force sector command posts and light naval force warships to the general headquarters of the armed forces; and guarantee communications between leaders of the State (using the Telecom Timor system as a back-up);

8. Recommendation: perform an additional study (for operational requirements) on the integrated tactical and strategic communications system in order to establish the good management of nationwide secure and effective communications’ networks. Use the Atsabe operations, the tsunami propaganda, the protest demonstration of peticionários [applicants] and the recent armed confrontations /armed political crisis as Case Studies.

29.7 Military Information System (SIM)
There is a lack of operational mechanisms amongst the armed forces detachments in the field for the permanent gathering of information and its channelling through to general headquarters, which would then subsequently share it with other agencies possessing analysis capacity and able to define information types and categorize threats.

The following must be guaranteed in the development of the military information system:

1. Steering its activity toward the military information and security fields;
2. Coherence, compatibility and convergence of effort and inter-institutional sharing;
3. Interoperability and collaboration with the State’s security services and other systems of neighbouring countries and of allies.

29.8 Crisis Management
The armed forces must possess suitable means and capacities to handle any type of crisis in coordination with the bodies of the State (inter-ministerial):

a) study, identify and analyze all possible types of national and international crises that may negatively impact on the Nation; and
b) recommend the timely synchronization and appropriate alignment of effective action to prevent and minimize the risks and possible damage to the Nation.

Define an improved crisis management plan for the military bases (sector command) that guarantees the systematic monitoring of the development of the crisis to provide decision-making support. This plan must be in harmony with the development of the national alert system and develop the detailed plans associated to each measure resulting from that system.

Develop plans for the use of the non-military component of national defence, in coordination with the Natural Catastrophe and Crisis Planning Centre. Lastly, participate in nationwide annual exercises concerning crisis management scenarios, in which all sectors that would be involved in a real situation participate. Allies, neighbours and friendly countries may also participate in these exercises.
30 - DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES

The Constitution states that the armed forces of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL-FDTL) are responsible for the military defence of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. The armed forces guarantee national independence, territorial integrity and the freedom and security of the general population against any kind of external threat or aggression. They ensure the safeguarding of the sovereignty of the State. The armed forces must, therefore, possess an organization with the capacity that allows them to effectively respond and/or act in the circumstances of their operational environment, in order to:

1. Exclusively confront (prevent and/or combat) any type of external threat, as national guarantee. As a last resort, delay for sufficient time to allow external support to intervene;
2. Intervene against any type of internal threat that jeopardizes national stability, in exceptional circumstances laid down in legislation.

The armed forces of Timor-Leste must be created in modules of small, light units. The armed forces’ units must be created at company level and gradually evolve to brigade level in a future perspective. The armed forces must accommodate professional and conscripted personnel, which will progressively comprise the military potential of the three joint Force elements. The total potential of Timor-Leste’s armed forces must be structured according to operational combat forces (land and sea) and territorial defence forces (land and sea), supported by the air support and service support components.

The armed forces of Timor-Leste must possess the capacity to fulfil various types of mission in different theatres of operation in both peace time and war time. In peace time, the armed forces must possess the capacity and maintain the level of professionalism and readiness to:

(a) permanently participate in missions in the public interest, in internal crises, in providing internal assistance and evacuation in situations of natural disaster;
(b) international humanitarian support and assistance;
(c) United Nations’ humanitarian and peacekeeping missions.

In war time, the armed forces must possess, after national mobilization, the readiness capacity to:

(a) be moved to combat zones in order to: defend, maintain and restore territorial integrity;
(b) cover operational areas to defend the Nation;
(c) dissuade, prevent or repulse enemy attack;
(d) reconquer occupied territory;
(e) and, inclusively, defend strategic assets and maritime and aerial lines of communication, maintaining the State’s operational freedom.

31 - INVESTMENT IN MILITARY DEFENCE

31.1 Introduction

There exist doubts in the heart of the civil and military community regarding the relevance of the national defence policy in the context of the Government’s programme and the respective grand options of the plan for national development.
After five years of development, the armed forces suffer from constraints that are critical to their survival. If the armed forces must exist to constitutionally defend the national interests of Timor-Leste, then they deserve to be treated justly and with dignity and be considered as a strategic (and priority) institution for strategic investment from the State in the public sector. If, on the contrary, the armed forces are not a priority in the national development plan, then this option must be publicly stated by political leaders, so that the historic value acquired by FALANTIL during the fight for national freedom and the consequent creation of a new regular force - FALANTIL-FDTL, is not undermined.

The pragmatism of the armed forces of Timor-Leste has its own existence, which is embodied in the VETERANS’ persistence in maintaining a notable status and regular institutional standing. However, the position of the leaders of the State shows institutional scepticism, demonstrated by the lack of decisions and leadership solutions in relation to the development of the armed forces produced by the ministry under the jurisdiction of which national defence falls. The documents of the general state budget for the 2004-05 and 2005-06 financial years show a lack of political will to plan the programs for the development of the armed forces. Similarly, the 2005 and 2006 sector investment programme (PIS) indicate the same less than encouraging content regarding investment to guarantee the development and capacity-building of the armed forces.

31.2 Assumptions

Another facet of the lack of development of military defence is the absence of mechanisms - legislative framework, defence budget planning system, and defence plan, program and project management -, which must be established in the military programming law. Later on, the development of these mechanisms is assessed in the Biennial Forces Planning Procedure (CBPF) which assesses the budget for military defence, constituting funds for the real investment in the development of the armed forces. The real investment must be steered towards achieving the political objectives of national defence.

The development of the armed forces is performed in line with its missions. It would be necessary to possess information that is individually impossible to obtain, in order to provide a response to the issue of the precise details of the specific missions of the armed forces. A satisfactory response can only be obtained based on the conjunction of multiple elements from different ministries (briefly described above). These elements include political orientation, strategic information, knowledge of existing resources (human, material and financial) and others that may exist within defined timeframes. The satisfactory response will allow a real investment plan to be drawn up and included in the defence budget.

It becomes necessary, after the real investment plan has been drawn up and included in the defence budget, to identify the main capacities that the armed forces of Timor-Leste must possess, and based on which its will be feasible to deduct the concrete missions and respective priorities regarding means, which is formed into the National Forces System and implementation timeframes.

The State, after establishing the required capacities for the armed forces in the context of the current strategic timeframe (15 to 20 years) and the detailing of the priorities regarding the analysis
of structures and the deployment of forces that may be available at any given time (in the event that the financial means are not immediately available), may resort to bilateral agreements to meet the needs for developing the armed forces in conformity with the set objective.

Assuming that the maritime underlying guideline forms part of the steering option for national development, the State must assume investment in the armed forces’ light naval force as a priority. In relation to military planning management, investment in the light naval force component must be prioritised to the following areas: instruction and training, human and material resources, equipment, uniforms and infrastructures.

31.3 Recommendations
It is recommended, considering the strategic role of the armed forces in national development and its inseparable inclusion in strategic public investment, that real investment for the development of the armed forces be included in the general state budget.

The State must maintain the ThinkTank method for the sustainable development of the armed forces. This ThinkTank studies and advises on military defence matters, including the details regarding the acquisition of war equipment and material recommended for the armed forces of Timor-Leste. A national Defence Consultant model would be advisable.

If compulsory military conscription is the option chosen then the creation of a small scale domestic defence industry would be advisable, the objective of which would be to produce uniforms and footwear, dry rations, ammunition and other types of military items and basic needs, for use in instruction and training.

A prerequisite for the participation of national and international suppliers of the military defence industry in war equipment calls to tender processes is that they must possess safety and quality certification (company certification) which is endorsed (and/or accredited) by the Timor-Lesteese government.

Currently, the average cost per individual in the armed forces of Timor-Leste is approximately USD 7500 per year\(^\text{16}\). The gradual increase of this average cost per individual must be considered in the development of the armed forces, and the use of this sum must be optimized, with the objective of training a professional soldier as an institutional requirement. The training of a regular and professional soldier is a public investment under the Government’s responsibility, which will strengthen the defence and armed forces institution and attain the overall national objective.

\(^{16}\) Estimate based on data provided by the Ministry of Defence, in a paper presented at GE F2020 by the Ministry of Defence’s financial consultant. (see attached “Supporting Documents”)
CHAPTER 5
COMMAND

Joint General Command Headquarters
Command of Forces Components
Sector Command
Command of Combined Response Companies (CMI)
Operations Theatre Command
32 - JOINT GENERAL COMMAND HEADQUARTERS
The highest level of the Timor-Leste Armed Forces shall be a joint entity, with a single command structure (the Joint Headquarters) incorporating the land forces, naval force, air force and support and service elements. The General Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces shall have the powers/legal right to command the armed forces, in both peacetime and wartime, and has the Chiefs of Forces Staff as his deputies. The Administrative and Logistical Command shall include all the units necessary for logistical support (if these units do not have their own command), and also underpins [the force-wide operator] in its various tasks related to logistics, communications, engineering, medical support, military police detachments and training.

The General Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces shall have a cabinet to provide general, personal and administrative assistance. This cabinet shall consist of a Head of Cabinet, an aide-de-camp, a Personal Security department, an Internal Information and Public Relations department (IIPR) and an Administrative Support department. It shall also include the Sergeant Major.

The Headquarters shall be made up of the Chief of the Joint Coordinating Staff, the Joint Coordinating Staff, and a Command and Services Sub-Division. The Joint Coordinating Staff is headed by the Chief of the Joint Coordinating Staff and Deputy Chiefs of the Joint Coordinating Staff, and also by those heading the following divisions: Staff (J1), Military Intelligence (J2), Operations (J3), Logistics (J4), Training, Education and Doctrine (J5), Communications (J6) and Finances (J7). The Chief of the Joint Coordinating Staff has a small cabinet to assist with coordination, command and administration.

The Command and Services Sub-Division shall be at Company grade and shall consist of: Company Command, Justice Section, Military Security Section, Finances Section, Health Section, Food Section, Military Police and Military Band Section.
In addition, all soldiers and any civilians who may be working at the Headquarters shall be registered for administrative reasons (book-keeping, updating, checking and recording individual proceedings, food, payment of [advances] and salaries, leave, etc) in the Command and Services Company of the Headquarters.

33 - COMMAND OF FORCES COMPONENTS
The future Command of the Components of the Armed Forces is made up of the Land Forces Command (FT), Light Naval Command (FNL), Air Support Command (CAA), Training Command (CFT), Administrative and Logistical Command (CAL) or Support and Service Command (CAS) and Theatre of Operations Command (CTO). Small command units could be set up, based on the following principles:

a. Role: During peacetime, these command units constitute the principle command of the operational structure of each component of the forces;
b. Mandate: Implementation of the annual activity plan; conducting operational training; deployment of forces and resources at times of public crisis and during public
interest missions; in exceptional cases or during wartime, operational command of the forces and resources under its control;

c. Structure: Commanding Officer, Deputy Commanding Officer, Administrative and Logistical Department, and Operations Centre (land, sea, air, and support and service sections).

These commands shall have of a small-sized permanent core.

The Administrative and Logistical Command shall incorporate all the units necessary for the logistical backup for the whole of the Land Forces, covering all areas of logistics, communications, engineering, health and training, if there is no specific command unit for these.

This Command shall be based upon the following main principles:

1. Role: During peacetime, this is the main centre for logistics, administration and training.

2. Mandate: Implementing the annual activity plan; administrative and logistical support for the land forces; operational training; deployment of forces and resources at times of public crisis and during public interest missions; in exceptional cases or during wartime, operational command of the forces and resources under its control;

3. Structure: Commanding Officer, Deputy Commanding Officer, Administrative and Logistical Centre and support bodies.

These commands shall have a small-sized permanent core.

The Administrative and Logistical Command is made up of the following units: logistics, communications, (training), engineering and medical assistance.

34 - SECTOR COMMAND

The Sector command is subordinate to the Land Force Command, and consists of two (2) components: the Operational Combat Forces and the Territorial Defence Forces. The Land Force Command (FT), in close cooperation with civilian organisations in the sectors and/or regions, establishes the military mechanisms necessary to take action in the field. Having an on-site military mechanism with high C4IRS capacity allows State authorities to have direct, permanent and effective control over the national territory, inhabitants and resources. This guarantees knowledge of the overall state of the nation and allows the authorities to assess risks which could jeopardize Timor-Leste’s interests.

(a) Role: During peacetime, these would be the main commands for the operational structure of the combined land companies.

(b) Mandate: Implementation of the annual activity plan for the sector; guidance for the command of each component of the forces as to operational training for forces deployed in the sector command; guidance on the timetable for joint manoeuvres of forces in the sector and on the deployment of forces and resources at times of public crisis and during public interest missions; in exceptional cases or during wartime, operational command of the forces and resources under its control;

(c) Structure: Commanding Officer, Deputy Commanding Officer, Administration-Logistics Department and Operations Centre. The incumbent Commander of the combined land company deployed within the sectoral area of responsibility could also take on this task.
The aim of the integrated framework for the sector command is to attribute responsibilities and operational tasks to the Combined Intervention Company (CMI) and define immediate objectives for the CICs deployed in the sector command.

**Tasks of the Sector Command:**

1. To act as a contact point for sectoral information/intelligence-gathering;
2. To carry out missions of a specific nature falling within their zone/sector of responsibility;
3. To plan, lead and manage the sector in accordance with orders from superiors;
4. To dismantle/destroy any cooperation between the local population and insurgents or those seeking to destabilise national defence and security;
5. To detect and neutralise any local insurrection structures or activities;
6. To guarantee an atmosphere of physical and psychological security for local people;
7. To cooperate with the civil administration and national police;
8. To coordinate the sector development programme along with the Armed Forces HQ, the civil administration and the national police;
9. To control the sector and manage a control programme along the following lines:
   a. Strengthening and developing the existing elements of the rule of law;
   b. Adopting a Justice For All philosophy in the management of control systems.
10. To establish military training in accordance with the Armed Forces training directives;
11. To comply fully with the operations plan established by the Headquarters.

**35. COMMAND OF COMBINED RESPONSE COMPANIES (CMI)**

The Combined Intervention Companies are made up of platoons and members of the FOCT and the FDT deployed in the areas covered, known as Operations Areas or Areas of Responsibility. Their task is mainly to carry out defensive operations, deterrent operations in joint civil-military actions, and constant intelligence-gathering. In administrative terms, the company is under the orders of the Sector Command and receives direct orders from the Land Forces Command.

a) Role: During peacetime, the main command centre for the Armed Forces’ basic support structure;

b) Mandate: Implementation of the fundamental activity programmes, operational training of forces, guidance for the Sector Command on the deployment of forces and resources at times of public crisis and during public interest missions; in exceptional cases or during wartime, operational command of the forces and resources under its control.

**Immediate Objectives of the Combined Intervention Companies in the Sector Command**

Combined Intervention Companies shall occupy a geographically defined Operations Area and serve as a contact point for intelligence-gathering in accordance with the following principles:

1. The position shall be occupied under orders from High Command;
2. Reconnaissance patrols shall be conducted at the base and in the Operations Area to gather intelligence;
3. A battle plan containing probable operation scenarios shall be drawn up, under orders from High Command;
4. The company shall be tactically relocated according to orders;
5. The main tasks are:
a. Implementation of the company's operational training programme;
b. Planning and carrying out psychological operations;
c. Coordinating activities within the scope of CIMIC;
d. Establishing and maintaining links with the Civil Administration and National Police;
e. Providing security and protection to the sector against any external threat;
f. Planning and readiness of a mobile reserve force.

36 – OPERATIONS THEATRE COMMAND

The Theatre of Operations Command could be established in the JHQ Operations Division (J3) with the task of planning operations of a specific nature within missions of national interest and international commitments. This Theatre of Operations Command shall draw up programmes to ensure preparation and readiness of the troops participating in joint missions, combined missions, joint manoeuvres with allies, humanitarian missions, peace missions and permanent national missions.
CHAPTER 6

LAND FORCES

Introduction to the Land Forces

Land Strategy

Developing the Land Forces

Land Forces Capability
37 - INTRODUCTION TO LAND FORCES
Conflicts over territory were a constant in the lives of our ancestors. Today, land retains its geographical value and is still the object of disputes and conflicts over its appropriation and control. Just as elsewhere, the various wars waged on Timor-Lesteese territory have always been a difficult and punishing experience for the country's inhabitants.
The FALANTIL have marked the country’s history, leaving behind a unique heritage for Independent Timor-Leste, which is of immeasurable importance in providing experience and knowledge to defend the nation. The FALANTIL are highly regarded by the Timor-Lesteese people and participate unfailingly in the national reconstruction process. The current Armed Forces (FALINTIL-FDTL) emerged from this past, and now form the embryo of a conventional military defence structure. On one hand, they represent a point of stability within national borders, and on the other they can bring pressure to bear externally in response to the challenges posed by the wider world outside their sovereign borders, with the aim of better defending these borders both militarily and diplomatically in terms of shared strategic interests.

38 - LAND STRATEGY
The strategic importance of the Land forces has is fundamental in any conflict, wherever it may be, for two reasons. Firstly, the use of territory as an land forces base is unequivocal in the eyes of society and awakens hope (thus guaranteeing national backing), giving it a decisive political value. Secondly, the Land Forces has the unique ability to take, occupy, retain and guarantee territory, and can maintain a permanent presence over a long period. The Land Forces seems to embody the whole conflict, in that winning or losing on the ground is synonymous with a victory or loss for the country. The FALINTIL’s experience demonstrated both the operational capacity and the relevance of territorial defence.

The Land Forces can maintain and sustain its influence from or for the land during peacetime, crises and wars. It can be used to defend Timor-Leste’s sovereignty, protect national interests and guarantee national independence. Military operations by the land forces are an obvious way for the Armed Forces to contribute to State objectives and also to assist civilians during peacetime (for example through UN peace missions, evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, and aid and assistance to civilian populations), since the land forces is an operational force which can provide strategic support to the State and has adequate resources at its disposal to allow it to adapt to any changes in strategic circumstances.

39 - DEVELOPING THE LAND FORCES
The model of a Joint Force has been gaining ground in Armed Forces across the world. In our case, this is a strategic principle which should be adopted by the National Defence Policy since it offers maximum flexibility and versatility and also complies with the proposals in the Military Defence Strategy. The Timor-Leste Land Forces should be structurally integrated into units of Operational Land Combat Forces and units of Territorial Defence Forces. Both units should be small, well equipped (with arms or) specialised troops, have significant firepower and manoeuvre capacity (structure, troops, vehicles, weapons, logistics and communications) at their disposal, and be
coordinated in such a way as to allow increases in firepower and combat capacity to destroy the enemy if necessary.

The policy adopted on Timor-Leste’s military potential must dovetail with the new model for the Armed Forces. This model is based upon greater flexibility and versatility and reflects the ideas contained within the Military Defence Strategy. The multidimensional nature of the land forces means that its Command must be perceptive, intuitive, innovative, competent and decisive, as well as being highly motivated to design, define, predict and plan the use of means and resources against enemy during wartime, and construct the country during peacetime.

The Land Forces should maintain the philosophy of the FALINTIL as a doctrine laying down the principles of any war. These principles are necessary to the success of all operations, including symmetrical or asymmetrical ones.

**Doctrine and Principles of the Land Forces**

**Doctrine of the Land Forces**

1. Mobile (maximum mobility);
2. Flexible (maximum flexibility);
3. Communicative (possess secure, integrated and effective means of communication);
4. Versatile (able to deal with any circumstances);
5. Able to fit in with the activities of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC);
6. Able to increase combat capacity according to the operational circumstances;
7. Able to increase firepower according to the strategic circumstances;
8. Able to intensify capacities and dimension of the military intelligence service;
9. Existence of a *standard* capacity to contribute to the UN Peacekeeping Forces;
10) Able to participate in support operations and manoeuvres as required at regional and international level.

**Principles of War**

1. C4IRS (sufficient investment in C4IRS to allow integrated use);
2. Defensive (the current main stance of the military defence strategy with a view to developing an Offensive stance)
3. Security (strong defence of security and maximum protection of troops);
4. Persuasion (troops are continually involved in civil-military cooperation);
5. Simplicity;
6. Dispersal;
7. Surprise;
8. Guerrilla.

**40 - LAND FORCES CAPABILITY**

Within the context of restructuring and streamlining the Armed Forces, the land forces should be incorporated into the structure of the National Forces System as follows:
A body of Timor-Leste Conventional Soldiers (the soldiers of the future) should be developed, based upon the character and attitudes of our ancestors.

The Land Forces should be developed around units of Operational Land Combat Forces (FOCT) and units of Territorial Defence Forces (FDT), constituting a joint force made up of small squadrons deployed in the areas of responsibility defined as containment zones or possible combat zones. These units shall be the front line, acting as a force multiplier during crises or wartime. The force must have the capacity to carry out various operations when the country is under threat from conventional warfare, or participate in peace operations in a regional and international arena.

Company grade is ideal for the initial development this force, which will gradually progress to Brigade level.

The FOCT shall be made up of mechanised infantry companies, special force companies and snipers, backed up by combat helicopter units and other combat and support resources (M113 A3). The FDT shall be made up of light artillery (anti-aircraft) and light cavalry (armoured personnel carriers, anti-helicopter, LRSU (long-range surveillance units), MGSS (mobile ground surveillance systems)), backed up by engineering units, medical support units (mobile clinics), and strategic reserves of troops carrying out their obligatory military service, if applicable.

The land forces element, made up of FOCT and FDT units, is one element of the Combined Intervention Companies (CMI). It possesses extensive combat capacity and is highly efficient, allowing autonomy, flexibility and mobility, given the need to assure the security and defence of national territory. This can be achieved by bestowing certain areas of responsibility or operations on the CIC via the Sector Command directly under Land forces command. This structure ensures maximum flexibility in deploying operational combat troops in the most effective way to achieve Military Defence objectives.
CHAPTER 7
LIGHT NAVAL FORCES

Introduction to the Light Naval Forces
Strategy of the Light Naval Forces
Developing the Capability of the Light Naval Forces
The System of Naval Authority

Air Support Component
Support and Services Component
41 - INTRODUCTION TO THE NAVAL FORCES

Timor-Leste is an archipelago and given the nature of maritime threats and the vital role the sea plays in national interests, the country must either guarantee surveillance and control of its seaspace, or have a minimum force at its disposal at sea which can act, as far as possible, as a deterrent against any external risk or threat, and can provide constant support to the Land Forces’s operational tasks. If this objective is to be met, it is imperative that the Naval component of the structure be given greater importance via a streamlining and restructuring process (short term), with a view to achieving functional efficiency in fulfilling missions, and eventually developing a Light Naval (medium term).

Timor-Leste does not need a large Naval Force capable of defeating its most probable enemies, but rather a lightweight component of an Integrated Naval Force; that is, a Light Naval Force able to defend national interests and act as a deterrent. In pragmatic terms, Timor-Leste must begin with an integrated and Light Naval Force capacity and steadily develop it into a Light Naval Force. This Light Naval Force should be compatible with national resources and responsibilities, and possess interoperable operational resources (with emphasis placed on good investment in up-to-date recent technology) and appropriately trained crews. If it fulfils these requirements, the Light Naval Force will be able to carry out EEZ surveillance, patrol the SLOCs, escort and assure the safe passage of oil tankers and guarantee the security of oil platforms. It must act as a deterrent against possible attacks, possibly contribute to peaceful conflict resolution, participate in operations of common interest under the terms of the partnership and, essentially, cooperate in missions of public interest carried out by the state. In future perspective, this naval capacity could take on a more offensive and proactive stance in defence of the SZPNIs, in response to the regional requirements.

In addition, participation in the Asia-Pacific Security Forums as a possible member of a regional security and cooperation organisation will create expectations of security guarantees in Timor-Leste, and this is inextricably linked to the effectiveness of our foreign policy and our ability to set up a complex network of bilateral and multilateral relations.

The volume “Supporting Documents” annexed to this Strategic Blueprint for the Development of the Armed Forces in Timor-Leste includes an in-depth and detailed study (with a work package) of the development of the naval element of the Timor-Leste Armed Forces, within the context of forces planning, which is entitled “NAVAL STRATEGY FOR TIMOR-LESTE”.

42 - STRATEGY OF THE LIGHT NAVAL FORCES

The streamlining and restructuring processes involved in the development of the Light Naval Force must be based upon a clear definition of the missions and tasks to be carried out, within the context of the legal framework, an appropriate structure, the resources and mechanisms to be incorporated into the National Forces System, and the necessary training so that the whole system has an effective and integrated naval capacity enabling it to:

(a) rebut any attacks from the sea;
(b) deter aggressors by patrolling EEZ territorial waters;

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17 This study was produced by Cmdt Neto Simões, member of the GE F2020 and advisor to the J2 (F-FDTL Military Intelligence Service) (see annexed volume “Supporting Documents”)
(c) affirm sovereignty by defining the SZPNI within the strategic maritime environment;
(d) cooperate with other civil security bodies as a permanent backup to the land forces;
(e) cooperate with neighbouring countries and regional and international allies within a context of common defence and security.

These tasks and responsibilities shall be conferred upon the Light Naval Force, incorporating combat and defence capacities in cooperation with the naval helicopter support unit, ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles, radars, sensors and the Naval Fusiliers (Fuzileiros Navais).

[The National Defence Policy must be linked in with the Maritime Policy and the subsequent creation of a Maritime Law to allow the creation off a Maritime Authority System in order to coordinate and fulfil the national defence objective of using naval resources in the main defence and security missions of public interest involving humanitarian aid.] This political and legislative framework is indispensable if Timor-Leste is to establish itself as a Maritime State.

When defining the [Deployment Strategy] (the link between naval resources and the Naval Fusiliers) it is important to match its use to the vectors to be defined, leaving open the option of future growth. Nevertheless, during the first phase (short/medium term) deployment should be in small detachments able to embark and carry out Boarding activities (inspection/seizure of vessels) and provide humanitarian support to populations which, for environmental reasons, are isolated and where access is only possible by sea coast. Particular attention should be paid to the Oecusse enclave and Atauro Island, which have no Armed Forces presence to guarantee their territorial defence. Within the future scope of the National Forces System, the Naval Fusiliers, with their specific characteristics and capacities, could even constitute the CEMGFA Operational Reserve.

42.1 The Sea and Naval Power in National Defence Strategy
Timor-Leste’s archipelagic characteristics and resources in the Timor Sea indicate that it is essentially a maritime nation. The Sea vector should therefore constitute a determining factor when defining National Defence Strategy. Timor-Leste is linked by sea to its main regional partners; maritime economic activities can become a significant factor in national progress and wellbeing; maritime communication circuits have a considerable influence on the national economy; the country’s foreign policy commitments have maritime foundations. This statement is not intended to limit national interests - resulting from our people’s desires, needs, possibilities and culture - to exclusively maritime aspects. It is merely intended to emphasise the fact that maritime interests should be considered as relevant factors when conducting political, economic, social and military affairs, in the sense that the sea emerges as a real asset which has not always been regarded as such in national life and that of the Timorese State. The sea has vital dual importance to Timor-Leste and it is for this reason that it should be constituted and recognised as a Maritime State. On the one hand, the maintenance of its own identity and sovereignty depends on the use of its maritime characteristics; on the other hand, the economic importance of the sea, namely the Timor Sea, is essential to its economic viability and sustainability.

International conflicts originate in the collision of States’ interests. Although Timor-Leste is a small country, its most important interests mean that it is unrealistic to consider it possible to overcome foreign controversies without the use of Armed Forces. The new strategic environment and
developments of the current conflict confirm that diplomacy without force is nothing more than an exercise in abstract and inconsequent rhetoric. Therefore, in any of these crises, the versatility of naval power, used in accordance with appropriate lines of action, will contribute to the success of Timorese foreign policy.

It is known that during the last decade, the mediation of land peace operations has fascinated some publicists, who hurried to prepare strategic conceptions of national defence, limiting the role of the Navy to logistical support. However, such strategic conceptions reveal a substantial lack of understanding of the role of the naval forces in the defence of national interests. They also illustrate the lack of understanding, on the part of their authors and defenders, of the nature of conflicts and the importance of coherence and equilibrium between land, air and naval forces, in addition to the indispensability of joint action. In addition, they demonstrate strategic myopia, a phenomenon which is very characteristic of extreme and corporative positions which, when guiding and conditioning the organisation, edification and deployment of the Armed Forces for very specific situations, ignoring its main mission, reduce the leadership’s flexibility to deal with future events which are difficult to predict and whose relative probabilities are difficult to evaluate.

Civil society and rulers understand that the cost/effectiveness relationship of an Armed Force whose constitution is based on such strategic conceptions, will be irrational and will require sacrifices from the nation, to which it will not provide due compensation in the form of security. Consequently, the absence of a logical starting point for the choice and orientation of the main guidelines for national defence strategy can make the harmonious development of the Armed Forces unfeasible in Timor-Leste and may have a negative impact on the military, due to lack of motivation amongst personnel, the redirection of individual skills to private activities and the involvement of the military in political affairs.

In the case of Timor-Leste, if our country loses the capacity to defend itself and to participate equitably in collective defence efforts, it will consequently cease to have a voice in international organisations. Moreover, when a sudden conflict emerges in which Timor-Leste cannot remain neutral or participate with forces, its national sovereignty and independence will be put at risk. This situation will reduce Timor-Leste to the condition of a “colony” of the nation-State providing its defence.

Regarding this point, it should be noted that in the study by King’s College18 (commissioned by UNTAET [United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor] in 2000, and the basis of the creation of the Falintil-Defence Forces of Timor-Leste), the majority of the donor countries, with the exception of Portugal, did not agree that the Falintil (Defence Forces of Timor-Leste) should have a Naval Component, which can be seen in the explicit reference made after the analysis and discussion of Option 3, where the following is stated:

“...Coastal security will be minimally assured in the short term by the frontier and customs services, whose modest capabilities are better than nothing. The informal indication that Australia may be disposed to patrol East Timor’s territorial waters should be analysed to ensure a greater degree of protection.” (p.58)

18 Independent Study on Security Force Options for East Timor (“Estudo Independente das Opções para as Forças de Segurança de Timor-Leste”), The Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, London, August 2000. (The text quoted above was taken from the Portuguese version, pages 58 and 60)
The following is stated later on:

"Air and naval forces are not proposed for the first five years. (...) the customs and excise services comprising 54 persons should be sufficient for the protection of fisheries and the fight against smuggling. (...) Australian defence cooperation has a military aid programme for non-coastal patrol, in the form of ships and other naval equipment and a contribution towards operational costs, which the Timorese defence forces may benefit from in the future." (p.60)

These statements indicate a situation which puts Timor-Leste’s sovereignty at risk, by proposing that responsibilities related to national sovereignty are transferred to other countries. This situation can be avoided if there is intelligence and the political will to readjust and restructure the operational organisation of the Armed Forces, making them effective and deserving of national credibility, through measures appropriate to the Timorese culture and reality, not influenced by politico-military mistrust and the interests of other countries. In this task, it is important to bear in mind that Timor-Leste cannot lose the capacity to defend itself at sea and to look after its main resources therein, which implies having a truly operational naval capacity, an essential instrument to maintain national power at a suitable level to meet the requirements of its national defence strategy.

Within the wider context of national development, the sea should be one of Timor-Leste’s most valuable resources which, if properly used, can counterbalance limited influence in the regional context. In fact, the sea has enormous future potential within economic, scientific research, security and defence areas, and is capable of constituting not only a source of wellbeing, but also an element of prestige and national affirmation. The identification of each of these areas leads to the conclusion that the sea is vital to Timor-Leste and that the economy, scientific research, security and defence should form the vertex of a new strategy based on the sea.

42.2 The Use of Naval Power in the current scenario and the Structure of Naval Strategy

Given some of the prospects for the future use of the Armed Forces, the enormous responsibility of the Navy becomes evident. However, possible future naval military missions will be more complex, possibly going beyond these scenarios and will inherently be an essential component of the maritime policy of each State, in practice taking on military functions and functions of public interest.

On the one hand, the diversity of the possible uses of naval power, in areas which do not always imply the existence of combat, and the capabilities of naval forces, constitute irreplaceable advantages for obtaining favourable decisions when interests exist between elements of the international political system. On the other hand, the characteristics warranting the use of operational naval forces in tasks inherent to public interests, in times of peace, crisis or conflict, enable an excellent cost/effectiveness relationship to be achieved within the components of these forces.

Given the scenarios referred to above, naval power can contribute significantly to dealing with future challenges by confronting the following:

- Threats to countries’ interests, resulting from ethnic and religious conflicts and from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, requiring the timely presence of naval forces in common strategic areas;
- Threats resulting from the abuse of jurisdictional waters (illegal immigration, smuggling, drugs and arms trafficking, maritime terrorism, ecological problems and the conservation of resources, related to pollution and overuse, etc), requiring the permanent exercise of effective control of the sea in the maritime areas adjacent to national territory.

The doctrine of Timor-Leste’s naval strategy should therefore be based on long-standing principles, since it is unquestionable that naval capability, irrespective of its force’s statute, should be conceived to guarantee the use of the sea, through the deployment of force along the coast, dominating vital coastal waters and controlling critical oceanic regions whenever necessary.

Currently, the use of force along the coast is carried out by making the most of the naval resources’ mobility, concentration, surprise, command and control capabilities and firing power, enabling the intelligent use of force.

The objective of challenges presented by potentially antagonistic powers will not be control of the sea, since this would be excessively demanding and is therefore unfeasible for any country in the near future, except where one of the parties is in a situation of overt overall weakness. However, these powers will try to weaken the national capacity for control in critical oceanic regions, in order to cause external ramifications for the economy or to create difficulties for naval operations. It is therefore essential that Timor-Leste’s Light Naval Force contributes to the free use of the sea as a communications route for rightful national interests and possibilities, which may imply the capability to defend vital interests, including the re-provisioning of parts of national territory (in light of the discontinuity of the territory), in addition to the assumption of sovereign responsibilities in maritime areas under national jurisdiction.

The arguments presented above indicate a structure for naval strategy which includes a concept of action in which the objective of naval power is the defence of national interests, through conservation of international order (norms and principles) and affirmation of national sovereignty (State authority), contributed to by a mission whose purpose is to guarantee the use of the sea, based on the tasks of coastal force deployment, domination of vital coastal waters and control of critical oceanic regions.

Any one of these tasks can cover a multiplicity of elementary actions, varying from nuclear deterrents to hydro-oceanographic studies, adjusted to the Timorese reality and available resources. Given the analysis of the international and regional context, the current reality and prospects for the near future, the tasks referred to above (deployment of force along the coast, domination of vital waters, control of critical oceanic regions), represent the greatest challenges to the deployment of naval power.

As essential characteristics of this structure for naval strategy, it should be emphasised that, apart from considering the balance between the need to deploy naval forces along the coast and at high sea, possibly participating in joint and/or combined operations, the central role of the combat capability of the naval component is clearly established. This should be guaranteed through Units with amphibian capabilities, namely the Marines, in order to obtain good results in situations of
peace, crisis or conflict. In addition, evidence is hereby provided of the extraordinary utility of the characteristics of naval power (mobility, freedom when faced with political restrictions, sustainability and flexibility) to provide appropriate levels of effort in support of the State’s political, economic, social and military action, confronting situations with different degrees of complexity and great unpredictability.

The proposed structure also places equal relevance on the joint deployment of military force, without meaning that the naval units are in any way subordinate to the land component or the air component (to be constituted). The distinction between naval tasks, according to each of the functions referred to above, is found at the level of the predominant nature of the forces used and the geographic areas of action: when exercising functions to preserve international order, Forces are normally multinational and deployed outside maritime areas under national jurisdiction; with respect to functions related to sovereignty, Forces are usually national and deployed within these areas.

In maritime nations, the Navy is traditionally heavily relied upon, assuming a position of oceanic capability. In the specific case of Timor-Leste, in order to assume our responsibilities in the processes and activities of the alliances we may participate in and also for the defence of our frontiers and maritime areas under national jurisdiction, it is indispensable that we possess a credible naval power.

Timor-Leste is experiencing a relatively stable strategic situation, although it is not entirely free of dangers and uncertainties. We should therefore maintain the capacity to resort to whatever means are necessary to protect our national interests, especially those related to the economic importance of the Sea for national economic growth and development.

Naval power, in times of war as well as in times of peace, can be subdivided into three categories: diplomatic, military and public service. Currently, these areas are not fully operational in Timor-Leste, although in the short run some areas of public service can be guaranteed. Capabilities inherent to these three areas must be developed if we wish to maintain the status of a maritime nation with naval power, with effective participation in international organisations.

In general terms, a State’s foreign policy is given credibility by the existence of both types of power: military and non-military. Naval power can contribute to achieving advantages within the context of the State’s external action, defending or enlarging positions and interests. The following elements are especially important within the context of principles of naval strategic doctrine:

i. Naval resources offer an immense and varied set of roles of a military and diplomatic character, able to serve foreign policy aims in the best way;

ii. The Light Naval Force component of the military system presents a multiplicity of characteristics, making it particularly advantageous for transmitting an extensive range of significant political signals. This quality is mainly derived from the versatility, mobility, freedom of access, capacity for graduated responses and self-reliance of naval resources;

iii. Navies play an especially useful role when the objective is a friendly approach or avoidance of the actual use of force to resolve disagreements;
iv. Joint and combined operations are realities to consider, given that they represent solidarity and the opportunity to participate. Inter-operability and technological differences should be evaluated as soon as possible;

v. Despite the modern tendency for operations to be on the conflict scale prior to war and for the Navy to be close to the coast, facing opponents of whom they have no prior knowledge, far from their bases, the underlying principles of the "Mahan theories" still remain valid, especially in respect of the concept of control of the sea and the inseparable link between naval power and the use of the sea to benefit the economy;

vi. The importance of naval power in times of peace or crisis is a good subject to explore at a public level. Participation in peace operations is well-accepted by public opinion, because people tend to associate usefulness with acceptability. The media plays an important role in preparing public opinion for any expeditionary action. The media should be an added concern for force commanders, in the sense of the need to transmit a favourable image of the actions which are witnessed and of the personnel involved;

vii. The Falintil (Defence Forces of Timor-Leste) component can provide strategic visibility, giving prestige to Timor-Leste, as long as measures are taken towards its consolidation and development in the next 15 to 20 years, mainly with respect to surface oceanic and command and control capabilities. Political decisions regarding the budget will be based on their inherent beneficial value to the country;

viii. There is still a lack of institutional coordination between foreign policy and national defence policy during times of peace or crisis, which can compromise the success of military action, especially that of the naval component, but this is not difficult to resolve.

### 42.3 Security and National Defence at Sea

One of the key factors of commercial maritime development is freedom for inoffensive use of the sea. Through the centuries, the international community has attempted, outside of belligerent contexts, to maintain free access to navigation routes, and has achieved this with varying degrees of success. However, the security of States themselves requires, even in times of peace, that the sea should not be used for illegal or risky purposes, such as terrorism, illicit immigration, arms or drugs trafficking, smuggling, etc.

In addition, the interests of Maritime States cannot be jeopardised as a result of threats to their vital interests at sea, and they cannot have their territories attacked from the sea. Consequently, in times of peace, these States seek to deter the appearance of risks and threats at an incipient stage through day-to-day controls, and to prepare resources capable of deploying Force at sea. Timor-Leste is no exception, in its justified need to guarantee the surveillance and control of its maritime areas, in addition to having available a minimum force to act as a deterrent at sea, whenever possible, to any risk or threat.

In order to do so, the Timorese State requires a strong Naval Authority coordinating the efforts of the various police forces and the civil authorities with competence in the area of maritime control in the sea and adjacent waters and which, if necessary, is able to resort to military, naval and aerial means, if and when these exist, to intervene in the abovementioned areas.
The risks and threats which can lead to more traditional situations of conflict require capabilities enabling Timor-Leste, with its allies, to be prepared to move from deterrence to another stage of coaction, if necessary, maintaining a set of resources permitting the deployment of missions in an autonomous form and with a level of power which accords with its size.

**43 - DEVELOPING THE CAPABILITY OF THE LIGHT NAVAL FORCE**

Within the context of Timor-Leste’s relationship with the sea, it is herein argued that the country should possess a Light Naval Force with four main vectors to be developed systematically in an integrated way:

**43.1 First vector**, in order to modernise and resize the Light Naval Force in accordance with State objectives, it is necessary to urgently acquire new Coastal Patrol Vessels with defence and attack capabilities, and greater flexibility and autonomy; low cost investment, operation and maintenance Rapid Assault Launches and Medium Landing Crafts, for the main security tasks (such as supporting military operations, search and rescue, collaborating in the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism, illicit immigration, smuggling, piracy, surveillance against the overuse of sea resources, polluters, etc). The naval resources acquired should be appropriate to the type of sea on Timor-Leste’s northern and southern coasts and should be adequately supported by a network of Naval Bases. Simultaneously, to begin training the Naval Combat Operational Force (Marines), possibly by external or internal recruitment through the conversion of soldiers from Rifle Companies, based on strict criteria and specific training. The Navy marine force will have to guarantee the State’s authority at sea from the land, deployment being coordinated with the Maritime Defence Forces as defined in the future.

**43.2 Second vector**, the Light Naval Force should possess an autonomous naval logistics support capability for military purposes, and have light and medium landing crafts and multivariant logistics vessels (LDL and LDM). This capability can be used as an alternative transport service (if and when requested) for missions related to humanitarian aid and public interest;

**43.3 Third vector**, education and naval training of technical personnel for the conventional strengthening and institutionalising of the Light Naval Force in order to respond to the structural needs defined in the first, second and fourth (Luso-French) vectors and, to the considerable investment in the maritime sector.

**43.4 Fourth vector**, the Light Naval Force should possess the capability to discourage any act of humiliation of the State of Timor-Leste at sea, or any offensive against its vital interests. It should also be able to participate effectively and with dignity in any alliances which the State may commit itself to. This capability should be progressively comprised of Combat Vessels (frigate and corvette categories, equipped with land-to-land and land-to-air missiles in 3-D) supported by an Ocean Patrol Vessel core, support and attack helicopter units, cutting-edge radar and sensors, Marines and anti-mine divers. Until this capability has been established, the DRET State can provide a military/technical cooperation mechanism (at the operational tactical level) within the scope of bilateral agreements aimed at the systematic and exclusive creation of this capability (Franco-Portuguese), given that it is indispensable to safeguard the interests of Timor-Leste in relation to issues of Naval Authority.
**44 - THE SYSTEM OF NAVAL AUTHORITY**

The new realities and new challenges appearing within the naval sector present new security requirements which, accompanied by the evolution of international technical regulations (maritime legislation), have focused the attention of States on maritime security issues, whose very nature is multidisciplinary.

The new vocation and basic maritime orientation of the State of Timor-Leste should develop in an integrated and inter-ministerial way. It is urgently necessary to define the strategic sectors which can be exploited and guaranteed so that Timor-Leste can benefit from the relevant income derived from its maritime resources, which have not yet been regulated in the sectors of industrial fisheries, maritime communications circuits (SLOC), maritime and port transport, maritime tourism and scientific research (I & D).

Considering the characteristics of the maritime area of national interest, whose surveillance must be guaranteed effectively, and the geostrategic situation of Timor-Leste, corresponding to a confluence of the most important and most frequently used international maritime circuits, additional attention must be paid to the prevention of potentially dangerous situations for national and regional interests, related to the abuse of jurisdictional waters, especially maritime terrorism. Timor-Leste possesses a reasonable E.E.Z., which also requires the existence of instruments able to respond effectively to the challenges posed as a result of this.

The logical consideration of collective national interests is therefore urgent in order to proceed with the evaluation of strategic aspects related to the development of the maritime economy.

**First,** the State of Timor-Leste should have a policy of maritime orientation which includes all aspects of the strategic environment and, in particular, all sectors covering the diversity of the maritime economy, potentially representing additional benefits to the country (mentioned above). The maritime vector cannot simply be guided towards maritime energy and fishing resources. The importance of the international maritime route of the Wetar and Ombai Straights should be considered and evaluated, both being considered strategic within National Defence Policy (SLOC defence and security). Other strategic aspects of the sector should be covered in order to evaluate and define maritime policy in a coordinated, integrated and consolidated manner within national development policy.

**Second,** orientation towards an integrated and convergent maritime policy, empowering the Naval Authority to defend its national strategic interests and making the national maritime economy at sea viable, thus minimising the impact of foreign strategic interests which sometimes affect national sovereignty and force the country to accept less profitable reciprocal commitments. These impacts can, in extreme cases, escalate into disputes causing conflicts of a diplomatic and military nature, with predictable economic repercussions in terms of uncertainty and vagueness within the private and foreign sector in relation to bringing large-scale strategic investments to Timor-Leste.

**Third,** an evaluation of the consequences of an unbalanced maritime policy. As an example, one possible case study (amongst others to be studied and evaluated) is the predictable backwash effect in the industrial fishing sector due to the non-regulated extraction of massive quantities of fishing resources, which in the medium- to long-term can weaken or even drain this sector. This over-use of
resources will continue until the current situation is reversed. Amongst other factors, the situation is characterised by: the absence of an integrated fisheries law; negligence in the definition of fishing licenses conceded to foreign fishing fleet owners, in conformity with a policy of regulating, controlling and managing fish stocks; lack of definition of compensation in terms of creating an employment quota for Timorese human resources in this sector.

A strategic evaluation must be carried out with the aim of protecting national interests. An unbalanced relationship between national human and other resources on board versus fishing profits will have unprofitable consequences for our country. Loss of control in definition and regulation (of variables such as the duration, quantity, period of the year authorised for fishing carried out by fishing fleet owners in fishing zones), has a negative impact greater than the levies and taxes paid by these fishing fleet owners to the Timorese State, since this revenue will not produce any direct effects whatsoever: it does not benefit the income level of national fishermen, nor is it channelled into the development of an infrastructure capable of attracting real investment in the national maritime sector.

Fourth, the General State Budget should consider the basic orientation of maritime development as a strategic investment vector for commercial, industrial and international security purposes. In other words, the synergetic conception of a vision of maritime development based on the maximisation of existing potential resources to be included in the national development plan, as complementary vectors to the indispensable economic diversification of the national non-oil-producing sector.

Given these and other concerns, considerations and priorities, the Government of the DRET can order the surveying of needs for the implementation of the abovementioned System of Naval Authority, proceeding with the overall evaluation of the characteristics and types of entities, bodies or services within an inter-ministerial context, responsible for naval authority, especially through the use of instruments for linking and coordinating these, aimed at improving the effectiveness and operationally of their activities.

Independently of the scope of this evaluation, special importance should be given to the gradual intervention of the Light Naval Force in so-called “missions of public interest”, especially in the area of application and verification of compliance with maritime laws and regulations, in areas under national sovereignty or jurisdiction (amongst others, vessel control, inspection of fishing, combat of pollution and the repression of other illicit maritime situations), whose legitimation still resides within International Law, providing tools to combat drug trafficking, terrorism and human trafficking. The legal statute which will be defined should adhere to this logic for consolidating the institutional and organisational resources of the Light Naval Force as the essential pillar of the Naval Authority.

The System of Naval Authority should possess the means for national coordination at a ministerial level and for high level operational coordination, in order to enable new dynamics in the convergence of efforts. This will optimise the capabilities of defence and security bodies, in order to carry out Governmental objectives in relation to the Naval Authority System’s Organisation and Attributes. The System of Naval Authority should act as the national naval authority, creating conditions guaranteeing greater effectiveness in the use of resources attributed to the Light Naval Force, and in carrying out the aforementioned activities in single or joint action with other State entities.
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<tr>
<th>CONCEPT</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>Defending national interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>Contributing towards the conservation of international order and regional stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSION</td>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>GUARANTEING THE USE OF THE SEA</td>
</tr>
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<td>TASKS</td>
<td>Deploying Force along the coast</td>
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</table>
45 - AIR COMPONENT

The Air Component is indispensable for Timor-Leste’s Armed Forces, due to its efficiency and effectiveness in fulfilling various missions supporting the Light Naval Force as well as the Land Forces, in light of difficult land access resulting from Timor-Leste’s climatic and topographic characteristics.

This component can provide multiple services aimed at rationalising resources and can realistically provide reconnaissance, evacuation and humanitarian aid capabilities in the medium term, carried out through the creation of a group of helicopters and the acquisition of light aircraft of the REIMS CESSNA F406 type for multipurpose use. The concept of their deployment should be defined in accordance with the Operational Concept of the Armed Forces. C – 130 will be acquired later on for military and humanitarian purposes.

However, a study should be done as soon as possible in relation to the acquisition process of these air resources, with maintenance and training packages. It is fundamental to analyse carefully the operational requirements of these air resources.

Special consideration can be made within the context of the development of this capability, by integrating it within the Light Naval Forces. Within the context of the future prospects for the development of the Air Force, the air resources can be systematically and interdependently linked to the naval resources.

It is also important to start necessary studies on the construction of heliports at various strategic points in Timor-Leste, and a multiuse airport (military, civil aviation and military base).
46 - SUPPORT AND SERVICES COMPONENT

Reinforcing existing support and service components to meet the military objectives stipulated in the Armed Forces development strategy.

The Transmissions (Communications) unit deserves special attention, given that its nature reveals its strategic importance and special and unique characteristics. This unit should have appropriate training and be established bilaterally with a high technology country without interests in the strategic orbit of Timor-Leste (such as India, for example). The Armed Forces should be equipped with secure, effective and integrated communications systems, at tactical, operational and strategic levels (see page 75, 29.6 Armaments and Equipment).

The Engineering and Medical Support units could be priorities for strategic development for military purposes with civil uses. This capability is part of a trend in the Armed Forces within the current context of national development. Internal and external commitments established within the framework of humanitarian operations and operations supporting the public interest can be carried out with civil-military cooperation activities (CIMIC). Both units should evolve with special assistance from the State and within a context of combined inter-ministerial means and resources for technical education and training with the collective purposes of national security and defence.

In order to provide logistical support and service to Land Combat Operational Forces, it will be necessary to strengthen the structure of robust logistics with conventional support and service management capability, appropriate and adaptable to self-sufficiency, with the capacity to work in a joint logistical environment with other institutions responsible for security, and in full support of the Land Forces, in its entirety.

Structurally reinforce the permanent staff of the Military Police detachment, by assigning it specific tasks within sector command.

The Support and Service Component units will contribute outstanding staff elements to form the structure of the Land Defence Forces in Mixed Intervention Company units. The support and service bodies should be joint, thus rationalising resources and funds in order to achieve the established objectives.
PART III – INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
CHAPTER 8

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER

Conventional Armed Forces
Development of Human Resources
Education and Training System
Training Centre of Excellence
Bilateral and Multilateral Programmes
47 - CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES

47.1 Institutional Challenges
Development of the human factor in order to achieve the conventional standard presents a permanent challenge for the Armed Forces, considering that the human factor is fundamental in the conventional development of the institutional character.

Timor-Leste’s Armed Forces should be guided by a holistic strategic vision of credibility, professionalism and efficiency in the defence of their people and territory, and remain politically impartial. The Armed Forces should represent a pillar of national pride and the constant challenge of preserving the best traditions of those who have fought for freedom. The Armed Forces will be a source of training and employment creation in society and an efficient and sustainable organisation. The Armed Forces will succeed in their mission, with integrity and self-sacrifice, guaranteeing national independence, the defence of the people and the national territory of Timor-Leste.

The immediate objectives of the Armed Forces cover: defending the Nation’s integrity and its territorial waters when faced with any external aggression; supporting the civil authority during any natural disaster or other emergencies, if and when requested to do so; increasing levels of professional competence through education and training; acquiring and adequately maintaining war equipment and material, and preparing and/or qualifying the necessary human resources in order to fulfil their mission.

In the Armed Forces, standards of professionalism are defined by constantly evaluating the aptitude and readiness of the military to perform their profession. In particular: soldiers in the Armed Forces should be highly trained and qualified, in accordance with regional and international standards; satisfying individual quality levels, such as discipline, education, health and good moral conduct; being well-equipped, with modern and sophisticated resources in order to fulfil their mission. The institution of the Armed Forces should ensure and guarantee the wellbeing and protection of their members.

The Armed Forces deserve credibility within the context of State sovereignty, since they are responsible, and respectful of its People and the International Community. Military values and virtues should be lived up to during the daily practice of military life, so that the Armed Forces can: serve and defend their country and fellow citizens; defend the freedom, democracy and independence of the nation; maintain and preserve the values of the fight for Freedom.

As a State institution, the Armed Forces should offer employment opportunities to national citizens, provide soldiers returning to civil life with technical training, offer them new experiences, teamwork, training for life under difficult conditions requiring good moral and physical conduct, and a unique patriotic opportunity to serve the Nation.

The Armed Forces have adopted the concept of modern sustainability in order to have the capacity to manage their own logistics, in accordance with the budget and resources provided for the fulfilment of their functions as the National Defence Force of the DRET.
The military should be explicitly apolitical and strictly forbidden from participating in political activities. The Armed Forces should be politically impartial and neutral, subordinate to the Constitution of the DRET and the democratically elected Government, and totally submissive to the President of the Republic as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

47.2 The Soldier of the Future

(Characteristics shaping the new personal attitude, character, capacity and culture of the soldier of the future)

Currently, respect for the dignity of the human being is the result of various conditions which the people of Timor-Leste have experienced, and has not always been the basis on which relationships between people, and by extension between the military, have been built. The notion still prevails that everything has to be subordinate to individual personal needs, and only after this are collective needs satisfied. It is not possible for this individualism to prevail within an Institution with the characteristics of the Armed Forces. The exercise of military functions, at all hierarchical levels from commanders to soldiers, should clearly and unequivocally reflect that the human rights established in the Constitution and Law are to be totally respected, as well as being held as a permanent guide on how to behave. The right to use "force" in its various forms will be ruled by the use of the minimum force necessary to achieve decisive results and maintain cohesion and discipline within the Armed Forces.

Discipline – Discipline should not be seen as inevitable, but as a cohesive factor in the Armed Forces, to which all are equally subject. Discipline has to be internalised by the soldier, it is a conscious responsibility of the soldier and cannot be imposed through the use of force. All have equal obligations, from the commander to his subordinates, to maintain discipline as an institutional standard for everyone.

Military discipline consists in the exact observation of military laws and regulations and of the resolutions essentially derived and resulting from a state of mind, based on civic spirit and patriotism, voluntarily leading to individual or group fulfilment of the Armed Forces’ mission.

In order for discipline to constitute the basis on which the armed institution should stand, the soldiers of Timor-Leste's Armed Forces should strictly observe the following, in the present and the future:

(a) All soldiers should internalise the fact that discipline, being a condition for the success of the mission, is consolidated and strengthened through consciousness of this mission, through the observation of the law and exact fulfilment of duty, through respect for everyone’s rights, through competence and correctness in procedures, resulting from civic spirit and patriotism, thus leading to a natural acceptance of hierarchy and authority and to the sacrifice of individual interests in favour of collective ones;

(b) Commanders and leaders especially, and all hierarchical superiors in general, should not forget that in all cases the attention of their subordinates is focussed on their actions and that, as a result, their competence, their irreprehensible firm but humane behaviour, using and encouraging dialogue and clarification whenever appropriate and possible, are the surest means by which to maintain discipline. In addition, commanders are responsible for offences committed
by their subordinates or those who are hierarchically inferior, whenever these offences originate in defective action on the part of those in command;

(c) The hierarchical superior can, through his relationship with his subordinates, seek to be an example and guide. He also has a duty to care for the interests of his subordinates, respect their dignity, help them with advice and appropriate attention, never forgetting that all are linked through solidarity in performing a common mission;

(d) Hierarchical superiors bear the responsibility for instructing and training subordinates serving under their command in knowledge of the legislation in force. They are responsible for the orders they give, which should be in accordance with the law and regulations; or in cases to the contrary or extraordinary cases, based on the best reasoning. Obedience to these orders should be timely and total. In exceptional cases, in which the fulfilment of an order can be potentially disadvantageous or harmful, the subordinate can, if his superior is present and the situation is not one of military formation or work, respectfully address the superior once precise authorisation is obtained, with any reflections considered appropriate; but, if the superior insists that the orders given must be carried out, the subordinate should obey in a timely manner, although the subordinate has the right to report the complaint to the competent authority;

(e) Obedience is always due to the highest ranking person, and amongst equal ranks to the oldest person, except in special cases appropriately established by law.

Commanders should rely on a style of leadership favouring communication and the participation of subordinates, always seeking freely accepted discipline. People's self-esteem should be as highly valued as possible, but should always derive from the satisfaction of fulfilled duty. All should understand and assume that the infringement of discipline is any omission or action contrary to military duty.

**Responsibility** – All soldiers, when carrying out their responsibilities within the Falintil (Defence Forces of Timor-Leste) structure, have inherent responsibilities with respect to the positions or functions performed. All should have the capacity to make decisions, within the freedom of action attributed to each, but will always assume the consequences of the acts or omissions performed. It is the responsibility of each one to use his capacities to the maximum level in the function performed, in order that the results obtained best satisfy the entire Institution and provide the best relationship between resources used and ends achieved.

**Courage** – Members of Falintil have had the courage to fight for a cause despite the sacrifice of many thousands of lives. It is in the shadow of those who preceded us that the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste were built. Looking with courage to the future means recognising that the Armed Forces (FALINTIL-FDTL) will face dangers during their process of institution building, admitting our own fears and weaknesses, but above all not being overcome by them, and always acting calmly, firmly and responsibly. It is indispensable that all fight for their convictions, for what we believe in, for what is just and for the truth. The courage we will have to show cannot allow us to be carried along
by exaggerations, but will make us act with careful reflection. Only thus can we overcome the challenges ahead of us.

**Team Spirit** – It has already been mentioned that individualism, groupings based on the “suco” (municipality) and regionalism, must disappear and be replaced with collectivism, with the need for common wellbeing. There is no doubt that with the continued and sustained development to be experienced by the Armed Forces, the importance of collective action will be even greater, in addition to a spirit of unity and appropriate and correct team spirit based on the highest moral standards of its members, all of whom should be subordinate to the interests of the military organisation and the institution of the DRET State. It will be the responsibility of the commanders to create an appropriate team spirit and atmosphere in order to stimulate group action to the detriment of the individual actions of each person.

**Professional competence** – It is not possible to consider the Armed Forces as credible if their members are not professionally competent and capable. The Armed Forces are usually the mirror of the Nation. We want valid and competent people in the Armed Forces, with high levels of knowledge of their profession, in tactical and technical aspects, in addition to other fields of knowledge ranging from administration to law. Commanders should be conscious that as the soldier of the future becomes increasingly more professional, greater demands will be placed upon the commanders themselves, and as such, they cannot permit themselves to become out-of-date. Their professional development should be continuous and centred on social, cultural, intellectual and technological development, as well as on constant concern for the evolution and maintenance of the equipment and material at the disposal of the Armed Forces. The change from the “old structure” respected by all, the Falintil, to the new structure, the Defence Forces of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL-FDTL), still poses substantial challenges. These challenges must be overcome through the efforts of all, by demonstrating the competence of the new force. It is not an easy task to transform guerrillas into conventional Armed Forces, but it has to be achieved.

**Flexibility** – The new Armed Forces soldier must necessarily be a flexible soldier, adaptable to the new requirements of a constantly changing world. The soldiers of the Defence Forces of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL-FDTL) should achieve a high degree of adaptability, not only in the procedural area but also in the interoperability of material resources, permitting greater exchange with neighbouring or allied defence structures. Being flexible is normally synonymous with intelligence. Intelligence is one of man’s most important resources and man is the most important resource of organisations, including military organisations. The new soldier must learn to be more efficient and this will only be possible if his knowledge reaches an appropriate level. The soldier or warrior of the future should possess professional qualifications, innovative creativity and be an individual who, as a soldier, reacts and adapts to any circumstances.

**48 – DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES**

The Indonesian military occupation caused not only immense destruction and damage to economic structures, infrastructures and institutional systems but also led to a lack of skilled and experienced human capital. It had an influence on education and thinking which currently affects the development of institutional systems and the socio-economic and socio-cultural fabric of the
country. This legacy influenced the intended development, character and culture of institutions in the Timor-Leste Defence and Armed Forces sector during the post-independence period. As in other national sectors, institutional reform and the reinforcement of human capital are essential and imperative if these objectives are to be achieved.

If, on the one hand, the educational, academic and cultural training of the post-invasion generations had a critical impact in terms of the difficulties experienced in articulating and incorporating them within the new institutions established by the state of the DRET, which includes the Armed Forces, the transformation of the existing forces (FALINTIL- the National Liberation Forces of Timor-Leste), which has an unconventional structure and guerrilla characteristics, is urgent and imperative for the institutional development of a conventional Armed Forces. Only in this way is it possible to plan the National Defence sector and the Armed Forces, make them viable and incorporate them within higher national interests and strategic national development objectives, both now and in the future.

Therefore any assessment of the needs, training and development of human resources in the Defence and Armed Forces sector should be anchored in the institutional training of the entire defence sector i.e. in the creation of an institutional environment with a clear, efficient and sustainable structure (in terms of governance, chain of command, policy definition, planning and management), provided with a legal and ethical framework that governs all institutional practices and commitments. Defining a medium/long term strategy for both the human and the material resources of the Armed Forces is a need which parallels the need to define an institutional development strategy for the national defence sector as a whole (including not only the Armed Forces but also the Ministry of Defence).

The present institutional administration situation with regard to both the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces reveals a lack of planning, or weak planning, for training and education leading to strategic development in the area of management and command and in the creation of a sustainable system for human resources. The state should adopt precise systems and pragmatic objectives for the effective management of military personnel, including both the command chain and the subordinate ranks, and propose and approve the necessary regulations to enable this to take place.

Two fundamental questions must be considered with regard to the strategic development of human resources in the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste:

1. **The Military Character** we intend to create within the Armed Forces – The type pf soldiers we need to defend the nation's interests and the type of military leadership we need to command and administer institutional interests in order to achieve all the stated objectives.

2. **The Institutional Character** we intend to create for the nation – The type pf education, training and resources provided for soldiers to enable them to carry out their mission. The type of programmes and initiatives the land forces should carry out in order to maintain national prestige. The guarantees of well-being, protection and security offered to soldiers.

Doctrinaire principles exist which respond to the above questions, such as the McKinsey theory (7S). Military organisations should posses a strong institutional character in order to instil patriotism in soldiers.
In the Armed Forces (as in the Ministry of National Defence), the human resources required to fulfil this mission are, as a rule, established within their own organisational staff structure. In Timor-Leste, the Ministry of Defence still lacks its own Organic Law and although the Armed Forces (FALINTIL-FDTL) have a current Organic Law (Law 7/2004, of 4 May), it is clearly inadequate and urgently needs to be reviewed.

Currently there appears to be a contradiction within the Armed Forces in Timor-Leste (FALINTIL-FDTL) with regard to the management of human resources, concerning estimated number of troops for the organisational staff structures (considered inadequate for many situations) and personnel costs. The solution must involve a reassessment of troop numbers and improvements to quality at all levels of the hierarchy. This will also involve reformulating structures in terms of missions and establishing troops in terms of the structures that are defined within the System for the National Armed Forces. These troops will need to become better qualified through an integrated training system, since the human factor must be prepared for incorporation into a career structure which is increasingly complex and diverse, demanding higher levels of knowledge yet which, despite the evolution of technological systems and procedures, still remains an essential element in warfare and military organisation.

It is therefore imperative to recruit highly qualified, competent and experienced human resources to provide support for leadership (command), management, technical assistance etc. for the Armed Forces in Timor-Leste. It is considered essential to gain urgent approval for an Organic Law for the Timor-Leste Ministry of Defence itself, which should cover certain key areas pertaining to the recruitment of qualified, competent and experienced human resources, specifically for strategic defence studies, defence policies and the planning and management of the Armed Forces, amongst other areas.

Recourse to (selected) bilateral and commercial means appears to be the most advisable solution for selection and contractual procedures, which must be jointly decided and managed by the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces–CEMGFA. These human resources must be able to work within a one-to-one system of on-job training based on the transfer of know-how, knowledge, aptitudes and skills, behaviour and professional attitudes to national human resources in order to enable them to work at the same level/position/office.

**49 - TRAINING AND INSTRUCTION SYSTEM**

The Training System plays a structuring role in consolidating and developing the forces. Soldiers in the Timor-Leste Armed Forces must be considered the most important element in the Armed System and must, in themselves, constitute a system that is decisive to the successful accomplishment of missions.

The creation of a Training System for the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste must be the direct result of the operational requirements that have been defined and for this purpose a multidisciplinary Working Party should be formed which is capable of designing the architecture of the Training Framework for the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste.

A large number of different questions arise out of the issue of training. Firstly, it involves defining and characterising the profile of the Armed Forces soldier and, prior to this, it must include a
definition of the concept of the operational use of units and equipment and an understanding of which responsibilities and duties arising out of this should be assumed by soldiers and how the remainder should be allocated. Following this, it will also be necessary to define:

**What** – which areas or segments of knowledge or educational values, science and technology, military techniques and tactics and operational and strategic leadership should be imparted;

**For whom** – which ranks: Officers? Sergeants? Soldiers? Only certain ranks? All ranks? Only certain sections?

**When** – at what career level or stage should each type of knowledge be acquired;

**Where** – in which educational/training establishment? In Timor-Leste or abroad? If abroad, in which country or countries? Initially outside the Armed Forces, then afterwards administered through FALINTIL-FDTL Instruction Centres?

**How** – through courses providing training, promotion, advanced skills, qualifications, specialisation or updating of knowledge? All of these? Modular training courses? By attendance only, or self study? A mixed system?

**By whom** – which trainers should be used? Trainers from the FALINTIL-FDTL? international trainers as part of technical-military initiatives? According to need?

In formulating the model for the intended training, the following may serve as guidelines:

1) There should be three levels of training: Basic (most personnel, to be administered by the Metinaro Instruction Centre); Intermediate (sergeants and subalterm officers, bilateral cooperation initiatives); Higher (officers in positions of leadership, basically provided abroad);

2) The matrix should consist of Basic Training supplemented by training courses offering advanced skills, updating of knowledge, qualifications and specialisation within the same occupational or professional area;

3) Basic Training must be guaranteed for officers of the Timor-Leste Armed Forces trained under Bilateral Cooperation Agreements;

4) The training carried out at present through military cooperation initiatives must be duly integrated into the Training Framework and managed by an appropriate department (Training Directorate);

5) Training syllabuses (national and foreign) must be produced;

6) Course design must include a definition of the human resources which meet the established operational requirements and must stipulate the purposes, occupational standards and training profiles (skills in relation to functions), together with clearly defined training (skills) and aptitude (learning) objectives;

7) Teaching methods in prestigious Instruction Centres in other countries indicate learning through “subject units”, orientated towards specific professional duties;

8) The Statutes for soldiers in the Armed Forces will be an important influence that must be taken into consideration in relation to the Training Framework;

9) Career planning should generate the appropriate type of training;

10) Education and training may be established within the context of (reciprocal) trade cooperation agreements involving packages of resources and materials.

Finally, it is important to note that the system for unit operational training should pay heed to and attempt to establish appropriate links with this training. These links are important in relation to on-
job training, which is understood to be an ongoing means of acquiring and assessing the knowledge required to undertake specific professional duties.

50 - THE IDEALISED TRAINING CENTRE

Education and Training Component (CFeT)

The Education and Training Component is the base structure for training the military forces. It is the component which prepares ordinary citizens from scratch to the point where they are professional soldiers or citizens with an understanding of the defence of the country and its people. Basic training in patriotism for citizens takes place through opportunities to serve the nation in the armed forces. If the armed forces possess centres of excellence for military training, the concept of defending the nation will be guaranteed in the hands of citizens.

It is necessary to build up the structural capital of the nation through the military institution as an element in national cohesion. The historical capital gained by Timor-Leste during the process of liberation discloses essential values that provide us with a reason for existing and acting in the world as a free and independent nation. The values that give prestige to the Armed Forces, through their knowledge and experience of serving the country, should be institutionally preserved and cultivated in order to shape the character of soldiers in the future.

It is imperative to define the doctrine and the conventional institutional character reflected in the basic training provided for soldiers through new syllabuses (already mentioned in the previous point concerning education and training).

When the operational requirements of the Armed Forces have been defined in accordance with the system for the fulfilment of missions by the national armed forces, the education and training system for soldiers will be designed.

The Instruction Centres should be strategically located in command sectors and in the respective components of the Forces. All candidates must undergo an integrated basic and elementary training course either on a voluntary basis or as an obligatory part of their service in the Armed Forces. After basic and elementary training, soldiers may be given the opportunity to take part in specialist technical courses, an added qualification which all soldiers should possess. Those who have the opportunity to engage in a military career should attend training courses at the Infantry School, Naval Academy or other specialist training schools as part of the training of specialist military staff, either within the country or abroad.

The Military Academy may be an option for strategic investment in shaping the military officer of the future. The Academic Training Course may be taken within the country, in coordination with other state academic institutions or, for obvious reasons, with recourse to outside support through technical military cooperation agreements.

Leadership, including both tactical-operational and strategic leadership, is another important aspect of training. It prepares higher-ranking military officers to occupy positions of command. All superior officers should follow, as a minimum requirement, a Staff Officer’s course and receive training in
leadership and command to meet the (previously described) challenges for the development of the Armed Forces in Timor-Leste.

It is intended that the missions of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste should include international commitments in the near future, such as deploying a national contingent of the Armed Forces on United Nations missions. The Education and Training Component would be the ideal structure for preparing a task force (at company level) for United Nations missions, in accordance with operational requirements and on the basis of political decisions concerning the readiness of the contingent and the rota established.

51 - BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL PROGRAMMES

A combined analysis of national challenges, regional alliances and global strategies (see Chapter 1) defining the strategic environment for Timor-Leste postulates that Timor-Leste will never be able to survive in isolation as a nation whilst ignoring the phenomenon of interdependence amongst states. This therefore presupposes the urgent need to establish cooperative bilateral and multilateral relations with immediate, close and more distant neighbouring countries, for the purposes of economic development and world security, in addition to ensuring peace and shared stability. The cooperation established through alliances is orientated towards coordinated diplomatic actions which extend to reciprocal trade agreements and shared political interests, both in terms of economic assistance and support in areas of geostrategic interest.

In order to establish a new strategic position for the development of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste, it will be important to establish a single pattern or model for military cooperation and to intensify bilateral cooperation, both within the context of aid and through reciprocal trade agreements.

Once this new strategic position has been established, Timor-Leste will become vulnerable to the interests of third parties. This justifies the need to review the existing models and programmes for military cooperation and to link them to the strategic environment and national interests of Timor-Leste. Bearing in mind the scarcity of financial resources immediately available for use in implementing the objectives defined for planning the Armed Forces in accordance with the Strategic Military Concept (CEM), the state may resort to bilateral agreements to meet development needs for the Armed Forces in accordance with the intended objectives.

Recommendations:

- The Ministry of National Defence should supervise the development of the Armed Forces in accordance with the National Defence Policy that defines the CEDN and governs relations based on bilateral and multilateral agreements within the context of national interests;

- The Ministry of National Defence should coordinate inter-ministerial meetings, specifically with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, in order to pursue a National Defence Policy and ensure a unified approach to the bilateral and multilateral cooperation policies that are established;
• The Ministry of National Defence must submit a plan for development needs within the Armed Forces and establish programmes within the framework of Military Planning for Cooperation;

• The Ministry of National Defence must set aside the premises established in international donor conferences concerning the defence of Timor-Leste.
PART IV - DEVELOPMENT OF THE FORCE
CHAPTER 9

OPTIONS

Force Planning – Military Potential

The Recommended Option

Combined Deployment

Joint Logistics Concept

Forecast Evolution of the Deployment Concept

Operational Requirements and Equipment Needs

Defence and Armed Forces Budget
Military potential forms part of the strategic potential of a nation, as defined within the context of the overall strategy required to realise national objectives. The military potential of Timor-Leste should be orientated in accordance with the dynamics of world geostrategic developments. The Armed Forces should be reoriented and reorganised in accordance with the current authorised number of troops and a rigorous selection process should be instigated, based on appropriate criteria that will allow for an effective reorganisation of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste.

The strategic environment of Timor-Leste and the varied nature of the threats it faces have led to the possibility of increasing the Armed Forces to a total of 3,000 staff within 15 to 20 years. This estimated capacity for the Armed Forces will ensure control of land, sea, air and space borders within the Timor-Leste Permanent Strategic National Interest Area (EEINP).

The proportional distribution of the Armed Forces will be undertaken in accordance with the proposals planned and characterised within the strategic environment of Timor-Leste. Strategically the military potential of Timor-Leste will extend to the following:

- A Land Force constituting 45% of the total force (operational combat units, territorial defence units, an artillery unit and an armoured cavalry unit);
- A Light Naval Fleet constituting 35% of the total force (squadrons of marines and naval fusilier operational units);
- A Support and Service Unit constituting 15% of the total force (CI, D-PM, logistics unit, engineering unit, air support unit);
- A Command Unit constituting 5% (CCS, communications unit (C4IRS) and the CEMGFA strategic reserve units).

In order to achieve the proposed restructuring and redimensioning of the Armed Forces, specific approaches designed to classify and accurately define particular aspects of military planning are required in the following areas: the political and legislative framework, ministerial directives and guiding principles.

However, the Light Infantry Battalions may be reconfigured as Territorial Defence Forces and Mixed Intervention Companies and subsequently, (Land/Sea) Operational Combat Forces. The forces which make up the Land Force units may be assembled in the short to medium term. Parallel to this, priority should be given to reinforcing the development of the naval component into a Light Naval Fleet and creating a naval fusilier detachment in the short term, after a political decision on planning procedures for the CEMGFA force.

Below we present an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the development options for the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste, in relation to its strategic environment.

**Option A** – Completion and execution of PDF – 2005. This involves maintaining the strategic guidelines for the development of the force provided by the King’s College studies. The disadvantage would be to deny our potential for maritime defence and to concentrate our vulnerability by centralising combat forces in light infantry battalions, which does not correspond to the historic
legacy inherited from the Glorious FALINTIL, or the various definitions of the strategic and operational environment.

**Option B** – Combine the approaches already developed in the PDF and considering it a form of military planning for the development of the forces involving a two-year assessment cycle, which implies maintaining the same strategy as **Option A**, avoiding the logistical implications, effective investment costs and additional maintenance necessary for restructuring, redimensioning and reequipping, in addition to strengthening the naval component in accordance with the development proposal submitted, defining and developing the Concept of Integrated Engagement and the Combined Logistics Concept and consolidating them in accordance with the overall and/or national objective.

**Option C** – Combine some approaches already developed in the PDF and consider it a form of planning for the development of the Armed Forces involving a two-year assessment cycle; redefine the military potential, the armed forces system, its nature and organisation; reconfigure the troop numbers and the structure of the operational combat forces on a smaller scale, adapt the structure of the territorial defence force and command sectors, apply the wealth of experience gained prior to 1975 and the valuable experience and knowledge of the FALINTIL at the start of the Indonesian occupation i.e. establish command sectors in accordance with regional administrative territorial divisions and adapt the concept of support bases to accommodate present-day needs; expand and consolidate the naval component into a Light Naval Fleet in accordance with the development proposal submitted; in the medium term, supplement the air support component with a helicopter unit; define and develop the Concept of Integrated Engagement and the Combined Logistics Concept and consolidate them in accordance with the overall and/or national objective contained in the previous development strategy for the forces. The overall objective is to establish permanent contact with the population in order to maintain the capacity to mobilise on a national scale to defend and develop the nation.

**Option D** – In the long term, transform all military units into multipurpose forces with a new concept of engagement assimilated into the integrated development of the nation.

**Option E** – Combine options C and D in the long and medium term.

**53 – RECOMMENDED OPTION – OPTION C**

*(OPTION E considered as a future perspectives for the development of the Armed Forces)*

**Restructuring of the Force** – From a retrospective analysis of the experience of the FALINTIL at the start of the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste when they simultaneously constituted the command sectors and developed the concept of the support base, we consider this conceptual model is still relevant to the future development of the Armed Forces. The objectives are the same, i.e. keeping in permanent contact with the population and maintaining the capacity to mobilise on a national scale to defend the nation.
The combat structure of the light infantry battalions should be redefined and reorganised into small company units within territorial organisations. Operational areas would be decentralised to create greater flexibility and mobility in combat and, in the "cover zone", greater firepower. A section of the light infantry battalion should be converted into a multipurpose force and naval fusilier detachments should gradually be formed to join the Light Naval Fleet. Three command sectors should be established to direct these units, establish contact networks with the civil authorities and provide CIMIC actions and humanitarian aid.

Given the present situation of the Armed Forces with regard to fulfilling the military objectives established within national objectives, it would be more beneficial to the country to maintain Armed Forces operational units based or organised at battalion level, when they are systematically able to act as a deterrent force in preventive actions in situations involving internal conflict, in addition to constituting a element of national cohesion.

The intention of these strategic specifications is to define the military plan for the development of the Armed Forces and achieve full operational use of the forces in accordance with their constitutionally defined missions.

The successful conclusion of the strategy for developing military defence presented here may contribute towards enhancing the rationale and justifications of Timorese decision-makers with regard to the new strategic environment of Timor-Leste and its subsequent integration within the general background of national development.

53.1 Proposed System of National Forces (SFN)

The System for the National Armed Forces and their missions, deployment of troops and preparation schedules may be reoriented in accordance with the current proposal for restructuring and redimensioning the Armed Forces. However, it is necessary to re-evaluate the criteria for selecting the permanent troops that will constitute the pioneer nucleus in the restructuring and redimensioning procedure and some alterations will be required to the operational structure and equipment in accordance with the option defined. The PDFs will continue to feature in future planning for the forces, until the elaboration of the CEDN gives rise to a redefinition of the CEM, in which case these stages may subsequently be readjusted during the consolidation phases.

Financial constraints have led to a systematic rationalisation of the SFN, which will enable specific and essential defence missions to be carried out on national territory, in addition to Timor-Leste EEINP surveillance.

This strategic development option redefines the new SFN in terms of land missions and the deployment of troops in accordance with the existing numbers authorised in the PDF. The reconfiguration of the structure of the force must gradually be orientated towards the various components of the land and sea operational combat forces (FOCT/FOCN) and land and sea defence forces (FDT/MARINHA), the air support unit (CAA), support and service unit (CAS), education and training unit (CFT) and command unit (QG-C).
A total x number of troops, known as the permanent military staff, will form the pioneer nucleus for the forces and will constitute the Armed Forces component. They will be distributed as follows:

1. **The Land Force Component (CFT)**
   a) Operational Combat Land Forces (FOCT) – mechanised infantry units; special forces units; combat support units (combat attack helicopters and armoured assault vehicles)
   b) Land Defence Forces (FDT) – consisting of a mixed unit (operational combat unit; engineering unit; strategic reserve unit (SMO); support and service unit (logistics, communications and medical/health care); artillery unit and armoured cavalry unit.

2. **Light Naval Fleet Component (CFNL)**
   a) Marines unit (ZEE and overseas attack and defence capability; ocean and coastal capability)
   b) Operational Combat Naval Forces (FOCN) – Naval fusilier detachments
   c) Naval Logistic Support Unit
   d) Naval Education and Training Unit
   e) (may eventually include an air-sea helicopter unit)

3. **Air Support Component (CAA)**
   a) Combat attack helicopter unit to support Land Forces
   b) Helicopter unit to support Light Naval Fleet
   c) C-130 for logistics support
   d) Light aircraft (Cesna) for air surveillance
   e) Air control unit

4. **Support and Service Unit (CAS)**
   1). Combined Logistics Unit (FLU)
   2). Engineering Unit (UE)
   3). Transmission and Technology Unit (UTT);

5. **Education and Training Component (CFeT)**
   a) Instruction Centres – Basic and Elementary Training Courses
   b) Infantry School – Staff Training Course (national/overseas)
   c) Military Academy – Academic training Course (national/overseas)
   d) National Contingent for United Nations operations

6. **Command Unit - Combined HQ (QG-C),**
   a) Command and Service Company (CCS)
   b) Military Police Detachment (D-PM)
   c) CEMGFA Strategic Reserve Unit (URE-CEMGFA) – a Special Forces detachment or company of FALINTIL Veterans

53.2 Organisation of the National Forces System (SFN)
In times of peace, the Land Defence Force (FDT) units are composed of mixed intervention companies (CMI), consisting of forces from the above-mentioned units, i.e. an FOCT platoon, two EU platoons, two armoured cavalry units, a mobile medical unit/clinic and a support and service unit (logistics). Troop numbers in the mixed intervention companies will be reinforced if they are required to undertake additional tasks in order to carry out their missions. In addition, troops in the strategic reserves must carry out annual training and exercises, thus increasing the FDT numbers.
In times of crisis or conflict (war), FOCT/FOCN troops will be doubled in the FDT/FDM theatre of operations and those of the strategic reserves increased through a national call-up. FDT units have the capacity to manoeuvre as platoons and to double up as companies, and may be reinforced with support companies from the Resistance Sector or support zones.

By 2010 an operational force defined as a Land Force and Light Naval Fleet must be organised and ready for service, as a priority via the new AF 2007. It should be highly prepared, of a size suitable to respond to the county's needs and ready to be sent abroad as a national contingent in United Nations peace-keeping missions if requested.

53.3 - Implementation

(a) – Concept of Engagement

In order to face new challenges, the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste must have the military capability to respond rapidly and efficiently to orders from superiors regarding military operations requested in accordance with the current Organic Law for the Armed Forces.

Giving priority to the definition of a system of combat forces ranked into territorial companies and observing the overall objective of the country, namely national defence through military defence operations and specific missions to support the civil authorities, this development strategy is intended to organise the combat forces by adapting them to the likely scenarios for rapid engagement and total cover. They may form immediate and rapid reaction forces posted to particular combat zones and attached to an operational area with various and joint capabilities, able to respond to the combined systems of the security forces in order to guarantee an adequate and timely response to the need for military options requested by the political hierarchy.

(b) - Objectives

In the reconfiguration of the combat units of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste, priority has been given to the concepts of mobility and versatility (rapid engagement and total cover). This operational reconfiguration will provide our troops with greater mobility and fighting capability by planning and developing the forces through the creation of small, well-trained units, orientated and equipped in terms of the multiple aspects of deterrence and increased strength. The units are to be constituted in accordance with the previously proposed System for the National Armed Forces. This new form of organisation for the forces will make C4IRS more efficient and will reproduce the living example of the valuable experience of the FALINTIL during its historic struggle for national liberation, whilst also taking into account the current restricted technical military resources which are still being assembled.

53.4 Some considerations

(a) – Dispersal of forces in small units

Although the degree of dispersal must increase in proportion to the size of the enemy attack, some restrictions must be considered, namely:

a) The mission to be fulfilled (general and specific);

b) The command and control capability;

c) The potential of the information system;
d) The possibilities of adapting the logistics system;

e) AO or AR features;

f) The degree of mobility of the forces;

g) The nature and deployment of the enemy forces.

(b) – The composition of small units

In terms of an analysis of the operational environment of Timor-Leste, the Armed Forces must be structurally organised into small units. The following proposal for FOTC organisation is presented for consideration within the planning of the CEMGFA force:

a) The nuclear unit for the forces is the Team or Squadron, composed of 5 soldiers with a firepower of 3 automatic assault rifles (M16/FNC), 1 grenade launcher (M203) and 1 light machine gun (Minimi - M249 SAW);

b) The bipartite structure of 2 teams creates a Section, composed of 11 soldiers with the combined firepower of 2 teams plus 1 additional semi-heavy MAG Machine Gun (M240 – 7.62mm));

c) The tripartite structure of 3 sections forms a Platoon, composed of 33 soldiers + 2 (1 officer and 1 sergeant) with the combined firepower of 3 sections, supported by a combat support platoon division;

d) The Combat Support structure is composed of 1 platoon of 18 soldiers + 2 officers, equipped with 6 personnel transport vehicles and 6 (armoured) assault vehicles or APC M113 supplied with 4 heavy machine guns (M2HB – QCB - .50 cal.) and 2 anti-tank missiles (milan);

e) The Support and Service structure is composed of 1 platoon consisting of a command section + communications and logistics staff (administration, maintenance, drivers);

f) The FOCT Company structure is composed of 3 operational combat platoons, 1 combat support platoon, 1 command section with a total of 150 soldiers + 1 platoon detachment from the Transmissions Unit (communications) and Logistics Unit (30 soldiers);

g) In times of war, the FOCT is transformed into guerrilla groupings. The structure of FOCT companies may easily be converted into tripartite sections. A Squadron is composed of 5 soldiers, each Platoon or Group is formed from 3 squadrons and each Company or Group is formed from 3 groups + commanders. This creates a total of 50 soldiers who form a FOCT guerrilla grouping which has greater mobility and firepower relative to the platoon structure responsible for one area of operations.

(c) – Concentration of forces into battalion units

The combat structure at battalion level does not correspond to the Timor-Leste operational environment, although it provides greater potential for combat manoeuvres and reduces reliance on conventional logistics. The current limitations, arising out of the concentration of the Force are:

a) Inefficient tactical mobility when undertaking missions;
b) Lack of command and control technical and managerial capabilities;
c) Restrictions on establishing permanent information system networks;
d) Inefficient integrated use of available resources in accordance with the characteristics of special operations;
e) Greater vulnerability to enemy attack;
f) Incompatibility with the nature and deployment of probable enemy attacks.

In the medium and long term, a structure may be established at battalion or brigade level when the organisational structures are better consolidated in relation to the needs of the country.

53.5 Disposition of Forces

The deployment of forces within national territory is defined in accordance with the SFN within the CEDN. In terms of military defence, the concept of engagement is orientated towards areas which are considered combat zones, i.e. zones subject to possible direct threats from enemy advances.

Military defence is applied to the combat zone or cover zone. In times of peace or of war, the Armed Forces are orientated towards militarily defined operational areas or areas of responsibility to establish institutional integration and develop intensive proactive measures within the context of the operational environment.

The administrative definition of the national territory of Timor-Leste, designated an archipelago, includes the eastern half of the island of Timor, the Oe-cusse enclave, the island of Ataúro, the Jaco islet (the Batuk/Oe-cusse islet is disputed) and the vast seas to the north and south of Timor-Leste. At present, national territory is defined by 13 administrative districts, 65 sub districts and 497 sucos (villages).

In military terms, national territory must be divided into three military command sectors: East, Central and West, i.e. the eastern sector, the central sector and the western sector. These sectors are geographically distributed by administrative district. The western/central command sector covers the Oe-cusse enclave and the central/eastern command sector covers the island of Ataúro and the Jaco islet. The territorial waters off the south coast of the Timor Gap and the north coast of the Timor-Leste Sea are the sole responsibility of the Light Naval Fleet.

Within the concept of the military defence of Timor-Leste national territory, we should consider the ways in which the enemy can be denied access to particular areas of national interest in order to maintain tactical and strategic objectives.

The maritime and terrestrial (air and space) borders are our areas of responsibility. The terrestrial operational areas established within the eastern sector (covering the northern and southern shores) will be considered Cover and Combat Zones (ZoCo), the central and/or eastern sector a Resistance, Reorganisation and Refuelling Zone (ZoRo) and the eastern sector a Reserve Zone (ZoRes). The western sector covers the Oe-cusse enclave, the central sector covers the island of Ataúro and the eastern sector covers the Jaco islet. The southern and northern expanses of the Timor Sea would be configured as the various zones of responsibility attributed to the Light Naval Fleet. The Oe-cusse
An enclave is considered an intervention zone and the island of Ataúro a permanent surveillance zone, in addition to the expanses of sea to the south (the Timor Gap) and the north (the Ombai/Wetar Straits). We should, however, consider areas of interest and influence as non-engagement zones within all terrestrial and maritime areas constituting national territory.

53.6 Armaments and equipment

Bearing in mind the principle of inter-institutional operations with regard to national security, it is essential to make maximum benefit of the resources that have already been allocated, namely by:

a) Adapting the Land Force into a mechanised infantry unit with the capacity to act in patrols and employ mobile combat tactics, upgrading the firepower (weapons and night fighting capability), providing armoured combat support personnel transport vehicles (various types of APC M113) with snipers and anti-tank missiles;
b) Within the naval component, creating detachments of naval fusiliers provided with the necessary arms and equipment according to modes of operation;
c) Adapting the land companies and naval force detachments to carry out civil/military actions;
d) Promoting technological initiatives in the areas of information technology, telecommunications, sensors, modelling and simulation, with a view to improving C4IRS capability;
e) Emphasising military information operations in the areas of reconnoitring, surveillance and electronic protection, making use, as far as possible, of the multiple aspects of the communications potential within the theatre of operations;
f) Considering the creation of light anti-aircraft artillery (in the short and medium term) and a future long-range defence system (Air Defence).

53.7 Military Intelligence System (SIM)

There is a lack of operational mechanisms within the Armed Forces deployed on land for ongoing information gathering to be directed to the GHQ and subsequently shared between other agencies with the capacity to analyse and define the types and categories of threat.

In developing the SIM, the following should be ensured:

a) Its activities are oriented towards military information and security;
b) Efforts are coherent, compatible and unified and the information is shared amongst institutions;
c) Collaboration and joint operations with the state security services and other systems in neighbouring and allied countries.

53.8 Crisis management

An improved crisis management plan should be drawn up for military bases which guarantees systematic supervision of the development of any crisis situation by providing decision-making support. This plan must comply with the development of a national warning system and develop detailed plans for each measure associated with this system.

In collaboration with the Centre for Crisis and Natural Disaster Planning, plans should be developed for the use of the non-military component in national defence.
Finally, crisis management scenarios should be incorporated into annual national exercises involving all sectors which would be affected in a real-life situation, and also envisaging the participation of allied/neighbouring countries and friends.

53.9 Reinforcement
Within a national context, plans should be established to ensure the capacity to reinforce and defend any point in national territory, with particular emphasis on the Oe-cusse enclave and Ataúro. Integrated C4IRS systems should be created with the sole and imperative capacity to engage forces.

53.10 Logistics support
Maximum benefit should be made of available resources by promoting and achieving scale economies, by prior standardisation of operational and technical requirements and rationalisation of the circuits and procedures involved;

Logistic support for the Armed Forces should be improved, based on the concept of combined logistics with regard to the purchase of consumables and fighting materials and equipment which guarantee not only improved coordination but also better use of scarce state resources;

Within this framework, we should proceed towards a rationalised, combined and coordinated use of services and infrastructures shared by more than one institution, particularly with regard to public health/military services;

Studies should be commissioned on the implementation of an advanced telecommunications infrastructure with integrated strategic and tactical military communications systems.

53.11 Infrastructure
Situation – At present the infrastructure of the Armed Forces (including the actual GHQ) is not worthy of an institution which represents the sovereignty of the independent state of Timor-Leste.

The entire historic period of the Glorious FALINTIL represents the dignity of the Resistance. The cantonment and attempts to disarm the FALINTIL represented a regression in the understanding of the defence of the sovereignty of Timor-Leste and constituted a security dilemma for the UN transitional administration in Timor-Leste. We believe that it was a hard and difficult decision for the UN authorities to create a defence force for Timor-Leste. Even so, the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste were founded through the determination and conviction of the members of the FALINTIL themselves, as part of the historic cycle of accomplishing their mission.

Following studies produced by King’s College, the formation of the Armed Forces began, involving multilateral initiatives. Countries such as Portugal and Australia led the process of forming the Armed Forces. Despite the worst of (unworthy and inhuman) conditions experienced in the Aileu cantonment, fighters from FALINTIL were recruited to form the embryonic Armed Forces. Later, following the offer by the Australian government of the new military base at Metinaro, Timor-Lesteese soldiers were finally provided with accommodation worthy of their status.
With the dramatic growth and successive increase in the number of new recruits versus the limited period of time for reducing the UN military forces, the first batch of troops which constituted the 1st BIL was transferred to Lospalos to occupy the base left by ROKBATT. Metinaro grew constantly due to the numbers of soldiers and the structures designated to complete the PDF, without taking into consideration the limited infrastructures. Consequently, many different types of problems built up in terms of logistics, maintenance, physical space and the structures required to accommodate the Armed Forces.

Framework – However, with strategic operational planning there is the option of redefining the structure of the forces, the resources and the uses of the troops, with the aim of relieving the military institution of some of its enormous costs.

Options:
1. Economies must be made with regard to existing resources and maximum benefit and use must be made of the resources at the disposal of the state of the DRET within an integrated system dedicated to national defence;
2. A planning system must be developed for infrastructures incorporating the needs of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of National Defence.

54 – COMBINED DEPLOYMENT
The integration of human and material resources and structures within the activities and operations of the overall objective, namely:
1) C4IRS;
2) Land and sea patrols (air and space) for reconnoitring and surveillance within the Timor-Leste EEINP;
3) Forces dispersed in small units at company and/or detachment level throughout the operational area (maintaining close links with the population as an enhancement or deterrent factor);
4) Guerrilla warfare, using the experience gained in the past;
5) Manoeuvres Units;
6) Support and Service Units;
7) Surveillance and control of maritime territory under national jurisdiction;
8) Patrolling of territorial waters;
9) Search and rescue operations;
10) Humanitarian aid;
11) Civil/Military cooperation;
12) Joint operations (sharing of resources);
13) Combined operations.

55 – JOINT LOGISTICS CONCEPT
It is important to adopt the integrated concept of sharing existing resources for operational and collective purposes, namely the possibility of establishing joint logistics in order to:
a) Develop and establish a single system for support, services and the management of property
and capital for the entities responsible for national defence and security under the aegis of a
single state entity;
b) Combine the joint use of means and resources for the purposes of administrative and
operational support;
c) Plan the concept of economy of means and resources in managing services and
maintenance;
d) Plan the concept of making maximum benefit of the local economy through direct
consumption of local products and the management and production of foodstuffs.

56 - FORECAST EVOLUTION OF THE DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT

The Employment Concept of the Armed Forces should come from the definition of the Military
Strategic Concept (CEM), which should in turn, come from the National Defence Strategic Concept
(CEDN) itself.

In the scope of the CEDN, guidelines should also be defined for the strategy in the military plan
which, initially, may come to contemplate the following vectors:

a) Interest of the Armed Forces in the defence of the DRTL and in the satisfaction of commitments
which will be made in the scope of regional organisations and the UN;
b) Interest of the Armed Forces as an instrument of Government policy, namely through the
cooperation with multinational Forces in operations to support the upholding of peace and
humanitarian assistance, and also in the participation of military cooperation actions with CPLP
countries so as to reinforce already existing solidarity and friendship ties;
c) The realisation of the National Forces System should take into consideration the need to improve
the operational mobility and flexibility of existing resources, so as to satisfy the needs laid down
by the archipelago characteristics of East-Timor and dispersion of the national territory, as well
as the subsequent characteristics of the inter-territorial space, namely in the scope of
reinforcement and quick intervention at any location with special attention to the Districts by the
border (Bobonaro and Cova Lima) and in the Oe-cusse enclave and the Island of Ataúro.
Therefore, it is necessary to guarantee a minimum capacity to manoeuvre through the Sea and
the employment of small units with amphibious skills to defend the territory and National
interests, as well as provide humanitarian support to populations and support to civil authorities
in emergency or catastrophic situations;
d) The amphibious capacity, which is understood in the geo-strategic context in which East-Timor is
inserted and keeping in mind the evaluation of threats and risks to security and national
interests, does not initially imply a projection of Force. In punctual cases of opposition to the
landing of these units, one should resort to the factor of surprise and dominating techniques of
the environmental factor in the sea-land interface area, namely through the infiltration of special
action groups who are capable of preparing the landing and eventually taking out the opposition
and also to the use of quick, flexible and small sized landing means.

In the present development phase of the Armed Forces, specifically in the restoration and
strengthening process, it is imperative to define an Employment Concept (time of peace and periods
of tension, crisis and war) which, taking into consideration the strategic environment, should
assume that the CEM believes that the occupation of the National territory is unlikely and admits the need to use small detachments with amphibious skills that are based at naval units to carry out the inspection of territorial waters (inspection of vessels carrying out illicit activities and marine interception operations), search and rescue, humanitarian support to populations and the landing of small units aimed at carrying out the actions destined to reach the limited objectives, namely the neutralisation of important sensitive areas. Hence, the CEM should admit and deduce the need of a light Force which is made up of elements who are highly skilled in tactical mobility, which guarantees the possibility of applying a potential combat at an opportune location and moment and whose main advantage comes from the capacity of being able to choose a Battle Field that is more favourable to the movement, which is sustained by its combat potential, be it in offensive or defensive terms with the objective of gaining advantage over the opponent who has a greater mobility or combat potential, through the deployment of the Force. Furthermore, the Force should have its own specificity to carry out operations on the seafront through getting closer to the objective in a discreet manner. This Force should be identified with the marine infantry (Marine) which is made up from the conversion of other infantry units and whose training process will need to include a solid evaluation of operational requirements in light of the Employment Concept and the Specific Missions to be defined in the scope of National Defence legislation.

For a better perception of what has been mentioned above, we briefly present the characterisation of the Naval Marines. The Naval Marines are Special Forces from the Infantry, light, flexible and highly prepared for combat and are used for combat on land while using the sea as an approach vector. Furthermore, they have a highly dissuasive capacity and, being an integral part of the SNF, can make up the Operational Reserve of the GCSAF and give to political power, on its own or in association with similar forces from other countries, a large margin to manoeuvre, in terms of national external policy, in the concentration of interests of the nations. With naval recourses and adequate equipment, using the sea as an immense area to manoeuvre in, the Marine Forces can be used at any point on the seafront as an instrument of naval power according to political, strategic and tactic convenience and with the flexibility of being able to remain in the Objective Area during specifics periods of time depending of the defined level of support.

In light of the determined parameters – Force Employment Concept, available Naval Resources and the appropriate Doctrine – operational employment of Marines who are articulated in forces with structures similar to those in Deployment (80 men) will have to be faced in the future so as to be able to constitute specific Task-Forces, to integrate C42 resources and the indispensable combat support. This formula will allow for the optimisation of the integration with naval resources (small and medium sized). The employment concept of the naval component and the conceptualisation of employment of the Marine units in the maritime area with national interest should be defined in structured documents. Here, we simply present some elements which allow for a more adequate analysis of the Employment concept to be defined. In addition to the usual Marine resources (Assault Boats), their operational employment should be considered in an articulated and integrated manner with the use of more appropriate ASB means (Assault Speed Boats), keeping in mind the characterisation of the south coast.
Under the dependence of the GCSAF, the Naval Marines can be used in a vast number of actions which involve exceptional expertise and bear remarkable risks, both in the support of other units and acting as an independent unit carrying out special operations of a military nature in actions with the aim of providing humanitarian assistance and the security of people against illicit acts of a criminal nature on vessels, platforms or in areas with national maritime jurisdiction. The operations carried out by Marine Deployments normally assume a discreet or covered up form; its protection and recuperation require the use of naval (surface or speed boats) and air resources of different types, while resorting to diving or other techniques to be carried out from helicopters and which involve the skill to:

1. Carry out amphibious raids, deep reconnaissance, destruction of objectives which are done in an isolated manner or within an advanced forces operation (joint or combined character);
2. Carry out special actions with a humanitarian character, or against marine terrorism which mainly involve: Rescuing people or providing urgent humanitarian care on platforms or locations which are difficult to reach or high risk; Intervention actions on platforms, vessels and ships keeping in mind the safety of passengers and crew or the protection of the property against illicit criminal acts.

The performance of the Marine Deployment should be independent from the environment in which the insertion or progression is carried out for the objective and techniques involved, demanding ability, equipment, training and exceptional skill and bearing remarkable risks for the unit. The expected Operations Area for this intervention incorporates the Pacific Ocean and the coastal areas of East-Timor. The operational capacity for combat is maximised through training, preparation and specialised readiness of its elements, weaponry and resources which are provided to the unit. The group of men/resources will be defined in the light of the mission, which will be articulated with the concealed needs and safety for its execution. The resources (previously defined) can be used from a port, vessel or from air means. This flexibility together with is great autonomy and speed allow one to operate in the entire EEZ area with the appropriate integrated support.

The Mixed Intervention Companies should be conventionally organised on location so as to guarantee an effective control of its constituting elements with the necessary fire power, a great flexibility and employment autonomy. Each Mixed Intervention Companies should be organised based on three specialised Squads and a fire support component (Light armoured artillery squadron with anti-air and anti-vehicle weapons). This base organisation should allow for the organisation of other temporary operational organisations in accord with the attributed mission (Deployment of Forces). In the case of Oe-Cusse, the Mixed Intervention Company can be independently used by FOCT or FOCN providing that it has logistic support. In this perspective, it is the smaller scaled manoeuvre which can receive combat and service support by forming an operation component (Task-Force) for complying with a specific mission.

57 - OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND EQUIPMENT NEEDS

Once the Employment Concepts of the main Units have been defined, the Operational Requirements of the Force can also be defined from the characterisation of its Operational Objectives which should be deduced in function of the tasks foreseen in the respective Employment Concepts and other conditioning tactics which are relevant to the operational employment. The Force provides an
organisational flexibility which guarantees an adequate response to the diversity of tasks and foreseeable operations:

1. Tactical mobility which allows the location and penetrations lines of the objective to be selected;
2. Command capacity, control, computers, information, recognition and surveillance (C4IRS);
3. Ability to land in a location which has previously been selected and recognised and which does not have port facilities;
4. Ability to manoeuvre on site so as to guarantee reinforcement and the necessary combat support at a convenient time in offensive and defensive actions;
5. Capacity to support operations on land;
6. Ability to fight against drug trafficking, piracy and maritime terrorism.

The operational requirements will also determine the Doctrine, training and global needs for the purchasing of equipment or re-equipping in the scope of the Forces Planning process which has not yet been defined and should have as its main objective (in the short term) the preparation of a Military Programming Law. It is necessary to define the areas of effort under which re-equipping should occur and this process should necessarily pass through the Operational Objectives of the Force. This will allow for the restructuring of the National Forces system with new operational skills for the different units, as well as enabling them to look at all of the equipment and weaponry needs of the Force, compare them with what they already have and consequently, the identification of re-equipping needs.

58 – DEFENCE AND ARMED FORCES BUDGET

The Defence and Armed Forces Budget have shown a significant growth over the last five years. However, the development indicators of the Armed Forces are presented as less satisfactory due to the inexistence of budget execution and bad management in the development of Armed Forces.

If we evaluate the level of the operational state and the readiness of the Armed Forces, since the creation of the Force until the end of 2005, we can say that they had positive results as the Armed Forces reached approximately 80% of its operational requirements. Having said this, the continuous absence of the legal framework itself and the lack of a retaining strategy of the military in the institutions of the Armed Forces, has significantly reduced the quality of the regular military which is incorporated in the Armed Forces. This institutional deficiency of a structural character has provoked an immediate impact on the development of the force by the quantitative reduction of permanent elements due to constant desertion which currently totals approximately 42% of total permanent elements of the Force.

Among others, factors which originate this institutional deficiency are located in the lack of decision making and in the lack of Defence Budget Planning which should constantly take into consideration the creation of feasibility mechanisms of operational funds to respond to the immediate needs of the Armed Forces in the area of operational readiness, the well-being of the military as a factor for moral support and other incentives.

The factors mentioned above are fundamental for the moulding of the institutional character of the structures which are desired for the strategic development of the Armed Forces. The state of affairs which are currently being felt in the Armed Forced constitutes a serious concern in the development process of the Government. The present moment could also be considered as an opportunity to guide the Armed Forces to a restructuring and resizing process proposed by the GE F2020 in this
Strategic blueprint. To execute the new projects for the development of the forces already identified by the GE F2020, with the objective of complying with the Main Missions which have constitutionally been attributed to the East-Timor Armed Forces, an increase is expected in the budget for the Armed Forces which may be requested once the cost evaluation in the planning of GCSAF Forces is carried out.

Other funds which the Defence sector needs to have in order to carry out Missions of Public Interest should not be laid down in the Defence Budget but should in fact, integrate the budget of other ministries to be transferred to the Armed Forces when the time is right. In other words, the priorities for surveying the resources needed, as well as their employment priorities should not be decided by the entities responsible for Security and Defence, but should in fact be of the authorities who are responsible for the activities in question, in connection with these entities but without harming the execution of specific military skills.

It is worth mentioning that non-military capacities should not be included in the Defence or Armed Forces budget, i.e.: those which are not military responses to threats or devices and similar actions to act in defence of public interest. In other words, non military capacities which political power attributes to the Armed Forces, because it is considered to be economically profitable to do so, using the possibility of carrying out certain useful tasks (even if, for this, resources need to be reinforced) instead of creating structures which are specifically aimed at them. Perhaps maximising the use of the engineering unit of the Armed Forces in jobs of public interest would be a bonus for the prosecution of Government objectives. With this possibility of including the Armed Forces in activities of public interest, the Government would have a greater importance in investing in the Armed Forces to later participate directly in the development of the Nation. A real investment in this engineering unit would give it the capacity to carry out multiple functions and take on various missions, for example: to carry out the maintenance of land communication lines to remote areas of the National territory. A military which is highly qualified in the technical area could take this knowledge to the civil society after the compliance of their military duty. Thus, the participation of the Armed Forces in this and other types of national strategic projects would represent a relevant and useful contribution to national development and it would also bring prestige to the image of the Armed Forces themselves.

With regards to the Joint Logistics Concept in the Armed Forces, we could select a management of inter-ministry planning to use combined funds for the same means, i.e.: the execution of a joint budget that is available for a specific purpose and common objectives. The creation of legal mechanisms and combined management systems for the budget may be necessary so as to be able to combine inter-ministry efforts to allocate special funds to Defence with the perspective of being used by the Armed Forces for National development. These combined funds could be identified as partnership funds for National development, where a partnership on a ministry and even Governmental level could be established. Inter-ministry partnerships could be carried out for activities with engineering, civil protection and natural disaster purposes, military defence strategies, fishing, communication, etc purposes.

In addition to these funds, funds may also be made available for joint maintenance such as: capital for reconstruction or purchasing of resources for the same purpose. For example:
1. Inter-ministry cooperation between Defence and Public Works – constitute a joint package of training and specialised technical preparation, share the use of engineering machinery and create funds for the development of infrastructures in rural areas;

2. Inter-ministry cooperation between Defence and Health – cleaning of district cities; fight against malaria; public healthcare; carry out medical assistance in rural areas according to the mechanism of the Territorial Defence Forces units;

3. Inter-ministry cooperation between Defence and Government Administration – carry out public humanitarian assistance for the regional administration to rural areas according to the mechanism of the Territorial Defence Forces units;

4. Inter-ministry cooperation between Defence and the Interior – natural disaster; use of transportation for a joint administrative movement of PNTL and Armed Forces; joint funds for the maintenance of administrative transportation; uniforms, shoes, combat rations, munitions;

5. Inter-ministry cooperation between Defence, Agriculture and Fishing- construction of the SPN;

6. Inter-ministry cooperation between Defence, Transports and Communication – integrated communication system on an operational tactical level and accessible on a strategic level;

7. Inter-ministry cooperation between Defences in CIMIC – interoperability with other countries, preparation for UN peace missions.
CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The strategic guidelines for the development of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste are based on the definition of the State’s strategic concepts and the fundamental principles of security and national stability, which should systematically converge in the defence of the national interests to achieve the State’s overall objective: Peace and Prosperity.

As with other Democratic States, the State of the RDTL is justified in using the national Armed Forces as a State resource to achieve constitutionally authorised missions. Within the scope of their mandate, the Forces must make themselves subordinate to the democratically elected political power, in terms of war or the defence of national sovereignty, and are deployed under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (a legally constituted political authority). The internal deployment of the Armed Forces may only take place within the constitutional parameters envisaged in current laws.

From a historic and geographic perspective, we have not neglected the past which holds a painful record of military conflicts. Irrespective of the ideological reasons and political and moral condemnation attributable to the strategic wars fought in Timor-Leste, it is the duty of historical leaders and scholars to objectively clarify the strategic factors and circumstances surrounding the motivations, conditions and reasons that expose the vulnerabilities of Timor-Leste when faced by third parties that use elements of dissension and violence to impose their geo-strategic, political and economic interests.

Guidelines for future national development must successfully integrate two interdependent components: the observance of a democratic State and the establishment of national political and ideological equilibrium in the regional and international context. Both require relevance with regard to the conceptual dispositions for defending the national interests within the ambit of global security.

Geographically, the inclusion of Timor-Leste in the challenge of regional and global geo-strategic interest compromises national strategic guidelines, bringing with it constant external interference in the development of the Armed Forces, something which has happened systematically. External interference has been a notable drain on the institutional capital of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL-FDTL). The possible strategic modelling of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste may also represent a unique vulnerability with regard to the geo-strategic interests of third countries.

Politically, this represents a vacillating and economic vulnerability for the future development of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste, which depend on the serious interest of the State of RDTL in putting into perspective and creating a real, sustainable and enduring Nation, with worthy reasons for existing in the world. It is, however, appropriate to emphasise that the tactical innovations or strategies we adopt in the development of the Armed Forces - no matter how respectively exceptional or efficient they are - do not always automatically contribute towards achieving the
State’s objectives. It is imperative to know how to deal with national interests and those of our neighbours.

Strategically, the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste represent the decisive guarantee of the security, sovereignty and independence of RDTL as entrenched in the Constitution. National Defence is, unquestionably, a fundamental pillar for the construction and viability of the Nation.

The analysis of changes in the strategic environment of Timor-Leste linked with the definition of the interest of the existence of the State of RDTL, constitute the fundamental national policies for defining the framework of the Armed Forces in the national and global development dynamic.

Finally, it falls upon the people of Timor-Leste to question and respond to the relevance of Timor-Leste itself within the concept of global development. Will Timor-Leste have the conditions, in the third millennium, to be and remain a sovereign nation without interference from all and sundry? Or, simply stated, does Timor-Leste pledge as an economically unfeasible country to transform itself geo-strategically into a platform or satellite state of third parties and profit from the benefits imposed by third parties and/or benefit from revenue and the collection of taxes? The advantages and disadvantages are relative and disproportionate and further aggravated by symptoms of political and ideological persecution from the past that linger concealed in the vision of some Timor-Leste politicians in conceiving the development of Timor-Leste. Analysing and defining the paths of the future for Timor-Leste is something that the people of country must debate widely and openly among themselves. As a sovereign Nation, what is the value of Timor-Leste in the context of globalisation? How can Timor-Leste engage in the global economic dynamic? In what ways can Timor-Leste participate in and contribute to the development of the world?

In relation to the future of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste, the State of the RDTL must employ special effort and dedication towards the development of the Armed Forces, through the prioritisation of structuring political decisions in relation to the legal framework, conceptual definitions and the concrete manifestation of technical and operational questions of a institutional character for the attainment of the Nation’s overall objectives.

**Structuring Political Decisions and Conceptual Guidelines:**

- Prioritisation of the Defence Sector in planning the Significant Options for National Development with the integrated perspective of continental and maritime base guidelines, specially emphasising the development of the Light Naval Fosse of the Armed Forces;

- Revision of the General State Budget (OGE) for the Defence sector, contemplating the development of the Armed Forces with strategic public investment;

- Engagement of the competent organs of State in the definition of National Defence Policy and of the legislative framework and structural concept of the National Defence and Armed Forces sector. Namely: the National Defence and Armed Forces Law (LDNFA), Military Service Law (LSM), Defence Budget Law (LPM), Strategic Concept of National Defence (CEDN), National Strategic Concept (CEM), Missions of the Armed Forces, National Forces
System and National Forces Mechanism. In addition to carry out a revision of the Organic Law of the F-FDTL in force, it is necessary to define an Organic Law of the Ministry of National Defence. And, to periodically issue Ministerial Directives on Military Defence to enable CEMGFA to update its Force planning;

- It is important that the CEMGFA be appointed on the terms defined by law and given the legal powers to elaborate the Force Planning doctrine for the creation, training and maintenance of the Forces;

- The procedures for Force Planning in the context of reorganising the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste must be supported by a coherent legislative structure, which brings together the new ideas that have been adopted and must aim to confer an prominently operational new dimension, enabling the Armed Forces to achieve a high standard of operational efficiency in the fulfilment of their various duties and responsibilities, both in a national and international context. This Force Planning and the definition of its objectives must be guided by analyses of the missions and current situation of the Armed Forces in an assessment of threats, risks and challenges that are envisaged in the short, medium and long term as well as in the dynamic characterisation of the potentials and vulnerabilities of the Forces, of both the country and its neighbours, referred to in the updated analysis of the strategic and operational environments of Timor-Leste;

- From the perspective of the development of the forces, effective technical and administrative decisions must be taken for the procurement of adequate resources needed by the Armed Forces, according to the operational requirements for the fulfilment of missions;

- Redefining the Specific Missions of the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste from the view of carrying out missions in the public interest, participating in humanitarian and peace missions under the United Nations, and in multilateral interests (ARF and CPLP);

- Implementing structuring strategic decisions to correct omissions that have shaped the institutional character of the Armed Forces and Defence sector, from the recruitment of young men to the phasing out of the oldest members of the Armed Forces.

**Technical and Operational Questions**

- Prioritisation of the development of the Armed Forces according to the strategic environment for defining Timor-Leste’s military potential. Encompassing the volume of the force, nature of the force, type of force, the structure and system of the forces, the missions and mechanism of the forces in conformity with National Defence Policy objectives;

- Establishing an adequate legal mechanism for implementing the Timor-Leste Forces Development Plan within the ambit of the proposal presented in this first strategic manuscript.

- Current Force contingent – the State authority must once again debate and provide new direction for the current authorised contingent versus the reduction and/or increase that the process of restructuring and remodelling the Force may imply;

- Volume of the Force - it is envisaged that the number of regular troops will reach 3,000 in 15 years (2020), taking into account the increased number of reserves available, in the
event conscription is adopted as an option in the military service system of the Timor-Leste Armed Forces;

- **Nature of the Force** – defined in relation to the strategic environment conditions of Timor-Leste, may be redesigned in the following way:
  
  - **Land Forces** – Subdivision of the land forces into two branches: Operational Land Combat Forces (FOCT) and Land Defence Forces (FDT). Both comprise various types of forces: mechanised infantry, special forces, armoured combat support units, aerial combat support units and upgraded firepower. Engineering and mobile health services have been added to the land defence forces, followed by the later addition of light artillery forces. A light structured force added to the echelon of the companies that group or regroup themselves in Combined Response Companies (CMI) to form battle groups;

  - **Light Naval Force** – the current structure of the naval component will be remodelled in phases into two branches, Operational Naval Combat Forces (FOCN – the Naval Marines) and the Naval Force, in addition to the logistics and training and development branches. It is a structure for the assertion and defence of the permanent strategic interests of Timor-Leste that is capable of operating together with neighbouring and allied countries in the context of defence and joint security;

  - Updating the structures of the Armed Forces General Command Headquarters, of Training and Development and other structures that depend on the control of the **Support and Service Component**, in accordance with the proposal presented by GE F2020.

- **Strengthening Institutional Training** to shape military and conventional institutional character. Preparing the structural and legal technical conditions for the phasing out of older members and focusing on training and developing new members of the armed forces;

- Within the context of consolidating the Forces, it is necessary to organise an operational force as a matter of priority, ready to intervene from the new 2007 to 2010 fiscal year, defined as the Land Forces and Light Naval Force and which are characterised by a high level of readiness, adequately sized to the reality of the country and able, if required, to be seconded outside the country in Task Force units for peace and humanitarian missions;

- **Creation of a body with a legal basis – Audit Committee** – a legal body comprised of members of the National Parliament and respective members of the security and defence institutions with the authority to guarantee institutional transparency, specifically in the process of auditing the procurement process for warfare equipment and materials and in monitoring the evident political problems in defence and security institutions;

- **When commissioning Studies on Defence**, the State must maintain the *Think-Tank* method for studying and advising on military defence material, including details for the procurement of warfare equipment and materials recommended for the Armed Forces of Timor-Leste. A national Defence Consultant model would also be advisable;
• In the event Compulsory Military Service is the chosen option, it will be advisable to create a small-scale domestic defence industry, with the aim of producing uniforms and footwear, dry rations, munitions and other military articles and basic necessities for use in training and development;

• National and international suppliers of the Military Defence Industry must possess a safety and quality diploma (company certification diploma), recognised (and/or accredited) by the RDTL Government, as a prerequisite for participation in tenders for warfare equipment.

**Ministry of National Defence**

• The Ministry of National Defence must guide the development of the Force in accordance with the National Defence Policy that defines the CEDN and determines bilateral and multilateral cooperation alliances in the scope of the national interest;

• The Ministry of National Defence must abandon the premises established in international donor conferences on the Defence of Timor-Leste;

• The Ministry of National Defence must coordinate inter-ministerial meetings for the implementation of National Defence Policy, particularly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in order to ensure a single direction for the established policy of bilateral and multilateral cooperation;

• The Ministry of National Defence must present a plan for the necessary development of the Armed Forces and establish programmes within the framework of Military Programming for Cooperation.

**CEMGFA**

• The CEMGFA Force Plan will refer to the study of costs and benefits and the technical details of the operational requirements for the preparation of the Force;

• The CEMGFA must plan for the participation of the Timor-Leste Armed Forces in international commitments through humanitarian and peace Missions under the United Nations;

• The CEMGFA must form workgroups, specifically to prepare the structural adjustment for the Forces Development Plan (PDF); the military budget, the procurement of equipment and arms (combat support units and integrated tactical and strategic communications system); the evaluation of training and development for the new Force plan.
DIAGRAMS - TABLES - GRAPH
PART V - FUTURE CAPABILITY

CHAPTER 11
FORECAST FOR DEFENCE 2020 - 2050
PERSPECTIVE: DEFENCE 2050 - 2075
Guidelines

- Training of strategic leadership of the Armed Forces;
- Modernising the capabilities of the Land Forces and Light Naval Force with new generation technological capability for combat (defence, attack and interoperability);
- Remodelling and developing the Structures of the Land Forces and Light Naval Force to the echelon of Brigade;
- Adopting the position of the military Defence Strategy with offensive and pro-active capability;
- Modernising the Light Naval Force with defence and attack capability in three dimensions;
- Developing an Air Force and Air Defence capability (2020-2050);
- Developing a Space control capability (2050-2075).